Book 5

Now the points for our enquiry in respect of Justice and Injustice are, what kind of actions are their object-matter, and what kind of a mean state Justice is, and between what points the abstract principle of it, i.e. the Just, is a mean. And our enquiry shall be, if you please, conducted in the same method as we have observed in the foregoing parts of this Treatise.

Our inquiry into Justice and Injustice will consider what kinds of actions they concern. We will also ask what kind of middle state Justice is. And we will ask between what extremes its abstract principle, the Just, stands as a middle point. If you agree, we will follow the same method used in the earlier parts of this work.

We see then that all men mean by the term Justice a moral state such that in consequence of it men have the capacity of doing what is just, and actually do it, and wish it:¹ similarly also with respect to Injustice, a moral state such that in consequence of it men do unjustly and wish what is unjust: let us also be content then with these as a ground-work sketched out.

We see, then, that all people understand Justice as a moral character that enables them to do what is just. Justice also leads them to act justly and to want what is just:¹ similarly, Injustice is a moral character that leads people to act unjustly and want what is unjust. Let us, then, accept these rough definitions as our starting point.

I mention the two, because the same does not hold with regard to States whether of mind or body as with regard to Sciences or Faculties: I mean that whereas it is thought that the same Faculty or Science embraces contraries, a State will not: from health, for instance, not the contrary acts are done but the healthy ones only; we say a man walks healthily when he walks as the healthy man would.

I mention the two because states of mind or body differ from sciences or abilities in this respect. A single ability or science is thought to cover opposites, but a state does not. For example, health produces only healthy actions, not their opposites. We say a man walks healthily when he walks as a healthy man would.

However, of the two contrary states the one may be frequently known from the other, and oftentimes the states from their subject-matter: if it be seen clearly what a good state of body is, then is it also seen what a bad state is, and from the things which belong to a good state of body the good state itself is seen, and vice versâ. If, for instance, the good state is firmness of flesh it follows that the bad state is flabbiness of flesh; and whatever causes firmness of flesh is connected with the good state.

However, one of two opposite states can often be understood through the other. Often, states can also be understood through the things they concern. If we clearly understand a good bodily condition, we also understand a bad one. We can recognize a good bodily condition from the things associated with it, and the other way around. If, for example, a good condition means firm flesh, then a bad condition means flabby flesh. And whatever causes firm flesh is connected with the good condition.

It follows moreover in general,² that if of two contrary terms the one is used in many senses so also will the other be; as, for instance, if “the Just,” then also “the Unjust.” Now Justice and Injustice do seem to be used respectively in many senses, but, because the line of demarcation between these is very fine and minute,³ it commonly escapes notice that they are thus used, and it is not plain and manifest as where the various significations of terms are widely different for in these last the visible difference is great, for instance, the word κλεὶς is used equivocally to denote the bone which is under the neck of animals and the instrument with which people close doors.

It also follows in general,² that if one of two opposite terms has several meanings, the other will too. For example, if “the Just” has several meanings, so will “the Unjust.” Now Justice and Injustice do seem to have several meanings each. But because the distinctions between these meanings are very fine and subtle,³ people commonly fail to notice the different uses. These differences are not as clear and obvious as when a word’s meanings are widely separated. In those cases, the difference is easy to see. For example, κλεὶς can mean both the bone below an animal’s neck and the tool people use to close doors.

Let it be ascertained then in how many senses the term “Unjust man” is used. Well, he who violates the law, and he who is a grasping man, and the unequal man, are all thought to be Unjust and so manifestly the Just man will be, the man who acts according to law, and the equal man “The Just” then will be the lawful and the equal, and “the Unjust” the unlawful and the unequal.

Let us first establish the different meanings of “unjust man”. A man who breaks the law, takes more than his share, or treats others unequally is considered unjust. So clearly, a just man follows the law and treats others equally. “The just” therefore means the lawful and the equal, and “the unjust” means the unlawful and the unequal.

Well, since the Unjust man is also a grasping man, he will be so, of course, with respect to good things, but not of every kind, only those which are the subject-matter of good and bad fortune and which are in themselves always good but not always to the individual.⁴ Yet men pray for and pursue these things: this they should not do but pray that things which are in the abstract good may be so also to them, and choose what is good for themselves.

Since an unjust man is also greedy, he is naturally greedy for good things, but not every kind. He wants only the goods that depend on good and bad fortune. These goods are always good in themselves, but not always good for a particular person.⁴ Yet people pray for and pursue these goods. They should not do so. Instead, people should pray that things good in themselves may also be good for them. And they should choose what is good for themselves.

But the Unjust man does not always choose actually the greater part, but even sometimes the less; as in the case of things which are simply evil: still, since the less evil is thought to be in a manner a good and the grasping is after good, therefore even in this case he is thought to be a grasping man, i.e. one who strives for more good than fairly falls to his share: of course he is also an unequal man, this being an inclusive and common term.

But the unjust man does not always choose the larger share. Sometimes he chooses the smaller share, as with things that are simply bad. Still, the lesser evil is considered good in a sense, and a grasping man seeks good. So even in this case, he is considered grasping, that is, someone seeking more good than his fair share. Of course, he is also unfair, a broader term that covers both cases.

We said that the violator of Law is Unjust, and the keeper of the Law Just: further, it is plain that all Lawful things are in a manner Just, because by Lawful we understand what have been defined by the legislative power and each of these we say is Just. The Laws too give directions on all points, aiming either at the common good of all, or that of the best, or that of those in power (taking for the standard real goodness or adopting some other estimate); in one way we mean by Just, those things which are apt to produce and preserve happiness and its ingredients for the social community.

We said that anyone who breaks the law is unjust, and anyone who obeys the law is just. Furthermore, all lawful things are clearly just in a sense. This is because “lawful” means whatever lawmakers have laid down, and we call each of these things just. Laws also give directions on all matters. They aim at the common good of all, of the best, or of those in power. The standard used is either true goodness or some other measure. So, in one sense, we call things just when they tend to produce and preserve happiness for the community. This includes producing and preserving the elements of happiness.

Further, the Law commands the doing the deeds not only of the brave man (as not leaving the ranks, nor flying, nor throwing away one’s arms), but those also of the perfectly self-mastering man, as abstinence from adultery and wantonness; and those of the meek man, as refraining from striking others or using abusive language: and in like manner in respect of the other virtues and vices commanding some things and forbidding others, rightly if it is a good law, in a way somewhat inferior if it is one extemporised.

Further, the law commands not only the actions of a brave person, such as staying in formation, not fleeing, and not throwing away weapons. It also commands the actions of someone with complete self-control, such as avoiding adultery and sexual misconduct. And it commands the actions of a gentle person, such as not hitting others or using abusive language. Likewise, with the other virtues and vices, the law commands some actions and forbids others. A good law does this properly, while a hastily drawn-up law does it somewhat less well.

Now this Justice is in fact perfect Virtue, yet not simply so but as exercised towards one’s neighbour: and for this reason Justice is thought oftentimes to be the best of the Virtues, and

Now this justice is indeed complete virtue, but only as practiced toward others, not in an unqualified sense. For this reason, justice is often considered the best of the virtues, and

and in a proverbial saying we express the same;

and we express the same idea in a proverb.

And it is in a special sense perfect Virtue because it is the practice of perfect Virtue. And perfect it is because he that has it is able to practise his virtue towards his neighbour and not merely on himself; I mean, there are many who can practise virtue in the regulation of their own personal conduct who are wholly unable to do it in transactions with their neighbour. And for this reason that saying of Bias is thought to be a good one,

And it is complete virtue in a special sense because it is the practice of complete virtue. It is complete because anyone who has it can practice virtue toward others, not just in their own conduct. I mean, many people can practice virtue in managing their own conduct but cannot do so at all in dealing with others. For this reason, the following saying of Bias is thought to be a good one,

for he who bears Rule is necessarily in contact with others, i.e. in a community. And for this same reason Justice alone of all the Virtues is thought to be a good to others, because it has immediate relation to some other person, inasmuch as the Just man does what is advantageous to another, either to his ruler or fellow-subject. Now he is the basest of men who practises vice not only in his own person,⁵ but towards his friends also; but he the best who practises virtue not merely in his own person but towards his neighbour, for this is a matter of some difficulty.

For anyone who rules must deal with others as part of a community. For this same reason, justice alone among all the virtues is considered a good for others. Justice directly concerns another person, because a just man does what benefits another, either his ruler or a fellow subject. Now the worst man is one who practices vice not only in his own life,⁵ but also toward his friends. But the best man practices virtue not only in his own life but also toward his neighbor. For acting virtuously toward others is difficult.

However, Justice in this sense is not a part of Virtue but is co-extensive with Virtue; nor is the Injustice which answers to it a part of Vice but co-extensive with Vice. Now wherein Justice in this sense differs from Virtue appears from what has been said: it is the same really, but the point of view is not the same: in so far as it has respect to one’s neighbour it is Justice, in so far as it is such and such a moral state it is simply Virtue.

However, Justice in this sense is not just one part of Virtue but covers the whole of Virtue. Nor is the corresponding Injustice just one part of Vice. It covers the whole of Vice. What has been said shows how Justice in this sense differs from Virtue. They are really the same, but viewed differently. Viewed in relation to other people, Virtue is Justice. Viewed simply as a moral state, it is Virtue.

But the object of our enquiry is Justice, in the sense in which it is a part of Virtue (for there is such a thing, as we commonly say), and likewise with respect to particular Injustice. And of the existence of this last the following consideration is a proof: there are many vices by practising which a man acts unjustly, of course, but does not grasp at more than his share of good; if, for instance, by reason of cowardice he throws away his shield, or by reason of ill-temper he uses abusive language, or by reason of stinginess does not give a friend pecuniary assistance; but whenever he does a grasping action, it is often in the way of none of these vices, certainly not in all of them, still in the way of some vice or other (for we blame him), and in the way of Injustice. There is then some kind of Injustice distinct from that co-extensive with Vice and related to it as a part to a whole, and some “Unjust” related to that which is co-extensive with violation of the law as a part to a whole.

But our inquiry concerns Justice as one part of Virtue (for such a thing exists, as we commonly say). We are also concerned with Injustice in this narrower sense. The following consideration proves that this particular kind of Injustice exists. A man can act unjustly through many vices without seeking more than his share of good things. For example, he might throw away his shield out of cowardice or use abusive language out of bad temper. Or he might refuse a friend financial help out of stinginess. But when he seeks more than his share, his action often involves none of these vices. It certainly does not involve all of them. Still, his action involves some vice (for we blame him), and it involves Injustice. So there is a kind of Injustice distinct from Injustice understood as the whole of Vice. This narrower Injustice relates to the broader kind as a part relates to a whole. Likewise, there is a narrower sense of “Unjust” within the broader sense that includes every violation of the law. The narrower sense relates to the broader sense as a part relates to a whole.

Again, suppose one man seduces a man’s wife with a view to gain and actually gets some advantage by it,⁶ and another does the same from impulse of lust, at an expense of money and damage; this latter will be thought to be rather destitute of self-mastery than a grasping man, and the former Unjust but not destitute of self-mastery: now why? plainly because of his gaining.

Again, suppose one man seduces another man’s wife for gain and actually benefits from it.⁶ Suppose another does the same out of lust, at a financial cost and to his own harm. The second man will be seen as lacking self-control rather than as greedy. But the first will be seen as unjust, not as lacking self-control. Why? Clearly, because he gains from his actions.

Again, all other acts of Injustice we refer to some particular depravity, as, if a man commits adultery, to abandonment to his passions; if he deserts his comrade, to cowardice; if he strikes another, to anger: but if he gains by the act to no other vice than to Injustice.

Again, we attribute all other unjust acts to some specific vice. If a man commits adultery, we attribute it to giving in to his passions. If he deserts his comrade, we attribute it to cowardice. If he strikes someone, we attribute it to anger. But if he profits from the act, we attribute it to no vice other than injustice.

Thus it is clear that there is a kind of Injustice different from and besides that which includes all Vice, having the same name because the definition is in the same genus; for both have their force in dealings with others, but the one acts upon honour, or wealth, or safety, or by whatever one name we can include all these things, and is actuated by pleasure attendant on gain, while the other acts upon all things which constitute the sphere of the good man’s action.

So there is clearly a specific kind of injustice, distinct from and alongside the injustice that includes all vice. Both kinds share the same name because they belong to the same general category. Both concern dealings with others. But the specific kind concerns honor, wealth, safety, or whatever single term covers all these things. It is driven by the pleasure that comes with gain. The broader kind concerns everything within the scope of a good person’s actions.

Now that there is more than one kind of Justice, and that there is one which is distinct from and besides that which is co-extensive with, Virtue, is plain: we must next ascertain what it is, and what are its characteristics.

It is clear that there is more than one kind of justice. One kind is separate from and additional to the justice that covers the whole of virtue. We must next determine what this separate kind of justice is and what its characteristics are.

Well, the Unjust has been divided into the unlawful and the unequal, and the Just accordingly into the lawful and the equal: the aforementioned Injustice is in the way of the unlawful. And as the unequal and the more⁷ are not the same, but differing as part to whole (because all more is unequal, but not all unequal more), so the Unjust and the Injustice we are now in search of are not the same with, but other than, those before mentioned, the one being the parts, the other the wholes; for this particular Injustice is a part of the Injustice co-extensive with Vice, and likewise this Justice of the Justice co-extensive with Virtue. So that what we have now to speak of is the particular Justice and Injustice, and likewise the particular Just and Unjust.

Well, we have divided the unjust into the unlawful and the unequal, and the just into the lawful and the equal. The injustice discussed earlier concerns the unlawful. Now, the unequal and having more⁷ are not the same. They differ as a part differs from a whole, because all having more is unequal, but not all inequality involves having more. In the same way, the unjust and the injustice we are now investigating differ from those discussed earlier. The kinds we are now investigating are parts, while the earlier kinds are wholes. For this particular injustice is part of the injustice that covers the whole of vice. Likewise, this particular justice is part of the justice that covers the whole of virtue. So we must now discuss particular justice and injustice, and likewise what is just and unjust in this particular sense.

Here then let us dismiss any further consideration of the Justice ranking as co-extensive with Virtue (being the practice of Virtue in all its bearings towards others), and of the co-relative Injustice (being similarly the practice of Vice). It is clear too, that we must separate off the Just and the Unjust involved in these: because one may pretty well say that most lawful things are those which naturally result in action from Virtue in its fullest sense, because the law enjoins the living in accordance with each Virtue and forbids living in accordance with each Vice. And the producing causes of Virtue in all its bearings are those enactments which have been made respecting education for society.

Let us now set aside Justice understood as Virtue as a whole, practiced in every aspect of our dealings with others. Let us also set aside the corresponding Injustice, understood as Vice practiced in the same way. Clearly, we must also distinguish the Just and the Unjust involved in these forms of Justice and Injustice. For we may fairly say that most lawful actions naturally follow from Virtue in its fullest sense. This is because the law requires us to live according to each Virtue and forbids living according to each Vice. And the laws governing education for life in society are what produce Virtue in all its aspects.

By the way, as to individual education, in respect of which a man is simply good without reference to others, whether it is the province of πολιτικὴ or some other science we must determine at a future time: for it may be it is not the same thing to be a good man and a good citizen in every case.⁸

As an aside, consider individual education, which makes a person good in themselves, without reference to others. We must decide later whether such education belongs to political science or some other field. For being a good person and being a good citizen may not always be the same thing.⁸

Now of the Particular Justice, and the Just involved in it, one species is that which is concerned in the distributions of honour, or wealth, or such other things as are to be shared among the members of the social community (because in these one man as compared with another may have either an equal or an unequal share), and the other is that which is Corrective in the various transactions between man and man.

Particular justice, and what is just within it, has two forms. One concerns the distribution of honor, wealth, or other things shared among members of the community. This is because one person may receive an equal or unequal share compared with another. The other form is corrective justice in the various transactions between people.

And of this latter there are two parts: because of transactions some are voluntary and some involuntary; voluntary, such as follow; selling, buying, use, bail, borrowing, deposit, hiring: and this class is called voluntary because the origination of these transactions is voluntary.

The latter has two parts, because some transactions are voluntary and some are involuntary. Voluntary transactions include selling, buying, lending for use, providing guarantees, borrowing, accepting deposits, and hiring. These transactions are called voluntary because they begin voluntarily.

The involuntary again are either such as effect secrecy; as theft, adultery, poisoning, pimping, kidnapping of slaves, assassination, false witness; or accompanied with open violence; as insult, bonds, death, plundering, maiming, foul language, slanderous abuse.

Involuntary dealings, in turn, either happen secretly or involve open violence. Secret acts include theft, adultery, poisoning, pimping, kidnapping slaves, assassination, and false testimony. Acts of open violence include assault, imprisonment, killing, looting, maiming, foul language, and slanderous abuse.

Well, the unjust man we have said is unequal, and the abstract “Unjust” unequal: further, it is plain that there is some mean of the unequal, that is to say, the equal or exact half (because in whatever action there is the greater and the less there is also the equal, i.e. the exact half). If then the Unjust is unequal the Just is equal, which all must allow without further proof: and as the equal is a mean the Just must be also a mean. Now the equal implies two terms at least: it follows then that the Just is both a mean and equal, and these to certain persons; and, in so far as it is a mean, between certain things (that is, the greater and the less), and, so far as it is equal, between two, and in so far as it is just it is so to certain persons. The Just then must imply four terms at least, for those⁹ to which it is just are two, and the terms representing the things are two.

Well, we have said that the unjust man is unequal, and that the abstract “Unjust” is unequal. Further, clearly there is a midpoint of the unequal: the equal, or exact half. For whenever an action involves a greater and a lesser amount, there is also an equal amount, the exact half. If, then, the Unjust is unequal, the Just is equal. All must accept this conclusion without further proof. And since the equal is a midpoint, the Just must also be a midpoint. Now equality involves at least two terms. It follows, then, that the Just is both a midpoint and equal, and is so for certain people. As a midpoint, the Just lies between certain things (the greater and the less). As equal, the Just involves two terms. And as just, the Just applies to certain people. The Just, then, must involve at least four terms. For the people⁹ to whom it is just are two, and the terms representing the things are two.

And there will be the same equality between the terms representing the persons, as between those representing the things: because as the latter are to one another so are the former: for if the persons are not equal they must not have equal shares; in fact this is the very source of all the quarrelling and wrangling in the world, when either they who are equal have and get awarded to them things not equal, or being not equal those things which are equal. Again, the necessity of this equality of ratios is shown by the common phrase “according to rate,” for all agree that the Just in distributions ought to be according to some rate: but what that rate is to be, all do not agree; the democrats are for freedom, oligarchs for wealth, others for nobleness of birth, and the aristocratic party for virtue.

The ratio between the people must be the same as the ratio between the things they receive. For the people stand in the same relation to one another as their shares do. If the people are not equal, they must not receive equal shares. In fact, this is the very source of all the quarrelling and conflict in the world. Equals have or are awarded unequal shares, or people who are unequal receive equal shares. The common phrase “according to rate” also shows why these ratios must be equal. For everyone agrees that a just distribution must follow some standard. But not everyone agrees on what that standard should be. Democrats favor freedom, oligarchs favor wealth, others favor noble birth, and the aristocratic party favors virtue.

The Just, then, is a certain proportionable thing. For proportion does not apply merely to number in the abstract,¹⁰ but to number generally, since it is equality of ratios, and implies four terms at least (that this is the case in what may be called discrete proportion is plain and obvious, but it is true also in continual proportion, for this uses the one term as two, and mentions it twice; thus A:B:C may be expressed A:B::B:C. In the first, B is named twice; and so, if, as in the second, B is actually written twice, the proportionals will be four): and the Just likewise implies four terms at the least, and the ratio between the two pair of terms is the same, because the persons and the things are divided similarly. It will stand then thus, A:B::C:D, and then permutando A:C::B:D, and then (supposing C and D to represent the things) A+C:B+D::A:B. The distribution in fact consisting in putting together these terms thus: and if they are put together so as to preserve this same ratio, the distribution puts them together justly.¹¹ So then the joining together of the first and third and second and fourth proportionals is the Just in the distribution, and this Just is the mean relatively to that which violates the proportionate, for the proportionate is a mean and the Just is proportionate. Now mathematicians call this kind of proportion geometrical: for in geometrical proportion the whole is to the whole as each part to each part. Furthermore this proportion is not continual, because the person and thing do not make up one term.

What is just, then, is proportionate. Proportion applies not only to abstract numbers,¹⁰ but to numbers generally. Proportion is equality between ratios and requires at least four terms. (The need for four terms is obvious in what we may call discrete proportion. But continuous proportion also requires four terms, because continuous proportion uses one term twice. Thus A:B:C can be written as A:B::B:C. In the first expression, B is named twice. So, if B is actually written twice, as in the second expression, there are four proportional terms.) What is just likewise requires at least four terms. The ratio between the two pairs is the same, because the people and the things are divided similarly. We therefore have A:B::C:D. Rearranging the terms gives A:C::B:D. Then, if C and D represent the things, A+C:B+D::A:B. Distribution consists in combining these terms in this way. If the combination preserves the same ratio, the distribution is just.¹¹ So, in distribution, justice consists in combining the first and third terms, and the second and fourth terms. This justice is the mean in relation to what violates proportion, because proportion is a mean, and justice is proportionate. Mathematicians call this kind of proportion geometrical. In geometrical proportion, the whole relates to the whole as each part relates to each corresponding part. Furthermore, this proportion is not continuous, because the person and the thing do not form a single term.

The Just then is this proportionate, and the Unjust that which violates the proportionate; and so there comes to be the greater and the less: which in fact is the case in actual transactions, because he who acts unjustly has the greater share and he who is treated unjustly has the less of what is good: but in the case of what is bad this is reversed: for the less evil compared with the greater comes to be reckoned for good, because the less evil is more choice-worthy than the greater, and what is choice-worthy is good, and the more so the greater good.

What is just, then, follows this proportion, while what is unjust violates it. So one person gets more and another less, as happens in actual transactions. The person acting unjustly gets a larger share of what is good, while the person treated unjustly gets less. But with what is bad, the reverse is true. For a lesser evil counts as good compared with a greater evil, because the lesser evil is more desirable. What is desirable is good, and what is more desirable is a greater good.

This then is the one species of the Just.

This, then, is one form of justice.

And the remaining one is the Corrective, which arises in voluntary as well as involuntary transactions. Now this just has a different form from the aforementioned; for that which is concerned in distribution of common property is always according to the aforementioned proportion: I mean that, if the division is made out of common property, the shares will bear the same proportion to one another as the original contributions did: and the Unjust which is opposite to this Just is that which violates the proportionate.

The remaining kind of justice is corrective justice, which applies to both voluntary and involuntary transactions. Corrective justice takes a different form from the kind discussed above. Justice in distributing common property always follows the proportion described above. I mean that, if common property is divided, the shares must have the same proportions as the original contributions. The injustice opposed to this kind of justice is a violation of that proportion.

But the Just which arises in transactions between men is an equal in a certain sense, and the Unjust an unequal, only not in the way of that proportion but of arithmetical.¹² Because it makes no difference whether a robbery, for instance, is committed by a good man on a bad or by a bad man on a good, nor whether a good or a bad man has committed adultery: the law looks only to the difference created by the injury and treats the men as previously equal, where the one does and the other suffers injury, or the one has done and the other suffered harm. And so this Unjust, being unequal, the judge endeavours to reduce to equality again, because really when the one party has been wounded and the other has struck him, or the one kills and the other dies, the suffering and the doing are divided into unequal shares; well, the judge tries to restore equality by penalty, thereby taking from the gain.

But justice in transactions between people is a kind of equality, and injustice a kind of inequality. The equality here, however, is arithmetic rather than proportional.¹² For example, whether a good man robs a bad man or a bad man robs a good man makes no difference. Nor does it matter whether a good or bad man has committed adultery. The law looks only at the difference caused by the injury and treats the people involved as previously equal. One person inflicts an injury, and the other suffers it, or one has caused harm and the other suffered harm. So the judge tries to restore equality because the injustice creates inequality. When one person wounds another, or one kills and the other dies, the doing and suffering are unequally shared. The judge therefore tries to restore equality through a penalty, taking away from the gain.

For these terms gain and loss are applied to these cases, though perhaps the term in some particular instance may not be strictly proper, as gain, for instance, to the man who has given a blow, and loss to him who has received it: still, when the suffering has been estimated, the one is called loss and the other gain.

For the terms gain and loss apply to these cases, though perhaps they may not strictly fit a particular case. For example, gain describes the man who struck a blow, and loss describes the man who received it. Still, once the suffering has been assessed, the injured man's share is called loss, and the other's gain.

And so the equal is a mean between the more and the less, which represent gain and loss in contrary ways (I mean, that the more of good and the less of evil is gain, the less of good and the more of evil is loss): between which the equal was stated to be a mean, which equal we say is Just: and so the Corrective Just must be the mean between loss and gain. And this is the reason why, upon a dispute arising, men have recourse to the judge: going to the judge is in fact going to the Just, for the judge is meant to be the personification of the Just.¹³ And men seek a judge as one in the mean, which is expressed in a name given by some to judges (μεσίδιοι, or middle-men) under the notion that if they can hit on the mean they shall hit on the Just. The Just is then surely a mean since the judge is also.

So equality is a middle point between more and less, which represent gain and loss in opposite ways. I mean that more good and less evil count as gain, while less good and more evil count as loss. Equality, as we said, lies between gain and loss, and we call this equality just. So corrective justice must be the middle point between loss and gain. This is why people turn to a judge when a dispute arises. Going to a judge is, in fact, going to justice, because the judge is meant to embody justice.¹³ People seek a judge as someone who stands in the middle. Some express this idea by calling judges μεσίδιοι, or middlemen. They believe that if they can find the middle point, they will find justice. Justice, then, is surely a middle point, since the judge also stands in the middle.

So it is the office of a judge to make things equal, and the line, as it were, having been unequally divided, he takes from the greater part that by which it exceeds the half, and adds this on to the less. And when the whole is divided into two exactly equal portions then men say they have their own, when they have gotten the equal; and the equal is a mean between the greater and the less according to arithmetical equality.

So a judge’s role is to make things equal. It is as if a line has been divided unequally. The judge takes from the larger part the amount by which it exceeds half the whole. He then adds that amount to the smaller part. When the whole is divided into two exactly equal parts, people say they have their own share. They have received an equal amount. This equal amount is the arithmetic mean between the larger and smaller amounts.

This, by the way, accounts for the etymology of the term by which we in Greek express the ideas of Just and Judge; (δίκαιον quasi δίχαιον, that is in two parts, and δικάστης quasi διχάστης, he who divides into two parts). For when from one of two equal magnitudes somewhat has been taken and added to the other, this latter exceeds the former by twice that portion: if it had been merely taken from the former and not added to the latter, then the latter would have exceeded the former only by that one portion; but in the other case, the greater exceeds the mean by one, and the mean exceeds also by one that magnitude from which the portion was taken. By this illustration, then, we obtain a rule to determine what one ought to take from him who has the greater, and what to add to him who has the less. The excess of the mean over the less must be added to the less, and the excess of the greater over the mean be taken from the greater.

This, incidentally, explains the origins of the Greek words for Just and Judge. (δίκαιον resembles δίχαιον, meaning in two parts, and δικάστης resembles διχάστης, meaning someone who divides into two parts.) Suppose a portion is taken from one of two equal amounts and added to the other. The larger amount now exceeds the smaller by twice that portion. If the portion had only been removed, not added to the other amount, the difference would be just one portion. But when the portion is transferred, the larger amount exceeds the average by one portion. The average also exceeds the amount from which the portion was taken by one portion. This example therefore gives us a rule for deciding how much to take from someone who has more. It also tells us how much to add to someone who has less. Add to the smaller amount the difference between the average and the smaller amount. Take from the larger amount the difference between the larger amount and the average.

Thus let there be three straight lines equal to one another. From one of them cut off a portion, and add as much to another of them. The whole line thus made will exceed the remainder of the first-named line, by twice the portion added, and will exceed the untouched line by that portion.¹⁴ And these terms loss and gain are derived from voluntary exchange: that is to say, the having more than what was one’s own is called gaining, and the having less than one’s original stock is called losing; for instance, in buying or selling, or any other transactions which are guaranteed by law: but when the result is neither more nor less, but exactly the same as there was originally,¹⁵ people say they have their own, and neither lose nor gain.

Suppose there are three straight lines of equal length. Cut a portion from one line and add the same amount to another. The extended line will exceed what remains of the first line by twice the added portion. It will exceed the untouched line by the added portion.¹⁴ The terms loss and gain come from voluntary exchange. Having more than one originally owned is called gaining, and having less is called losing. Examples include buying, selling, and other transactions guaranteed by law. But sometimes the result is neither more nor less, but exactly the same as what one originally had.¹⁵ In such cases, people say they have what is their own, and have neither lost nor gained.

So then the Just we have been speaking of is a mean between loss and gain arising in involuntary transactions; that is, it is the having the same after the transaction as one had before it took place.

So the justice we have discussed is a middle point between loss and gain in involuntary transactions. That means having the same amount after the transaction as before.

There are people who have a notion that Reciprocation is simply just, as the Pythagoreans said: for they defined the Just simply and without qualification as “That which reciprocates with another.” But this simple Reciprocation will not fit on either to the Distributive Just, or the Corrective (and yet this is the interpretation they put on the Rhadamanthian rule of Just,

Some people think Reciprocation is simply justice, as the Pythagoreans said. The Pythagoreans defined justice, simply and without qualification, as “That which reciprocates with another.” But simple Reciprocation does not fit either distributive justice or corrective justice. (Yet the Pythagoreans interpret the Rhadamanthian rule of justice as requiring simple Reciprocation,

for in many cases differences arise: as, for instance, suppose one in authority has struck a man, he is not to be struck in turn; or if a man has struck one in authority, he must not only be struck but punished also.¹⁶ And again, the voluntariness or involuntariness of actions makes a great difference.

For circumstances differ in many cases. For example, suppose someone in authority strikes a man. The man must not strike back. But if a man strikes someone in authority, he must be struck and also punished.¹⁶ And whether actions are voluntary or involuntary makes a great difference.

But in dealings of exchange such a principle of Justice as this Reciprocation forms the bond of union, but then it must be Reciprocation according to proportion and not exact equality, because by proportionate reciprocity of action the social community is held together, For either Reciprocation of evil is meant, and if this be not allowed it is thought to be a servile condition of things: or else Reciprocation of good, and if this be not effected then there is no admission to participation which is the very bond of their union.

But in exchanges, reciprocity as a principle of justice forms the bond that unites people. Yet reciprocity must be proportionate, not exactly equal, because proportionate give-and-take holds the community together. For reciprocity means either returning harm or returning good. If people are not allowed to return harm, their condition is considered one of servitude. Or else reciprocity means returning good. If good is not returned, there is no sharing in the exchange, and such sharing is what binds people together.

And this is the moral of placing the Temple of the Graces (χάριτες) in the public streets; to impress the notion that there may be requital, this being peculiar to χάρις¹⁷ because a man ought to requite with a good turn the man who has done him a favour and then to become himself the originator of another χάρις, by doing him a favour.

And the Temple of the Graces (χάριτες) stands in the public streets to teach this lesson: favours may be repaid. Such repayment is a defining feature of χάρις¹⁷. For a man ought to return a favour to the man who helped him. Then he ought to take the lead in another χάρις by doing that man a favour.

Now the acts of mutual giving in due proportion may be represented by the diameters of a parallelogram, at the four angles of which the parties and their wares are so placed that the side connecting the parties be opposite to that connecting the wares, and each party be connected by one side with his own ware, as in the accompanying diagram.

Exchanges in proper proportion may be represented by the diagonals of a parallelogram. The two parties and their goods occupy the four corners, as shown in the accompanying diagram. The side joining the parties is opposite the side joining the goods. Each party is connected to their own goods by one side.

The builder is to receive from the shoemaker of his ware, and to give him of his own: if then there be first proportionate equality, and then the Reciprocation takes place, there will be the just result which we are speaking of: if not, there is not the equal, nor will the connection stand: for there is no reason why the ware of the one may not be better than that of the other, and therefore before the exchange is made they must have been equalised. And this is so also in the other arts: for they would have been destroyed entirely if there were not a correspondence in point of quantity and quality between the producer and the consumer. For, we must remember, no dealing arises between two of the same kind, two physicians, for instance; but say between a physician and agriculturist, or, to state it generally, between those who are different and not equal, but these of course must have been equalised before the exchange can take place.

The builder is to receive some of the shoemaker’s goods and give the shoemaker some of his own. If their goods are first made equal in proportion, and then exchanged, the result will be just, as described. If not, there is no equality, and the relationship will not last. For one person’s goods may be better than the other’s. So the goods must be made equal in value before the exchange. The same applies to the other crafts. For these crafts would have disappeared entirely without a match in quantity and quality between producer and consumer. We must remember that exchange does not arise between two people of the same kind, such as two physicians. Instead, exchange arises, for example, between a physician and a farmer. More generally, exchange arises between people who are different and unequal. But these people must, of course, be put on an equal footing before the exchange can take place.

It is therefore indispensable that all things which can be exchanged should be capable of comparison, and for this purpose money has come in, and comes to be a kind of medium, for it measures all things and so likewise the excess and defect; for instance, how many shoes are equal to a house or a given quantity of food. As then the builder to the shoemaker, so many shoes must be to the house (or food, if instead of a builder an agriculturist be the exchanging party); for unless there is this proportion there cannot be exchange or dealing, and this proportion cannot be unless the terms are in some way equal; hence the need, as was stated above, of some one measure of all things. Now this is really and truly the Demand for them, which is the common bond of all such dealings. For if the parties were not in want at all or not similarly of one another’s wares, there would either not be any exchange, or at least not the same.

Everything that can be exchanged must therefore be comparable. Money was introduced for this purpose and serves as a kind of medium. Money measures everything, including how much one thing exceeds or falls short of another. For example, money measures how many shoes equal a house or a given amount of food. The ratio of builder to shoemaker must match the ratio of shoes to house. The same applies to shoes and food if a farmer, rather than a builder, is making the exchange. Without this proportion, there can be no exchange or trade. And this proportion is impossible unless the things exchanged are equal in some way. So, as stated above, there must be one measure for everything. In fact, this measure is the demand for these goods, the common bond behind all such dealings. For if neither party needed the other's goods, or their needs did not correspond, no exchange would occur, or at least not the same exchange.

And money has come to be, by general agreement, a representative of Demand: and the account of its Greek name νομισμα is this, that it is what it is not naturally but by custom or law (νόμος), and it rests with us to change its value, or make it wholly useless.

And money has become, by general agreement, a representative of demand. Its Greek name, νομισμα, reflects that money is what it is through custom or law (νόμος), not by nature. And we have the power to change money’s value or make money entirely useless.

Very well then, there will be Reciprocation when the terms have been equalised so as to stand in this proportion; Agriculturist : Shoemaker : : wares of Shoemaker : wares of Agriculturist; but you must bring them to this form of proportion when they exchange, otherwise the one extreme will combine both exceedings of the mean:¹⁸ but when they have exactly their own then they are equal and have dealings, because the same equality can come to be in their case. Let A represent an agriculturist, C food, B a shoemaker, D his wares equalised with A’s. Then the proportion will be correct, A:B::C:D; now Reciprocation will be practicable, if it were not, there would have been no dealing.

Very well, then, there will be reciprocal exchange when the terms have been equalized in this proportion: farmer : shoemaker : : shoemaker’s goods : farmer’s goods. But you must establish this proportion when they exchange goods. Otherwise, one extreme will combine both excesses over the mean.¹⁸ But when each has exactly their own share, they are equal and can trade. This is because the same equality can be established between them. Let A represent a farmer, C food, B a shoemaker, and D the shoemaker’s goods, equalized with the farmer’s. Then the proportion will be correct, A:B::C:D. Now reciprocal exchange will be possible. If reciprocal exchange were not possible, no trade would have taken place.

Now that what connects men in such transactions is Demand, as being some one thing, is shown by the fact that, when either one does not want the other or neither want one another, they do not exchange at all: whereas they do¹⁹ when one wants what the other man has, wine for instance, giving in return corn for exportation.

Demand is the common factor that connects people in these exchanges, as the following shows. If either person wants nothing from the other, or neither wants anything from the other, they do not exchange at all. But they do¹⁹ when one wants something the other has, such as wine, and gives grain for export in return.

And further, money is a kind of security to us in respect of exchange at some future time (supposing that one wants nothing now that we shall have it when we do): the theory of money being that whenever one brings it one can receive commodities in exchange: of course this too is liable to depreciation, for its purchasing power is not always the same, but still it is of a more permanent nature than the commodities it represents. And this is the reason why all things should have a price set upon them, because thus there may be exchange at any time, and if exchange then dealing. So money, like a measure, making all things commensurable equalises them: for if there was not exchange there would not have been dealing, nor exchange if there were not equality, nor equality if there were not the capacity of being commensurate: it is impossible that things so greatly different should be really commensurate, but we can approximate sufficiently for all practical purposes in reference to Demand. The common measure must be some one thing, and also from agreement (for which reason it is called νόμισμα), for this makes all things commensurable: in fact, all things are measured by money. Let B represent ten minæ, A a house worth five minæ, or in other words half B, C a bed worth 1/10th of B: it is clear then how many beds are equal to one house, namely, five.

Money also gives us some security when we want to exchange goods in the future. If we want nothing now, money ensures we can get what we need when we do. The idea behind money is that whenever someone brings it, they can receive goods in exchange. Of course, money too can lose value, since its purchasing power is not always the same. Still, money is more lasting than the goods it represents. For this reason, all things should have a price. Prices allow exchange at any time, and exchange makes trade possible. So money acts like a measure, making all things comparable and establishing their equality in value. Without exchange, there would have been no trade. Nor could there be exchange without equality, or equality without a way to measure things against one another. Things so different cannot truly be measured on the same scale. But we can come close enough for practical purposes in relation to demand. There must be one common measure, and it must be established by agreement. This is why money is called νόμισμα. Money makes all things comparable. In fact, all things are measured by money. Let B represent ten minæ, and A a house worth five minæ, or half of B. Let C represent a bed worth one-tenth of B. It is then clear how many beds equal one house: five.

It is obvious also that exchange was thus conducted before the existence of money: for it makes no difference whether you give for a house five beds or the price of five beds.

Clearly, exchange also worked this way before money existed. For exchanging five beds for a house is no different from paying the price of five beds.

We have now said then what the abstract Just and Unjust are, and these having been defined it is plain that just acting is a mean between acting unjustly and being acted unjustly towards: the former being equivalent to having more, and the latter to having less.

We have now explained justice and injustice in the abstract. With these defined, acting justly is clearly a middle point between acting unjustly and being treated unjustly. Acting unjustly means having more, while being treated unjustly means having less.

But Justice, it must be observed, is a mean state not after the same manner as the forementioned virtues, but because it aims at producing the mean, while Injustice occupies both the extremes.

But note that Justice is a middle state, though not in the same way as the virtues mentioned earlier. Justice is a middle state because it aims to produce the middle ground, while Injustice occupies both extremes.

And Justice is the moral state in virtue of which the just man is said to have the aptitude for practising the Just in the way of moral choice, and for making division between, himself and another, or between two other men, not so as to give to himself the greater and to his neighbour the less share of what is choice-worthy and contrariwise of what is hurtful, but what is proportionably equal, and in like manner when adjudging the rights of two other men.

Justice is the moral disposition that enables a just person to act justly by deliberate choice. It also enables him to divide things between himself and another person, or between two other people. He does not give himself more of what is desirable and his neighbor less, or less of what is harmful. Instead, he gives each a proportionately equal share. He follows the same principle when deciding the rights of two other people.

Injustice is all this with respect to the Unjust: and since the Unjust is excess or defect of what is good or hurtful respectively, in violation of the proportionate, therefore Injustice is both excess and defect because it aims at producing excess and defect; excess, that is, in a man’s own case of what is simply advantageous, and defect of what is hurtful: and in the case of other men in like manner generally speaking, only that the proportionate is violated not always in one direction as before but whichever way it happens in the given case. And of the Unjust act the less is being acted unjustly towards, and the greater the acting unjustly towards others.²⁰

Injustice has all these features in relation to what is unjust. What is unjust involves too much benefit or too little harm, contrary to proper proportion. So injustice involves both excess and deficiency because it aims to produce both. In one’s own case, injustice seeks too much of what is beneficial in itself and too little of what is harmful. In dealings with others, the same generally applies. But the violation of proper proportion does not always follow the same direction as in one’s own case. Instead, the direction varies with the particular case. In an unjust act, receiving less means suffering injustice, while taking more means acting unjustly toward others.²⁰

Let this way of describing the nature of Justice and Injustice, and likewise the Just and the Unjust generally, be accepted as sufficient.

Let us accept this account of justice and injustice, and of the just and unjust in general, as sufficient.

[Again, since a man may do unjust acts and not yet have formed a character of injustice, the question arises whether a man is unjust in each particular form of injustice, say a thief, or adulterer, or robber, by doing acts of a given character.

[Again, a man may commit unjust acts without yet having developed an unjust character. So the question arises: does committing a particular kind of unjust act make a man unjust in that specific way? For example, does it make him a thief, an adulterer, or a robber?

We may say, I think, that this will not of itself make any difference; a man may, for instance, have had connection with another’s wife, knowing well with whom he was sinning, but he may have done it not of deliberate choice but from the impulse of passion: of course he acts unjustly, but he has not necessarily formed an unjust character: that is, he may have stolen yet not be a thief; or committed an act of adultery but still not be an adulterer, and so on in other cases which might be enumerated.]²¹

I think we may say that this alone will make no difference. For example, a man may have had sex with another man’s wife, knowing full well whom he was sinning with. But he may have acted on an impulse of passion rather than by deliberate choice. Of course, he acts unjustly, but he has not necessarily developed an unjust character. In other words, he may have stolen without being a thief, or committed adultery without being an adulterer. The same applies to other cases we could list.]²¹

Of the relation which Reciprocation bears to the Just we have already spoken: and here it should be noticed that the Just which we are investigating is both the Just in the abstract and also as exhibited in Social Relations, which latter arises in the case of those who live in communion with a view to independence and who are free and equal either proportionately or numerically.²²

We have already discussed how reciprocity relates to justice. Here we should note that we are examining both justice in the abstract and justice in social relations. Justice in social relations arises among people who live together with the aim of being self-sufficient. These people are free and equal, either proportionately or numerically.²²

It follows then that those who are not in this position have not among themselves the Social Just, but still Just of some kind and resembling that other. For Just implies mutually acknowledged law, and law the possibility of injustice, for adjudication is the act of distinguishing between the Just and the Unjust.

It follows that those who are not in this position do not have social justice among themselves. But they still have some kind of justice resembling social justice. For justice requires mutually acknowledged law, and law implies the possibility of injustice. This is because judging means distinguishing between what is just and what is unjust.

And among whomsoever there is the possibility of injustice among these there is that of acting unjustly; but it does not hold conversely that injustice attaches to all among whom there is the possibility of acting unjustly, since by the former we mean giving one’s self the larger share of what is abstractedly good and the less of what is abstractedly evil.

Among people capable of injustice, acting unjustly is also possible. But not everyone capable of acting unjustly is guilty of injustice. For injustice means giving yourself a larger share of what is good in itself, and a smaller share of what is bad in itself.

This, by the way, is the reason why we do not allow a man to govern, but Principle, because a man governs for himself and comes to be a despot: but the office of a ruler is to be guardian of the Just and therefore of the Equal. Well then, since he seems to have no peculiar personal advantage, supposing him a Just man, for in this case he does not allot to himself the larger share of what is abstractedly good unless it falls to his share proportionately (for which reason he really governs for others, and so Justice, men say, is a good not to one’s self so much as to others, as was mentioned before), therefore some compensation must be given him, as there actually is in the shape of honour and privilege; and wherever these are not adequate there rulers turn into despots.

This, by the way, is why we let principle govern rather than a man. A man governs for his own benefit and becomes a despot. But a ruler’s duty is to protect justice and therefore equality. Now, if the ruler is just, he seems to gain no special personal advantage. He does not give himself a larger share of good things unless that share is proportionate to his due. For this reason, he really governs for others. So people say justice benefits others more than oneself, as we mentioned before. Therefore, the ruler must receive some compensation, as he does in the form of honour and privilege. Wherever these rewards are inadequate, rulers turn into despots.

But the Just which arises in the relations of Master and Father, is not identical with, but similar to, these; because there is no possibility of injustice towards those things which are absolutely one’s own; and a slave or child (so long as this last is of a certain age and not separated into an independent being), is, as it were, part of a man’s self, and no man chooses to hurt himself, for which reason there cannot be injustice towards one’s own self: therefore neither is there the social Unjust or Just, which was stated to be in accordance with law and to exist between those among whom law naturally exists, and these were said to be they to whom belongs equality of ruling and being ruled.

But justice in a master’s or father’s relationships is not identical to these forms of justice, though it is similar. This is because no one can act unjustly toward what belongs entirely to him. A slave or child is, in a sense, part of a man himself. For a child, this applies only until a certain age, while the child has not become independent. No man chooses to harm himself, so no one can act unjustly toward himself. Therefore, neither social injustice nor social justice applies in these relationships. As stated earlier, social justice follows the law and exists between people whose relations naturally involve law. These people, as we said, have an equal share in ruling and being ruled.

Hence also there is Just rather between a man and his wife than between a man and his children or slaves; this is in fact the Just arising in domestic relations: and this too is different from the Social Just.

So justice also exists more between a man and his wife than between him and his children or slaves. This is the justice found in domestic relations. Domestic justice, too, differs from justice in society.

Further, this last-mentioned Just is of two kinds, natural and conventional; the former being that which has everywhere the same force and does not depend upon being received or not; the latter being that which originally may be this way or that indifferently but not after enactment: for instance, the price of ransom being fixed at a mina, or the sacrificing a goat instead of two sheep; and again, all cases of special enactment, as the sacrificing to Brasidas as a hero; in short, all matters of special decree.

Further, the kind of justice just mentioned has two forms: natural and conventional. Natural justice has the same force everywhere, whether people accept it or not. Conventional justice concerns matters that can initially be settled either way, but not once a law has been passed. Examples include fixing a ransom at one mina, or requiring the sacrifice of a goat rather than two sheep. Conventional justice also includes all special laws, such as requiring sacrifices to Brasidas as a hero. In short, it includes all matters settled by special decree.

But there are some men who think that all the Justs are of this latter kind, and on this ground: whatever exists by nature, they say, is unchangeable and has everywhere the same force; fire, for instance, burns not here only but in Persia as well, but the Justs they see changed in various places.

But some people think that all forms of justice are of this latter kind, for the following reason. Whatever exists by nature, they say, is unchanging and has the same force everywhere. Fire, for example, burns not only here but also in Persia. But they see that what is just varies from place to place.

Now this is not really so, and yet it is in a way (though among the gods perhaps by no means): still even amongst ourselves there is somewhat existing by nature: allowing that everything is subject to change, still there is that which does exist by nature, and that which does not.²³

Now this is not really true, yet in a way it is (though perhaps not at all among the gods). Still, even among us, some things exist by nature. Even if everything can change, some things exist by nature and others do not.²³

Nay, we may go further, and say that it is practically plain what among things which can be otherwise does exist by nature, and what does not but is dependent upon enactment and conventional, even granting that both are alike subject to be changed: and the same distinctive illustration will apply to this and other cases; the right hand is naturally the stronger, still some men may become equally strong in both.

We can go further. Among things that can change, it is fairly clear what exists by nature and what depends on laws and conventions. We can distinguish them even if we accept that both can change. The same example illustrates the distinction here and in other cases. The right hand is naturally stronger, but some people may become equally strong in both hands.

A parallel may be drawn between the Justs which depend upon convention and expedience, and measures; for wine and corn measures are not equal in all places, but where men buy they are large, and where these same sell again they are smaller: well, in like manner the Justs which are not natural, but of human invention, are not everywhere the same, for not even the forms of government are, and yet there is one only which by nature would be best in all places.

Rules of justice based on convention and practical advantage may be compared to measures. Measures for wine and grain are not the same everywhere. They are larger where people buy, but smaller where those same people sell again. Similarly, rules of justice invented by humans, rather than rooted in nature, are not the same everywhere. For even forms of government differ from place to place. Yet only one form of government would, by nature, be best everywhere.

Now of Justs and Lawfuls each bears to the acts which embody and exemplify it the relation of an universal to a particular; the acts being many, but each of the principles only singular because each is an universal. And so there is a difference between an unjust act and the abstract Unjust, and the just act and the abstract Just: I mean, a thing is unjust in itself, by nature or by ordinance; well, when this has been embodied in act, there is an unjust act, but not till then, only some unjust thing.²⁴ And similarly of a just act. (Perhaps δικαιοπράγημα is more correctly the common or generic term for just act, the word δικαίωμα, which I have here used, meaning generally and properly the act corrective of the unjust act.) Now as to each of them, what kinds there are, and how many, and what is their object-matter, we must examine afterwards.

Principles of justice and law relate to the acts that embody them as universal rules relate to particular cases. The acts are many, but each principle is one because each principle is universal. So an unjust act differs from injustice in the abstract, just as a just act differs from justice in the abstract. Something may be unjust in itself, whether by nature or by law. When that injustice takes the form of an action, there is an unjust act. Until then, there is only something unjust.²⁴ The same applies to a just act. (Perhaps δικαιοπράγημα is the more accurate general term for a just act. The word δικαίωμα, which I have used here, generally and properly means an act that corrects an unjust act.) We must examine later the kinds of each, how many kinds there are, and what they concern.

For the present we proceed to say that, the Justs and the Unjusts being what have been mentioned, a man is said to act unjustly or justly when he embodies these abstracts in voluntary actions, but when in involuntary, then he neither acts unjustly or justly except accidentally; I mean that the being just or unjust is really only accidental to the agents in such cases.

For now, we take just and unjust things to be as described above. A person is said to act justly or unjustly when they voluntarily put these principles into action. But when they act involuntarily, they act neither justly nor unjustly, except incidentally. I mean that, in such cases, justice or injustice is only incidental to the person acting.

So both unjust and just actions are limited by the being voluntary or the contrary: for when an embodying of the Unjust is voluntary, then it is blamed and is at the same time also an unjust action: but, if voluntariness does not attach, there will be a thing which is in itself unjust but not yet an unjust action.

So whether actions count as unjust or just depends on whether they are voluntary or involuntary. For when someone voluntarily does something unjust, the act deserves blame and also counts as an unjust action. But if the act is not voluntary, it is unjust in itself but does not yet count as an unjust action.

By voluntary, I mean, as we stated before, whatsoever of things in his own power a man does with knowledge, and the absence of ignorance as to the person to whom, or the instrument with which, or the result with which he does; as, for instance, whom he strikes, what he strikes him with, and with what probable result; and each of these points again, not accidentally nor by compulsion; as supposing another man were to seize his hand and strike a third person with it, here, of course, the owner of the hand acts not voluntarily, because it did not rest with him to do or leave undone: or again, it is conceivable that the person struck may be his father, and he may know that it is a man, or even one of the present company, whom he is striking, but not know that it is his father. And let these same distinctions be supposed to be carried into the case of the result and in fact the whole of any given action. In fine then, that is involuntary which is done through ignorance, or which, not resulting from ignorance, is not in the agent’s control or is done on compulsion.

As we said before, I call an action voluntary when a person knowingly does something within his control. He must know whom he is acting on, what instrument he is using, and what result is likely. For example, he must know whom he is striking, what he is striking with, and the likely result. Each of these details must also be part of his action, not merely accidental or forced. Suppose another man grabs his hand and uses it to strike a third person. The man whose hand is used is clearly not acting voluntarily. He could not choose whether to strike or not. Or the person struck may be his father. He may know he is striking a man, or even someone in the group present, without knowing it is his father. The same distinctions apply to the result and, indeed, to every aspect of any given action. In short, an action is involuntary if it is done through ignorance. Even without ignorance, an action is involuntary if it is outside the person's control or done under compulsion.

I mention these cases, because there are many natural things which we do and suffer knowingly but still no one of which is either voluntary or involuntary, growing old, or dying, for instance.

I mention these cases because we knowingly do or experience many natural things. But none of these things are either voluntary or involuntary, such as growing old or dying.

Again, accidentality may attach to the unjust in like manner as to the just acts. For instance, a man may have restored what was deposited with him, but against his will and from fear of the consequences of a refusal: we must not say that he either does what is just, or does justly, except accidentally: and in like manner the man who through compulsion and against his will fails to restore a deposit, must be said to do unjustly, or to do what is unjust, accidentally only.

Again, unjust acts, like just acts, may be unjust only incidentally. For example, a man may return something entrusted to him, but unwillingly, out of fear of the consequences of refusing. We must not say he does what is just, or acts justly, except incidentally. Likewise, a man may be forced, against his will, not to return something entrusted to him. We must say he acts unjustly, or does what is unjust, only incidentally.

Again, voluntary actions we do either from deliberate choice or without it; from it, when we act from previous deliberation; without it, when without any previous deliberation. Since then hurts which may be done in transactions between man and man are threefold, those mistakes which are attended with ignorance are, when a man either does a thing not to the man to whom he meant to do it, or not the thing he meant to do, or not with the instrument, or not with the result which he intended: either he did not think he should hit him at all, or not with this, or this is not the man he thought he should hit, or he did not think this would be the result of the blow but a result has followed which he did not anticipate; as, for instance, he did it not to wound but merely to prick him; or it is not the man whom, or the way in which, he meant.

Again, we act voluntarily either with or without deliberate choice. We act with deliberate choice when we have thought beforehand about what to do. We act without deliberate choice when we have not thought beforehand about what to do. Now, there are three kinds of harm people may cause in their dealings with one another. Mistakes involving ignorance occur when someone acts against a person other than the intended person, or does something unintended. Such mistakes also occur when someone uses an unintended instrument or produces an unintended result. For example, someone may not have expected to strike the other person at all, or not with that instrument. Or the person struck may not be the person they thought they would strike. Or they may not have expected the blow to have that result, but an unforeseen result followed. For instance, they may have meant only to prick the person, not to wound them. Or they may have acted against someone other than the intended person, or in a way they did not intend.

Now when the hurt has come about contrary to all reasonable expectation, it is a Misadventure; when though not contrary to expectation yet without any viciousness, it is a Mistake; for a man makes a mistake when the origination of the cause rests with himself, he has a misadventure when it is external to himself. When again he acts with knowledge, but not from previous deliberation, it is an unjust action; for instance, whatever happens to men from anger or other passions which are necessary or natural: for when doing these hurts or making these mistakes they act unjustly of course and their actions are unjust, still they are not yet confirmed unjust or wicked persons by reason of these, because the hurt did not arise from depravity in the doer of it: but when it does arise from deliberate choice, then the doer is a confirmed unjust and depraved man.

When harm occurs against all reasonable expectations, it is a misadventure. When harm is not unexpected but involves no moral fault, it is a mistake. A person makes a mistake when the cause originates in himself. He suffers a misadventure when the cause is outside himself. When someone acts knowingly but without thinking beforehand, his action is unjust. Examples include actions driven by anger or other necessary or natural passions. People who cause such harm or make such mistakes do act unjustly, and their actions are unjust. Still, these actions do not by themselves make them thoroughly unjust or wicked people, because the harm did not arise from a corrupt character. But when the harm results from deliberate choice, the person who causes it is thoroughly unjust and corrupt.

And on this principle acts done from anger are fairly judged not to be from malice prepense, because it is not the man who acts in wrath who is the originator really but he who caused his wrath. And again, the question at issue in such cases is not respecting the fact but respecting the justice of the case, the occasion of anger being a notion of injury.²⁵ I mean, that the parties do not dispute about the fact, as in questions of contract (where one of the two must be a rogue, unless real forgetfulness can be pleaded), but, admitting the fact, they dispute on which side the justice of the case lies (the one who plotted against the other, i.e. the real aggressor, of course, cannot be ignorant),²⁶ so that the one thinks there is injustice committed while the other does not.

On this principle, acts done in anger are rightly judged not to be deliberately planned wrongdoing. For the true instigator is not the person acting in anger, but the person who provoked that anger. Again, the dispute in such cases concerns not what happened, but whether it was just. Anger arises from a belief that one has been wronged.²⁵ I mean that the parties do not dispute what happened, as they do in contract disputes. (In contract disputes, one party must be dishonest, unless genuine forgetfulness can explain the disagreement.) Instead, both parties admit what happened, but dispute whose side is just. (The person who plotted against the other, that is, the real aggressor, of course cannot be unaware of the wrongdoing.)²⁶ So one party believes an injustice has been committed, while the other does not.

Well then, a man acts unjustly if he has hurt another of deliberate purpose, and he who commits such acts of injustice is ipso facto an unjust character when they are in violation of the proportionate or the equal; and in like manner also a man is a just character when he acts justly of deliberate purpose, and he does act justly if he acts voluntarily.

Well then, a man acts unjustly if he deliberately harms another person. A man who commits such unjust acts is by that very fact unjust in character if those acts violate proportion or equality. Likewise, a man is just in character when he deliberately acts justly. And he acts justly if he acts voluntarily.

Then as for involuntary acts of harm, they are either such as are excusable or such as are not: under the former head come all errors done not merely in ignorance but from ignorance; under the latter all that are done not from ignorance but in ignorance caused by some passion which is neither natural nor fairly attributable to human infirmity.

Involuntary acts that cause harm are either excusable or inexcusable. Excusable acts include all mistakes made not merely in ignorance but because of ignorance. Inexcusable acts include all mistakes made in ignorance, but not because of ignorance, when some passion causes the ignorance. Such a passion is neither natural nor reasonably explained by human weakness.

Now a question may be raised whether we have spoken with sufficient distinctness as to being unjustly dealt with, and dealing unjustly towards others.

Now we may ask: Have we been clear enough about being treated unjustly and treating others unjustly?

First, whether the case is possible which Euripides has put, saying somewhat strangely,

First, is the situation Euripides describes possible? He says, somewhat strangely,

I mean then, is it really possible for a person to be unjustly dealt with with his own consent, or must every case of being unjustly dealt with be against the will of the sufferer as every act of unjust dealing is voluntary?

What I mean is, can someone really be treated unjustly with their own consent? Or must unjust treatment always be against the victim’s will, just as every act of unjust treatment is voluntary?

And next, are cases of being unjustly dealt with to be ruled all one way as every act of unjust dealing is voluntary? or may we say that some cases are voluntary and some involuntary?

Next, must all cases of being treated unjustly fall into one category, just as all unjust acts are voluntary? Or may we say that being treated unjustly is voluntary in some cases and involuntary in others?

Similarly also as regards being justly dealt with: all just acting is voluntary, so that it is fair to suppose that the being dealt with unjustly or justly must be similarly opposed, as to being either voluntary or involuntary.

The same reasoning applies to being treated justly. All just actions are voluntary. So it is reasonable to suppose that being treated unjustly and being treated justly are likewise opposites: one voluntary, the other involuntary.

Now as for being justly dealt with, the position that every case of this is voluntary is a strange one, for some are certainly justly dealt with without their will.²⁷ The fact is a man may also fairly raise this question, whether in every case he who has suffered what is unjust is therefore unjustly dealt with, or rather that the case is the same with suffering as it is with acting; namely that in both it is possible to participate in what is just, but only accidentally. Clearly the case of what is unjust is similar: for doing things in themselves unjust is not identical with acting unjustly, nor is suffering them the same as being unjustly dealt with. So too of acting justly and being justly dealt with, since it is impossible to be unjustly dealt with unless some one else acts unjustly or to be justly dealt with unless some one else acts justly.

As for being treated justly, it is strange to claim that everyone accepts such treatment willingly. Some people are certainly treated justly against their will.²⁷ We may also reasonably ask whether everyone who suffers something unjust is therefore treated unjustly. Or is undergoing an action like performing one? In both cases, a person can be involved in something just, but only incidentally. Clearly, the same applies to what is unjust. Doing things that are unjust in themselves is not the same as acting unjustly. Nor is suffering those things the same as being treated unjustly. The same distinction applies to acting justly and being treated justly. For no one can be treated unjustly unless someone else acts unjustly. Nor can anyone be treated justly unless someone else acts justly.

Now if acting unjustly is simply “hurting another voluntarily” (by which I mean, knowing whom you are hurting, and wherewith, and how you are hurting him), and the man who fails of self-control voluntarily hurts himself, then this will be a case of being voluntarily dealt unjustly with, and it will be possible for a man to deal unjustly with himself. (This by the way is one of the questions raised, whether it is possible for a man to deal unjustly with himself.) Or again, a man may, by reason of failing of self-control, receive hurt from another man acting voluntarily, and so here will be another case of being unjustly dealt with voluntarily.

Now suppose acting unjustly simply means “voluntarily harming another person.” Here I mean knowing whom you are harming, what you are using, and how you are harming them. Suppose also that someone who lacks self-control voluntarily harms himself. Then he would be voluntarily suffering an injustice, and it would be possible for someone to act unjustly toward himself. (Whether someone can act unjustly toward himself is, incidentally, one of the questions raised.) Or again, someone may, through lack of self-control, suffer harm from another person who acts voluntarily. So here would be another case of someone voluntarily suffering an injustice.

The solution, I take it, is this: the definition of being unjustly dealt with is not correct, but we must add, to the hurting with the knowledge of the person hurt and the instrument and the manner of hurting him, the fact of its being against the wish of the man who is hurt.

I think the solution is this: the definition of being treated unjustly is incorrect. It includes harming someone while knowing who is being harmed, by what means, and in what way. But we must add that the harm goes against the wishes of the person harmed.

So then a man may be hurt and suffer what is in itself unjust voluntarily, but unjustly dealt with voluntarily no man can be: since no man wishes to be hurt, not even he who fails of self-control, who really acts contrary to his wish: for no man wishes for that which he does not think to be good, and the man who fails of self-control does not what he thinks he ought to do.

So a person may willingly suffer harm and something that is in itself unjust. But no one can willingly be treated unjustly, since no one wishes to be harmed. Even someone who lacks self-control does not wish to be harmed, but actually acts against their wishes. For no one wishes for anything they do not think is good. And someone who lacks self-control does not do what they think they ought to do.

And again, he that gives away his own property (as Homer says Glaucus gave to Diomed, “armour of gold for brass, armour worth a hundred oxen for that which was worth but nine”) is not unjustly dealt with, because the giving rests entirely with himself; but being unjustly dealt with does not, there must be some other person who is dealing unjustly towards him.

Again, someone who gives away his own property is not being treated unjustly. As Homer says, Glaucus gave Diomed “gold armour for bronze armour, armour worth a hundred oxen for armour worth only nine”. Giving is entirely within the giver’s control. But being treated unjustly is not within his control. Someone else must be treating him unjustly.

With respect to being unjustly dealt with then, it is clear that it is not voluntary.

So it is clear that being treated unjustly is not voluntary.

There remain yet two points on which we purposed to speak: first, is he chargeable with an unjust act who in distribution has given the larger share to one party contrary to the proper rate, or he that has the larger share? next, can a man deal unjustly by himself?

Two questions remain that we intended to discuss. First, who is responsible for an unjust act when someone receives more than their proper share? Is it the person who has given the larger share, or the person who has the larger share? Next, can a person act unjustly toward himself?

In the first question, if the first-named alternative is possible and it is the distributor who acts unjustly and not he who has the larger share, then supposing that a person knowingly and willingly gives more to another than to himself here is a case of a man dealing unjustly by himself; which, in fact, moderate men are thought to do, for it is a characteristic of the equitable man to take less than his due.

On the first question, suppose the first alternative is possible. Suppose the distributor acts unjustly, not the person who receives the larger share. Then, if someone knowingly and willingly gives another person more than he gives himself, he acts unjustly toward himself. In fact, moderate men are thought to treat themselves this way. For a fair-minded man characteristically takes less than his due.

Is not this the answer? that the case is not quite fairly stated, because of some other good, such as credit or the abstract honourable, in the supposed case the man did get the larger share. And again, the difficulty is solved by reference to the definition of unjust dealing: for the man suffers nothing contrary to his own wish, so that, on this score at least, he is not unjustly dealt with, but, if anything, he is hurt only.

Isn’t the answer that the case has not been presented quite fairly? In the supposed case, the man did receive the larger share of some other good, such as recognition or honor itself. Again, the difficulty is resolved by considering the definition of unjust treatment. For the man suffers nothing against his own wishes. So, on that basis at least, he is not treated unjustly. If anything, he is only harmed.

It is evident also that it is the distributor who acts unjustly and not the man who has the greater share: because the mere fact of the abstract Unjust attaching to what a man does, does not constitute unjust action, but the doing this voluntarily: and voluntariness attaches to that quarter whence is the origination of the action, which clearly is in the distributor not in the receiver. And again the term doing is used in several senses; in one sense inanimate objects kill, or the hand, or the slave by his master’s bidding; so the man in question does not act unjustly but does things which are in themselves unjust.

It is also clear that the distributor acts unjustly, not the person who receives the greater share. Because an act’s being unjust in itself does not mean that the person performing it acts unjustly. The person must perform the act voluntarily. And an act is voluntary on the part of the person who initiates it. Clearly, the distributor initiates the action, not the receiver. Again, “doing” has several meanings. In one sense, inanimate objects kill, as does a hand or a slave acting on his master’s orders. So the person in question does not act unjustly, but does things that are unjust in themselves.

Again, suppose that a man has made a wrongful award in ignorance; in the eye of the law he does not act unjustly nor is his awarding unjust, but yet he is in a certain sense: for the Just according to law and primary or natural Just are not coincident: but, if he knowingly decided unjustly, then he himself as well as the receiver got the larger share, that is, either of favour from the receiver or private revenge against the other party: and so the man who decided unjustly from these motives gets a larger share, in exactly the same sense as a man would who received part of the actual matter of the unjust action: because in this case the man who wrongly adjudged, say a field, did not actually get land but money by his unjust decision.

Again, suppose a man unknowingly makes a wrongful judgment. In the eyes of the law, neither his action nor his judgment is unjust. Yet in a certain sense he is unjust, because legal justice and primary or natural justice do not coincide. But if he knowingly judged unjustly, both he and the person benefiting from his judgment gained a larger share. The judge gained either favor from the recipient or personal revenge against the other party. So a man who judges unjustly for these reasons gains a larger share. His gain is like that of someone who receives part of the actual property involved in the unjust action. For example, a man who wrongfully awarded a field did not actually receive land, but money through his unjust judgment.

Now men suppose that acting Unjustly rests entirely with themselves, and conclude that acting Justly is therefore also easy. But this is not really so; to have connection with a neighbour’s wife, or strike one’s neighbour, or give the money with one’s hand, is of course easy and rests with one’s self: but the doing these acts with certain inward dispositions neither is easy nor rests entirely with one’s self. And in like way, the knowing what is Just and what Unjust men think no great instance of wisdom because it is not hard to comprehend those things of which the laws speak. They forget that these are not Just actions, except accidentally: to be Just they must be done and distributed in a certain manner: and this is a more difficult task than knowing what things are wholesome; for in this branch of knowledge it is an easy matter to know honey, wine, hellebore, cautery, or the use of the knife, but the knowing how one should administer these with a view to health, and to whom and at what time, amounts in fact to being a physician.

People suppose that acting unjustly is entirely within their control. So they conclude that acting justly is also easy. But that is not really so. Sleeping with a neighbor’s wife, striking a neighbor, or handing over money is, of course, easy and within one’s control. But doing these things with a particular inner attitude is neither easy nor entirely within one’s control. Likewise, people think knowing what is just and unjust requires no great wisdom. They think so because understanding what the laws discuss is not difficult. But they forget that these actions are just only incidentally. To be just, actions must be performed and distributions made in a particular way. Knowing how to do this is harder than knowing what is healthy. In medicine, recognizing honey, wine, hellebore, cautery, or the use of a knife is easy. But knowing how to use these treatments to promote health, for whom, and when, amounts to being a physician.

From this very same mistake they suppose also, that acting Unjustly is equally in the power of the Just man, for the Just man no less, nay even more, than the Unjust, may be able to do the particular acts; he may be able to have intercourse with a woman or strike a man; or the brave man to throw away his shield and turn his back and run this way or that. True: but then it is not the mere doing these things which constitutes acts of cowardice or injustice (except accidentally), but the doing them with certain inward dispositions: just as it is not the mere using or not using the knife, administering or not administering certain drugs, which constitutes medical treatment or curing, but doing these things in a certain particular way.

The same mistake also leads them to suppose that a just person is equally capable of acting unjustly. For a just person may be as capable as an unjust person, or even more capable, of particular acts. A just person may be able to have sex with a woman or strike a man. Likewise, a brave person may be able to throw away his shield, turn his back, and run in any direction. True, but merely doing these things does not make them acts of cowardice or injustice, except incidentally. Rather, what makes them cowardly or unjust is doing them with certain inner attitudes. Similarly, medical treatment or healing does not consist merely in using or not using a knife, or giving or withholding certain drugs. Rather, medical treatment or healing consists in doing these things in a particular way.

Again the abstract principles of Justice have their province among those who partake of what is abstractedly good, and can have too much or too little of these.²⁸ Now there are beings who cannot have too much of them, as perhaps the gods; there are others, again, to whom no particle of them is of use, those who are incurably wicked to whom all things are hurtful; others to whom they are useful to a certain degree: for this reason then the province of Justice is among Men.

Again, the abstract principles of Justice apply to those who share in things that are good in themselves. Such people can have too much or too little of these goods.²⁸ Some beings, perhaps the gods, cannot have too much of these goods. Others gain no benefit from even the smallest amount. These are the incurably wicked, for whom all things are harmful. Still others benefit from these goods up to a certain point. For this reason, then, Justice applies among Men.

We have next to speak of Equity and the Equitable, that is to say, of the relations of Equity to Justice and the Equitable to the Just; for when we look into the matter the two do not appear identical nor yet different in kind; and we sometimes commend the Equitable and the man who embodies it in his actions, so that by way of praise we commonly transfer the term also to other acts instead of the term good, thus showing that the more Equitable a thing is the better it is: at other times following a certain train of reasoning we arrive at a difficulty, in that the Equitable though distinct from the Just is yet praiseworthy; it seems to follow either that the Just is not good or the Equitable not Just, since they are by hypothesis different; or if both are good then they are identical.

Next we must discuss Equity and the Equitable, and how they relate to Justice and the Just. When we examine Equity and Justice, they seem neither identical nor different in kind. Sometimes we praise the Equitable and the person whose actions embody it. As a form of praise, we commonly call other actions equitable rather than good. In doing so, we suggest that the more equitable something is, the better it is. At other times, however, a certain line of reasoning leads us to a difficulty. The Equitable is praiseworthy, although it differs from the Just. Since we assume they are different, it seems either that the Just is not good or the Equitable is not Just. Or, if both are good, then they are identical.

This is a tolerably fair statement of the difficulty which on these grounds arises in respect of the Equitable; but, in fact, all these may be reconciled and really involve no contradiction: for the Equitable is Just, being also better than one form of Just, but is not better than the Just as though it were different from it in kind: Just and Equitable then are identical, and, both being good, the Equitable is the better of the two.

This is a reasonably fair account of the difficulty these arguments raise about the Equitable. But all these points can, in fact, be reconciled and involve no real contradiction. For the Equitable is Just and is also better than one form of the Just. But the Equitable is not better than the Just as though the two were different in kind. The Just and the Equitable are therefore identical. Both are good, but the Equitable is the better of the two.

What causes the difficulty is this; the Equitable is Just, but not the Just which is in accordance with written law, being in fact a correction of that kind of Just. And the account of this is, that every law is necessarily universal while there are some things which it is not possible to speak of rightly in any universal or general statement. Where then there is a necessity for general statement, while a general statement cannot apply rightly to all cases, the law takes the generality of cases, being fully aware of the error thus involved; and rightly too notwithstanding, because the fault is not in the law, or in the framer of the law, but is inherent in the nature of the thing, because the matter of all action is necessarily such.

The difficulty is this: what is equitable is just, but not in the sense of following written law. Instead, equity corrects that kind of justice. The reason is that every law must be universal. Yet some matters cannot be accurately covered by any universal or general statement. So when a general statement is necessary but cannot apply correctly to every case, the law covers most cases. The law does so with full awareness of the error involved. Even so, the law is right to take this approach. The fault lies neither in the law nor in the lawmaker, but in the nature of the matter itself. This is because the matters that human action deals with are necessarily of this kind.

When then the law has spoken in general terms, and there arises a case of exception to the general rule, it is proper, in so far as the lawgiver omits the case and by reason of his universality of statement is wrong, to set right the omission by ruling it as the lawgiver himself would rule were he there present, and would have provided by law had he foreseen the case would arise. And so the Equitable is Just but better than one form of Just; I do not mean the abstract Just but the error which arises out of the universality of statement: and this is the nature of the Equitable, “a correction of Law, where Law is defective by reason of its universality.”

When a law speaks in general terms, a case may arise that is an exception to the general rule. If the lawgiver overlooked the case and the general wording leads to an error, the omission should be corrected. The ruling should be what the lawgiver himself would decide if he were present. It should also be what he would have written into law had he foreseen the case. So the Equitable is Just, but better than one form of the Just. I do not mean better than the Just in the abstract. I mean better than the error that results from a general statement. This, then, is the nature of the Equitable: “a correction of Law where Law falls short because it speaks in general terms.”

This is the reason why not all things are according to law, because there are things about which it is simply impossible to lay down a law, and so we want special enactments for particular cases. For to speak generally, the rule of the undefined must be itself undefined also, just as the rule to measure Lesbian building is made of lead: for this rule shifts according to the form of each stone and the special enactment according to the facts of the case in question.

This is why laws do not cover everything. Some matters simply cannot be governed by a law, so we need special rulings for particular cases. In general, a rule for something indefinite must itself be indefinite. The same is true of the lead ruler used in Lesbian building. The ruler bends to fit the shape of each stone, just as a special ruling adapts to the case’s facts.

It is clear then what the Equitable is; namely that it is Just but better than one form of Just: and hence it appears too who the Equitable man is: he is one who has a tendency to choose and carry out these principles, and who is not apt to press the letter of the law on the worse side but content to waive his strict claims though backed by the law: and this moral state is Equity, being a species of Justice, not a different moral state from Justice.

It is clear, then, what Equity is. It is just, but better than one form of justice. From this, it is also clear who the equitable man is. He tends to choose and act on these principles. He does not insist on the letter of the law when doing so would make matters worse. Instead, he is willing to give up his strict claims, even though the law supports them. This moral disposition is Equity, a form of Justice, not a different moral disposition from Justice.

The answer to the second of the two questions indicated above, “whether it is possible for a man to deal unjustly by himself,” is obvious from what has been already stated.

The second of the two questions mentioned above asks “whether a person can act unjustly toward themselves.” The answer is obvious from what has already been said.

In the first place, one class of Justs is those which are enforced by law in accordance with Virtue in the most extensive sense of the term: for instance, the law does not bid a man kill himself; and whatever it does not bid it forbids: well, whenever a man does hurt contrary to the law (unless by way of requital of hurt), voluntarily, i.e. knowing to whom he does it and wherewith, he acts Unjustly. Now he that from rage kills himself, voluntarily, does this in contravention of Right Reason, which the law does not permit. He therefore acts Unjustly: but towards whom? towards the Community, not towards himself (because he suffers with his own consent, and no man can be Unjustly dealt with with his own consent), and on this principle the Community punishes him; that is a certain infamy is attached to the suicide as to one who acts Unjustly towards the Community.

First, one kind of justice consists of actions required by law in accordance with virtue in its broadest sense. For example, the law does not tell a man to kill himself. And whatever the law does not tell him to do, it forbids. Now, a man acts unjustly whenever he voluntarily harms someone against the law, unless he is retaliating for harm. He acts voluntarily if he knows whom he is harming and what he is using to cause harm. A man who kills himself out of rage does so voluntarily and acts against right reason. The law does not permit such an act. He therefore acts unjustly. But towards whom? Towards the community, not himself. For he suffers with his own consent, and no one can be treated unjustly with his own consent. On this basis, the community punishes him. That is, a certain disgrace attaches to someone who dies by suicide, as someone who acts unjustly towards the community.

Next, a man cannot deal Unjustly by himself in the sense in which a man is Unjust who only does Unjust acts without being entirely bad (for the two things are different, because the Unjust man is in a way bad, as the coward is, not as though he were chargeable with badness in the full extent of the term, and so he does not act Unjustly in this sense), because if it were so then it would be possible for the same thing to have been taken away from and added to the same person:²⁹ but this is really not possible, the Just and the Unjust always implying a plurality of persons.

Next, a man cannot treat himself unjustly in the sense of committing unjust acts without being entirely bad. These are two different things. An unjust man is bad in a particular way, just as a coward is. He is not bad in the fullest sense of the word. So a man cannot act unjustly toward himself in this sense. If he could, the same thing could be both taken from him and given to him:²⁹ but that is impossible. Justice and injustice always involve more than one person.

Again, an Unjust action must be voluntary, done of deliberate purpose, and aggressive (for the man who hurts because he has first suffered and is merely requiting the same is not thought to act Unjustly), but here the man does to himself and suffers the same things at the same time.

Again, an unjust act must be voluntary, deliberate, and aggressive. (For someone who harms another merely to repay harm already suffered is not thought to act unjustly.) But here, the man inflicts harm on himself and suffers that same harm at the same time.

Again, it would imply the possibility of being Unjustly dealt with with one’s own consent.

Again, it would mean that someone could consent to being treated unjustly.

And, besides all this, a man cannot act Unjustly without his act falling under some particular crime; now a man cannot seduce his own wife, commit a burglary on his own premises, or steal his own property.

Besides all this, a man cannot act unjustly unless his action falls under some specific crime. But a man cannot seduce his own wife, burgle his own premises, or steal his own property.

After all, the general answer to the question is to allege what was settled respecting being Unjustly dealt with with one’s own consent.

After all, the general answer is to refer to the earlier conclusion about willingly being treated unjustly.

It is obvious, moreover, that being Unjustly dealt by and dealing Unjustly by others are both wrong; because the one is having less, the other having more, than the mean, and the case is parallel to that of the healthy in the healing art, and that of good condition in the art of training: but still the dealing Unjustly by others is the worst of the two, because this involves wickedness and is blameworthy; wickedness, I mean, either wholly, or nearly so (for not all voluntary wrong implies injustice), but the being Unjustly dealt by does not involve wickedness or injustice.

Moreover, both being treated unjustly and treating others unjustly are clearly wrong. The first means receiving less than the proper middle amount, and the second means receiving more. The comparison is with health in medicine and good physical condition in athletic training. Still, treating others unjustly is worse, because it involves wickedness and deserves blame. The wickedness involved is complete, or nearly so (for not every voluntary wrong involves injustice). But being treated unjustly involves neither wickedness nor injustice.

In itself then, the being Unjustly dealt by is the least bad, but accidentally it may be the greater evil of the two. However, scientific statement cannot take in such considerations; a pleurisy, for instance, is called a greater physical evil than a bruise: and yet this last may be the greater accidentally; it may chance that a bruise received in a fall may cause one to be captured by the enemy and slain.

In itself, then, being treated unjustly is the lesser evil, but circumstances may make it the greater of the two. However, a scientific account cannot take such circumstances into consideration. Pleurisy, for example, is considered a greater physical evil than a bruise. Yet circumstances may make a bruise the greater evil. A bruise from a fall may happen to lead to someone being captured by the enemy and killed.

Further: Just, in the way of metaphor and similitude, there may be I do not say between a man and himself exactly but between certain parts of his nature; but not Just of every kind, only such as belongs to the relation of master and slave, or to that of the head of a family. For all through this treatise the rational part of the Soul has been viewed as distinct from the irrational.

Further, justice may exist in a metaphorical or figurative sense, not exactly between a man and himself, but between parts of his nature. But this is not justice of every kind. It is only the kind found between master and slave, or between the head of a household and its members. For throughout this work, the rational part of the soul has been treated as distinct from the irrational part.

Now, taking these into consideration, there is thought to be a possibility of injustice towards one’s self, because herein it is possible for men to suffer somewhat in contradiction of impulses really their own; and so it is thought that there is Just of a certain kind between these parts mutually, as between ruler and ruled.

With these points in mind, people think it is possible to act unjustly toward oneself. This is because people can experience something contrary to their own genuine impulses. So people think a certain kind of justice exists between these parts, as between a ruler and the ruled.

Let this then be accepted as an account of the distinctions which we recognise respecting Justice and the rest of the moral virtues.³⁰

Let us accept this account of the distinctions we recognize concerning Justice and the other moral virtues.³⁰