How Ideas Connect

1. Something unreasonable in most Men.

1. Most people have something unreasonable about them.

There is scarce any one that does not observe something that seems odd to him, and is in itself really extravagant, in the opinions, reasonings, and actions of other men. The least flaw of this kind, if at all different from his own, every one is quick-sighted enough to espy in another, and will by the authority of reason forwardly condemn; though he be guilty of much greater unreasonableness in his own tenets and conduct, which he never perceives, and will very hardly, if at all, be convinced of.

Almost everyone notices something in other people’s opinions, reasoning, and actions that seems strange and really is unreasonable. Everyone is quick to spot even the smallest such flaw in someone else, if it differs at all from their own. They readily condemn the flaw in the name of reason. Yet they may be guilty of far greater unreasonableness in their own beliefs and conduct without ever noticing it. And they can hardly, if ever, be convinced of their own unreasonableness.

2. Not wholly from Self-love.

2. Not entirely from self-love.

This proceeds not wholly from self-love, though that has often a great hand in it. Men of fair minds, and not given up to the overweening of self-flattery, are frequently guilty of it; and in many cases one with amazement hears the arguings, and is astonished at the obstinacy of a worthy man, who yields not to the evidence of reason, though laid before him as clear as daylight.

This does not come entirely from self-love, though self-love often plays a large part in it. Fair-minded people who do not flatter themselves excessively are often guilty of it too. In many cases, we are amazed by a decent man's arguments and astonished by his stubbornness. He refuses to accept the evidence of reason, even when it is presented to him as clearly as daylight.

3. Not from Education.

3. Not from education.

This sort of unreasonableness is usually imputed to education and prejudice, and for the most part truly enough, though that reaches not the bottom of the disease, nor shows distinctly enough whence it rises, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly assigned for the cause, and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itself: but yet, I think, he ought to look a little further, who would trace this sort of madness to the root it springs from, and so explain it, as to show whence this flaw has its original in very sober and rational minds, and wherein it consists.

This kind of irrationality is usually blamed on education and prejudice, and for the most part rightly so. But that explanation does not get to the root of the disease. Nor does it show clearly enough where the disease comes from or what it consists of. Education is often rightly identified as the cause, and prejudice is a good general name for the irrationality itself. But I think anyone who wants to trace this kind of madness to its roots should look a little further. The explanation should show how this flaw arises in otherwise levelheaded and rational minds, and what the flaw consists of.

4. A Degree of Madness found in most Men.

4. A degree of madness is found in most people.

I shall be pardoned for calling it by so harsh a name as madness, when it is considered that opposition to reason deserves that name, and is really madness; and there is scarce a man so free from it, but that if he should always, on all occasions, argue or do as in some cases he constantly does, would not be thought fitter for Bedlam than civil conversation. I do not here mean when he is under the power of an unruly passion, but in the steady calm course of his life. That which will yet more apologize for this harsh name, and ungrateful imputation on the greatest part of mankind, is, that, inquiring a little by the bye into the nature of madness, (b. ii. ch. xi., Section 13,) I found it to spring from the very same root, and to depend on the very same cause we are here speaking of. This consideration of the thing itself, at a time when I thought not the least on the subject which I am now treating of, suggested it to me. And if this be a weakness to which all men are so liable, if this be a taint which so universally infects mankind, the greater care should be taken to lay it open under its due name, thereby to excite the greater care in its prevention and cure.

I hope to be forgiven for using so harsh a word as madness. Acting against reason deserves that name and really is madness. Hardly anyone is entirely free from it. Suppose someone always argued or acted as he regularly does in certain cases. Hardly anyone would then be considered more fit for civilized company than for Bedlam, the madhouse. I do not mean when someone is ruled by an uncontrollable passion. I mean during the steady, calm course of his life. There is a further reason to excuse this harsh name and this unwelcome judgment on most of humanity. During a brief examination of the nature of madness, I found that madness springs from the very same root. It depends on the very same cause we are discussing here. That examination appears in Book II, Chapter XI, Section 13. Considering madness itself suggested this connection to me. At the time, I was not thinking at all about the subject I am now discussing. And if all people are so vulnerable to this weakness, if this taint infects humanity so universally, greater care is needed. We should expose this weakness under its proper name, to encourage greater care in preventing and curing it.

5. From a wrong Connexion of Ideas.

5. From a mistaken connection between ideas.

Some of our ideas have a NATURAL correspondence and connexion one with another: it is the office and excellency of our reason to trace these, and hold them together in that union and correspondence which is founded in their peculiar beings. Besides this, there is another connexion of ideas wholly owing to CHANCE or CUSTOM. Ideas that in themselves are not all of kin, come to be so united in some men’s minds, that it is very hard to separate them; they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the understanding, but its associate appears with it; and if they are more than two which are thus united, the whole gang, always inseparable, show themselves together.

Some of our ideas have a NATURAL relationship and connection with one another. Reason’s task and strength is to trace these connections and keep the ideas linked according to their particular natures. Besides these natural connections, ideas can also be connected entirely through CHANCE or CUSTOM. Ideas with no inherent relationship become so closely linked in some people’s minds that separating them is very hard. These ideas always appear together. Whenever one enters the mind, its companion immediately appears too. And if more than two ideas are linked this way, the whole gang always appears together, inseparable.

6. This Connexion made by custom.

6. This connection is formed by habit.

This strong combination of ideas, not allied by nature, the mind makes in itself either voluntarily or by chance; and hence it comes in different men to be very different, according to their different inclinations, education, interests, &c. CUSTOM settles habits of thinking in the understanding, as well as of determining in the will, and of motions in the body: all which seems to be but trains of motions in the animal spirits, which, once set a going, continue in the same steps they have been used to; which, by often treading, are worn into a smooth path, and the motion in it becomes easy, and as it were natural. As far as we can comprehend thinking, thus ideas seem to be produced in our minds; or, if they are not, this may serve to explain their following one another in an habitual train, when once they are put into their track, as well as it does to explain such motions of the body. A musician used to any tune will find that, let it but once begin in his head, the ideas of the several notes of it will follow one another orderly in his understanding, without any care or attention, as regularly as his fingers move orderly over the keys of the organ to play out the tune he has begun, though his unattentive thoughts be elsewhere a wandering. Whether the natural cause of these ideas, as well as of that regular dancing of his fingers be the motion of his animal spirits, I will not determine, how probable soever, by this instance, it appears to be so: but this may help us a little to conceive of intellectual habits, and of the tying together of ideas.

The mind forms strong connections between ideas that are not naturally related, either deliberately or by chance. These connections therefore vary greatly from person to person, according to their different inclinations, education, interests, and so on. CUSTOM establishes habits of thought in the understanding, just as it establishes habits of decision in the will and movement in the body. All these habits seem to be sequences of movements in the animal spirits. Once started, these movements continue along their familiar paths. Repeated use wears these paths smooth, making movement along them easy and seemingly natural. As far as we can understand thinking, ideas seem to arise in our minds through movements like these. Or, if ideas do not arise this way, these movements may still explain how ideas follow one another in habitual sequences. Once ideas are set on a familiar track, the explanation may apply just as it does to bodily movements. A musician familiar with a tune finds that, once the tune begins in his head, its notes follow in order. The ideas of those notes pass through his understanding without any effort or attention. They follow as regularly as his fingers move over the organ keys to finish the tune he has begun. Meanwhile, his wandering thoughts may be elsewhere. I will not decide whether movements of the animal spirits cause both these ideas and his fingers’ orderly dance. This example may make that explanation seem probable. But the example may help us understand a little better how habits of thought form and ideas become linked.

7. Some Antipathies an Effect of it.

7. Some Dislikes Result from It.

That there are such associations of them made by custom, in the minds of most men, I think nobody will question, who has well considered himself or others; and to this, perhaps, might be justly attributed most of the sympathies and antipathies observable in men, which work as strongly, and produce as regular effects as if they were natural; and are therefore called so, though they at first had no other original but the accidental connexion of two ideas, which either the strength of the first impression, or future indulgence so united, that they always afterwards kept company together in that man’s mind, as if they were but one idea. I say most of the antipathies, I do not say all; for some of them are truly natural, depend upon our original constitution, and are born with us; but a great part of those which are counted natural, would have been known to be from unheeded, though perhaps early, impressions, or wanton fancies at first, which would have been acknowledged the original of them, if they had been warily observed. A grown person surfeiting with honey no sooner hears the name of it, but his fancy immediately carries sickness and qualms to his stomach, and he cannot bear the very idea of it; other ideas of dislike, and sickness, and vomiting, presently accompany it, and he is disturbed; but he knows from whence to date this weakness, and can tell how he got this indisposition. Had this happened to him by an over-dose of honey when a child, all the same effects would have followed; but the cause would have been mistaken, and the antipathy counted natural.

I think nobody who has carefully considered themselves or others will question that habit links ideas in most people’s minds. Perhaps these associations could rightly explain most of the likes and dislikes we observe in people. These feelings act as strongly and produce effects as consistently as if they were natural. They are therefore called natural, though they began only with an accidental connection between two ideas. Either a strong first impression or later reinforcement joined the ideas so firmly that they always stayed together afterward. In that person’s mind, the two ideas were as if they were one. I say most dislikes, not all. Some are truly natural, depend on our original makeup, and are present from birth. But many supposedly natural dislikes could have been traced to unnoticed impressions, perhaps formed early, or initially to passing fancies. If these impressions or fancies had been carefully observed, they would have been recognized as the sources of those dislikes. An adult who has made himself sick by eating too much honey feels nauseated whenever he hears honey mentioned. His imagination immediately brings sickness and queasiness to his stomach, and he cannot bear even the idea of honey. Thoughts of disgust, sickness, and vomiting immediately accompany the thought of honey and upset him. But he knows when this weakness began and can explain how he developed this aversion. If eating too much honey had caused the same experience in childhood, all the same effects would have followed. But the cause would have been misunderstood, and the aversion would have been considered natural.

8. Influence of association to be watched educating young children.

8. The influence of mental associations must be watched when educating young children.

I mention this, not out of any great necessity there is in this present argument to distinguish nicely between natural and acquired antipathies; but I take notice of it for another purpose, viz. that those who have children, or the charge of their education, would think it worth their while diligently to watch, and carefully to prevent the undue connexion of ideas in the minds of young people. This is the time most susceptible of lasting impressions; and though those relating to the health of the body are by discreet people minded and fenced against, yet I am apt to doubt, that those which relate more peculiarly to the mind, and terminate in the understanding or passions, have been much less heeded than the thing deserves: nay, those relating purely to the understanding, have, as I suspect, been by most men wholly overlooked.

I mention this, not because the present argument greatly needs a precise distinction between natural and learned aversions. Rather, I have another purpose. I want parents and those responsible for children's education to consider careful attention to young minds worth their time. They should watch closely for improper connections between ideas and carefully prevent those connections from forming. Youth is the time when lasting impressions form most readily. Sensible people pay attention to impressions that affect physical health and guard against them. Yet I suspect that impressions affecting the mind, particularly understanding or emotions, have received far less attention than they deserve. Indeed, I suspect that most people have entirely overlooked impressions affecting the understanding alone.

9. Wrong connexion of ideas a great Cause of Errors.

9. Wrong connections between ideas are a major cause of errors.

This wrong connexion in our minds of ideas in themselves loose and independent of one another, has such an influence, and is of so great force to set us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural, passions, reasonings, and notions themselves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after.

In our minds, we wrongly connect ideas that are separate and independent of one another. These false connections have a powerful influence, leading us astray in our actions, both moral and physical. They also distort our emotions, reasoning, and ideas themselves. So perhaps nothing deserves more careful attention than these false connections.

10. As instance.

10. For example.

The ideas of goblins and sprites have really no more to do with darkness than light: yet let but a foolish maid inculcate these often on the mind of a child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives, but darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas, and they shall be so joined, that he can no more bear the one than the other.

Ideas of goblins and sprites have no more connection with darkness than with light. Yet suppose a foolish maid repeatedly plants these ideas in a child's mind and links them with darkness. Perhaps he will never be able to separate these ideas from darkness for as long as he lives. Darkness will then always bring those frightening ideas to mind. The connection will be so strong that he can no more bear darkness than the ideas themselves.

11. Another instance.

11. Another example.

A man receives a sensible injury from another, thinks on the man and that action over and over, and by ruminating on them strongly, or much, in his mind, so cements those two ideas together, that he makes them almost one; never thinks on the man, but the pain and displeasure he suffered comes into his mind with it, so that he scarce distinguishes them, but has as much an aversion for the one as the other. Thus hatreds are often begotten from slight and innocent occasions, and quarrels propagated and continued in the world.

A man suffers a hurt from someone and thinks about the person and the action over and over. By dwelling on them intensely or often, he binds the two ideas so closely that they become almost one. He never thinks of the person without remembering the pain and displeasure he suffered. As a result, he can hardly separate the person from the hurt, and feels as much aversion to either. In this way, hatred often grows from slight and innocent causes, and quarrels spread and continue in the world.

12. A third instance.

12. A third example.

A man has suffered pain or sickness in any place; he saw his friend die in such a room: though these have in nature nothing to do one with another, yet when the idea of the place occurs to his mind, it brings (the impression being once made) that of the pain and displeasure with it: he confounds them in his mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.

A man has suffered pain or illness in a certain place, or seen his friend die in a particular room. Although the place and the suffering have no natural connection, they become linked in his mind. Once that impression has formed, thinking of the place brings back the pain and distress. He mixes the two together in his mind and can bear the thought of the place no better than the suffering.

13. Why Time cures some Disorders in the Mind, which Reason cannot cure.

13. Why time cures some disorders of the mind that reason cannot cure.

When this combination is settled, and while it lasts, it is not in the power of reason to help us, and relieve us from the effects of it. Ideas in our minds, when they are there, will operate according to their natures and circumstances. And here we see the cause why time cures certain affections, which reason, though in the right, and allowed to be so, has not power over, nor is able against them to prevail with those who are apt to hearken to it in other cases. The death of a child that was the daily delight of its mother’s eyes, and joy of her soul, rends from her heart the whole comfort of her life, and gives her all the torment imaginable: use the consolations of reason in this case, and you were as good preach ease to one on the rack, and hope to allay, by rational discourses, the pain of his joints tearing asunder. Till time has by disuse separated the sense of that enjoyment and its loss, from the idea of the child returning to her memory, all representations, though ever so reasonable, are in vain; and therefore some in whom the union between these ideas is never dissolved, spend their lives in mourning, and carry an incurable sorrow to their graves.

Once this connection between ideas is established, reason cannot free us from its effects as long as the connection lasts. Ideas present in our minds act according to their nature and circumstances. This explains why time heals certain feelings that reason cannot overcome, even when reason is right and acknowledged as right. Even people who readily listen to reason in other cases cannot be persuaded out of these feelings. A child may be a mother’s daily delight and the joy of her soul. The child’s death tears all comfort from her heart and brings her every imaginable torment. Offering her the comforts of reason is like telling someone stretched on the rack to feel at ease. You might as well hope that rational arguments will ease the pain of his joints being torn apart. Time must weaken the connection through disuse, separating the remembered child from the sense of that joy and its loss. Until then, all arguments, however reasonable, are useless. In some people, this connection between ideas never breaks. They therefore spend their lives in mourning and carry an incurable sorrow to their graves.

14. Another instance of the Effect of the Association of Ideas.

14. Another example of the effect of linking ideas.

A friend of mine knew one perfectly cured of madness by a very harsh and offensive operation. The gentleman who was thus recovered, with great sense of gratitude and acknowledgment owned the cure all his life after, as the greatest obligation he could have received; but, whatever gratitude and reason suggested to him, he could never bear the sight of the operator: that image brought back with it the idea of that agony which he suffered from his hands, which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure.

A friend of mine knew someone who was completely cured of madness by a very harsh and painful operation. For the rest of his life, the man gratefully acknowledged the cure as the greatest favor anyone could have done him. But despite his gratitude and reason, he could never bear to see the person who performed the operation. The sight brought back the memory of the agony he had suffered at that person's hands. That memory was too powerful and unbearable for him to endure.

15. More instances.

15. More examples.

Many children, imputing the pain they endured at school to their books they were corrected for, so join those ideas together, that a book becomes their aversion, and they are never reconciled to the study and use of them all their lives after; and thus reading becomes a torment to them, which otherwise possibly they might have made the great pleasure of their lives. There are rooms convenient enough, that some men cannot study in, and fashions of vessels, which, though ever so clean and commodious, they cannot drink out of, and that by reason of some accidental ideas which are annexed to them, and make them offensive; and who is there that hath not observed some man to flag at the appearance, or in the company of some certain person not otherwise superior to him, but because, having once on some occasion got the ascendant, the idea of authority and distance goes along with that of the person, and he that has been thus subjected, is not able to separate them.

Many children blame their books for the pain of being punished at school over those books. They link the two ideas so closely that they come to hate books. For the rest of their lives, they never become comfortable with studying or using books. Reading thus becomes a torment, although it might otherwise have become one of their greatest pleasures in life. Some people cannot study in certain rooms, even though the rooms are quite suitable. Nor can they drink from certain kinds of cups, however clean and convenient the cups may be. These rooms and cups offend them because of ideas that have become attached to them by chance. And who has not seen someone lose confidence at the sight of a certain person, or in that person's company? The other person is not otherwise superior, but once gained the upper hand on some occasion. Because of that experience, the idea of that person now carries ideas of authority and distance. The person who was once brought under the other's power cannot separate these ideas.

16. A curious instance.

16. An interesting example.

Instances of this kind are so plentiful everywhere, that if I add one more, it is only for the pleasant oddness of it. It is of a young gentleman, who, having learnt to dance, and that to great perfection, there happened to stand an old trunk in the room where he learnt. The idea of this remarkable piece of household stuff had so mixed itself with the turns and steps of all his dances, that though in that chamber he could dance excellently well, yet it was only whilst that trunk was there; nor could he perform well in any other place, unless that or some such other trunk had its due position in the room. If this story shall be suspected to be dressed up with some comical circumstances, a little beyond precise nature, I answer for myself that I had it some years since from a very sober and worthy man, upon his own knowledge, as I report it; and I dare say there are very few inquisitive persons who read this, who have not met with accounts, if not examples, of this nature, that may parallel, or at least justify this.

Examples of this kind are so common everywhere that I add another only because it is amusingly odd. A young gentleman had learned to dance extremely well. An old trunk happened to stand in the room where he learned. The image of this distinctive piece of furniture had become mixed up with the turns and steps of all his dances. Although he could dance excellently in that room, he could do so only while the trunk was there. Nor could he dance well anywhere else unless that trunk, or a similar one, stood in the proper position. Some may suspect that this story has been embellished with comic details that go a little beyond reality. In my defense, a very sensible and respectable man told me the story some years ago. He knew the facts firsthand and told them as I have reported them. And I dare say very few curious readers have not encountered accounts, if not actual examples, of this kind. Those accounts or examples may match this story, or at least give us reason to accept it.

17. Influence of Association on intellectual Habits.

17. How Associations Shape Habits of Thought.

Intellectual habits and defects this way contracted, are not less frequent and powerful, though less observed. Let the ideas of being and matter be strongly joined, either by education or much thought; whilst these are still combined in the mind, what notions, what reasonings, will there be about separate spirits? Let custom from the very childhood have joined figure and shape to the idea of God, and what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the Deity? Let the idea of infallibility be inseparably joined to any person, and these two constantly together possess the mind; and then one body in two places at once, shall unexamined be swallowed for a certain truth, by an implicit faith, whenever that imagined infallible person dictates and demands assent without inquiry.

Mental habits and flaws formed in this way are no less common or powerful, though they attract less notice. Suppose education or repeated thought closely links the ideas of existence and matter. As long as these ideas remain linked in the mind, what ideas or arguments can there be about spirits existing apart from matter? Suppose habit, from earliest childhood, has linked physical form and shape to the idea of God. What absurd ideas about God will that mind be prone to? Suppose the idea of infallibility becomes inseparably linked to a person, and both ideas constantly occupy the mind together. Then, whenever that supposedly infallible person demands agreement without inquiry, unquestioning faith will accept his pronouncements as certain truths. Even the claim that one body can be in two places at once will be accepted without examination.

18. Observable in the opposition between different Sects of philosophy and of religion.

18. Seen in the opposition between different schools of philosophy and religious groups.

Some such wrong and unnatural combinations of ideas will be found to establish the irreconcilable opposition between different sects of philosophy and religion; for we cannot imagine every one of their followers to impose wilfully on himself, and knowingly refuse truth offered by plain reason. Interest, though it does a great deal in the case, yet cannot be thought to work whole societies of men to so universal a perverseness, as that every one of them to a man should knowingly maintain falsehood: some at least must be allowed to do what all pretend to, i.e. to pursue truth sincerely; and therefore there must be something that blinds their understandings, and makes them not see the falsehood of what they embrace for real truth. That which thus captivates their reasons, and leads men of sincerity blindfold from common sense, will, when examined, be found to be what we are speaking of: some independent ideas, of no alliance to one another, are, by education, custom, and the constant din of their party, so coupled in their minds, that they always appear there together; and they can no more separate them in their thoughts than if they were but one idea, and they operate as if they were so. This gives sense to jargon, demonstration to absurdities, and consistency to nonsense, and is the foundation of the greatest, I had almost said of all the errors in the world; or, if it does not reach so far, it is at least the most dangerous one, since, so far as it obtains, it hinders men from seeing and examining. When two things, in themselves disjoined, appear to the sight constantly united; if the eye sees these things riveted which are loose, where will you begin to rectify the mistakes that follow in two ideas that they have been accustomed so to join in their minds as to substitute one for the other, and, as I am apt to think, often without perceiving it themselves? This, whilst they are under the deceit of it, makes them incapable of conviction, and they applaud themselves as zealous champions for truth, when indeed they are contending for error; and the confusion of two different ideas, which a customary connexion of them in their minds hath to them made in effect but one, fills their heads with false views, and their reasonings with false consequences.

Some mistaken and unnatural connections between ideas explain the irreconcilable opposition between different schools of philosophy and religion. We cannot imagine that all their followers deliberately deceive themselves and knowingly reject truth presented by clear reasoning. Self-interest certainly plays a large part. Yet we cannot think it makes whole communities so thoroughly perverse that every member knowingly defends falsehood. We must allow that at least some sincerely pursue truth, as all claim to do. So something must blind their understanding, preventing them from seeing the falsehood in what they accept as truth. On examination, what traps their reason and leads sincere people blindly away from common sense proves to be our subject here. Education, habit, and their party’s constant clamor bind together ideas that are independent and unrelated. These ideas then always appear together in their minds. They can no longer separate the ideas in thought, any more than if the ideas were one. And the ideas work as though they were one. This connection makes jargon seem meaningful, absurdities seem proven, and nonsense seem consistent. It underlies the greatest errors in the world, and I almost said all of them. Even if its reach is not that wide, this connection is at least the most dangerous error. Wherever it takes hold, it prevents people from seeing and examining. Suppose two things that are separate in themselves always appear joined to the eye. If the eye sees loose things as riveted together, where can you begin correcting the mistakes that follow? The same problem arises with two ideas people habitually join in their minds until they substitute one for the other. I am inclined to think they often make this substitution without noticing it themselves. While people remain deceived by this connection, they cannot be persuaded of their error. They praise themselves as devoted champions of truth, when they are actually fighting for error. Habitually connecting two different ideas has effectively made those ideas one in their minds. Confusing the two fills their heads with false views and their reasoning with false conclusions.

19. Conclusion.

19. Conclusion.

Having thus given an account of the original, sorts, and extent of our IDEAS, with several other considerations about these (I know not whether I may say) instruments, or materials of our knowledge, the method I at first proposed to myself would now require that I should immediately proceed to show, what use the understanding makes of them, and what KNOWLEDGE we have by them. This was that which, in the first general view I had of this subject, was all that I thought I should have to do: but, upon a nearer approach, I find that there is so close a connexion between ideas and WORDS, and our abstract ideas and general words have so constant a relation one to another, that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our knowledge, which all consists in propositions, without considering, first, the nature, use, and signification of Language; which, therefore, must be the business of the next Book.

I have now explained the origin, types, and range of our IDEAS, along with several other points about them. I am not sure whether to call them the tools or the materials of our knowledge. My original plan would now require me to explain immediately how the understanding uses ideas and what KNOWLEDGE they give us. When I first considered this subject as a whole, I thought that was all I would need to do. But a closer look shows me how closely ideas and WORDS are connected. Our abstract ideas and general words also relate to one another so consistently that we must first examine language. Without first considering the nature, use, and meaning of language, we cannot discuss our knowledge clearly and precisely. For all our knowledge consists of propositions. Language must therefore be the subject of the next Book.