The Power of Understanding, or Human Freedom

At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is concerned with the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant. It is no part of my design to point out the method and means whereby the understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the body may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of its functions. The latter question lies in the province of Medicine, the former in the province of Logic. Here, therefore, I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation. That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have already shown. Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely govern them. But these philosophers were compelled, by the protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess, that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them: and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house—dog and the other a hunting—dog. For by long training it could be brought about, that the house—dog should become accustomed to hunt, and the hunting—dog to cease from running after hares. To this opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained, that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of the animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal spirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many different marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it; whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends the gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and determining them to the condition wherein they were, when repulsed before by a similar position of the gland. He further asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature to a certain given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever anyone desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition causes the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result, inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with the wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to look at remote or very near objects. Lastly, he maintained that, although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life, yet it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de l'âme, I.50. He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power over its passions. For passions as defined by him are "perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression) are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement of the spirits." (Passions de l'âme, I.27). But, seeing that we can join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits, to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely on our own powers; if, therefore, we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an absolute dominion over our passions. Such is the doctrine of this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his own words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man. Indeed, I am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted, that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from self—evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which occult qualities are commonplace. What does he understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like him to explain this union through its proximate cause. But he had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body, that he could not assign any particular cause of the union between the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God. Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness, yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything except running away. In truth, as there is no common standard of volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body; consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other. We may also add, that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain. Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have abundantly proved that his premisses are false. Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness.

At last I turn to the remaining part of my Ethics, which concerns the path to freedom. Here I will discuss the power of reason. I will show how far reason can control the emotions, and explain the nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness. We will then see how much more powerful the wise person is than the ignorant person. I do not intend to explain the methods and means by which understanding can be perfected. Nor will I explain how to care for the body so that it can perform its functions properly. Caring for the body belongs to Medicine, and perfecting the understanding belongs to Logic. Here, then, I repeat, I will discuss only the power of the mind, or reason. My main purpose is to show how far, and in what ways, reason can govern, control, and moderate the emotions. I have already shown that we do not have absolute control over the emotions. Yet the Stoics thought that emotions depended entirely on our will, and that we could govern them absolutely. Experience, rather than their own principles, forced these philosophers to admit something else. Controlling and moderating the emotions requires considerable practice and effort. Someone tried to illustrate this point with two dogs, if I remember correctly. One was a house dog and the other a hunting dog. Through long training, the house dog could become accustomed to hunting, and the hunting dog could stop chasing hares. Descartes leans considerably toward this opinion. He held that the soul, or mind, is specially united to a particular part of the brain, called the pineal gland. Through this gland, the mind can sense all the movements set in motion in the body, as well as external objects. The mind can also move the gland in various ways through a simple act of will. He claimed that the gland hangs in the middle of the brain. The slightest movement of the animal spirits can move it. He further claimed that the gland can hang in as many different positions as the animal spirits can strike it. And as many different impressions are made on the gland as there are different external objects driving animal spirits toward it. From this account, the following result follows. Suppose the soul's will holds the gland in a position previously produced by animal spirits moving in one direction or another. The gland then acts back on those spirits. It drives them into the same state they entered when previously repelled by a similar position of the gland. Descartes further claimed that every act of mental willing is naturally linked to a particular movement of the gland. For example, whenever someone wants to look at a distant object, that act of will causes the pupil to widen. But merely thinking about widening the pupil, and wishing to widen it, would not produce that result. A movement of the gland directs animal spirits toward the optic nerve in a way that widens or narrows the pupil. This movement is not naturally linked to the wish to widen or narrow the pupil. Instead, it is linked to the wish to look at distant or very nearby objects. Finally, Descartes held that each movement of the gland seems naturally linked to one particular thought from the beginning of life. Yet habit can link that movement to other thoughts. He tries to prove this in Passions de l'âme, I.50. From this he concludes that no soul is so weak that, properly guided, it cannot gain absolute power over its passions. For he defines passions as "perceptions, feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which relate specifically to the soul. They are produced, maintained, and strengthened by some movement of the spirits." Note that last expression (Passions de l'âme, I.27). But we can link any movement of the gland, and consequently of the spirits, to any act of will. Therefore, directing the will lies entirely within our power. So suppose we direct our will through firm, certain decisions toward the actions we want to perform. Suppose we also link those decisions to the movements of the passions we want to acquire. We will then gain absolute control over our passions. Such is the teaching of this distinguished philosopher, as far as I can gather from his own words. Had it been less ingenious, I could hardly believe it came from so great a man. Indeed, I am astonished. This philosopher firmly insisted that he would draw no conclusions except those following from self-evident premises. He would affirm nothing that he did not perceive clearly and distinctly. He repeatedly criticized the scholastics for trying to explain obscure things through hidden qualities. Yet he could support a hypothesis that makes hidden qualities seem commonplace by comparison. What, I ask, does he mean by the union of mind and body? What clear and distinct conception does he have of thought intimately united with a particular particle of extended matter? I would truly like him to explain this union through its immediate cause. But his conception of the mind as distinct from the body was so distinct that he could explain neither. He could identify no particular cause of their union, or of the mind itself. Instead, he had to turn to the cause of the entire universe, that is, to God. Further, I would very much like to know how much motion the mind can give this pineal gland. With what force can the mind hold the gland in position? I do not know whether the mind can move the gland more slowly or quickly than the animal spirits can. Nor do I know whether physical causes can break the link between passionate movements and firm decisions. If they can, the following result would follow. The mind might firmly intend to face a particular danger, and might link movements of boldness to that decision. Yet the sight of danger might put the gland in a position that prevents every thought except running away. In truth, there is no common measure of willing and motion. So no comparison is possible between the mind's power and the body's power or strength. Consequently, the strength of one cannot in any way determine the strength of the other. We may also add that no gland can be found in the middle of the brain positioned as Descartes requires. No gland there can so easily be moved in so many ways. Nor do all the nerves extend as far as the brain's cavities. Finally, I will leave aside all his claims about the will and its freedom. I have already amply proved that his premises are false. As I have shown above, understanding alone defines the mind's power. Therefore, knowledge of the mind alone will determine the remedies for the emotions. I believe everyone has experienced these remedies, but does not observe them accurately or see them distinctly. From the same foundation, we will draw all the conclusions concerning the mind's blessedness.

I. If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a change must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of the two, and continue until they cease to be contrary.

I. If two opposing actions begin in the same subject, one or both must change. The change must continue until the actions no longer oppose each other.

II. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause.

II. An effect’s power is defined by the power of its cause. This holds to the extent that the cause’s essence explains or defines the effect’s essence.

(This axiom is evident from III. vii.)

(This axiom is clear from Part III, Proposition 7.)

PROP. I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and associated in the body.

PROP. I. Thoughts and ideas of things are arranged and connected in the mind. Bodily changes, or images of things, are arranged and connected in the body in exactly the same way.

Proof.—The order and connection of ideas is the same (II. vii.) as the order and connection of things, and vice versâ the order and connection of things is the same (II. vi. Coroll. and vii.) as the order and connection of ideas. Wherefore, even as the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place according to the order and association of modifications of the body (II. xviii.), so vice versâ (III. ii.) the order and connection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance with the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind. Q.E.D.

Proof. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things (II. vii.). Conversely, the order and connection of things is the same as that of ideas (II. vi. Coroll. and vii.). Thus, ideas in the mind are ordered and connected according to the order and association of bodily modifications (II. xviii.). Conversely (III. ii.), bodily modifications are ordered and connected according to how thoughts and ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind. Q.E.D.

PROP. II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external cause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these emotions, be destroyed.

PROP. II. If we detach a mental disturbance, or emotion, from the thought of an external cause and connect it to other thoughts, then love or hatred toward that external cause will disappear. So will the emotional swings that arise from that love or hatred.

Proof.—That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred, is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.); wherefore, when this cause is removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it; therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are destroyed. Q.E.D.

Proof. Love or hatred consists of pleasure or pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause (Definitions of the Emotions, vi. vii.). So, when the external cause is removed, love or hatred is removed with it. Therefore, these emotions and the emotions arising from them are destroyed. Q.E.D.

PROP. III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.

PROP. III. An emotion that is a passion stops being a passion as soon as we understand that emotion clearly and distinctly.

Proof.—An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by the general Def. of the Emotions). If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, by reason (II. xxi., and note); therefore (III. iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D.

Proof. An emotion that is a passion is a confused idea (by the general Definition of the Emotions). Suppose, then, that we form a clear and distinct idea of a given emotion. Insofar as the emotion relates to the mind alone, the idea and the emotion differ only conceptually (II. xxi., and note). Therefore (III. iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D.

Corollary—An emotion therefore becomes more under our control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as it is more known to us.

Corollary: Therefore, the better we understand an emotion, the more control we have over it. In the same proportion, the mind is less passive toward that emotion.

PROP. IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.

PROP. IV. We can form some clear and distinct idea of every modification of the body.

Proof.—Properties which are common to all things can only be conceived adequately (II. xxxviii.); therefore (II. xii. and Lemma ii. after II. xiii.) there is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. Q.E.D.

Proof. Properties common to all things can only be understood adequately (II. xxxviii.). Therefore, we can form some clear and distinct conception of every modification of the body (II. xii. and Lemma ii. after II. xiii.). Q.E.D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the general Def. of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception.

Corollary. It follows that we can form some clear and distinct conception of every emotion. For an emotion is the idea of a change in the body (by the general Definition of the Emotions). Therefore, every emotion must involve some clear and distinct conception (by the preceding Proposition).

Note.—Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by an effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly understand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate (II. xl.), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it about, that he should become less subject to them. To attain this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive (IV. lxi.). For it must be especially remarked, that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted, that everyone desires his fellow—men to live after his own fashion (III. xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof). In like manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV. lix.). Than this remedy for the emotions (to return to the point from which I started), which consists in a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within our power, can be devised. For the mind has no other power save that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown above (III. iii.).

Note. Everything produces an effect (I. xxxvi.). And we clearly and distinctly understand whatever follows from an adequate idea within us (II. xl.). It follows that everyone can clearly and distinctly understand themselves and their emotions, if not completely, at least in part. Consequently, everyone can become less subject to their emotions. To achieve this, we must focus chiefly on gaining, as far as possible, clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion. The purpose is for emotion to lead the mind toward thoughts it clearly and distinctly perceives and fully accepts. In this way, the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause and linked with true thoughts. As a result, not only will love, hatred, and so on be destroyed (V. ii.). The appetites or desires that usually arise from such an emotion will also become incapable of excess (IV. lxi.). We must especially note that the appetite through which someone acts and the appetite through which someone is passive are identical. For example, we have shown that human nature makes everyone desire others to live as they themselves do (III. xxxi. note). In someone not guided by reason, this appetite is a passion called ambition, and differs little from pride. But in someone guided by reason, the same appetite is an activity or virtue called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof). Likewise, all appetites or desires are passions only insofar as they arise from inadequate ideas. The same effects are attributed to virtue when adequate ideas arouse or produce them. For all desires that lead us to any particular action can arise from adequate ideas just as from inadequate ideas (IV. lix.). To return to my starting point, this remedy for the emotions consists in truly knowing them. No better remedy within our power can be devised. For the mind has no power beyond thinking and forming adequate ideas, as we have shown above (III. iii.).

PROP. V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply, and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.

PROP. V. An emotion toward something we consider simply, not as necessary, contingent, or possible, is stronger than any other emotion, all other things being equal.

Proof.—An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be necessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.). But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes whereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note); therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and, consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D.

Proof. An emotion toward something we consider free is stronger than an emotion toward something we consider necessary (III. xlix.). Consequently, it is stronger still than an emotion toward something we consider possible or contingent (IV. xi.). But considering something free means nothing more than considering it alone, without knowing the causes that determined its actions (II. xxxv. note). Therefore, other conditions being equal, an emotion toward something considered alone is stronger than an emotion toward something considered necessary, possible, or contingent. Consequently, it is the strongest of all. Q.E.D.

PROP. VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as necessary.

PROP. VI. The mind has more power over emotions and is less controlled by them insofar as it understands all things as necessary.

Proof.—The mind understands all things to be necessary (I. xxix.) and to be determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes; therefore (by the foregoing Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III. xlviii.) feels less emotion towards the things themselves. Q.E.D.

Proof. The mind understands that all things are necessary (I. xxix.). It understands that an infinite chain of causes determines their existence and actions. Therefore, to that extent, the mind becomes less subject to the emotions arising from those things (by the preceding Proposition). It also feels less emotion toward the things themselves (III. xlviii.). Q.E.D.

Note.—The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, as experience also testifies. For we see, that the pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any means have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly, because it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness. Whereas, if most people were born full—grown and only one here and there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants; because infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature; and we may note several other instances of the same sort.

Note. The more we apply our knowledge that things are necessary to particular things, the more power the mind has over emotions. This power grows as we understand those particular things more clearly and vividly. Experience also confirms this. We see that the pain of losing something good eases once the person recognizes that nothing could have preserved it. We also see that no one pities an infant because the infant cannot speak, walk, or reason. Nor does anyone pity an infant for spending so many years in what seems like unconsciousness. But if most people were born fully grown, and only a few as infants, everyone would pity the infants. For infancy would then seem not natural and necessary, but a fault or failure in Nature. We may note several other examples of the same kind.

PROP. VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.

PROP. VII. If we take time into account, emotions arising from reason are stronger than emotions caused by particular objects we consider absent.

Proof.—We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body, being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the said thing (II. xvii.). Wherefore, the emotion, which is referred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power (IV. vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its external cause (IV. ix.). But an emotion which springs from reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things (see the def. of reason in II. xl. note. ii.), which we always regard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their present existence), and which we always conceive in the same manner (II. xxxviii.). Wherefore an emotion of this kind always remains the same; and consequently (V. Ax. i.) emotions, which are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more, until they are no longer contrary to it; to this extent the emotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D.

Proof. We do not regard a thing as absent because of the emotion through which we conceive it. Rather, we regard it as absent because another emotion affects the body and excludes that thing’s existence (II. xvii.). Therefore, an emotion connected with something we regard as absent cannot overcome a person’s other activities and power (IV. vi.). On the contrary, such an emotion can be controlled to some extent by emotions that exclude its external cause’s existence (IV. ix.). But an emotion arising from reason necessarily relates to the common properties of things. See the definition of reason in II. xl. note. ii. We always regard these properties as present, because nothing can exclude their present existence. We also always conceive these properties in the same way (II. xxxviii.). Therefore, an emotion arising from reason always remains the same. Consequently (V. Ax. i.), opposing emotions not sustained by their external causes must increasingly adapt to this reason-based emotion. This adaptation continues until those emotions no longer oppose it. To this extent, the emotion arising from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D.

PROP. VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.

PROP. VIII. An emotion grows stronger in proportion to the number of causes acting together to arouse it.

Proof.—Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few (III. vii.): therefore (IV. v.), in proportion to the increased number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion becomes stronger. Q.E.D.

Proof. Many causes acting at once are more powerful than a few (III. vii.). Therefore (IV. v.), an emotion grows stronger as the number of causes arousing the emotion at once increases. Q.E.D.

Note—This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. ii.

Note: This proposition is also clear from Part V, Axiom 2.

PROP. IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a single cause.

PROP. IX. An emotion tied to many different causes is less harmful when the mind sees those causes as occurring at the same time as the emotion. We are less subject to that emotion and less affected by each of its causes. In each case, the comparison is with a different, equally powerful emotion tied to fewer causes or a single cause.

Proof.—An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders the mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.); therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is unable to think of anything else; this was our first point. Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III. vii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.), the mind is less passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few or of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, this emotion (III. xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them. Q.E.D.

Proof. An emotion is bad or harmful only insofar as it limits the mind's ability to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.). Therefore, an emotion that directs the mind to consider several things at once is less harmful than another equally powerful emotion. The other emotion so absorbs the mind in considering a few objects, or just one, that it cannot think of anything else. This proves our first point. Next, the mind's essence, or power (III. vii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.). So the mind is less passive under an emotion that makes it think of several things at once. It is more passive under an equally strong emotion that keeps it absorbed in a few objects, or just one. This proves our second point. Finally, insofar as this emotion is attributable to several causes, its power in relation to each cause is less (III. xlviii.). Q.E.D.

PROP. X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.

PROP. X. As long as emotions contrary to our nature do not attack us, we can arrange and connect changes in our body according to the order of the intellect.

Proof.—The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that is (IV. xxx.), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede the mind from understanding (IV. xxvii.). So long, therefore, as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things (IV. xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II. xl. note. ii. and II. xlvii. note); consequently we have in such cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order. Q.E.D.

Proof. Emotions contrary to our nature are bad (IV. xxx.). They are bad insofar as they prevent the mind from understanding (IV. xxvii.). Therefore, as long as we are not troubled by emotions contrary to our nature, the mind’s power remains unhindered. Through this power, the mind strives to understand things (IV. xxvi.). So the mind can form clear and distinct ideas and deduce them from one another (II. xl. note. ii. and II. xlvii. note). Consequently, in such cases, we can arrange and connect the body’s modifications according to the order of the intellect. Q.E.D.

Note.—By this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by evil emotions. For (V. vii.) a greater force is needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and associated according to the intellectual order, than when they, are uncertain and unsettled. The best we can do, therefore, so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts, to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith¹⁶ to the particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that it may be always ready to our hand. For instance, we have laid down among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and note), that hatred should be overcome with love or high—mindedness, and not required with hatred in return. Now, that this precept of reason may be always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and in what manner and way they may be best warded off by high—mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready for use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.). If we keep also in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships; further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result of the right way of life ( IV. lii.), and that men, no less than everything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and will be easily overcome; or, if the anger which springs from a grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As is indeed evident from V. vi. vii. viii. We should, in the same way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them. But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions we should always bear in mind that which is good in every individual thing (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.), in order that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of pleasure. For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain it. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving vent to their anger would fain appear wise. Wherefore it is certain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of honour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily covet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common to all who are ill—used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit. For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches. So, again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion, directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart. Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wise desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will diligently observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for the most part, to direct his actions according to the commandments of reason.

Note. By properly arranging and connecting changes in the body, we can keep harmful emotions from affecting us easily. For emotions arranged and connected according to the order of the intellect require greater force to control them (V. vii.). Uncertain and unsettled emotions require less force. Until we fully understand our emotions, the best we can do is establish rules for right conduct, or fixed practical principles. We should memorize these principles and immediately apply them¹⁶ to the particular situations we encounter in life. In this way, our imagination can become thoroughly shaped by these principles, keeping them always ready for use. For example, among the rules of life, we have established that hatred should be overcome with love or generosity of spirit. We should not return hatred with hatred (IV. xlvi. and note). To keep this principle of reason ready when needed, we should often reflect on the wrongs people commonly commit. We should also consider how generosity of spirit can best protect us against those wrongs. We will then connect the idea of being wronged with the idea of this principle. The principle will therefore always be ready for use when someone wrongs us (II. xviii.). We should also keep in mind our true advantage and the good that comes from mutual friendship and community. We should remember that living rightly brings complete contentment (IV. lii.). We should also remember that people, like everything else, act by the necessity of their nature. If we keep these things in mind, the wrong, or the hatred usually arising from it, will occupy very little of our imagination. We will easily overcome the wrong or hatred. Or anger caused by a serious wrong may not be easily overcome. Even so, we will overcome the anger far sooner than if we had not reflected on these matters beforehand. This will still involve an inner struggle, as is clear from V. vi. vii. viii. In the same way, we should reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear. We should often bring to mind and imagine life's ordinary dangers. Alongside these dangers, we should imagine how resourcefulness and strength of mind can help us avoid and overcome them. But when arranging our thoughts and ideas, we must always keep in mind what is good in each individual thing. This is so that an emotion of pleasure may always move us to act (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.). For example, if a man sees that he pursues honor too eagerly, let him consider its proper use. Let him consider the purpose for which he should pursue honor and the means of attaining it. Let him not dwell on honor's misuse and emptiness, people's fickleness, and similar matters. No one dwells on such things except from an unhealthy state of mind. The most ambitious people torment themselves most with these thoughts when they despair of gaining the distinctions they crave. While venting their anger in this way, they want to appear wise. So those who protest loudest against the misuse of honor and the world's vanity certainly crave honor most greedily. This is not peculiar to ambitious people. It is common to all whose fortunes have treated them badly and whose spirits are weak. A poor man who is also miserly will likewise talk endlessly about the misuse of wealth and the rich's vices. By doing so, he merely torments himself. He shows everyone that he cannot tolerate either his own poverty or other people's wealth. Similarly, men rejected by a woman they love think only of women's fickleness, treachery, and other supposedly typical faults. They forget all these faults as soon as their sweetheart welcomes them back. Thus, anyone seeking to govern his emotions and desires solely through love of freedom strives to understand the virtues and their causes. He does so as far as he can. He also strives to fill his mind with the joy that comes from truly understanding the virtues. He will have no desire to dwell on people's faults, criticize others, or delight in a false appearance of freedom. Anyone who carefully follows and practices these principles, which are not difficult, will soon achieve a real ability. For the most part, he will be able to guide his actions according to the commands of reason.

PROP. XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to more objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and occupies the mind more.

PROP. XI. The more objects a mental image is linked to, the more often it appears or becomes vivid. The image also occupies the mind more as it is linked to more objects.

Proof.—In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is referred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can be aroused and fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mind contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion; therefore the emotion is more frequent, or is more often in full vigour, and (V. viii.) occupies the mind more. Q.E.D.

Proof. The more objects a mental image or emotion is associated with, the more causes can arouse and sustain it. By assumption, the mind considers all these causes at once in connection with the given emotion. Therefore, the emotion occurs more frequently, or is more often at full strength, and occupies the mind more (V. viii.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XII. The mental images of things are more easily associated with the images referred to things which we clearly and distinctly understand, than with others.

PROP. XII. Mental images of things are more easily associated with images of things we understand clearly and distinctly than with other images.

Proof.—Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand, are either the common properties of things or deductions therefrom (see definition of Reason, II. xl. note ii.), and are consequently (by the last Prop.) more often aroused in us. Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should contemplate other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with something else, and consequently (II. xviii.) that the images of the said things should be more often associated with the images of these than with the images of something else. Q.E.D.

Proof. What we clearly and distinctly understand consists of the common properties of things or conclusions drawn from those properties. (See the definition of Reason, II. xl. note ii.) Consequently, by the previous proposition, these are more often called to mind. So we may more readily consider other things together with these properties or conclusions than with something else. Consequently (II. xviii.), images of those other things may more often be associated with images of these properties or conclusions. Such associations may occur more often than associations with images of something else. Q.E.D.

PROP. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as it is associated with a greater number of other images.

PROP. XIII. A mental image is vivid more often as the number of other images linked to it increases.

Proof.—In proportion as an image is associated with a greater number of other images, so (II. xviii.) are there more causes whereby it can be aroused. Q.E.D.

Proof. The more images an image is associated with, the more causes can bring that image to mind (II. xviii.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of God.

PROP. XIV. The mind can connect all changes in the body or images of things to the idea of God.

Proof.—There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind may not form some clear and distinct conception (V. iv.); wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred to the idea of God (I. xv.). Q.E.D.

Proof. The mind can form some clear and distinct conception of every modification of the body (V. iv.). Therefore, the mind can relate all these modifications to the idea of God (I. xv.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions.

PROP. XV. Anyone who clearly and distinctly understands themselves and their emotions loves God. The more they understand themselves and their emotions, the more they love God.

Proof.—He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is (by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of God; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, vi.) such an one loves God, and (for the same reason) so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions. Q.E.D.

Proof. Anyone who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.). By the previous proposition, this pleasure is accompanied by the idea of God. Therefore, such a person loves God (Def. of the Emotions, vi.). For the same reason, the more he understands himself and his emotions, the more he loves God. Q.E.D.

PROP. XVI. This love towards God must hold the chief place in the mind.

PROP. XVI. This love for God must take first place in the mind.

Proof.—For this love is associated with all the modifications of the body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.); therefore (V. xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind. Q.E.D.

Proof. This love is linked to all the body's modifications (V. xiv.) and is strengthened by them all (V. xv.). Therefore (V. xi.), this love must hold the highest place in the mind. Q.E.D.

PROP. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.

PROP. XVII. God has no passions and is not affected by feelings of pleasure or pain.

Proof.—All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true (II. xxxii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate; and therefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) God is without passions. Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.); therefore (by Def. of the Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.

Proof. All ideas, insofar as they relate to God, are true (II. xxxii.). That is, they are adequate (II. Def. iv.). Therefore, by the general Definition of the Emotions, God has no passions. Also, God cannot become either more or less perfect (I. xx. Coroll. ii.). Therefore, he experiences no emotion of pleasure or pain (Def. of the Emotions, ii. iii.).

Corollary.—Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.

Corollary: Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For God feels no emotion of pleasure or pain, as shown in the previous proposition. Therefore, by the Definitions of the Emotions, vi and vii, he does not love or hate anyone.

PROP. XVIII. No one can hate God.

PROPOSITION XVIII. No one can hate God.

Proof.—The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (II. xlvi. xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God, we are active (III. iii.); consequently (III. lix.) there can be no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God. Q.E.D.

Proof. Our idea of God is adequate and perfect (II. xlvi. xlvii.). Therefore, insofar as we contemplate God, we are active (III. iii.). Consequently (III. lix.), no pain can be accompanied by the idea of God. In other words (Def. of the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.

Corollary: Love for God cannot turn into hate.

Note.—It may be objected that, as we understand God as the cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause of pain. But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a passion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore, in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to that extent feel pleasure.

Note. Someone may object that understanding God as the cause of all things means regarding God as the cause of pain. But my answer is this: the more we understand the causes of pain, the less pain remains a passion (V. iii.). In other words, to that extent it ceases to be pain (III. lix.). Therefore, to the extent that we understand God as the cause of pain, we feel pleasure.

PROP. XIX. He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should love him in return.

PROP. XIX. Anyone who loves God cannot try to make God love them in return.

Proof.—For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V. xvii. Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.); which is absurd (III. xxviii.). Therefore, he who loves God, &c. Q.E.D.

Proof. For if a man tried to do so, he would want God, whom he loves, not to be God (V. xvii. Coroll.). Consequently, he would want to feel pain (III. xix.), which is absurd (III. xxviii.). Therefore, whoever loves God, etc. Q.E.D.

PROP. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to God by the same bond of love.

PROP. XX. This love for God cannot be tainted by envy or jealousy. On the contrary, this love grows stronger as we imagine more people united with God by the same loving bond.

Proof.—This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common to all men (IV. xxxvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice therein (IV. xxxvii.); therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.), it cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion of jealousy (V. xviii. see definition of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note); but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice therein. Q.E.D.

Proof. This love for God is the highest good we can seek under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.). This love is common to everyone (IV. xxxvi.), and we want everyone to rejoice in it (IV. xxxvii.). Therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.), this love cannot be tainted by envy or jealousy (V. xviii.). See the definition of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note. On the contrary, this love must grow stronger as we imagine more people rejoicing in it. Q.E.D.

Note.—We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be destroyed; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards God is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the body be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.

Note. We can show in the same way that no emotion directly opposes this love and can therefore destroy it. So we may conclude that this love towards God is the most constant of all emotions. Insofar as this love relates to the body, it cannot be destroyed unless the body is also destroyed. We will soon examine the nature of this love insofar as it relates to the mind alone.

I have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them. Whence it appears that the mind's power over the emotions consists:——

I have now covered all the remedies against the emotions, or everything the mind can do against them on its own. From this, we can see that the mind's power over the emotions consists of the following:

I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. iv. note).

I. In actually understanding the emotions (V. iv. note).

II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V. ii. and V. iv. note).

II. In how it separates emotions from the thought of an external cause that we understand unclearly (V. ii. and V. iv. note).

III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions referred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner (V. vii.).

III. In the fact that emotions about things we clearly understand last longer than emotions about things we understand only confusedly and incompletely (V. vii.).

IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications¹⁷ are fostered, which have regard to the common properties of things or to God (V. ix. xi.).

IV. In the number of causes that strengthen those modifications¹⁷ concerning the common properties of things or God (V. ix. xi.).

V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and associate, one with another, its own emotions (V. x. note and xii. xiii. xiv.).

V. Finally, in the order in which the mind can arrange and connect its own emotions (V. x. note and xii. xiii. xiv.).

But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better understood, it should be specially observed that the emotions are called by us strong, when we compare the emotion of one man with the emotion of another, and see that one man is more troubled than another by the same emotion; or when we are comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another, and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than by another. For the strength of every emotion is defined by a comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause. Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge only: it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive, whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active, whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that, although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human infirmity. Again, it must be observed, that spiritual unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love for something which is subject to many variations, and which we can never become masters of. For no one is solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he loves it; neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. arise, except in regard to things whereof no one can be really master.

But to better understand the mind’s power over emotions, we should pay particular attention to what makes emotions strong. We call emotions strong when we compare one person’s emotion with another’s and find one person more troubled by the same emotion. We also compare different emotions in the same person and find that one affects or stirs that person more than another. For the strength of every emotion is defined by comparing our own power with the power of an external cause. Now the mind’s power is defined by knowledge alone, and its weakness or passivity by lack of knowledge alone. So the most passive mind is the one made up mostly of inadequate ideas. Such a mind can be characterized more readily by its passive states than by its activities. By contrast, the most active mind is the one made up mostly of adequate ideas. Such a mind may contain as many inadequate ideas as the more passive mind. Even so, ideas reflecting human virtue may characterize it more readily than ideas reflecting human weakness. We must also note that mental ill health and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love for something changeable. What we love in these cases is subject to many changes, and we can never fully control it. For no one worries or feels anxious about anything unless they love it. Nor do wrongs, suspicions, hostilities, and so on arise except over things that no one can truly control.

We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge (II. xlvii. note), founded on the actual knowledge of God, possesses over the emotions: if it does not absolutely destroy them, in so far as they are passions (V. iii. and iv. note); at any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind (V. xiv.). Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable and eternal (V. xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession (II. xlv.); neither can it be defiled with those faults which are inherent in ordinary love; but it may grow from strength to strength, and may engross the greater part of the mind, and deeply penetrate it.

We can thus readily understand the power that clear and distinct knowledge has over the emotions. This is especially true of the third kind of knowledge (II. xlvii. note), founded on actual knowledge of God. Such knowledge may not completely destroy emotions insofar as they are passions (V. iii. and iv. note). But at least it makes them occupy only a very small part of the mind (V. xiv.). Further, this knowledge creates love for something unchanging and eternal (V. xv.), which we can truly possess (II. xlv.). Nor can this love be tainted by the faults inherent in ordinary love. Instead, this love may grow stronger and stronger, occupy most of the mind, and reach deeply into it.

And now I have finished with all that concerns this present life: for, as I said in the beginning of this note, I have briefly described all the remedies against the emotions. And this everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has attended to what is advanced in the present note, and also to the definitions of the mind and its emotions, and, lastly, to Propositions i. and iii. of Part III. It is now, therefore, time to pass on to those matters, which appertain to the duration of the mind, without relation to the body.

I have now finished discussing everything that concerns this present life. For, as I said at the beginning of this note, I have briefly described all the remedies against the emotions. Everyone may readily have seen this for themselves if they have carefully considered the arguments in this note. They must also have considered the definitions of the mind and its emotions, and, finally, Propositions I and III of Part III. So it is now time to turn to matters concerning the mind’s duration, apart from the body.

PROP. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what is past, while the body endures.

PROP. XXI. The mind can imagine things or remember the past only as long as the body exists.

Proof.—The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as actual, except while the body endures (II. viii. Coroll.); and, consequently (II. xxvi.), it does not imagine any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures. Thus it cannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II. xvii. note), or remember things past, except while the body endures (see definition of Memory, II. xviii. note). Q.E.D.

Proof. The mind expresses the actual existence of its body only while the body continues to exist. Only during that time does the mind imagine the body’s changes as actual (II. viii. Coroll.). Consequently, the mind imagines any body as actually existing only while its own body continues to exist (II. xxvi.). Thus the mind cannot imagine anything or remember past things except while its body continues to exist. For the definition of Imagination, see II. xvii. note. For the definition of Memory, see II. xviii. note. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea, which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity.

PROP. XXII. Nevertheless, an idea necessarily exists in God. This idea expresses the essence of a particular human body from the perspective of eternity.

Proof.—God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or that human body, but also of its essence (I. xxv.). This essence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the very essence of God (I. Ax. iv.), and be thus conceived by a certain eternal necessity (I. xvi.); and this conception must necessarily exist in God (II. iii.). Q.E.D.

Proof. God causes not only the existence of each particular human body but also its essence (I. xxv.). Therefore, each body’s essence must necessarily be understood through God’s own essence (I. Ax. iv.). It must therefore be understood through a certain eternal necessity (I. xvi.). And this understanding must necessarily exist in God (II. iii.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.

PROP. XXIII. The human mind cannot be completely destroyed along with the body. But something of the mind remains eternal.

Proof.—There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which expresses the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which, therefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essence of the human mind (II. xiii.). But we have not assigned to the human mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained through duration, and may be defined by time—that is (II. viii. Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body endures. Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of God (last Prop.); this something, which appertains to the essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.

Proof. There is necessarily in God a concept or idea that expresses the essence of the human body (previous proposition). This idea therefore necessarily belongs to the essence of the human mind (II. xiii.). But we have assigned the human mind no duration measurable by time, except insofar as it expresses the body's actual existence. That existence is explained through duration and can be measured by time. That is, we assign the mind duration only as long as the body lasts (II. viii. Coroll.). Yet something belonging to the mind's essence is conceived with a certain eternal necessity through God's very essence (previous proposition). Therefore, that part of the mind's essence must necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.

Note.—This idea, which expresses the essence of the body under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is necessarily eternal. Yet it is not possible that we should remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in terms of time, or have any relation to time. But, notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no less than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of the mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than proofs. Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or explained through duration. Thus our mind can only be said to endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus far only has it the power of determining the existence of things by time, and conceiving them under the category of duration.

Note. This idea expresses the essence of the body viewed in terms of eternity. As we have said, the idea is a particular mode of thought that belongs to the mind’s essence. It is necessarily eternal. Yet we cannot remember existing before our body, because our body can bear no trace of such an existence. Nor can eternity be defined in terms of time or have any relation to time. Nevertheless, we feel and know that we are eternal. For the mind feels what it understands just as much as what it remembers. The eyes of the mind, through which it sees and observes things, are nothing other than proofs. So, although we do not remember existing before the body, we still feel that our mind is eternal. This is true insofar as the mind includes the essence of the body viewed in terms of eternity. Thus, the mind’s existence cannot be defined in terms of time or explained through duration. Our mind can therefore be said to last only insofar as it includes the body’s actual existence. Only to that extent can the mind’s existence be defined by a fixed period of time. And only to that extent can the mind determine when things exist and conceive of them in terms of duration.

PROP. XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the more do we understand God.

PROPOSITION XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the more we understand God.

Proof.—This is evident from I. xxv. Coroll.

Proof: This is clear from the corollary to Part I, Proposition 25.

PROP. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.

PROP. XXV. The mind’s highest aim and highest virtue is to understand things through the third kind of knowledge.

Proof.—The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things (see its definition II. xl. note. ii.); and, in proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better understand God (by the last Prop.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the highest virtue of the mind, that is (IV. Def. viii.) the power, or nature, or (III. vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D.

Proof. The third kind of knowledge begins with an adequate idea of certain attributes of God. It leads to adequate knowledge of the essence of things (see its definition, II. xl. note. ii.). The more we understand things in this way, the better we understand God (by the previous proposition). Therefore (IV. xxviii.), the mind’s highest virtue is to understand things through the third kind of knowledge. This highest virtue is the mind’s power or nature (IV. Def. viii.), or its highest striving (III. vii.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires more to understand things by that kind.

PROP. XXVI. The more the mind can understand things through the third kind of knowledge, the more it wants to do so.

Proof—This is evident. For, in so far as we conceive the mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of knowledge, we, to that extent, conceive it as determined thus to conceive things; and consequently (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more capable thereof. Q.E.D.

Proof: This is evident. To the extent that we conceive the mind as capable of understanding things through this kind of knowledge, we also conceive it as determined to understand things this way. Consequently (Definition of the Emotions, i.), the more capable the mind is of understanding things this way, the more it desires to do so. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVII. From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence.

PROP. XXVII. This third kind of knowledge brings the greatest possible peace of mind.

Proof.—The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV. xxviii.), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge (V. xxv.), and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind knows things more by the said kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.): consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def. of the Emotions, ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own virtue; thus (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), from this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence. Q.E.D.

Proof. The mind’s highest virtue is to know God (IV. xxviii.), or to understand things through the third kind of knowledge (V. xxv.). This virtue grows as the mind understands more things through this kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.). Consequently, anyone who understands things through this kind of knowledge reaches the height of human perfection. Such a person therefore experiences the highest pleasure (Def. of the Emotions, ii.). This pleasure is accompanied by the idea of oneself and one’s own virtue. Thus, this kind of knowledge produces the greatest possible self-contentment (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind of knowledge.

PROP. XXVIII. The effort or desire to know things through the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind. But it can arise from the second kind of knowledge.

Proof.—This proposition is self—evident. For whatsoever we understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through itself, or through that which is conceived through itself; that is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note. ii.) cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind. Q.E.D.

Proof. This proposition is self-evident. For whatever we understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through itself or through something conceived through itself. In other words, our clear and distinct ideas, or ideas belonging to the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note. ii.), cannot follow from fragmentary and confused ideas. These fragmentary and confused ideas belong to the first kind of knowledge. Instead, clear and distinct ideas must follow from adequate ideas, meaning ideas of the second and third kinds of knowledge. Therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire to know things through the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind. It must arise from the second kind. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity.

PROP. XXIX. Whatever the mind understands as eternal, it understands not by conceiving the body’s actual existence in the present. Instead, the mind understands it by conceiving the body’s essence as eternal.

Proof.—In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.). But eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii. and explanation). Therefore to this extent the mind has not the power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll. ii.), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V. xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to the essence of mind (II. xiii.). Therefore this power of conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity. Q.E.D.

Proof. Insofar as the mind conceives its body's present existence, it conceives duration that can be measured by time. Only to that extent can the mind conceive things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.). But eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii. and explanation). Therefore, insofar as the mind conceives its body's present existence, it cannot conceive things as eternal. Yet the mind does have the power to conceive things as eternal. This is because reason by its nature conceives things as eternal (II. xliv. Coroll. ii.). It is also because the mind by its nature conceives the body's essence as eternal (V. xxiii.). For nothing beyond these two belongs to the mind's essence (II. xiii.). Therefore, the mind can conceive things as eternal only because it conceives the body's essence as eternal. Q.E.D.

Note.—Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and following from the necessity of the divine nature. Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in II. xlv. and note, which see.

Note. We understand things as actual in two ways. We either understand them as existing at a particular time and place, or as contained in God. In the second case, we understand them as following necessarily from the divine nature. Whatever we understand as true or real in this second way, we understand from the perspective of eternity. Our ideas of these things involve the eternal and infinite essence of God. We showed this in II. xlv. and its note. See that proposition and note.

PROP. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived through God.

PROP. XXX. To the extent that our mind knows itself and the body from the perspective of eternity, it necessarily knows God. To that same extent, our mind knows that it exists in God and is understood through God.

Proof.—Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.). Therefore to conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &c. Q.E.D.

Proof. Eternity is the very essence of God, insofar as that essence involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.). Therefore, to conceive things in terms of eternity is to conceive them as real entities through God’s essence. Or it is to conceive them as involving existence through God’s essence. So, insofar as our mind conceives itself and the body in terms of eternity, it necessarily knows God. To that extent, our mind also knows, etc. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.

PROP. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as its formal cause, insofar as the mind itself is eternal.

Proof.—The mind does not conceive anything under the form of eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the form of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything which can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge (see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind (III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause of such knowledge. Q.E.D.

Proof. The mind conceives anything under the form of eternity only insofar as it conceives its own body that way (V. xxix.). That is, the mind does so only insofar as it is eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.). Therefore, by the previous proposition, the mind has knowledge of God insofar as it is eternal. This knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.). Thus, insofar as it is eternal, the mind can know everything that can follow from this knowledge of God (II. xl.). In other words, the mind can know things through the third kind of knowledge (see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.). Accordingly, insofar as it is eternal, the mind is the adequate or formal cause of such knowledge (III. Def. i.). Q.E.D.

Note.—In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of himself and of God; in other words, he will be more perfect and blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel. But we must here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more readily explained and better understood, we will consider the mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have done hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, so long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our premisses are plain.

Note: Therefore, the stronger a man's grasp of this kind of knowledge, the more fully he will understand himself and God. In other words, he will be more perfect and blessed, as will become clearer later. But we must note something here. We are already certain that the mind is eternal insofar as it understands things from the perspective of eternity. Yet, to make our argument easier to explain and understand, we will consider the mind as if it had just begun to exist and to understand things from the perspective of eternity. Indeed, we have treated the mind this way up to now. We can do so without any risk of error, as long as we draw conclusions only from clear premises.

PROP. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as cause.

PROP. XXXII. We take delight in everything we understand through the third kind of knowledge. And our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as its cause.

Proof.—From this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions, xxv.), pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the idea also of God as cause. Q.E.D.

Proof. This kind of knowledge produces the greatest possible mental contentment, that is, pleasure (Def of the Emotions, xxv.). This contentment is accompanied by the idea of the mind itself (V. xxvii.). Consequently, it is also accompanied by the idea of God as its cause (V. xxx.). Q.E.D.

Corollary.—From the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises the intellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledge arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is (Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of God; not in so far as we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the intellectual love of God.

Corollary. The intellectual love of God necessarily arises from the third kind of knowledge. This kind of knowledge produces pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as its cause. Such pleasure is the love of God (Def. of the Emotions, vi.). We love God not because we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but because we understand him to be eternal. This is what I call the intellectual love of God.

PROP. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.

PROP. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God comes from the third kind of knowledge. This love is eternal.

Proof.—The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. xxxi. I. Ax. iii.); therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises therefrom is also necessarily eternal. Q.E.D.

Proof: The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. xxxi. I. Ax. iii.). Therefore, by the same axiom, the love arising from this knowledge is also necessarily eternal. Q.E.D.

Note.—Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing Prop.) no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of love, just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll. of the last Prop. Nor is there here any difference, except that the mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea of God as eternal cause. If pleasure consists in the transition to a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the mind being endowed with perfection itself.

Note: Although this love toward God has no beginning, as the preceding Proposition shows, it has all the perfections of love. It is just as if this love had arisen as we imagined in the previous Proposition’s Corollary. There is only one difference: the mind possesses eternally the same perfections that we imagined it gaining. These perfections are accompanied by the idea of God as their eternal cause. If pleasure consists in moving to greater perfection, then surely blessedness must consist in the mind possessing perfection itself.

PROP. XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject to those emotions which are attributable to passions.

PROP. XXXIV. The mind is subject to emotions arising from passions only as long as the body lasts.

Proof.—Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind contemplates a thing as present (II. xvii. note); yet this idea indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.). Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions) is imagination, in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body; therefore (V. xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures, subject to emotions which are attributable to passions. Q.E.D.

Proof. Imagination is the idea through which the mind regards a thing as present (II. xvii. note). Yet this idea indicates the human body's present state rather than the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.). Therefore, emotion is imagination insofar as imagination indicates the body's present state (see general Def. of Emotions). Therefore (V. xxi.), the mind is subject to emotions attributable to passions only as long as the body continues to exist. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that no love save intellectual love is eternal.

Corollary: It follows that only intellectual love is eternal.

Note.—If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after death.

Note: If we consider people's common beliefs, we see that they are indeed aware of the eternity of their minds. But they confuse eternity with duration. They also attribute eternity to imagination or memory, which they believe survives after death.

PROP. XXXV. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.

PROPOSITION 35. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.

Proof.—God is absolutely infinite (I. Def. vi.), that is (II. Def. vi.), the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection; and such rejoicing is (II. iii.) accompanied by the idea of himself, that is (I. xi. and Def. i.), the idea of his own cause: now this is what we have (in V. xxxii. Coroll.) described as intellectual love.

Proof. God is absolutely infinite (I. Def. vi.). In other words (II. Def. vi.), God’s nature rejoices in infinite perfection. This rejoicing is accompanied by God’s idea of himself (II. iii.). That idea is the idea of his own cause (I. xi. and Def. i.). This is what we have described as intellectual love (V. xxxii. Coroll.).

PROP. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.

PROP. XXXVI. The mind’s intellectual love for God is the very love with which God loves himself. This is not God’s self-love insofar as he is infinite. Rather, it is God’s self-love insofar as he can be understood through the human mind’s essence, viewed from eternity. In other words, the mind’s intellectual love for God is part of the infinite love with which God loves himself.

Proof.—This love of the mind must be referred to the activities of the mind (V. xxxii. Coroll. and III. iii.); it is itself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itself accompanied by the idea of God as cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.); that is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.), an activity whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself; therefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself. Q.E.D.

Proof. This love of the mind must be counted among the mind’s activities (V. xxxii. Coroll. and III. iii.). Indeed, this love is an activity in which the mind considers itself, together with the idea of God as its cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.). That is, God considers himself, together with the idea of himself, insofar as he can be explained through the human mind (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.). Therefore, by the previous proposition, this love of the mind is part of the infinite love with which God loves himself. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are identical.

Corollary: It follows that God, insofar as he loves himself, loves human beings. Therefore, God’s love for human beings and the mind’s intellectual love for God are identical.

Note.—From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love towards men. This love or blessedness is, in the Bible, called Glory, and not undeservedly. For whether this love be referred to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of spirit, which (Def. of the Emotions, xxv. xxx.) is not really distinguished from glory. In so far as it is referred to God, it is (V. xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term, accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is referred to the mind, it is the same (V. xxvii.).

Note. From what has been said, we clearly understand what our salvation, blessedness, or freedom consists in. It consists in the constant and eternal love of God, or in God's love for human beings. The Bible calls this love or blessedness Glory, and rightly so. For whether we consider this love in relation to God or to the mind, we may rightly call it spiritual contentment. This contentment (Definitions of the Emotions, xxv. xxx.) is not really distinct from glory. In relation to God, this love is pleasure accompanied by the idea of itself (V. xxxv.). That is, if we may still use the word pleasure. In relation to the mind, this love is the same (V. xxvii.).

Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is God (I. xv., and II. xlvii. note), it becomes clear to us, in what manner and way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from the divine nature and constantly depends on God. I have thought it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I have called intuitive or of the third kind (II. xl. note. ii.), is potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, which I have styled knowledge of the second kind. For, although in Part I. I showed in general terms, that all things (and consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence and existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimate and placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind so much, as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual essence of some particular thing, which we say depends on God.

Again, the essence of our mind consists only in knowledge, whose beginning and foundation is God (I. xv., and II. xlvii. note). So we can clearly see how our mind, in its essence and existence, follows from the divine nature. We can also see how our mind constantly depends on God. I have thought it worthwhile to draw attention to this dependence here, to show the power of knowing particular things. I have called this knowledge intuitive, or knowledge of the third kind (II. xl. note. ii.). This example shows that intuitive knowledge is more powerful than universal knowledge, which I have called knowledge of the second kind. For in Part I, I showed in general terms that all things depend on God for their essence and existence. This includes the human mind. Yet although that proof is valid and beyond doubt, it does not affect our mind as strongly as another approach. Our mind is more strongly affected when we draw the same conclusion from the actual essence of a particular thing that we say depends on God.

PROP. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away.

PROP. XXXVII. Nothing in nature opposes this intellectual love or can take it away.

Proof.—This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through the nature of God as an eternal truth (V. xxxiii. and xxix.). If, therefore, there should be anything which would be contrary to this love, that thing would be contrary to that which is true; consequently, that, which should be able to take away this love, would cause that which is true to be false; an obvious absurdity. Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &c. Q.E.D.

Proof. This intellectual love follows necessarily from the mind’s nature, insofar as the mind is understood through God’s nature as an eternal truth (V. xxxiii. and xxix.). Therefore, if anything opposed this love, it would oppose what is true. Consequently, anything capable of destroying this love would make what is true false. This is obviously absurd. Therefore, nothing in nature can destroy this love, etc. Q.E.D.

Note.—The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular things, in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given time and place: of this, I think, no one can doubt.

Note. The Axiom of Part IV concerns particular things only as considered in relation to a given time and place. I think no one can doubt this point.

PROP. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.

PROP. XXXVIII. The more things the mind understands through the second and third kinds of knowledge, the less harmful emotions affect it. In the same proportion, the mind also fears death less.

Proof.—The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.); therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the part of it that endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.), and, consequently (by the last Prop.), the greater will be the part that is not touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in other words, evil (IV. xxx.). Thus, in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, &c. Q.E.D.

Proof. The mind’s essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.). Therefore, the more the mind understands through the second and third kinds of knowledge, the more of it endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.). Consequently, by the previous proposition, more of the mind remains untouched by emotions contrary to our nature, or evil (IV. xxx.). Thus, the more the mind understands through the second and third kinds of knowledge, the more of it remains unharmed. Consequently, the mind is less subject to emotions, and so on. Q.E.D.

Note.—Hence we understand that point which I touched on in IV. xxxix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part; namely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and, consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more. Again, since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it follows that the human mind can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which we have shown to perish with the body (V. xxi.) should be of little importance when compared with the part which endures. But I will soon treat of the subject at greater length.

Note: This explains the point I touched on in IV. xxxix. note and promised to explain in this Part. Death becomes less harmful as the mind’s clear and distinct knowledge grows, and consequently as the mind loves God more. Moreover, the third kind of knowledge brings the greatest possible contentment (V. xxvii.). It follows that the human mind can develop so that the part that perishes with the body is relatively unimportant. As we have shown (V. xxi.), that part perishes, while another part endures. The perishing part can become unimportant compared with the enduring part. But I will soon discuss this subject at greater length.

PROP. XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal.

PROP. XXXIX. A person whose body can perform the greatest number of activities has a mind whose greatest part is eternal.

Proof.—He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which are evil (IV. xxxviii.)—that is (IV. xxx.), by those emotions which are contrary to our nature; therefore (V. x.), he possesses the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order, and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God; whence it will come to pass that (V. xv.) he will be affected with love towards God, which (V. xvi.) must occupy or constitute the chief part of the mind; therefore (V. xxxiii.), such a man will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal. Q.E.D.

Proof. Someone whose body is capable of the greatest number of activities is least disturbed by evil emotions (IV. xxxviii.). These are emotions contrary to our nature (IV. xxx.). Therefore, this person can arrange and connect the body's changes according to the order of the intellect (V. x.). Consequently, this person can bring all the body's changes into relation with the idea of God. As a result, this person will feel love toward God (V. xv.). This love must occupy or constitute the greater part of the mind (V. xvi.). Therefore, such a person will have a mind whose greater part is eternal (V. xxxiii.). Q.E.D.

Note.—Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number of activities, there is no doubt but that they may be of such a nature, that they may be referred to minds possessing a great knowledge of themselves and of God, and whereof the greatest or chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely fear death. But, in order that this may be understood more clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of perpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the better or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy.

Note. Since human bodies can perform the greatest number of activities, they can undoubtedly have the following nature. They may correspond to minds with great knowledge of themselves and of God. The greatest or chief part of such minds may be eternal, so they may scarcely fear death. But to understand this more clearly, we must remember that we live in a state of constant change. We are called happy or unhappy according to whether we change for the better or the worse.

For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a corpse, is called unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness, if we have been able to live through the whole period of life with a sound mind in a sound body. And, in reality, he, who, as in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable of very few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely conscious of itself, or of God, or of things; whereas, he, who has a body capable of very many activities, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things. In this life, therefore, we primarily endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into something else capable of very many activities, and referable to a mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things; and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its imagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison with its intellect, as I have already said in the note to the last Proposition.

For someone who dies in infancy or childhood is considered unfortunate. By contrast, we count ourselves fortunate if we live out our full lifespan with a sound mind and body. In fact, an infant or child has a body capable of very few activities and depends mostly on external causes. Such a person’s mind, considered on its own, is barely conscious of itself, of God, or of things. By contrast, someone whose body is capable of very many activities has a mind with a high degree of awareness. Considered on its own, such a mind is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things. In this life, therefore, our main effort is to develop a child’s body as far as its nature allows and supports. We seek to transform the child’s body into one capable of very many activities. Such a body corresponds to a mind highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things. We want to transform the body so that what belongs to the mind’s imagination and memory becomes insignificant beside its intellect. I have already said this in the note to the last Proposition.

PROP. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice versâ, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.

PROP. XL. The more perfect each thing is, the more active and less passive it is. Conversely, the more active a thing is, the more perfect it is.

Proof.—In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it possesses more of reality (II. Def. vi.), and, consequently (III. iii. and note), it is to that extent more active and less passive. This demonstration may be reversed, and thus prove that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more perfect. Q.E.D.

Proof. The more perfect a thing is, the more reality it possesses (II. Def. vi.). Consequently, the thing is proportionately more active and less passive (III. iii. and note). This proof can be reversed to show that the more active a thing is, the more perfect it is. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that the part of the mind which endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind (V. xxiii. xxix.) is the understanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.); the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V. xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III. iii. and general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it great or small, is more perfect than the latter. Q.E.D.

Corollary. It follows that the part of the mind that endures, whether great or small, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind is the understanding (V. xxiii. xxix.). Only through the understanding are we said to act (III. iii.). The part we have shown to perish is the imagination (V. xxi.). Only through the imagination are we said to be passive (III. iii. and general Def. of the Emotions). Therefore, the understanding, whether great or small, is more perfect than the imagination. Q.E.D.

Note.—Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set forth concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded without relation to the body; whence, as also from I. xxi. and other places, it is plain that our mind, in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to infinity; so that all taken together at once constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God.

Note. These are the ideas I intended to explain about the mind when considered apart from the body. From these ideas, I. xxi., and other passages, it is clear that our mind, insofar as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking. Our mind, in this respect, is determined by another eternal mode of thinking. That other mode is determined by a third, and so on to infinity. Thus, all these modes, taken together at once, make up the eternal and infinite intellect of God.

PROP. XLI. Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we should still consider as of primary importance piety and religion, and generally all things which, in Part IV., we showed to be attributable to courage and high—mindedness.

PROP. XLI. Even if we did not know our mind is eternal, we should still make piety and religion top priorities. We should give the same priority to all things we showed in Part IV to arise from courage and high-mindedness.

Proof.—The first and only foundation of virtue, or the rule of right living is (IV. xxii. Coroll. and xxiv.) seeking one's own true interest. Now, while we determined what reason prescribes as useful, we took no account of the mind's eternity, which has only become known to us in this Fifth Part. Although we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, we nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage and high—mindedness are of primary importance. Therefore, even if we were still ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place. Q.E.D.

Proof. The first and only foundation of virtue, or rule for living rightly, is seeking one's own true interest (IV. xxii. Coroll. and xxiv.). Now, when we established what reason tells us is useful, we did not consider the mind's eternity. We have learned that the mind is eternal only in this Fifth Part. Although we did not know then that the mind is eternal, we still gave courage and high-mindedness primary importance. Therefore, even if we still did not know this teaching, we should still give first place to those rules of reason. Q.E.D.

Note.—The general belief of the multitude seems to be different. Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so far as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the commandments of the divine law. They therefore believe that piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is, for their piety and religion; it is not only by this hope, but also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after death, that they are induced to live according to the divine commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry them.

Note. The common belief seems to be different. Most people seem to believe they are free to the extent that they can follow their lusts. They believe they give up their rights to the extent that divine law requires them to live by its commandments. So they see piety, religion, and generally everything associated with strength of mind as burdens. After death, they hope to set aside these burdens and receive a reward for their servitude, meaning their piety and religion. Not only this hope, but chiefly the fear of terrible punishment after death, moves them to obey God's commandments. They obey as far as their weak and unsteady spirit allows.

If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of piety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey fortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to me not less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to cram himself with poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth refuting.

Suppose people lacked this hope and fear, but believed that the mind dies with the body. Suppose they believed no hope of a longer life remained for those poor souls worn down by religious devotion. They would then return to their own desires and direct everything according to their lusts. They would want to obey fortune rather than govern themselves. Such behavior seems to me no less absurd than someone choosing to stuff himself with poison and deadly food. His reason would be that he does not believe healthy food can keep his body alive forever. It is also no less absurd than someone preferring to lose his mind altogether and live without reason. His reason would be that he sees the mind is not eternal or immortal. These ideas are so absurd that they are hardly worth refuting.

PROP. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our lusts.

PROP. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward for virtue, but virtue itself. We do not rejoice in blessedness because we control our desires. On the contrary, because we rejoice in blessedness, we are able to control our desires.

Proof.—Blessedness consists in love towards God (V. xxxvi and note), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V. xxxii. Coroll.); therefore this love (III. iii. lix.) must be referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active; therefore (IV. Def. viii.) it is virtue itself. This was our first point. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand (V. xxxii.); that is (V. iii. Coroll.), so much the more power has it over the emotions, and (V. xxxviii.) so much the less is it subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And, since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but, contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this blessedness itself. Q.E.D.

Proof. Blessedness consists in love for God (V. xxxvi and note). This love arises from the third kind of knowledge (V. xxxii. Coroll.). Therefore, this love belongs to the mind insofar as the mind is active (III. iii. lix.). It is therefore virtue itself (IV. Def. viii.). This proves our first point. Next, the more the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, the more the mind understands (V. xxxii.). That is, the mind gains greater power over the emotions (V. iii. Coroll.). The mind also becomes less subject to harmful emotions (V. xxxviii.). Therefore, the more the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, the greater its power to control lusts. Human power to control the emotions consists solely in understanding. It follows that no one rejoices in blessedness because they have controlled their lusts. On the contrary, their power to control their lusts arises from blessedness itself. Q.E.D.

Note.—I have thus completed all I wished to set forth touching the mind's power over the emotions and the mind's freedom. Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various ways by external causes without ever gaining the true acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.

Note. I have now covered all I wished to explain about the mind's power over the emotions and its freedom. This shows how powerful the wise man is, and how greatly he surpasses the ignorant man, driven only by desires. For the ignorant man is not only pulled in different directions by external causes, never finding true peace of mind. He also lives as if unaware of himself, of God, and of things. And as soon as he stops being affected by external causes, he also ceases to exist.

Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit.

By contrast, a wise man, insofar as he is wise, is hardly disturbed in spirit at all. But through a certain eternal necessity, he is conscious of himself, of God, and of things. In this awareness, he never ceases to exist, but always has true peace of mind.

If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it be possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.

If the path I have shown toward this result seems extremely hard, it can still be found. The path must be hard, since so few find it. If salvation were close at hand and could be found without great effort, how could almost everyone neglect it? But all excellent things are as difficult as they are rare.