Part 7

Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing. For instance, the word 'superior' is explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over something else that is meant. Similarly, the expression 'double' has this external reference, for it is the double of something else that is meant. So it is with everything else of this kind. There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude. The significance of all these is explained by a reference to something else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been mentioned. Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which is explained by reference to something else, the preposition 'of' or some other preposition being used to indicate the relation. Thus, one mountain is called great in comparison with another; for the mountain claims this attribute by comparison with something. Again, that which is called similar must be similar to something else, and all other such attributes have this external reference. It is to be noted that lying and standing and sitting are particular attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid attitudes.

Things are called relative when they are described as belonging to or relating to something else. Their meaning is explained by reference to that other thing. For example, the word 'superior' is explained by reference to something else, because it means superior to something else. Similarly, 'double' refers to something else, because it means double something else. The same holds for everything else of this kind. Other relatives include habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude. The meaning of all these is explained only by reference to something else. A habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, and attitude is the attitude of something. The same holds for all the other relatives mentioned. Relative terms, then, are terms whose nature is explained by reference to something else. The preposition 'of' or another preposition indicates the relation. For example, one mountain is called great in comparison with another. The mountain has this attribute because of its comparison with something else. Likewise, anything called similar must be similar to something else. All other attributes of this kind also refer to something else. Notice that lying, standing, and sitting are particular attitudes, while attitude itself is a relative term. To lie, to stand, and to be seated are not themselves attitudes. Instead, these expressions take their names from the attitudes just mentioned.

It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a contrary, ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives; 'double' and 'triple' have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term.

Relative terms can have opposites. For example, virtue has an opposite, vice, and both are relative terms. Knowledge, too, has an opposite, ignorance. But not all relative terms have opposites. 'Double' and 'triple' have no opposite, nor does any term of that kind.

It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree. For 'like' and 'unlike', 'equal' and 'unequal', have the modifications 'more' and 'less' applied to them, and each of these is relative in character: for the terms 'like' and 'unequal' bear a reference to something external. Yet, again, it is not every relative term that admits of variation of degree. No term such as 'double' admits of this modification. All relatives have correlatives: by the term 'slave' we mean the slave of a master, by the term 'master', the master of a slave; by 'double', the double of its half; by 'half', the half of its double; by 'greater', greater than that which is less; by 'less', less than that which is greater.

Relative terms also seem to allow differences in degree. For 'like' and 'unlike', 'equal' and 'unequal' can be modified by 'more' and 'less'. Each of these terms is relative, since terms such as 'like' and 'unequal' refer to something else. But not every relative term allows differences in degree. A term such as 'double' cannot be modified in this way. All relative terms have corresponding terms: by 'slave' we mean the slave of a master. By 'master', we mean the master of a slave. By 'double', we mean the double of its half. By 'half', we mean the half of its double. By 'greater', we mean greater than something less. By 'less', we mean less than something greater.

So it is with every other relative term; but the case we use to express the correlation differs in some instances. Thus, by knowledge we mean knowledge of the knowable; by the knowable, that which is to be apprehended by knowledge; by perception, perception of the perceptible; by the perceptible, that which is apprehended by perception.

The same holds for every other relative term. But in some cases, we use a different grammatical case to express the relationship. Thus, knowledge means knowledge of the knowable. The knowable means what can be grasped through knowledge. Perception means perception of the perceptible. The perceptible means what is grasped through perception.

Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which the relative is related is not accurately stated. If a man states that a wing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion between these two will not be reciprocal, for it will not be possible to say that a bird is a bird by reason of its wings. The reason is that the original statement was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be relative to the bird qua bird, since many creatures besides birds have wings, but qua winged creature. If, then, the statement is made accurate, the connexion will be reciprocal, for we can speak of a wing, having reference necessarily to a winged creature, and of a winged creature as being such because of its wings.

Sometimes, however, a relationship between relative terms does not seem to work both ways. This happens when someone makes a mistake and does not accurately identify what a relative term relates to. If someone says a wing necessarily relates to a bird, the relationship will not work both ways. For we cannot say that a bird is a bird because of its wings. The reason is that the original statement was inaccurate. A wing does not relate to a bird as a bird, since many creatures besides birds have wings. Rather, a wing relates to a bird as a winged creature. If, then, the statement is made accurate, the relationship will work both ways. For we can speak of a wing as necessarily belonging to a winged creature. And we can speak of a winged creature as being winged because of its wings.

Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word exists by which a correlation can adequately be explained. If we define a rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our definition will not be appropriate, for the rudder does not have this reference to a boat qua boat, as there are boats which have no rudders. Thus we cannot use the terms reciprocally, for the word 'boat' cannot be said to find its explanation in the word 'rudder'. As there is no existing word, our definition would perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word like 'ruddered' as the correlative of 'rudder'. If we express ourselves thus accurately, at any rate the terms are reciprocally connected, for the 'ruddered' thing is 'ruddered' in virtue of its rudder. So it is in all other cases. A head will be more accurately defined as the correlative of that which is 'headed', than as that of an animal, for the animal does not have a head qua animal, since many animals have no head.

Sometimes, perhaps, we need to invent words if no existing word adequately explains a relationship. If we define a rudder as necessarily related to a boat, our definition will not be accurate. A rudder is not related to a boat simply because the boat is a boat, since some boats have no rudders. So we cannot use the terms to explain each other. The word 'boat' cannot be explained by reference to the word 'rudder'. Since no word exists, our definition might be more accurate if we invented a word like 'ruddered'. This word would name what corresponds to a 'rudder'. If we speak this precisely, the terms at least explain each other. A 'ruddered' thing is 'ruddered' because of its rudder. The same applies in all other cases. A head is more accurately defined in relation to something 'headed' than in relation to an animal. An animal does not have a head simply because it is an animal, since many animals have no head.

Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing is related, when a name does not exist, if, from that which has a name, we derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the first is reciprocally connected, as in the aforesaid instances, when we derived the word 'winged' from 'wing' and from 'rudder'.

Thus, when something has no name, we may perhaps most easily understand what another thing is related to as follows. We can derive a new name from the thing that already has one. We then apply the new name to the thing connected to the first by a reciprocal relationship. This follows the earlier examples, where we derived 'winged' from 'wing' and similarly formed a name from 'rudder'.

All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative. I add this condition because, if that to which they are related is stated as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to be interdependent. Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the case of acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for each, there will be no interdependence if one of the two is denoted, not by that name which expresses the correlative notion, but by one of irrelevant significance. The term 'slave', if defined as related, not to a master, but to a man, or a biped, or anything of that sort, is not reciprocally connected with that in relation to which it is defined, for the statement is not exact. Further, if one thing is said to be correlative with another, and the terminology used is correct, then, though all irrelevant attributes should be removed, and only that one attribute left in virtue of which it was correctly stated to be correlative with that other, the stated correlation will still exist. If the correlative of 'the slave' is said to be 'the master', then, though all irrelevant attributes of the said 'master', such as 'biped', 'receptive of knowledge', 'human', should be removed, and the attribute 'master' alone left, the stated correlation existing between him and the slave will remain the same, for it is of a master that a slave is said to be the slave. On the other hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not correctly termed, then, when all other attributes are removed and that alone is left in virtue of which it was stated to be correlative, the stated correlation will be found to have disappeared.

All relative terms, then, have a correlative if they are properly defined. I add this condition because the relationship must be stated accurately, not at random. Otherwise, the two terms will not be mutually dependent. Let me explain more clearly. Even recognized correlatives, each with its own name, will not be mutually dependent if one is given an irrelevant name. The name must express the correlative relationship. Suppose 'slave' is defined in relation not to a master, but to a man, a biped, or something similar. Then 'slave' and the term used to define its relationship are not mutually connected, because the definition is not exact. Further, suppose one thing is described as correlative with another, and the correct terms are used. Even if all irrelevant attributes were removed, the stated relationship would remain. Only the attribute that makes the description correct would need to remain. Suppose the correlative of 'the slave' is said to be 'the master'. Even if all irrelevant attributes of that 'master' were removed, the relationship would remain unchanged. These attributes include 'biped', 'receptive of knowledge', and 'human'. Only the attribute 'master' would need to remain, because a slave is said to be the slave of a master. On the other hand, suppose one of two correlatives is not correctly named. Suppose all other attributes are then removed. Only the attribute used to describe the correlative relationship remains. In that case, the stated relationship will have disappeared.

For suppose the correlative of 'the slave' should be said to be 'the man', or the correlative of 'the wing' is 'the bird'; if the attribute 'master' be withdrawn from 'the man', the correlation between 'the man' and 'the slave' will cease to exist, for if the man is not a master, the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the attribute 'winged' be withdrawn from 'the bird', 'the wing' will no longer be relative; for if the so-called correlative is not winged, it follows that 'the wing' has no correlative.

Suppose we say that the counterpart of 'the slave' is 'the man', or that of 'the wing' is 'the bird'. If 'the man' no longer has the attribute 'master', the relationship between 'the man' and 'the slave' disappears. For if the man is not a master, the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if 'the bird' no longer has the attribute 'winged', 'the wing' will no longer have a counterpart. For if the supposed counterpart is not winged, then 'the wing' has no counterpart.

Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be easy; if not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. When the terminology is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are interdependent.

So it is essential to name the related terms precisely. If a name already exists, stating the relationship will be easy. If not, we must certainly create names. When the terms are correctly named, it is clear that all related terms depend on one another.

Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously. This is for the most part true, as in the case of the double and the half. The existence of the half necessitates the existence of that of which it is a half. Similarly the existence of a master necessitates the existence of a slave, and that of a slave implies that of a master; these are merely instances of a general rule. Moreover, they cancel one another; for if there is no double it follows that there is no half, and vice versa; this rule also applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not appear to be true in all cases that correlatives come into existence simultaneously. The object of knowledge would appear to exist before knowledge itself, for it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge of objects already existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of knowledge the beginning of the existence of which was contemporaneous with that of its object.

Correlatives are thought to come into existence at the same time. This is mostly true, as with the double and the half. If a half exists, what it is half of must also exist. Similarly, if a master exists, a slave must exist, and if a slave exists, a master must exist. These are just examples of a general rule. Moreover, the absence of either correlative rules out the other. If there is no double, there is no half, and vice versa. This rule also applies to all such correlatives. Yet correlatives do not seem to come into existence at the same time in every case. The object of knowledge seems to exist before knowledge itself. We usually acquire knowledge of objects that already exist. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of knowledge that began when its object began to exist.

Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative, the converse of this is not true. It is true that if the object of knowledge does not exist there can be no knowledge: for there will no longer be anything to know. Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a certain object does not exist, the object may nevertheless quite well exist. Thus, in the case of the squaring of the circle, if indeed that process is an object of knowledge, though it itself exists as an object of knowledge, yet the knowledge of it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all animals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, but there might yet be many objects of knowledge.

Again, if an object of knowledge ceases to exist, knowledge of that object also ceases at the same time. But the reverse is not true. If the object does not exist, there can be no knowledge of it, because there is nothing to know. Yet an object may well exist even if knowledge of that object does not exist. Take the squaring of the circle, if that process is indeed an object of knowledge. Though the process itself exists as an object of knowledge, knowledge of it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all animals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge. But there might still be many objects of knowledge.

This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception. If the perceptible is annihilated, perception also will cease to exist; but the annihilation of perception does not cancel the existence of the perceptible. For perception implies a body perceived and a body in which perception takes place. Now if that which is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the body is annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing; and if the body does not exist, it follows that perception also ceases to exist. Thus the annihilation of the perceptible involves that of perception.

The same is true of perception. The object of perception appears to exist before the act of perception. If what can be perceived is destroyed, perception will also cease to exist. But destroying perception does not destroy what can be perceived. For perception requires both a body being perceived and a body in which perception takes place. Now, if what can be perceived is destroyed, the body must also be destroyed, because the body can be perceived. And if the body does not exist, perception must also cease to exist. So destroying what can be perceived also destroys perception.

But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body, heat, sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain.

But the loss of perception does not mean the loss of what can be perceived. For if the animal is destroyed, perception is also destroyed. But things that can be perceived, such as bodies, heat, sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain.

Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the animal. But the perceptible surely exists before perception; for fire and water and such elements, out of which the animal is itself composed, exist before the animal is an animal at all, and before perception. Thus it would seem that the perceptible exists before perception.

Again, perception begins at the same time as the perceiving subject, because perception begins when the animal comes into existence. But surely things that can be perceived exist before perception. For fire, water, and similar elements make up the animal itself. These elements exist before the animal is an animal at all, and before perception exists. So things that can be perceived would seem to exist before perception.

It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is relative, as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be made in the case of certain secondary substances. With regard to primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such possibility, for neither wholes nor parts of primary substances are relative. The individual man or ox is not defined with reference to something external. Similarly with the parts: a particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or head of a particular person, but as the hand or head of a particular person. It is true also, for the most part at least, in the case of secondary substances; the species 'man' and the species 'ox' are not defined with reference to anything outside themselves. Wood, again, is only relative in so far as it is some one's property, not in so far as it is wood. It is plain, then, that in the cases mentioned substance is not relative. But with regard to some secondary substances there is a difference of opinion; thus, such terms as 'head' and 'hand' are defined with reference to that of which the things indicated are a part, and so it comes about that these appear to have a relative character. Indeed, if our definition of that which is relative was complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not complete, if those things only are properly called relative in the case of which relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence, perhaps some explanation of the dilemma may be found.

We may question whether no substance is relative, as seems to be true. Or should we make exceptions for certain secondary substances? For primary substances, there is certainly no such possibility. Neither whole primary substances nor their parts are relative. An individual man or ox is not defined by reference to anything outside itself. The same applies to their parts. A particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or head belonging to a particular person. Rather, it is defined as the hand or head of a particular person. The same is true, at least for the most part, of secondary substances. The species 'man' and the species 'ox' are not defined by reference to anything outside themselves. Again, wood is relative only insofar as it is someone's property, not insofar as it is wood. Clearly, then, substance is not relative in these cases. But opinions differ about some secondary substances. For example, terms such as 'head' and 'hand' are defined by reference to the whole they belong to. These terms therefore seem to have a relative character. Indeed, if our definition of what is relative was complete, proving that no substance is relative is very difficult, perhaps impossible. But suppose our definition was incomplete. Suppose only things whose existence necessarily depends on a relation to something external are properly called relative. If so, perhaps we can find an explanation for this dilemma.

The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else does not make it essentially relative.

The earlier definition does apply to all relatives. But explaining a thing in relation to something else does not make that thing relative by nature.

From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a relative thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which it is relative. Indeed this is self-evident: for if a man knows that some particular thing is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in the case of which relation to something is a necessary condition of existence, he knows that also to which it is related. For if he does not know at all that to which it is related, he will not know whether or not it is relative. This is clear, moreover, in particular instances. If a man knows definitely that such and such a thing is 'double', he will also forthwith know definitely that of which it is the double. For if there is nothing definite of which he knows it to be the double, he does not know at all that it is double. Again, if he knows that a thing is more beautiful, it follows necessarily that he will forthwith definitely know that also than which it is more beautiful. He will not merely know indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which is less beautiful, for this would be supposition, not knowledge. For if he does not know definitely that than which it is more beautiful, he can no longer claim to know definitely that it is more beautiful than something else which is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing was less beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man apprehends some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also definitely to which it is related.

This makes it clear that anyone who clearly understands a relative thing also clearly understands what it relates to. Indeed, this is self-evident. Suppose we call something relative when its existence necessarily depends on its relation to something else. If someone knows that a particular thing is relative, they also know what it relates to. For if they do not know at all what it relates to, they cannot know whether it is relative. Specific examples also make this clear. If someone knows clearly that a particular thing is 'double', they will immediately know clearly what it is double. For if they know of nothing definite that it is double, they do not know at all that it is double. Again, if someone knows that a thing is more beautiful, they must immediately know clearly what it is more beautiful than. They will not merely know vaguely that it is more beautiful than something less beautiful. That would be an assumption, not knowledge. For suppose they do not know clearly what it is more beautiful than. They can no longer claim to know clearly that it is more beautiful than something else less beautiful. For there might be nothing less beautiful. So anyone who clearly understands a relative thing must also clearly know what it relates to.

Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is possible to know their essential character definitely, but it does not necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related. It is not possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant. Thus these are not relatives, and, this being the case, it would be true to say that no substance is relative in character. It is perhaps a difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without more exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with regard to details is not without advantage.

Now the head, the hand, and similar things are substances. We can know their essential nature with certainty. But knowing their nature does not necessarily mean knowing what they are related to. We cannot immediately know whose head or hand is meant. So heads and hands are not relatives. If so, it would be true to say that no substance is relative in nature. Perhaps making a definite statement in such cases is difficult without a more thorough examination. Still, raising questions about the details has some value.