Book 4

We will next speak of Liberality. Now this is thought to be the mean state, having for its object-matter Wealth: I mean, the Liberal man is praised not in the circumstances of war, nor in those which constitute the character of perfected self-mastery, nor again in judicial decisions, but in respect of giving and receiving Wealth, chiefly the former. By the term Wealth I mean “all those things whose worth is measured by money.”

Next we will discuss generosity. Generosity is considered the balanced state in matters of wealth. A generous person is not praised for conduct in war, perfect self-control, or judicial decisions. Instead, a generous person is praised for giving and receiving wealth, especially giving. By wealth I mean “all those things whose value is measured in money.”

Now the states of excess and defect in regard of Wealth are respectively Prodigality and Stinginess: the latter of these terms we attach invariably to those who are over careful about Wealth, but the former we apply sometimes with a complex notion; that is to say, we give the name to those who fail of self-control and spend money on the unrestrained gratification of their passions; and this is why they are thought to be most base, because they have many vices at once.

In matters of wealth, the extremes of excess and deficiency are wastefulness and stinginess, respectively. We always call people stingy when they are too concerned about wealth. But we sometimes use “wastefulness” in a more complex sense. We also apply the term to people who lack self-control and spend money freely indulging their passions. For this reason, such people are considered among the worst, because they have many vices at once.

It must be noted, however, that this is not a strict and proper use of the term, since its natural etymological meaning is to denote him who has one particular evil, viz. the wasting his substance: he is unsaved (as the term literally denotes) who is wasting away by his own fault; and this he really may be said to be; the destruction of his substance is thought to be a kind of wasting of himself, since these things are the means of living. Well, this is our acceptation of the term Prodigality.

However, we should note that this is not the strict, proper use of the term. The word’s original meaning refers to someone with one particular fault: wasting his wealth. The term literally means unsaved, describing someone who is wasting away through his own fault. A person who wastes his wealth may indeed be described this way. Destroying his wealth is thought to be a kind of self-destruction, since wealth provides the means to live. This, then, is what we mean by Prodigality.

Again. Whatever things are for use may be used well or ill, and Wealth belongs to this class. He uses each particular thing best who has the virtue to whose province it belongs: so that he will use Wealth best who has the virtue respecting Wealth, that is to say, the Liberal man.

Again, anything meant for use may be used well or badly, and wealth is no exception. A person uses each thing best when they have the virtue suited to its use. So the person who uses wealth best has the virtue concerning wealth, namely generosity. That person is generous.

Expenditure and giving are thought to be the using of money, but receiving and keeping one would rather call the possessing of it. And so the giving to proper persons is more characteristic of the Liberal man, than the receiving from proper quarters and forbearing to receive from the contrary. In fact generally, doing well by others is more characteristic of virtue than being done well by, and doing things positively honourable than forbearing to do things dishonourable; and any one may see that the doing well by others and doing things positively honourable attaches to the act of giving, but to that of receiving only the being done well by or forbearing to do what is dishonourable.

Spending and giving are considered uses of money, but receiving and keeping money are better described as possessing money. So a generous person is known more for giving to the right people than for receiving from the right sources. Giving also matters more than refusing to receive from the wrong sources. In general, virtue is more about doing good to others than having others do good to you. Virtue is also more about doing honorable things than avoiding dishonorable things. Anyone can see that giving involves doing good to others and doing honorable things. Receiving, by contrast, involves only benefiting from others or avoiding dishonorable conduct.

Besides, thanks are given to him who gives, not to him who merely forbears to receive, and praise even more. Again, forbearing to receive is easier than giving, the case of being too little freehanded with one’s own being commoner than taking that which is not one’s own.

Besides, we thank people who give, not those who merely refrain from taking. This is even more true of praise. Again, refraining from taking is easier than giving. Being ungenerous with your own possessions is more common than taking what belongs to someone else.

And again, it is they who give that are denominated Liberal, while they who forbear to receive are commended, not on the score of Liberality but of just dealing, while for receiving men are not, in fact, praised at all.

Again, people who give are called generous. Those who refrain from taking are praised, not for generosity, but for dealing fairly. But people are not, in fact, praised at all for taking.

And the Liberal are liked almost best of all virtuous characters, because they are profitable to others, and this their profitableness consists in their giving.

And generous people are liked almost more than any other virtuous people, because they benefit others through their giving.

Furthermore: all the actions done in accordance with virtue are honourable, and done from the motive of honour: and the Liberal man, therefore, will give from a motive of honour, and will give rightly; I mean, to proper persons, in right proportion, at right times, and whatever is included in the term “right giving:” and this too with positive pleasure, or at least without pain, since whatever is done in accordance with virtue is pleasant or at least not unpleasant, most certainly not attended with positive pain.

Furthermore, all virtuous actions are honorable and are done for the sake of honor. So a generous man will give for the sake of honor, and he will give rightly. I mean he will give to the right people, in the right amounts, and at the right times. He will also meet every other requirement of “right giving.” And he will give with pleasure, or at least without pain. For every virtuous action is pleasant, or at least not unpleasant, and certainly involves no actual pain.

But the man who gives to improper people, or not from a motive of honour but from some other cause, shall be called not Liberal but something else. Neither shall he be so denominated who does it with pain: this being a sign that he would prefer his wealth to the honourable action, and this is no part of the Liberal man’s character; neither will such an one receive from improper sources, because the so receiving is not characteristic of one who values not wealth: nor again will he be apt to ask, because one who does kindnesses to others does not usually receive them willingly; but from proper sources (his own property, for instance) he will receive, doing this not as honourable but as necessary, that he may have somewhat to give: neither will he be careless of his own, since it is his wish through these to help others in need: nor will he give to chance people, that he may have wherewith to give to those to whom he ought, at right times, and on occasions when it is honourable so to do.

But a man who gives to the wrong people should not be called generous, but something else. The same applies if he gives for some reason other than doing what is honorable. Nor should he be called generous if giving pains him. His pain shows that he would prefer his wealth to an honorable action. Such a preference has no place in a generous man’s character. Nor will a generous man accept wealth from improper sources, because accepting it does not suit someone who values wealth little. Nor will he be inclined to ask for help, because someone who does kindnesses for others usually accepts kindnesses reluctantly. But he will accept wealth from proper sources, such as his own property. He does so not because accepting it is honorable, but because he needs something to give. Nor will he neglect his own property, since he wishes to use it to help others in need. Nor will he give to people at random. He wants to have enough to give to those he should, at the right times, when giving is honorable.

Again, it is a trait in the Liberal man’s character even to exceed very much in giving so as to leave too little for himself, it being characteristic of such an one not to have a thought of self.

Again, a generous man characteristically gives far too much, leaving too little for himself. This is because he characteristically gives no thought to himself.

Now Liberality is a term of relation to a man’s means, for the Liberal-ness depends not on the amount of what is given but on the moral state of the giver which gives in proportion to his means. There is then no reason why he should not be the more Liberal man who gives the less amount, if he has less to give out of.

Generosity is relative to a person’s means. For generosity depends not on how much someone gives, but on the giver’s character and giving proportionately to their means. So there is no reason someone who gives less cannot be more generous, if they have less to give.

Again, they are thought to be more Liberal who have inherited, not acquired for themselves, their means; because, in the first place, they have never experienced want, and next, all people love most their own works, just as parents do and poets.

Again, people who inherit their wealth are thought to be more generous than those who earn it themselves. First, this is because those who inherit wealth have never experienced need. Second, all people love their own creations most, just as parents and poets do.

It is not easy for the Liberal man to be rich, since he is neither apt to receive nor to keep but to lavish, and values not wealth for its own sake but with a view to giving it away. Hence it is commonly charged upon fortune that they who most deserve to be rich are least so. Yet this happens reasonably enough; it is impossible he should have wealth who does not take any care to have it, just as in any similar case.

A generous man finds it hard to be rich because he tends neither to acquire wealth nor to keep it. Instead, he gives freely and values wealth not for its own sake but as something to give away. So people commonly blame fortune because those who most deserve to be rich have the least wealth. Yet there is good reason for this. A man cannot have wealth if he takes no care to acquire it, just as in any similar case.

Yet he will not give to improper people, nor at wrong times, and so on: because he would not then be acting in accordance with Liberality, and if he spent upon such objects, would have nothing to spend on those on which he ought: for, as I have said before, he is Liberal who spends in proportion to his means, and on proper objects, while he who does so in excess is prodigal (this is the reason why we never call despots prodigal, because it does not seem to be easy for them by their gifts and expenditure to go beyond their immense possessions).

Yet he will not give to the wrong people, or at the wrong times, and so on. Because giving in those ways would not be generous. And if he spent on the wrong things, he would have nothing left for the things he should support. For, as I have said before, a generous person spends according to his means and on the right things. Someone who spends beyond his means is wasteful. (This is why we never call despots wasteful. Their possessions are so vast that it seems hard for their gifts and spending to exceed their wealth.)

To sum up then. Since Liberality is a mean state in respect of the giving and receiving of wealth, the Liberal man will give and spend on proper objects, and in proper proportion, in great things and in small alike, and all this with pleasure to himself; also he will receive from right sources, and in right proportion: because, as the virtue is a mean state in respect of both, he will do both as he ought, and, in fact, upon proper giving follows the correspondent receiving, while that which is not such is contrary to it. (Now those which follow one another come to co-exist in the same person, those which are contraries plainly do not.)

To sum up, generosity is a balanced state in giving and receiving wealth. So a generous man will give and spend on the right things, in the right amounts. He will do so in matters both great and small, and will take pleasure in all of it. He will also receive wealth from the right sources and in the right amounts. Because generosity involves balance in both giving and receiving, he will do both as he should. In fact, proper giving goes together with proper receiving, while improper receiving is contrary to proper giving. (Qualities that go together come to exist in the same person. Clearly, contrary qualities do not.)

Again, should it happen to him to spend money beyond what is needful, or otherwise than is well, he will be vexed, but only moderately and as he ought; for feeling pleasure and pain at right objects, and in right manner, is a property of Virtue.

Again, if he spends more money than necessary or spends it unwisely, he will be upset. But he will be upset only moderately, as he should. For virtue involves feeling pleasure and pain about the right things and in the right way.

The Liberal man is also a good man to have for a partner in respect of wealth: for he can easily be wronged, since he values not wealth, and is more vexed at not spending where he ought to have done so than at spending where he ought not, and he relishes not the maxim of Simonides.

The generous man is also a good partner in financial matters. For he can easily be taken advantage of, since he does not value wealth. He is more upset about failing to spend when he should than about spending when he should not. And he does not like the saying of Simonides.

But the Prodigal man goes wrong also in these points, for he is neither pleased nor pained at proper objects or in proper manner, which will become more plain as we proceed.

But the wasteful man also goes wrong in these ways. He feels neither pleasure nor pain at the right things or in the right way. These failings will become clearer as we go on.

We have said already that Prodigality and Stinginess are respectively states of excess and defect, and this in two things, giving and receiving (expenditure of course we class under giving). Well now, Prodigality exceeds in giving and forbearing to receive and is deficient in receiving, while Stinginess is deficient in giving and exceeds in receiving, but it is in small things.

As we have already said, wastefulness and stinginess are states of excess and deficiency, respectively. Both concern two things: giving and receiving. (We count spending as giving.) Wastefulness means giving too much, refusing too much to receive, and receiving too little. Stinginess means giving too little and receiving too much, but in small matters.

The two parts of Prodigality, to be sure, do not commonly go together; it is not easy, I mean, to give to all if you receive from none, because private individuals thus giving will soon find their means run short, and such are in fact thought to be prodigal. He that should combine both would seem to be no little superior to the Stingy man: for he may be easily cured, both by advancing in years, and also by the want of means, and he may come thus to the mean: he has, you see, already the facts of the Liberal man, he gives and forbears to receive, only he does neither in right manner or well. So if he could be wrought upon by habituation in this respect, or change in any other way, he would be a real Liberal man, for he will give to those to whom he should, and will forbear to receive whence he ought not. This is the reason too why he is thought not to be low in moral character, because to exceed in giving and in forbearing to receive is no sign of badness or meanness, but only of folly.

The two parts of wastefulness do not usually go together. I mean, it is not easy to give to everyone if you accept nothing from anyone. Private individuals who give in this way will soon run out of money. Such people are in fact considered wasteful. Someone who combined both traits would seem considerably better than a stingy person. For he may easily be cured, both by growing older and by running short of money. He may thus reach the proper balance. You see, his actions already resemble those of a generous person. He gives and refrains from accepting, but he does neither in the right way or well. So if habit could change him in this respect, or he could change in some other way, he would become truly generous. For he would give to those he should and refuse to accept from sources he should not. This also explains why he is not thought to have a low moral character. Giving too much and refusing too much is no sign of wickedness or meanness, but only of foolishness.

Well then, he who is Prodigal in this fashion is thought far superior to the Stingy man for the aforementioned reasons, and also because he does good to many, but the Stingy man to no one, not even to himself. But most Prodigals, as has been said, combine with their other faults that of receiving from improper sources, and on this point are Stingy: and they become grasping, because they wish to spend and cannot do this easily, since their means soon run short and they are necessitated to get from some other quarter; and then again, because they care not for what is honourable, they receive recklessly, and from all sources indifferently, because they desire to give but care not how or whence.

Well then, someone who is wasteful in this way is considered far better than a stingy person. This is for the reasons already mentioned, and because the wasteful person benefits many people. The stingy person benefits no one, not even himself. But most wasteful people, as already noted, add another fault to their other failings: taking money from improper sources. In this respect, they are stingy. They become grasping because they want to spend but find it difficult. Their money soon runs out, forcing them to get more elsewhere. And because they do not care about what is honorable, they take money recklessly from any and every source. They want to give, but do not care how they give or where the money comes from.

And for this reason their givings are not Liberal, inasmuch as they are not honourable, nor purely disinterested, nor done in right fashion; but they oftentimes make those rich who should be poor, and to those who are quiet respectable kind of people they will give nothing, but to flatterers, or those who subserve their pleasures in any way, they will give much. And therefore most of them are utterly devoid of self-restraint; for as they are open-handed they are liberal in expenditure upon the unrestrained gratification of their passions, and turn off to their pleasures because they do not live with reference to what is honourable.

For this reason, their giving is not truly generous. It is neither honorable nor entirely selfless, nor is it done in the right way. They often make people rich who ought to be poor. Yet they give nothing to quiet, respectable people. Instead, they give generously to flatterers or anyone who serves their pleasures in any way. So most of these givers have no self-control at all. Because they are open-handed, they spend freely on satisfying their passions without restraint. And they turn to their pleasures because they do not live according to what is honorable.

Thus then the Prodigal, if unguided, slides into these faults; but if he could get care bestowed on him he might come to the mean and to what is right.

So, without guidance, the wasteful person falls into these faults. But if he received proper care, he might find the right balance and do what is right.

Stinginess, on the contrary, is incurable: old age, for instance, and incapacity of any kind, is thought to make people Stingy; and it is more congenial to human nature than Prodigality, the mass of men being fond of money rather than apt to give: moreover it extends far and has many phases, the modes of stinginess being thought to be many. For as it consists of two things, defect of giving and excess of receiving, everybody does not have it entire, but it is sometimes divided, and one class of persons exceed in receiving, the other are deficient in giving. I mean those who are designated by such appellations as sparing, close-fisted, niggards, are all deficient in giving; but other men’s property they neither desire nor are willing to receive, in some instances from a real moderation and shrinking from what is base.

Stinginess, by contrast, is incurable. Old age, for example, and any kind of incapacity are thought to make people stingy. Stinginess is also more natural to human beings than wastefulness, since most people love money rather than readily give it away. Moreover, stinginess is widespread and takes many forms, since there are thought to be many ways of being stingy. Stinginess consists of two things: giving too little and taking too much. Not everyone has both faults. Instead, the faults are sometimes separate: some people take too much, while others give too little. Those described as tight with money, close-fisted, or miserly all give too little. But such people neither desire nor are willing to accept other people’s property. In some cases, this comes from genuine moderation and an aversion to shameful conduct.

There are some people whose motive, either supposed or alleged, for keeping their property is this, that they may never be driven to do anything dishonourable: to this class belongs the skinflint, and every one of similar character, so named from the excess of not-giving. Others again decline to receive their neighbour’s goods from a motive of fear; their notion being that it is not easy to take other people’s things yourself without their taking yours: so they are content neither to receive nor give.

Some people keep their property so they may never be forced to do anything dishonorable. This motive is either attributed to them or claimed by them. Skinflints and everyone of similar character belong to this group, named for their excessive unwillingness to give. Others refuse to accept their neighbors’ goods out of fear. They believe it is not easy to take other people’s things without those people taking theirs in return. So they are content neither to receive nor to give.

The other class again who are Stingy in respect of receiving exceed in that they receive anything from any source; such as they who work at illiberal employments, brothel keepers, and such-like, and usurers who lend small sums at large interest: for all these receive from improper sources, and improper amounts. Their common characteristic is base-gaining, since they all submit to disgrace for the sake of gain and that small; because those who receive great things neither whence they ought, nor what they ought (as for instance despots who sack cities and plunder temples), we denominate wicked, impious, and unjust, but not Stingy.

The other class of stingy people go too far in taking, accepting anything from any source. Examples include people in degrading occupations, brothel keepers and the like, and moneylenders who charge high interest on small loans. For all these people take money from improper sources and in improper amounts. Their common trait is shameful profiteering, since they all accept disgrace for the sake of even a small gain. But we do not call people stingy when they take great amounts from improper sources or take what they should not. Examples include despots who sack cities and plunder temples. We call such people wicked, impious, and unjust, but not stingy.

Now the dicer and bath-plunderer and the robber belong to the class of the Stingy, for they are given to base gain: both busy themselves and submit to disgrace for the sake of gain, and the one class incur the greatest dangers for the sake of their booty, while the others make gain of their friends to whom they ought to be giving.

Dice players, bathhouse thieves, and robbers belong among the stingy because they seek shameful profits. All work for gain and accept disgrace for its sake. Some face the greatest dangers for their loot, while others profit from friends to whom they should be giving.

So both classes, as wishing to make gain from improper sources, are given to base gain, and all such receivings are Stingy. And with good reason is Stinginess called the contrary of Liberality: both because it is a greater evil than Prodigality, and because men err rather in this direction than in that of the Prodigality which we have spoken of as properly and completely such.

So both groups seek shameful gain because they want to profit from improper sources. All such taking is stingy. And stinginess is rightly called the opposite of generosity. One reason is that stinginess is a greater evil than wastefulness. Another is that people more often fall into stinginess than into wastefulness in the full, true sense described earlier.

Let this be considered as what we have to say respecting Liberality and the contrary vices.

Let this conclude our discussion of generosity and the vices opposed to it.

Next in order would seem to come a dissertation on Magnificence, this being thought to be, like liberality, a virtue having for its object-matter Wealth; but it does not, like that, extend to all transactions in respect of Wealth, but only applies to such as are expensive, and in these circumstances it exceeds liberality in respect of magnitude, because it is (what the very name in Greek hints at) fitting expense on a large scale: this term is of course relative: I mean, the expenditure of equipping and commanding a trireme is not the same as that of giving a public spectacle: “fitting” of course also is relative to the individual, and the matter wherein and upon which he has to spend. And a man is not denominated Magnificent for spending as he should do in small or ordinary things, as, for instance,

Next, it would seem, we should discuss Magnificence. Like generosity, Magnificence is considered a virtue concerned with wealth. But unlike generosity, Magnificence does not cover all dealings with wealth, only those involving great expense. In such cases, Magnificence exceeds generosity in scale, because it means appropriate spending on a large scale. The Greek name itself suggests this meaning. Of course, scale is relative. I mean, equipping and commanding a trireme does not cost the same as putting on a public spectacle. What is “fitting” also depends on the individual, the occasion, and what he must spend money on. A man is not called Magnificent for spending appropriately on small or ordinary things, as, for instance,

but for doing so in great matters: that is to say, the Magnificent man is liberal, but the liberal is not thereby Magnificent. The falling short of such a state is called Meanness, the exceeding it Vulgar Profusion, Want of Taste, and so on; which are faulty, not because they are on an excessive scale in respect of right objects but, because they show off in improper objects, and in improper manner: of these we will speak presently. The Magnificent man is like a man of skill, because he can see what is fitting, and can spend largely in good taste; for, as we said at the commencement, the confirmed habit is determined by the separate acts of working, and by its object-matter.

but for doing so on a grand scale. That is, the magnificent person is generous, but a generous person is not necessarily magnificent. Falling short of this quality is called pettiness. Going too far is called vulgar extravagance, bad taste, and so on. These excesses are faults, not because they involve spending too much on the right things. Rather, they involve showing off by spending on the wrong things and in the wrong way. We will discuss these faults shortly. The magnificent person is like a skilled craftsman, because he recognizes what is fitting and spends lavishly with good taste. For, as we said at the beginning, an established habit is defined by particular actions and the things those actions concern.

Well, the expenses of the Magnificent man are great and fitting: such also are his works (because this secures the expenditure being not great merely, but befitting the work). So then the work is to be proportionate to the expense, and this again to the work, or even above it: and the Magnificent man will incur such expenses from the motive of honour, this being common to all the virtues, and besides he will do it with pleasure and lavishly; excessive accuracy in calculation being Mean. He will consider also how a thing may be done most beautifully and fittingly, rather, than for how much it may be done, and how at the least expense.

The Magnificent man spends large sums, and his spending is appropriate. His works are also great and fitting, because this makes his spending not merely large but appropriate to the work. So the work must match the expense, and the expense must match the work, or even exceed it. The Magnificent man will spend such sums for the sake of honour, a motive common to all the virtues. He will also spend gladly and generously, because calculating costs too precisely is petty. He will consider how something can be done most beautifully and appropriately, rather than its cost or the cheapest way to do it.

So the Magnificent man must be also a liberal man, because the liberal man will also spend what he ought, and in right manner: but it is the Great, that is to say tke large scale, which is distinctive of the Magnificent man, the object-matter of liberality being the same, and without spending more money than another man he will make the work more magnificent. I mean, the excellence of a possession and of a work is not the same: as a piece of property that thing is most valuable which is worth most, gold for instance; but as a work that which is great and beautiful, because the contemplation of such an object is admirable, and so is that which is Magnificent. So the excellence of a work is Magnificence on a large scale. There are cases of expenditure which we call honourable, such as are dedicatory offerings to the gods, and the furnishing their temples, and sacrifices, and in like manner everything that has reference to the Deity, and all such public matters as are objects of honourable ambition, as when men think in any case that it is their duty to furnish a chorus for the stage splendidly, or fit out and maintain a trireme, or give a general public feast.

So a magnificent man must also be generous, because a generous man spends what he ought, in the right way. But what sets the magnificent man apart is the scale of his spending. Generosity concerns the same things, but he will make a work more magnificent without spending more money than another man. I mean that excellence in a possession differs from excellence in a work. As property, the most valuable thing is whatever is worth the most, gold, for example. But as a work, the best is whatever is great and beautiful. Such an object inspires admiration when viewed, as does whatever is magnificent. So excellence in a work is magnificence on a large scale. We call certain kinds of spending honorable. These include offerings dedicated to the gods, furnishing their temples, sacrifices, and likewise everything connected with the divine. They also include all public undertakings that are objects of honorable ambition. Examples include occasions when men believe they have a duty to provide a splendid chorus for the stage. Other examples are fitting out and maintaining a trireme, or providing a feast for the whole community.

Now in all these, as has been already stated, respect is had also to the rank and the means of the man who is doing them: because they should be proportionate to these, and befit not the work only but also the doer of the work. For this reason a poor man cannot be a Magnificent man, since he has not means wherewith to spend largely and yet becomingly; and if he attempts it he is a fool, inasmuch as it is out of proportion and contrary to propriety, whereas to be in accordance with virtue a thing must be done rightly.

In all these matters, as already stated, the man's rank and resources must also be considered. For his actions should match his rank and resources, and suit not only the task but also the man performing it. For this reason, a poor man cannot be a Magnificent man. He lacks the resources to spend large amounts appropriately. If he tries to do so, he is a fool, because such spending exceeds his means and is improper. To accord with virtue, however, an action must be done rightly.

Such expenditure is fitting moreover for those to whom such things previously belong, either through themselves or through their ancestors or people with whom they are connected, and to the high-born or people of high repute, and so on: because all these things imply greatness and reputation.

Such spending is also fitting for those already entitled to it through themselves, their ancestors, or their connections. It also suits people of noble birth or high standing, and others like them. This is because all these qualities imply greatness and prestige.

So then the Magnificent man is pretty much as I have described him, and Magnificence consists in such expenditures: because they are the greatest and most honourable: and of private ones such as come but once for all, marriage to wit, and things of that kind; and any occasion which engages the interest of the community in general, or of those who are in power; and what concerns receiving and despatching strangers; and gifts, and repaying gifts: because the Magnificent man is not apt to spend upon himself but on the public good, and gifts are pretty much in the same case as dedicatory offerings.

So the magnificent man is much as I have described him. Magnificence involves spending of this kind because these expenditures are the greatest and most honorable. Private expenditures include once-in-a-lifetime occasions, such as marriage and similar events. They also include any occasion that interests the whole community or those in power. Magnificence also involves welcoming strangers and seeing them off, giving gifts, and returning gifts. For the magnificent man is not inclined to spend on himself, but on the public good. And gifts are much like offerings dedicated to the gods.

It is characteristic also of the Magnificent man to furnish his house suitably to his wealth, for this also in a way reflects credit; and again, to spend rather upon such works as are of long duration, these being most honourable. And again, propriety in each case, because the same things are not suitable to gods and men, nor in a temple and a tomb. And again, in the case of expenditures, each must be great of its kind, and great expense on a great object is most magnificent, that is in any case what is great in these particular things.

The Magnificent man also furnishes his house in keeping with his wealth, because this, too, brings him some credit. He also prefers to spend on things that last, because these are the most honorable. And his spending must suit each occasion, because the same things do not suit gods and humans, or temples and tombs. Each expense must also be great of its kind. Spending greatly on a great object is the most magnificent spending. In each case, greatness depends on the particular things involved.

There is a difference too between greatness of a work and greatness of expenditure: for instance, a very beautiful ball or cup is magnificent as a present to a child, while the price of it is small and almost mean. Therefore it is characteristic of the Magnificent man to do magnificently whatever he is about: for whatever is of this kind cannot be easily surpassed, and bears a proper proportion to the expenditure.

There is also a difference between the greatness of a work and the amount spent on it. For example, a very beautiful ball or cup is a magnificent gift for a child. Yet its price is small, almost trivial. So a magnificent man does whatever he undertakes magnificently. For work of this kind cannot easily be surpassed, and its greatness is in proper proportion to its cost.

Such then is the Magnificent man.

That, then, is what the Magnificent man is like.

The man who is in the state of excess, called one of Vulgar Profusion, is in excess because he spends improperly, as has been said. I mean in cases requiring small expenditure he lavishes much and shows off out of taste; giving his club a feast fit for a wedding-party, or if he has to furnish a chorus for a comedy, giving the actors purple to wear in the first scene, as did the Megarians. And all such things he will do, not with a view to that which is really honourable, but to display his wealth, and because he thinks he shall be admired for these things; and he will spend little where he ought to spend much, and much where he should spend little.

The man who goes to excess, a fault called Vulgar Profusion, spends inappropriately, as already noted. When only a small expense is needed, he spends lavishly and shows off without taste. He gives his club a feast fit for a wedding party. Or, if he must provide a chorus for a comedy, he dresses the actors in purple for the first scene. The Megarians did the same. He does all these things not for anything truly honorable, but to display his wealth. He also thinks people will admire him for such displays. And he spends little where he should spend much, and much where he should spend little.

The Mean man will be deficient in every case, and even where he has spent the most he will spoil the whole effect for want of some trifle; he is procrastinating in all he does, and contrives how he may spend the least, and does even that with lamentations about the expense, and thinking that he does all things on a greater scale than he ought.

The stingy man will fall short in every case. Even when he has spent the most, he will spoil the whole effect by leaving out some small detail. He puts off everything he does and looks for ways to spend as little as possible. Even then, he complains about the expense and thinks he does everything on a grander scale than he should.

Of course, both these states are faulty, but they do not involve disgrace because they are neither hurtful to others nor very unseemly.

Of course, both these states are flawed. But neither is disgraceful, because neither harms others or is especially improper.

The very name of Great-mindedness implies, that great things are its object-matter; and we will first settle what kind of things. It makes no difference, of course, whether we regard the moral state in the abstract or as exemplified in an individual.

The very name Great-mindedness suggests that it concerns great things. We will first establish what kinds of things these are. Of course, it makes no difference whether we consider this moral quality in general or in a particular person.

Well then, he is thought to be Great-minded who values himself highly and at the same time justly, because he that does so without grounds is foolish, and no virtuous character is foolish or senseless. Well, the character I have described is Great-minded. The man who estimates himself lowly, and at the same time justly, is modest; but not Great-minded, since this latter quality implies greatness, just as beauty implies a large bodily conformation while small people are neat and well made but not beautiful.

A man is considered Great-minded if he values himself highly and deserves to do so. For a man who values himself highly without good reason is foolish, and no virtuous person is foolish or senseless. So the man I have described is Great-minded. A man who values himself modestly, and rightly so, is modest, but not Great-minded. Being Great-minded implies greatness, just as beauty implies a large body. Small people can be neat and well-proportioned, but not beautiful.

Again, he who values himself highly without just grounds is a Vain man: though the name must not be applied to every case of unduly high self-estimation. He that values himself below his real worth is Small-minded, and whether that worth is great, moderate, or small, his own estimate falls below it. And he is the strongest case of this error who is really a man of great worth, for what would he have done had his worth been less?

Again, a man who thinks highly of himself without good reason is vain. But not every case of thinking too highly of oneself deserves this label. A man who thinks less of himself than his actual worth is small-minded. Whether his worth is great, moderate, or small, he rates himself below it. And a man of great worth who undervalues himself is the clearest case of this error. For how would he have judged himself if his worth had been less?

The Great-minded man is then, as far as greatness is concerned, at the summit, but in respect of propriety he is in the mean, because he estimates himself at his real value (the other characters respectively are in excess and defect). Since then he justly estimates himself at a high, or rather at the highest possible rate, his character will have respect specially to one thing: this term “rate” has reference of course to external goods: and of these we should assume that to be the greatest which we attribute to the gods, and which is the special object of desire to those who are in power, and which is the prize proposed to the most honourable actions: now honour answers to these descriptions, being the greatest of external goods. So the Great-minded man bears himself as he ought in respect of honour and dishonour. In fact, without need of words, the Great-minded plainly have honour for their object-matter: since honour is what the great consider themselves specially worthy of, and according to a certain rate.

The Great-minded man, then, stands at the summit in greatness. But in judging his own worth, he follows the proper middle course, because he values himself accurately. (The other types of character value themselves either too highly or too low.) Since he rightly values himself highly, or rather as highly as possible, his character chiefly concerns one thing. This “rate” of worth refers, of course, to external goods. Among external goods, we should consider the greatest to be the good we attribute to the gods. The greatest external good is also what those in power especially desire, and the reward for the most honourable actions. Honour fits these descriptions, since honour is the greatest external good. So the Great-minded man responds as he should to honour and dishonour. Indeed, even without explanation, honour is clearly the concern of the Great-minded. For honour is what great people consider themselves especially worthy of, in proportion to their worth.

The Small-minded man is deficient, both as regards himself, and also as regards the estimation of the Great-minded: while the Vain man is in excess as regards himself, but does not get beyond the Great-minded man. Now the Great-minded man, being by the hypothesis worthy of the greatest things, must be of the highest excellence, since the better a man is the more is he worth, and he who is best is worth the most: it follows then, that to be truly Great-minded a man must be good, and whatever is great in each virtue would seem to belong to the Great-minded. It would no way correspond with the character of the Great-minded to flee spreading his hands all abroad; nor to injure any one; for with what object in view will he do what is base, in whose eyes nothing is great? in short, if one were to go into particulars, the Great-minded man would show quite ludicrously unless he were a good man: he would not be in fact deserving of honour if he were a bad man, honour being the prize of virtue and given to the good.

The Small-minded man falls short both of his own worth and of the Great-minded man’s view of himself. The Vain man rates himself too highly, but not more highly than the Great-minded man rates himself. Now, by our assumption, the Great-minded man deserves the greatest things. So he must possess the greatest excellence. For the better a man is, the more he deserves, and the best man deserves the most. It follows that a truly Great-minded man must be good. Whatever is great in each virtue would seem to belong to the Great-minded man. It would be entirely out of character for him to flee with his arms flung wide or to harm anyone. For what could he hope to gain by doing something shameful, when nothing seems great to him? In short, if we examined the details, the Great-minded man would look quite ridiculous unless he were good. Indeed, if he were bad, he would not deserve honour. For honour is the reward for virtue and is given to the good.

This virtue, then, of Great-mindedness seems to be a kind of ornament of all the other virtues, in that it makes them better and cannot be without them; and for this reason it is a hard matter to be really and truly Great-minded; for it cannot be without thorough goodness and nobleness of character.

The virtue of Great-mindedness, then, seems to be a kind of ornament to all the other virtues. It makes them better and cannot exist without them. For this reason, being truly Great-minded is difficult, because it requires complete goodness and nobility of character.

Honour then and dishonour are specially the object-matter of the Great-minded man: and at such as is great, and given by good men, he will be pleased moderately as getting his own, or perhaps somewhat less for no honour can be quite adequate to perfect virtue: but still he will accept this because they have nothing higher to give him. But such as is given by ordinary people and on trifling grounds he will entirely despise, because these do not come up to his deserts: and dishonour likewise, because in his case there cannot be just ground for it.

Honour and dishonour, then, are the special concerns of the great-minded man. He will be moderately pleased by great honours given by good men. He sees such honours as what he deserves, or perhaps somewhat less, because no honour can fully match perfect virtue. Still, he will accept these honours because good men have nothing greater to give him. But he will utterly despise honours given by ordinary people on trivial grounds, because such honours fall below his worth. He will likewise despise dishonour, because in his case there can be no just grounds for it.

Now though, as I have said, honour is specially the object-matter of the Great-minded man, I do not mean but that likewise in respect of wealth and power, and good or bad fortune of every kind, he will bear himself with moderation, fall out how they may, and neither in prosperity will he be overjoyed nor in adversity will he be unduly pained. For not even in respect of honour does he so bear himself; and yet it is the greatest of all such objects, since it is the cause of power and wealth being choice-worthy, for certainly they who have them desire to receive honour through them. So to whom honour even is a small thing to him will all other things also be so; and this is why such men are thought to be supercilious.

As I have said, honour is the main concern of the great-minded man. But he will also show moderation toward wealth, power, and every kind of good or bad fortune, whatever happens. In prosperity he will not be overjoyed, and in adversity he will not be unduly distressed. For even honour does not stir such strong feelings in him. Yet honour is the greatest of all these things, since honour makes power and wealth worth choosing. Certainly, those who have power and wealth want to gain honour through them. So if even honour means little to a man, all other things will also mean little to him. This is why such men are thought to look down on others.

It seems too that pieces of good fortune contribute to form this character of Great-mindedness: I mean, the nobly born, or men of influence, or the wealthy, are considered to be entitled to honour, for they are in a position of eminence and whatever is eminent by good is more entitled to honour: and this is why such circumstances dispose men rather to Great-mindedness, because they receive honour at the hands of some men.

Good fortune also seems to help develop the character of Great-mindedness. I mean that people of noble birth, influence, or wealth are considered entitled to honour because of their high standing. Whatever stands out because of something good is more entitled to honour. So these advantages make people more inclined toward Great-mindedness, because some people honour them.

Now really and truly the good man alone is entitled to honour; only if a man unites in himself goodness with these external advantages he is thought to be more entitled to honour: but they who have them without also having virtue are not justified in their high estimate of themselves, nor are they rightly denominated Great-minded; since perfect virtue is one of the indispensable conditions to such & character.

In truth, only a good man deserves honour. Only if a man combines goodness with these external advantages is he considered more deserving of honour. But men who have these advantages without virtue are not justified in thinking so highly of themselves. Nor are they rightly called Great-minded, because complete virtue is essential to such a character.

Further, such men become supercilious and insolent, it not being easy to bear prosperity well without goodness; and not being able to bear it, and possessed with an idea of their own superiority to others, they despise them, and do just whatever their fancy prompts; for they mimic the Great-minded man, though they are not like him, and they do this in such points as they can, so without doing the actions which can only flow from real goodness they despise others. Whereas the Great-minded man despises on good grounds (for he forms his opinions truly), but the mass of men do it at random.

Furthermore, such men become arrogant and insolent, because it is not easy to handle prosperity well without goodness. Unable to handle prosperity and convinced of their superiority, they look down on others and do whatever they please. For they imitate the Great-minded man, although they are not like him, copying him wherever they can. So they look down on others without performing the actions that can come only from genuine goodness. By contrast, the Great-minded man has good grounds for looking down on others, because his judgments are accurate. But most people look down on others without any sound basis.

Moreover, he is not a man to incur little risks, nor does he court danger, because there are but few things he has a value for; but he will incur great dangers, and when he does venture he is prodigal of his life as knowing that there are terms on which it is not worth his while to live. He is the sort of man to do kindnesses, but he is ashamed to receive them; the former putting a man in the position of superiority, the latter in that of inferiority; accordingly he will greatly overpay any kindness done to him, because the original actor will thus be laid under obligation and be in the position of the party benefited. Such men seem likewise to remember those they have done kindnesses to, but not those from whom they have received them: because he who has received is inferior to him who has done the kindness and our friend wishes to be superior; accordingly he is pleased to hear of his own kind acts but not of those done to himself (and this is why, in Homer, Thetis does not mention to Jupiter the kindnesses she had done him, nor did the Lacedæmonians to the Athenians but only the benefits they had received).

Moreover, he does not take small risks or seek out danger, because there are few things he values. But he will face great dangers. When he does, he freely risks his life, knowing that under some conditions life is not worth living. He is the sort of man who does favors but feels ashamed to receive them. Doing favors puts a man in a superior position, while receiving them puts him in an inferior one. So he will repay any favor with a much greater one. The person who first helped him will then owe him something and become the one who has benefited. Such men also seem to remember those they have helped, but not those who have helped them. This is because the receiver is inferior to the giver, and the man we are describing wants to be superior. So he likes hearing about his own kind acts, but not about kindnesses done to him. (This is why, in Homer, Thetis does not mention to Jupiter the kindnesses she had done him. Nor did the Lacedæmonians mention their kindnesses to the Athenians, but only the benefits they had received.)

Further, it is characteristic of the Great-minded man to ask favours not at all, or very reluctantly, but to do a service very readily; and to bear himself loftily towards the great or fortunate, but towards people of middle station affably; because to be above the former is difficult and so a grand thing, but to be above the latter is easy; and to be high and mighty towards the former is not ignoble, but to do it towards those of humble station would be low and vulgar; it would be like parading strength against the weak.

Furthermore, the great-minded man never asks for favors, or asks only very reluctantly, but readily helps others. He acts proudly toward the powerful or fortunate, but is friendly toward people of middle rank. For rising above the powerful or fortunate is difficult and therefore impressive, but rising above people of middle rank is easy. Acting proudly toward the powerful or fortunate is not shameful. But acting that way toward people of low rank would be petty and vulgar, like showing off strength against the weak.

And again, not to put himself in the way of honour, nor to go where others are the chief men; and to be remiss and dilatory, except in the case of some great honour or work; and to be concerned in few things, and those great and famous. It is a property of him also to be open, both in his dislikes and his likings, because concealment is a consequent of fear. Likewise to be careful for reality rather than appearance, and talk and act openly (for his contempt for others makes him a bold man, for which same reason he is apt to speak the truth, except where the principle of reserve comes in), but to be reserved towards the generality of men.

Again, he does not seek out honor or go where others are the leading figures. He is slow to act and takes his time, except when some great honor or work is involved. He concerns himself with few things, and those are great and famous. He is also open about both his dislikes and his likes, because concealment comes from fear. Likewise, he cares about reality rather than appearances, and speaks and acts openly. (His contempt for others makes him bold. For the same reason, he tends to speak the truth, except when reserve is called for.) But he is reserved with people in general.

And to be unable to live with reference to any other but a friend; because doing so is servile, as may be seen in that all flatterers are low and men in low estate are flatterers. Neither is his admiration easily excited, because nothing is great in his eyes; nor does he bear malice, since remembering anything, and specially wrongs, is no part of Great-mindedness, but rather overlooking them; nor does he talk of other men; in fact, he will not speak either of himself or of any other; he neither cares to be praised himself nor to have others blamed; nor again does he praise freely, and for this reason he is not apt to speak ill even of his enemies except to show contempt and insolence.

And he cannot live to suit anyone but a friend, because doing so is servile. We can see this because all flatterers are low-minded, and people of low status are flatterers. He is not easily impressed, because nothing seems great to him. Nor does he hold grudges, because remembering anything, especially wrongs, is no part of Great-mindedness. Instead, Great-mindedness means overlooking such things. Nor does he talk about other people. In fact, he will not speak about himself or anyone else. He cares neither about being praised himself nor about having others blamed. Nor does he give praise freely. For this reason, he is not inclined to speak ill even of his enemies, except to show contempt and disrespect.

And he is by no means apt to make laments about things which cannot be helped, or requests about those which are trivial; because to be thus disposed with respect to these things is consequent only upon real anxiety about them. Again, he is the kind of man to acquire what is beautiful and unproductive rather than what is productive and profitable: this being rather the part of an independent man.

And he is not at all inclined to complain about things that cannot be helped or ask for trivial things. Such behavior comes only from genuine concern about those things. Also, he prefers to acquire beautiful things that produce nothing rather than things that are productive and profitable. This preference is more characteristic of an independent man.

Also slow motion, deep-toned voice, and deliberate style of speech, are thought to be characteristic of the Great-minded man: for he who is earnest about few things is not likely to be in a hurry, nor he who esteems nothing great to be very intent: and sharp tones and quickness are the result of these.

Slow movements, a deep voice, and measured speech are also thought to be characteristic of the Great-minded man. For someone who takes few things seriously is unlikely to be in a hurry. Nor is someone who considers nothing great likely to be very intense. Such urgency and intensity produce a sharp voice and rapid speech.

This then is my idea of the Great-minded man; and he who is in the defect is a Small-minded man, he who is in the excess a Vain man. However, as we observed in respect of the last character we discussed, these extremes are not thought to be vicious exactly, but only mistaken, for they do no harm.

This, then, is my idea of the Great-minded man. A man who falls short is Small-minded, while one who goes too far is Vain. However, as we noted about the last character we discussed, these extremes are not considered morally bad exactly. They are considered only mistaken, because they do no harm.

The Small-minded man, for instance, being really worthy of good deprives himself of his deserts, and seems to have somewhat faulty from not having a sufficiently high estimate of his own desert, in fact from self-ignorance: because, but for this, he would have grasped after what he really is entitled to, and that is good. Still such characters are not thought to be foolish, but rather laggards. But the having such an opinion of themselves seems to have a deteriorating effect on the character: because in all cases men’s aims are regulated by their supposed desert, and thus these men, under a notion of their own want of desert, stand aloof from honourable actions and courses, and similarly from external goods.

The small-minded man, for instance, truly deserves good things but denies himself what he deserves. He seems somewhat at fault for not valuing himself highly enough, which is really a failure to know himself. Otherwise, he would have sought what he is truly entitled to, and what he is entitled to is good. Still, such people are not considered foolish, but rather slow to act. Yet their low opinion of themselves seems to weaken their character. For in all cases, people set their aims according to what they believe they deserve. So, believing they are unworthy, these people hold back from honorable actions and pursuits, and likewise from external goods.

But the Vain are foolish and self-ignorant, and that palpably: because they attempt honourable things, as though they were worthy, and then they are detected. They also set themselves off, by dress, and carriage, and such-like things, and desire that their good circumstances may be seen, and they talk of them under the notion of receiving honour thereby. Small-mindedness rather than Vanity is opposed to Great-mindedness, because it is more commonly met with and is worse.

But vain people are foolish and clearly lack self-knowledge. Because they attempt things worthy of honor as though they deserved such honor, their shortcomings are then exposed. They also show off through their clothes, their bearing, and similar things. They want others to see their good fortune, and talk about it because they think doing so brings them honor. Small-mindedness, rather than vanity, is the opposite of greatness of soul, because small-mindedness is more common and worse.

Well, the virtue of Great-mindedness has for its object great Honour, as we have said: and there seems to be a virtue having Honour also for its object (as we stated in the former book), which may seem to bear to Great-mindedness the same relation that Liberality does to Magnificence: that is, both these virtues stand aloof from what is great but dispose us as we ought to be disposed towards moderate and small matters. Further: as in giving and receiving of wealth there is a mean state, an excess, and a defect, so likewise in grasping after Honour there is the more or less than is right, and also the doing so from right sources and in right manner.

As we have said, the virtue of Great-mindedness concerns great honour. There also seems to be a virtue concerned with honour, as we noted in the previous book. This virtue may relate to Great-mindedness as Liberality relates to Magnificence. That is, this virtue and Liberality leave great matters aside but guide us properly in moderate and small matters. Furthermore, in giving and receiving wealth, there is a middle ground, an excess, and a deficiency. Likewise, we can seek honour more or less than we should. We can also seek honour from the right sources and in the right way.

For we blame the lover of Honour as aiming at Honour more than he ought, and from wrong sources; and him who is destitute of a love of Honour as not choosing to be honoured even for what is noble. Sometimes again we praise the lover of Honour as manly and having a love for what is noble, and him who has no love for it as being moderate and modest (as we noticed also in the former discussion of these virtues).

For we blame the lover of honor for seeking more honor than he should, and from the wrong sources. We also blame the man who lacks a love of honor for not seeking honor even for noble deeds. Yet sometimes we praise the lover of honor as manly and as loving what is noble. We also praise the man who has no love of honor as moderate and modest. (We also noted these points in our earlier discussion of these virtues.)

It is clear then that since “Lover of so and so” is a term capable of several meanings, we do not always denote the same quality by the term “Lover of Honour;” but when we use it as a term of commendation we denote more than the mass of men are; when for blame more than a man should be.

Clearly, then, “Lover of so and so” can have several meanings. So we do not always mean the same quality when we call someone a “Lover of Honour.” When we use the term as praise, we mean someone who loves honour more than most people do. When we use it as criticism, we mean someone who loves honour more than a person should.

And the mean state having no proper name the extremes seem to dispute for it as unoccupied ground: but of course where there is excess and defect there must be also the mean. And in point of fact, men do grasp at Honour more than they should, and less, and sometimes just as they ought; for instance, this state is praised, being a mean state in regard of Honour, but without any appropriate name. Compared with what is called Ambition it shows like a want of love for Honour, and compared with this it shows like Ambition, or compared with both, like both faults: nor is this a singular case among the virtues. Here the extreme characters appear to be opposed, because the mean has no name appropriated to it.

The balanced state has no name of its own, so the extremes seem to claim it as unoccupied ground. But of course, wherever there is excess and deficiency, there must also be a middle ground. In fact, people seek honour more than they should, less than they should, and sometimes just as they should. For example, the balanced state is praised as a middle ground in seeking honour, but has no suitable name. Compared with ambition, the balanced state looks like too little love of honour. Compared with too little love of honour, the balanced state looks like ambition. Compared with both extremes, the balanced state looks like both faults. Nor is this the only virtue for which this happens. Here the extremes appear to oppose each other because the balanced state has no name of its own.

Meekness is a mean state, having for its object-matter Anger: and as the character in the mean has no name, and we may almost say the same of the extremes, we give the name of Meekness (leaning rather to the defect, which has no name either) to the character in the mean.

Meekness is a middle state concerned with anger. The character at this midpoint has no name, and we can almost say the same of the extremes. So we call the middle character meekness. The word leans more toward too little anger, an extreme that also has no name.

The excess may be called an over-aptness to Anger: for the passion is Anger, and the producing causes many and various. Now he who is angry at what and with whom he ought, and further, in right manner and time, and for proper length of time, is praised, so this Man will be Meek since Meekness is praised. For the notion represented by the term Meek man is the being imperturbable, and not being led away by passion, but being angry in that manner, and at those things, and for that length of time, which Reason may direct. This character however is thought to err rather on the side of defect, inasmuch as he is not apt to take revenge but rather to make allowances and forgive. And the defect, call it Angerlessness or what you will, is blamed: I mean, they who are not angry at things at which they ought to be angry are thought to be foolish, and they who are angry not in right manner, nor in right time, nor with those with whom they ought; for a man who labours under this defect is thought to have no perception, nor to be pained, and to have no tendency to avenge himself, inasmuch as he feels no anger: now to bear with scurrility in one’s own person, and patiently see one’s own friends suffer it, is a slavish thing.

The excess may be called being too quick to anger. The emotion is anger, and its causes are many and varied. A man is praised for being angry at the right things and with the right people. He must also be angry in the right way, at the right time, and for the right length of time. Such a man will be gentle, since gentleness is praised. A gentle man is understood to remain calm and not be carried away by emotion. Instead, he is angry in the way, at the things, and for as long as reason directs. Yet this character is thought to lean toward too little anger rather than too much. For he is not quick to take revenge, but instead makes allowances and forgives. The opposite failing, call it a lack of anger or whatever you like, is blamed. People are thought foolish if they are not angry at things that ought to anger them. The same is true of those whose anger comes in the wrong way, at the wrong time, or toward the wrong people. A man with too little anger is thought not to recognize an insult or feel hurt by it. Because he feels no anger, he is also thought to have no desire to avenge himself. But accepting insults against yourself, and patiently watching your friends suffer them, is slavish.

As for the excess, it occurs in all forms; men are angry with those with whom, and at things with which, they ought not to be, and more than they ought, and too hastily, and for too great a length of time. I do not mean, however, that these are combined in any one person: that would in fact be impossible, because the evil destroys itself, and if it is developed in its full force it becomes unbearable.

Excessive anger takes all forms. People get angry at people and things they should not be angry at. They also get angrier than they should, too quickly, and for too long. But I do not mean that all these faults occur together in one person. That would actually be impossible, because such a failing destroys itself. If the failing reaches its full force, it becomes unbearable.

Now those whom we term the Passionate are soon angry, and with people with whom and at things at which they ought not, and in an excessive degree, but they soon cool again, which is the best point about them. And this results from their not repressing their anger, but repaying their enemies (in that they show their feeings by reason of their vehemence), and then they have done with it.

Now the people we call Passionate get angry quickly, at the wrong people and things, and far too intensely. But they soon cool down again, which is their best quality. They cool down because they do not hold back their anger, but strike back at their enemies. Their intense anger makes them show their feelings, and then they are done with it.

The Choleric again are excessively vehement, and are angry at everything, and on every occasion; whence comes their Greek name signifying that their choler lies high.

Hot-tempered people, in turn, react far too strongly. They get angry at everything and on every occasion. This is why their Greek name means that their anger lies close to the surface.

The Bitter-tempered are hard to reconcile and keep their anger for a long while, because they repress the feeling: but when they have revenged themselves then comes a lull; for the vengeance destroys their anger by producing pleasure in lieu of pain. But if this does not happen they keep the weight on their minds: because, as it does not show itself, no one attempts to reason it away, and digesting anger within one’s self takes time. Such men are very great nuisances to themselves and to their best friends.

Bitter-tempered people are hard to reconcile with and stay angry for a long time because they suppress their anger. But once they have taken revenge, their anger subsides. Revenge destroys their anger by replacing pain with pleasure. But if they do not get revenge, their anger keeps weighing on their minds. Because their anger does not show, no one tries to reason them out of it. And working through anger on your own takes time. Such people are a great nuisance to themselves and to their closest friends.

Again, we call those Cross-grained who are angry at wrong objects, and in excessive degree, and for too long a time, and who are not appeased without vengeance or at least punishing the offender.

Again, we call people bad-tempered when they get angry at the wrong things, too intensely, and for too long. These people cannot be calmed without taking revenge or at least punishing the offender.

To Meekness we oppose the excess rather than the defect, because it is of more common occurrence: for human nature is more disposed to take than to forgo revenge. And the Cross-grained are worse to live with [than they who are too phlegmatic].

We treat excessive anger, rather than too little anger, as the opposite of gentleness, because excessive anger is more common. Human nature is more inclined to seek revenge than to forgo it. And bad-tempered people are harder to live with [than people who are too slow to anger].

Now, from what has been here said, that is also plain which was said before. I mean, it is no easy matter to define how, and with what persons, and at what kind of things, and how long one ought to be angry, and up to what point a person is right or is wrong. For he that transgresses the strict rule only a little, whether on the side of too much or too little, is not blamed: sometimes we praise those who are deficient in the feeling and call them Meek, sometimes we call the irritable Spirited as being well qualified for government. So it is not easy to lay down, in so many words, for what degree or kind of transgression a man is blameable: because the decision is in particulars, and rests therefore with the Moral Sense. Thus much, however, is plain, that the mean state is praiseworthy, in virtue of which we are angry with those with whom, and at those things with which, we ought to be angry, and in right manner, and so on; while the excesses and defects are blameable, slightly so if only slight, more so if greater, and when considerable very blameable.

What we have said also makes an earlier point clear. It is not easy to define how we should be angry, with whom, at what, or for how long. Nor is it easy to say at what point someone is right or wrong. Someone who departs only slightly from the strict rule is not blamed, whether for too much anger or too little. Sometimes we praise people who feel too little anger and call them gentle. Sometimes we call irritable people spirited, seeing them as well suited to govern. So it is hard to state precisely what degree or kind of departure deserves blame. The judgment depends on the particular circumstances and therefore rests with our moral sense. Still, one thing is clear: the balanced state deserves praise. In this state, we are angry with the right people, at the right things, in the right way, and so on. By contrast, both too much and too little anger deserve blame. Slight departures deserve slight blame, greater departures deserve more, and considerable departures deserve severe blame.

It is clear, therefore, that the mean state is what we are to hold to.

Clearly, then, we should hold to the middle ground.

This then is to be taken as our account of the various moral states which have Anger for their object-matter.

This, then, is our account of the various moral states related to anger.

Next, as regards social intercourse and interchange of words and acts, some men are thought to be Over-Complaisant who, with a view solely to giving pleasure, agree to everything and never oppose, but think their line is to give no pain to those they are thrown amongst: they, on the other hand, are called Cross and Contentious who take exactly the contrary line to these, and oppose in everything, and have no care at all whether they give pain or not.

Next, consider social interactions and the exchange of words and actions. Some men are considered overly agreeable because they agree to everything and never object, solely to please others. They believe their role is to avoid upsetting anyone they find themselves with. By contrast, men who take exactly the opposite approach are called irritable and argumentative. They oppose everything and do not care at all whether they upset others.

Now it is quite clear of course, that the states I have named are blameable, and that the mean between them is praiseworthy, in virtue of which a man will let pass what he ought as he ought, and also will object in like manner. However, this state has no name appropriated, but it is most like Friendship; since the man who exhibits it is just the kind of man whom we would call the amiable friend, with the addition of strong earnest affection; but then this is the very point in which it differs from Friendship, that it is quite independent of any feeling or strong affection for those among whom the man mixes: I mean, that he takes everything as he ought, not from any feeling of love or hatred, but simply because his natural disposition leads him to do so; he will do it alike to those whom he does know and those whom he does not, and those with whom he is intimate and those with whom he is not; only in each case as propriety requires, because it is not fitting to care alike for intimates and strangers, nor again to pain them alike.

Clearly, the states I have named deserve blame, while the middle ground between them deserves praise. A man with this balanced disposition lets things pass when and how he should, and objects in the same way. This disposition has no special name, but it most resembles Friendship. A man who shows it is just the sort we would call a pleasant friend, if strong, sincere affection were added. But this is precisely how the disposition differs from Friendship. It does not depend on any feeling or strong affection for the people he spends time with. He responds to everything as he should, not out of love or hatred, but simply because of his natural disposition. He behaves this way toward people he knows and people he does not, toward close companions and others alike. But in each case, he acts as is appropriate. For it is not fitting to show equal concern for close companions and strangers, or to cause them equal pain.

It has been stated in a general way that his social intercourse will be regulated by propriety, and his aim will be to avoid giving pain and to contribute to pleasure, but with a constant reference to what is noble and expedient.

As already stated in general terms, he will behave appropriately in social situations. He will aim to avoid causing pain and to give pleasure, but always consider what is noble and practical.

His proper object-matter seems to be the pleasures and pains which arise out of social intercourse, but whenever it is not honourable or even hurtful to him to contribute to pleasure, in these instances he will run counter and prefer to give pain.

His main concern seems to be the pleasures and pains that arise from social interaction. But whenever helping others feel pleasure would be dishonourable or even harmful to him, he will resist. In these cases, he will prefer to cause pain.

Or if the things in question involve unseemliness to the doer, and this not inconsiderable, or any harm, whereas his opposition will cause some little pain, here he will not agree but will run counter.

Or if the actions would seriously disgrace or cause any harm to the person doing them, while his opposition would cause only a little pain, he will not agree. Instead, he will oppose them.

Again, he will regulate differently his intercourse with great men and with ordinary men, and with all people according to the knowledge he has of them; and in like manner, taking in any other differences which may exist, giving to each his due, and in itself preferring to give pleasure and cautious not to give pain, but still guided by the results, I mean by what is noble and expedient according as they preponderate.

Again, he will treat powerful men differently from ordinary men, and everyone according to how well he knows them. Likewise, he will consider any other differences that may exist and give each person their due. In general, he prefers to give pleasure and takes care not to cause pain. But he is still guided by the results, meaning what is noble and beneficial, according to which carries greater weight.

Again, he will inflict trifling pain with a view to consequent pleasure.

Again, he will cause slight pain for the sake of pleasure later.

Well, the man bearing the mean character is pretty well such as I have described him, but he has no name appropriated to him: of those who try to give pleasure, the man who simply and disinterestedly tries to be agreeable is called Over-Complaisant, he who does it with a view to secure some profit in the way of wealth, or those things which wealth may procure, is a Flatterer: I have said before, that the man who is “always non-content” is Cross and Contentious. Here the extremes have the appearance of being opposed to one another, because the mean has no appropriate name.

Well, the man whose character strikes the right balance is much as I have described him. But there is no specific name for him. Among those who try to please, a man who simply wants to be agreeable, without self-interest, is called Over-Complaisant. A man who does so to gain wealth, or anything wealth can buy, is a Flatterer. As I said before, the man who is “always non-content” is Cross and Contentious. Here the extremes seem opposed to each other because there is no specific name for the middle ground.

The mean state which steers clear of Exaggeration has pretty much the same object-matter as the last we described, and likewise has no name appropriated to it. Still it may be as well to go over these states: because, in the first place, by a particular discussion of each we shall be better acquainted with the general subject of moral character, and next we shall be the more convinced that the virtues are mean states by seeing that this is universally the case.

The balanced state that avoids exaggeration concerns much the same things as the state we last described. Like that state, it has no specific name. Still, it may be worth examining these states for two reasons. First, discussing each state in detail will help us better understand moral character in general. Second, seeing that all virtues are balanced states will make us more convinced that virtue lies in a middle ground.

In respect then of living in society, those who carry on this intercourse with a view to pleasure and pain have been already spoken of; we will now go on to speak of those who are True or False, alike in their words and deeds and in the claims which they advance.

In discussing social life, we have already considered people who interact with others with pleasure and pain in mind. We will now discuss people who are truthful or false in their words, actions, and the claims they make.

Now the Exaggerator is thought to have a tendency to lay claim to things reflecting credit on him, both when they do not belong to him at all and also in greater degree than that in which they really do: whereas the Reserved man, on the contrary, denies those which really belong to him or else depreciates them, while the mean character being a Plain-matter-of-fact person is Truthful in life and word, admitting the existence of what does really belong to him and making it neither greater nor less than the truth.

The Exaggerator is thought to claim qualities or achievements that bring him credit, even when he has none of them. He is also thought to exaggerate those he does have. The Reserved man, by contrast, denies qualities or achievements he really has, or downplays them. But the person between these extremes is straightforward and truthful in both life and speech. He acknowledges what he really has, making it neither greater nor less than it is.

It is possible of course to take any of these lines either with or without some further view: but in general men speak, and act, and live, each according to his particular character and disposition, unless indeed a man is acting from any special motive.

Of course, people can take any of these approaches with or without some further aim. But people generally speak, act, and live according to their own character and disposition, unless they have a special motive.

Now since falsehood is in itself low and blameable, while truth is noble and praiseworthy, it follows that the Truthful man (who is also in the mean) is praiseworthy, and the two who depart from strict truth are both blameable, but especially the Exaggerator.

Falsehood is inherently base and blameworthy, while truth is noble and praiseworthy. So the Truthful man, who also holds to the middle ground, deserves praise. Both those who depart from strict truth deserve blame, but especially the Exaggerator.

We will now speak of each, and first of the Truthful man: I call him Truthful, because we are not now meaning the man who is true in his agreements nor in such matters as amount to justice or injustice (this would come within the province of a different virtue), but, in such as do not involve any such serious difference as this, the man we are describing is true in life and word simply because he is in a certain moral state.

We will now discuss each in turn, starting with the truthful man. I call him truthful, but I do not mean someone who keeps his agreements or acts justly rather than unjustly. Such matters belong to a different virtue. Instead, we are discussing matters that do not involve such serious distinctions. In these matters, the man we are describing is truthful in his life and speech simply because of his character.

And he that is such must be judged to be a good man: for he that has a love for Truth as such, and is guided by it in matters indifferent, will be so likewise even more in such as are not indifferent; for surely he will have a dread of falsehood as base, since he shunned it even in itself: and he that is of such a character is praiseworthy, yet he leans rather to that which is below the truth, this having an appearance of being in better taste because exaggerations are so hateful.

And a man like this must be considered good. For someone who loves truth for its own sake follows it even in matters of little importance. He will follow it still more closely in important matters. Surely he will hate falsehood as shameful, since he avoided falsehood even for its own sake. A man of this character deserves praise, yet he tends toward understatement rather than the full truth. Understatement seems more tasteful because exaggeration is so offensive.

As for the man who lays claim to things above what really belongs to him without any special motive, he is like a base man because he would not otherwise have taken pleasure in falsehood, but he shows as a fool rather than as a knave. But if a man does this with a special motive, suppose for honour or glory, as the Braggart does, then he is not so very blameworthy, but if, directly or indirectly, for pecuniary considerations, he is more unseemly.

A man who claims more than he deserves without any particular motive is like a dishonorable man. Otherwise, he would not take pleasure in lying. But he seems more like a fool than a scoundrel. If a man makes such claims with a particular motive, say for honor or glory, as the Braggart does, he is not very blameworthy. But if he does so, directly or indirectly, for money, his behavior is more disgraceful.

Now the Braggart is such not by his power but by his purpose, that is to say, in virtue of his moral state, and because he is a man of a certain kind; just as there are liars who take pleasure in falsehood for its own sake while others lie from a desire of glory or gain. They who exaggerate with a view to glory pretend to such qualities as are followed by praise or highest congratulation; they who do it with a view to gain assume those which their neighbours can avail themselves of, and the absence of which can be concealed, as a man’s being a skilful soothsayer or physician; and accordingly most men pretend to such things and exaggerate in this direction, because the faults I have mentioned are in them.

A braggart is defined not by his ability but by his intention, his moral character, and the kind of person he is. Similarly, some liars enjoy falsehood for its own sake, while others lie to gain glory or profit. Those who exaggerate to gain glory claim qualities that earn praise or the highest admiration. Those who exaggerate for profit claim abilities their neighbors can use, and whose absence they can conceal. For example, they may claim to be skilled soothsayers or physicians. Accordingly, most people make such claims and exaggerate in these areas because they have the faults I have mentioned.

The Reserved, who depreciate their own qualities, have the appearance of being more refined in their characters, because they are not thought to speak with a view to gain but to avoid grandeur: one very common trait in such characters is their denying common current opinions, as Socrates used to do. There are people who lay claim falsely to small things and things the falsity of their pretensions to which is obvious; these are called Factotums and are very despicable.

The Reserved, who downplay their own qualities, seem to have more refined characters. This is because people think the Reserved speak not for personal gain, but to avoid seeming grand. One very common trait among the Reserved is denying widely accepted opinions, as Socrates used to do. Some people make false claims about minor qualities or possessions, and the falseness of their claims is obvious. These people are called Factotums and are deeply contemptible.

This very Reserve sometimes shows like Exaggeration; take, for instance, the excessive plainness of dress affected by the Lacedæmonians: in fact, both excess and the extreme of deficiency partake of the nature of Exaggeration. But they who practise Reserve in moderation, and in cases in which the truth is not very obvious and plain, give an impression of refinement. Here it is the Exaggerator (as being the worst character) who appears to be opposed to the Truthful Man.

Even understatement sometimes looks like exaggeration. Take, for example, the excessively plain dress adopted by the Lacedæmonians. In fact, both excess and extreme deficiency are forms of exaggeration. But people who understate things moderately, when the truth is not obvious and clear, give an impression of refinement. Here, the exaggerator appears to be the truthful person's opposite, because the exaggerator has the worse character.

Next, as life has its pauses and in them admits of pastime combined with Jocularity, it is thought that in this respect also there is a kind of fitting intercourse, and that rules may be prescribed as to the kind of things one should say and the manner of saying them; and in respect of hearing likewise (and there will be a difference between the saying and hearing such and such things). It is plain that in regard to these things also there will be an excess and defect and a mean.

Next, life has its breaks, and these allow time for amusement and joking. So people think there is also an appropriate way to interact on these occasions. Rules may be set for what people should say and how they should say it. The same applies to listening (though saying certain things differs from hearing them). Clearly, in joking too, there can be too much, too little, and a balanced middle ground.

Now they who exceed in the ridiculous are judged to be Buffoons and Vulgar, catching at it in any and every way and at any cost, and aiming rather at raising laughter than at saying what is seemly and at avoiding to pain the object of their wit. They, on the other hand, who would not for the world make a joke themselves and are displeased with such as do are thought to be Clownish and Stern. But they who are Jocular in good taste are denominated by a Greek term expressing properly ease of movement, because such are thought to be, as one may say, motions of the moral character; and as bodies are judged of by their motions so too are moral characters.

People who take humor too far are judged to be buffoons and vulgar. They seek laughs in any way and at any cost. They care more about raising a laugh than speaking appropriately and avoiding hurting the target of their wit. Others, by contrast, would never make a joke themselves and disapprove of people who do. They are considered boorish and stern. But people who joke in good taste are described by a Greek term whose literal meaning is ease of movement. This is because their jokes are thought to be, so to speak, movements of their moral character. Just as bodies are judged by their movements, so too are moral characters.

Now as the ridiculous lies on the surface, and the majority of men take more pleasure than they ought in Jocularity and Jesting, the Buffoons too get this name of Easy Pleasantry, as if refined and gentlemanlike; but that they differ from these, and considerably too, is plain from what has been said.

Now, the ridiculous is easy to spot, and most people enjoy jokes and jesting more than they should. So buffoons, too, get called witty, as if they were refined gentlemen. But what has already been said makes clear that buffoons differ considerably from people with genuine wit.

One quality which belongs to the mean state is Tact: it is characteristic of a man of Tact to say and listen to such things as are fit for a good man and a gentleman to say and listen to: for there are things which are becoming for such a one to say and listen to in the way of Jocularity, and there is a difference between the Jocularity of the Gentleman and that of the Vulgarian; and again, between that of the educated and uneducated man. This you may see from a comparison of the Old and New Comedy: in the former obscene talk made the fun; in the latter it is rather innuendo: and this is no slight difference as regards decency.

Tact is one quality of the balanced state between extremes. A tactful man says and listens to what is appropriate for a good man and a gentleman. For some things are appropriate for such a man to say and hear in jest. A gentleman’s humor differs from a vulgar man’s, and an educated man’s humor differs from an uneducated man’s. You can see these differences by comparing Old and New Comedy. In Old Comedy, obscene language provided the humor. In New Comedy, the humor comes more from innuendo. The difference is considerable in terms of decency.

Well then, are we to characterise him who jests well by his saying what is becoming a gentleman, or by his avoiding to pain the object of his wit, or even by his giving him pleasure? or will not such a definition be vague, since different things are hateful and pleasant to different men?

Well then, should we judge a good joker by whether his jokes are fitting for a gentleman? Or by whether he avoids hurting the person he jokes about, or even gives that person pleasure? But wouldn’t such a definition be vague, since different people dislike and enjoy different things?

Be this as it may, whatever he says such things will he also listen to, since it is commonly held that a man will do what he will bear to hear: this must, however, be limited; a man will not do quite all that he will hear: because jesting is a species of scurrility and there are some points of scurrility forbidden by law; it may be certain points of jesting should have been also so forbidden. So then the refined and gentlemanlike man will bear himself thus as being a law to himself. Such is the mean character, whether denominated the man of Tact or of Easy Pleasantry.

Be that as it may, he will also listen to the same kinds of things he says. For people commonly believe that a man will do whatever he is willing to hear. But this belief needs a limit. A man will not do absolutely everything he is willing to hear. For joking is a form of abusive speech, and some kinds of abusive speech are forbidden by law. Perhaps certain kinds of joking should also have been forbidden. So the refined, gentlemanly man will behave accordingly, acting as a law to himself. Such is the man who strikes the right balance, whether called a man of Tact or of Easy Pleasantry.

But the Buffoon cannot resist the ridiculous, sparing neither himself nor any one else so that he can but raise his laugh, saying things of such kind as no man of refinement would say and some which he would not even tolerate if said by others in his hearing.

But the buffoon cannot resist a joke. He spares neither himself nor anyone else, as long as he can get a laugh. He says things no refined person would say. Some of his remarks are things a refined person would not even tolerate hearing from others.

The Clownish man is for such intercourse wholly useless: inasmuch as contributing nothing jocose of his own he is savage with all who do.

The boorish man is completely useless in such conversation because he offers no jokes of his own. He is also hostile toward everyone who does.

Yet some pause and amusement in life are generally judged to be indispensable.

Yet some rest and amusement in life are generally considered essential.

The three mean states which have been described do occur in life, and the object-matter of all is interchange of words and deeds. They differ, in that one of them is concerned with truth, and the other two with the pleasurable: and of these two again, the one is conversant with the jocosities of life, the other with all other points of social intercourse.

The three balanced states described above do occur in life. All three concern exchanges of words and actions. They differ because one concerns truth, while the other two concern what is pleasant. Of these last two, one concerns jokes and humor, while the other concerns all other aspects of social interaction.

To speak of Shame as a Virtue is incorrect, because it is much more like a feeling than a moral state. It is defined, we know, to be “a kind of fear of disgrace,” and its effects are similar to those of the fear of danger, for they who feel Shame grow red and they who fear death turn pale. So both are evidently in a way physical, which is thought to be a mark of a feeling rather than a moral state.

It is wrong to call shame a virtue because shame is much more like a feeling than a moral state. As we know, shame is defined as “a kind of fear of disgrace,” and its effects resemble those of fearing danger. People who feel shame blush, while people who fear death turn pale. So both shame and fear are clearly physical in a way. Such physical effects are thought to mark a feeling rather than a moral state.

Moreover, it is a feeling not suitable to every age, but only to youth: we do think that the young should be Shamefaced, because since they live at the beck and call of passion they do much that is wrong and Shame acts on them as a check. In fact, we praise such young men as are Shamefaced, but no one would ever praise an old man for being given to it, inasmuch as we hold that he ought not to do things which cause Shame; for Shame, since it arises at low bad actions, does not at all belong to the good man, because such ought not to be done at all: nor does it make any difference to allege that some things are disgraceful really, others only because they are thought so; for neither should be done, so that a man ought not to be in the position of feeling Shame. In truth, to be such a man as to do anything disgraceful is the part of a faulty character. And for a man to be such that he would feel Shame if he should do anything disgraceful, and to think that this constitutes him a good man, is absurd: because Shame is felt at voluntary actions only, and a good man will never voluntarily do what is base.

Moreover, shame is not appropriate at every age, but only in youth. We do think young people should feel shame. Because they are ruled by passion, they do many wrong things, and shame keeps them in check. In fact, we praise young men who are prone to shame. But no one would ever praise an old man for being prone to shame. We believe he should not do things that cause shame. For shame arises from low, bad actions, so it has no place in a good man. Such actions should never be done at all. Nor does it matter whether some actions are truly disgraceful while others are merely thought to be disgraceful. Neither kind should be done, so a man should not put himself in a position to feel shame. In truth, being the kind of man who does anything disgraceful shows a flawed character. A man might feel shame if he did something disgraceful. But it is absurd for him to think that his willingness to feel shame makes him a good man. For shame is felt only over voluntary actions, and a good man will never voluntarily do anything base.

True it is, that Shame may be good on a certain supposition, as “if a man should do such things, he would feel Shame:” but then the Virtues are good in themselves, and not merely in supposed cases. And, granted that impudence and the not being ashamed to do what is disgraceful is base, it does not the more follow that it is good for a man to do such things and feel Shame.

It is true that shame may be good under certain conditions, as in “if a man did such things, he would feel shame.” But virtues are good in themselves, not just in hypothetical cases. Granted, shamelessness and feeling no shame about doing disgraceful things are wrong. But that does not mean it is good for a man to do disgraceful things and feel shame.

Nor is Self-Control properly a Virtue, but a kind of mixed state: however, all about this shall be set forth in a future Book.

Nor is self-control truly a virtue, but rather a kind of mixed state. However, all of this will be explained in a later book.