True and False Ideas

1. Truth and Falsehood properly belong to Propositions, not to Ideas.

1. Truth and falsehood properly apply to statements, not to ideas.

Though truth and falsehood belong, in propriety of speech, only to PROPOSITIONS: yet IDEAS are oftentimes termed true or false (as what words are there that are not used with great latitude, and with some deviation from their strict and proper significations?) Though I think that when ideas themselves are termed true or false, there is still some secret or tacit proposition, which is the foundation of that denomination: as we shall see, if we examine the particular occasions wherein they come to be called true or false. In all which we shall find some kind of affirmation or negation, which is the reason of that denomination. For our ideas, being nothing but bare APPEARANCES, or perceptions in our minds, cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be true or false, no more than a single name of anything can be said to be true or false.

Strictly speaking, truth and falsehood apply only to PROPOSITIONS. Yet IDEAS are often called true or false. (After all, what words are not used loosely, with some departure from their strict and proper meanings?) Still, I think calling ideas themselves true or false always rests on some hidden or unspoken proposition. We shall see this if we examine the particular cases in which ideas are called true or false. In all these cases, we shall find some kind of affirmation or denial that explains why these labels are used. For our ideas are nothing but mere APPEARANCES, or perceptions in our minds. So ideas, considered simply in themselves, cannot properly be called true or false. A single name for something can no more be called true or false than an idea can.

2. Ideas and words may be said to be true, inasmuch as they really are ideas and words.

2. Ideas and words may be called true insofar as they really are ideas and words.

Indeed both ideas and words may be said to be true, in a metaphysical sense of the word truth; as all other things that any way exist are said to be true, i.e. really to be such as they exist. Though in things called true, even in that sense, there is perhaps a secret reference to our ideas, looked upon as the standards of that truth; which amounts to a mental proposition, though it be usually not taken notice of.

Indeed, both ideas and words may be called true in the metaphysical sense of truth. In the same way, all other things that exist are called true, meaning they really are as they exist. Yet even calling things true in this sense may involve an unspoken reference to our ideas as standards of truth. Such a reference amounts to a statement in the mind, though we usually do not notice it.

3. No Idea, as an Appearance in the Mind, either true or false.

3. An idea, considered simply as something appearing in the mind, is neither true nor false.

But it is not in that metaphysical sense of truth which we inquire here, when we examine, whether our ideas are capable of being true or false, but in the more ordinary acceptation of those words: and so I say that the ideas in our minds, being only so many perceptions or appearances there, none of them are false; the idea of a centaur having no more falsehood in it when it appears in our minds, than the name centaur has falsehood in it, when it is pronounced by our mouths, or written on paper. For truth or falsehood lying always in some affirmation or negation, mental or verbal, our ideas are not capable, any of them, of being false, till the mind passes some judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies something of them.

But when we ask whether our ideas can be true or false, we are not using truth in that metaphysical sense. Instead, we are using true and false in their ordinary sense. So I say that our ideas are simply perceptions or appearances in our minds, and none of them are false. The idea of a centaur is no more false when it appears in our minds than the name centaur is false when spoken or written. For truth or falsehood always involves affirming or denying something, whether in thought or in words. So none of our ideas can be false until the mind makes some judgment about them. In other words, the mind must affirm or deny something about those ideas.

4. Ideas referred to anything extraneous to them may be true or false.

4. Ideas may be true or false when related to something outside themselves.

Whenever the mind refers any of its ideas to anything extraneous to them, they are then capable to be called true or false. Because the mind, in such a reference, makes a tacit supposition of their conformity to that thing; which supposition, as it happens to be true or false, so the ideas themselves come to be denominated. The most usual cases wherein this happens, are these following:

Whenever the mind relates any of its ideas to something outside those ideas, the ideas can be called true or false. This is because the mind silently assumes that the ideas match what it relates them to. So the ideas themselves are called true or false according to whether that assumption is true or false. The most common cases in which this happens are the following:

5. Other Men’s Ideas; real Existence; and supposed real Essences, are what Men usually refer their Ideas to.

5. People usually relate their ideas to other people’s ideas, real existence, and supposed real essences.

First, when the mind supposes any idea it has CONFORMABLE to that in OTHER MEN’S MINDS, called by the same common name; v.g. when the mind intends or judges its ideas of justice, temperance, religion, to be the same with what other men give those names to.

First, when the mind assumes one of its ideas MATCHES an idea in OTHER PEOPLE’S MINDS bearing the same common name. For example, the mind intends or judges its ideas of justice, moderation, and religion to match other people’s ideas bearing those names.

Secondly, when the mind supposes any idea it has in itself to be CONFORMABLE to some REAL EXISTENCE. Thus the two ideas of a man and a centaur, supposed to be the ideas of real substances, are the one true and the other false; the one having a conformity to what has really existed, the other not. Thirdly, when the mind REFERS any of its ideas to that REAL constitution and ESSENCE of anything, whereon all its properties depend: and thus the greatest part, if not all our ideas of substances, are false.

Second, the mind assumes that an idea it holds matches something that really exists. Consider the ideas of a man and a centaur, taken as ideas of real substances. The first idea is true, and the second is false. The idea of a man matches something that has really existed, while the idea of a centaur does not. Third, the mind takes an idea to represent a thing’s real constitution and essence, on which all its properties depend. In this sense, most, if not all, of our ideas of substances are false.

6. The cause of such Reference.

6. The reason for such a reference.

These suppositions the mind is very apt tacitly to make concerning its own ideas. But yet, if we will examine it, we shall find it is chiefly, if not only, concerning its ABSTRACT complex ideas. For the natural tendency of the mind being towards knowledge; and finding that, if it should proceed by and dwell upon only particular things, its progress would be very slow, and its work endless; therefore, to shorten its way to knowledge, and make each perception more comprehensive, the first thing it does, as the foundation of the easier enlarging its knowledge, either by contemplation of the things themselves that it would know, or conference with others about them, is to bind them into bundles, and rank them so into sorts, that what knowledge it gets of any of them it may thereby with assurance extend to all of that sort; and so advance by larger steps in that which is its great business, knowledge. This, as I have elsewhere shown, is the reason why we collect things under comprehensive ideas, with names annexed to them, into genera and species; i.e. into kinds and sorts.

The mind is very likely to make these assumptions about its own ideas without noticing. But if we examine the matter, we find that these assumptions chiefly, if not entirely, concern its ABSTRACT complex ideas. The mind naturally seeks knowledge. It finds that considering only individual things would make its progress very slow and its work endless. So, to reach knowledge more quickly and make each perception cover more, the mind begins by grouping things into sorts. This grouping provides the foundation for expanding knowledge more easily, whether by studying things themselves or discussing them with others. Whatever knowledge the mind gains about any members of a sort, it can then confidently extend to all members. In this way, the mind takes larger steps toward its great goal, knowledge. As I have shown elsewhere, this is why we group things under broad ideas, give those ideas names, and arrange things into genera and species. That is, we arrange them into kinds and sorts.

7. Names of things supposed to carry in them knowledge of their essences.

7. The names of things are assumed to convey knowledge of their essential nature.

If therefore we will warily attend to the motions of the mind, and observe what course it usually takes in its way to knowledge, we shall I think find, that the mind having got an idea which it thinks it may have use of either in contemplation or discourse, the first thing it does is to abstract it, and then get a name to it; and so lay it up in its storehouse, the memory, as containing the essence of a sort of things, of which that name is always to be the mark. Hence it is, that we may often observe that, when any one sees a new thing of a kind that he knows not, he presently asks, what it is; meaning by that inquiry nothing but the name. As if the name carried with it the knowledge of the species, or the essence of it; whereof it is indeed used as the mark, and is generally supposed annexed to it.

If we carefully watch how the mind works and how it usually moves toward knowledge, I think we will find the following. The mind acquires an idea that it thinks may be useful in thought or conversation. First, the mind abstracts the idea, then gives the idea a name. The mind then stores the idea in memory as containing the essence of a kind of thing. The name will always serve as the label for that kind. This explains something we may often notice when someone sees something new of an unfamiliar kind. The person immediately asks what the thing is, meaning only to ask its name. It is as if the name brought knowledge of the kind, or of its essence. In fact, the name serves as a label for that essence and is generally assumed to be attached to it.

8. How men suppose that their ideas must correspond to things, and to the customary meanings of names.

8. How people assume their ideas must match things and the usual meanings of words.

But this ABSTRACT IDEA, being something in the mind, between the thing that exists, and the name that is given to it; it is in our ideas that both the rightness of our knowledge, and the propriety and intelligibleness of our speaking, consists. And hence it is that men are so forward to suppose, that the abstract ideas they have in their minds are such as agree to the things existing without them, to which they are referred; and are the same also to which the names they give them do by the use and propriety of that language belong. For without this double conformity of their ideas, they find they should both think amiss of things in themselves, and talk of them unintelligibly to others.

But this ABSTRACT IDEA exists in the mind, between the thing itself and the name given to it. So the accuracy of our knowledge depends on our ideas, as does the correctness and clarity of our speech. This is why people so readily assume their abstract ideas match the things outside their minds that those ideas represent. People also assume these ideas match the meanings their names carry in the established, proper use of their language. For people recognize that, without both kinds of agreement, they would misunderstand things themselves and speak unintelligibly to others.

9. Simple Ideas may be false, in reference to others of the same Name, but are least liable to be so.

9. Simple ideas may be false when compared with other ideas of the same name. But simple ideas are the least likely to be false in this way.

First, then, I say, that when the truth of our ideas is judged of by the conformity they have to the ideas which other men have, and commonly signify by the same name, they may be any of them false. But yet SIMPLE IDEAS are least of all liable to be so mistaken. Because a man, by his senses and every day’s observation, may easily satisfy himself what the simple ideas are which their several names that are in common use stand for; they being but few in number, and such as, if he doubts or mistakes in, he may easily rectify by the objects they are to be found in. Therefore it is seldom that any one mistakes in his names of simple ideas, or applies the name red to the idea green, or the name sweet to the idea bitter: much less are men apt to confound the names of ideas belonging to different senses, and call a colour by the name of a taste, &c. Whereby it is evident that the simple ideas they call by any name are commonly the same that others have and mean when they use the same names.

First, then, I say that any of our ideas may be false if judged by the following standard. That standard is how closely our ideas match those others have and commonly express by the same name. But SIMPLE IDEAS are the least likely to be mistaken in this way. Through the senses and everyday observation, anyone can easily establish what simple ideas their commonly used names stand for. These ideas are few in number. If someone doubts or mistakes a simple idea, the objects containing that idea can easily clear up the confusion. So people seldom misuse the names of simple ideas. They rarely apply the name red to the idea green, or the name sweet to the idea bitter. People are even less likely to confuse the names of ideas belonging to different senses. They rarely call a colour by the name of a taste, for example. So, clearly, the simple ideas people name are generally the same ideas others have and mean by those same names.

10. Ideas of mixed Modes most liable to be false in this Sense.

10. Ideas of mixed modes are most likely to be false in this sense.

Complex ideas are much more liable to be false in this respect; and the complex ideas of MIXED MODES, much more than those of substances; because in substances (especially those which the common and unborrowed names of any language are applied to) some remarkable sensible qualities, serving ordinarily to distinguish one sort from another, easily preserve those who take any care in the use of their words, from applying them to sorts of substances to which they do not at all belong. But in mixed modes we are much more uncertain; it being not so easy to determine of several actions, whether they are to be called JUSTICE or CRUELTY, LIBERALITY or PRODIGALITY. And so in referring our ideas to those of other men, called by the same names, ours may be false; and the idea in our minds, which we express by the word JUSTICE, may perhaps be that which ought to have another name.

Complex ideas are much more likely to be false in this respect. And complex ideas of MIXED MODES are much more likely to be false than ideas of substances. This is because substances have some noticeable qualities we can perceive through our senses. These qualities usually distinguish one kind of substance from another. This is especially true of substances with ordinary names native to a language, rather than borrowed from another language. Such qualities easily keep anyone reasonably careful with words from applying those names to kinds of substances they do not fit. But with mixed modes, we are much less certain. It is not so easy to decide whether various actions should be called JUSTICE or CRUELTY, LIBERALITY or PRODIGALITY. And so our ideas may be false when we compare them with other people's ideas bearing the same names. The idea we express with the word JUSTICE may perhaps be an idea that should have another name.

11. Or at least to be thought false.

11. Or at least to be considered false.

But whether or no our ideas of mixed modes are more liable than any sort to be different from those of other men, which are marked by the same names, this at least is certain. That this sort of falsehood is much more familiarly attributed to our ideas of mixed modes than to any other. When a man is thought to have a false idea of JUSTICE, or GRATITUDE, or GLORY, it is for no other reason, but that his agrees not with the ideas which each of those names are the signs of in other men.

But our ideas of mixed modes may or may not be more likely than other kinds to differ from other people's ideas bearing the same names. Either way, one thing is certain. We call ideas of mixed modes false much more often than we call other kinds of ideas false. When someone is thought to have a false idea of JUSTICE, GRATITUDE, or GLORY, there is only one reason. Their idea does not match the ideas those same names represent for other people.

12. And why.

12. And why.

The reason whereof seems to me to be this: That the abstract ideas of mixed modes, being men’s voluntary combinations of such a precise collection of simple ideas, and so the essence of each species being made by men alone, whereof we have no other sensible standard existing anywhere but the name itself, or the definition of that name; we having nothing else to refer these our ideas of mixed modes to, as a standard to which we would conform them, but the ideas of those who are thought to use those names in their most proper significations; and, so as our ideas conform or differ from THEM, they pass for true or false. And thus much concerning the truth and falsehood of our ideas, in reference to their names.

The reason seems to me to be this: Abstract ideas of mixed modes are combinations people freely make from a precise collection of simple ideas. So people alone create the essence of each kind. We have no standard available to our senses except the name itself or its definition. We therefore have only one standard to follow in forming our ideas of mixed modes. That standard is the ideas of people thought to use those names in their most proper meanings. Our ideas are considered true or false according to whether they agree with or differ from THOSE PEOPLE’S IDEAS. That concludes the discussion of the truth and falsehood of our ideas in relation to their names.

13. As referred to Real Existence, none of our Ideas can be false but those of Substances.

13. In relation to what really exists, only our ideas of substances can be false.

Secondly, as to the truth and falsehood of our ideas, in reference to the real existence of things. When that is made the standard of their truth, none of them can be termed false but only our complex ideas of substances.

Second, consider whether our ideas are true or false in relation to the real existence of things. When real existence is the standard of truth, only our complex ideas of substances can be called false.

14. First, Simple Ideas in this Sense not false and why.

14. First, why simple ideas are not false in this sense.

First, our simple ideas, being barely such perceptions as God has fitted us to receive, and given power to external objects to produce in us by established laws and ways, suitable to his wisdom and goodness, though incomprehensible to us, their truth consists in nothing else but in such appearances as are produced in us, and must be suitable to those powers he has placed in external objects or else they could not be produced in us: and thus answering those powers, they are what they should be, true ideas. Nor do they become liable to any imputation of falsehood, if the mind (as in most men I believe it does) judges these ideas to be in the things themselves. For God in his wisdom having set them as marks of distinction in things, whereby we may be able to discern one thing from another, and so choose any of them for our uses as we have occasion; it alters not the nature of our simple idea, whether we think that the idea of blue be in the violet itself, or in our mind only; and only the power of producing it by the texture of its parts, reflecting the particles of light after a certain manner, to be in the violet itself. For that texture in the object, by a regular and constant operation producing the same idea of blue in us, it serves us to distinguish, by our eyes, that from any other thing; whether that distinguishing mark, as it is really in the violet, be only a peculiar texture of parts, or else that very colour, the idea whereof (which is in us) is the exact resemblance. And it is equally from that appearance to be denominated blue, whether it be that real colour, or only a peculiar texture in it, that causes in us that idea: since the name, BLUE, notes properly nothing but that mark of distinction that is in a violet, discernible only by our eyes, whatever it consists in; that being beyond our capacities distinctly to know, and perhaps would be of less use to us, if we had faculties to discern.

First, our simple ideas are merely perceptions that God has equipped us to receive. He has given external objects the power to produce these perceptions in us through established laws and processes. These laws and processes suit his wisdom and goodness, though we cannot understand them. The truth of our simple ideas consists only in their being the appearances produced in us. These appearances must correspond to the powers God has placed in external objects. Otherwise, the objects could not produce these appearances in us. Because our simple ideas correspond to those powers, they are what they should be: true ideas. Nor do these ideas become false if the mind judges that the ideas exist in the things themselves. I believe most people make this judgment. For God, in his wisdom, has made these ideas distinguishing marks of things. These marks allow us to tell one thing from another and choose things for our use as needed. So our simple idea of blue remains unchanged whether we think blue exists in the violet itself or only in our minds. On the second view, the violet itself has only the power to produce the idea of blue in us. This power comes from the arrangement of its parts, which reflect particles of light in a certain way. For this arrangement regularly and consistently produces the same idea of blue in us. The idea therefore allows us to distinguish the violet from anything else by sight. This holds whether the violet's distinguishing mark is merely a particular arrangement of parts or the actual color itself. In the latter case, our idea of the color exactly resembles the color in the violet. Either way, the violet can equally be called blue because of its appearance. This holds whether an actual color or merely a particular arrangement of parts causes our idea of blue. For the name BLUE properly means only the distinguishing mark in a violet that we perceive through sight alone. Whatever that mark consists in, its precise nature is beyond our ability to know. And perhaps knowing its precise nature would be less useful to us, even if we had the faculties to perceive it.

15. Though one Man’s Idea of Blue should be different from another’s.

15. Though one person’s idea of blue may differ from another’s.

Neither would it carry any imputation of falsehood to our simple ideas, if by the different structure of our organs it were so ordered, that THE SAME OBJECT SHOULD PRODUCE IN SEVERAL MEN’S MINDS DIFFERENT IDEAS at the same time; v.g. if the idea that a violet produced in one man’s mind by his eyes were the same that a marigold produced in another man’s, and vice versa. For, since this could never be known, because one man’s mind could not pass into another man’s body, to perceive what appearances were produced by those organs; neither the ideas hereby, nor the names, would be at all confounded, or any falsehood be in either. For all things that had the texture of a violet, producing constantly the idea that he called blue, and those which had the texture of a marigold, producing constantly the idea which he as constantly called yellow, whatever those appearances were in his mind; he would be able as regularly to distinguish things for his use by those appearances, and understand and signify those distinctions marked by the name blue and yellow, as if the appearances or ideas in his mind received from those two flowers were exactly the same with the ideas in other men’s minds. I am nevertheless very apt to think that the sensible ideas produced by any object in different men’s minds, are most commonly very near and undiscernibly alike. For which opinion, I think, there might be many reasons offered: but that being besides my present business, I shall not trouble my reader with them; but only mind him, that the contrary supposition, if it could be proved, is of little use, either for the improvement of our knowledge, or conveniency of life, and so we need not trouble ourselves to examine it.

Nor would our simple ideas be false if differences in our sense organs had the following effect: THE SAME OBJECT PRODUCED DIFFERENT IDEAS IN DIFFERENT PEOPLE’S MINDS at the same time. For example, suppose a violet seen by one person produced the same idea as a marigold seen by another, and vice versa. Such a difference could never be known. One person’s mind could not enter another person’s body to perceive the appearances produced by that person’s sense organs. So neither the ideas nor their names would become confused, and neither would contain any falsehood. Everything with the texture of a violet would consistently produce the idea a person called blue. Everything with the texture of a marigold would consistently produce the idea that person called yellow. Whatever those appearances were in that person’s mind, they would serve equally well for distinguishing things for practical purposes. The person could also understand and communicate the distinctions marked by the names blue and yellow. This would work just as reliably as if the two flowers produced exactly the same ideas in everyone’s minds. Nevertheless, I am strongly inclined to think that objects usually produce sensory ideas in different people that are almost indistinguishably alike. I think many reasons could be offered for this opinion. But those reasons fall outside my present purpose, so I will not trouble the reader with them. I will only remind the reader that the opposite assumption, even if proved, would be of little use. It would do little either to improve our knowledge or to make life more convenient. So we need not trouble ourselves to examine it.

16. Simple Ideas can none of them be false in respect of real existence.

16. No simple idea can be false in relation to real existence.

From what has been said concerning our simple ideas, I think it evident that our simple ideas can none of them be false in respect of things existing without us. For the truth of these appearances or perceptions in our minds consisting, as has been said, only in their being answerable to the powers in external objects to produce by our senses such appearances in us, and each of them being in the mind such as it is, suitable to the power that produced it, and which alone it represents, it cannot upon that account, or as referred to such a pattern, be false. Blue and yellow, bitter or sweet, can never be false ideas: these perceptions in the mind are just such as they are there, answering the powers appointed by God to produce them; and so are truly what they are, and are intended to be. Indeed the names may be misapplied, but that in this respect makes no falsehood in the ideas; as if a man ignorant in the English tongue should call purple scarlet.

From what I have said about our simple ideas, I think one thing is clear. None of our simple ideas can be false in relation to things existing outside us. For, as I have said, these appearances or perceptions in our minds are true in just one sense. They correspond to the powers of external objects to produce such appearances in us through our senses. Each perception in the mind corresponds to the power that produced it, and represents only that power. So, judged by that standard, the perception cannot be false. Blue and yellow, bitter or sweet, can never be false ideas. These perceptions are exactly what they are in the mind. They correspond to the powers God has appointed to produce them. So these perceptions truly are what they are, and what they are intended to be. Names can indeed be misapplied, but misnaming ideas does not make the ideas themselves false in this respect. Someone unfamiliar with English might, for example, call purple scarlet.

17. Secondly, Modes not false cannot be false in reference to essences of things.

17. Second, modes that are not false cannot be false in relation to the essences of things.

Secondly, neither can our complex ideas of modes, in reference to the essence of anything really existing, be false; because whatever complex ideas I have of any mode, it hath no reference to any pattern existing, and made by nature; it is not supposed to contain in it any other ideas than what it hath; nor to represent anything but such a complication of ideas as it does. Thus, when I have the idea of such an action of a man who forbears to afford himself such meat, drink, and clothing, and other conveniences of life, as his riches and estate will be sufficient to supply and his station requires, I have no false idea; but such an one as represents an action, either as I find or imagine it, and so is capable of neither truth nor falsehood. But when I give the name FRUGALITY or VIRTUE to this action, then it may be called a false idea, if thereby it be supposed to agree with that idea to which, in propriety of speech, the name of frugality doth belong, or to be conformable to that law which is the standard of virtue and vice.

Secondly, our complex ideas of modes cannot be false in relation to the essence of anything that actually exists. This is because any complex idea I have of a mode refers to no existing pattern made by nature. The idea is not supposed to contain any ideas beyond those it actually contains. Nor is it supposed to represent anything beyond that particular combination of ideas. For example, I may imagine a man denying himself food, drink, clothing, and other comforts of life. His wealth could supply these comforts, and his social position requires them. My idea of his action is not false. The idea simply represents an action as I observe or imagine it, so it can be neither true nor false. But suppose I call this action FRUGALITY or VIRTUE. Then my idea may be called false if the name implies agreement with the idea properly called frugality. The same applies if the name implies conformity to the law that sets the standard for virtue and vice.

18. Thirdly, Ideas of Substances may be false in reference to existing things.

18. Third, ideas of substances may be false when compared with things that exist.

Thirdly, our complex ideas of substances, being all referred to patterns in things themselves, may be false. That they are all false, when looked upon as the representations of the unknown essences of things, is so evident that there needs nothing to be said of it. I shall therefore pass over that chimerical supposition, and consider them as collections of simple ideas in the mind, taken from combinations of simple ideas existing together constantly in things, of which patterns they are the supposed copies; and in this reference of them to the existence of things, they are false ideas:—(1) When they put together simple ideas, which in the real existence of things have no union; as when to the shape and size that exist together in a horse, is joined in the same complex idea the power of barking like a dog: which three ideas, however put together into one in the mind, were never united in nature; and this, therefore, may be called a false idea of a horse. (2) Ideas of substances are, in this respect, also false, when, from any collection of simple ideas that do always exist together, there is separated, by a direct negation, any other simple idea which is constantly joined with them. Thus, if to extension, solidity, fusibility, the peculiar weightiness, and yellow colour of gold, any one join in his thoughts the negation of a greater degree of fixedness than is in lead or copper, he may be said to have a false complex idea, as well as when he joins to those other simple ones the idea of perfect absolute fixedness. For either way, the complex idea of gold being made up of such simple ones as have no union in nature, may be termed false. But, if he leaves out of this his complex idea that of fixedness quite, without either actually joining to or separating it from the rest in his mind, it is, I think, to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect idea, rather than a false one; since, though it contains not all the simple ideas that are united in nature, yet it puts none together but what do really exist together.

Thirdly, our complex ideas of substances may be false, since we compare all such ideas with patterns in things themselves. If we regard these ideas as representations of things’ unknown essences, all such ideas are false. This is so obvious that nothing needs to be said about it. I shall therefore set aside that imaginary assumption. Instead, I shall consider complex ideas as collections of simple ideas in the mind. These collections come from combinations of simple ideas that constantly exist together in things. Our complex ideas are supposed to copy those patterns. When compared with things as they actually exist, these ideas are false in the following cases: (1) Complex ideas are false when they combine simple ideas that are not united in things as they actually exist. For example, someone might combine a horse’s shape and size with the ability to bark like a dog. However these three ideas are combined in the mind, they have never been united in nature. This combination may therefore be called a false idea of a horse. (2) Ideas of substances are also false in this respect when they explicitly deny a quality that always accompanies the others. Consider a collection of simple ideas that always exist together. Suppose someone explicitly denies another simple idea that is constantly joined with that collection. For example, someone might think of gold as occupying space, being solid and meltable, and having its distinctive weight and yellow colour. But suppose that person also denies that gold resists vaporizing under heat more than lead or copper does. That person may be said to have a false complex idea. The same is true if someone adds perfect, absolute resistance to vaporizing under heat to those other simple ideas. In either case, the complex idea of gold combines simple ideas that are not united in nature. The complex idea may therefore be called false. But suppose someone simply leaves this resistance out of the complex idea altogether. The person neither includes the resistance nor explicitly denies that it accompanies the other qualities. Then I think the idea should be considered inadequate and incomplete rather than false. Although the idea does not contain all the simple ideas united in nature, it combines only ideas that really exist together.

19. Truth or Falsehood always supposes Affirmation or Negation.

19. Truth or falsehood always requires affirming or denying something.

Though, in compliance with the ordinary way of speaking, I have shown in what sense and upon what ground our ideas may be sometimes called true or false; yet if we will look a little nearer into the matter, in all cases where any idea is called true or false, it is from some JUDGMENT that the mind makes, or is supposed to make, that is true or false. For truth or falsehood, being never without some affirmation or negation, express or tacit, it is not to be found but where signs are joined or separated, according to the agreement or disagreement of the things they stand for. The signs we chiefly use are either ideas or words; wherewith we make either mental or verbal propositions. Truth lies in so joining or separating these representatives, as the things they stand for do in themselves agree or disagree; and falsehood in the contrary, as shall be more fully shown hereafter.

Following ordinary usage, I have explained in what sense and on what grounds our ideas may sometimes be called true or false. But if we look more closely, every case of calling an idea true or false depends on a JUDGMENT. The mind makes, or is supposed to make, this judgment, and the judgment is what is true or false. For truth or falsehood always involves affirming or denying something, either explicitly or implicitly. So truth or falsehood occurs only when signs are joined or separated according to whether the things represented agree or disagree. The signs we chiefly use are ideas or words. With these signs, we form statements in thought or in words. Truth consists in joining or separating these signs according to how the things represented actually agree or disagree. Falsehood consists in doing the opposite, as I will explain more fully later.

20. Ideas in themselves neither true nor false.

20. Ideas in themselves are neither true nor false.

Any idea, then, which we have in our minds, whether conformable or not to the existence of things, or to any idea in the minds of other men, cannot properly for this alone be called false. For these representations, if they have nothing in them but what is really existing in things without, cannot be thought false, being exact representations of something: nor yet if they have anything in them differing from the reality of things, can they properly be said to be false representations, or ideas of things they do not represent. But the mistake and falsehood is:

An idea in our minds, then, cannot properly be called false simply because of whether it matches something else. The idea may or may not match things as they exist, or ideas in other people’s minds. If these mental representations contain only what really exists outside our minds, they cannot be considered false. They accurately represent something. But even if these representations differ from reality, they cannot properly be called false representations of things they do not represent. Nor can they properly be called ideas of things they do not represent. Rather, the error and falsehood lie here:

21. But are false—1. When judged agreeable to another Man’s Idea, without being so.

21. But are false: 1. When judged to match another person’s idea, though they do not.

First, when the mind having any idea, it JUDGES and concludes it the same that is in other men’s minds, signified by the same name; or that it is conformable to the ordinary received signification or definition of that word, when indeed it is not: which is the most usual mistake in mixed modes, though other ideas also are liable to it.

First, the mind has an idea and JUDGES that other people have the same idea, expressed by the same name. Or the mind concludes that its idea matches the word’s commonly accepted meaning or definition, when in fact it does not. This mistake is most common with mixed modes, though it can also occur with other ideas.

22. Secondly, When judged to agree to real Existence, when they do not.

22. Secondly, when they are judged to match what actually exists, but do not.

(2) When it having a complex idea made up of such a collection of simple ones as nature never puts together, it JUDGES it to agree to a species of creatures really existing; as when it joins the weight of tin to the colour, fusibility, and fixedness of gold.

(2) When it has a complex idea made up of simple ideas that nature never combines, yet JUDGES that idea to match a kind of thing that really exists. For example, it combines tin’s weight with gold’s colour, ability to melt, and resistance to vaporization.

23. Thirdly, When judged adequate, without being so.

23. Third, when considered adequate but not actually adequate.

(3) When in its complex idea it has united a certain number of simple ideas that do really exist together in some sort of creatures, but has also left out others as much inseparable, it JUDGES this to be a perfect complete idea of a sort of things which really it is not; v.g. having joined the ideas of substance, yellow, malleable, most heavy, and fusible, it takes that complex idea to be the complete idea of gold, when yet its peculiar fixedness, and solubility in AQUA REGIA, are as inseparable from those other ideas, or qualities, of that body as they are one from another.

(3) It combines several simple ideas into a complex idea, drawing on qualities that actually occur together in certain things. But it leaves out other qualities that are just as inseparable from the rest. It then JUDGES this complex idea to be a complete idea of a kind of thing, although it is not. For example, it combines the ideas of substance, yellowness, malleability, extreme heaviness, and the ability to melt. It takes this complex idea to be the complete idea of gold. Yet gold also resists vaporizing under heat and dissolves in AQUA REGIA. These qualities are as inseparable from gold’s other qualities as those other qualities are from one another.

24. Fourthly, When judged to represent the real Essence.

24. Fourth, when considered to represent the real essence.

(4) The mistake is yet greater, when I JUDGE that this complex idea contains in it the real essence of any body existing; when at least it contains but some few of those properties which flow from its real essence and constitution. I say only some few of those properties; for those properties consisting mostly in the active and passive powers it has in reference to other things, all that are vulgarly known of any one body, of which the complex idea of that kind of things is usually made, are but a very few, in comparison of what a man that has several ways tried and examined it knows of that one sort of things; and all that the most expert man knows are but a few, in comparison of what are really in that body, and depend on its internal or essential constitution. The essence of a triangle lies in a very little compass, consists in a very few ideas: three lines including a space make up that essence: but the properties that flow from this essence are more than can be easily known or enumerated. So I imagine it is in substances; their real essences lie in a little compass, though the properties flowing from that internal constitution are endless.

(4) The mistake is even greater when I JUDGE that this complex idea contains the real essence of any existing body. In fact, the idea contains only a few properties arising from the body’s real essence and constitution. I say only a few properties because these properties consist mostly in the body’s powers to affect other things or be affected by them. The commonly known properties of any body usually make up our complex idea of that kind of thing. But these are very few compared with the properties known to someone who has tested and examined that kind in several ways. And even the greatest expert knows only a few of the properties actually present in that body. These properties depend on the body’s internal or essential constitution. The essence of a triangle takes up very little space and consists of very few ideas. Three lines enclosing a space make up that essence. But the properties arising from this essence are more numerous than we can easily know or list. So I imagine the same is true of substances. Their real essences take up little space, though the properties arising from their internal constitution are endless.

25. Ideas, when called false.

25. When ideas are called false.

To conclude, a man having no notion of anything without him, but by the idea he has of it in his mind, (which idea he has a power to call by what name he pleases,) he may indeed make an idea neither answering the reason of things, nor agreeing to the idea commonly signified by other people’s words; but cannot make a wrong or false idea of a thing which is no otherwise known to him but by the idea he has of it: v.g. when I frame an idea of the legs, arms, and body of a man, and join to this a horse’s head and neck, I do not make a false idea of anything; because it represents nothing without me. But when I call it a MAN or TARTAR, and imagine it to represent some real being without me, or to be the same idea that others call by the same name; in either of these cases I may err. And upon this account it is that it comes to be termed a false idea; though indeed the falsehood lies not in the idea, but in that tacit mental proposition, wherein a conformity and resemblance is attributed to it which it has not. But yet, if, having framed such an idea in my mind, without thinking either that existence, or the name MAN or TARTAR, belongs to it, I will call it MAN or TARTAR, I may be justly thought fantastical in the naming; but not erroneous in my judgment; nor the idea any way false.

To conclude, a person knows nothing outside himself except through the idea he has of it in his mind. He can give that idea any name he pleases. He may indeed form an idea that neither fits the nature of things nor matches what others mean by their words. But he cannot form a wrong or false idea of something he knows only through his idea of it. For example, I may imagine a man’s legs, arms, and body, then add a horse’s head and neck. I have not formed a false idea of anything, because my idea represents nothing outside my mind. But suppose I call my idea MAN or TARTAR and imagine that it represents some real being outside me. Or suppose I imagine that my idea is the same idea others call by that name. In either case, I may be mistaken. For this reason, the idea comes to be called false. Yet the falsehood lies not in the idea, but in an unspoken judgment made in the mind. That judgment claims the idea matches or resembles something it does not. But suppose I form such an idea without thinking that anything matching it exists. Nor do I think that the name MAN or TARTAR belongs to it. If I nevertheless call the idea MAN or TARTAR, I may justly be thought fanciful in my choice of name. But I have not made an error in judgment, nor is the idea false in any way.

26. More properly to be called right or wrong.

26. More accurately called right or wrong.

Upon the whole matter, I think that our ideas, as they are considered by the mind,—either in reference to the proper signification of their names; or in reference to the reality of things,—may very fitly be called RIGHT or WRONG ideas, according as they agree or disagree to those patterns to which they are referred. But if any one had rather call them true or false, it is fit he use a liberty, which every one has, to call things by those names he thinks best; though, in propriety of speech, TRUTH or FALSEHOOD will, I think, scarce agree to them, but as they, some way or other, virtually contain in them some mental proposition. The ideas that are in a man’s mind, simply considered, cannot be wrong; unless complex ones, wherein inconsistent parts are jumbled together. All other ideas are in themselves right, and the knowledge about them right and true knowledge; but when we come to refer them to anything, as to their patterns and archetypes then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they disagree with such archetypes.

Overall, I think our ideas may properly be called RIGHT or WRONG according to how the mind considers them. The mind may compare ideas with the proper meanings of their names, or with the reality of things. Ideas are right or wrong according to whether they match the standards against which they are judged. But if anyone prefers to call ideas true or false, they should have that freedom. Everyone is free to give things the names they think best. Strictly speaking, though, I think TRUTH or FALSEHOOD hardly applies to ideas unless they somehow implicitly contain a mental statement. Ideas in a person’s mind, considered simply in themselves, cannot be wrong. The only exceptions are complex ideas that jumble together incompatible parts. All other ideas are right in themselves, and knowledge about those ideas is right and true knowledge. But when we compare ideas with anything as their models or standards, those ideas can be wrong. They are wrong to the extent that they differ from those models.