Book 6

Having stated in a former part of this treatise that men should choose the mean instead of either the excess or defect, and that the mean is according to the dictates of Right Reason; we will now proceed to explain this term.

Earlier in this treatise, we said that people should choose the mean rather than either excess or deficiency. We also said that the mean follows the guidance of Right Reason. We will now explain what Right Reason means.

For in all the habits which we have expressly mentioned, as likewise in all the others, there is, so to speak, a mark with his eye fixed on which the man who has Reason tightens or slacks his rope;¹ and there is a certain limit of those mean states which we say are in accordance with Right Reason, and lie between excess on the one hand and defect on the other.

For all the habits we have specifically mentioned, and all the others, there is, so to speak, a target. A man guided by Reason keeps his eye on this target as he tightens or loosens his rope.¹ And there is a definite boundary for the balanced states we describe as consistent with Right Reason. These states lie between excess on one side and deficiency on the other.

Now to speak thus is true enough but conveys no very definite meaning: as, in fact, in all other pursuits requiring attention and diligence on which skill and science are brought to bear; it is quite true of course to say that men are neither to labour nor relax too much or too little, but in moderation, and as Right Reason directs; yet if this were all a man had he would not be greatly the wiser; as, for instance, if in answer to the question, what are proper applications to the body, he were to be told, “Oh! of course, whatever the science of medicine, and in such manner as the physician, directs.”

Speaking this way is true enough, but gives no very clear guidance. The same is true in all other activities requiring care and effort, where skill and knowledge are applied. Of course, people should neither work nor rest too much or too little, but in moderation, as Right Reason directs. Yet if someone were told only this, they would not be much wiser. Suppose, for example, someone asked what treatments were suitable for the body and received this answer: “Oh! Of course, whatever medical science prescribes, applied as the doctor directs.”

And so in respect of the mental states it is requisite not merely that this should be true which has been already stated, but further that it should be expressly laid down what Right Reason is, and what is the definition of it.

So, regarding mental states, what has already been stated must be true. But we must also explain clearly what Right Reason is and how it is defined.

Now in our division of the Excellences of the Soul, we said there were two classes, the Moral and the Intellectual: the former we have already gone through; and we will now proceed to speak of the others, premising a few words respecting the Soul itself. It was stated before, you will remember, that the Soul consists of two parts, the Rational, and Irrational: we must now make a similar division of the Rational.

We divided the virtues of the soul into two kinds: moral and intellectual. We have already discussed the moral virtues, and we will now turn to the intellectual virtues. First, we need to say a few words about the soul itself. As you will remember, we said earlier that the soul has two parts: the rational and the irrational. We must now divide the rational part in a similar way.

Let it be understood then that there are two parts of the Soul possessed of Reason; one whereby we realise those existences whose causes cannot be otherwise than they are, and one whereby we realise those which can be otherwise than they are,² (for there must be, answering to things generically different, generically different parts of the soul naturally adapted to each, since these parts of the soul possess their knowledge in virtue of a certain resemblance and appropriateness in themselves to the objects of which they are percipients);³ and let us name the former, “that which is apt to know,” the latter, “that which is apt to calculate” (because deliberating and calculating are the same, and no one ever deliberates about things which cannot be otherwise than they are: and so the Calculative will be one part of the Rational faculty of the soul).

Let us understand, then, that two parts of the soul have reason. One understands things whose causes cannot be otherwise than they are. The other understands things whose causes can be otherwise than they are.² (For things that differ in kind must have corresponding parts of the soul, also different in kind and naturally suited to each. These parts gain knowledge through a certain resemblance and suitability to the objects they perceive.)³ Let us call the first “the knowing part” and the second “the calculating part.” (For deliberating and calculating are the same, and no one ever deliberates about things that cannot be otherwise. So the calculating part is one part of the soul’s rational faculty.)

We must discover, then, which is the best state of each of these, because that will be the Excellence of each; and this again is relative to the work each has to do.⁴

We must find, then, the best state of each of these, because that state will be its excellence. This excellence, in turn, depends on the work each has to do.⁴

There are in the Soul three functions on which depend moral action and truth; Sense, Intellect, Appetition, whether vague Desire or definite Will. Now of these Sense is the originating cause of no moral action, as is seen from the fact that brutes have Sense but are in no way partakers of moral action.⁵

Moral action and truth depend on three functions of the soul: sense, intellect, and appetite. Appetite includes both vague desire and definite will. Of these, sense does not give rise to any moral action. We can see this because animals have sense but take no part in moral action.⁵

[Intellect and Will are thus connected,] what in the Intellectual operation is Affirmation and Negation that in the Will is Pursuit and Avoidance, And so, since Moral Virtue is a State apt to exercise Moral Choice and Moral Choice is Will consequent on deliberation, the Reason must be true and the Will right, to constitute good Moral Choice, and what the Reason affirms the Will must pursue.⁶

[Intellect and will are thus connected.] Affirmation and denial in thought correspond to pursuit and avoidance in the will. Moral virtue is a disposition to make moral choices, and moral choice is an act of will following deliberation. So, for moral choice to be good, reasoning must be true and the will rightly directed. The will must pursue what reason affirms.⁶

Now this Intellectual operation and this Truth is what bears upon Moral Action; of course truth and falsehood must be the good and the bad of that Intellectual Operation which is purely Speculative, and concerned neither with action nor production, because this is manifestly the work of every Intellectual faculty, while of the faculty which is of a mixed Practical and Intellectual nature, the work is that Truth which, as I have described above, corresponds to the right movement of the Will.

Now this activity of the intellect and this truth concern moral action. Of course, truth and falsehood must be the good and bad of purely theoretical thought. Such thought concerns neither action nor production. This is because finding truth is clearly the work of every intellectual faculty. But the faculty that combines practical and intellectual activity has a different task. Its work is to find truth that agrees with the right movement of the will, as I described above.

Now the starting-point of moral action is Moral Choice, (I mean, what actually sets it in motion, not the final cause,)⁷ and of Moral Choice, Appetition, and Reason directed to a certain result: and thus Moral Choice is neither independent of intellect, i. e. intellectual operation, nor of a certain moral state: for right or wrong action cannot be, independently of operation of the Intellect, and moral character.

Now moral action starts with Moral Choice. (I mean what actually sets the action in motion, not the ultimate purpose of the action.)⁷ Moral Choice, in turn, starts with desire and reasoning directed toward a particular result. So Moral Choice depends both on intellect, meaning intellectual activity, and on a certain moral character. For right or wrong action cannot occur without intellectual activity and moral character.

But operation of the Intellect by itself moves nothing, only when directed to a certain result, i. e. exercised in Moral Action: (I say nothing of its being exercised in production, because this function is originated by the former: for every one who makes makes with a view to somewhat further; and that which is or may be made, is not an End in itself, but only relatively to somewhat else, and belonging to some one:⁸ whereas that which is or may be done is an End in itself, because acting well is an End in itself, and this is the object of the Will,) and so Moral Choice is either⁹ Intellect put in a position of Will-ing, or Appetition subjected to an Intellectual Process. And such a Cause is Man.

But the Intellect alone moves nothing to action. It does so only when directed toward a particular result, that is, when exercised in Moral Action. (I leave aside its role in production, because that role arises from its role in Moral Action. For everyone who makes something does so with a further purpose in view. What is or can be made is not an end in itself. Instead, it serves some further purpose and belongs to someone:⁸ By contrast, what is or can be done is an end in itself. This is because acting well is an end in itself, and acting well is what the Will seeks.) And so Moral Choice is either⁹ Intellect engaged in willing, or desire guided by an intellectual process. And a human being is a cause of this kind.

But nothing which is done and past can be the object of Moral Choice; for instance, no man chooses to have sacked Troy; because, in fact, no one ever deliberates about what is past, but only about that which is future, and which may therefore be influenced, whereas what has been cannot not have been: and so Agathon is right in saying

But nothing already done can be the object of moral choice. For example, no one chooses to have sacked Troy. This is because no one ever deliberates about the past, but only about the future, which can therefore be influenced. By contrast, what has happened cannot be made not to have happened. And so Agathon is right in saying

Thus then Truth is the work of both the Intellectual Parts of the Soul; those states therefore are the Excellences of each in which each will best attain truth.

Truth, then, is the work of both intellectual parts of the soul. So the virtues of each part are the states that best enable each part to reach truth.

Commencing then from the point stated above we will now speak of these Excellences again. Let those faculties whereby the Soul attains truth in Affirmation or Negation, be assumed to be in number five:¹⁰ viz. Art, Knowledge, Practical Wisdom, Science, Intuition: (Supposition and Opinion I do not include, because by these one may go wrong.)

Starting from the point stated above, we will now discuss these excellences again. Let us assume that the soul has five faculties for reaching truth by affirming or denying:¹⁰ Art, Knowledge, Practical Wisdom, Science, and Intuition. (I do not include Supposition and Opinion, because these can lead to error.)

What Knowledge is, is plain from the following of considerations, if one is to speak accurately, instead of being led away by resemblances. For we all conceive that what we strictly speaking know, cannot be otherwise than it is, because as to those things which can be otherwise than they are, we are uncertain whether they are or are not, the moment they cease to be within the sphere of our actual observation.

The following considerations make clear what knowledge is, if we speak precisely rather than let similarities mislead us. For we all believe that what we know, strictly speaking, cannot be otherwise than it is. By contrast, some things can be otherwise than they are. Because these things can change, we become uncertain whether they are or are not as soon as we stop observing them.

So then, whatever comes within the range of Knowledge is by necessity, and therefore eternal, (because all things are so which exist necessarily,) and all eternal things are without beginning, and indestructible.

So, whatever can be known exists necessarily and is therefore eternal (because all things that exist necessarily are eternal). And all eternal things have no beginning and cannot be destroyed.

Again, all Knowledge is thought to be capable of being taught, and what comes within its range capable of being learned. And all teaching is based upon previous knowledge; (a statement you will find in the Analytics also,)¹¹ for there are two ways of teaching, by Syllogism and by Induction. In fact. Induction is the source of universal propositions, and Syllogism reasons from these universals.¹² Syllogism then may reason from principles which cannot be themselves proved Syllogistically: and therefore must by Induction.

Again, all knowledge is thought to be teachable, and everything within its scope is thought to be learnable. All teaching builds on previous knowledge. (You will also find this statement in the Analytics.)¹¹ For there are two ways of teaching: syllogism and induction. In fact, induction is the source of universal propositions, and syllogism reasons from these universals.¹² Syllogism, then, may reason from principles that cannot themselves be proved by syllogism. These principles must therefore be established by induction.

So Knowledge is “a state or mental faculty apt to demonstrate syllogistically,” &c. as in the Analytics:¹³ because a man, strictly and properly speaking, knows, when he establishes his conclusion in a certain way, and the principles are known to him: for if they are not better known to him than the conclusion, such knowledge as he has will be merely accidental.

So Knowledge is “a mental state or ability suited to proving conclusions through syllogisms,” and so on, as in the Analytics:¹³ This is because, strictly speaking, a person knows when he proves his conclusion in a certain way. He must also know the principles. For if he does not know the principles better than the conclusion, his knowledge will be merely accidental.

Let thus much be accepted as a definition of Knowledge.

Let us accept the account above as a definition of Knowledge.

Matter which may exist otherwise than it actually does in any given case (commonly called Contingent) is of two kinds, that which is the object of Making, and that which is the object of Doing; now Making and Doing are two different things (as we show in the exoteric treatise), and so that state of mind, conjoined with Reason, which is apt to Do, is distinct from that also conjoined with Reason, which is apt to Make: and for this reason they are not included one by the other, that is, Doing is not Making, nor Making Doing.¹⁴ Now¹⁵ as Architecture is an Art, and is the same as “a certain state of mind, conjoined with Reason, which is apt to Make,” and as there is no Art which is not such a state, nor any such state which is not an Art, Art, in its strict and proper sense, must be “a state of mind, conjoined with true Reason, apt to Make.”

Things that can be otherwise than they actually are in any given case are commonly called Contingent. They fall into two kinds: objects of Making and objects of Doing. Making and Doing are different, as we show in the treatise for a general audience. So a state of mind guided by Reason and suited to Doing differs from one suited to Making. For this reason, neither includes the other. That is, Doing is not Making, nor is Making Doing.¹⁴ Now¹⁵ Architecture is an Art. It is the same as “a certain state of mind, guided by Reason and suited to Making.” Every Art is such a state of mind, and every such state of mind is an Art. Therefore, Art in its strict and proper sense must be “a state of mind, guided by true Reason and suited to Making.”

Now all Art has to do with production, and contrivance, and seeing how any of those things may be produced which may either be or not be, and the origination of which rests with the maker and not with the thing made.

Now all art involves making things, devising methods, and considering how to produce things that may or may not exist. The source of these things lies in the maker, not in the thing made.

And, so neither things which exist or come into being necessarily, nor things in the way of nature, come under the province of Art, because these are self-originating. And since Making and Doing are distinct, Art must be concerned with the former and not the latter. And in a certain sense Art and Fortune are concerned with the same things, as, Agathon says by the way,

So Art does not deal with things that necessarily exist or come into being, or with things produced by nature. These things originate in themselves. And since Making and Doing are distinct, Art must concern Making, not Doing. And in a certain sense, Art and Fortune deal with the same things, as Agathon remarks in passing,

So Art, as has been stated, is “a certain state of mind, apt to Make, conjoined with true Reason;” its absence, on the contrary, is the same state conjoined with false Reason, and both are employed upon Contingent matter.

So art, as already stated, is “a state of mind suited to making things and guided by sound reasoning.” The absence of art, by contrast, is the same state guided by faulty reasoning. Both deal with things that could be otherwise.

As for Practical Wisdom, we shall ascertain its nature by examining to what kind of persons we in common language ascribe it.¹⁶

To understand Practical Wisdom, we will examine what kinds of people we commonly describe as having practical wisdom.¹⁶

It is thought then to be the property of the Practically Wise man to be able to deliberate well respecting what is good and expedient for himself, not in any definite line,¹⁷ as what is conducive to health or strength, but what to living well. A proof of this is that we call men Wise in this or that, when they calculate well with a view to some good end in a case where there is no definite rule. And so, in a general way of speaking, the man who is good at deliberation will be Practically Wise. Now no man deliberates respecting things which cannot be otherwise than they are, nor such as lie not within the range of his own action: and so, since Knowledge requires strict demonstrative reasoning, of which Contingent matter does not admit (I say Contingent matter, because all matters of deliberation must be Contingent and deliberation cannot take place with respect to things which are Necessarily), Practical Wisdom cannot be Knowledge nor Art; nor the former, because what falls under the province of Doing must be Contingent; not the latter, because Doing and Making are different in kind.

The practically wise man is thought to be able to judge well what is good and beneficial for himself. He considers not just a particular area,¹⁷ such as what promotes health or strength, but what promotes living well overall. As evidence, we call men wise in particular areas when they reason well toward some good end without a definite rule. So, generally speaking, a man who deliberates well will be practically wise. Now no one deliberates about things that cannot be otherwise, or about things beyond his own power to act. Knowledge requires strict logical proof, but contingent matters, meaning matters that could be otherwise, do not allow such proof. I call these matters contingent because all matters for deliberation must be contingent. Deliberation cannot concern things that are necessarily as they are. So practical wisdom cannot be knowledge or art. It cannot be knowledge because matters of action must be contingent. It cannot be art because acting and making are different in kind.

It remains then that it must be “a state of mind true, conjoined with Reason, and apt to Do, having for its object those things which are good or bad for Man:” because of Making something beyond itself is always the object, but cannot be of Doing because the very well-doing is in itself an End.

It follows, then, that it must be “a truthful state of mind, guided by reason and suited to action. Its concern is what is good or bad for human beings.” For making always aims at something beyond itself. But action cannot have such an aim, because acting well is itself an end.

For this reason we think Pericles and men of that stamp to be Practically Wise, because they can see what is good for themselves and for men in general, and we also think those to be such who are skilled in domestic management or civil government. In fact, this is the reason why we call the habit of perfected self-mastery by the name which in Greek it bears, etymologically signifying “that which preserves the Practical Wisdom:” for what it does preserve is the Notion I have mentioned, i.e. of one’s own true interest.¹⁸

For this reason, we consider Pericles and men like him practically wise. They can see what is good for themselves and for people in general. We also consider people skilled in household management or government practically wise. In fact, this explains the Greek name for the settled habit of complete self-mastery. The name’s roots mean “that which preserves practical wisdom:” because self-mastery preserves the understanding I mentioned, namely, of one’s own true interests.¹⁸

For it is not every kind of Notion which the pleasant and the painful corrupt and pervert, as, for instance, that “the three angles of every rectilineal triangle are equal to two right angles,” but only those bearing on moral action.

For pleasure and pain do not distort and corrupt every kind of belief. For example, they do not affect the belief that “the three angles of every triangle add up to two right angles.” They affect only beliefs about moral action.

For the Principles of the matters of moral action are the final cause of them:¹⁹ now to the man who has been corrupted by reason of pleasure or pain the Principle immediately becomes obscured, nor does he see that it is his duty to choose and act in each instance with a view to this final cause and by reason of it: for viciousness has a tendency to destroy the moral Principle: and so Practical Wisdom must be “a state conjoined with reason, true, having human good for its object, and apt to do.”

For the principles guiding moral actions are their final purpose:¹⁹ pleasure or pain can corrupt a person. For someone corrupted in this way, the principle immediately becomes obscured. Such a person no longer sees the duty to choose and act each time with that final purpose in mind. Nor does the person see that this purpose must be the reason for choosing and acting. For vice tends to destroy the moral principle. So Practical Wisdom must be “a state guided by true reasoning, aimed at human good, and capable of action.”

Then again Art admits of degrees of excellence, but Practical Wisdom does not:²⁰ and in Art he who goes wrong purposely is preferable to him who does so unwittingly,²¹ but not so in respect of Practical Wisdom or the other Virtues. It plainly is then an Excellence of a certain kind, and not an Art.

Again, Art allows for degrees of excellence, but Practical Wisdom does not.²⁰ In Art, someone who makes mistakes deliberately is preferable to someone who makes mistakes unknowingly.²¹ But the same is not true of Practical Wisdom or the other Virtues. Clearly, then, Practical Wisdom is a kind of Excellence, not an Art.

Now as there are two parts of the Soul which have Reason, it must be the Excellence of the Opinionative [which we called before calculative or deliberative], because both Opinion and Practical Wisdom are exercised upon Contingent matter. And further, it is not simply a state conjoined with Reason, as is proved by the fact that such a state may be forgotten and so lost while Practical Wisdom cannot.

The soul has two parts that use reason. So practical wisdom must be the excellence of the part that forms opinions [previously called the calculating or deliberating part]. This is because both opinion and practical wisdom deal with matters that could turn out differently. Furthermore, practical wisdom is not simply a state guided by reason. The proof is that such a state can be forgotten and therefore lost, while practical wisdom cannot.

Now Knowledge is a conception concerning universals and Necessary matter, and there are of course certain First Principles in all trains of demonstrative reasoning (that is of all Knowledge because this is connected with reasoning): that faculty, then, which takes in the first principles of that which comes under the range of Knowledge, cannot be either Knowledge, or Art, or Practical Wisdom: not Knowledge, because what is the object of Knowledge must be derived from demonstrative reasoning; not either of the other two, because they are exercised upon Contingent matter only. Nor can it be Science which takes in these, because the Scientific Man must in some cases depend on demonstrative Reasoning.

Knowledge concerns universal truths and matters that cannot be otherwise. All chains of demonstrative reasoning depend, of course, on certain First Principles. So does all Knowledge, because Knowledge is tied to reasoning. The faculty that grasps the First Principles underlying Knowledge, then, cannot be Knowledge, Art, or Practical Wisdom. It cannot be Knowledge, because the objects of Knowledge must be established through demonstrative reasoning. Nor can it be Art or Practical Wisdom, because both deal only with matters that could be otherwise. Nor can Science grasp these First Principles, because the Scientific Man must sometimes rely on demonstrative reasoning.

It comes then to this: since the faculties whereby we always attain truth and are never deceived when dealing with matter Necessary or even Contingent are Knowledge, Practical Wisdom, Science, and Intuition, and the faculty which takes in First Principles cannot be any of the three first; the last, namely Intuition, must be it which performs this function.

The conclusion is this: Knowledge, Practical Wisdom, Science, and Intuition always lead us to truth, never to error. They do so when dealing with what must be true or even what could be otherwise. But the ability to grasp First Principles cannot be any of the first three. So Intuition must be the ability that grasps First Principles.

Science is a term we use principally in two meanings: in the first place, in the Arts we ascribe it to those who carry their arts to the highest accuracy;²² Phidias, for instance, we call a Scientific or cunning sculptor; Polycleitus a Scientific or cunning statuary; meaning, in this instance, nothing else by Science than an excellence of art: in the other sense, we think some to be Scientific in a general way, not in any particular line or in any particular thing, just as Homer says of a man in his Margites; “Him the Gods made neither a digger of the ground, nor ploughman, nor in any other way Scientific.”

We use the term wisdom mainly in two senses. First, in the arts, we apply it to those who achieve the highest precision in their craft.²² For example, we call Phidias a wise or skilled sculptor, and Polycleitus a wise or skilled maker of statues. In these cases, wisdom means nothing more than excellence in an art. In the other sense, we consider some people wise in general, not in any particular field or activity. This is the sense Homer uses when he says of a man in his Margites: “The gods made him neither a digger nor a ploughman, nor wise in any other way.”

So it is plain that Science must mean the most accurate of all Knowledge; but if so, then the Scientific man must not merely know the deductions from the First Principles but be in possession of truth respecting the First Principles. So that Science must be equivalent to Intuition and Knowledge; it is, so to speak, Knowledge of the most precious objects, with a head on.²³

So Science must clearly mean the most accurate of all Knowledge. But if so, a person versed in Science must know more than the conclusions drawn from the First Principles. They must also know the truth about the First Principles themselves. So Science must combine Intuition and Knowledge. Science is, so to speak, Knowledge of the most precious objects, with a head on.²³

I say of the most precious things, because it is absurd to suppose πολιτικὴ,²⁴ or Practical Wisdom, to be the highest, unless it can be shown that Man is the most excellent of all that exists in the Universe. Now if “healthy” and “good” are relative terms, differing when applied to men or to fish, but “white” and “straight” are the same always, men must allow that the Scientific is the same always, but the Practically Wise varies: for whatever provides all things well for itself, to this they would apply the term Practically Wise, and commit these matters to it; which is the reason, by the way, that they call some brutes Practically Wise, such that is as plainly have a faculty of forethought respecting their own subsistence.

I speak of the most precious things for a reason. It is absurd to consider πολιτικὴ,²⁴ or Practical Wisdom, the highest unless we can show that humanity is the most excellent thing in the Universe. Now suppose “healthy” and “good” are relative terms, with different meanings when applied to humans and fish. But “white” and “straight” always mean the same thing. If so, we must admit that scientific knowledge is always the same, but practical wisdom varies. For people call any being practically wise if that being provides well for all its own needs. And they entrust the care of those needs to that being. This, by the way, is why people call some animals practically wise. Such animals clearly have the ability to plan ahead for their own survival.

And it is quite plain that Science and πολιτικὴ cannot be identical: because if men give the name of Science to that faculty which is employed upon what is expedient for themselves, there will be many instead of one, because there is not one and the same faculty employed on the good of all animals collectively, unless in the same sense as you may say there is one art of healing with respect to all living beings.

And Science and political science clearly cannot be the same. For if people call the ability to judge their own interests Science, there will be many such abilities, not one. This is because no single ability deals with the good of all animals collectively. The only exception is in the sense that we may speak of one art of healing for all living beings.

If it is urged that man is superior to all other animals, that makes no difference: for there are many other things more Godlike in their nature than Man, as, most obviously, the elements of which the Universe is composed.²⁵

If someone argues that humans are superior to all other animals, the argument makes no difference. For many other things are more godlike in nature than humans. The most obvious examples are the elements that make up the Universe.²⁵

It is plain then that Science is the union of Knowledge and Intuition, and has for its objects those things which are most precious in their nature. Accordingly, Anexagoras, Thales, and men of that stamp, people call Scientific, but not Practically Wise because they see them ignorant of what concerns themselves; and they say that what they know is quite out of the common run certainly, and wonderful, and hard, and very fine no doubt, but still useless because they do not seek after what is good for them as men.

Clearly, then, Science combines Knowledge and Intuition and concerns the things that are most valuable by nature. Accordingly, people call Anexagoras, Thales, and others like them Scientific, but not Practically Wise. This is because people see that these thinkers are ignorant of matters that concern their own lives. People say these thinkers’ knowledge is certainly unusual, remarkable, difficult, and undoubtedly impressive, but still useless. This is because these thinkers do not seek what is good for them as human beings.

But Practical Wisdom is employed upon human matters, and such as are objects of deliberation (for we say, that to deliberate well is most peculiarly the work of the man who possesses this Wisdom), and no man deliberates about things which cannot be otherwise than they are, nor about any save those that have some definite End and this End good resulting from Moral Action; and the man to whom we should give the name of Good in Counsel, simply and without modification, is he who in the way of calculation has a capacity for attaining that of practical goods which is the best for Man.

But practical wisdom concerns human affairs and matters open to deliberation. (For we say that deliberating well is the distinctive task of someone who possesses practical wisdom.) No one deliberates about things that cannot be otherwise. Nor does anyone deliberate about anything without a definite goal, a good achievable through moral action. Someone who deserves to be called good at deliberation, without qualification, can reason out how to achieve the best practical good for human beings.

Nor again does Practical Wisdom consist in a knowledge of general principles only, but it is necessary that one should know also the particular details, because it is apt to act, and action is concerned with details: for which reason sometimes men who have not much knowledge are more practical than others who have; among others, they who derive all they know from actual experience: suppose a man to know, for instance, that light meats are easy of digestion and wholesome, but not what kinds of meat are light, he will not produce a healthy state; that man will have a much better chance of doing so, who knows that the flesh of birds is light and wholesome. Since then Practical Wisdom is apt to act, one ought to have both kinds of knowledge, or, if only one, the knowledge of details rather than of Principles. So there will be in respect of Practical Wisdom the distinction of supreme and subordinate.²⁶

Nor is Practical Wisdom merely knowledge of general principles. We must also know particular details, because Practical Wisdom guides action, and action concerns details. For this reason, people with little knowledge are sometimes more effective in practice than those with greater knowledge. Among them are people who learn everything they know from actual experience. Suppose someone knows that light meats are easily digested and healthy, but does not know which meats are light. Such a person will not bring about good health. Someone who knows that bird meat is light and healthy will have a much better chance of doing so. Since Practical Wisdom guides action, we should have both kinds of knowledge. Or, if we have only one, we should know the details rather than the principles. So within Practical Wisdom, too, there will be a distinction between what is supreme and what is subordinate.²⁶

Further: πολιτικὴ and Practical Wisdom are the same mental state, but the point of view is not the same.

Also, political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state of mind. But they differ in perspective.

Of Practical Wisdom exerted upon a community that which I would call the Supreme is the faculty of Legislation; the subordinate, which is concerned with the details, generally has the common name πολιτικὴ, and its functions are Action and Deliberation (for the particular enactment is a matter of action, being the ultimate issue of this branch of Practical Wisdom, and therefore people commonly say, that these men alone are really engaged in government, because they alone act, filling the same place relatively to legislators, that workmen do to a master).²⁷

Of practical wisdom applied to a community, I would call lawmaking the highest form. The subordinate form deals with details and is generally called πολιτικὴ, or politics. Its functions are action and deliberation. (A particular enactment is a matter of action, since it is the final outcome of this branch of practical wisdom. Therefore, people commonly say that only those handling these details are really engaged in government, because they alone act. They stand in the same relation to lawmakers as workers do to a master.)²⁷

Again, that is thought to be Practical Wisdom in the most proper sense which has for its object the interest of the Individual: and this usually appropriates the common name: the others are called respectively Domestic Management, Legislation, Executive Government divided into two branches, Deliberative and Judicial.²⁸ Now of course, knowledge for one’s self is one kind of knowledge, but it admits of many shades of difference: and it is a common notion that the man who knows and busies himself about his own concerns merely is the man of Practical Wisdom, while they who extend their solicitude to society at large are considered meddlesome.

Again, Practical Wisdom in its strictest sense is thought to concern the interests of the individual. This form usually takes the general name of Practical Wisdom. The other forms are called Domestic Management, Legislation, and Executive Government, with Executive Government divided into Deliberative and Judicial branches.²⁸ Now, of course, knowing what serves your own interests is one kind of knowledge, but it has many variations. People commonly think that someone who understands and attends only to his own affairs has Practical Wisdom. By contrast, people who extend their concern to society as a whole are considered meddlesome.

Euripides has thus embodied this sentiment; “How,” says one of his Characters, “How foolish am I, who whereas I might have shared equally, idly numbered among the multitude of the army *** for them that are busy and meddlesome [Jove hates],” because the generality of mankind seek their own good and hold that this is their proper business. It is then from this opinion that the notion has arisen that such men are the Practically-Wise. And yet it is just possible that the good of the individual cannot be secured independently of connection with a family or a community. And again, how a man should manage his own affairs is sometimes not quite plain, and must be made a matter of enquiry.²⁹

Euripides expresses this feeling through one of his characters: “How foolish I am. I could have had an equal share, doing nothing, counted among the army’s ranks *** for [Jove hates] busybodies and meddlers.” For most people seek their own good and believe looking after themselves is their proper business. This belief has given rise to the idea that such people are practically wise. Yet it is possible that individuals cannot secure their own good without ties to a family or community. And how someone should manage their own affairs is sometimes unclear and needs to be examined.²⁹

A corroboration of what I have said is³⁰ the fact, that the young come to be geometricians, and mathematicians, and Scientific in such matters, but it is not thought that a young man can come to be possessed of Practical Wisdom: now the reason is, that this Wisdom has for its object particular facts, which come to be known from experience, which a young man has not because it is produced only by length of time.

What I have said is supported by³⁰ the fact that young people can become geometers, mathematicians, and experts in such subjects. But a young man is not thought capable of gaining Practical Wisdom. The reason is that Practical Wisdom concerns particular facts, which are learned through experience. A young man lacks such experience because experience develops only over a long time.

By the way, a person might also enquire,³¹ why a boy may be made a mathematician but not Scientific or a natural philosopher. Is not this the reason? that mathematics are taken in by the process of abstraction, but the principles of Science³² and natural philosophy must be gained by experiment; and the latter young men talk of but do not realise, while the nature of the former is plain and clear.

By the way, someone might also ask,³¹ why a boy may become a mathematician but not a wise thinker or natural philosopher. Isn't the reason that mathematics is learned through abstraction? By contrast, the principles of wisdom³² and natural philosophy must be learned through experience. Young men talk about these principles without truly understanding them, while the nature of mathematics is plain and clear.

Again, in matter of practice, error attaches either to the general rule, in the process of deliberation, or to the particular fact: for instance, this would be a general rule, “All water of a certain gravity is bad;” the particular fact, “this water is of that gravity.”

Again, in practical matters, an error can concern either the general rule used in deliberation or a particular fact. For example, the general rule might be, “All water of a certain density is bad.” The particular fact would be, “this water has that density.”

And that Practical Wisdom is not Knowledge is plain, for it has to do with the ultimate issue,³³ as has been said, because every object of action is of this nature.

Practical Wisdom is clearly not Knowledge, because it deals with particular cases.³³ This point has already been made. Practical Wisdom deals with particulars because every object of action is particular.

To Intuition it is opposed, for this takes in those principles which cannot be proved by reasoning, while Practical Wisdom is concerned with the ultimate particular fact which cannot be realised by Knowledge but by Sense; I do not mean one of the five senses, but the same by which we take in the mathematical fact, that no rectilineal figure can be contained by less than three lines, i.e. that a triangle is the ultimate figure, because here also is a stopping point.

Practical Wisdom contrasts with Intuition, because Intuition grasps principles that cannot be proved by reasoning. Practical Wisdom, however, deals with the final particular fact, grasped not through Knowledge but through Sense. I do not mean one of the five senses. I mean the kind of perception through which we grasp a mathematical fact: no straight-sided figure can have fewer than three sides. In other words, the triangle is the most basic figure, because here too we reach a stopping point.

This however is Sense rather than Practical Wisdom, which is of another kind.³⁴

But this is Sense rather than Practical Wisdom. Practical Wisdom is a different kind of understanding.³⁴

Now the acts of enquiring and deliberating differ, though deliberating is a kind of enquiring. We ought to ascertain about Good Counsel likewise what it is, whether a kind of Knowledge, or Opinion, or Happy Conjecture, or some other kind of faculty. Knowledge it obviously is not, because men do not enquire about what they know, and Good Counsel is a kind of deliberation, and the man who is deliberating is enquiring and calculating.

Inquiry and deliberation differ, although deliberation is a kind of inquiry. We should also determine what good counsel is. Is good counsel a kind of knowledge, an opinion, a lucky guess, or some other ability? Clearly, good counsel is not knowledge, because people do not investigate what they already know. Good counsel is a kind of deliberation, and someone who deliberates is investigating and reasoning.

Neither is it Happy Conjecture; because this is independent of reasoning, and a rapid operation; but men deliberate a long time, and it is a common saying that one should execute speedily what has been resolved upon in deliberation, but deliberate slowly.

Nor is it a lucky guess, because a lucky guess involves no reasoning and happens quickly. But people take a long time to deliberate. And as the common saying goes, we should act quickly once we have decided, but deliberate slowly.

Quick perception of causes³⁵ again is a different faculty from good counsel, for it is a species of Happy Conjecture. Nor is Good Counsel Opinion of any kind.

Again, quickly recognizing causes³⁵ is a different ability from good counsel, because it is a form of Happy Conjecture. Nor is Good Counsel any kind of Opinion.

Well then, since he who deliberates ill goes wrong, and he who deliberates well does so rightly, it is clear that Good Counsel is rightness of some kind, but not of Knowledge nor of Opinion: for Knowledge cannot be called right because it cannot be wrong, and Rightness of Opinion is Truth: and again, all which is the object of opinion is definitely marked out.³⁶

Well then, someone who deliberates badly goes wrong, while someone who deliberates well does so correctly. So Good Counsel is clearly a kind of correctness, but not the correctness of Knowledge or Opinion. For Knowledge cannot be called correct, because it cannot be wrong. And correctness in Opinion is Truth. Moreover, everything that is a subject of opinion is clearly defined.³⁶

Still, however, Good Counsel is not independent of Reason, Does it remain then that it is a rightness of Intellectual Operation simply, because this does not amount to an assertion; and the objection to Opinion was that it is not a process of enquiry but already a definite assertion; whereas whosoever deliberates, whether well or ill, is engaged in enquiry and calculation.

Still, Good Counsel is not independent of Reason. Does it follow, then, that Good Counsel is simply correctness in Intellectual Operation, since Intellectual Operation makes no assertion? The objection to Opinion was that Opinion is not a process of inquiry but already a definite assertion. By contrast, anyone who deliberates, whether well or badly, is engaged in inquiry and calculation.

Well, Good Counsel is a Rightness of deliberation, and so the first question must regard the nature and objects of deliberation. Now remember Rightness is an equivocal term; we plainly do not mean Rightness of any kind whatever; the ἀκρατὴς, for instance, or the bad man, will obtain by his calculation what he sets before him as an object, and so he may be said to have deliberated rightly in one sense, but will have attained a great evil. Whereas to have deliberated well is thought to be a good, because Good Counsel is Rightness of deliberation of such a nature as is apt to attain good.

Well, Good Counsel is correct deliberation, so we must first ask what deliberation is and what it concerns. Remember, correctness has several meanings. We clearly do not mean just any kind of correctness. For example, a person who lacks self-control, or a bad person, will calculate how to achieve his goal and succeed. So, in one sense, he may be said to have deliberated rightly, but he will have achieved a great evil. By contrast, deliberating well is considered good, because Good Counsel is deliberation that is correct in a way that leads to good.

But even this again you may get by false reasoning, and hit upon the right effect though not through right means,³⁷ your middle term being fallacious: and so neither will this be yet Good Counsel in consequence of which you get what you ought but not through proper means.

But again, you may reach the right result through faulty reasoning, though not by the right means,³⁷ because your middle term is flawed. So reasoning that gets you what you should achieve, but not by proper means, is still not Good Counsel.

Again, one man may hit on a thing after long deliberation, another quickly. And so that before described will not be yet Good Counsel, but the Rightness must be with reference to what is expedient; and you must have a proper end in view, pursue it in a right manner and right time.

Again, one person may find an answer after much thought, while another may find it quickly. So the correctness described above is not yet good counsel. Rather, the answer must be correct in terms of what is beneficial. You must also have the right goal and pursue that goal in the right way and at the right time.

Once more. One may deliberate well either generally or towards some particular End.³⁸ Good counsel in the general then is that which goes right towards that which is the End in a general way of consideration; in particular, that which does so towards some particular End.

Again, one may deliberate well either in general or about some particular goal.³⁸ Good counsel in general, then, correctly guides us toward the goal considered in general terms. Good counsel about a particular goal correctly guides us toward that goal.

Since then deliberating well is a quality of men possessed of Practical Wisdom, Good Counsel must be “Rightness in respect of what conduces to a given End, of which³⁹ Practical Wisdom is the true conception.”

Men with Practical Wisdom deliberate well. So Good Counsel must be “being right about what leads to a given End. That End³⁹ is what Practical Wisdom truly understands.”

There is too the faculty of Judiciousness, and also its absence, in virtue of which we call men Judicious or the contrary.

There is also the ability to judge well, and its absence. We call people judicious or the opposite depending on whether they have this ability.

Now Judiciousness is neither entirely identical with Knowledge or Opinion (for then all would have been Judicious), nor is it any one specific science, as medical science whose object matter is things wholesome; or geometry whose object matter is magnitude: for it has not for its object things which always exist and are immutable, nor of those things which come into being just any which may chance; but those in respect of which a man might doubt and deliberate.

Now, judiciousness is not exactly the same as knowledge or opinion, since then everyone would have been judicious. Nor is judiciousness any particular science, such as medicine, which concerns health, or geometry, which concerns magnitude. For judiciousness does not concern things that always exist and never change. Nor does judiciousness concern just anything that happens to come into being. Instead, judiciousness concerns matters about which a person might have doubts and deliberate.

And so it has the same object matter as Practical Wisdom; yet the two faculties are not identical, because Practical Wisdom has the capacity for commanding and taking the initiative, for its End is “what one should do or not do:” but Judiciousness is only apt to decide upon suggestions (though we do in Greek put “well” on to the faculty and its concrete noun, these really mean exactly the same as the plain words), and Judiciousness is neither the having Practical Wisdom, nor attaining it: but just as learning is termed συνιέναι when a man uses his knowledge, so judiciousness consists in employing the Opinionative faculty in judging concerning those things which come within the province of Practical Wisdom, when another enunciates them; and not judging merely, but judging well (for εὐ and καλῶς mean exactly the same thing). And the Greek name of this faculty is derived from the use of the term συνιέναι in learning: μανθάνειν and συνιέναι being often used as synonymous.

And so Judiciousness concerns the same matters as Practical Wisdom. Yet the two faculties are not identical, because Practical Wisdom can command and take the initiative. Its goal is “what one should do or not do:” but Judiciousness can only judge suggestions. (Though Greek adds “well” to the names for this faculty and the person exercising it, the meaning remains unchanged.) Judiciousness is neither possessing Practical Wisdom nor acquiring it. But learning is called συνιέναι when someone uses their knowledge. In the same way, Judiciousness means using the Opinionative faculty to judge matters within Practical Wisdom’s scope when someone else presents them. It means not merely judging, but judging well (for εὐ and καλῶς mean exactly the same thing). And the Greek name for this faculty comes from the use of συνιέναι in learning. The words μανθάνειν and συνιέναι are often used as synonyms.

The faculty called γνώμη,⁴⁰ in right of which we call men εὐγνώμονες, or say they have γνώμη, is “the right judgment of the equitable man.” A proof of which is that we most commonly say that the equitable man has a tendency to make allowance, and the making allowance in certain cases is equitable. And συγγνώμη (the word denoting allowance) is right γνώμη having a capacity of making equitable decisions, By “right” I mean that of the Truthful man.

The faculty called γνώμη,⁴⁰ is “the right judgment of the equitable man.” Because of this faculty, we call people εὐγνώμονες or say they have γνώμη. The proof is that we most commonly say an equitable person tends to make allowances. And making allowances in certain cases is equitable. Thus συγγνώμη (the word for making allowances) is right γνώμη capable of making equitable decisions. By “right” I mean the judgment of a truthful person.

Now all these mental states⁴¹ tend to the same object, as indeed common language leads us to expect: I mean, we speak of γνώμη, Judiciousness, Practical Wisdom, and Practical Intuition, attributing the possession of γνώμη and Practical Intuition to the same Individuals whom we denominate Practically-Wise and Judicious: because all these faculties are employed upon the extremes,⁴² i.e. on particular details; and in right of his aptitude for deciding on the matters which come within the province of the Practically-Wise, a man is Judicious and possessed of good γνώμη; i.e. he is disposed to make allowance, for considerations of equity are entertained by all good men alike in transactions with their fellows.

All these mental states⁴¹ aim at the same object, just as ordinary language would lead us to expect. We speak of γνώμη, Judiciousness, Practical Wisdom, and Practical Intuition. We attribute γνώμη and Practical Intuition to the same people we call Practically-Wise and Judicious. This is because all these faculties deal with extremes,⁴² that is, particular details. A person is Judicious and has good γνώμη because he can judge matters that fall within Practical Wisdom. In other words, he is willing to make allowances. For all good people alike consider fairness in their dealings with others.

And all matters of Moral Action belong to the class of particulars, otherwise called extremes: for the man of Practical Wisdom must know them, and Judiciousness and γνώμη are concerned with matters of Moral Actions, which are extremes.

And all matters of moral action concern particular cases, also called extremes. For a person with practical wisdom must know these cases. Sound judgment and γνώμη also concern matters of moral action, which are extremes.

Intuition, moreover, takes in the extremes at both ends:⁴³ I mean, the first and last terms must be taken in not by reasoning but by Intuition [so that Intuition comes to be of two kinds], and that which belongs to strict demonstrative reasonings takes in immutable, i.e. Necessary, first terms; while that which is employed in practical matters takes in the extreme, the Contingent, and the minor Premiss:⁴⁴ for the minor Premisses are the source of the Final Cause, Universals being made up out of Particulars.⁴⁵ To take in these, of course, we must have Sense, i.e. in other words Practical Intuition.

Intuition also grasps the extremes at both ends:⁴³ I mean that the first and last terms require Intuition, not reasoning. [So Intuition comes in two kinds.] Intuition in strict deductive reasoning grasps unchanging first terms, that is, necessary ones. In practical matters, however, Intuition grasps the extreme, the contingent, and the minor premise:⁴⁴ for minor premises are the source of the final cause, since universals are built from particulars.⁴⁵ To grasp these particulars, of course, we must have perception, in other words, practical Intuition.

And for this reason these are thought to be simply gifts of nature; and whereas no man is thought to be Scientific by nature, men are thought to have γνώμη, and Judiciousness, and Practical Intuition: a proof of which is that we think these faculties are a consequence even of particular ages, and this given age has Practical Intuition and γνώμη, we say, as if under the notion that nature is the cause. And thus Intuition is both the beginning and end, because the proofs are based upon the one kind of extremes and concern the other.

For this reason, these abilities are thought to be simply gifts of nature. No one is thought to have scientific knowledge by nature. But people are thought to have sound judgment, good sense, and practical intuition by nature. As evidence, we think these abilities come with particular ages. We say that people of a certain age have practical intuition and sound judgment, as if nature were the cause. Thus intuition is both the beginning and the end. For proofs start from one kind of extreme and concern the other.

And so⁴⁶ one should attend to the undemonstrable dicta and opinions of the skilful, the old and the Practically-Wise, no less than to those which are based on strict reasoning, because they see aright, having gained their power of moral vision from experience.

And so⁴⁶ we should heed the statements and opinions of skilled, elderly, and practically wise people, even when these cannot be proved. These deserve no less attention than views based on rigorous reasoning. For these people see correctly, because experience has developed their moral insight.

Well, we have now stated the nature and objects of Practical Wisdom and Science respectively, and that they belong each to a different part of the Soul. But I can conceive a person questioning their utility. “Science,” he would say, “concerns itself with none of the causes of human happiness (for it has nothing to do with producing anything): Practical Wisdom has this recommendation, I grant, but where is the need of it, since its province is those things which are just and honourable, and good for man, and these are the things which the good man as such does; but we are not a bit the more apt to do them because we know them, since the Moral Virtues are Habits; just as we are not more apt to be healthy or in good condition from mere knowledge of what relates to these (I mean,⁴⁷ of course, things so called not from their producing health, etc., but from their evidencing it in a particular subject), for we are not more apt to be healthy and in good condition merely from knowing the art of medicine or training.

We have now explained the nature and objects of Practical Wisdom and Science. We have also said that each belongs to a different part of the Soul. But I can imagine someone questioning their usefulness. “Science,” he might say, “deals with none of the causes of human happiness, since it produces nothing. Practical Wisdom, I admit, does have this advantage. But why do we need Practical Wisdom? It deals with things that are just, honourable, and good for human beings. These are the things a good person does as a good person. But knowing these things does not make us any better at doing them, since the Moral Virtues are habits. In the same way, knowing about health or fitness does not make us any healthier or fitter. I mean,⁴⁷ of course, things called healthy or fit because they show someone's health or fitness, not because they produce it. For merely knowing medicine or physical training does not make us any healthier or fitter.

“If it be urged that knowing what is good does not by itself make a Practically-Wise man but becoming good; still this Wisdom will be no use either to those that are good, and so have it already, or to those who have it not; because it will make no difference to them whether they have it themselves or put themselves under the guidance of others who have; and we might be contented to be in respect of this as in respect of health: for though we wish to be healthy still we do not set about learning the art of healing.

“If someone argues that practical wisdom requires not just knowing what is good but becoming good, the difficulty remains. This wisdom will still be useless both to those who are good and already have it, and to those who lack it. For those who lack practical wisdom, having it themselves or following others who have it will make no difference. And we might be content to treat practical wisdom as we treat health. For although we wish to be healthy, we do not set out to learn the art of healing.

“Furthermore, it would seem to be strange that, though lower in the scale than Science, it is to be its master; which it is, because whatever produces results takes the rule and directs in each matter.”

“Furthermore, it would seem strange that it should rule Science, despite ranking below Science. It does rule Science, because whatever produces results governs and directs each matter.”

This then is what we are to talk about, for these are the only points now raised.

These, then, are the points we will discuss, because they are the only ones raised so far.

Now first we say that being respectively Excellences of different parts of the Soul they must be choice-worthy, even on the supposition that they neither of them produce results.

First, we say that each is an excellence of a different part of the soul. For that reason, both must be worth choosing, even if neither produces any results.

In the next place we say that they do produce results; that Science makes Happiness, not as the medical art but as healthiness makes health:⁴⁸ because, being a part of Virtue in its most extensive sense, it makes a man happy by being possessed and by working.

Next, we say that they do produce results. Science produces Happiness, not as medicine produces health, but as being healthy produces health.⁴⁸ This is because Science is part of Virtue in its broadest sense. Possessing and exercising Science therefore makes a person happy.

Next, Man’s work as Man is accomplished by virtue of Practical Wisdom and Moral Virtue, the latter giving the right aim and direction, the former the right means to its attainment;⁴⁹ but of the fourth part of the Soul, the mere nutritive principle, there is no such Excellence, because nothing is in its power to do or leave undone.⁵⁰

Next, human beings fulfill their work as human beings through Practical Wisdom and Moral Virtue. Moral Virtue provides the right aim and direction, and Practical Wisdom provides the right means to achieve that aim.⁴⁹ But the fourth part of the Soul, the purely nutritive part, has no such Excellence. This is because the nutritive part has no power to choose whether to act or not.⁵⁰

As to our not being more apt to do what is noble and just by reason of possessing Practical Wisdom, we must begin a little higher up,⁵¹ taking this for our starting-point. As we say that men may do things in themselves just and yet not be just men; for instance, when men do what the laws require of them, either against their will, or by reason of ignorance or something else, at all events not for the sake of the things themselves; and yet they do what they ought and all that the good man should do; so it seems that to be a good man one must do each act in a particular frame of mind, I mean from Moral Choice and for the sake of the things themselves which are done. Now it is Virtue which makes the Moral Choice right, but whatever is naturally required to carry out that Choice comes under the province not of Virtue but of a different faculty. We must halt, as it were, awhile, and speak more clearly on these points.

Consider the claim that possessing Practical Wisdom does not make us more able to do what is noble and just. We must begin a little further back,⁵¹ with the following point. As we say, people may do things that are just in themselves without being just people. For example, people may do what the laws require against their will, through ignorance, or for some other reason. In any case, they do not act for the sake of the actions themselves. Yet they do what they ought to do, and all that a good person should do. So it seems that being a good person requires doing each action in a particular state of mind. I mean acting from Moral Choice and for the sake of the actions themselves. Now Virtue makes Moral Choice right. But whatever is naturally required to carry out that Choice belongs to a different faculty, not to Virtue. We must pause here, so to speak, and explain these points more clearly.

There is then a certain faculty, commonly named Cleverness, of such a nature as to be able to do and attain whatever conduces to any given purpose: now if that purpose be a good one the faculty is praiseworthy; if otherwise, it goes by a name which, denoting strictly the ability, implies the willingness to do anything; we accordingly call the Practically-Wise Clever, and also those who can and will do anything.⁵²

There is, then, an ability commonly called Cleverness. It enables someone to do and achieve whatever serves any given purpose. If the purpose is good, the ability deserves praise. If not, the ability gets a different name. Strictly speaking, that name describes the ability to do anything, but it also implies a willingness to do anything. So we call both the Practically-Wise and those who can and will do anything Clever.⁵²

Now Practical Wisdom is not identical with Cleverness, nor is it without this power of adapting means to ends: but this Eye of the Soul (as we may call it) does not attain its proper state without goodness, as we have said before and as is quite plain, because the syllogisms into which Moral Action may be analysed have for their Major Premiss,⁵³ “since —— is the End and the Chief Good”⁵⁴ (fill up the blank with just anything you please, for we merely want to exhibit the Form, so that anything will do), but how this blank should be filled is seen only by the good man: because Vice distorts the moral vision and causes men to be deceived in respect of practical principles.⁵⁵

Practical Wisdom is not the same as Cleverness, but it does require the ability to adapt means to ends. Yet this Eye of the Soul, as we may call it, cannot reach its proper state without goodness. We have said this before, and the reason is quite clear. Moral Action can be analyzed as logical arguments whose main premise is,⁵³ “since _____ is the End and the Chief Good”⁵⁴. (Fill the blank with anything you like. We only want to show the form of the argument, so anything will do.) But only a good person sees how to fill this blank. This is because Vice distorts moral vision and misleads people about the principles that guide action.⁵⁵

It is clear, therefore, that a man cannot be a Practically-Wise, without being a good, man.

Clearly, then, a man cannot have practical wisdom without also being a good man.

We must enquire again also about Virtue: for it may be divided into Natural Virtue and Matured, which two bear to each other a relation similar to that which Practical Wisdom bears to Cleverness, one not of identity but resemblance. I speak of Natural Virtue, because men hold that each of the moral dispositions attach to us all somehow by nature: we have dispositions⁵⁶ towards justice, self-mastery and courage, for instance, immediately from our birth: but still we seek Goodness in its highest sense as something distinct from these, and that these dispositions should attach to us in a somewhat different fashion.⁵⁷ Children and brutes have these natural states, but then they are plainly hurtful unless combined with an intellectual element: at least thus much is matter of actual experience and observation, that as a strong body destitute of sight must, if set in motion, fall violently because it has not sight, so it is also in the case we are considering: but if it can get the intellectual element it then excels in acting. Just so the Natural State of Virtue, being like this strong body, will then be Virtue in the highest sense when it too is combined with the intellectual element.

We must also examine Virtue again, because it may be divided into Natural Virtue and Matured Virtue. Their relationship resembles the relationship between Practical Wisdom and Cleverness. In each case, the two are similar, but not identical. I speak of Natural Virtue because people believe that all of us have each moral disposition somehow by nature. For example, we have dispositions⁵⁶ toward justice, self-control, and courage from birth. But we still seek Goodness in its fullest sense as something distinct from these natural dispositions. We also seek to have these dispositions in a somewhat different way.⁵⁷ Children and animals have these natural qualities, but without an intellectual element, these qualities are clearly harmful. At least this much is established by experience and observation. A strong body without sight must fall heavily if set in motion, because it cannot see. The same is true of the natural qualities we are considering. But if these qualities gain the intellectual element, they then lead to excellent action. Natural Virtue is like that strong body. Natural Virtue, too, becomes Virtue in its fullest sense when combined with the intellectual element.

So that, as in the case of the Opinionative faculty, there are two forms, Cleverness and Practical Wisdom; so also in the case of the Moral there are two, Natural Virtue and Matured; and of these the latter cannot be formed without Practical Wisdom.⁵⁸

So the faculty of judgment has two forms: Cleverness and Practical Wisdom. Similarly, moral character has two forms: Natural Virtue and Matured Virtue. Matured Virtue cannot develop without Practical Wisdom.⁵⁸

This leads some to say that all the Virtues are merely intellectual Practical Wisdom, and Socrates was partly right in his enquiry and partly wrong: wrong in that he thought all the Virtues were merely intellectual Practical Wisdom, right in saying they were not independent of that faculty.

This leads some to say that all virtues are nothing more than intellectual practical wisdom. Socrates was partly right and partly wrong in his inquiry. He was wrong to think that all virtues were nothing more than intellectual practical wisdom. But he was right to say that the virtues could not exist independently of practical wisdom.

A proof of which is that now all, in defining Virtue, add on the “state” [mentioning also to what standard it has reference, namely that] “which is accordant with Right Reason:” now “right” means in accordance with Practical Wisdom. So then all seem to have an instinctive notion that that state which is in accordance with Practical Wisdom is Virtue; however, we must make a slight change in their statement, because that state is Virtue, not merely which is in accordance with but which implies the possession of Right Reason; which, upon such matters, is Practical Wisdom. The difference between us and Socrates is this: he thought the Virtues were reasoning processes (i.e. that they were all instances of Knowledge in its strict sense), but we say they imply the possession of Reason.

Here is proof: all who now define Virtue include the “state” [also naming the standard it follows, namely the state] “that accords with Right Reason.” Here, “right” means in accordance with Practical Wisdom. So all seem to have an instinctive sense that a state in accordance with Practical Wisdom is Virtue. But we must slightly revise their statement. Virtue is not merely a state in accordance with Right Reason, but a state that requires possessing Right Reason. In these matters, Right Reason is Practical Wisdom. The difference between us and Socrates is this: he thought the Virtues were reasoning processes (that is, all were forms of Knowledge in its strict sense). But we say the Virtues require possessing Reason.

From what has been said then it is clear that one cannot be, strictly speaking, good without Practical Wisdom nor Practically-Wise without moral goodness.

What has been said makes the conclusion clear. Strictly speaking, no one can be good without practical wisdom or have practical wisdom without moral goodness.

And by the distinction between Natural and Matured Virtue one can meet the reasoning by which it might be argued “that the Virtues are separable because the same man is not by nature most inclined to all at once so that he will have acquired this one before he has that other:” we would reply that this is possible with respect to the Natural Virtues but not with respect to those in right of which a man is denominated simply good: because they will all belong to him together with the one faculty of Practical Wisdom.

The distinction between Natural and Matured Virtue lets us answer the following argument: “The Virtues can exist separately. For the same man is not naturally most inclined toward all the Virtues at once. So he will have acquired one before he acquires another.” We would reply that such separation is possible for the Natural Virtues. But it is not possible for the Virtues that make a man good without qualification. For he will possess all those Virtues together with the single faculty of Practical Wisdom.

It is plain too that even had it not been apt to act we should have needed it, because it is the Excellence of a part of the Soul; and that the moral choice cannot be right independently of Practical Wisdom and Moral Goodness; because this gives the right End, that causes the doing these things which conduce to the End.

Clearly, even if it had no practical use, we would still have needed it. This is because it is the excellence of a part of the soul. It is also clear that moral choice cannot be right without Practical Wisdom and Moral Goodness. This is because Moral Goodness sets the right goal, while Practical Wisdom guides the actions that lead to that goal.

Then again, it is not Master of Science (i.e. of the superior part of the Soul), just as neither is the healing art Master of health; for it does not make use of it, but looks how it may come to be: so it commands for the sake of it but does not command it.

Again, it does not rule over Science (the higher part of the Soul). Just as medicine does not rule over health, medicine does not use health, but considers how health may come about. So medicine gives orders for the sake of health, but does not give orders to health.

The objection is, in fact, about as valid as if a man should say πολιτικὴ governs the gods because it gives orders about all things in the communty.

In fact, the objection is about as valid as saying that πολιτικὴ (political science) governs the gods because political science gives orders about everything in the community.

On ἐπισπήμη, from I. Post. Analyt. chap. i. and ii.

On ἐπισπήμη (scientific knowledge), from Posterior Analytics, Book I, chapters 1 and 2.

(Such parts only are translated as throw light on the Ethics.)

(Only the parts that help explain the Ethics are translated.)

All teaching, and all intellectual learning, proceeds on the basis of previous knowledge, as will appear on an examination of all. The Mathematical Sciences, and every other system, draw their conclusions in this method. So too of reasonings, whether by syllogism, or induction: for both teach through what is previously known, the former assuming the premisses as from wise men, the latter proving universals from the evidentness of the particulars. In like manner too rhetoricians persuade, either through examples (which amounts to induction), or through enthymemes (which amounts to syllogism).

All teaching and all intellectual learning build on previous knowledge, as a review of all cases will show. The mathematical sciences and every other system draw their conclusions in this way. The same holds for reasoning, whether through syllogism or induction, because both teach through what is already known. Syllogism assumes premises as accepted by wise people. Induction establishes universal truths from the clear evidence of particular cases. In the same way, speakers persuade through examples (a form of induction) or enthymemes (a form of syllogism).

Well, we suppose that we know things (in the strict and proper sense of the word) when we suppose ourselves to know the cause by reason of which the thing is to be the cause of it; and that this cannot be otherwise. It is plain that the idea intended to be conveyed by the term knowing is something of this kind; because they who do not really know suppose themselves thus related to the matter in hand and they who do know really are so that of whatsoever there is properly speaking Knowledge this cannot be otherwise than it is Whether or no there is another way of knowing we will say afterwards, but we do say that we know through demonstration, by which I mean a syllogism apt to produce Knowledge, i.e. in right of which through having it, we know.

Well, we think we know something, in the strict and proper sense, when we believe we understand its cause. We believe we recognize that cause as the reason the thing is as it is. And we believe the thing cannot be otherwise. Clearly, the word knowing is meant to express something like this. Because people who do not truly know believe they have this understanding, while people who truly know actually have it. So anything we have Knowledge of, properly speaking, cannot be otherwise than it is. Whether there is another way of knowing is a question we will discuss later. But we do say that we know through demonstration. By demonstration, I mean a syllogism that produces Knowledge, a logical argument through which we know by grasping it.

If Knowledge then is such as we have described it, the Knowledge produced by demonstrative reasoning must be drawn from premisses true and first, and incapable of syllogistic proof, and better known, and prior in order of time, and causes of the conclusion, for so the principles will be akin to the conclusion demonstrated.

If knowledge is as we have described, then knowledge gained through demonstrative reasoning must come from premises with certain qualities. These premises must be true and first, and incapable of proof by syllogism. They must also be better known, earlier in time, and causes of the conclusion. For in this way, the principles will be closely related to the conclusion they demonstrate.

(Syllogism, of course there may be without such premisses, but it will not be demonstration because it will not produce knowledge).

(Of course, a syllogism may exist without such premises. But such a syllogism will not be a demonstration because it will not produce knowledge.)

True, they must be, because it is impossible to know that which is not.

They must be true, because it is impossible to know what does not exist.

First, that is indemonstrable, because, if demonstrable, he cannot be said to know them who has no demonstration of them for knowing such things as are demonstrable is the same as having demonstration of them.

First, that cannot be proved. For if those things could be proved, someone without proof of them could not be said to know them. This is because knowing things that can be proved is the same as having proof of them.

Causes they must be, and better known, and prior in time, causes, because we then know when we are acquainted with the cause, and prior, if causes, and known beforehand, not merely comprehended in idea but known to exist (The terms prior, and better known, bear two senses for prior by nature and prior relatively to ourselves are not the same, nor better known by nature, and better known to us I mean, by prior and better known relatively to ourselves, such things as are nearer to sensation, but abstractedly so such as are further Those are furthest which are most universal those nearest which are particulars, and these are mutually opposed.)

They must be causes, better known, and earlier in time. They must be causes because we know something when we know its cause. They must be earlier if they are causes. And they must be known beforehand, not merely understood as ideas but known to exist. (The terms “earlier” and “better known” have two meanings. What is earlier by nature is not the same as what is earlier in relation to us. Nor is what is better known by nature the same as what is better known to us. By earlier and better known in relation to us, I mean things closer to sense perception. But in the absolute sense, I mean things further from sense perception. The most universal things are furthest from sense perception, while particular things are nearest. These two kinds of things are opposites.)

And by first, I mean principles akin to the conclusion, for principle means the same as first And the principle or first step in demonstration is a proposition incapable of syllogistic proof, i.e. one to which there is none prior. Now of such syllogistic principles I call that a θέσις which you cannot demonstrate, and which is unnecessary with a view to learning something else. That which is necessary in order to learn something else is an Axiom.

And by first, I mean principles akin to the conclusion, because “principle” means the same as “first.” The principle, or first step, in a demonstration is a proposition that cannot be proved by syllogistic reasoning. It is, i.e., a proposition with no prior proposition. Among these syllogistic principles, I call a principle a θέσις if it cannot be demonstrated and is unnecessary for learning something else. A principle necessary for learning something else is an Axiom.

Further, since one is to believe and know the thing by having a syllogism of the kind called demonstration, and what constitutes it to be such is the nature of the premisses, it is necessary not merely to know before, but to know better than the conclusion, either all or at least some of, the principles, because that which is the cause of a quality inhering in something else always inheres itself more as the cause of our loving is itself more lovable. So, since the principles are the cause of our knowing and behoving we know and believe them more, because by reason of them we know also the conclusion following.

Further, we come to believe and know something through a syllogism of the kind called a demonstration. The nature of its premises makes the syllogism a demonstration. So we must not merely know beforehand, but know better than the conclusion, all or at least some underlying principles. This is because whatever causes a quality in something else has that quality to a greater degree. For example, whatever causes our love is itself more lovable. So, since the principles cause our knowledge and belief, we know them better and believe them more firmly. For through these principles we also know the conclusion that follows.

Further: the man who is to have the Knowledge which comes through demonstration must not merely know and believe his principles better than he does his conclusion, but he must believe nothing more firmly than the contradictories of those principles out of which the contrary fallacy may be constructed: since he who knows, is to be simply and absolutely infallible.

Furthermore, anyone seeking knowledge through proof must know his principles better and believe them more firmly than his conclusion. But he must believe nothing more firmly than the opposites of those principles. From those principles, a false argument for the opposite conclusion may be constructed. For anyone who knows must be completely and absolutely incapable of error.