Book 8

Next would seem properly to follow a dissertation on Friendship: because, in the first place, it is either itself a virtue or connected with virtue; and next it is a thing most necessary for life, since no one would choose to live without friends though he should have all the other good things in the world: and, in fact, men who are rich or possessed of authority and influence are thought to have special need of friends: for where is the use of such prosperity if there be taken away the doing of kindnesses of which friends are the most usual and most commendable objects? Or how can it be kept or preserved without friends? because the greater it is so much the more slippery and hazardous: in poverty moreover and all other adversities men think friends to be their only refuge.

A discussion of friendship would seem the proper next step. First, friendship is either a virtue itself or connected with virtue. Second, friendship is essential to life. No one would choose to live without friends, even with all the other good things in the world. In fact, people with wealth, authority, or influence are thought to have a special need for friends. For what use is such prosperity without the chance to show kindness? Friends are the most usual recipients of kindness, and showing kindness to friends is most praiseworthy. Or how can prosperity be maintained or protected without friends? For the greater the prosperity, the easier it is to lose and the greater the risks. Moreover, in poverty and all other hardships, people regard friends as their only refuge.

Furthermore, Friendship helps the young to keep from error: the old, in respect of attention and such deficiencies in action as their weakness makes them liable to; and those who are in their prime, in respect of noble deeds (“They two together going,” Homer says, you may remember), because they are thus more able to devise plans and carry them out.

Furthermore, friendship helps the young avoid mistakes. It gives older people care and support with tasks their weakness makes difficult. It also helps people in their prime do noble deeds. (You may remember Homer’s words, “They two together going.”) This is because friends are better able to make plans and carry them out together.

Again, it seems to be implanted in us by Nature: as, for instance, in the parent towards the offspring and the offspring towards the parent (not merely in the human species, but likewise in birds and most animals), and in those of the same tribe towards one another, and specially in men of the same nation; for which reason we commend those men who love their fellows: and one may see in the course of travel how close of kin and how friendly man is to man.

Again, it seems to come naturally to us, as in the affection parents and offspring feel for one another. This affection exists not only in humans, but also in birds and most animals. Members of the same tribe also feel affection for one another, especially people of the same nation. For this reason, we praise people who love their fellow human beings. And when traveling, we can see how closely connected and friendly human beings are to one another.

Furthermore, Friendship seems to be the bond of Social Communities, and legislators seem to be more anxious to secure it than Justice even. I mean, Unanimity is somewhat like to Friendship, and this they certainly aim at and specially drive out faction as being inimical.

Furthermore, friendship seems to hold communities together, and lawmakers seem more eager to secure friendship than even justice. I mean, agreement is somewhat like friendship, and lawmakers certainly aim for agreement. They especially seek to drive out factional conflict because it threatens agreement.

Again, where people are in Friendship Justice is not required;¹ but, on the other hand, though they are just they need Friendship in addition, and that principle which is most truly just is thought to partake of the nature of Friendship.

Again, when people are friends, they do not need justice.¹ But even when people are just, they still need friendship. And the truest form of justice is thought to share the nature of friendship.

Lastly, not only is it a thing necessary but honourable likewise: since we praise those who are fond of friends, and the having numerous friends is thought a matter of credit to a man; some go so far as to hold, that “good man” and “friend” are terms synonymous.

Finally, friendship is not only necessary but also honorable, because we praise people who value their friends. Having many friends is also seen as a credit to a person. Some even hold that “good man” and “friend” mean the same thing.

Yet the disputed points respecting it are not few: some men lay down that it is a kind of resemblance, and that men who are like one another are friends: whence come the common sayings, “Like will to like,” “Birds of a feather,” and so on. Others, on the contrary, say, that all such come under the maxim, “Two of a trade never agree.”²

Yet there are many disagreements about it. Some say it is a kind of similarity, and that people who are alike are friends. This gives rise to common sayings like “Like attracts like,” “Birds of a feather,” and so on. Others, by contrast, say that all such people fit the saying, “Two people in the same trade never agree.”²

Again, some men push their enquiries on these points higher and reason physically: as Euripides, who says,

Again, some men take these questions further and explain them in terms of nature. Euripides, for example, says,

Heraclitus, again, maintains, that “contrariety is expedient, and that the best agreement arises from things differing, and that all things come into being in the way of the principle of antagonism.”

Heraclitus, again, argues that “opposition is beneficial. And the best harmony comes from things that differ. And all things come into being through conflict.”

Empedocles, among others, in direct opposition to these, affirms, that “like aims at like.”

Empedocles and others directly oppose them, stating that “like seeks like.”

These physical questions we will take leave to omit, inasmuch as they are foreign to the present enquiry; and we will examine such as are proper to man and concern moral characters and feelings: as, for instance, “Does Friendship arise among all without distinction, or is it impossible for bad men to be friends?” and, “Is there but one species of Friendship, or several?” for they who ground the opinion that there is but one on the fact that Friendship admits of degrees hold that upon insufficient proof; because things which are different in species admit likewise of degrees (on this point we have spoken before).

We will set aside these questions about nature, since they fall outside our present inquiry. Instead, we will examine questions about human beings, their moral character, and their feelings. For example, “Can Friendship arise among all people without distinction, or is it impossible for bad people to be friends?” And, “Is there only one kind of Friendship, or are there several?” Some argue that there is only one kind because Friendship varies in degree. But that fact is not enough to support their view, because things of different kinds can also vary in degree. (We have discussed this point before.)

Our view will soon be cleared on these points when we have ascertained what is properly the object-matter of Friendship: for it is thought that not everything indiscriminately, but some peculiar matter alone, is the object of this affection; that is to say, what is good, or pleasurable, or useful. Now it would seem that that is useful through which accrues any good or pleasure, and so the objects of Friendship, as absolute Ends, are the good and the pleasurable.

Our view on these points will soon become clearer once we establish what friendship is properly directed toward. For people think this affection is not directed toward everything indiscriminately, but only toward certain things. These are things that are good, pleasant, or useful. Now, something seems to be useful if it brings about some good or pleasure. So the things friendship seeks as ends in themselves are the good and the pleasant.

A question here arises; whether it is good absolutely or that which is good to the individuals, for which men feel Friendship (these two being sometimes distinct): and similarly in respect of the pleasurable. It seems then that each individual feels it towards that which is good to himself, and that abstractedly it is the real good which is the object of Friendship, and to each individual that which is good to each. It comes then to this; that each individual feels Friendship not for what is but for that which conveys to his mind the impression of being good to himself. But this will make no real difference, because that which is truly the object of Friendship will also convey this impression to the mind.

A question arises here. Do people feel Friendship for what is good in itself or for what is good for them personally? The two are sometimes different. The same question applies to what is pleasant. It seems, then, that each person feels Friendship for what is good for them personally. In general, the object of Friendship is what is truly good. For each person, however, the object is what is good for that person. So each person feels Friendship not for what is good for them, but for what seems good for them. But this distinction will make no real difference, because the true object of Friendship will also seem good to them.

There are then three causes from which men feel Friendship: but the term is not applied to the case of fondness for things inanimate because there is no requital of the affection nor desire for the good of those objects: it certainly savours of the ridiculous to say that a man fond of wine wishes well to it: the only sense in which it is true being that he wishes it to be kept safe and sound for his own use and benefit.³ But to the friend they say one should wish all good for his sake. And when men do thus wish good to another (he not reciprocating the feeling), people call them Kindly; because Friendship they describe as being “Kindliness between persons who reciprocate it.” But must they not add that the feeling must be mutually known? for many men are kindly disposed towards those whom they have never seen but whom they conceive to be amiable or useful: and this notion amounts to the same thing as a real feeling between them.

There are, then, three reasons why people feel friendship. But we do not use the term for fondness for lifeless things. Such things cannot return our affection, and we do not wish them well. It is certainly ridiculous to say that someone fond of wine wishes the wine well. This is true only in the sense that he wants the wine preserved for his own use and benefit.³ But people say we should wish a friend every good thing for the friend's own sake. When people wish someone well without having that feeling returned, we call them well-disposed. For people describe friendship as “goodwill between people who return that goodwill.” But must we not add that each person must know of the other's goodwill? For many people feel goodwill toward those they have never seen but believe to be likable or useful. And this belief amounts to the same thing as a real feeling between them.

Well, these are plainly Kindly-disposed towards one another: but how can one call them friends while their mutual feelings are unknown to one another? to complete the idea of Friendship, then, it is requisite that they have kindly feelings towards one another, and wish one another good from one of the aforementioned causes, and that these kindly feelings should be mutually known.

Well, these people clearly feel goodwill toward one another. But how can we call them friends when neither knows how the other feels? Friendship, then, requires mutual goodwill and a wish for each other’s good for one of the reasons mentioned earlier. Each person must also know about the other’s goodwill.

As the motives to Friendship differ in kind so do the respective feelings and Friendships. The species then of Friendship are three, in number equal to the objects of it, since in the line of each there may be “mutual affection mutually known.”

Just as the reasons for friendship differ in kind, so do the corresponding feelings and friendships. There are therefore three kinds of friendship, matching the three kinds of things people seek in friendship. For in each kind, there may be “affection felt by both people and known to both.”

Now they who have Friendship for one another desire one another’s good according to the motive of their Friendship; accordingly they whose motive is utility have no Friendship for one another really, but only in so far as some good arises to them from one another.

Friends wish each other well for the reasons that underlie their friendship. So people whose friendship is based on usefulness are not really friends with each other. They are friends only insofar as each gains some benefit from the other.

And they whose motive is pleasure are in like case: I mean, they have Friendship for men of easy pleasantry, not because they are of a given character but because they are pleasant to themselves. So then they whose motive to Friendship is utility love their friends for what is good to themselves; they whose motive is pleasure do so for what is pleasurable to themselves; that is to say, not in so far as the friend beloved is but in so far as he is useful or pleasurable. These Friendships then are a matter of result: since the object is not beloved in that he is the man he is but in that he furnishes advantage or pleasure as the case may be.

The same is true of people whose motive is pleasure. I mean, they befriend amusing people not because of their character, but because they find their company pleasant. So people whose motive for friendship is usefulness love their friends for the benefit they receive. People whose motive is pleasure love their friends for the pleasure they receive. In other words, they love their friends not for who each friend is, but for being useful or pleasant. These friendships, then, depend on what comes from them. For the friend is loved not for being who he is, but for providing benefit or pleasure.

Such Friendships are of course very liable to dissolution if the parties do not continue alike: I mean, that the others cease to have any Friendship for them when they are no longer pleasurable or useful. Now it is the nature of utility not to be permanent but constantly varying: so, of course, when the motive which made them friends is vanished, the Friendship likewise dissolves; since it existed only relatively to those circumstances.

Such friendships are, of course, very likely to end if the people involved do not stay the same. I mean that people stop feeling friendship for someone who is no longer pleasant or useful to them. Now, usefulness is not permanent by nature but constantly changes. So, of course, when the reason for becoming friends disappears, the friendship ends too, because it depended on those circumstances alone.

Friendship of this kind is thought to exist principally among the old (because men at that time of life pursue not what is pleasurable but what is profitable); and in such, of men in their prime and of the young, as are given to the pursuit of profit. They that are such have no intimate intercourse with one another; for sometimes they are not even pleasurable to one another; nor, in fact, do they desire such intercourse unless their friends are profitable to them, because they are pleasurable only in so far as they have hopes of advantage. With these Friendships is commonly ranked that of hospitality.

This kind of friendship is thought to exist mainly among older people. At that age, people seek what is useful rather than what is pleasant. It is also found among people in their prime and young people who seek personal gain. Such friends do not spend much time together, because sometimes they do not even enjoy each other’s company. In fact, they do not want to spend time together unless their friends are useful to them. They enjoy their friends only insofar as they hope to gain something from them. Friendships based on hospitality are commonly included in this category.

But the Friendship of the young is thought to be based on the motive of pleasure: because they live at the beck and call of passion and generally pursue what is pleasurable to themselves and the object of the present moment: and as their age changes so likewise do their pleasures.

But young people’s friendships are thought to be based on pleasure. This is because young people are ruled by passion and generally pursue what pleases them in the moment. And as they grow older, their pleasures change too.

This is the reason why they form and dissolve Friendships rapidly: since the Friendship changes with the pleasurable object and such pleasure changes quickly.

This is why they form and end friendships quickly. The friendship changes as the source of pleasure changes, and that pleasure changes quickly.

The young are also much given up to Love; this passion being, in great measure, a matter of impulse and based on pleasure: for which cause they conceive Friendships and quickly drop them, changing often in the same day: but these wish for society and intimate intercourse with their friends, since they thus attain the object of their Friendship.

Young people are also very prone to falling in love. This passion is largely driven by impulse and based on pleasure. So they form friendships and quickly abandon them, often changing friends within the same day. But they want companionship and close contact with their friends, because this gives them what they seek from friendship.

That then is perfect Friendship which subsists between those who are good and whose similarity consists in their goodness: for these men wish one another’s good in similar ways; in so far as they are good (and good they are in themselves); and those are specially friends who wish good to their friends for their sakes, because they feel thus towards them on their own account and not as a mere matter of result; so the Friendship between these men continues to subsist so long as they are good; and goodness, we know, has in it a principle of permanence.

Perfect friendship, then, exists between good people who are alike in their goodness. For these people wish each other well in similar ways because they are good, and good in themselves. Those who wish their friends well for their friends’ own sake are friends in the fullest sense. They feel this way because of who their friends are, not merely because of what comes from the friendship. So their friendship lasts as long as they remain good. And goodness, as we know, has a lasting quality.

Moreover, each party is good abstractedly and also relatively to his friend, for all good men are not only abstractedly good but also useful to one another. Such friends are also mutually pleasurable because all good men are so abstractedly, and also relatively to one another, inasmuch as to each individual those actions are pleasurable which correspond to his nature, and all such as are like them. Now when men are good these will be always the same, or at least similar.

Moreover, each friend is good both in himself and in relation to his friend. For all good people are not only good in themselves but also useful to one another. Such friends also give each other pleasure. This is because all good people are pleasant both in themselves and to one another. For each person takes pleasure in actions that suit his nature, and in all similar actions. Now, in good people, these actions will always be the same, or at least similar.

Friendship then under these circumstances is permanent, as we should reasonably expect, since it combines in itself all the requisite qualifications of friends. I mean, that Friendship of whatever kind is based upon good or pleasure (either abstractedly or relatively to the person entertaining the sentiment of Friendship), and results from a similarity of some sort; and to this kind belong all the aforementioned requisites in the parties themselves, because in this the parties are similar, and so on:⁴ moreover, in it there is the abstractedly good and the abstractedly pleasant, and as these are specially the object-matter of Friendship so the feeling and the state of Friendship is found most intense and most excellent in men thus qualified.

Friendship under these circumstances lasts, as we would reasonably expect, because it combines all the qualities that friends need. I mean that every kind of friendship rests on goodness or pleasure. These may be good or pleasant in themselves, or good or pleasant to the person who feels friendship. Friendship also arises from some kind of similarity. In this kind of friendship, the friends themselves have all the qualities mentioned above, because they are similar, and so on.⁴ Moreover, this friendship includes what is good in itself and pleasant in itself. Since goodness and pleasure are the chief objects of friendship, both friendly feeling and friendship itself are strongest and best among people with these qualities.

Rare it is probable Friendships of this kind will be, because men of this kind are rare. Besides, all requisite qualifications being presupposed, there is further required time and intimacy: for, as the proverb says, men cannot know one another “till they have eaten the requisite quantity of salt together;” nor can they in fact admit one another to intimacy, much less be friends, till each has appeared to the other and been proved to be a fit object of Friendship. They who speedily commence an interchange of friendly actions may be said to wish to be friends, but they are not so unless they are also proper objects of Friendship and mutually known to be such: that is to say, a desire for Friendship may arise quickly but not Friendship itself.

Friendships of this kind are likely to be rare because men of this kind are rare. Besides, even when all the necessary qualities are present, time and closeness are also needed. As the proverb says, men cannot know one another “until they have eaten the required amount of salt together.” Nor can they really become close, much less become friends, until each has proved worthy of the other’s friendship. People who quickly begin treating each other as friends may be said to want friendship. But they are not friends unless both are worthy of friendship and each knows the other is worthy. In other words, the desire for friendship may arise quickly, but friendship itself does not.

Well, this Friendship is perfect both in respect of the time and in all other points; and exactly the same and similar results accrue to each party from the other; which ought to be the case between friends.

Well, this friendship is perfect both in how long it lasts and in every other respect. And each friend receives the same or similar benefits from the other, as friends should.

The friendship based upon the pleasurable is, so to say, a copy of this, since the good are sources of pleasure to one another: and that based on utility likewise, the good being also useful to one another. Between men thus connected Friendships are most permanent when the same result accrues to both from one another, pleasure, for instance; and not merely so but from the same source, as in the case of two men of easy pleasantry; and not as it is in that of a lover and the object of his affection, these not deriving their pleasure from the same causes, but the former from seeing the latter and the latter from receiving the attentions of the former: and when the bloom of youth fades the Friendship sometimes ceases also, because then the lover derives no pleasure from seeing and the object of his affection ceases to receive the attentions which were paid before: in many cases, however, people so connected continue friends, if being of similar tempers they have come from custom to like one another’s disposition.

Friendship based on pleasure is, so to speak, a copy of this friendship, since good people give one another pleasure. The same is true of friendship based on usefulness, since good people are also useful to one another. Among people connected in these ways, friendships last longest when both receive the same benefit from each other, such as pleasure. And the pleasure must come from the same source, as with two men who enjoy joking together. This is not the case with a lover and the person he loves. They find pleasure in different things. The lover enjoys seeing his beloved, while the beloved enjoys receiving the lover’s attention. When youthful beauty fades, the friendship sometimes ends too. The lover no longer enjoys seeing his beloved, and the beloved no longer receives the attention once given. In many cases, however, people in such relationships remain friends. This happens if their temperaments are similar and familiarity has led them to like each other’s character.

Where people do not interchange pleasure but profit in matters of Love, the Friendship is both less intense in degree and also less permanent: in fact, they who are friends because of advantage commonly part when the advantage ceases; for, in reality, they never were friends of one another but of the advantage.

When people exchange benefits rather than pleasure in love, their friendship is both less intense and less lasting. In fact, people who are friends because of an advantage usually part when that advantage ends. For they were never really friends with each other, but only with the advantage.

So then it appears that from motives of pleasure or profit bad men may be friends to one another, or good men to bad men or men of neutral character to one of any character whatever: but disinterestedly, for the sake of one another, plainly the good alone can be friends; because bad men have no pleasure even in themselves unless in so far as some advantage arises.

So it seems that bad people may be friends with one another for pleasure or profit. For the same reasons, good people may be friends with bad people. People who are neither good nor bad may also be friends with people of any character for these reasons. But clearly, only good people can be friends for each other’s sake, without seeking personal gain. This is because bad people take no pleasure even in themselves unless some advantage comes from it.

And further, the Friendship of the good is alone superior to calumny; it not being easy for men to believe a third person respecting one whom they have long tried and proved: there is between good men mutual confidence, and the feeling that one’s friend would never have done one wrong, and all other such things as are expected in Friendship really worthy the name; but in the other kinds there is nothing to prevent all such suspicions.

Furthermore, only friendship between good people is safe from slander. People do not easily believe someone else's accusations against a friend whose character they have long tested and trusted. Good people trust each other and feel sure their friends would never have wronged them. Their friendship also has all the other qualities expected of friendship truly worthy of the name. But in other kinds of friendship, nothing prevents any of these suspicions.

I call them Friendships, because since men commonly give the name of friends to those who are connected from motives of profit (which is justified by political language, for alliances between states are thought to be contracted with a view to advantage), and to those who are attached to one another by the motive of pleasure (as children are), we may perhaps also be allowed to call such persons friends, and say there are several species of Friendship; primarily and specially that of the good, in that they are good, and the rest only in the way of resemblance: I mean, people connected otherwise are friends in that way in which there arises to them somewhat good and some mutual resemblance (because, we must remember the pleasurable is good to those who are fond of it).

I call these relationships friendships because people commonly call those connected by mutual benefit friends. Political language supports this usage, since alliances between states are thought to be formed for mutual advantage. People also call those drawn together by pleasure friends, as children are. So perhaps we too may call such people friends and say there are several kinds of friendship. The primary and truest kind is friendship between good people because they are good. The other kinds are friendships only by resemblance. I mean that people connected for other reasons are friends insofar as their relationship brings them something good and some mutual resemblance. For we must remember that pleasure is good to those who enjoy it.

These secondary Friendships, however, do not combine very well; that is to say, the same persons do not become friends by reason of advantage and by reason of the pleasurable, for these matters of result are not often combined. And Friendship having been divided into these kinds, bad men will be friends by reason of pleasure or profit, this being their point of resemblance; while the good are friends for one another’s sake, that is, in so far as they are good.

These secondary kinds of friendship, however, do not combine very well. In other words, the same people do not become friends for both benefit and pleasure. This is because these benefits of friendship do not often occur together. With friendship divided into these kinds, bad people will be friends for pleasure or profit. Their similarity lies in seeking pleasure or profit. Good people, by contrast, are friends for each other’s sake, insofar as they are good.

These last may be termed abstractedly and simply friends, the former as a matter of result and termed friends from their resemblance to these last.

The latter may be called friends in the plain, unqualified sense. The former are friends incidentally, and are called friends because they resemble the latter.

Further; just as in respect of the different virtues some men are termed good in respect of a certain inward state, others in respect of acts of working, so is it in respect of Friendship: I mean, they who live together take pleasure in, and impart good to, one another: but they who are asleep or are locally separated do not perform acts, but only are in such a state as to act in a friendly way if they acted at all: distance has in itself no direct effect upon Friendship, but only prevents the acting it out: yet, if the absence be protracted, it is thought to cause a forgetfulness even of the Friendship: and hence it has been said, “many and many a Friendship doth want of intercourse destroy.”

Furthermore, with the different virtues, some people are called good because of their inner disposition, others because of their actions. The same is true of friendship. Friends who live together enjoy each other’s company and do good for one another. But friends who are asleep or far apart do not act on their friendship. They simply remain disposed to act as friends if they were to act at all. Distance itself does not directly affect friendship, but only prevents friends from putting their friendship into practice. Yet a long absence is thought to make people forget even their friendship. Hence the saying, “Lack of contact destroys many a friendship.”

Accordingly, neither the old nor the morose appear to be calculated for Friendship, because the pleasurableness in them is small, and no one can spend his days in company with that which is positively painful or even not pleasurable; since to avoid the painful and aim at the pleasurable is one of the most obvious tendencies of human nature. They who get on with one another very fairly, but are not in habits of intimacy, are rather like people having kindly feelings towards one another than friends; nothing being so characteristic of friends as the living with one another, because the necessitous desire assistance, and the happy companionship, they being the last persons in the world for solitary existence: but people cannot spend their time together unless they are mutually pleasurable and take pleasure in the same objects, a quality which is thought to appertain to the Friendship of companionship.

Accordingly, neither old people nor gloomy people seem well suited to friendship, because their company offers little pleasure. No one can spend their days with someone whose company is painful or even simply unpleasant. For avoiding pain and seeking pleasure are among the most obvious tendencies of human nature. People who get along fairly well but are not close are more like well-wishers than friends. Nothing is more characteristic of friends than sharing their lives. For people in need want help, while happy people want companionship. Happy people are the last people who would want to live alone. But people cannot spend their time together unless they enjoy each other’s company and take pleasure in the same things. These qualities are thought to belong to friendship based on companionship.

The connection then subsisting between the good is Friendship par excellence, as has already been frequently said: since that which is abstractedly good or pleasant is thought to be an object of Friendship and choice-worthy, and to each individual whatever is such to him; and the good man to the good man for both these reasons.

The bond between good people, then, is Friendship in the fullest sense, as has often been said already. For what is good or pleasant in itself is considered worthy of friendship and choice. Each person also considers whatever is good or pleasant to them worthy of friendship and choice. And a good person is both good and pleasant to another good person.

(Now the entertaining the sentiment is like a feeling, but Friendship itself like a state: because the former may have for its object even things inanimate, but requital of Friendship is attended with moral choice which proceeds from a moral state: and again, men wish good to the objects of their Friendship for their sakes, not in the way of a mere feeling but of moral state.)

(Affection is like a feeling, but friendship itself is like a settled state of character. This is because affection may be directed even toward lifeless things. But returning friendship involves a moral choice, and moral choice comes from a settled state of character. Also, people wish their friends well for their friends’ own sake. They do so not merely out of feeling, but from a settled state of character.)

And the good, in loving their friend, love their own good (inasmuch as the good man, when brought into that relation, becomes a good to him with whom he is so connected), so that either party loves his own good, and repays his friend equally both in wishing well and in the pleasurable: for equality is said to be a tie of Friendship. Well, these points belong most to the Friendship between good men.

In loving their friends, good people also love their own good. This is because a good person becomes a source of good to someone who becomes his friend. So each friend loves his own good and gives equally in return, both in goodwill and in pleasure. For equality is said to be a bond of friendship. These qualities belong most of all to friendship between good people.

But between morose or elderly men Friendship is less apt to arise, because they are somewhat awkward-tempered, and take less pleasure in intercourse and society; these being thought to be specially friendly and productive of Friendship: and so young men become friends quickly, old men not so (because people do not become friends with any, unless they take pleasure in them); and in like manner neither do the morose. Yet men of these classes entertain kindly feelings towards one another: they wish good to one another and render mutual assistance in respect of their needs, but they are not quite friends, because they neither spend their time together nor take pleasure in one another, which circumstances are thought specially to belong to Friendship.

But friendship is less likely to develop between gloomy or elderly men. Their temperaments are somewhat difficult, and they take less pleasure in conversation and company. Enjoying conversation and company is thought especially characteristic of friendship and likely to foster it. So young men become friends quickly, but old men do not, because people become friends only with those they enjoy. The same is true of gloomy men. Yet men in these groups feel goodwill toward one another. They wish one another well and help meet one another’s needs. But they are not quite friends, because they neither spend time together nor enjoy one another’s company. Spending time together and enjoying one another’s company are thought especially characteristic of friendship.

To be a friend to many people, in the way of the perfect Friendship, is not possible; just as you cannot be in love with many at once: it is, so to speak, a state of excess which naturally has but one object; and besides, it is not an easy thing for one man to be very much pleased with many people at the same time, nor perhaps to find many really good. Again, a man needs experience, and to be in habits of close intimacy, which is very difficult.

You cannot have perfect friendship with many people, just as you cannot be in love with many people at once. Such friendship is, so to speak, an extreme feeling that naturally focuses on just one person. Besides, it is not easy to enjoy many people's company very much at the same time. Nor is it perhaps easy to find many truly good people. Again, you need experience with people and regular, close contact with them, and that is very difficult.

But it is possible to please many on the score of advantage and pleasure: because there are many men of the kind, and the services may be rendered in a very short time.

But it is possible to please many people by offering benefits and pleasure. This is because many people are receptive to these, and the services can be provided very quickly.

Of the two imperfect kinds that which most resembles the perfect is the Friendship based upon pleasure, in which the same results accrue from both and they take pleasure in one another or in the same objects; such as are the Friendships of the young, because a generous spirit is most found in these. The Friendship because of advantage is the connecting link of shopkeepers.

Of the two imperfect kinds of friendship, friendship based on pleasure comes closest to perfect friendship. Both friends gain the same things and enjoy each other’s company or the same things. The friendships of young people are like this, because a generous spirit is most often found in these friendships. Friendship based on advantage is what connects shopkeepers.

Then again, the very happy have no need of persons who are profitable, but of pleasant ones they have because they wish to have people to live intimately with; and what is painful they bear for a short time indeed, but continuously no one could support it, nay, not even the Chief Good itself, if it were painful to him individually: and so they look out for pleasant friends: perhaps they ought to require such to be good also; and good moreover to themselves individually, because then they will have all the proper requisites of Friendship.

Again, very happy people have no need of useful friends, but they do need pleasant ones. This is because they want people to share their lives closely with. People can bear pain for a short time, but no one could bear it continually. No one could bear even the Chief Good itself if it caused them pain. So very happy people seek pleasant friends. Perhaps they should require these friends to be good as well, and also good to them personally. Then their friendships will have all the qualities that Friendship requires.

Men in power are often seen to make use of several distinct friends: for some are useful to them and others pleasurable, but the two are not often united: because they do not, in fact, seek such as shall combine pleasantness and goodness, nor such as shall be useful for honourable purposes: but with a view to attain what is pleasant they look out for men of easy-pleasantry; and again, for men who are clever at executing any business put into their hands: and these qualifications are not commonly found united in the same man.

Men in power often rely on different friends, because some are useful and others are pleasant company. But the two qualities are not often found together. This is because powerful men do not actually seek friends who combine pleasantness with goodness. Nor do they seek friends who will be useful for honorable purposes. Instead, for pleasure, they seek men who are quick with a joke. For practical needs, they seek men who are skilled at carrying out whatever task they are given. These qualities are not commonly found in the same man.

It has been already stated that the good man unites the qualities of pleasantness and usefulness: but then such a one will not be a friend to a superior unless he be also his superior in goodness: for if this be not the case, he cannot, being surpassed in one point, make things equal by a proportionate degree of Friendship.⁵ And characters who unite superiority of station and goodness are not common.

As already stated, a good man is both pleasant and useful. But he will not be friends with someone of higher rank unless he surpasses that person in goodness. Otherwise, being inferior in rank, he cannot balance the relationship through a proportionate degree of friendship.⁵ And people who combine high rank with superior goodness are uncommon.

Now all the kinds of Friendship which have been already mentioned exist in a state of equality, inasmuch as either the same results accrue to both and they wish the same things to one another, or else they barter one thing against another; pleasure, for instance, against profit: it has been said already that Friendships of this latter kind are less intense in degree and less permanent.

All the kinds of friendship already mentioned are based on equality. Either both friends receive the same benefits and wish the same things for each other, or they exchange different benefits. For example, one may offer pleasure in return for profit. As already noted, friendships based on exchanging different benefits are less intense and less lasting.

And it is their resemblance or dissimilarity to the same thing which makes them to be thought to be and not to be Friendships: they show like Friendships in right of their likeness to that which is based on virtue (the one kind having the pleasurable, the other the profitable, both of which belong also to the other); and again, they do not show like Friendships by reason of their unlikeness to that true kind; which unlikeness consists herein, that while that is above calumny and so permanent these quickly change and differ in many other points.

These relationships are considered friendships or not because of their similarities to, or differences from, friendship based on virtue. They seem like friendships because they resemble friendship based on virtue. One kind offers pleasure, the other usefulness, and friendship based on virtue offers both. Yet these relationships also seem unlike friendships because they differ from true friendship. Friendship based on virtue is safe from slander and therefore lasting. These other relationships, however, change quickly and differ from true friendship in many other ways.

But there is another form of Friendship, that, namely, in which the one party is superior to the other; as between father and son, elder and younger, husband and wife, ruler and ruled. These also differ one from another: I mean, the Friendship between parents and children is not the same as between ruler and the ruled, nor has the father the same towards the son as the son towards the father, nor the husband towards the wife as she towards him; because the work, and therefore the excellence, of each of these is different, and different therefore are the causes of their feeling Friendship; distinct and different therefore are their feelings and states of Friendship.

But there is another kind of friendship, in which one person is superior to the other. Examples include father and son, older and younger people, husband and wife, and ruler and subject. These friendships also differ from one another. Friendship between parents and children is not the same as friendship between ruler and subject. Nor is a father's friendship toward his son the same as a son's friendship toward his father. Nor is a husband's friendship toward his wife the same as hers toward him. This is because each person's role is different, and so is the excellence associated with that role. The reasons for their friendship therefore differ. So their feelings and the nature of their friendships are also distinct and different.

And the same results do not accrue to each from the other, nor in fact ought they to be looked for: but, when children render to their parents what they ought to the authors of their being, and parents to their sons what they ought to their offspring, the Friendship between such parties will be permanent and equitable.

And each receives different benefits from the other, nor should they expect the same benefits. But children must give their parents what they owe those who gave them life. Parents, in turn, must give their sons what they owe their offspring. When both do so, their friendship will be lasting and fair.

Further; the feeling of Friendship should be in a due proportion in all Friendships which are between superior and inferior; I mean, the better man, or the more profitable, and so forth, should be the object of a stronger feeling than he himself entertains, because when the feeling of Friendship comes to be after a certain rate then equality in a certain sense is produced, which is thought to be a requisite in Friendship.

Furthermore, in all friendships between a superior and an inferior, affection should be proportionate. I mean that the better man, or the one who provides more benefit, and so on, should receive more affection than he gives. This is because proportionate affection creates a kind of equality, and equality is considered necessary for friendship.

(It must be remembered, however, that the equal is not in the same case as regards Justice and Friendship: for in strict Justice the exactly proportioned equal ranks first, and the actual numerically equal ranks second, while in Friendship this is exactly reversed.)

(However, remember that equality works differently in Justice and Friendship. In strict Justice, exact proportional equality comes first, and numerical equality comes second. In Friendship, the order is exactly reversed.)

And that equality is thus requisite is plainly shown by the occurrence of a great difference of goodness or badness, or prosperity, or something else: for in this case, people are not any longer friends, nay they do not even feel that they ought to be. The clearest illustration is perhaps the case of the gods, because they are most superior in all good things. It is obvious too, in the case of kings, for they who are greatly their inferiors do not feel entitled to be friends to them; nor do people very insignificant to be friends to those of very high excellence or wisdom. Of course, in such cases it is out of the question to attempt to define up to what point they may continue friends: for you may remove many points of agreement and the Friendship last nevertheless; but when one of the parties is very far separated (as a god from men), it cannot continue any longer.

The need for equality becomes clear when people differ greatly in goodness, badness, prosperity, or something else. In such cases, people are no longer friends and do not even feel they ought to be. Perhaps the clearest example is the gods, because they are far superior in all good things. The same is obvious with kings. People far below kings do not feel entitled to be their friends. Nor do very insignificant people feel entitled to be friends with people of outstanding excellence or wisdom. Of course, in such cases, we cannot define exactly how great a difference a friendship can survive. People may lose many things they have in common, yet their friendship may still last. But when one friend is very far above the other (as a god is above humans), the friendship cannot continue.

This has given room for a doubt, whether friends do really wish to their friends the very highest goods, as that they may be gods: because, in case the wish were accomplished, they would no longer have them for friends, nor in fact would they have the good things they had, because friends are good things. If then it has been rightly said that a friend wishes to his friend good things for that friend’s sake, it must be understood that he is to remain such as he now is: that is to say, he will wish the greatest good to him of which as man he is capable: yet perhaps not all, because each man desires good for himself most of all.

This raises a doubt about whether friends really wish their friends the very greatest goods, such as becoming gods. For if that wish came true, they would no longer have those friends. Nor would they still have the good things they once had, because friends are good things. Suppose, then, we are right to say that a friend wishes good things for another for that friend’s own sake. We must understand this wish as depending on the friend remaining as he now is. In other words, someone will wish his friend the greatest good his friend can have as a human being. Yet perhaps he will not wish his friend every good, because each person desires good for himself most of all.

It is thought that desire for honour makes the mass of men wish rather to be the objects of the feeling of Friendship than to entertain it themselves (and for this reason they are fond of flatterers, a flatterer being a friend inferior or at least pretending to be such and rather to entertain towards another the feeling of Friendship than to be himself the object of it), since the former is thought to be nearly the same as being honoured, which the mass of men desire. And yet men seem to choose honour, not for its own sake, but incidentally:⁶ I mean, the common run of men delight to be honoured by those in power because of the hope it raises; that is they think they shall get from them anything they may happen to be in want of, so they delight in honour as an earnest of future benefit. They again who grasp at honour at the hands of the good and those who are really acquainted with their merits desire to confirm their own opinion about themselves: so they take pleasure in the conviction that they are good, which is based on the sentence of those who assert it. But in being the objects of Friendship men delight for its own sake, and so this may be judged to be higher than being honoured and Friendship to be in itself choice-worthy. Friendship, moreover, is thought to consist in feeling, rather than being the object of, the sentiment of Friendship, which is proved by the delight mothers have in the feeling: some there are who give their children to be adopted and brought up by others, and knowing them bear this feeling towards them never seeking to have it returned, if both are not possible; but seeming to be content with seeing them well off and bearing this feeling themselves towards them, even though they, by reason of ignorance, never render to them any filial regard or love.

The desire for honour is thought to make most people prefer being loved to loving others. For this reason, they are fond of flatterers. A flatterer is an inferior friend, or at least pretends to be one, and offers love rather than receiving it. Being loved is thought to be much like being honoured, which most people desire. Yet people seem to choose honour not for its own sake, but for what comes with it:⁶ Most people enjoy being honoured by those in power because of the hopes such honour raises. They think those in power will give them whatever they may need. So they enjoy honour as a promise of future benefits. Others seek honour from good people who truly know their merits, because they want to confirm their opinion of themselves. They enjoy the conviction that they are good, based on the judgment of those who say so. But people enjoy being loved for its own sake. So being loved may be judged better than being honoured, and Friendship worth choosing for itself. Moreover, Friendship is thought to consist more in loving than in being loved. The pleasure mothers take in loving their children proves this. Some mothers give their children to others to adopt and raise. These mothers know who their children are and love them. If they cannot both love and be loved, they never seek love in return. Instead, they seem content to see their children doing well and to love them. This remains true even when the children, not knowing their mothers, never show them a child's respect or love.

Since then Friendship stands rather in the entertaining, than in being the object of, the sentiment, and they are praised who are fond of their friends, it seems that entertaining the sentiment is the Excellence of friends; and so, in whomsoever this exists in due proportion these are stable friends and their Friendship is permanent. And in this way may they who are unequal best be friends, because they may thus be made equal.

Friendship, then, consists more in loving than in being loved, and people are praised for loving their friends. So loving seems to be the virtue of friends. Those who love in the right proportion are steady friends, and their friendship lasts. This is also how unequal people may best be friends, because loving in the right proportion may make them equal.

Equality, then, and similarity are a tie to Friendship, and specially the similarity of goodness, because good men, being stable in themselves, are also stable as regards others, and neither ask degrading services nor render them, but, so to say, rather prevent them: for it is the part of the good neither to do wrong themselves nor to allow their friends in so doing.

Equality and similarity, then, hold friendship together, especially similarity in goodness. This is because good men are consistent in themselves and in their dealings with others. They neither ask for degrading services nor perform them, but instead, so to speak, prevent them. For good men neither do wrong themselves nor allow their friends to do wrong.

The bad, on the contrary, have no principle of stability: in fact, they do not even continue like themselves: only they come to be friends for a short time from taking delight in one another’s wickedness. Those connected by motives of profit, or pleasure, hold together somewhat longer: so long, that is to say, as they can give pleasure or profit mutually.

Bad people, by contrast, have no stable principles. In fact, they do not even remain consistent with themselves. They become friends only briefly because they enjoy one another’s wickedness. People brought together by profit or pleasure stay friends somewhat longer. Their friendship lasts as long as they can give each other pleasure or profit.

The Friendship based on motives of profit is thought to be most of all formed out of contrary elements: the poor man, for instance, is thus a friend of the rich, and the ignorant of the man of information; that is to say, a man desiring that of which he is, as it happens, in want, gives something else in exchange for it. To this same class we may refer the lover and beloved, the beautiful and the ill-favoured. For this reason lovers sometimes show in a ridiculous light by claiming to be the objects of as intense a feeling as they themselves entertain: of course if they are equally fit objects of Friendship they are perhaps entitled to claim this, but if they have nothing of the kind it is ridiculous.

Friendship based on profit is thought to arise most often between opposites. A poor man, for example, becomes friends with a rich man, and an ignorant man with a knowledgeable one. In other words, someone who wants something he happens to lack offers something else in exchange. We may put the lover and the beloved, the beautiful and the unattractive, in this same category. For this reason, lovers sometimes look ridiculous when they demand to be loved as intensely as they themselves love. Of course, if they are equally worthy of friendship, they are perhaps entitled to demand equal love. But if they have no such worth, their demand is ridiculous.

Perhaps, moreover, the contrary does not aim at its contrary for its own sake but incidentally: the mean is really what is grasped at; it being good for the dry, for instance, not to become wet but to attain the mean, and so of the hot, etc.

Perhaps, moreover, something seeks its opposite not for the opposite’s own sake, but only incidentally. What it really seeks is the mean. For example, what is good for something dry is not to become wet, but to reach the mean. The same applies to something hot, and so on.

However, let us drop these questions, because they are in fact somewhat foreign to our purpose.

However, let's set these questions aside, because they are in fact somewhat outside our purpose.

It seems too, as was stated at the commencement, that Friendship and Justice have the same object-matter, and subsist between the same persons: I mean that in every Communion there is thought to be some principle of Justice and also some Friendship: men address as friends, for instance, those who are their comrades by sea, or in war, and in like manner also those who are brought into Communion with them in other ways: and the Friendship, because also the Justice, is co-extensive with the Communion, This justifies the common proverb, “the goods of friends are common,” since Friendship rests upon Communion.

As noted at the beginning, friendship and justice also seem to concern the same matters and exist between the same people. In every association, people recognize some principle of justice and also some friendship. For example, men call their companions at sea or in war friends. They do the same with people who share other kinds of association with them. Friendship extends as far as the association does, because justice does too. This supports the common proverb, “the goods of friends are common,” since friendship rests on sharing.

Now brothers and intimate companions have all in common, but other people have their property separate, and some have more in common and others less, because the Friendships likewise differ in degree. So too do the various principles of Justice involved, not being the same between parents and children as between brothers, nor between companions as between fellow-citizens merely, and so on of all the other conceivable Friendships. Different also are the principles of Injustice as regards these different grades, and the acts become intensified by being done to friends; for instance, it is worse to rob your companion than one who is merely a fellow-citizen; to refuse help to a brother than to a stranger; and to strike your father than any one else. So then the Justice naturally increases with the degree of Friendship, as being between the same parties and of equal extent.

Brothers and close companions share everything, but other people keep their property separate. Some share more and others less, because friendships also differ in closeness. The principles of justice involved differ too. Justice between parents and children is not the same as justice between brothers. Nor is justice between companions the same as justice between people who are merely fellow citizens. The same applies to every other kind of friendship. What counts as injustice also differs with these degrees of friendship, and wrongs become worse when committed against friends. For example, robbing your companion is worse than robbing someone who is merely a fellow citizen. Refusing help to a brother is worse than refusing help to a stranger. Striking your father is worse than striking anyone else. So the demands of justice naturally increase with the closeness of friendship. Justice and friendship concern the same people and extend equally far.

All cases of Communion are parts, so to say, of the great Social one, since in them men associate with a view to some advantage and to procure some of those things which are needful for life; and the great Social Communion is thought originally to have been associated and to continue for the sake of some advantage: this being the point at which legislators aim, affirming that to be just which is generally expedient.

All associations are, so to speak, parts of the wider political community. For in these associations, people join together to gain some benefit and secure some of life's necessities. The political community is thought to have formed originally, and to continue, for the sake of some benefit. Legislators aim at this benefit, declaring that whatever serves the common good is just.

All the other cases of Communion aim at advantage in particular points; the crew of a vessel at that which is to result from the voyage which is undertaken with a view to making money, or some such object; comrades in war at that which is to result from the war, grasping either at wealth or victory, or it may be a political position; and those of the same tribe, or Demus, in like manner.

All other forms of association aim at specific benefits. A ship’s crew seeks the benefits of a voyage undertaken to make money or achieve some similar goal. Comrades in war seek the benefits of war, aiming at wealth, victory, or perhaps political position. Members of the same tribe or Demus seek specific benefits in the same way.

Some of them are thought to be formed for pleasure’s sake, those, for instance, of bacchanals or club-fellows, which are with a view to Sacrifice or merely company. But all these seem to be ranged under the great Social one, inasmuch as the aim of this is, not merely the expediency of the moment but, for life and at all times; with a view to which the members of it institute sacrifices and their attendant assemblies, to render honour to the gods and procure for themselves respite from toil combined with pleasure. For it appears that sacrifices and religious assemblies in old times were made as a kind of first-fruits after the ingathering of the crops, because at such seasons they had most leisure.

Some associations are thought to be formed for pleasure, such as groups of bacchanals or fellow club members. These groups meet to offer sacrifices or simply to enjoy one another’s company. But all these associations seem to fall within the larger political community. The political community aims not merely at immediate benefit, but at benefit throughout life and at all times. With this aim, its members establish sacrifices and the gatherings that accompany them. These observances honor the gods and give the members a pleasant break from work. For in ancient times, sacrifices and religious gatherings seem to have been offerings of first fruits after the harvest. This was because people had the most leisure at those times.

So then it appears that all the instances of Communion are parts of the great Social one: and corresponding Friendships will follow upon such Communions.

So it appears that all associations are parts of the larger social community. And each kind of association gives rise to a corresponding kind of friendship.

Of Political Constitutions there are three kinds; and equal in number are the deflections from them, being, so to say, corruptions of them.

There are three kinds of political constitution, and there are just as many departures from them. These departures are, so to speak, corruptions of those constitutions.

The former are Kingship, Aristocracy, and that which recognises the principle of wealth, which it seems appropriate to call Timocracy (I give to it the name of a political constitution because people commonly do so). Of these the best is Monarchy, and Timocracy the worst.

The former are Kingship, Aristocracy, and a form of government based on wealth. It seems appropriate to call the wealth-based form Timocracy. (I call Timocracy a political constitution because people commonly do so.) Of these, Monarchy is the best, and Timocracy is the worst.

From Monarchy the deflection is Despotism; both being Monarchies but widely differing from each other; for the Despot looks to his own advantage, but the King to that of his subjects: for he is in fact no King who is not thoroughly independent and superior to the rest in all good things, and he that is this has no further wants: he will not then have to look to his own advantage but to that of his subjects, for he that is not in such a position is a mere King elected by lot for the nonce.

Monarchy becomes Despotism when it goes wrong. Both are forms of rule by one person, but they differ greatly. The Despot seeks his own advantage, but the King seeks the advantage of his subjects. For no one is truly a King unless he is fully independent and surpasses everyone else in all good things. A man in that position needs nothing more. So he will not need to seek his own advantage, but rather the advantage of his subjects. For anyone not in that position is merely a King chosen by lot for the time being.

But Despotism is on a contrary footing to this Kingship, because the Despot pursues his own good: and in the case of this its inferiority is most evident, and what is worse is contrary to what is best. The Transition to Despotism is made from Kingship, Despotism being a corrupt form of Monarchy, that is to say, the bad King comes to be a Despot.

But despotism is the opposite of this kind of kingship, because the despot pursues his own good. Despotism’s inferiority is especially clear, since the worst is the opposite of the best. Kingship turns into despotism, because despotism is a corrupt form of monarchy. In other words, a bad king becomes a despot.

From Aristocracy to Oligarchy the transition is made by the fault of the Rulers in distributing the public property contrary to right proportion; and giving either all that is good, or the greatest share, to themselves; and the offices to the same persons always, making wealth their idol; thus a few bear rule and they bad men in the place of the best.

Aristocracy turns into oligarchy when rulers distribute public property unfairly, ignoring the proper proportions. They give themselves all the good things, or the largest share. They also keep giving public offices to the same people, making wealth their idol. As a result, a few bad men rule in place of the best.

From Timocracy the transition is to Democracy, they being contiguous: for it is the nature of Timocracy to be in the hands of a multitude, and all in the same grade of property are equal. Democracy is the least vicious of all, since herein the form of the constitution undergoes least change.

Timocracy shifts into Democracy because the two forms of government are closely related. Timocracy is by nature governed by many people, and all with the same level of property are equal. Democracy is the least flawed of all, since the form of government changes least in this transition.

Well, these are generally the changes to which the various Constitutions are liable, being the least in degree and the easiest to make.

Well, these are generally the changes that the various constitutions are subject to. These changes are the smallest and easiest to make.

Likenesses, and, as it were, models of them, one may find even in Domestic life: for instance, the Communion between a Father and his Sons presents the figure of Kingship, because the children are the Father’s care: and hence Homer names Jupiter Father because Kingship is intended to be a paternal rule. Among the Persians, however, the Father’s rule is Despotic, for they treat their Sons as slaves. (The relation of Master to Slaves is of the nature of Despotism because the point regarded herein is the Master’s interest): this now strikes me to be as it ought, but the Persian custom to be mistaken; because for different persons there should be different rules.

We may find similarities, and something like models of these forms of rule, even in family life. For example, the relationship between a father and his sons resembles kingship, because the children are the father’s responsibility. That is why Homer calls Jupiter Father, because kingship is meant to be a fatherly form of rule. Among the Persians, however, a father’s rule is despotic, because Persian fathers treat their sons as slaves. (The relationship between a master and slaves is a form of despotism because it serves the master’s interests.) Rule over slaves seems to me proper, but the Persian custom seems mistaken, because different people should be ruled differently.

Between Husband and Wife the relation takes the form of Aristocracy, because he rules by right and in such points only as the Husband should, and gives to the Wife all that befits her to have. Where the Husband lords it in everything he changes the relation into an Oligarchy; because he does it contrary to right and not as being the better of the two. In some instances the Wives take the reins of government, being heiresses: here the rule is carried on not in right of goodness but by reason of wealth and power, as it is in Oligarchies.

The relationship between husband and wife takes the form of an aristocracy. This is because the husband rules by right, and only in matters where a husband should rule. He gives his wife all that she should have. When the husband dominates in everything, he turns the relationship into an oligarchy. For he rules unjustly, not because he is the better of the two. In some cases, wives take control because they are heiresses. Here, their rule rests not on goodness but on wealth and power, just as in oligarchies.

Timocracy finds its type in the relation of Brothers: they being equal except as to such differences as age introduces: for which reason, if they are very different in age, the Friendship comes to be no longer a fraternal one: while Democracy is represented specially by families which have no head (all being there equal), or in which the proper head is weak and so every member does that which is right in his own eyes.

Timocracy is reflected in the relationship between brothers. Brothers are equal except for differences arising from age. For this reason, if their ages differ greatly, their friendship is no longer that of brothers. Democracy is reflected especially in families without a head, where all members are equal. It is also reflected in families where the rightful head is weak, so everyone does what seems right to them.

Attendant then on each form of Political Constitution there plainly is Friendship exactly co-extensive with the principle of Justice; that between a King and his Subjects being in the relation of a superiority of benefit, inasmuch as he benefits his subjects; it being assumed that he is a good king and takes care of their welfare as a shepherd tends his flock; whence Homer (to quote him again) calls Agamemnon, “shepherd of the people.” And of this same kind is the Paternal Friendship, only that it exceeds the former in the greatness of the benefits done; because the father is the author of being (which is esteemed the greatest benefit) and of maintenance and education (these things are also, by the way, ascribed to ancestors generally): and by the law of nature the father has the right of rule over his sons, ancestors over their descendants, and the king over his subjects.

Each form of political constitution clearly has a corresponding friendship, with exactly the same scope as justice within that constitution. Friendship between a king and his subjects rests on his greater role in providing benefits, since he benefits his subjects. This assumes that he is a good king who cares for their welfare as a shepherd tends his flock. That is why Homer, to quote him again, calls Agamemnon “shepherd of the people.” Friendship between a father and his children is of the same kind, but the father's benefits are greater. For the father gives life, which is considered the greatest benefit, as well as support and education. These benefits, incidentally, are also credited to ancestors in general. And by natural law, fathers have the right to rule their sons, ancestors their descendants, and kings their subjects.

These friendships are also between superiors and inferiors, for which reason parents are not merely loved but also honoured. The principle of Justice also between these parties is not exactly the same but according to proportiton, because so also is the Friendship.

These friendships also exist between people of higher and lower rank. For this reason, parents are not only loved but also honored. Justice between people of unequal rank is not based on strict equality but on proportion, just as their friendship is.

Now between Husband and Wife there is the same Friendship as in Aristocracy: for the relation is determined by relative excellence, and the better person has the greater good and each has what befits: so too also is the principle of Justice between them.

The friendship between husband and wife is the same as the friendship found in an aristocracy. For their relationship is based on their relative excellence. The better person receives the greater good, and each receives what is fitting. The same principle also governs justice between them.

The Fraternal Friendship is like that of Companions, because brothers are equal and much of an age, and such persons have generally like feelings and like dispositions. Like to this also is the Friendship of a Timocracy, because the citizens are intended to be equal and equitable: rule, therefore, passes from hand to hand, and is distributed on equal terms: so too is the Friendship accordingly.

Friendship between brothers resembles friendship between companions, because brothers are equals and close in age. People like this generally have similar feelings and dispositions. Friendship in a timocracy is also similar, because its citizens are meant to be equal and fair. So rule passes from one person to another and is shared on equal terms. Friendship in a timocracy follows the same pattern.

In the deflections from the constitutional forms, just as the principle of Justice is but small so is the Friendship also: and least of all in the most perverted form: in Despotism there is little or no Friendship. For generally wherever the ruler and the ruled have nothing in common there is no Friendship because there is no Justice; but the case is as between an artisan and his tool, or between soul and body, and master and slave; all these are benefited by those who use them, but towards things inanimate there is neither Friendship nor Justice: nor even towards a horse or an ox, or a slave quâ slave, because there is nothing in common: a slave as such is an animate tool, a tool an inanimate slave. Quâ slave, then, there is no Friendship towards him, only quâ man: for it is thought that there is some principle of Justice between every man, and every other who can share in law and be a party to an agreement; and so somewhat of Friendship, in so far as he is man. So in Despotisms the Friendships and the principle of Justice are inconsiderable in extent, but in Democracies they are most considerable because they who are equal have much in common.

In departures from constitutional forms of government, justice is limited, and so is friendship. Both are most limited in the most corrupt form. In despotism there is little or no friendship. For generally, wherever rulers and subjects have nothing in common, there is no friendship because there is no justice. Instead, their relationship resembles that between a craftsman and his tool, soul and body, or master and slave. All these tools, bodies, and slaves benefit from those who use them. But there is neither friendship nor justice toward lifeless things. Nor is there friendship or justice toward a horse, an ox, or a slave as a slave. This is because they have nothing in common with those who use them. A slave as such is a living tool, and a tool is a lifeless slave. So there is no friendship toward a slave as a slave, but only as a human being. For people think some justice exists between every person and anyone else capable of sharing in law and making agreements. So there is also some friendship toward a slave insofar as he is a human being. Thus, in despotisms, friendship and justice have little scope. But in democracies they have the greatest scope, because equals have much in common.

Now of course all Friendship is based upon Communion, as has been already stated: but one would be inclined to separate off from the rest the Friendship of Kindred, and that of Companions: whereas those of men of the same city, or tribe, or crew, and all such, are more peculiarly, it would seem, based upon Communion, inasmuch as they plainly exist in right of some agreement expressed or implied: among these one may rank also the Friendship of Hospitality,

Of course, all friendship is based on shared life, as already stated. But we might distinguish friendship between relatives and friendship between companions from other kinds. By contrast, friendships among people of the same city, tribe, crew, or similar group seem more specifically based on association. For these friendships clearly exist because of some agreement, whether spoken or understood. Friendship between hosts and guests may also be included among these.

The Friendship of Kindred is likewise of many kinds, and appears in all its varieties to depend on the Parental: parents, I mean, love their children as being a part of themselves, children love their parents as being themselves somewhat derived from them. But parents know their offspring more than these know that they are from the parents, and the source is more closely bound to that which is produced than that which is produced is to that which formed it: of course, whatever is derived from one’s self is proper to that from which it is so derived (as, for instance, a tooth or a hair, or any other thing whatever to him that has it): but the source to it is in no degree proper, or in an inferior degree at least.

Friendship among relatives also takes many forms, and all seem to depend on the bond between parents and children. I mean that parents love their children as parts of themselves. Children love their parents because the children themselves come, in a sense, from their parents. But parents know their children as their own more fully than children know that they come from their parents. And a source is more closely attached to what it produces than the product is to its source. Of course, whatever comes from someone belongs to that person. A tooth, a hair, or anything else a person has belongs to that person in this way. But the source does not belong to its product at all, or at least belongs to it less fully.

Then again the greater length of time comes in: the parents love their offspring from the first moment of their being, but their offspring them only after a lapse of time when they have attained intelligence or instinct. These considerations serve also to show why mothers have greater strength of affection than fathers.

The longer time parents have loved their children also matters. Parents love their children from the first moment of their existence. But children love their parents only later, once the children have developed intelligence or instinct. These considerations also help explain why mothers feel stronger affection than fathers.

Now parents love their children as themselves (since what is derived from themselves becomes a kind of other Self by the fact of separation), but children their parents as being sprung from them. And brothers love one another from being sprung from the same; that is, their sameness with the common stock creates a sameness with one another;⁷ whence come the phrases, “same blood,” “root,” and so on. In fact they are the same, in a sense, even in the separate distinct individuals.

Now parents love their children as they love themselves. (Children come from their parents and become a kind of other self when they become separate individuals.) But children love their parents as the people they came from. And brothers love one another because they come from the same parents. That is, their shared identity with their common family line gives them a shared identity with one another.⁷ This is where phrases like “same blood,” “root,” and so on come from. In fact, brothers are, in a sense, the same, even as separate, distinct individuals.

Then again the being brought up together, and the nearness of age, are a great help towards Friendship, for a man likes one of his own age and persons who are used to one another are companions, which accounts for the resemblance between the Friendship of Brothers and that of Companions.

Also, growing up together and being close in age greatly help friendship. For a man likes someone his own age, and people who are used to one another are companions. This explains why friendship between brothers resembles friendship between companions.

And cousins and all other relatives derive their bond of union from these, that is to say, from their community of origin: and the strength of this bond varies according to their respective distances from the common ancestor.

And cousins and all other relatives are connected through these same bonds, that is, through their shared ancestry. The strength of their bond varies according to how far each is from the common ancestor.

Further: the Friendship felt by children towards parents, and by men towards the gods, is as towards something good and above them; because these have conferred the greatest possible benefits, in that they are the causes of their being and being nourished, and of their having been educated after they were brought into being.

Furthermore, children feel friendship toward their parents, and people toward the gods, as toward beings good and superior to themselves. This is because parents and gods have given them the greatest possible benefits. Parents and gods are responsible for their existence, nourishment, and education after birth.

And Friendship of this kind has also the pleasurable and the profitable more than that between persons unconnected by blood, in proportion as their life is also more shared in common. Then again in the Fraternal Friendship there is all that there is in that of Companions, and more in the good, and generally in those who are alike; in proportion as they are more closely tied and from their very birth have a feeling of affection for one another to begin with, and as they are more like in disposition who spring from the same stock and have grown up together and been educated alike: and besides this they have the greatest opportunities in respect of time for proving one another, and can therefore depend most securely upon the trial.

This kind of friendship also offers more pleasure and benefit than friendship between people unrelated by blood. These advantages grow in proportion to how much of their lives they share. Friendship between siblings, in turn, includes everything found in friendship between companions. It includes more among good siblings and, generally, among those who are alike. This is because siblings are more closely connected and feel affection for one another from birth. They are also more alike in character because they come from the same family and share an upbringing and education. Besides, siblings have the most time to test one another and can therefore rely most confidently on that experience.

Between Husband and Wife there is thought to be Friendship by a law of nature: man being by nature disposed to pair, more than to associate in Communities: in proportion as the family is prior in order of time and more absolutely necessary than the Community. And procreation is more common to him with other animals; all the other animals have Communion thus far, but human creatures cohabit not merely for the sake of procreation but also with a view to life in general:⁸ because in this connection the works are immediately divided, and some belong to the man, others to the woman: thus they help one the other, putting what is peculiar to each into the common stock.

Friendship between husband and wife is thought to be natural. Humans are naturally more inclined to form couples than communities, just as families come before communities and are more essential. And reproduction is something humans share more widely with other animals. All other animals unite for reproduction, but humans live together not merely to reproduce but also to share life generally:⁸ because in this partnership, tasks are divided from the start. Some tasks belong to the man, others to the woman. In this way, husband and wife help each other, each contributing what is distinctively their own to their shared life.

And for these reasons this Friendship is thought to combine the profitable and the pleasurable: it will be also based upon virtue if they are good people; because each has goodness and they may take delight in this quality in each other. Children too are thought to be a tie: accordingly the childless sooner separate, for the children are a good common to both and anything in common is a bond of union.

For these reasons, this friendship is thought to combine usefulness and pleasure. If both people are good, their friendship will also be based on virtue. This is because each person is good, and each may take pleasure in the other's goodness. Children too are thought to strengthen the bond. So couples without children separate sooner, because children are a good shared by both parents. And anything shared creates a bond.

The question how a man is to live with his wife, or (more generally) one friend with another, appears to be no other than this, how it is just that they should: because plainly there is not the same principle of Justice between a friend and friend, as between strangers, or companions, or mere chance fellow-travellers.

How should a man live with his wife, or, more generally, one friend with another? The question seems to be simply what is just in those relationships. For clearly, the same principle of justice does not apply between friends as between strangers, companions, or chance fellow travelers.

There are then, as was stated at the commencement of this book, three kinds of Friendship, and in each there may be friends on a footing of equality and friends in the relation of superior and inferior; we find, I mean, that people who are alike in goodness, become friends, and better with worse, and so also pleasant people; again, because of advantage people are friends, either balancing exactly their mutual profitableness or differing from one another herein. Well then, those who are equal should in right of this equality be equalised also by the degree of their Friendship and the other points, and those who are on a footing of inequality by rendering Friendship in proportion to the superiority of the other party.

As stated at the beginning of this book, there are three kinds of friendship. In each kind, friends may be equals, or one may be superior to the other. I mean that people equally good become friends, as do better people with worse people. The same is true of people who are pleasant. Again, people become friends because of the benefits they gain. Each may benefit the other equally, or they may differ in how much benefit they provide. So friends who are equals should show equal affection and treat each other equally in other respects. Friends who are unequal should show affection in proportion to the other person's superiority.

Fault-finding and blame arises, either solely or most naturally, in Friendship of which utility is the motive: for they who are friends by reason of goodness, are eager to do kindnesses to one another because this is a natural result of goodness and Friendship; and when men are vying with each other for this End there can be no fault-finding nor contention: since no one is annoyed at one who entertains for him the sentiment of Friendship and does kindnesses to him, but if of a refined mind he requites him with kind actions. And suppose that one of the two exceeds the other, yet as he is attaining his object he will not find fault with his friend, for good is the object of each party.

Fault-finding and blame arise only, or at least most naturally, in friendships based on usefulness. For friends whose friendship rests on goodness are eager to treat each other kindly. Such kindness follows naturally from goodness and friendship. And when friends compete to show kindness, there can be no fault-finding or conflict. For no one resents someone who feels friendship toward them and treats them kindly. Instead, a person of good character responds with kind actions. And suppose one friend does more good than the other. Still, since the more generous friend is achieving his aim, he will not find fault with his friend. For each friend aims at what is good.

Neither can there well be quarrels between men who are friends for pleasure’s sake: because supposing them to delight in living together then both attain their desire; or if not a man would be put in a ridiculous light who should find fault with another for not pleasing him, since it is in his power to forbear intercourse with him. But the Friendship because of advantage is very liable to fault-finding; because, as the parties use one another with a view to advantage, the requirements are continually enlarging, and they think they have less than of right belongs to them, and find fault because though justly entitled they do not get as much as they want: while they who do the kindnesses, can never come up to the requirements of those to whom they are being done.

Quarrels are also unlikely between people who are friends for pleasure. If they enjoy spending time together, both get what they want. If not, a man would look ridiculous complaining that his friend does not please him. After all, he can choose not to spend time with that friend. But friendships based on advantage are very prone to complaints. Because each friend uses the other for personal gain, their demands keep growing. Each thinks he receives less than he deserves. Each complains that he does not get as much as he wants, though he is entitled to it. Meanwhile, those doing the favors can never meet the demands of those receiving them.

It seems also, that as the Just is of two kinds, the unwritten and the legal, so Friendship because of advantage is of two kinds, what may be called the Moral, and the Legal: and the most fruitful source of complaints is that parties contract obligations and discharge them not in the same line of Friendship. The Legal is upon specified conditions, either purely tradesmanlike from hand to hand or somewhat more gentlemanly as regards time but still by agreement a quid pro quo.

It also seems that, just as justice has two forms, unwritten and legal, friendship based on advantage has two forms. These may be called moral and legal. The greatest source of complaints is accepting obligations under one form of friendship but fulfilling them under the other. Legal friendship has specific terms. It may be strictly businesslike, with an immediate exchange, or somewhat more gentlemanly, allowing time for payment. But either way, the agreement still requires something in return.

In this Legal kind the obligation is clear and admits of no dispute, the friendly element is the delay in requiring its discharge: and for this reason in some countries no actions can be maintained at Law for the recovery of such debts, it being held that they who have dealt on the footing of credit must be content to abide the issue.

In this legal kind of arrangement, the obligation is clear and beyond dispute. The friendly element lies in allowing extra time for repayment. For this reason, in some countries, no lawsuit can be brought to recover such debts. The view is that people who have extended credit must accept the outcome.

That which may be termed the Moral kind is not upon specified conditions, but a man gives as to his friend and so on: but still he expects to receive an equivalent, or even more, as though he had not given but lent: he also will find fault, because he does not get the obligation discharged in the same way as it was contracted.

What may be called the moral kind has no specified terms. A man gives as he would to a friend, and so on. But he still expects to receive as much or even more in return, as though he had lent, not given. He will also complain because the obligation is not repaid in the same spirit in which it was created.

Now this results from the fact, that all men, or the generality at least, wish what is honourable, but, when tested, choose what is profitable; and the doing kindnesses disinterestedly is honourable while receiving benefits is profitable. In such cases one should, if able, make a return proportionate to the good received, and do so willingly, because one ought not to make a disinterested friend⁹ of a man against his inclination: one should act, I say, as having made a mistake originally in receiving kindness from one from whom one ought not to have received it, he being not a friend nor doing the act disinterestedly; one should therefore discharge one’s self of the obligation as having received a kindness on specified terms: and if able a man would engage to repay the kindness, while if he were unable even the doer of it would not expect it of him: so that if he is able he ought to repay it. But one ought at the first to ascertain from whom one is receiving kindness, and on what understanding, that on that same understanding one may accept it or not.

This happens because all people, or at least most, wish for what is honorable. But when put to the test, they choose what benefits them. Giving help without expecting anything in return is honorable, while receiving help is beneficial. In such cases, you should, if able, willingly repay the kindness in proportion to the benefit received. You should not force someone to be a friend who expects nothing in return⁹. Instead, you should recognize that you made a mistake in accepting kindness from someone you should not have accepted it from. That person was neither a friend nor acting without expecting something in return. You should therefore settle the obligation as though you had accepted the kindness on specific terms. If able, you would agree to repay the kindness. If you were unable, even the person who helped you would not expect repayment. So if you can repay the kindness, you should. But before accepting kindness, you should establish who is offering it and on what terms. Then you can decide whether to accept it on those terms.

A question admitting of dispute is whether one is to measure a kindness by the good done to the receiver of it, and make this the standard by which to requite, or by the kind intention of the doer?

One question is open to debate: should we measure a kindness by how much good it does the recipient? Should we use that benefit to decide how to repay the kindness, or use the giver’s kind intention instead?

For they who have received kindnesses frequently plead in depreciation that they have received from their benefactors such things as were small for them to give, or such as they themselves could have got from others: while the doers of the kindnesses affirm that they gave the best they had, and what could not have been got from others, and under danger, or in such-like straits.

For people who receive kindness often downplay it, saying the gifts cost their benefactors little to give. Or they say they could have received the same things from others. But those who show kindness insist they gave the best they had, and things no one else could have provided. They also say they gave while facing danger or similar difficulties.

May we not say, that as utility is the motive of the Friendship the advantage conferred on the receiver must be the standard? because he it is who requests the kindness and the other serves him in his need on the understanding that he is to get an equivalent: the assistance rendered is then exactly proportionate to the advantage which the receiver has obtained, and he should therefore repay as much as he gained by it, or even more, this being more creditable.

Since usefulness motivates the friendship, may we not say that the benefit to the receiver should set the standard? After all, the receiver asks for the favor. The other person meets his need on the understanding that he will receive something equivalent in return. The help given is therefore worth exactly as much as the benefit the receiver gains. So the receiver should repay as much as he gained, or even more, since repaying more is more honorable.

In Friendships based on goodness, the question, of course, is never raised, but herein the motive of the doer seems to be the proper standard, since virtue and moral character depend principally on motive.

In friendships based on goodness, the question, of course, never comes up. But here, the person's motive for acting seems to be the right standard. This is because virtue and moral character depend mainly on motive.

Quarrels arise also in those Friendships in which the parties are unequal because each party thinks himself entitled to the greater share, and of course, when this happens, the Friendship is broken up.

Quarrels also arise in friendships between unequal partners because each thinks he deserves the greater share. Of course, when both partners think this way, the friendship falls apart.

The man who is better than the other thinks that having the greater share pertains to him of right, for that more is always awarded to the good man: and similarly the man who is more profitable to another than that other to him: “one who is useless,” they say, “ought not to share equally, for it comes to a tax, and not a Friendship, unless the fruits of the Friendship are reaped in proportion to the works done:” their notion being, that as in a money partnership they who contribute more receive more so should it be in Friendship likewise.

The man who is better than another thinks he deserves the larger share, because a good man always receives more. A man who benefits another more than he benefits in return thinks the same. “Someone who contributes nothing,” they say, “should not receive an equal share. Otherwise, Friendship becomes a tax, unless its benefits are shared in proportion to the work done.” Their idea is that Friendship should work like a business partnership, where those who contribute more receive more.

On the other hand, the needy man and the less virtuous advance the opposite claim: they urge that “it is the very business of a good friend to help those who are in need, else what is the use of having a good or powerful friend if one is not to reap the advantage at all?”

On the other hand, the person in need and the less virtuous person make the opposite claim. They argue that “a good friend’s very role is to help those in need. Otherwise, what use is a good or powerful friend if you gain no benefit at all?”

Now each seems to advance a right claim and to be entitled to get more out of the connection than the other, only not more of the same thing: but the superior man should receive more respect, the needy man more profit: respect being the reward of goodness and beneficence, profit being the aid of need.

Now each seems to have a fair claim to receive more from the relationship than the other. But each should receive not more of the same thing: the better man should receive more respect, the needy man more material benefit. Respect is the reward for goodness and generosity, while material benefit helps meet need.

This is plainly the principle acted upon in Political Communities: he receives no honour who gives no good to the common stock: for the property of the Public is given to him who does good to the Public, and honour is the property of the Public; it is not possible both to make money out of the Public and receive honour likewise; because no one will put up with the less in every respect: so to him who suffers loss as regards money they award honour, but money to him who can be paid by gifts: since, as has been stated before, the observing due proportion equalises and preserves Friendship.

Political communities clearly follow this principle: no one receives honour without contributing to the common good. For public resources go to those who benefit the public, and honour is a public resource. No one can both profit from the public and receive honour as well. This is because no one will accept getting less in every respect. So communities award honour to those who lose out financially, but money to those who can be compensated with gifts. For, as stated before, giving each person a proportionate share creates equality and preserves friendship.

Like rules then should be observed in the intercourse of friends who are unequal; and to him who advantages another in respect of money, or goodness, that other should repay honour, making requital according to his power; because Friendship requires what is possible, not what is strictly due, this being not possible in all cases, as in the honours paid to the gods and to parents: no man could ever make the due return in these cases, and so he is thought to be a good man who pays respect according to his ability.

Similar rules should apply to relationships between friends of unequal standing. Someone who benefits from another’s money or goodness should repay that person with honor, according to their ability. For friendship requires what is possible, not what is strictly owed. Giving what is strictly owed is not always possible, as with honoring the gods and parents. No one could ever repay them fully. So a person who shows respect according to their ability is considered good.

For this reason it may be judged never to be allowable for a son to disown his father, whereas a father may his son: because he that owes is bound to pay; now a son can never, by anything he has done, fully requite the benefits first conferred on him by his father, and so is always a debtor. But they to whom anything is owed may cast off their debtors: therefore the father may his son. But at the same time it must perhaps be admitted, that it seems no father ever would sever himself utterly from a son, except in a case of exceeding depravity: because, independently of the natural Friendship, it is like human nature not to put away from one’s self the assistance which a son might render. But to the son, if depraved, assisting his father is a thing to be avoided, or at least one which he will not be very anxious to do; most men being willing enough to receive kindness, but averse to doing it as unprofitable.

For this reason, we may judge that a son must never disown his father, though a father may disown his son. This is because anyone who owes a debt is bound to repay it. A son can never fully repay the benefits his father first gave him, whatever he does. So he always remains in debt. But those who are owed something may release their debtors. Therefore, a father may disown his son. But perhaps we must also admit that no father, it seems, ever would completely cut ties with his son, unless the son were extremely depraved. Quite apart from natural affection, people naturally resist giving up the help a son might provide. But a depraved son sees helping his father as something to avoid, or at least feels little eagerness to help. For most people are willing enough to receive kindness, but reluctant to show kindness because they see no benefit in doing so.

Let thus much suffice on these points.

Let that be enough on these points.