Part 8

By 'quality' I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such and such.

By 'quality' I mean what makes people describable as being a certain way.

Quality is a term that is used in many senses. One sort of quality let us call 'habit' or 'disposition'. Habit differs from disposition in being more lasting and more firmly established. The various kinds of knowledge and of virtue are habits, for knowledge, even when acquired only in a moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its character and difficult to displace, unless some great mental upheaval takes place, through disease or any such cause. The virtues, also, such as justice, self-restraint, and so on, are not easily dislodged or dismissed, so as to give place to vice.

Quality is a term with many meanings. Let us call one kind of quality 'habit' or 'disposition'. Habit differs from disposition because habit lasts longer and is more firmly established. The various kinds of knowledge and virtue are habits. For knowledge, even when acquired to only a moderate degree, is generally agreed to last and be difficult to lose. The exception is when disease or a similar cause brings about a major mental upheaval. Virtues, too, such as justice, self-restraint, and so on, are not easily lost or set aside to make room for vice.

By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite. Thus, heat, cold, disease, health, and so on are dispositions. For a man is disposed in one way or another with reference to these, but quickly changes, becoming cold instead of warm, ill instead of well. So it is with all other dispositions also, unless through lapse of time a disposition has itself become inveterate and almost impossible to dislodge: in which case we should perhaps go so far as to call it a habit.

A disposition, on the other hand, is a condition that changes easily and quickly gives way to its opposite. Heat, cold, disease, health, and so on are dispositions. A person is in one condition or another in these respects, but quickly changes. They become cold instead of warm, ill instead of well. The same is true of all other dispositions, unless a disposition becomes deeply rooted over time and almost impossible to change. In that case, we might perhaps go so far as to call the disposition a habit.

It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits which are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to displace; for those who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are not said to have such and such a 'habit' as regards knowledge, yet they are disposed, we may say, either better or worse, towards knowledge. Thus habit differs from disposition in this, that while the latter in ephemeral, the former is permanent and difficult to alter.

Clearly, people tend to call conditions habits when those conditions are more or less lasting and hard to change. For people who cannot retain knowledge, but are changeable, are not said to have a particular 'habit' of knowledge. Yet we may say that such people have a better or worse disposition toward knowledge. Thus habit differs from disposition: a disposition is temporary, while a habit is lasting and hard to change.

Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are not necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit may be said also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed; but those who are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases the corresponding habit.

Habits are also dispositions, but dispositions are not necessarily habits. For people with a particular habit may also be described as disposed a certain way because of that habit. But people disposed in a particular way do not always have the corresponding habit.

Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example, we call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact it includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity. Such things are not predicated of a person in virtue of his disposition, but in virtue of his inborn capacity or incapacity to do something with ease or to avoid defeat of any kind. Persons are called good boxers or good runners, not in virtue of such and such a disposition, but in virtue of an inborn capacity to accomplish something with ease. Men are called healthy in virtue of the inborn capacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that may ordinarily arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this capacity. Similarly with regard to softness and hardness. Hardness is predicated of a thing because it has that capacity of resistance which enables it to withstand disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing by reason of the lack of that capacity.

Another kind of quality is what makes us call people good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly. This kind includes all terms referring to an inborn ability or inability. We describe people in these ways not because of their disposition, but because of their inborn ability or inability. The ability in question is to do something easily or to resist defeat of any kind. People are called good boxers or good runners because they have an inborn ability to perform easily, not a particular disposition. People are called healthy because they have an inborn ability to resist ordinary harmful influences easily. They are called unhealthy because they lack this ability. The same applies to softness and hardness. A thing is called hard because it can resist breaking apart. A thing is called soft because it lacks this ability.

A third class within this category is that of affective qualities and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of this sort of quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat, moreover, and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective qualities. It is evident that these are qualities, for those things that possess them are themselves said to be such and such by reason of their presence. Honey is called sweet because it contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains whiteness; and so in all other cases.

A third class within this category consists of affective qualities and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, and all similar qualities are examples. Heat, cold, whiteness, and blackness are also affective qualities. These are clearly qualities because things that possess them are described in terms of those qualities. Honey is called sweet because it contains sweetness. A body is called white because it contains whiteness. The same applies in all other cases.

The term 'affective quality' is not used as indicating that those things which admit these qualities are affected in any way. Honey is not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor is this what is meant in any other instance. Similarly heat and cold are called affective qualities, not because those things which admit them are affected. What is meant is that these said qualities are capable of producing an 'affection' in the way of perception. For sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of taste; heat, that of touch; and so it is with the rest of these qualities.

The term 'affective quality' does not mean that things with these qualities are themselves affected in any way. Honey is not called sweet because it is affected in a particular way. Nor does the term mean this in any other case. Similarly, heat and cold are called affective qualities, not because things with these qualities are themselves affected. Rather, these qualities can produce an 'affection' in our senses. Sweetness can affect the sense of taste, and heat can affect the sense of touch. The same is true of the other qualities of this kind.

Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not said to be affective qualities in this sense, but because they themselves are the results of an affection. It is plain that many changes of colour take place because of affections. When a man is ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. So true is this, that when a man is by nature liable to such affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the corresponding complexion of skin. For the same disposition of bodily elements, which in the former instance was momentarily present in the case of an access of shame, might be a result of a man's natural temperament, so as to produce the corresponding colouring also as a natural characteristic. All conditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent and lasting affections, are called affective qualities. For pallor and duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we are said to be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they originate in natural constitution, but also if they come about through long disease or sunburn, and are difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout life. For in the same way we are said to be such and such because of these.

Whiteness, blackness, and other colours, however, are not called affective qualities in this sense. Instead, they are called affective qualities because they result from an affection, or a condition affecting the body. Clearly, many changes in colour occur because of such conditions. When a man feels ashamed, he blushes. When he feels afraid, he turns pale, and so on. Indeed, a man may be naturally prone to such conditions because of a particular combination of elements in his body. In that case, we can reasonably infer that his skin has the corresponding colour. The same arrangement of bodily elements may be briefly present during a moment of shame. But that arrangement might also arise from a man's natural temperament, making the corresponding colour a natural characteristic. All conditions of this kind, then, are called affective qualities if they result from permanent and lasting affections. A pale or dark complexion is called a quality because we describe people by their complexion. This applies not only when the complexion comes from their natural constitution. It also applies when the complexion results from prolonged illness or sunburn and is difficult to remove or lasts throughout life. For we describe people by these acquired complexions in the same way.

Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not qualities, but affections: for we are not said to be such in virtue of them. The man who blushes through shame is not said to be a constitutional blusher, nor is the man who becomes pale through fear said to be constitutionally pale. He is said rather to have been affected.

Some conditions, however, arise from causes that can easily be neutralized or quickly removed. Such conditions are called affections, not qualities, because we do not describe a person's nature in terms of them. A man who blushes from shame is not said to be naturally prone to blushing. Nor is a man who turns pale from fear said to be naturally pale. Instead, we say that the man has been affected.

Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities. In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of the soul. That temper with which a man is born and which has its origin in certain deep-seated affections is called a quality. I mean such conditions as insanity, irascibility, and so on: for people are said to be mad or irascible in virtue of these. Similarly those abnormal psychic states which are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance of certain other elements, and are difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are called qualities, for in virtue of them men are said to be such and such.

So these conditions are called affections, not qualities. Similarly, the soul has both affective qualities and affections. A person's inborn temperament is called a quality when it arises from certain deep-seated affections. I mean conditions such as insanity, irritability, and so on. People are called insane or irritable because of these conditions. Similarly, some abnormal mental states are not inborn but arise from a combination of certain other factors. When these states are difficult to remove or entirely permanent, they are called qualities. This is because people are described as being a certain way because of these states.

Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered ineffective are called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a man is irritable when vexed: he is not even spoken of as a bad-tempered man, when in such circumstances he loses his temper somewhat, but rather is said to be affected. Such conditions are therefore termed, not qualities, but affections.

Conditions caused by things that are easily made ineffective, however, are called affections, not qualities. Suppose a man becomes irritable when annoyed. If he loses his temper somewhat in these circumstances, he is not even described as bad-tempered. Instead, he is said to be affected. Such conditions are therefore called affections, not qualities.

The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such and such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said to have a specific character, or again because it is straight or curved; in fact a thing's shape in every case gives rise to a qualification of it.

The fourth kind of quality is a thing's form or shape. This kind also includes straightness, curvedness, and other similar qualities. Each of these qualities describes a thing as being a certain way. A thing has a particular character because it is triangular or four-sided, or because it is straight or curved. In fact, a thing's shape always provides a way to describe its qualities.

Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms indicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to a class different from that of quality. For it is rather a certain relative position of the parts composing the thing thus qualified which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms. A thing is dense, owing to the fact that its parts are closely combined with one another; rare, because there are interstices between the parts; smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak, evenly; rough, because some parts project beyond others.

Sparseness and density, roughness and smoothness seem to describe qualities. Yet these terms appear to belong to a different category from quality. Rather, each term seems to describe how a thing’s parts are positioned relative to one another. A thing is dense because its parts are closely packed together. It is sparse because there are gaps between its parts. It is smooth because its parts lie evenly, so to speak. It is rough because some parts stick out beyond others.

There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most properly so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated.

There may be other kinds of quality. But we can safely say we have listed those most properly called qualities.

These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name from them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on them, are said to be qualified in some specific way. In most, indeed in almost all cases, the name of that which is qualified is derived from that of the quality. Thus the terms 'whiteness', 'grammar', 'justice', give us the adjectives 'white', 'grammatical', 'just', and so on.

These, then, are qualities. Things named after these qualities, or dependent on them in some other way, are described as having a specific quality. In most cases, indeed in almost all, the name of the thing described comes from the quality’s name. Thus 'whiteness', 'grammar', and 'justice' give us the adjectives 'white', 'grammatical', and 'just', and so on.

There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it should have a name that is derivative. For instance, the name given to the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity, is not derived from that of any quality; for both those capacities have no name assigned to them. In this, the inborn capacity is distinct from the science, with reference to which men are called, e.g. boxers or wrestlers. Such a science is classed as a disposition; it has a name, and is called 'boxing' or 'wrestling' as the case may be, and the name given to those disposed in this way is derived from that of the science. Sometimes, even though a name exists for the quality, that which takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a derivative. For instance, the upright man takes his character from the possession of the quality of integrity, but the name given him is not derived from the word 'integrity'. Yet this does not occur often.

In some cases, however, a quality has no name, so people who possess it cannot have a name derived from it. For example, someone may be called a runner or boxer because of an inborn ability. But neither ability has a name, so neither person's name comes from the name of a quality. In this respect, inborn ability differs from the knowledge that leads people to be called boxers or wrestlers. Such knowledge is classified as a disposition. It has a name, 'boxing' or 'wrestling', and people with this disposition get their name from that knowledge. Sometimes, even when a quality has a name, the person characterized by it has a name not derived from it. For example, an upright man gets his character from possessing the quality of integrity. But his name does not come from the word 'integrity'. Yet this happens only rarely.

We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed of some specific quality which have a name derived from that of the aforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent on it.

We may therefore say that things have a particular quality in either of two cases. Their names derive from the name of that quality, mentioned above, or the things depend on it in some other way.

One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The things, also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of these qualities, may be contrary the one to the other; for that which is unjust is contrary to that which is just, that which is white to that which is black. This, however, is not always the case. Red, yellow, and such colours, though qualities, have no contraries.

One quality may be the opposite of another. For example, justice is the opposite of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. Things described by these qualities may also be opposites. For something unjust is the opposite of something just, and something white is the opposite of something black. However, qualities do not always have opposites. Red, yellow, and similar colors, though qualities, have no opposites.

If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a quality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we apply the names used to denote the other categories; for instance, granted that justice is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality, injustice will also be a quality: neither quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor indeed any other category but that of quality, will be applicable properly to injustice. So it is with all other contraries falling under the category of quality.

If one of two opposites is a quality, the other will also be a quality. We can see this in specific examples if we try applying the names of the other categories. For example, suppose justice is the opposite of injustice and justice is a quality. Then injustice will also be a quality. Neither quantity, relation, place, nor any category other than quality properly applies to injustice. The same holds for all other opposites that fall under the category of quality.

Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is also the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same thing may exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is white, it may become whiter.

Qualities vary in degree. One thing can be more or less white than another. The same is true of justice. Also, the same thing may show a quality to a greater degree than before. If something is white, it may become whiter.

Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if we should say that justice admitted of variation of degree, difficulties might ensue, and this is true with regard to all those qualities which are dispositions. There are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility of variation here. They maintain that justice and health cannot very well admit of variation of degree themselves, but that people vary in the degree in which they possess these qualities, and that this is the case with grammatical learning and all those qualities which are classed as dispositions. However that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact that the things which in virtue of these qualities are said to be what they are vary in the degree in which they possess them; for one man is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy or just, than another, and so on.

Though this is generally true, there are exceptions. If we said that justice itself could vary in degree, difficulties might arise. The same applies to all qualities classed as dispositions. Some people, indeed, deny that these qualities can vary in degree. They argue that justice and health themselves cannot really vary in degree. Instead, people vary in how much justice or health they possess. They say the same applies to knowledge of grammar and all qualities classed as dispositions. Whatever the answer, one fact is beyond dispute. Things described in terms of these qualities vary in how much of each quality they possess. For example, one person is said to know grammar better than another, or to be healthier or more just. The same holds for other such qualities.

The qualities expressed by the terms 'triangular' and 'quadrangular' do not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor indeed do any that have to do with figure. For those things to which the definition of the triangle or circle is applicable are all equally triangular or circular. Those, on the other hand, to which the same definition is not applicable, cannot be said to differ from one another in degree; the square is no more a circle than the rectangle, for to neither is the definition of the circle appropriate. In short, if the definition of the term proposed is not applicable to both objects, they cannot be compared. Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation of degree.

The qualities described by 'triangular' and 'quadrangular' do not seem to vary in degree. Nor do any other qualities related to shape. For all things that fit the definition of a triangle or circle are equally triangular or circular. On the other hand, things that do not fit the same definition cannot differ in degree. A square is no more a circle than a rectangle is, because neither fits the definition of a circle. In short, if the definition of the term in question does not apply to both objects, they cannot be compared. So not all qualities vary in degree.

Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar to quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated with reference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive feature. One thing is like another only with reference to that in virtue of which it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar mark of quality.

None of the characteristics I have mentioned belong only to quality. But likeness and unlikeness can be described only in terms of quality, so they distinguish quality from other categories. One thing is like another only in terms of the quality that makes it what it is. Thus, likeness and unlikeness are the distinctive mark of quality.

We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in it many relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions were relative. In practically all such cases the genus is relative, the individual not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by reference to something else, for we mean a knowledge of something. But particular branches of knowledge are not thus explained. The knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything external, nor is the knowledge of music, but these, if relative at all, are relative only in virtue of their genera; thus grammar is said be the knowledge of something, not the grammar of something; similarly music is the knowledge of something, not the music of something.

We should not be troubled by a possible objection to our discussion of the category of quality. The objection is that we have included many relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions were relative. In almost all such cases, the genus is relative, but the individual case is not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by reference to something else, because we mean knowledge of something. But particular branches of knowledge are not explained this way. Knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything external, nor is knowledge of music. If these branches are relative at all, they are relative only because of their genera. Thus grammar is called knowledge of something, not grammar of something. Similarly, music is called knowledge of something, not music of something.

Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative. And it is because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we are said to be such and such. It is these that we actually possess: we are called experts because we possess knowledge in some particular branch. Those particular branches, therefore, of knowledge, in virtue of which we are sometimes said to be such and such, are themselves qualities, and are not relative. Further, if anything should happen to fall within both the category of quality and that of relation, there would be nothing extraordinary in classing it under both these heads.

So individual branches of knowledge are not relative. And we are described in particular ways because we possess knowledge in these individual branches. What we actually possess is knowledge in particular branches. We are called experts because we have knowledge in a particular branch. So the particular branches of knowledge that sometimes lead us to be described in certain ways are qualities, not relations. Further, if something falls into both the category of quality and the category of relation, classifying it under both would be perfectly reasonable.