On Human Bondage, or the Power of Emotions

Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better for him, to follow that which is worse. Why this is so, and what is good or evil in the emotions, I propose to show in this part of my treatise. But, before I begin, it would be well to make a few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection, good and evil.

I call the human inability to moderate and control emotions bondage. For when someone is in the grip of their emotions, they are not their own master. Instead, they are at the mercy of fortune. So much so that they are often forced to follow the worse course, even while seeing the better one. In this part of my treatise, I intend to explain why this happens and what is good or evil in emotions. But before I begin, a few introductory remarks on perfection and imperfection, good and evil, would be useful.

When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has brought it to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect, not only by himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks that he knows, the intention and aim of its author. For instance, suppose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not yet completed), and knows that the aim of the author of that work is to build a house, he will call the work imperfect; he will, on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he sees that it is carried through to the end, which its author had purposed for it. But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen before, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect. Such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms.

When someone sets out to make something and brings it to perfection, he will call his work perfect. So will everyone who correctly understands, or thinks he understands, the maker’s intention and aim. For example, suppose someone sees a work that, I assume, is not yet finished. If he knows the maker intends to build a house, he will call the work imperfect. But as soon as he sees the work completed as its maker intended, he will call it perfect. Now suppose someone sees a work unlike anything he has seen before and does not know the maker’s intention. He plainly cannot know whether the work is perfect or imperfect. This seems to be the original meaning of these terms.

But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out types of houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain types to others, it came about, that each man called perfect that which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the thing in question, and called imperfect that which he saw agree less with his own preconceived type, even though it had evidently been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer. This seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena, which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or imperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things natural, no less than of things artificial, and such ideas they hold as types, believing that Nature (who they think does nothing without an object) has them in view, and has set them as types before herself. Therefore, when they behold something in Nature, which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they have formed of the thing in question, they say that Nature has fallen short or has blundered, and has left her work incomplete. Thus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than from true knowledge of what they pronounce upon.

But people began to form general ideas and imagine types of houses, buildings, towers, and so on. They also began to prefer some types to others. As a result, each person called something perfect when it matched the general idea they had formed of it. They called something imperfect when it matched their preconceived type less closely. They did so even when the thing had clearly been completed according to its maker’s idea. This seems to be the only reason people call natural things perfect or imperfect, although human hands do not make them. For people form general ideas of natural things just as they do of artificial things. They treat these ideas as models. They believe that Nature keeps these models in mind and has set them before herself as standards. They think Nature does nothing without a purpose. So when people see something in Nature that does not fully match their preconceived model, they say Nature has failed. They say she has made a mistake and left her work incomplete. Thus, people tend to call natural things perfect or imperfect based on their own prejudices. They do so rather than from true knowledge of the things they judge.

Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does not work with an end in view. For the eternal and infinite Being, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as that whereby it exists. For we have shown, that by the same necessity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works (I. xvi.). The reason or cause why God or Nature exists, and the reason why he acts, are one and the same. Therefore, as he does not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for the sake of an end; of his existence and of his action there is neither origin nor end. Wherefore, a cause which is called final is nothing else but human desire, in so far as it is considered as the origin or cause of anything. For example, when we say that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house, we mean nothing more than that a man, conceiving the conveniences of household life, had a desire to build a house. Wherefore, the being inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as a final cause, is nothing else but this particular desire, which is really the efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary cause, because men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires. They are, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actions and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are determined to any particular desire. Therefore, the common saying that Nature sometimes falls short, or blunders, and produces things which are imperfect, I set down among the glosses treated of in the Appendix to Part I. Perfection and imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or notions which we form from a comparison among one another of individuals of the same species; hence I said above (II. Def. vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing. For we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category of Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong. Thus, in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this category, and comparing them one with another, find that some possess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent, say that some are more perfect than others. Again, in so far as we attribute to them anything implying negation—as term, end, infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them imperfect, because they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or because Nature has blundered. For nothing lies within the scope of a thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily comes to pass.

We showed in the Appendix to Part I that Nature does not act with a goal in mind. The eternal and infinite Being we call God or Nature acts by the same necessity by which he exists. For we have shown that the necessity of his nature determines both his existence and his actions (I. xvi.). The reason or cause of God's or Nature's existence is also the reason or cause of his actions. Therefore, just as he does not exist for a purpose, he does not act for a purpose. Neither his existence nor his actions have a beginning or an end. So a “final cause” is nothing but human desire considered as the source or cause of something. For example, we say that being lived in is the final cause of a particular house. We mean only that someone imagined the comforts of home life and wanted to build a house. Thus, being lived in, when considered as a final cause, is nothing but this particular desire. That desire is actually the efficient cause, the cause that brings the house into existence. People regard the desire as the first cause because they are generally unaware of what causes their desires. As I have often said, people are aware of their own actions and appetites. But they do not know the causes that lead them to any particular desire. Therefore, people commonly say that Nature sometimes falls short, makes mistakes, and produces imperfect things. I count this saying among the misconceptions discussed in the Appendix to Part I. Perfection and imperfection, then, are really only ways of thinking. They are ideas we form by comparing individuals of the same species with one another. That is why I said above (II. Def. vi.) that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing. For we usually place all individual things in nature within one general class, called the highest genus. This is the category of Being, to which absolutely all individuals in nature belong. When we place individuals in this category and compare them, we find that some have more being or reality than others. To that extent, we say that some are more perfect than others. Again, we call things imperfect insofar as we attribute something negative to them, such as limits, an end, or weakness. We call them imperfect because they affect our minds less than the things we call perfect. We do not call them imperfect because they have some inherent deficiency or because Nature has made a mistake. For a thing's nature includes only what necessarily follows from the nature of its efficient cause. And whatever necessarily follows from the nature of that efficient cause necessarily happens.

As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive quality in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of thinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of things one with another. Thus one and the same thing can be at the same time good, bad, and indifferent. For instance, music is good for him that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is deaf, it is neither good nor bad.

The terms good and bad do not describe any actual quality in things considered in themselves. Instead, good and bad are simply ways of thinking, or ideas we form by comparing things with one another. So the same thing can be good, bad, and neither good nor bad at the same time. For example, music is good for someone who feels melancholy, but bad for someone who is grieving. For someone who is deaf, music is neither good nor bad.

Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be retained. For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a type of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful for us to retain the terms in question, in the sense I have indicated.

Nevertheless, even though this is so, we should still keep these terms. We want to form an idea of a human being as a model of human nature to keep in view. For that purpose, keeping these terms in the sense I have explained will be useful.

In what follows, then, I shall mean by, "good" that, which we certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by "bad," that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in approaching the said type. Again, we shall that men are more perfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach more or less nearly to the said type. For it must be specially remarked that, when I say that a man passes from a lesser to a greater perfection, or vice versâ, I do not mean that he is changed from one essence or reality to another; for instance, a horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a man, as by being changed into an insect. What I mean is, that we conceive the thing's power of action, in so far as this is understood by its nature, to be increased or diminished. Lastly, by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, mean reality—in other words, each thing's essence, in so far as it exists, and operates in a particular manner, and without paying any regard to its duration. For no given thing can be said to be more perfect, because it has passed a longer time in existence. The duration of things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essence of things involves no fixed and definite period of existence; but everything, whether it be more perfect or less perfect, will always be able to persist in existence with the same force wherewith it began to exist; wherefore, in this respect, all things are equal.

In what follows, I will use "good" to mean what we know with certainty helps us approach our chosen model of human nature. By "bad," I mean what we know with certainty hinders us from approaching that model. We will also call people more or less perfect according to how closely they approach that model. One point needs special emphasis. When I say someone moves from lesser to greater perfection, or the reverse, I do not mean their essence changes. They do not change from one essence or reality into another. For example, changing a horse into a human would destroy the horse just as completely as changing it into an insect. Rather, I mean that we understand a thing’s power to act as increasing or decreasing, as understood through its nature. Finally, as I have said, by perfection in general I mean reality. In other words, I mean each thing’s essence, insofar as the thing exists and acts in a particular way. This meaning takes no account of how long the thing exists. For no particular thing can be called more perfect because it has existed longer. How long things exist cannot be determined by their essence. For their essence involves no fixed, definite period of existence. But everything, whether more or less perfect, can always continue existing with the same force with which it began to exist. So, in this respect, all things are equal.

I. By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us.

I. By good I mean what we know for certain is useful to us.

II. By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in the attainment of any good.

II. By evil I mean anything we know for certain stands in our way of achieving any good.

(Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the end.)

(For these terms, see the end of the preceding preface.)

III. Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while regarding their essence only, we find nothing therein, which necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.

III. I call particular things contingent insofar as their essence alone neither requires nor rules out their existence.

IV. Particular things I call possible in so far as, while regarding the causes whereby they must be produced, we know not, whether such causes be determined for producing them.

IV. I call particular things possible under the following condition. We consider the causes that must produce those things, but do not know whether those causes are determined to produce them.

(In I. xxxiii. note. i., I drew no distinction between possible and contingent, because there was in that place no need to distinguish them accurately.)

(In I. xxxiii. note. i., I did not distinguish between possible and contingent. This was because there was no need for a precise distinction there.)

V. By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in different directions, though they are of the same kind, such as luxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and are contraries, not by nature, but by accident.

V. By conflicting emotions, I mean emotions that pull a person in different directions, though they are of the same kind. Examples include extravagance and greed, both forms of love. These emotions are opposed not by their nature, but because of circumstances.

VI. What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future, present, and past, I explained in III. xviii., notes. i. and ii., which see.

VI. I explained what I mean by emotion toward a future, present, or past thing in III. xviii., notes i. and ii. See those notes.

(But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit; that is, all objects distant from us more than two hundred feet, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive, seem to be an equal distance from us, and all in the same plane; so also objects, whose time of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all equally distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the same moment of time.)

(But I should also note here that we can clearly imagine distances in space or time only within a definite limit. All objects more than two hundred feet away, or beyond the distance we can clearly imagine, seem equally far away. They also seem to lie in the same plane. The same applies to objects whose existence we imagine as farther from the present than we can clearly grasp. All such objects seem equally distant from the present, as though they belonged to the same moment in time.)

VII. By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a desire.

VII. By a goal we do something to achieve, I mean a desire.

VIII. By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that is (III. vii), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a man's nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.

VIII. By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing. That is (III. vii), human virtue is a person's nature or essence, considered in terms of its power. This power produces effects that can be understood only through the laws of that person's nature.

There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is not another more powerful and strong. Whatsoever thing be given, there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.

For every individual thing in nature, there is another more powerful and stronger. Whatever the thing, something stronger can destroy it.

PROP. I. No positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being true.

PROP. I. The presence of truth does not remove any positive quality of a false idea merely because that truth is true.

Proof.—Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas involve (II. xxxv.), nor have they any positive quality on account of which they are called false (II. xxxiii.); contrariwise, in so far as they are referred to God, they are true (II. xxxii.). Wherefore, if the positive quality possessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being true, a true idea would then be removed by itself, which (IV. iii.) is absurd. Therefore, no positive quality possessed by a false idea, &c. Q.E.D.

Proof. Falsity consists only in the lack of knowledge that inadequate ideas involve (II. xxxv.). These ideas have no positive quality that makes them false (II. xxxiii.). On the contrary, insofar as these ideas are considered in relation to God, they are true (II. xxxii.). So suppose the presence of a true idea removed a false idea’s positive quality simply because the true idea was true. Then a true idea would remove itself, which is absurd (IV. iii.). Therefore, no positive quality possessed by a false idea, etc. Q.E.D.

Note.—This proposition is more clearly understood from II. xvi. Coroll. ii. For imagination is an idea, which indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external body; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly; whence it comes to pass, that the mind is said to err. For instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it is distant from us about two hundred feet; in this judgment we err, so long as we are in ignorance of its true distance; when its true distance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination; or, in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explains tho nature of that luminary, in so far as the body is affected thereby: wherefore, though we know the real distance, we shall still nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us. For, as we said in II. xxxv. note, we do not imagine the sun to be so near us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the body is affected thereby. Thus, when the rays of the sun falling on the surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine the sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of its real position; and similarly other imaginations, wherein the mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition of the body, or that its power of activity is increased or diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at its presence. It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an evil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the contrary also happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will certainly come, and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings; thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth, in virtue of its being true, but because other imaginations, stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the present existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II. xvii.

Note. This proposition is clearer in light of II. xvi. Coroll. ii. For imagination is an idea that indicates the human body’s present condition more than the nature of an external body. It does so confusedly, not distinctly, and this is why the mind is said to be mistaken. For example, when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about two hundred feet away. We are mistaken in this judgment as long as we do not know its true distance. Once we know its true distance, the error disappears, but the imagined appearance remains. In other words, the idea of the sun remains. This idea explains the sun’s nature only insofar as the sun affects our body. So, although we know the sun’s actual distance, we will still imagine it to be nearby. As we said in II. xxxv. note, we do not imagine the sun so near because we lack knowledge of its true distance. Rather, the mind conceives the sun’s size according to how the sun affects the body. Similarly, when sunlight strikes the surface of water and reflects into our eyes, we imagine the sun in the water. We do so even though we know its actual position. The same applies to other imagined appearances through which the mind is deceived. These appearances may indicate the body’s natural condition, or an increase or decrease in its power to act. They do not contradict the truth, and they do not disappear when the truth becomes known. Indeed, when we mistakenly fear something bad, our fear sometimes disappears when we hear the truth. But the opposite also happens. We fear something bad that will certainly happen, yet our fear disappears when we hear a false report. Thus, imagined appearances do not disappear because the truth is present and is true. They disappear because other, stronger imagined appearances take their place. These stronger appearances rule out the present existence of what we previously imagined, as I showed in II. xvii.

PROP. II. We are only passive, in so far as we are apart of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.

PROP. II. We are passive only insofar as we are a part of Nature that cannot be understood without other parts.

Proof.—We are said to be passive, when something arises in us, whereof we are only a partial cause (III. Def. ii.), that is (III. Def. i.), something which cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature. We are passive therefore, in so far as we are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts. Q.E.D.

Proof. We are said to be passive when something arises in us for which we are only a partial cause (III. Def. ii.). That is, what arises cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature (III. Def. i.). Therefore, we are passive insofar as we are a part of Nature that cannot be understood apart from other parts. Q.E.D.

PROP. III. The force whereby a man persists in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.

PROP. III. A person's power to continue existing is limited. The power of external causes is infinitely greater.

Proof.—This is evident from the axiom of this part. For, when man is given, there is something else—say A—more powerful; when A is given, there is something else—say B—more powerful than A, and so on to infinity; thus the power of man is limited by the power of some other thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. Q.E.D.

Proof. This follows from the axiom of this part. For any human being, there is something else, call it A, that is more powerful. For any A, there is something else, call it B, that is more powerful than A. This continues to infinity. Thus, a human being’s power is limited by the power of some other thing. And the power of external causes infinitely exceeds human power. Q.E.D.

PROP. IV. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes, save such as can be understood through his nature only as their adequate cause.

PROP. IV. A human being must be part of Nature. Nor can a person's changes all be explained by their own nature alone as the adequate cause.

Proof.—The power, whereby each particular thing, and consequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God or of Nature (I. xxiv. Coroll.); not in so far as it is infinite, but in so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence (III. vii.). Thus the power of man, in so far as it is explained through his own actual essence, is a part of the infinite power of God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof (I. xxxiv.). This was our first point. Again, if it were possible, that man should undergo no changes save such as can be understood solely through the nature of man, it would follow that he would not be able to die, but would always necessarily exist; this would be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was either finite or infinite; namely, either of man's power only, inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself all changes which could spring from external causes; or of the infinite power of Nature, whereby all individual things would be so ordered, that man should be incapable of undergoing any changes save such as tended towards his own preservation. But the first alternative is absurd (by the last Prop., the proof of which is universal, and can be applied to all individual things). Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be capable of undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely through his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as we have shown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow from the infinite power of God, and consequently (I. xvi.) from the necessity of the divine nature, in so far as it is regarded as affected by the idea of any given man, the whole order of nature as conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must be deducible. It would therefore follow (I. xxi.) that man is infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. It is, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any changes save those whereof he is the adequate cause. Q.E.D.

Proof. The power by which each individual thing, and therefore a human being, preserves its existence is God's or Nature's power (I. xxiv. Coroll.). This is not God's power considered as infinite, but as explained through an actual human essence (III. vii.). Thus human power, insofar as it is explained through a person's own actual essence, is part of God's or Nature's infinite power. In other words, human power is part of God's or Nature's essence (I. xxxiv.). This establishes our first point. Now suppose a person could undergo only changes that could be understood solely through human nature. Such a person could not die, but would necessarily always exist. This necessary existence would have to result from a cause whose power was either finite or infinite. The finite cause would be the person's own power alone. In that case, the person could ward off all changes arising from external causes. The infinite cause would be Nature's power. In that case, Nature would arrange all individual things so that the person could undergo only changes promoting their own preservation. But the first alternative is absurd, as the preceding proposition shows. Its proof is universal and applies to all individual things. Therefore, suppose a person could undergo only changes explainable solely through their own nature. As we have shown, that person would necessarily always exist. This result would have to follow from God's infinite power, and therefore from the necessity of the divine nature (I. xvi.). The entire order of nature, conceived under the attributes of extension and thought, would then have to be deducible from that divine nature, insofar as it is considered as affected by the idea of any given person. It would therefore follow that the person is infinite (I. xxi.). But the first part of this proof shows that this conclusion is absurd. Therefore, it is impossible for a person to undergo only changes of which they are the adequate cause. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a prey to his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order of nature, and that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as the nature of things demands.

Corollary: It follows that people are necessarily always at the mercy of their passions. They follow and obey the general order of nature, adapting to it as much as the nature of things requires.

PROP. V. The power and increase of every passion, and its persistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby we ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own.

PROP. V. The strength, growth, and duration of every passion are not determined by our own power to keep existing. Instead, they are determined by the power of an external cause compared with our own.

Proof.—The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our essence alone (III. Deff. i. and ii.), that is (III. vii.), the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in II. xvi.) must necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own. Q.E.D.

Proof. The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our essence alone (III. Deff. i. and ii.). That is, a passion’s power cannot be defined by the power through which we strive to continue existing (III. vii.). Instead, a passion’s power must be defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own power. This is shown in II. xvi. Q.E.D.

PROP. VI. The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the rest of a man's activities or power, so that the emotion becomes obstinately fixed to him.

PROP. VI. Any passion or emotion can overpower all of a person's other activities or abilities, becoming stubbornly fixed in that person.

Proof.—The force and increase of any passion and its persistence in existing are defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore (IV. iii.) it can overcome a man's power, &e. Q.E.D.

Proof. A passion’s strength, growth, and duration depend on the power of an external cause compared with our own power. This follows from the previous proposition. Therefore (IV. iii.), a passion can overpower a person’s own strength, etc. Q.E.D.

PROP. VII. An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for controlling emotion.

PROP. VII. An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by an opposing emotion with greater power to control emotions.

Proof.—Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existence than before (cf. the general Definition of the Emotions at the end of Part III.). When, therefore, the mind is assailed by any emotion, the body is at the same time affected with a modification whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished. Now this modification of the body (IV. v.) receives from its cause the force for persistence in its being; which force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II. vi.), in virtue of the body being affected with a modification contrary to (III. v.) and stronger than itself (IV. Ax.); wherefore (II. xii.) the mind is affected by the idea of a modification contrary to, and stronger than the former modification, in other words, (by the general definition of the emotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and stronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy the existence of the former emotion; thus an emotion cannot be destroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and stronger emotion. Q.E.D.

Proof. An emotion, insofar as it relates to the mind, is an idea. Through this idea, the mind affirms that its body has a greater or lesser force of existence than before. (See the general Definition of the Emotions at the end of Part III.) Therefore, when an emotion strikes the mind, the body simultaneously undergoes a change that increases or decreases its power to act. This bodily change receives from its cause the force to persist in its existence (IV. v.). Only a bodily cause can check or destroy this force (II. vi.). Such a cause must produce a bodily change opposite to (III. v.) and stronger than the existing change (IV. Ax.). Consequently, the mind experiences the idea of a bodily change opposite to and stronger than the previous change (II. xii.). In other words, by the general definition of the emotions, the mind experiences an opposite and stronger emotion. This stronger emotion excludes or destroys the previous emotion. Thus, an emotion can only be destroyed or controlled by an opposite and stronger emotion. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, can only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a modification of the body contrary to, and stronger than, that which we are undergoing. For the emotion which we undergo can only be checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to, and stronger than, itself, in other words, (by the general Definition of the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification of the body contrary to, and stronger than, the modification which we undergo.

Corollary. An emotion, insofar as it relates to the mind, can only be controlled or eliminated through an idea of a bodily change. This bodily change must oppose and be stronger than the bodily change we are experiencing. For an emotion we experience can only be restrained or eliminated by an opposing, stronger emotion. In other words, according to the general Definition of the Emotions, this requires an idea of a bodily change. That bodily change must oppose and be stronger than the bodily change we are experiencing.

PROP. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof.

PROPOSITION VIII. Knowledge of good and evil is nothing more than feelings of pleasure or pain, insofar as we are aware of those feelings.

Proof.—We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or the reverse in preserving our being (IV. Deff. i. and ii.), that is (III. vii.), when it increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our power of activity. Thus, in so far as we perceive that a thing affects us with pleasure or pain, we call it good or evil; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily follows from that pleasurable or painful emotion (II. xxii.). But this idea is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united to body (II. xxi.); that is, there is no real distinction between this idea and the emotion or idea of the modification of the body, save in conception only. Therefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotion, in so far as we are conscious thereof. Q.E.D.

Proof. We call a thing good or evil when it helps or hinders the preservation of our being (IV. Deff. i. and ii.). That is, when it increases or decreases, helps or hinders, our power to act (III. vii.). Thus, insofar as we perceive that a thing causes us pleasure or pain, we call that thing good or evil. So knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the idea of pleasure or pain. This idea necessarily follows from the pleasurable or painful emotion (II. xxii.). But this idea is united with the emotion just as the mind is united with the body (II. xxi.). In other words, the idea and the emotion, or idea of a change in the body, are not really distinct. We distinguish them only in thought. Therefore, knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the emotion insofar as we are conscious of that emotion. Q.E.D.

PROP. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive the cause to be with us.

PROP. IX. An emotion is stronger if we think its cause is present with us than if we do not.

Proof.—Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the mind regards a thing as present (II. xvii. note), but which indicates the disposition of the mind rather than the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.). An emotion is therefore a conception, in so far as it indicates the disposition of the body. But a conception (by II. xvii.) is stronger, so long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence of the external object; wherefore an emotion is also stronger or more intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time, than when we do not conceive the cause to be with us. Q.E.D.

Proof. Imagination or conception is an idea through which the mind regards a thing as present (II. xvii. note). But the idea indicates the mind’s state rather than the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.). An emotion is therefore a conception insofar as the conception indicates the body’s state. But a conception is stronger as long as we conceive nothing that rules out the external object’s present existence (II. xvii.). Therefore, an emotion is also stronger or more intense when we conceive its cause as present with us now. The emotion is stronger than when we do not conceive its cause as present with us. Q.E.D.

Note.—When I said above in III. xviii. that we are affected by the image of what is past or future with the same emotion as if the thing conceived were present, I expressly stated, that this is only true in so far as we look solely to the image of the thing in question itself; for the thing's nature is unchanged, whether we have conceived it or not; I did not deny that the image becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us other things which exclude the present existence of the future object: I did not expressly call attention to the fact, because I purposed to treat of the strength of the emotions in this part of my work.

Note. In III. xviii., I said that images of past or future things affect us as if those things were present. I explicitly limited this claim to cases where we consider only the image of the thing itself. For the thing’s nature remains unchanged, whether we have imagined the thing or not. I did not deny that the image weakens when we consider other things to be present. Those other things rule out the future object’s present existence. I did not explicitly draw attention to this weakening because I planned to discuss the strength of emotions here.

Corollary.—The image of something past or future, that is, of a thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time future, to the exclusion of time present, is, when other conditions are equal, weaker than the image of something present; consequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future is less intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion felt towards something present.

Corollary: An image of something past or future represents something we regard as belonging to the past or future, not the present. Other things being equal, this image is weaker than an image of something present. Consequently, other things being equal, an emotion toward something past or future is less intense than one toward something present.

PROP. X. Towards something future, which we conceive as close at hand, we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer interval; so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have not long passed away we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that it has long passed away.

PROP. X. We are affected more strongly by something future if we imagine it happening soon than if we imagine it happening later. Similarly, a memory affects us more strongly if we think of the event as recent rather than long past.

Proof.—In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or not long passed away, we conceive that which excludes the presence of the object less, than if its period of future existence were more distant from the present, or if it had long passed away (this is obvious) therefore (by the foregoing Prop.) we are, so far, more intensely affected towards it. Q.E.D.

Proof. When we imagine a thing as near in time or recently past, we imagine less that rules out its presence than if its future existence were more distant or it had passed away long ago. (This is obvious.) So, by the previous proposition, we are to that extent more intensely affected by the thing. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—From the remarks made in Def. vi. of this part it follows that, if objects are separated from the present by a longer period than we can define in conception, though their dates of occurrence be widely separated one from the other, they all affect us equally faintly.

Corollary: The following conclusion follows from the remarks in Definition 6 of this part. If objects are further from the present than we can mentally define, all those objects affect us equally faintly. This holds even though the objects occur at widely separated times.

PROP. XI. An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion towards that which possible, or contingent, or non—necessary.

PROP. XI. Other things being equal, an emotion toward something we consider necessary is stronger than an emotion toward something we consider possible, contingent, or not necessary.

Proof.—In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we, to that extent, affirm its existence; on the other hand we deny a thing's existence, in so far as we conceive it not to be necessary (I. xxxiii. note. i.); wherefore (IV. ix.) an emotion towards that which is necessary is, other conditions being equal, more intense than an emotion that which is non—necessary. Q.E.D.

Proof. To the extent that we consider a thing necessary, we affirm its existence. Conversely, to the extent that we consider a thing not necessary, we deny its existence (I. xxxiii. note. i.). Therefore (IV. ix.), with other conditions equal, an emotion toward something necessary is stronger than an emotion toward something nonessentially necessary. Q.E.D.

PROP. XII. An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to exist at the present time, and which we conceive as possible, is more intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a thing contingent.

PROP. XII. Consider an emotion toward something we know does not currently exist but regard as possible. Other conditions being equal, this emotion is stronger than an emotion toward something contingent.

Proof.—In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are affected by the conception of some further thing, which would assert the existence of the former (IV. Def. iii.); but, on the other hand, we (by hypothesis) conceive certain things, which exclude its present existence. But, in so far as we conceive a thing to be possible in the future, we there by conceive things which assert its existence (IV. iv.), that is (III. xviii.), things which promote hope or fear: wherefore an emotion towards something possible is more vehement. Q.E.D.

Proof. Insofar as we think of a thing as contingent, we are affected by the idea of some further thing. That further thing would establish the first thing’s existence (IV. Def. iii.). But, by hypothesis, we also conceive of certain things that rule out the first thing’s present existence. By contrast, insofar as we think of a thing as possible in the future, we conceive of things that establish its existence (IV. iv.). That is, we conceive of things that encourage hope or fear (III. xviii.). Therefore, an emotion toward something possible is stronger. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to exist in the present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far fainter, than if we conceive the thing to be present with us.

Corollary: Suppose we know a thing does not exist now and consider its existence possible but not necessary. Our emotion toward that thing is far weaker than if we imagined the thing present with us.

Proof.—Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist, is more intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as future (IV. ix. Coroll.), and is much more vehement, than if the future time be conceived as far distant from the present (IV. x.). Therefore an emotion towards a thing, whose period of existence we conceive to be far distant from the present, is far fainter, than if we conceive the thing as present; it is, nevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as contingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard as contingent, will be far fainter, than if we conceived the thing to be present with us. Q.E.D.

Proof. An emotion toward something we imagine as existing is stronger than if we imagined it as future (IV. ix. Coroll.). The emotion is much stronger still than if we imagined that future time as far away (IV. x.). So an emotion toward something we imagine existing in the distant future is much weaker than if we imagined it present. Nevertheless, that emotion is stronger than if we imagined the thing as contingent, meaning it might or might not exist. Therefore, an emotion toward something we regard as contingent is much weaker than if we imagined the thing present with us. Q.E.D.

PROP. XIII. Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know not to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal, fainter than an emotion towards a thing past.

PROP. XIII. We may feel an emotion toward something that may or may not exist, without knowing whether it exists now. Other conditions being equal, this emotion is weaker than an emotion toward something in the past.

Proof.—In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are not affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the existence of the said thing (IV. Def. iii.), but, on the other hand (by hypothesis), we conceive certain things excluding its present existence. But, in so far as we conceive it in relation to time past, we are assumed to conceive something, which recalls the thing to memory, or excites the image thereof (II. xviii. and note), which is so far the same as regarding it as present (II. xvii. Coroll.). Therefore (IV. ix.) an emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is fainter, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a thing past. Q.E.D.

Proof. When we conceive of a thing as contingent, no image of another thing affirms its existence for us (IV. Def. iii.). Instead, by hypothesis, we conceive of certain things that rule out its present existence. But when we conceive of the thing in relation to the past, we are assumed to conceive of something else. That something recalls the thing to memory or brings its image to mind (II. xviii. and note). To that extent, this is the same as regarding the thing as present (II. xvii. Coroll.). Therefore (IV. ix.), an emotion toward a contingent thing we know does not presently exist is weaker, other conditions being equal, than an emotion toward a past thing. Q.E.D.

PROP. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion.

PROP. XIV. True knowledge of good and evil cannot restrain any emotion simply because that knowledge is true. Such knowledge can restrain an emotion only insofar as the knowledge itself is considered an emotion.

Proof.—An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existing than before (by the general Definition of the Emotions); therefore it has no positive quality, which can be destroyed by the presence of what is true; consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot, by virtue of being true, restrain any emotion. But, in so far as such knowledge is an emotion (IV. viii.) if it have more strength for restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able to restrain the given emotion. Q.E.D.

Proof. An emotion is an idea through which the mind affirms that its body has greater or lesser power to exist than before. This follows from the general Definition of the Emotions. Therefore, an emotion has no positive quality that the presence of truth can destroy. Consequently, knowledge of good and evil cannot restrain any emotion simply by being true. But such knowledge is itself an emotion (IV. viii.). If, as an emotion, this knowledge has greater strength to restrain an emotion, it can restrain that emotion to that extent. Q.E.D.

PROP. XV. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can be quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed.

PROP. XV. Desire arising from knowledge of good and bad can be extinguished or held back by many other desires. These other desires arise from the emotions that grip us.

Proof.—From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it is an emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the strength of which is proportioned to the strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises (III. xxxvii.). But, inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the fact of our truly understanding anything, it follows that it is also present with us, in so far as we are active (III. i.), and must therefore be understood through our essence only (III. Def. ii.); consequently (III. vii.) its force and increase can be defined solely by human power. Again, the desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as the said emotions are more vehement; wherefore their force and increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes, which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it (IV. iii.); hence the desires arising from like emotions may be more vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it. Q.E.D.

Proof. True knowledge of good and evil necessarily produces desire insofar as that knowledge is an emotion (Def. of the Emotions, i.). The desire’s strength is proportional to the strength of the emotion producing it (III. xxxvii.). But we assume that this desire arises from our truly understanding something. So this desire is also present in us insofar as we are active (III. i.). Therefore, this desire must be understood through our essence alone (III. Def. ii.). Consequently, its strength and growth can be determined solely by human power (III. vii.). By contrast, desires arising from emotions that assail us are stronger in proportion to the intensity of those emotions. Therefore, the strength and growth of these desires must be determined solely by the power of external causes. Compared with our own power, the power of external causes exceeds it without any fixed limit (IV. iii.). Hence, desires arising from such emotions may be stronger than the desire arising from true knowledge of good and evil. Consequently, those desires may control or extinguish the desire arising from that knowledge. Q.E.D.

PROP. XVI. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is agreeable at the present moment.

PROP. XVI. Desire arising from knowledge of good and evil, when that knowledge concerns the future, may be easier to control or extinguish than desire for what is pleasant right now.

Proof.—Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future, is fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV. ix. Coroll.). But desire, which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, though it be concerned with things which are good at the moment, can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong desire (by the last Prop., the proof whereof is of universal application). Wherefore desire arising from such knowledge, when concerned with the future, can be more easily controlled or quenched, &c. Q.E.D.

Proof. Emotion toward something we imagine as future is weaker than emotion toward something present (IV. ix. Coroll.). But any forceful desire can suppress or control a desire arising from true knowledge of good and evil. This holds even when the desire arising from knowledge concerns things that are good at the moment. This follows from the previous proposition, whose proof applies universally. Therefore, desire arising from such knowledge can be controlled or suppressed more easily when it concerns the future, etc. Q.E.D.

PROP. XVII. Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire for things that are present.

PROP. XVII. When true knowledge of good and evil concerns things that may or may not happen, desire arising from that knowledge is far easier still to control than desire for things that are present.

Proof.—This Prop. is proved in the same way as the last Prop. from IV. xii. Coroll.

Proof: This proposition is proved just like the previous proposition, using the corollary to Part IV, Proposition 12.

Note.—I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved by opinion more readily than by true reason, why it is that the true knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul, and often yields to every kind of passion. This state of things gave rise to the exclamation of the poet:¹²—— "The better path I gaze at and approve, The worse—I follow."

Note. I think I have now shown why people are moved more readily by opinion than by sound reasoning. I have also shown why true knowledge of good and evil causes inner conflicts and often gives way to every kind of passion. These struggles led the poet to exclaim:¹² "I see and approve the better path, but I follow the worse."

Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind, when he says, "He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." I have not written the above with the object of drawing the conclusion, that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or that a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power and the infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power. I have said, that in the present part I shall merely treat of human infirmity. The power of reason over the emotions I have settled to treat separately.

Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought when he says, "Whoever increases knowledge increases sorrow." I have not written the above to suggest that ignorance is better than knowledge. Nor do I mean that a wise person is no better than a fool at controlling emotions. Rather, we must understand the strengths and weaknesses of our nature before determining how far reason can control our emotions. We must also understand those strengths and weaknesses to determine what lies beyond reason’s power. As I have said, in this part I will deal only with human weakness. I have decided to discuss reason’s power over the emotions separately.

PROP. XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is, other conditions being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain.

PROP. XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is stronger than desire arising from pain, all other things being equal.

Proof.—Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions, i.), that is, the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist in his own being. Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by the fact of pleasure being felt, increased or helped; on the contrary, desire arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being felt, diminished or hindered; hence the force of desire arising from pleasure must be defined by human power together with the power of an external cause, whereas desire arising from pain must be defined by human power only. Thus the former is the stronger of the two. Q.E.D.

Proof. Desire is a person's essence (Definition of the Emotions, i.), meaning the effort to continue in their own being. So desire arising from pleasure is increased or supported by the feeling of pleasure itself. By contrast, desire arising from pain is weakened or hindered by the feeling of pain itself. Therefore, the strength of desire arising from pleasure must be determined by human power combined with an external cause's power. But the strength of desire arising from pain must be determined by human power alone. Thus, desire arising from pleasure is the stronger of the two. Q.E.D.

Note.—In these few remarks I have explained the causes of human infirmity and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide by the precepts of reason. It now remains for me to show what course is marked out for us by reason, which of the emotions are in harmony with the rules of human reason, and which of them are contrary thereto. But, before I begin to prove my Propositions in detailed geometrical fashion, it is advisable to sketch them briefly in advance, so that everyone may more readily grasp my meaning.

Note. In these few remarks, I have explained the causes of human weakness and inconsistency. I have also shown why people do not follow the principles of reason. I must now show what path reason sets out for us. I must also show which emotions agree with the rules of human reason and which go against them. But before I prove my propositions in detail using the geometrical method, I should briefly outline them. This outline may help everyone understand my meaning more easily.

As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands, that every man should love himself, should seek that which is useful to him—I mean, that which is really useful to him, should desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection, and should, each for himself, endeavour as far as he can to preserve his own being. This is as necessarily true, as that a whole is greater than its part. (Cf. III. iv.)

Since reason demands nothing contrary to nature, reason requires every person to love themselves and seek what is useful. I mean what is truly useful to them. Reason also requires everyone to desire everything that truly brings them closer to perfection. And reason requires each person to do all they can to preserve their own being. These requirements are as necessarily true as the fact that a whole is greater than any of its parts. (See III. iv.)

Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance with the laws of one's own nature (IV. Def. viii.), and as no one endeavours to preserve his own being, except in accordance with the laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that the foundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one's own being, and that happiness consists in man's power of preserving his own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful to us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly and lastly, that suicides are weak—minded, and are overcome by external causes repugnant to their nature. Further, it follows from Postulate iv., Part II., that we can never arrive at doing without all external things for the preservation of our being or living, so as to have no relations with things which are outside ourselves. Again, if we consider our mind, we see that our intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could understand nothing besides itself. There are, then, many things outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to be desired. Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than those which are in entire agreement with our nature. For if, for example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are united, they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them singly.

Again, virtue is nothing but acting according to the laws of one's own nature (IV. Def. viii.). And everyone strives to preserve their own being only according to the laws of their own nature. Three conclusions follow. First, the foundation of virtue is the effort to preserve one's own being. Happiness consists in a person's power to preserve their own being. Second, virtue is to be desired for its own sake. Nothing is more excellent or more useful to us for whose sake we should desire virtue. Third and last, people who kill themselves are weak-minded and are overcome by external causes opposed to their nature. Further, Postulate iv., Part II., shows that we can never preserve our being or live without any external things. We can never be entirely free of relations with things outside ourselves. Again, consider our mind. Our intellect would be less perfect if the mind were alone and could understand nothing beyond itself. So many things outside ourselves are useful to us and therefore desirable. Among these, nothing can be found more excellent than things entirely in agreement with our nature. For example, if two individuals of exactly the same nature unite, together they are twice as powerful as either alone.

Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than man—nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being can be wished for by men, than that all should so in all points agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were, one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with one consent, as far as they are able, endeavour to preserve their being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all. Hence, men who are governed by reason—that is, who seek what is useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for themselves nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their conduct.

Therefore, nothing is more useful to human beings than other human beings. I repeat, people can wish for nothing better for preserving their existence than complete agreement among all. In such agreement, everyone’s minds and bodies would form, as it were, a single mind and a single body. All would work together, as far as they could, to preserve their existence. And all would seek, with one accord, what benefits everyone. Therefore, people guided by reason seek what benefits them in accordance with reason. They desire nothing for themselves that they do not also desire for the rest of humanity. Consequently, they are just, faithful, and honorable in their conduct.

Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus briefly to indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater detail. I have taken this course, in order, if possible, to gain the attention of those who believe, that the principle that every man is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue.

These are the principles of reason I intended to outline briefly before proving them in greater detail. I have done so to gain, if possible, the attention of those who hold the following belief. They believe that everyone's duty to seek what benefits them is the foundation of impiety, rather than piety and virtue.

Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the case, I go on to prove it by the same method, as that whereby I have hitherto proceeded.

Therefore, after briefly showing that the opposite is true, I will prove it using the same method as before.

PROP. XIX. Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.

PROP. XIX. By the laws of their nature, all people necessarily desire what they consider good and avoid what they consider bad.

Proof.—The knowledge of good and evil is (IV. viii.) the emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof; therefore, every man necessarily desires what he thinks good, and shrinks from what he thinks bad. Now this appetite is nothing else but man's nature or essence (Cf. the Definition of Appetite, III. ix. note, and Def. of the Emotions, i.). Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his nature, desires the one, and shrinks from the other, &c. Q.E.D.

Proof. Knowledge of good and evil is the emotion of pleasure or pain insofar as we are conscious of it (IV. viii.). Therefore, every person necessarily desires what they think good and avoids what they think bad. Now this appetite is nothing other than a person's nature or essence. (See the Definition of Appetite, III. ix. note, and Definition of the Emotions, i.) Therefore, solely by the laws of their own nature, every person desires what they think good and avoids what they think bad, etc. Q.E.D.

PROP. XX. The more every man endeavours, and is able to seek what is useful to him—in other words, to preserve his own being—the more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, in proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.

PROP. XX. The more a person strives and is able to seek what benefits him, the more virtue he has. Seeking what benefits him means preserving his own existence. Conversely, the more a person neglects to seek what benefits him (to preserve his own existence), the less power he has.

Proof.—Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by man's essence (IV. Def. viii.), that is, which is defined solely by the endeavour made by man to persist in his own being. Wherefore, the more a man endeavours, and is able to preserve his own being, the more is he endowed with virtue, and, consequently (III. iv. and vi.), in so far as a man neglects to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power. Q.E.D.

Proof. Virtue is human power, defined solely by a person's essence (IV. Def. viii.). In other words, virtue is defined solely by a person's effort to continue existing. Therefore, the more a person strives and is able to preserve his own existence, the more virtue he has. Consequently (III. iv. and vi.), to the extent that a person neglects to preserve his own existence, he lacks power. Q.E.D.

Note.—No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or preserving his own being, unless he be overcome by causes external and foreign to his nature. No one, I say, from the necessity of his own nature, or otherwise than under compulsion from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills himself: which latter may be done in a variety of ways. A man, for instance, kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists round his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a sword, and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart; or, again, he may be compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant's command, to open his own veins—that is, to escape a greater evil by incurring, a lesser; or, lastly, latent external causes may so disorder his imagination, and so affect his body, that it may assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof the idea cannot exist in the mind (III. x.) But that a man, from the necessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become non—existent, is as impossible as that something should be made out of nothing, as everyone will see for himself, after a little reflection.

Note. Therefore, no one neglects to seek his own good or preserve his own existence unless overcome by outside causes foreign to his nature. No one, I say, refuses food or kills himself because his own nature requires it. Only pressure from outside causes can bring him to do so. A person may kill himself in several ways. For example, another man may twist his right hand, in which he happens to hold a sword. The other man then forces him to turn the blade against his own heart. Or a tyrant’s command may compel him, like Seneca, to open his own veins. In other words, he accepts a lesser evil to escape a greater one. Finally, hidden external causes may so disturb his imagination and affect his body that his body takes on a different nature. This new nature is contrary to his former nature, and the idea of it cannot exist in his mind (III. x.). But a person cannot strive to cease existing because his own nature requires it. That is as impossible as making something out of nothing, as everyone will see after a little reflection.

PROP. XXI. No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and to live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, act, and to live—in other words, to actually exist.

PROP. XXI. No one can wish to be blessed, act rightly, and live rightly without also wishing to be, act, and live. In other words, they must also wish to actually exist.

Proof.—The proof of this proposition, or rather the proposition itself, is self—evident, and is also plain from the definition of desire. For the desire of living, acting, &c., blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of the Emotions, i.) the essence of man—that is (III. vii.), the endeavour made by everyone to preserve his own being. Therefore, no one can desire, &c. Q.E.D.

Proof. The proof of this proposition, or rather the proposition itself, is self-evident. The proposition is also clear from the definition of desire. For the desire to live, act, and so on, blessedly or rightly is the essence of a human being (Def. of the Emotions, i.). That essence is the effort everyone makes to preserve their own being (III. vii.). Therefore, no one can desire, and so on. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this endeavour to preserve one's own being.

PROP. XXII. No virtue can be understood as coming before this effort to preserve one's own existence.

Proof.—The effort for self—preservation is the essence of a thing (III. vii.); therefore, if any virtue could be conceived as prior thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be conceived as prior to itself, which is obviously absurd. Therefore no virtue, &c. Q.E.D.

Proof. The effort to preserve itself is the essence of a thing (III. vii.). So, if any virtue could be conceived as prior to this effort, a thing’s essence would have to be conceived as prior to itself. That is obviously absurd. Therefore no virtue, etc. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—The effort for self—preservation is the first and only foundation of virtue. For prior to this principle nothing can be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.

Corollary: The effort to preserve oneself is the first and only foundation of virtue. For nothing can be conceived before this principle, and no virtue can be conceived without it.

PROP. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely said to act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described, in so far as he is determined for the action because he understands.

PROP. XXIII. To the extent that inadequate ideas determine a person's action, that person cannot be said without qualification to act virtuously. A person can be described as acting virtuously only to the extent that understanding determines the action.

Proof.—In so far as a man is determined to an action through having inadequate ideas, he is passive (III. i.), that is (III. Deff. i., and iii.), he does something, which cannot be perceived solely through his essence, that is (by IV. Def. viii.), which does not follow from his virtue. But, in so far as he is determined for an action because he understands, he is active; that is, he does something, which is perceived through his essence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue. Q.E.D.

Proof. To the extent that inadequate ideas determine a man's action, he is passive (III. i.). That is, he does something that cannot be understood through his essence alone (III. Deff. i., and iii.). In other words, his action does not follow from his virtue (IV. Def. viii.). But to the extent that understanding determines his action, he is active. That is, he does something that can be understood through his essence alone, or follows adequately from his virtue. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIV. To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being (these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance with the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to one's self.

PROP. XXIV. For us, acting entirely according to virtue means acting, living, or preserving our being by following reason. Acting, living, and preserving our being all mean the same thing. Following reason in this way is based on seeking what is useful to ourselves.

Proof.—To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else but to act according to the laws of one's own nature. But we only act, in so far as we understand (III. iii.): therefore to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act, to live, or to preserve one's being in obedience to reason, and that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us (IV. xxii. Coroll.). Q.E.D.

Proof. To act entirely according to virtue is simply to act according to the laws of one's own nature. But we act only insofar as we understand (III. iii.). Therefore, for us, acting according to virtue means simply acting, living, or preserving our being according to reason. We do so on the basis of seeking what is useful to us (IV. xxii. Coroll.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XXV. No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of anything else.

PROP. XXV. No one wants to keep existing for the sake of anything else.

Proof.—The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its being, is defined solely by the essence of the thing itself (III. vii.); from this alone, and not from the essence of anything else, it necessarily follows (III. vi.) that everyone endeavours to preserve his being. Moreover, this proposition is plain from IV. xxii. Coroll., for if a man should endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else, the last—named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue, which, by the foregoing corollary, is absurd. Therefore no one, &c. Q.E.D.

Proof. The effort each thing makes to continue existing is defined solely by that thing’s own essence (III. vii.). From that essence alone, and not from anything else’s essence, everyone necessarily strives to preserve their own being (III. vi.). This proposition also follows clearly from IV. xxii. Coroll. For if someone strove to preserve their being for the sake of something else, that other thing would clearly be the basis of virtue. But according to the preceding corollary, that conclusion is absurd. Therefore no one, etc. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is nothing further than to understand; neither does the mind, in so far as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it, save such things as are conducive to understanding.

PROP. XXVI. Everything we strive for by following reason has no aim beyond understanding. And insofar as the mind uses reason, the mind considers nothing useful except what contributes to understanding.

Proof.—The effort for self—preservation is nothing else but the essence of the thing in question (III. vii.), which, in so far as it exists such as it is, is conceived to have force for continuing in existence (III. vi.) and doing such things as necessarily follow from its given nature (see the Def. of Appetite, III. ix. note). But the essence of reason is nought else but our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly understands (see the definition in II. xl. note. ii.); therefore (II. xl.) whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is nothing else but to understand. Again, since this effort of the mind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons, to preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding; this effort at understanding is (IV. xxii. Coroll.) the first and single basis of virtue, nor shall we endeavour to understand things for the sake of any ulterior object (IV. xxv.); on the other hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons, will not be able to conceive any good for itself, save such things as are conducive to understanding.

Proof. The effort to preserve itself is nothing other than the essence of the thing in question (III. vii.). Insofar as the thing exists as it is, its essence is understood to have the power to continue existing (III. vi.). Its essence also has the power to do whatever necessarily follows from its given nature (see the definition of Appetite, III. ix. note). But reason is nothing other than our mind insofar as our mind understands clearly and distinctly (see the definition in II. xl. note. ii.). Therefore (II. xl.), whatever we strive for by following reason is nothing other than understanding. Again, insofar as the mind reasons, its effort to preserve its own being is nothing other than understanding. This effort to understand is therefore the first and only basis of virtue (IV. xxii. Coroll.). Nor will we strive to understand things for the sake of any further goal (IV. xxv.). On the other hand, insofar as the mind reasons, it cannot conceive of anything as good for itself except what promotes understanding.

PROP. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are able to hinder us from understanding.

PROP. XXVII. We know nothing is certainly good or evil except what truly helps us understand or can hinder our understanding.

Proof.—The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing beyond understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself, save such things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing Prop.). But the mind (II. xli., xliii. and note) cannot possess certainty concerning anything, except in so far as it has adequate ideas, or (what by II. xl. note, is the same thing) in so far as it reasons. Therefore we know nothing to be good or evil save such things as really conduce, &c. Q.E.D.

Proof. Insofar as the mind reasons, it desires nothing beyond understanding. It judges only what contributes to understanding to be useful to itself (by the preceding proposition). But the mind can be certain of anything only insofar as it has adequate ideas (II. xli., xliii. and note). Having adequate ideas is the same as reasoning (II. xl. note). Therefore, we know nothing to be good or evil except what really contributes to understanding, etc. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVIII. The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God, and the mind's highest virtue is to know God.

PROP. XXVIII. The mind’s highest good is knowledge of God. And the mind’s highest virtue is to know God.

Proof.—The mind is not capable of understanding anything higher than God, that is (I. Def. vi.), than a Being absolutely infinite, and without which (I. xv.) nothing can either be or be conceived; therefore (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.), the mind's highest utility or (IV. Def. i.) good is the knowledge of God. Again, the mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and only to the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously. The mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand. Now, as we have already shown, the highest that the mind can understand is God; therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand or to know God. Q.E.D.

Proof. The mind cannot understand anything higher than God, an absolutely infinite Being (I. Def. vi.). Without God, nothing can exist or be conceived (I. xv.). Therefore, the mind's greatest benefit (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.), or good (IV. Def. i.), is knowledge of God. Again, the mind is active only to the extent that it understands. Only to that same extent can the mind be said to act virtuously in the fullest sense. The mind's virtue in the fullest sense is therefore to understand. Now, as we have already shown, God is the highest being the mind can understand. Therefore, the mind's highest virtue is to understand or know God. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIX. No individual thing, which is entirely different from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has something in common with our nature.

PROP. XXIX. No individual thing entirely different from our own nature can increase or limit our power to act. And absolutely nothing can benefit or harm us unless it has something in common with our nature.

Proof.—The power of every individual thing, and consequently the power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be determined by an individual thing (I. xxviii.), whose nature (II. vi.) must be understood through the same nature as that, through which human nature is conceived. Therefore our power of activity, however it be conceived, can be determined and consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other individual thing, which has something in common with us, but not by the power of anything, of which the nature is entirely different from our own; and since we call good or evil that which is the cause of pleasure or pain (IV. viii.), that is (III. xi. note), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our power of activity; therefore, that which is entirely different from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad. Q.E.D.

Proof. Every individual thing has a power by which it exists and acts, and so does every human being. This power can only be determined by another individual thing (I. xxviii.). The nature of that other thing must be understood through the same nature through which human nature is understood (II. vi.). Therefore, however we understand our power to act, another individual thing that shares something with us can determine that power. Consequently, the other thing’s power can help or hinder our power to act. But the power of anything whose nature is entirely different from ours cannot do so. We call something good or evil when it causes pleasure or pain (IV. viii.). In other words, it increases or decreases, helps or hinders, our power to act (III. xi. note). Therefore, anything whose nature is entirely different from ours can be neither good nor bad for us. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in so far as it is contrary to our nature.

PROP. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us because of a quality it shares with our nature. But a thing is bad for us to the extent that it goes against our nature.

Proof.—We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV. viii.), that is (by the Def., which see in III. xi. note), when it diminishes or checks our power of action. Therefore, if anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in common with our nature, it would be able itself to diminish or check that which it has in common with our nature, which (III. iv.) is absurd. Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that quality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand, in so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown), in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action, it is contrary to our nature. Q.E.D.

Proof. We call something bad when it causes pain (IV. viii.). In other words, it reduces or limits our power to act (see the definition in III. xi. note). Now suppose something were bad for us because of a quality it shares with our nature. Then that thing could itself reduce or limit what it shares with our nature. But this is absurd (III. iv.). Therefore, nothing can be bad for us because of a quality it shares with us. On the contrary, insofar as something is bad for us, it is opposed to our nature. As we have just shown, being bad for us means being able to reduce or limit our power to act. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXI. In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good.

PROP. XXXI. To the extent that something agrees with our nature, it is necessarily good.

Proof.—In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it cannot be bad for it. It will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent. If it be assumed that it be neither good nor bad, nothing will follow from its nature (IV. Def. i.), which tends to the preservation of our nature, that is (by the hypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing itself; but this (III. vi.) is absurd; therefore, in so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good. Q.E.D.

Proof. Insofar as a thing agrees with our nature, it cannot be bad for our nature. It must therefore be either good or neutral. Suppose the thing is neither good nor bad. Then nothing follows from its nature that helps preserve our nature (IV. Def. i.). Under our assumption, this means nothing follows from its nature that helps preserve the thing itself. But this is absurd (III. vi.). Therefore, insofar as a thing agrees with our nature, it is necessarily good. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing is in harmony with our nature, so is it more useful or better for us, and vice versâ, in proportion as a thing is more useful for us, so is it more in harmony with our nature. For, in so far as it is not in harmony with our nature, it will necessarily be different therefrom or contrary thereto. If different, it can neither be good nor bad (IV. xxix.); if contrary, it will be contrary to that which is in harmony with our nature, that is, contrary to what is good—in short, bad. Nothing, therefore, can be good, except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature; and hence a thing is useful, in proportion as it is in harmony with our nature, and vice versâ. Q.E.D.

Corollary. It follows that the more a thing agrees with our nature, the more useful or better it is for us. Conversely, the more useful a thing is for us, the more it agrees with our nature. For insofar as a thing does not agree with our nature, it must differ from or oppose our nature. If it differs from our nature, it can be neither good nor bad (IV. xxix.). If it opposes our nature, it will oppose what agrees with our nature, meaning what is good. In short, it will be bad. Therefore, nothing can be good except insofar as it agrees with our nature. So the more a thing agrees with our nature, the more useful it is for us, and conversely. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXII. In so far as men are a prey to passion, they cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony.

PROP. XXXII. To the extent that people are controlled by passion, they cannot be called naturally harmonious with one another.

Proof.—Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are understood to agree in power (III. vii.), not in want of power or negation, and consequently not in passion (III. iii. note); wherefore men, in so far as they are a prey to their passions, cannot be said to be naturally in harmony. Q.E.D.

Proof. Things said to be naturally in harmony are understood to agree in power (III. vii.). They do not agree in lack of power or negation, and therefore not in passion (III. iii. note). So, insofar as people are subject to their passions, they cannot be said to be naturally in harmony. Q.E.D.

Note.—This is also self—evident; for, if we say that white and black only agree in the fact that neither is red, we absolutely affirm that the do not agree in any respect. So, if we say that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that both are finite—wanting in power, not existing by the necessity of their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causes—we should certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in no respect alike; therefore, things which agree only in negation, or in qualities which neither possess, really agree in no respect.

Note. This is also self-evident. For if we say white and black share only the fact that neither is red, we deny any real similarity. Likewise, suppose we say a man and a stone share only the fact that both are finite. By finite, we mean lacking power, not existing through the necessity of their own nature, or, finally, having their power indefinitely exceeded by external causes. We would certainly be saying that a man and a stone are alike in no respect. Therefore, things that share only a negation, or qualities that neither possesses, really have nothing in common.

PROP. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are assailed by those emotions, which are passions, or passive states; and to this extent one and the same man is variable and inconstant.

PROP. XXXIII. People can differ in nature insofar as they are affected by emotions that are passions, or passive states. And to that extent, the same person can be changeable and inconsistent.

Proof.—The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely through our essence or nature (III. Deff. i., ii.), but it must be defined by the power, that is (III. vii.), by the nature of external causes in comparison with our own; hence it follows, that there are as many kinds of each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected (III. lvi.), and that men may be differently affected by one and the same object (III. li.), and to this extent differ in nature; lastly, that one and the same man may be differently affected towards the same object, and may therefore be variable and inconstant. Q.E.D.

Proof. The nature or essence of emotions cannot be explained by our essence or nature alone (III. Deff. i., ii.). Instead, emotions must be defined by the power of external causes compared with our own power. That power is the nature of those causes (III. vii.). It follows that each emotion has as many kinds as there are external objects that affect us (III. lvi.). Also, different people may be affected differently by the same object (III. li.), and differ in nature to that extent. Finally, the same person may be affected differently by the same object at different times, and may therefore be changeable and inconsistent. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are passions, they can be contrary one to another.

PROP. XXXIV. To the extent that people are driven by emotions that are passions, they can be opposed to one another.

Proof.—A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul's feeling pain, because he (Peter) possesses something similar to that which Paul hates (III. xvi.), or because Peter has sole possession of a thing which Paul also loves (III. xxxii. and note), or for other causes (of which the chief are enumerated in III. lv. note); it may therefore happen that Paul should hate Peter (Def. of Emotions, vii.), consequently it may easily happen also, that Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each should endeavour to do the other an injury, (III. xxxix.), that is (IV. xxx.), that they should be contrary one to another. But the emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state (III. lix.); hence men, in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are passions, can be contrary one to another. Q.E.D.

Proof. A man, for example Peter, can cause Paul pain because Peter has something similar to what Paul hates (III. xvi.). Or Peter may be the sole owner of something Paul also loves (III. xxxii. and note). There may also be other causes (the main ones are listed in III. lv. note). So Paul may come to hate Peter (Def. of Emotions, vii.). Consequently, Peter may easily come to hate Paul in return, and each may try to harm the other (III. xxxix.). That is, they may be opposed to one another (IV. xxx.). But the emotion of pain is always a passion, or passive state (III. lix.). Therefore, people can be opposed to one another insofar as they are affected by emotions that are passions. Q.E.D.

Note.—I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives that Peter possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from this it seems, at first sight, to follow, that these two men, through both loving the same thing, and, consequently, through agreement of their respective natures, stand in one another's way; if this were so, Props. xxx. and xxxi. of this part would be untrue. But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we shall see that the discrepancy vanishes. For the two men are not in one another's way in virtue of the agreement of their natures, that is, through both loving the same thing, but in virtue of one differing from the other. For, in so far as each loves the same thing, the love of each is fostered thereby (III. xxxi.), that is (Def. of the Emotions, vi.) the pleasure of each is fostered thereby. Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are at variance through both loving the same thing, and through the agreement in their natures. The cause for their opposition lies, as I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to differ. For we assume that Peter has the idea of the loved object as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea of the loved object as lost. Hence the one man will be affected with pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus they will be at variance one with another. We can easily show in like manner, that all other causes of hatred depend solely on differences, and not on the agreement between men's natures.

Note. I said that Paul may hate Peter because Paul believes Peter possesses something Paul also loves. At first, it seems to follow that the two men stand in each other’s way because they love the same thing. That would mean their conflict arises from the agreement between their natures. If so, Propositions xxx. and xxxi. of this part would be false. But if we consider the matter without bias, we will see that the contradiction disappears. The two men do not stand in each other’s way because their natures agree, meaning they love the same thing. Rather, they stand in each other’s way because they differ. Insofar as each loves the same thing, each man’s love is strengthened (III. xxxi.). That is, each man’s pleasure is increased (Definition of the Emotions, vi.). So their shared love and the agreement between their natures are far from being the cause of their conflict. As I have said, their opposition arises solely from the difference we assume between them. For we assume that Peter thinks of the loved object as already his, while Paul thinks of it as lost. So Peter will feel pleasure, while Paul will feel pain, and thus the two men will be in conflict. We can easily show, in the same way, that all other causes of hatred depend solely on differences between people’s natures. They do not depend on agreement between those natures.

PROP. XXXV. In so far only as men live in obedience to reason, do they always necessarily agree in nature.

PROP. XXXV. Only to the extent that people live by reason do they always and necessarily agree in nature.

Proof.—In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are passions, they can be different in nature (IV. xxxiii.), and at variance one with another. But men are only said to be active, in so far as they act in obedience to reason (III. iii.); therefore, what so ever follows from human nature in so far as it is defined by reason must (III. Def. ii.) be understood solely through human nature as its proximate cause. But, since every man by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good, and endeavours to remove that which he deems bad (IV. xix.); and further, since that which we, in accordance with reason, deem good or bad, necessarily is good or bad (II. xli.); it follows that men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human nature, and consequently for each individual man (IV. xxxi. Coroll.); in other words, such things as are in harmony with each man's nature. Therefore, men in so far as they live in obedience to reason, necessarily live always in harmony one with another. Q.E.D.

Proof. To the extent that people are driven by emotions that are passions, they can differ in nature (IV. xxxiii.). They can also be in conflict with one another. But people are said to be active only insofar as they act according to reason (III. iii.). Therefore, whatever follows from human nature, insofar as human nature is defined by reason, must be understood through human nature alone. Human nature must be understood as its immediate cause (III. Def. ii.). Now, by the laws of human nature, everyone desires what they consider good and tries to remove what they consider bad (IV. xix.). Moreover, whatever we judge good or bad according to reason necessarily is good or bad (II. xli.). It follows that, insofar as people live according to reason, they necessarily do only what is necessarily good for human nature. Consequently, their actions are necessarily good for each individual person (IV. xxxi. Coroll.). In other words, these actions are in harmony with each person's nature. Therefore, insofar as people live according to reason, they necessarily always live in harmony with one another. Q.E.D.

Corollary I.—There is no individual thing in nature, which is more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. For that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony with his nature (IV. xxxi. Coroll.); that is, obviously, man. But man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature, when he lives in obedience to reason (III. Def. ii.), and to this extent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of another man (by the last Prop.); wherefore among individual things nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. Q.E.D.

Corollary I. Nothing in nature is more useful to a person than another person who lives according to reason. For what is most useful to a person is what most closely agrees with that person’s nature (IV. xxxi. Coroll.). Clearly, this means another person. But people act entirely according to the laws of their nature when they live according to reason (III. Def. ii.). Only to this extent do they always necessarily agree in nature with another person (by the previous proposition). Therefore, among individual things, nothing is more useful to a person than another person who lives according to reason. Q.E.D.

Corollary II.—As every man seeks most that which is useful to him, so are men most useful one to another. For the more a man seeks what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself, the more is he endowed with virtue (IV. xx.), or, what is the same thing (IV. Def. viii.), the more is he endowed with power to act according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live in obedience to reason. But men are most in natural harmony, when they live in obedience to reason (by the last Prop.); therefore (by the foregoing Coroll.) men will be most useful one to another, when each seeks most that which is useful to him. Q.E.D.

Corollary II. The more each person seeks what is useful to himself, the more useful people are to one another. For the more a person seeks his own benefit and strives to preserve himself, the more virtue he has (IV. xx.). Having more virtue means the same thing as having more power to act according to his own nature (IV. Def. viii.). That is, he has more power to live according to reason. But people are most in harmony by nature when they live according to reason (by the previous Proposition). Therefore, people are most useful to one another when each person seeks most what is useful to himself (by the preceding Corollary). Q.E.D.

Note.—What we have just shown is attested by experience so conspicuously, that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone: "Man is to man a God." Yet it rarely happens that men live in obedience to reason, for things are so ordered among them, that they are generally envious and troublesome one to another. Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, so that the definition of man as a social animal has met with general assent; in fact, men do derive from social life much more convenience than injury. Let satirists then laugh their fill at human affairs, let theologians rail, and let misanthropes praise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity, let them heap contempt on men and praises on beasts; when all is said, they will find that men can provide for their wants much more easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can they escape from the dangers that on every side beset them: not to say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is, to study the actions of men than the actions of beasts. But I will treat of this more at length elsewhere.

Note. Experience confirms what we have just shown so clearly that nearly everyone repeats the saying: "Man is to man a God." Yet people rarely live by reason. Relations among people are such that they generally envy and trouble one another. Nevertheless, people can hardly live alone, so the definition of humans as social animals has been widely accepted. In fact, people gain far more benefit than harm from social life. Let satirists laugh all they like at human affairs. Let theologians denounce them. Let those who hate humanity praise the simple, uneducated country life as much as they please. Let them heap contempt on humans and praise on animals. When all is said, these critics will find that people can meet their needs much more easily by helping one another. They will also find that only by joining forces can people escape the dangers surrounding them on every side. Besides, studying human actions is far more valuable and worthy of our attention than studying the actions of animals. But I will discuss this subject at greater length elsewhere.

PROP. XXXVI. The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.

PROPOSITION XXXVI. The highest good of those who live by virtue is shared by all. So all can rejoice equally in this good.

Proof.—To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason (IV. xxiv.), and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to reason is to understand (IV. xxvi.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the highest good for those who follow after virtue is to know God; that is (II. xlvii. and note) a good which is common to all and can be possessed by all men equally, in so far as they are of the same nature. Q.E.D.

Proof. To act virtuously is to act according to reason (IV. xxiv.). Everything we strive to do according to reason aims at understanding (IV. xxvi.). Therefore, the highest good for those who pursue virtue is to know God (IV. xxviii.). Knowing God is a good shared by all (II. xlvii. and note). All people can possess this good equally, insofar as they share the same nature. Q.E.D.

Note.—Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of those who follow after virtue were not common to all? Would it not then follow, as above (IV. xxxiv.), that men living in obedience to reason, that is (IV. xxxv.), men in so far as they agree in nature, would be at variance one with another? To such an inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not accidentally but from the very nature of reason, that main's highest good is common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of man, in so far as defined by reason; and that a man could neither be, nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure in this highest good. For it belongs to the essence of the human mind (II. xlvii.), to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Note. Someone may ask what would happen if the highest good of those who pursue virtue were not shared by all. Would people living according to reason then be in conflict with one another, as shown above (IV. xxxiv.)? These are people who, insofar as they follow reason, agree in nature (IV. xxxv.). My answer is that humanity’s highest good is shared by all, not by chance, but by reason’s very nature. For this highest good follows from the very essence of human beings, insofar as that essence is defined by reason. A human being could neither exist nor be conceived without the capacity to take pleasure in this highest good. For adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence belongs to the essence of the human mind (II. xlvii.).

PROP. XXXVII. The good which every man, who follows after virtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men, and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge of God.

PROP. XXXVII. Anyone who pursues virtue desires the same good for others as for himself. The greater his knowledge of God, the more strongly he desires this good for others.

Proof.—Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, are most useful to their fellow men (IV. xxxv; Coroll. i.); therefore (IV. xix.), we shall in obedience to reason necessarily endeavour to bring about that men should live in obedience to reason. But the good which every man, in so far as he is guided by reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue, desires for himself, is to understand (IV. xxvi.); wherefore the good, which each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also for others. Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.); now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (II. xi.), which involves the knowledge of God (II. xlvii.), and without it (I. xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived; therefore, in proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge of God, so also will be greater the desire of the follower of virtue, that other men should possess that which he seeks as good for himself. Q.E.D.

Proof. People are most useful to others insofar as they live according to reason (IV. xxxv, Coroll. i.). Therefore, guided by reason, we will necessarily strive to bring others to live according to reason (IV. xix.). But the good each person desires for themselves, insofar as they follow reason, is understanding (IV. xxvi.). Following reason is, in other words, pursuing virtue. So each person who pursues virtue will also desire for others the good they seek for themselves. Again, desire, insofar as it relates to the mind, is the mind’s very essence (Def. of the Emotions, i.). Now the mind’s essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.), and this knowledge involves knowledge of God (II. xlvii.). Without knowledge of God, the mind’s essence can neither exist nor be conceived (I. xv.). Therefore, the more knowledge of God the mind’s essence involves, the stronger the virtuous person’s desire for others’ good. They will desire more strongly that others possess the good they seek for themselves. Q.E.D.

Another Proof.—The good, which a man desires for himself and loves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that others love it also (III. xxxi.); he will therefore endeavour that others should love it also; and as the good in question is common to all, and therefore all can rejoice therein, he will endeavour, for the same reason, to bring about that all should rejoice therein, and this he will do the more (III. xxxvii.), in proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater.

Another Proof. A man will love the good he desires for himself more steadily if he sees others love it too (III. xxxi.). He will therefore try to make others love that good too. Since that good is shared by all, everyone can take joy in it. For the same reason, he will try to bring everyone to take joy in that good. The greater his own enjoyment of that good, the harder he will try (III. xxxvii.).

Note I.—He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause others to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse, and is, therefore, hateful, especially, to those who take delight in something different, and accordingly study and, by similar impulse, endeavour, to make men live in accordance with what pleases themselves. Again, as the highest good sought by men under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be possessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love it are not consistent in their intentions, but, while they delight to sing its praises, fear to be believed. But he, who endeavours to lead men by reason, does not act by impulse but courteously and kindly, and his intention is always consistent. Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause in so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to Religion. The desire of well—doing, which is engendered by a life according to reason, I call piety. Further, the desire, whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate others with himself in friendship, I call honour¹³; by honourable I mean that which is praised by men living according to reason, and by base I mean that which is repugnant to the gaining of friendship. I have also shown in addition what are the foundations of a state; and the difference between true virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I have said; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in accordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else but man's allowing himself to be led by things which are external to himself, and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded by the general disposition of things rather than by his own nature considered solely in itself.

Note I. Someone guided only by emotion tries to make others love what he loves. He also tries to make everyone else live according to his own wishes. Such a person acts solely on impulse and therefore earns hatred, especially from those who enjoy something different. Driven by a similar impulse, these others seek and try to make people live according to their own preferences. Moreover, the highest good people seek under the guidance of emotion is often something only one person can possess. So those who love this good have conflicting intentions. They delight in praising it, yet fear that others will believe them. But someone who tries to guide people by reason acts with courtesy and kindness, not on impulse. His intention is always consistent. Moreover, I attribute to Religion whatever we desire and do that we ourselves cause insofar as we understand or know God. I call the desire to do good that arises from living according to reason piety. Further, I call the desire that binds someone living according to reason to unite with others in friendship honour¹³. By honourable, I mean what people living according to reason praise. By base, I mean what works against forming friendships. I have also shown the foundations of a state. The difference between true virtue and weakness can readily be understood from what I have said. True virtue is nothing other than living according to reason. Weakness is nothing other than allowing ourselves to be guided by things outside us. These external things determine our actions according to the overall arrangement of things, rather than our own nature considered alone.

Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop. xviii. of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts, or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us. Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men. Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions (III. lvii. note). It remains for me to explain what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit. On these points see the following note.

These are the points I promised to prove in Proposition xviii of this Part. They make it clear that the law against slaughtering animals rests more on empty superstition and womanish pity than sound reason. The rational pursuit of what benefits us also teaches us that we must associate with our fellow humans. But we need not associate with animals or things whose nature differs from ours. We have the same rights over them as they have over us. Indeed, since everyone’s right is defined by their virtue, or power, humans have far greater rights over animals than animals have over humans. Still, I do not deny that animals feel. What I deny is that we are forbidden to pursue our own advantage and use animals as we please. We may treat animals in whatever way suits us best. For their nature differs from ours, and their emotions naturally differ from human emotions (III. lvii. note). I still need to explain what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit. On these points, see the following note.

Note II.—In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain praise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.

Note II. In the Appendix to Part I, I set out to explain praise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.

Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. xxix. note: the time has now come to treat of the remaining terms. But I must first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature and in society.

I discussed praise and blame in the note to III. xxix. Now it is time to discuss the remaining terms. But first I must say a few words about people in the state of nature and in society.

Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and, consequently, by sovereign natural right performs those actions which follow from the necessity of his own nature; therefore by sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is bad, takes care of his own advantage according to his own disposition (IV. xix. and IV. xx.), avenges the wrongs done to him (III. xl. Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which he loves and to destroy that which he hates (III. xxviii.). Now, if men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain in possession of this his right, without any injury being done to his neighbour (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.). But seeing that they are a prey to their emotions, which far surpass human power or virtue (IV. vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and being at variance one with another (IV. xxxiii. xxxiv.), stand in need of mutual help (IV. xxxv. note). Wherefore, in order that men may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is necessary that they should forego their natural right, and, for the sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injure their fellow—men. The way in which this end can be obtained, so that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV. iv. Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV. vii. and III. xxxix. It is there shown, that an emotion can only be restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to itself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of incurring a greater injury themselves.

Every person exists by supreme natural right. Consequently, everyone has the same supreme natural right to act as their own nature necessarily leads them to act. By this right, everyone judges what is good and what is bad. Everyone pursues their own advantage according to their own disposition (IV. xix. and IV. xx.). Everyone avenges wrongs done to them (III. xl. Coroll. ii.). And everyone tries to preserve what they love and destroy what they hate (III. xxviii.). Now, if people lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would keep this right without harming anyone else (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.). But people are subject to emotions that far exceed human power or virtue (IV. vi.). So people are often pulled in different directions and come into conflict with one another (IV. xxxiii. xxxiv.). They also need one another’s help (IV. xxxv. note). Therefore, to live together in harmony and help one another, people must give up their natural right. For the sake of security, they must refrain from all actions that can harm others. People are necessarily subject to their emotions (IV. iv. Coroll.), changeable, and different from one another. How such people can make one another secure and trust one another is clear from IV. vii. and III. xxxix. These passages show that an emotion can be restrained only by a stronger, opposing emotion. They also show that people avoid harming others because they fear suffering greater harm themselves.

On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps in its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging injury, and pronouncing on good and evil; and provided it also possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in restraining emotion, but by threats (IV. xvii. note). Such a society established with laws and the power of preserving itself is called a State, while those who live under its protection are called citizens. We may readily understand that there is in the state of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced good or bad; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself.

Society can be established on this law, as long as society itself holds certain rights that everyone possesses. These are the rights to avenge injury and to judge good and evil. Society must also have the power to set a general rule of conduct and pass laws enforced by threats. Reason cannot enforce these laws, because reason is powerless to restrain emotion (IV. xvii. note). A society established with laws and the power to preserve itself is called a State. Those who live under its protection are called citizens. We can readily understand that, in the state of nature, nothing is universally agreed to be good or bad. For in the state of nature, everyone thinks only of their own advantage. Each person judges good and bad according to their own disposition, considering only their own advantage. No law binds them to anyone but themselves.

In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it can only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on by common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State authority. Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is therefore punished by the right of the State only. Obedience, on the other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages which a State provides.

In the state of nature, therefore, sin is impossible to conceive. Sin can exist only in a State where good and evil are defined by common agreement. In such a State, everyone is bound to obey the State’s authority. Sin, then, is nothing but disobedience, so only the State has the right to punish sin. Obedience, on the other hand, is counted as merit. For a person is considered worthy of merit if he takes pleasure in the benefits a State provides.

Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent master of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be said to belong to one man rather than another: all things are common to all. Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no wish to render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of that which belongs to him; in other words, there is nothing in the state of nature answering to justice and injustice. Such ideas are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common consent what belongs to one man and what to another.

Again, in the state of nature, no one owns anything by common agreement. Nor can anything in nature be said to belong to one person rather than another. Everything is shared by all. So, in the state of nature, we cannot conceive of a wish to give everyone what is rightfully theirs. Nor can we conceive of a wish to take from anyone what belongs to them. In other words, justice and injustice have no place in the state of nature. These ideas are possible only in a society where common agreement determines what belongs to one person and what to another.

From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes which display the nature of the mind. But I have said enough.

All these considerations make it clear that justice and injustice, sin and merit, are ideas external to the mind. They are not qualities that reveal the mind’s nature. But I have said enough.

PROP. XXXVIII. Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting other bodies in an increased number of ways; contrariwise, whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is hurtful to man.

PROP. XXXVIII. Anything that enables the human body to be affected in more ways is useful to human beings. So is anything that enables the body to affect external bodies in more ways. The more something increases either ability, the more useful it is. Conversely, anything that reduces either ability is harmful to human beings.

Proof.—Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body increases also the mind's capability of perception (II. xiv.); therefore, whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders it capable, is necessarily good or useful (IV. xxvi. xxvii.); and is so in proportion to the extent to which it can render the body capable; contrariwise (II. xiv., IV. xxvi. xxvii.), it is hurtful, if it renders the body in this respect less capable. Q.E.D.

Proof. Whatever increases the body's abilities in this way also increases the mind's ability to perceive (II. xiv.). Therefore, whatever prepares the body in this way and gives it these abilities is necessarily good or useful (IV. xxvi. xxvii.). The more it increases the body's abilities, the more good or useful it is. Conversely, whatever reduces the body's abilities in this respect is harmful (II. xiv., IV. xxvi. xxvii.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIX. Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body mutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes a change in such proportion is bad.

PROP. XXXIX. Anything that preserves the proportion of motion and rest among the human body's parts is good. Conversely, anything that changes this proportion is bad.

Proof.—The human body needs many other bodies for its preservation (II. Post. iv.). But that which constitutes the specific reality (forma) of a human body is, that its parts communicate their several motions one to another in a certain fixed proportion (Def. before Lemma iv. after II. xiii.). Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the proportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human body mutually possess, preserves the specific reality of the human body, and consequently renders the human body capable of being affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies in many ways; consequently it is good (by the last Prop.). Again, whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid proportion causes the human body to assume another specific character, in other words (see Preface to this Part towards the end, though the point is indeed self—evident), to be destroyed, and consequently totally incapable of being affected in an increased numbers of ways; therefore it is bad. Q.E.D.

Proof. The human body needs many other bodies to preserve itself (II. Post. iv.). But a human body's specific nature (forma) consists in its parts transmitting their motions in a fixed proportion (Def. before Lemma iv. after II. xiii.). Therefore, whatever preserves the proportion of motion and rest among the body's parts preserves the body's specific nature. Consequently, whatever preserves this proportion enables the body to be affected in many ways and to affect external bodies in many ways. It is therefore good (by the previous Proposition). Conversely, whatever changes this proportion causes the human body to take on a different specific nature. In other words, the body is destroyed (see the Preface to this Part, near the end, though the point is self-evident). Consequently, the body becomes wholly incapable of being affected in a greater number of ways. Therefore, whatever changes this proportion is bad. Q.E.D.

Note.—The extent to which such causes can injure or be of service to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part. But I would here remark that I consider that a body undergoes death, when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually among its several parts is changed. For I do not venture to deny that a human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally different from its own. There is no reason, which compels me to maintain that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse; nay, experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion. It sometimes happens, that a man undergoes such changes, that I should hardly call him the same. As I have heard tell of a certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, and though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his past life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he had written to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for a grown—up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue. If this instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he can only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy of other men. However, I prefer to leave such questions undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for raising new issues.

Note. The Fifth Part will explain how much such causes can harm or help the mind. But here I would point out when I consider a body to die. A body dies when the balance of motion and rest among its parts changes. I would not deny that a human body may change into something entirely different in nature. Such a change may occur even while blood still circulates and other features thought to constitute bodily life remain. Nothing forces me to hold that a body dies only when it becomes a corpse. Indeed, experience seems to suggest the opposite. Sometimes a man changes so much that I would hardly call him the same person. For example, I have heard of a certain Spanish poet who fell ill. Although he recovered, he remembered so little of his past life that he denied having written his plays and tragedies. Indeed, he might have been taken for a grown-up child if he had also forgotten his native language. If this example seems unbelievable, what are we to say about infants? A mature man considers their nature so unlike his own that only comparison with other men can persuade him that he too was once an infant. However, I prefer to leave such questions unexplored, lest I give superstitious people grounds for raising new issues.

PROP. XL. Whatsoever conduces to man's social life, or causes men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever brings discord into a State is bad.

PROP. XL. Anything that supports human social life or helps people live together in harmony is useful. But anything that causes discord in a state is bad.

Proof.—For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony also causes them to live according to reason (IV. xxxv.), and is therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason) whatsoever brings about discord is bad. Q.E.D.

Proof: Anything that causes people to live together in harmony also causes them to live according to reason (IV. xxxv.). Therefore, anything that promotes harmony is good (IV. xxvi. xxvii.). For the same reason, anything that causes discord is bad. Q.E.D.

PROP. XLI. Pleasure in itself is not bad but good: contrariwise, pain in itself is bad.

PROPOSITION XLI. Pleasure in itself is not bad but good. In contrast, pain in itself is bad.

Proof.—Pleasure (III. xi. and note) is emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is increased or helped; pain is emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or checked; therefore (IV. xxxviii.) pleasure in itself is good, &c. Q.E.D.

Proof. Pleasure (III. xi. and note) is an emotion that increases or supports the body's power to act. Pain is an emotion that reduces or limits the body's power to act. Therefore (IV. xxxviii.), pleasure in itself is good, etc. Q.E.D.

PROP. XLII. Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good; contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad.

PROPOSITION XLII. Cheerfulness cannot be excessive and is always good. By contrast, melancholy is always bad.

Proof.—Mirth (see its Def. in III. xi. note) is pleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in all parts of the body being affected equally: that is (III. xi.), the body's power of activity is increased or aided in such a manner, that the several parts maintain their former proportion of motion and rest; therefore Mirth is always good (IV. xxxix.), and cannot be excessive. But Melancholy (see its Def. in the same note to III. xi.) is pain, which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in the absolute decrease or hindrance of the body's power of activity; therefore (IV. xxxviii.) it is always bad. Q.E.D.

Proof. Mirth is pleasure (see its definition in III. xi. note). As far as the body is concerned, this pleasure consists in all parts of the body being affected equally. In other words (III. xi.), the body's power to act is increased or supported. This happens in a way that preserves the previous proportions of motion and rest among the body's parts. Therefore, Mirth is always good (IV. xxxix.) and cannot be excessive. But Melancholy is pain (see its definition in the same note to III. xi.). As far as the body is concerned, this pain consists in an absolute decrease or restriction of its power to act. Therefore (IV. xxxviii.), Melancholy is always bad. Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIII. Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the other hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is bad.

PROP. XLIII. Stimulation may be excessive and harmful. On the other hand, grief may be good insofar as stimulation or pleasure is harmful.

Proof.—Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is pleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the rest (see its Definition, III. xi. note); the power of this emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body (IV. vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other ways: therefore (IV. xxxviii.) it may be bad. Again, grief, which is pain, cannot as such be good (IV. xli.). But, as its force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own (IV. v.), we can conceive infinite degrees and modes of strength in this emotion (IV. iii.); we can, therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation, and preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body's capabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good. Q.E.D.

Proof. Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is pleasure that, in bodily terms, affects one or some parts more than others. (See its Definition, III. xi. note.) The power of this emotion may be enough to overcome other bodily actions (IV. vi.). The emotion may also remain stubbornly fixed in the body, making the body unable to respond in various other ways. Therefore (IV. xxxviii.), localized pleasure may be bad. Again, grief is pain, and as such cannot be good (IV. xli.). But its strength and growth depend on the power of an external cause compared with our own (IV. v.). We can therefore conceive of infinitely many degrees and forms of strength in this emotion (IV. iii.). We can thus conceive of grief as capable of restraining stimulation, preventing stimulation from becoming excessive and limiting the body's capabilities. To this extent, grief will be good. Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive.

PROPOSITION 44. Love and desire may be excessive.

Proof.—Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Def. of Emotions, vi.); therefore stimulation, accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love (III. xi. note); hence love maybe excessive. Again, the strength of desire varies in proportion to the emotion from which it arises (III. xxxvii.). Now emotion may overcome all the rest of men's actions (IV. vi.); so, therefore, can desire, which arises from the same emotion, overcome all other desires, and become excessive, as we showed in the last proposition concerning stimulation.

Proof. Love is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Def. of Emotions, vi.). Therefore, stimulation accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love (III. xi. note). So love may be excessive. Also, the strength of desire varies in proportion to the emotion from which the desire arises (III. xxxvii.). Now an emotion may overpower all the rest of a person's actions (IV. vi.). Therefore, desire arising from that same emotion can overpower all other desires and become excessive. We showed this in the previous proposition concerning stimulation.

Note.—Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived more easily than it can be observed. For the emotions, whereby we are daily assailed, are generally referred to some part of the body which is affected more than the rest; hence the emotions are generally excessive, and so fix the mind in the contemplation of one object, that it is unable to think of others; and although men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions—and very few are found who are always assailed by one and the same—yet there are cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately fixed. We sometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that, although it be not present, they think they have it before them; when this is the case with a man who is not asleep, we say he is delirious or mad; nor are those persons who are inflamed with love, and who dream all night and all day about nothing but their mistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for they are made objects of ridicule. But when a miser thinks of nothing but gain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but glory, they are not reckoned to be mad, because they are generally harmful, and are thought worthy of being hated. But, in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, &c., are species of madness, though they may not be reckoned among diseases.

Note. The cheerfulness I have described as good is easier to imagine than to observe. For the emotions that trouble us daily generally involve one part of the body more than the rest. These emotions are therefore generally excessive. They fix the mind so firmly on one object that it cannot think of others. Although people are usually subject to many emotions, and very few are always troubled by the same emotion, exceptions exist. In some cases, one emotion remains stubbornly fixed. We sometimes see people so absorbed in an object that they think it is before them, even when absent. When someone experiences this while awake, we call that person delirious or mad. Nor do we consider people any less mad when they burn with love and dream only of their beloved, or some woman, all night and day. For we make such people objects of ridicule. But when misers think only of profit or money, or ambitious people think only of glory, we do not consider them mad. This is because such people are generally harmful and are thought to deserve hatred. In reality, however, greed, ambition, lust, and so on are forms of madness, though they may not count as diseases.

PROP. XLV. Hatred can never be good.

PROPOSITION 45. Hatred can never be good.

Proof.—When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III. xxxix.), that is (IV. xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that is bad. Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.

Proof. When we hate a man, we try to destroy him (III. xxxix.). In other words, we try to do something bad (IV. xxxvii.). Therefore, etc. Q.E.D.

N.B. Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred towards men.

Note: Here and throughout what follows, by hatred I mean only hatred toward people.

Corollary I.—Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and other emotions attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are bad; this is evident from III. xxxix. and IV. xxxvii.

Corollary I. Envy, mockery, contempt, anger, revenge, and other emotions linked to hatred or arising from it are bad. Their badness is clear from III. xxxix. and IV. xxxvii.

Corollary II.—Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is base, and in a State unjust. This also is evident from III. xxxix., and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in IV. xxxvii. note.

Corollary II. Everything we desire out of hatred is morally base and, in a State, unjust. This conclusion also follows from III. xxxix. and the definitions of baseness and injustice in IV. xxxvii. note.

Note.—Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to be bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference. For laughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleasure; therefore, so long as it be not excessive, it is in itself good (IV. xli.). Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim and gloomy superstition. For why is it more lawful to satiate one's hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason, and have convinced myself as follows: No deity, nor anyone else, save the envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort, nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like, which axe signs of infirmity of spirit; on the contrary, the greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the perfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more must we necessarily partake of the divine nature. Therefore, to make use of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible (not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is the part of a wise man. I say it is the part of a wise man to refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres, and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to his neighbour. For the human body is composed of very numerous parts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need of fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from the necessity of its own nature; and, consequently, so that the mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things simultaneously. This way of life, then, agrees best with our principles, and also with general practice; therefore, if there be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is the best, and in every way to be commended. There is no need for me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.

Note. I recognize a great difference between mockery and laughter. I have said in Corollary I that mockery is bad. But laughter, like joking, is simply pleasure. Therefore, as long as laughter is not excessive, it is good in itself (IV. xli.). Certainly, nothing forbids people to enjoy themselves except grim and gloomy superstition. For why is satisfying hunger and thirst more acceptable than driving away sadness? I have reasoned as follows and convinced myself. No deity, nor anyone else except the envious, takes pleasure in my weakness and distress. Nor do they count my tears, sobs, fear, and similar signs of spiritual weakness as evidence of my virtue. On the contrary, the greater our pleasure, the greater the perfection we attain. In other words, we must necessarily share more fully in the divine nature. Therefore, wise people use what comes their way and enjoy it as much as possible. They do not indulge to the point of being sated, for that would no longer be enjoyment. I say that wise people refresh and restore themselves with moderate amounts of pleasant food and drink. They also enjoy perfumes, the gentle beauty of growing plants, clothing, music, many sports, the theater, and similar things. Everyone may enjoy these things without harming their neighbors. For the human body consists of very many parts of different kinds. These parts continually need fresh and varied nourishment. This nourishment allows the whole body to remain equally capable of every action that necessarily follows from its own nature. Consequently, the mind can also remain equally capable of understanding many things at once. This way of life, then, best agrees with our principles and with common practice. Therefore, if any other way of life is proposed, the one described here is best and deserves praise in every respect. There is no need for me to explain the matter more clearly or in greater detail.

PROP. XLVI. He, who lives under the guidance of reason, endeavours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness, for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, &c., towards him.

PROP. XLVI. Anyone guided by reason tries, as far as possible, to respond with love or kindness when others show hatred, anger, contempt, or similar feelings toward them.

Proof.—All emotions of hatred are bad (IV. xlv. Coroll. i.); therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid being assailed by such emotions (IV. xix.); consequently, he will also endeavour to prevent others being so assailed (IV. xxxvii.). But hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love (III. xliii.), so that hatred may pass into love (III. xliv.); therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, with kindness. Q.E.D.

Proof. All emotions of hatred are bad (IV. xlv. Coroll. i.). Therefore, anyone guided by reason will try, as far as possible, to avoid experiencing such emotions (IV. xix.). Consequently, they will also try to prevent others from experiencing such emotions (IV. xxxvii.). But hatred grows when met with hatred and can be extinguished by love (III. xliii.). In this way, hatred may turn into love (III. xliv.). Therefore, anyone guided by reason will try to repay hatred with love, that is, with kindness. Q.E.D.

Note.—He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is assuredly wretched. But he, who strives to conquer hatred with love, fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands many as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune's aid. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but through increase in their powers; all these consequences follow so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding, that I have no need to prove them in detail.

Note. Anyone who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is certainly miserable. But someone who strives to overcome hatred with love fights with joy and confidence. He withstands many opponents as easily as one and needs very little help from luck. Those he defeats yield joyfully, not because their powers have failed, but because their powers have increased. All these consequences follow so clearly from the definitions of love and understanding alone that detailed proof is unnecessary.

PROP. XLVII. Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves good.

PROPOSITION XLVII. Hope and fear cannot be good in themselves.

Proof.—Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain. For fear is pain (Def. of the Emotions, xiii.), and hope (Def. of the Emotions, Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without fear; therefore (IV. xli.) these emotions cannot be good in themselves, but only in so far as they can restrain excessive pleasure (IV. xliii.). Q.E.D.

Proof. Hope and fear cannot exist without pain. For fear is pain (Def. of the Emotions, xiii.). And hope cannot exist without fear (Def. of the Emotions, Explanation xii. and xiii.). Therefore, these emotions cannot be good in themselves (IV. xli.). They can be good only to the extent that they restrain excessive pleasure (IV. xliii.). Q.E.D.

Note.—We may add, that these emotions show defective knowledge and an absence of power in the mind; for the same reason confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are signs of a want of mental power. For although confidence and joy are pleasurable emotions, they nevertheless imply a preceding pain, namely, hope and fear. Wherefore the more we endeavour to be guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour to free ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate fortune, directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.

Note. We may add that these emotions show incomplete knowledge and a lack of power in the mind. For the same reason, confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are signs of a lack of mental power. Although confidence and joy are pleasurable emotions, they still imply earlier pain, namely hope and fear. So the more we try to be guided by reason, the less we depend on hope. We try to free ourselves from fear and, as far as we can, to master fortune. We do so by guiding our actions with the reliable advice of wisdom.

PROP. XLVIII. The emotions of over—esteem and disparagement are always bad.

PROPOSITION XLVIII. The emotions of thinking too highly or too poorly of someone are always bad.

Proof.—These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi. xxii.) are repugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) bad. Q.E.D.

Proof: These emotions (see Definitions of the Emotions, xxi and xxii) conflict with reason. Therefore, they are bad (IV. xxvi and xxvii). Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIX. Over—esteem is apt to render its object proud.

PROP. XLIX. Thinking too highly of someone tends to make that person proud.

Proof.—If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love's sake, we are apt to become elated (III. xli.), or to be pleasurably affected (Def. of the Emotions, xxx.); the good which we hear of ourselves we readily believe (III. xxv.); and therefore, for love's sake, rate ourselves too highly; in other words, we are apt to become proud. Q.E.D.

Proof. If we see that someone thinks too highly of us out of love, we tend to feel elated (III. xli.). In other words, we feel pleasure (Def. of the Emotions, xxx.). We readily believe the good things we hear about ourselves (III. xxv.). So, because of love, we think too highly of ourselves. In other words, we tend to become proud. Q.E.D.

PROP. L. Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason, is in itself bad and useless.

PROP. L. For someone guided by reason, pity is in itself bad and useless.

Proof.—Pity (Def. of the Emotions, xviii.) is a pain, and therefore (IV. xli.) is in itself bad. The good effect which follows, namely, our endeavour to free the object of our pity from misery, is an action which we desire to do solely at the dictation of reason (IV. xxxvii.); only at the dictation of reason are we able to perform any action, which we know for certain to be good (IV. xxvii.); thus, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad. Q.E.D.

Proof. Pity (Definition of the Emotions, xviii.) is a form of pain, and therefore is bad in itself (IV. xli.). Pity does lead to a good effect: our effort to free the person we pity from misery. But reason alone directs us to desire this action (IV. xxxvii.). Only through reason’s guidance can we perform any action that we know for certain to be good (IV. xxvii.). Thus, for a person who lives under reason’s guidance, pity itself is useless and bad. Q.E.D.

Note.—He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor will he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of human virtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to rejoice. We may add, that he, who is easily touched with compassion, and is moved by another's sorrow or tears, often does something which he afterwards regrets; partly because we can never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partly because we are easily deceived by false tears. I am in this place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of reason. He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by compassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for (III. xxvii.) he seems unlike a man.

Note. Anyone who rightly understands that all things follow necessarily from the divine nature will see events differently. Everything happens according to nature’s eternal laws and rules. Such a person will find nothing worthy of hatred, ridicule, or contempt, and will pity nothing. Instead, to the fullest extent of human virtue, he will strive to do good, as the saying goes, and rejoice. We may add that someone easily touched by compassion and moved by another’s sorrow or tears often does something he later regrets. This is partly because we can never be sure that an action driven by emotion is good. It is also partly because false tears easily deceive us. Here I am speaking specifically of someone who lives under the guidance of reason. Anyone whom neither reason nor compassion moves to help others is rightly called inhuman. For (III. xxvii.) such a person seems unlike a human being.

PROP. LI. Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree therewith and arise therefrom.

PROP. LI. Approval does not conflict with reason, but can agree with reason and arise from it.

Proof.—Approval is love towards one who has done good to another (Def. of the Emotions, xix.); therefore it may be referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active (III. lix.), that is (III. iii.), in so far as it understands; therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c. Q.E.D.

Proof. Approval is love for someone who has done good to another person (Definition of the Emotions, xix.). Therefore, approval may be attributed to the mind insofar as the mind is active (III. lix.). That is, insofar as the mind understands (III. iii.). Therefore, approval agrees with reason, etc. Q.E.D.

Another Proof.—He, who lives under the guidance of reason, desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV. xxxvii.); wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow his own endeavour to do good is aided; in other words, he will feel pleasure (III. xi. note) accompanied by the idea of the benefactor. Therefore he approves of him. Q.E.D.

Another Proof. A person guided by reason wants others to have the good he seeks for himself (IV. xxxvii.). So seeing someone do good to another person strengthens his own effort to do good. In other words, he feels pleasure (III. xi. note) together with the thought of the person doing good. Therefore, he approves of that person. Q.E.D.

Note.—Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions, xx.) is necessarily evil (IV. xlv.); we may, however, remark that, when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace punishes a citizen who has injured another, it should not be said to be indignant with the criminal, for it is not incited by hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense of duty to punish him.

Note. Indignation, as we defined it (Definition of the Emotions, xx.), is necessarily evil (IV. xlv.). However, we may note a distinction when the sovereign power punishes a citizen for injuring another to preserve peace. We should not say that the sovereign power is indignant with the criminal. For the sovereign power is not driven by hatred to ruin him, but by a sense of duty to punish him.

PROP. LII. Self—approval may arise from reason, and that which arises from reason is the highest possible.

PROP. LII. Self-approval may arise from reason, and self-approval that arises from reason is the highest possible.

Proof.—Self—approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.). But a man's true power of action or virtue is reason herself (III. iii.), as the said man clearly and distinctly contemplates her (II. xl. xliii.); therefore self—approval arises from reason. Again, when a man is contemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctly or adequately, such things as follow from his power of action (III. Def. ii.), that is (III. iii.), from his power of understanding; therefore in such contemplation alone does the highest possible self—approval arise. Q.E.D.

Proof. Self-approval is pleasure arising from a person's reflection on himself and his own power to act (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.). But a person's true power to act, or virtue, is reason itself (III. iii.). He understands reason clearly and distinctly (II. xl. xliii.). Therefore, self-approval arises from reason. Furthermore, when a person reflects on himself, he perceives clearly and distinctly, or adequately, only what follows from his power to act (III. Def. ii.). That is, he perceives only what follows from his power to understand (III. iii.). Therefore, only through such reflection does the highest possible self-approval arise. Q.E.D.

Note.—Self—approval is in reality the highest object for which we can hope. For (as we showed in IV. xxv.) no one endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior object, and, as this approval is more and more fostered and strengthened by praise (III. liii. Coroll.), and on the contrary (III. lv. Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life under disgrace is almost unendurable.

Note. Self-approval is truly the highest goal we can hope for. For, as we showed in IV. xxv., no one strives to preserve their existence for any further purpose. Praise increasingly fosters and strengthens self-approval (III. liii. Coroll.), while blame increasingly unsettles it (III. lv. Coroll.). As a result, fame becomes the most powerful incentive to act, and living in disgrace is almost unbearable.

PROP. LIII. Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason.

PROPOSITION LIII. Humility is not a virtue. In other words, humility does not come from reason.

Proof.—Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own infirmities (Def. of the Emotions, xxvi.). But, in so far as a man knows himself by true reason, he is assumed to understand his essence, that is, his power (III. vii.). Wherefore, if a man in self—contemplation perceives any infirmity in himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself, but (III. lv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked. But, if we assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by virtue of understanding something stronger than himself, by the knowledge of which he determines his own power of activity, this is the same as saying that we conceive that a man understands himself distinctly (IV. xxvi.), because¹⁴ his power of activity is aided. Wherefore humility, or the pain which arises from a man's contemplation of his own infirmity, does not arise from the contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion. Q.E.D.

Proof. Humility is pain arising from a person's reflection on their own weaknesses (Def. of the Emotions, xxvi.). But insofar as someone knows themselves through true reason, they are understood to grasp their essence, meaning their power (III. vii.). So if someone reflects on themselves and perceives a weakness, that perception does not come from understanding themselves. Instead, it comes from their power to act being held back (III. lv.). But suppose someone perceives their own weakness by understanding something stronger than themselves. Suppose they use that knowledge to determine their own power to act. This amounts to saying that we conceive of someone who understands themselves clearly (IV. xxvi.), because¹⁴ their power to act is aided. Therefore humility, the pain arising from reflection on one's own weakness, does not arise from reflection guided by reason. It is not a virtue but a passion. Q.E.D.

PROP. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm.

PROP. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, or, in other words, does not arise from reason. But anyone who repents of an action is doubly miserable or weak.

Proof.—The first part of this proposition is proved like the foregoing one. The second part is proved from the mere definition of the emotion in question (Def. of the Emotions, xxvii.). For the man allows himself to be overcome, first, by evil desires; secondly, by pain.

Proof. The first part of this proposition is proved in the same way as the previous proposition. The second part follows directly from the definition of the emotion in question (Definitions of the Emotions, xxvii.). For the man allows himself to be overcome first by evil desires, then by pain.

Note.—As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these two emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and Fear, bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had better sin in that direction. For, if all men who are a prey to emotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing, and would fear nothing; how then could they be joined and linked together in bonds of union? The crowd plays the tyrant, when it is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence. Indeed those who are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than others to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to become free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.

Note. People seldom live by reason. For that reason, Humility and Repentance, along with Hope and Fear, do more good than harm. So, since we must sin, we had better sin in that direction. For if all people ruled by emotion were equally proud, they would stop at nothing and fear nothing. How, then, could such people be joined together in unity? The crowd acts like a tyrant when it has no fear. So we should not be surprised that the prophets so strongly praised Humility, Repentance, and Reverence. The prophets sought the good of everyone, not just a few. Indeed, people ruled by these emotions may be led much more easily than others to live by reason. That is, they may be led to become free and enjoy the life of the blessed.

PROP. LV. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance of self.

PROPOSITION LV. Extreme pride or self-belittlement shows an extreme lack of self-understanding.

Proof.—This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and xxix.

Proof. This is clear from Definitions of the Emotions, 28 and 29.

PROP. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.

PROP. LVI. Extreme pride or self-abasement shows extreme weakness of spirit.

Proof.—The first foundation of virtue is self—preservation (IV. xxii. Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.). He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the foundation of all virtues, and consequently of all virtues. Again, to act virtuously is merely to act under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.): now he, that acts under the guidance of reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II. xliii.). Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and consequently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue; in other words (IV. Def. viii.), is most infirm of spirit. Thus extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit. Q.E.D.

Proof. The first foundation of virtue is self-preservation (IV. xxii. Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.). Therefore, anyone who does not know himself does not know the foundation of all virtues, and consequently knows no virtues. Again, acting virtuously means nothing more than acting under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.). Anyone who acts under the guidance of reason must necessarily know that he is doing so (II. xliii.). Therefore, someone with extremely little knowledge of himself, and consequently of all virtues, acts least in accordance with virtue. In other words (IV. Def. viii.), he has the greatest weakness of spirit. Thus extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme weakness of spirit. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.

Corollary: It follows very clearly that proud and dejected people are especially vulnerable to their emotions.

Note.—Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride; for the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a painful emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful (IV. xviii.).

Note: Yet dejection can be corrected more easily than pride. This is because pride is a pleasurable emotion, while dejection is painful, and pleasurable emotions are stronger than painful ones (IV. xviii.).

PROP. LVII. The proud man delights in the company of flatterers and parasites, but hates the company of the high—minded.

PROP. LVII. A proud man delights in the company of flatterers and freeloaders. But he hates the company of noble-minded people.

Proof.—Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimation of himself (Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and vi.); this estimation the proud man will endeavour to foster by all the means in his power (III. xiii. note); he will therefore delight in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose character is too well known to need definition here), and will avoid the company of high—minded men, who value him according to his deserts. Q.E.D.

Proof. Pride is pleasure that comes from a man's exaggerated opinion of himself (Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and vi.). A proud man will try to maintain this opinion by all means in his power (III. xiii. note). He will therefore enjoy the company of flatterers and parasites. Their character is too well known to need defining here. He will also avoid the company of principled men, who judge him according to his merits. Q.E.D.

Note.—It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the evil results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a prey to all the emotions, though to none of them less than to love and pity. I cannot, however, pass over in silence the fact, that a man may be called proud from his underestimation of other people; and, therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider himself superior to his fellows. The dejection, which is the opposite quality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising from the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior to his fellows. Such being the ease, we can easily see that a proud man is necessarily envious (III. xli. note), and only takes pleasure in the company, who fool his weak mind to the top of his bent, and make him insane instead of merely foolish.

Note. Listing all the harmful effects of pride here would take too long. Proud people fall prey to all emotions, though least of all to love and pity. Still, I cannot leave out the fact that someone may be called proud because he undervalues other people. Pride in this sense may therefore be defined as pleasure arising from the false belief that one is superior to others. Dejection, the opposite of this kind of pride, may be defined as pain arising from the false belief that one is inferior to others. Given this, we can easily see that a proud man is necessarily envious (III. xli. note). He enjoys only the company of people who indulge his weak mind to the fullest. They make him insane instead of merely foolish.

Though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the dejected man very near akin to the proud man. For, inasmuch as his pain arises from a comparison between his own infirmity and other men's power or virtue, it will be removed, or, in other words, he will feel pleasure, if his imagination be occupied in contemplating other men's faults; whence arises the proverb, "The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow—sufferers." Contrariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as he thinks himself inferior to others; hence none are so prone to envy as the dejected, they are specially keen in observing men's actions, with a view to fault—finding rather than correction, in order to reserve their praises for dejection, and to glory therein, though all the time with a dejected air. These effects follow as necessarily from the said emotion, as it follows from the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two right angles. I have already said that I call these and similar emotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man. The laws of nature have regard to nature's general order, whereof man is but a part. I mention this, in passing, lest any should think that I have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds of men rather than the nature and properties of things. For, as I said in the preface to the third Part, I regard human emotions and their properties as on the same footing with other natural phenomena. Assuredly human emotions indicate the power and ingenuity, of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully as other things which we admire, and which we delight to contemplate. But I pass on to note those qualities in the emotions, which bring advantage to man, or inflict injury upon him.

Although dejection is the opposite of pride, a dejected person is closely related to a proud person. His pain comes from comparing his own weakness with other people's power or virtue. So his pain will disappear, or in other words, he will feel pleasure, if he imagines other people's faults. This gives rise to the proverb, "The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow sufferers." On the other hand, the more inferior he thinks himself to others, the more pain he will feel. So no one is more prone to envy than dejected people. They watch people's actions especially closely, looking for faults rather than ways to correct them. Their aim is to reserve their praise for dejection and take pride in it, though always with a dejected air. These effects follow as necessarily from dejection as a triangle's angles, by its nature, add up to two right angles. I have already said that I call these and similar emotions bad only in relation to human usefulness. The laws of nature concern nature's overall order, and humanity is only one part of that order. I mention this in passing so that no one thinks I intended to describe people's faults and irrational actions. My aim is instead to describe the nature and properties of things. As I said in the preface to the third Part, I treat human emotions and their properties like other natural phenomena. Human emotions certainly reveal nature's power and ingenuity, if not human nature's. They do so just as fully as other things we admire and enjoy contemplating. But I will now turn to the qualities of emotions that benefit or harm people.

PROP. LVIII. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may arise therefrom.

PROP. LVIII. Honour (gloria) does not conflict with reason, but may arise from reason.

Proof.—This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxx., and also from the definition of an honourable man (IV. xxxvii. note. i.).

Proof. This follows clearly from Definition 30 of the Emotions and the definition of an honourable man (IV. xxxvii. note. i.).

Note—Empty honour, as it is styled, is self—approval, fostered only by the good opinion of the populace; when this good opinion ceases there ceases also the self—approval, in other words, the highest object of each man's love (IV. lii. note); consequently, he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must, day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in order to retain his reputation. For the populace is variable and inconstant, so that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away. Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and readily represses the fame of others. The object of the strife being estimated as the greatest of all goods, each combatant is seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every possible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is more proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to himself. This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being nothing.

Note: So-called empty honour is self-approval sustained only by the public’s good opinion. When that good opinion ends, so does self-approval, the thing each person loves most (IV. lii. note). So anyone whose honour depends on public approval must anxiously strive, act, and scheme every day to maintain his reputation. For the public is changeable and unreliable, so a reputation quickly fades if it is not maintained. Everyone wants public applause for himself and readily undermines the fame of others. The prize in this struggle is considered the greatest of all goods. So each competitor is seized by a fierce desire to defeat his rivals in every possible way. In the end, the winner takes more pride in harming others than in benefiting himself. This kind of honour, then, is truly empty, because it is nothing.

The points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance. I will only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue, is yet good, in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is really imbued with the desire to live honourably; in the same way as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is not mortified. Therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful, he is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has no desire to live honourably.

What we should note about shame follows easily from what was said about mercy and repentance. I will only add that shame, like compassion, is not a virtue. Still, shame is good insofar as it shows a genuine desire to live honorably. In the same way, pain is good because it shows that the injured part is not dead. So although someone who feels shame is sad, that person is still more perfect than someone without shame or any desire to live honorably.

Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the desires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good or evil emotions. But all, in so far as they are engendered in us by emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as is evident from what was said in IV. xliv. note), and would be useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance of reason only, as I will now briefly, show.

These are the points I set out to make about the emotions of pleasure and pain. Desires are good or bad according to whether they arise from good or evil emotions. But all desires are blind insofar as they arise in us from emotions in which the mind is passive. This is clear from what was said in IV. xliv. note. Such desires would be useless if people could easily be persuaded to live by reason alone. I will now briefly show why.

PROP. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive; we can be determined without emotion by reason.

PROP. LIX. We can be driven to act by emotions in which the mind is passive. Reason can lead us to all the same actions, without emotion.

Proof.—To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def. ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the necessity, of our nature considered in itself alone. But pain is bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action (IV. xli.); wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidance of reason. Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.); therefore to this extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we could not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly, pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is increased or aided); nor is the mind passive therein, except in so far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his actions (III. iii., and note).

Proof. To act rationally means only to perform actions that necessarily follow from our nature considered on its own (III. iii. and Def. ii.). But pain is bad insofar as it reduces or limits our power to act (IV. xli.). So pain cannot lead us to any action we would be unable to perform under reason’s guidance. Again, pleasure is bad only insofar as it limits a person’s ability to act (IV. xli. xliii.). So, to that extent, pleasure cannot lead us to any action we could not perform under reason’s guidance. Finally, insofar as pleasure is good, pleasure agrees with reason. For pleasure consists in an increase in, or support for, a person’s ability to act. Nor is the mind passive in such pleasure, except insofar as the increase in a person’s power to act falls short. That increase falls short of enabling the person to understand himself and his actions adequately (III. iii., and note).

Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to such a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more, capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive. But all emotions are attributable to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv. explanation); and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing else but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &c. Q.E.D.

Therefore, suppose a man experiencing pleasure reaches a level of perfection that gives him adequate understanding of himself and his actions. He will be equally capable, indeed more capable, of the actions prompted by emotions in which his mind is passive. But all emotions arise from pleasure, pain, or desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv. explanation). And desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing but the effort to act. Therefore, to all actions, etc. Q.E.D.

Another Proof.—A given action is called bad, in so far as it arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion. But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad (as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same action being sometimes good, sometimes bad; wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion, we may be led by reason (IV. xix.). Q.E.D.

Another Proof. An action is called bad insofar as it arises from someone experiencing hatred or any evil emotion. But no action, considered by itself, is either good or bad. We pointed this out in the preface to Part IV. The same action is sometimes good and sometimes bad. So reason may lead us to an action that is sometimes bad or arises from some evil emotion (IV. xix.). Q.E.D.

Note.—An example will put this point in a clearer light. The action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body. If, then, a man, moved by anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm, this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one and the same action can be associated with various mental images of things; therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and distinct ideas. Hence it is evident that every desire which springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become useless, if men could be guided by reason. Let us now see why desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is called by us blind.

Note. An example will make this point clearer. Consider the act of striking purely as a physical movement. A man raises his arm, clenches his fist, and swings his whole arm forcefully downward. Viewed this way, striking is a virtue or excellence belonging to the structure of the human body. Now suppose anger or hatred leads a man to clench his fist or move his arm. This happens because the same action can be associated with different mental images of things, as we showed in Part II. So we may be led to perform the same action by confused ideas or by clear and distinct ideas. Thus, every desire arising from an emotion in which the mind is passive would become unnecessary if people could be guided by reason. Let us now see why we call desire arising from an emotion in which the mind is passive blind.

PROP. LX. Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is not attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts thereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole.

PROP. LX. Desire arising from pleasure or pain affecting only one or some parts of the body, rather than the whole body, is of no benefit to a person as a whole.

Proof.—Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a body, is so strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails over the remaining parts (IV. vi.). This part will not endeavour to do away with its own powers, in order that the other parts of the body may perform its office; for this it would be necessary for it to have a force or power of doing away with its own powers, which (III. vi.) is absurd. The said part, and, consequently, the mind also, will endeavour to preserve its condition. Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind aforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as a whole. If it be assumed, on the other hand, that the part, A, be checked so that the remaining parts prevail, it may be proved in the same manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to a man as a whole. Q.E.D.

Proof. Suppose, for example, that an external cause strengthens A, a part of a body, enough to overpower the other parts (IV. vi.). This part will not try to eliminate its own powers so that the body's other parts can perform its function. To do so, the part would need the power to eliminate its own powers, which is absurd (III. vi.). The part, and therefore the mind as well, will try to preserve its condition. Therefore, desire arising from pleasure of the kind described above has no benefit for a person as a whole. Suppose, on the other hand, that part A is restrained so that the other parts overpower it. The same reasoning can prove that desire arising from pain has no benefit for a person as a whole. Q.E.D.

Note.—As pleasure is generally (IV. xliv. note) attributed to one part of the body, we generally desire to preserve our being with out taking into consideration our health as a whole: to which it may be added, that the desires which have most hold over us (IV. ix.) take account of the present and not of the future.

Note. Pleasure is generally associated with one part of the body (IV. xliv. note). So we generally seek to preserve our being without considering our overall health. We may also add that our strongest desires (IV. ix.) concern the present, not the future.

PROP. LXI. Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.

PROPOSITION LXI. Desire that comes from reason cannot be excessive.

Proof.—Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered absolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself. Hence desire, which arises from reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are adequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. ii.). Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction. Therefore, such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.

Proof. Desire, considered in itself, is the actual essence of a human being (Def. of the Emotions, i.). More precisely, desire is that essence understood as directed toward a particular activity by some modification of itself. So desire arising from reason is desire produced in us insofar as we act (III. iii.). Such desire is our actual essence or nature, understood as directed toward certain activities. These activities can be adequately understood through our essence alone (III. Def. ii.). Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered by itself could exceed itself. In other words, human nature could do more than it can do, an obvious contradiction. Therefore, such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.

PROP. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the dictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be of a thing future, past, or present.

PROP. LXII. Insofar as the mind understands something through reason, the mind is affected equally whether that thing is future, past, or present.

Proof.—Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II. xliv. Coroll. ii.), and is therefore affected with the same certitude (II. xliii. and note). Wherefore, whether the thing be present, past, or future, the mind conceives it under the same necessity and is affected with the same certitude; and whether the idea be of something present, past, or future, it will in all cases be equally true (II. xli.); that is, it will always possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II. Def. iv.); therefore, in so far as the mind conceives things under the dictates of reason, it is affected in the same manner, whether the idea be of a thing future, past, or present. Q.E.D.

Proof. Whatever the mind conceives through reason, it conceives as eternal or necessary (II. xliv. Coroll. ii.). The mind therefore experiences the same certainty (II. xliii. and note). So, whether a thing is present, past, or future, the mind conceives it as equally necessary. The mind also experiences the same certainty in each case. And whether an idea concerns something present, past, or future, the idea is equally true in every case (II. xli.). That is, the idea always has the same properties of an adequate idea (II. Def. iv.). Therefore, insofar as the mind conceives things through reason, the mind is affected in the same way. This holds whether the idea concerns something future, past, or present. Q.E.D.

Note.—If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present; and the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it conceived as future; consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of evil in the future, as we shall presently show. However, we can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (II. xxxi.); and the periods of their existence (II. xliv. note.) we can only determine by imagination, which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the present. Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order of things and the connection of causes, with a view to determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather imaginary than real. Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the present time. (Cf. IV. xvi.)

Note: If we adequately understood how long things last, and could determine their lifespans through reason, our emotions would respond differently. We would feel the same emotions about future things as about present things. The mind would desire a good it imagined in the future as though that good were present. Consequently, the mind would necessarily pass over a lesser present good for a greater future good. Nor would it desire anything good in the present that would cause harm in the future, as we will soon show. However, our knowledge of how long things last is very inadequate (II. xxxi.). We can determine their lifespans only through imagination (II. xliv. note.). But imagination is less powerfully affected by the future than by the present. So whatever true knowledge we have of good and evil is merely abstract or general. We judge the order of things and the connections between causes to determine what is good or bad for us now. But that judgment is based more on imagination than on reality. It is therefore no surprise that desire arising from such knowledge, insofar as it concerns the future, is more easily restrained. Desire for things that please us now is harder to restrain. (Cf. IV. xvi.)

PROP. LXIII. He who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.

PROP. LXIII. Anyone who is guided by fear and does good to avoid evil is not guided by reason.

Proof.—All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active, or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and desire (III. lix.); therefore, he who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.

Proof. All emotions arising from the mind’s activity, in other words from reason, are emotions of pleasure and desire (III. lix.). Therefore, someone who is driven by fear and does good to escape evil is not guided by reason.

Note.—Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at vice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by reason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow—men.

Note. Superstitious people are better at condemning vice than teaching virtue. They do not try to guide people by reason. Instead, they try to restrain people so that people would rather avoid evil than love virtue. Such superstitious people aim only to make others as miserable as themselves. So it is no wonder that they are generally troublesome and hateful to others.

Corollary.—Under desire which springs from reason, we seek good directly, and shun evil indirectly.

Corollary: When desire comes from reason, we seek good directly and avoid evil indirectly.

Proof.—Desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III. lix.), in other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive (IV. lxi.), and not from pain; wherefore this desire springs from the knowledge of good, not of evil (IV. viii.); hence under the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by implication shun evil. Q.E.D.

Proof. Desire arising from reason can arise only from a pleasurable emotion in which the mind is not passive (III. lix.). In other words, such desire arises from pleasure that cannot be excessive (IV. lxi.), not from pain. Therefore, such desire arises from knowledge of good, not of evil (IV. viii.). So, when guided by reason, we seek good directly and avoid evil only as a consequence. Q.E.D.

Note.—This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick and a healthy man. The sick man through fear of death eats what he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takes pleasure in his food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out of life, than if he were in fear of death, and desired directly to avoid it. So a judge, who condemns a criminal to death, not from hatred or anger but from love of the public well—being, is guided solely by reason.

Note. This corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick man and a healthy man. The sick man eats food he naturally finds unappealing because he fears death. But the healthy man enjoys his food. He therefore enjoys life more than if he feared death and aimed directly to avoid death. Similarly, a judge who sentences a criminal to death is guided solely by reason if his motive is public well-being. He acts out of love for public well-being, not hatred or anger.

PROP. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.

PROPOSITION LXIV. Knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge.

Proof.—The knowledge of evil (IV. viii.) is pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof. Now pain is the transition to a lesser perfection (Def. of the Emotions, iii.) and therefore cannot be understood through man's nature (III. vi., and vii.); therefore it is a passive state (III. Def. ii.) which (III. iii.) depends on inadequate ideas; consequently the knowledge thereof (II. xxix.), namely, the knowledge of evil, is inadequate. Q.E.D.

Proof. Knowledge of evil is pain insofar as we are conscious of that pain (IV. viii.). Pain is a transition to a lesser perfection (Def. of the Emotions, iii.). Therefore, pain cannot be understood through human nature (III. vi., and vii.). Pain is therefore a passive state (III. Def. ii.) and so depends on inadequate ideas (III. iii.). Consequently, knowledge of pain, namely knowledge of evil, is inadequate (II. xxix.). Q.E.D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessed only adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil.

Corollary: It follows that if the human mind had only adequate ideas, it would have no concept of evil.

PROP. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.

PROPOSITION LXV. Guided by reason, we should pursue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.

Proof.—A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to things, in so far as we compare them one with another (see preface to this Part); therefore, evil is in reality a lesser good; hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil. Q.E.D.

Proof. A good that prevents us from enjoying a greater good is actually an evil. For we call things good and bad only in comparison with one another (see preface to this Part). Therefore, evil is actually a lesser good. So, guided by reason, we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the lesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun the lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil. For the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good, and the lesser good is really evil, wherefore we may seek the former and shun the latter. Q.E.D.

Corollary: Guided by reason, we may pursue the lesser evil as though it were the greater good. We may also avoid the lesser good that would cause the greater evil. For what we call the lesser evil here is actually good, and the lesser good is actually evil. So we may seek the former and avoid the latter. Q.E.D.

PROP. LXVI. We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a greater evil in the future.¹⁵

PROP. LXVI. Guided by reason, we may seek a greater future good rather than a lesser present good. And we may seek a lesser present evil rather than a greater future evil.¹⁵

Proof.—If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things future, it would be affected towards what is future in the same way as towards what is present (IV. lxii.); wherefore, looking merely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do, there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be assumed as present, or assumed as future; hence (IV. lxv.) we may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, &c. Q.E.D.

Proof. If the mind could adequately know future things, it would respond to them as it does to present things (IV. lxii.). So, from reason’s perspective alone, a greater good or evil is no different whether considered present or future. This proposition assumes that we take reason’s perspective alone. Therefore (IV. lxv.), we may seek a greater future good rather than a lesser present good, and so on. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present, because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future. This Corollary is related to the foregoing Proposition as the Corollary to IV. lxv. is related to the said IV. lxv.

Corollary. Guided by reason, we may seek a lesser evil now because it causes a greater good in the future. We may also avoid a lesser good now because it causes a greater evil in the future. This Corollary relates to the preceding Proposition just as the Corollary to IV. lxv. relates to Proposition IV. lxv.

Note.—If these statements be compared with what we have pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part up to Prop. xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a man, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is led by reason. The former, whether will or no, performs actions whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master and only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importance in life, and therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call the former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few observations.

Note. If we compare these statements with our discussion of the strength of emotions in this Part through Proposition xviii., we will readily see a difference. It is the difference between someone guided only by emotion or opinion and someone guided by reason. The first person, willingly or not, acts without any understanding of his actions. The second is his own master. He acts only in ways he knows are most important in life and therefore most desires. For this reason, I call the first a slave and the second a free man. It will be useful to make a few observations about the free man's character and way of life.

PROP. LXVII. A free man thinks of death least of all things; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.

PROPOSITION LXVII. A free man thinks about death less than anything else. His wisdom lies in reflecting on life, not death.

Proof.—A free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason, who is not led by fear (IV. lxiii.), but who directly desires that which is good (IV. lxiii. Coroll.), in other words (IV. xxiv.), who strives to act, to live, and to preserve his being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage; wherefore such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom is a meditation of life. Q.E.D.

Proof. A free man lives by reason. He is not driven by fear (IV. lxiii.), but directly desires what is good (IV. lxiii. Coroll.). In other words (IV. xxiv.), he strives to act, live, and preserve his existence by seeking his own true advantage. So he thinks of death less than anything else. His wisdom is instead a reflection on life. Q.E.D.

PROP. LXVIII. If men were born free, they would, so long as they remained free, form no conception of good and evil.

PROP. LXVIII. If people were born free, they would have no concept of good and evil as long as they remained free.

Proof.—I call free him who is led solely by reason; he, therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only adequate ideas; therefore (IV. lxiv. Coroll.) he has no conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being correlative) of good. Q.E.D.

Proof. I call someone free if he is guided only by reason. Therefore, someone who is born free and remains free has only adequate ideas. So (IV. lxiv. Coroll.) he has no concept of evil. Consequently, he has no concept of good either, since good and evil are relative to each other. Q.E.D.

Note.—It is evident, from IV. iv., that the hypothesis of this Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as we look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in so far as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the cause of man's existence.

Note. IV. iv. makes clear that this Proposition’s assumption is false and inconceivable, except insofar as we consider human nature alone. Or rather, we consider God, not as infinite, but only as the cause of human existence.

This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to have been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man. For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save that whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he provided solely for man's advantage; it is stated that God forbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it, he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live. Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be nothing in nature which could be more useful to him; but that after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway began to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.), and to lose his freedom; this freedom was afterwards recovered by the patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have shown above (IV. xxxvii.).

Moses seems to have expressed this, and other things we have already proved, in the story of the first man. That story presents no power of God except the power by which he created man. In other words, it presents only the power by which God provided solely for man's benefit. The story says that God forbade man, who was free, to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. As soon as man ate from that tree, he would fear death rather than desire to live. The story also says that man found a wife whose nature was in complete harmony with his own. He then knew that nothing in nature could be more useful to him. But after he believed that the beasts were like himself, he immediately began to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.). He also began to lose his freedom. The patriarchs later recovered this freedom, guided by the spirit of Christ, that is, by the idea of God. Only through the idea of God can man be free and desire for others the good he desires for himself. We have shown this above (IV. xxxvii.).

PROP. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great, when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.

PROP. LXIX. A free man shows just as much virtue in avoiding dangers as in overcoming them.

Proof.—Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion contrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining emotion (IV. vii.). But blind daring and fear are emotions, which can be conceived as equally great (IV. v. and iii.): hence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring than in checking fear (III. lix. note); in other words (Def. of the Emotions, xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue, when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them. Q.E.D.

Proof. An emotion can only be restrained or removed by an opposing emotion with greater power to restrain it (IV. vii.). But reckless daring and fear are emotions that can be equally strong (IV. v. and iii.). So restraining daring requires no less virtue or firmness than restraining fear (III. lix. note). In other words (Def. of the Emotions, xl. and xli.), the free man shows equal virtue in either case. He shows as much virtue when he avoids dangers as when he tries to overcome them. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.

Corollary: A free man is as courageous in a timely retreat as in battle. In other words, he shows equal courage or presence of mind whether he chooses to fight or retreat.

Note.—What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby, I explained in III. lix. note. By danger I mean everything, which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord, &c.

Note. I explained what courage (animositas) is and what I mean by it in III. lix. note. By danger I mean anything that can lead to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord, and so on.

PROP. LXX. The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.

PROPOSITION 70. A free man living among ignorant people tries, as far as he can, to avoid accepting favors from them.

Proof.—Everyone judges what is good according to his disposition (III. xxxix. note); wherefore an ignorant man, who has conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon it, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by the receiver, will feel pain (III. xlii.). But the free man only desires to join other men to him in friendship (IV. xxxvii.), not repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value, but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason, and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary importance. Therefore the free man, lest he should become hateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather than reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving their favours.

Proof. Everyone judges what is good according to his own disposition (III. xxxix. note). So an ignorant man who has benefited someone else places his own value on the benefit. If the recipient seems to value the benefit less highly, the ignorant man will feel pain (III. xlii.). But the free man desires only to bring others into friendship with him (IV. xxxvii.). He does not repay their benefits with benefits judged to be of equal value. Instead, he guides himself and others by the free judgment of reason. He does only what he knows to be most important. Therefore, the free man will try, as far as he can, to avoid accepting favors from the ignorant. He does so to avoid becoming hateful to them or following their desires rather than reason.

Note.—I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant, yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human aid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is often necessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repay such favours in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution in declining favours, lest we should have the appearance of despising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it. Thus, in declining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility and courtesy.

Note. I say, as far as he can. For although people may be ignorant, they are still human. In times of need, they could give us human help, the most valuable of all things. So we must often accept favors from them and, consequently, repay those favors in kind. We must therefore be careful when declining favors. Otherwise, we may seem to despise those offering them, or seem unwilling to repay them out of greed. We would thus give cause for offense through our very effort to avoid it. So when declining favors, we must consider both practical benefit and courtesy.

PROP. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to another.

PROP. LXXI. Only free men are fully grateful to one another.

Proof.—Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another, and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of friendship (IV. xxxv., and Coroll. i.), only such men endeavour, with mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other (IV. xxxvii.), and, therefore, only they are thoroughly grateful one to another. Q.E.D.

Proof. Only free men are fully useful to one another. Only free men are bound together by the strongest necessity of friendship (IV. xxxv., and Coroll. i.). Only such men strive to benefit one another with mutual, devoted love (IV. xxxvii.). Therefore, only free men are fully grateful to one another. Q.E.D.

Note.—The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire have for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement, rather than pure goodwill. Moreover, ingratitude is not an emotion. Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, &c. He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits, is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by the gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal his thefts, or by any similar persons. Contrariwise, such an one shows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be corrupted, to his own or the general hurt.

Note. The goodwill people driven by blind desire show one another is generally a bargain or an enticement, not genuine goodwill. Moreover, ingratitude is not an emotion. Yet ingratitude is base because it generally shows that someone is driven by excessive hatred, anger, pride, greed, and so on. Someone who, through foolishness, does not know how to return a favor is not ungrateful. Still less is someone ungrateful for refusing a courtesan’s gifts meant to win him over to satisfy her lust. The same holds for refusing a thief’s gifts meant to buy his silence about thefts, or gifts from similar people. On the contrary, such a person shows a firm mind. For no gifts can corrupt him into harming himself or the community.

PROP. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in good faith.

PROP. LXXII. A free man never acts dishonestly, but always in good faith.

Proof.—If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a case where he could by breaking faith free himself from the danger of present death? Would not his plan of self—preservation completely persuade him to deceive? This may be answered by pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their forces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have any general laws, which is absurd.

Proof. Someone might ask: How should a man act if breaking his word could save him from imminent death? Wouldn't his aim of preserving his own life fully convince him to deceive? We may answer that if reason persuaded him to act this way, reason would persuade all men to do likewise. In that case, reason would persuade men not to agree in good faith to join forces or share common laws. In other words, reason would persuade men not to have any general laws, which is absurd.

PROP. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in solitude, where he is independent.

PROP. LXXIII. A person guided by reason is freer living in a State under shared laws than living alone and independently.

Proof.—The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey through fear (IV. lxiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to preserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is (IV. lxvi. note), in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom, he desires to order his life according to the general good (IV. xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we showed in IV. xxxvii. note. ii.), to live according to the laws of his country. Therefore the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires to possess the general rights of citizenship. Q.E.D.

Proof. A man guided by reason does not obey out of fear (IV. lxiii.). But insofar as he seeks to preserve his existence by following reason, he seeks to live freely (IV. lxvi. note). Insofar as he does so, he wants to organize his life around the common good (IV. xxxvii.). Consequently, he wants to live according to his country's laws, as we showed in IV. xxxvii. note. ii. Therefore, to enjoy greater freedom, a free man wants to have the full rights of citizenship. Q.E.D.

Note.—These and similar observations, which we have made on man's true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note). I do not think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of strength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud. These propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and religion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii. and IV. xlvi.; namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself. We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV. l., and in other places; namely, that the strong man has ever first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious, horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe. Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar emotions, which I have mentioned above. Thus he endeavours, as we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on his way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of attaining to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in the following Part.

Note. These and similar observations about true human freedom may be understood in terms of strength. By strength I mean courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note). I do not think it worthwhile to prove every property of strength separately. Still less do I need to show that a strong person hates no one and is angry with no one. Such a person envies no one, resents no one, despises no one, and, least of all, is proud. These claims, and all claims about the true way of life and religion, follow easily from IV. xxxvii. and IV. xlvi. Those propositions show that hatred should be overcome with love. They also show that everyone should desire for others the good they seek for themselves. We may also repeat a point made in the note to IV. l. and elsewhere. A strong person always keeps foremost in mind that all things follow necessarily from the divine nature. Therefore, whatever he considers harmful and evil appears that way because his understanding of the universe is disordered, incomplete, and confused. The same holds for whatever consequently seems to him impious, horrible, unjust, and base. Above all, then, he strives to understand things as they really are and to remove obstacles to true knowledge. These obstacles include hatred, anger, envy, mockery, pride, and the similar emotions I mentioned above. Thus, as we said before, he tries, as far as he can, to do good and live joyfully. In the following Part, I will prove how far human virtue can reach this condition and what its powers may be.

What have said in this Part concerning the right way of life has not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view, but has been set forth piece—meal, according as I thought each Proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it. I propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them under leading heads.

I have not arranged my remarks in this Part about the right way to live to provide an overall view. Instead, I presented them piece by piece, following the order I thought made each Proposition easiest to derive from earlier ones. So I now propose to rearrange my remarks under main headings.

I. All our endeavours or desires so follow from the necessity of our nature, that they can be understood either through it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our being a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceived through itself without other individuals.

I. All our efforts or desires follow necessarily from our nature. We can therefore understand them in either of two ways. We can understand them through our nature alone as their immediate cause, or through our being part of nature. As a part of nature, we cannot be fully understood on our own, without reference to other individuals.

II. Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner, that they can be understood through it alone, are those which are referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to us: wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter passions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter, on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.

II. Some desires follow from our nature in such a way that our nature alone explains them. These desires relate to the mind insofar as the mind consists of adequate ideas. The remaining desires relate to the mind only insofar as the mind understands things inadequately. Their strength and growth are generally determined not by human power, but by the power of things outside us. So the first kind of desire is rightly called action, and the second kind passion. Actions always show our power, while passions show our weakness and incomplete knowledge.

III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by man's power or reason, are always good. The rest may be either good or bad.

III. Our actions are the desires defined by human power or reason. These desires are always good. Other desires may be either good or bad.

IV. Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone man's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God's attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of his nature. Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, the ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his intelligence.

IV. Thus, the most useful thing in life is to develop our understanding, or reason, as fully as we can. In this alone lies our highest happiness, or blessedness. Indeed, blessedness is nothing but the peace of mind that comes from intuitive knowledge of God. Now, developing our understanding means nothing but understanding God, God's attributes, and the actions that necessarily follow from his nature. Therefore, a person guided by reason has an ultimate aim, or highest desire, in seeking to govern all others. This aim is to gain an adequate understanding of himself and everything within the reach of his intelligence.

V. Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational life: and things are only good, in so far as they aid man in his enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by intelligence. Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man's perfecting of his reason, and capability to enjoy the rational life, are alone called evil.

V. Therefore, without intelligence there is no rational life. Things are good only insofar as they help people enjoy the intellectual life, which is defined by intelligence. By contrast, only things that hinder people from perfecting their reason and enjoying the rational life are called evil.

VI. As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are necessarily good, no evil can befall man except through external causes; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to conform to in almost infinite ways.

VI. Everything that humans directly cause is necessarily good, so evil can only befall humans through external causes. This is because humans are part of nature as a whole. Human nature is compelled to obey nature’s laws and conform to them in almost infinite ways.

VII. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of nature, or that he should not follow her general order; but if he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with his own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered, whereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little in harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.

VII. A person cannot exist outside nature or avoid following its general order. But if someone finds himself among individuals whose nature harmonizes with his own, his ability to act is strengthened. By contrast, if their nature has little in common with his, he can hardly adapt without changing greatly himself.

VIII. Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the rational life, we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems safest to us; on the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be good or useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the rational life, we may appropriate to our use and employ as we think best. Everyone without exception may, by sovereign right of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.

VIII. We may try to remove anything in nature we consider evil, using whatever method seems safest to us. The same applies to anything we think could harm our ability to exist and enjoy a rational life. On the other hand, we may take for our use anything we consider good or useful for preserving our existence and enabling us to enjoy a rational life. We may use such things as we think best. Everyone, without exception, has the supreme right by nature to do whatever they think will advance their own interests.

IX. Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any given thing than other individuals of the same species; therefore (cf. vii.) for man in the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful than his fellow—man who is led by reason. Further, as we know not anything among individual things which is more excellent than a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of his skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at last to live under the dominion of their own reason.

IX. Nothing can be more in harmony with a thing’s nature than other individuals of the same species. Therefore (see vii.), nothing helps a person preserve their existence and enjoy a rational life more than another person guided by reason. Further, among individual things, we know of nothing more excellent than a person guided by reason. So no one can better show the power of their abilities and character than by teaching others to live by their own reason.

X. In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of hatred, one towards another, they are at variance, and are therefore to be feared in proportion, as they are more powerful than their fellows.

X. To the extent that people are driven by envy or hatred toward one another, they are in conflict. They are therefore to be feared in proportion to how much more powerful they are than others.

XI. Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and high—mindedness.

XI. Yet minds are won over not by force, but by love and generosity.

XII. It is before all things useful to men to associate their ways of life, to bind themselves together with such bonds as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity, and generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship.

XII. Above all, people benefit from sharing their lives with one another. They benefit from forming bonds they believe are best suited to unite them all. And, in general, they benefit from doing whatever helps strengthen friendship.

XIII. But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness. For men are diverse (seeing that those who live under the guidance of reason are few), yet are they generally envious and more prone to revenge than to sympathy. No small force of character is therefore required to take everyone as he is, and to restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others. But those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at vice than in instilling virtue, and who break rather than strengthen men's dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and others. Thus many from too great impatience of spirit, or from misguided religious zeal, have preferred to live among brutes rather than among men; as boys or youths, who cannot peaceably endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers and choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their father: suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as they may spite their parents.

XIII. But this requires skill and care. For people differ, and few live by reason. Yet people are generally envious and more inclined to revenge than sympathy. So it takes considerable strength of character to accept everyone as they are and avoid copying other people’s emotions. But some people criticize humanity and are better at condemning vice than encouraging virtue. They weaken people’s character rather than strengthen it, harming both themselves and others. Thus many people, through excessive impatience or misguided religious zeal, have preferred living among beasts to living among people. They are like boys or young men who cannot calmly endure their parents’ scolding. These young men enlist as soldiers, choosing war’s hardships and harsh military discipline over home’s comforts and their father’s warnings. They accept any burden, as long as they can spite their parents.

XIV. Therefore, although men are generally governed in everything by their own lusts, yet their association in common brings many more advantages than drawbacks. Wherefore it is better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us, and to strive to promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and friendship.

XIV. Therefore, although people are generally guided in everything by their own desires, living together brings far more advantages than drawbacks. So it is better to bear patiently the wrongs others may do us. We should also work to promote whatever helps bring about harmony and friendship.

XV. Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are attributable to justice, equity, and honourable living. For men brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what is reckoned disgraceful, or that a man should slight the received customs of their society. For winning love those qualities are especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety (cf. IV. xxxvii. notes. i. ii.; xlvi. note; and lxxiii. note).

XV. Justice, fairness, and honorable living promote harmony. For people resent not only what is unjust or unfair, but also what they consider disgraceful. They also resent anyone who disregards their society’s accepted customs. To win love, qualities relating to religion and piety are especially necessary (see IV. xxxvii. notes. i. ii., xlvi. note, and lxxiii. note).

XVI. Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but such harmony is insecure. Further, fear arises from infirmity of spirit, and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason: the same is true of compassion, though this latter seems to bear a certain resemblance to piety.

XVI. Also, harmony often results from fear, but such harmony is unstable. Fear also arises from weakness of spirit and is not an exercise of reason. The same is true of compassion, though compassion seems to bear some resemblance to piety.

XVII. Men are also gained over by liberality, especially such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain life. However, to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the power and the advantage of any private person. For the riches of any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call. Again, an individual man's resources of character are too limited for him to be able to make all men his friends. Hence providing for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, and has regard only to the general advantage.

XVII. Generosity also wins people over, especially those who cannot afford the necessities of life. However, helping every poor person is far beyond any private individual's means or interests. No individual's wealth is anywhere near enough to meet such a need. Also, an individual's personal qualities are too limited to make friends with everyone. So providing for the poor is the duty of the State as a whole, guided only by the common good.

XVIII. In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our duty must be wholly different (cf. IV. lxx. note; lxxi. note).

XVIII. Our duty when accepting favors must be entirely different from our duty when expressing gratitude (see IV. lxx. note, lxxi. note).

XIX. Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of generation arising from bodily beauty, and generally every sort of love, which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause, readily passes into hate; unless indeed, what is worse, it is a species of madness; and then it promotes discord rather than harmony (cf. III. xxxi. Coroll.).

XIX. Again, lustful love, that is, the desire to reproduce stirred by physical beauty, readily turns into hatred. So does any love caused by anything other than freedom of the soul. The exception is when such love is a form of madness, which is worse. In that case, such love promotes conflict rather than harmony (cf. III. xxxi. Coroll.).

XX. As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in harmony with reason, if the desire for physical union be not engendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to beget children and to train them up wisely; and moreover, if the love of both, to wit, of the man and of the woman, is not caused by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul.

XX. Marriage is certainly in harmony with reason if the following conditions hold. The desire for physical union must come not only from bodily beauty, but also from wanting children to raise wisely. Moreover, the love of both the man and the woman must come not only from bodily beauty. Their love must also come from freedom of soul.

XXI. Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by means of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery. None are more readily taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to be first, but are not.

XXI. Furthermore, flattery creates harmony, but only through the vile wrongdoing of servile obedience or betrayal. No one is more easily won over by flattery than proud people, who want to rank first but do not.

XXII. There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety and religion. Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet is he that abases himself most akin to the proud (IV. lvii. note).

XXII. Self-abasement gives a false impression of piety and religion. Although self-abasement is the opposite of pride, those who abase themselves are most like the proud (IV. lvii. note).

XXIII. Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such matters as cannot be hid. Further, as shame is a species of pain, it does not concern the exercise of reason.

XXIII. Shame also brings about harmony, but only in matters that cannot be hidden. Furthermore, because shame is a form of pain, it has nothing to do with the use of reason.

XXIV. The remaining emotions of pain towards men are directly opposed to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion; and, although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance to equity, yet is life but lawless, where every man may pass judgment on another's deeds, and vindicate his own or other men's rights.

XXIV. The remaining painful emotions directed toward others are directly opposed to justice, fairness, honor, piety, and religion. Although indignation seems somewhat like fairness, life is lawless when everyone may judge another’s actions and enforce their own or others’ rights.

XXV. Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire of pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable to piety (as we said in IV. xxxvii. note. i.). But, if it spring from emotion, it is ambition, or the desire whereby, men, under the false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords and seditions. For he who desires to aid his fellows either in word or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest good, he, I say, will before all things strive to win them over with love: not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called after his name, nor to give any cause for envy. Further, in his conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: but he will dwell at length on human virtue or power, and the way whereby it may be perfected. Thus will men be stirred not by fear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to reason.

XXV. Proper conduct (modestia) is the desire to please others when that desire is guided by reason. It belongs to piety (as we said in IV. xxxvii. note. i.). But if the desire comes from emotion, it is ambition. Through this desire, people generally stir up conflict and rebellion under the false cover of piety. For someone who wants to help others, in words or actions, so that together they may enjoy the highest good, will seek above all to win them over with love. He will not seek their admiration so that a system of thought may bear his name. Nor will he give any cause for envy. Further, in conversation he will avoid discussing people's faults and speak only sparingly of human weakness. Instead, he will speak at length about human virtue or power and how it may be perfected. In this way, people will be moved neither by fear nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy. That joy will move them to try, as far as they can, to live according to reason.

XXVI. Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we may.

XXVI. Apart from human beings, we know of no individual thing in nature whose mind we can take joy in. Nor do we know of any with whom we can form a friendship or any kind of fellowship. Therefore, our own advantage does not require us to preserve anything in nature other than human beings. Instead, we may preserve or destroy other things according to their various capacities, adapting them to our use as best we can.

XXVII. The advantage which we derive from things external to us, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from observing them, and from recombining their elements in different forms, is principally the preservation of the body; from this point of view, those things are most useful which can so feed and nourish the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil their functions. For, in proportion as the body is capable of being affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external bodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind capable of thinking (IV. xxxviii., xxxix.). But there seem to be very few things of this kind in nature; wherefore for the due nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature. For the human body is composed of very many parts of different nature, which stand in continual need of varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything that can follow from its own nature, and consequently that the mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions.

XXVII. We gain experience and knowledge by observing things outside us and combining their elements in different forms. Beyond these benefits, their main advantage is that they preserve the body. From this perspective, the most useful things nourish the body so that all its parts can function properly. For the more ways the body can be affected, and the more ways it can affect external bodies, the more the mind can think (IV. xxxviii., xxxix.). But there seem to be very few such things in nature. So we must use many different kinds of food to nourish the body properly. For the human body consists of many parts of different kinds, and these parts constantly need varied nourishment. This nourishment allows the whole body to remain equally capable of doing everything that can follow from its own nature. Consequently, the mind too may remain equally capable of forming many perceptions.

XXVIII. Now for providing these nourishments the strength of each individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one another mutual aid. But money has furnished us with a token for everything: hence it is with the notion of money, that the mind of the multitude is chiefly engrossed: nay, it can hardly conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the idea of money as cause.

XXVIII. Now, each person would hardly have the strength to provide these sources of nourishment without help from others. But money has given us a token for everything. So the minds of most people are chiefly occupied with the idea of money. Indeed, they can hardly imagine any pleasure without also thinking of money as its cause.

XXIX. This result is the fault only of those, who seek money, not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants, but because they have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring themselves to great splendour. Certainly they nourish their bodies, according to custom, but scantily, believing that they lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of their body. But they who know the true use of money, and who fix the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs, live content with little.

XXIX. This result is solely the fault of people who seek money neither because they are poor nor to meet basic needs. Instead, they seek money because they have learned ways to make it and use them to live in great splendor. These people do feed their bodies, as custom requires, but give them little nourishment. They believe that whatever they spend to keep their bodies healthy is wealth lost. But people who understand the true use of money judge wealth solely by their actual needs. They live content with little.

XXX. As, therefore, those things are good which assist the various parts of the body, and enable them to perform their functions; and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid to, man's power, in so far as he is composed of mind and body; it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good. But seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit our advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred to one part of the body more than to the other parts; therefore most emotions of pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at hand), and consequently the desires arising therefrom, may become excessive. Moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most regard to what is agreeable in the present, nor can we estimate what is future with emotions equally vivid. (IV. xliv. note, and lx. note.)

XXX. Things are good, then, when they help the body's various parts and enable those parts to perform their functions. And pleasure consists in increasing or supporting a person's power, insofar as that person consists of mind and body. It follows that all things that bring pleasure are good. But things do not act with the aim of giving us pleasure. Nor is their power to act adjusted to serve our interests. Finally, pleasure generally affects one part of the body more than the others. Therefore, most feelings of pleasure may become excessive unless reason and watchfulness are present. The desires arising from those feelings may consequently become excessive too. We may also add that emotion leads us to focus most on what is pleasant in the present. Nor can we judge the future with equally vivid emotions. (IV. xliv. note, and lx. note.)

XXXI. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure. However, as we said above (IV. xlv. note), none but the envious take delight in my infirmity and trouble. For the greater the pleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection whereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated by a true regard for our advantage. But contrariwise he, who is led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by reason.

XXXI. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to regard everything that brings pain as good, and everything that brings pleasure as bad. But as we said above (IV. xlv. note), only the envious take pleasure in my weakness and suffering. For the greater the pleasure we experience, the greater the perfection we reach. Consequently, we share more fully in the divine nature. No pleasure can ever be evil if it is guided by a true concern for our own advantage. By contrast, anyone driven by fear, who does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by reason.

XXXII. But human power is extremely limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; we have not, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those things which are without us. Nevertheless, we shall bear with an equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims of our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have done our duty, and that the power which we possess is not sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely; remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding of this, that part of our nature which is defined by intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence will endeavour to persist. For, in so far as we are intelligent beings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary, nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding of these things, the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.

XXXII. But human power is extremely limited, and the power of external causes is infinitely greater. We therefore have no absolute power to shape things outside us to suit our needs. Nevertheless, we will calmly bear everything that happens against our interests, as long as we know we have done our duty. We must also recognize that our power is not enough to protect us completely. We must remember that we are part of nature as a whole and follow its order. If we understand this clearly and distinctly, our rational nature, the better part of ourselves, will certainly accept what happens. That better part will also strive to maintain this acceptance. For insofar as we are rational beings, we can desire only what is necessary. Nor can we fully accept anything except what is true. Therefore, insofar as we understand these things correctly, the striving of our better part agrees with nature’s order as a whole.