Adequate and Inadequate Ideas

1. Adequate Ideas are such as perfectly represent their Archetypes.

1. Adequate ideas are those that perfectly represent the originals they are based on.

Of our real ideas, some are adequate, and some are inadequate. Those I call ADEQUATE, which perfectly represent those archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from: which it intends them to stand for, and to which it refers them. INADEQUATE IDEAS are such, which are but a partial or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which account it is plain,

Some of our real ideas are adequate, and some are inadequate. I call ideas ADEQUATE when they perfectly represent the originals the mind assumes they come from. These originals are what the mind intends the ideas to stand for and refers them to. INADEQUATE IDEAS represent only part of the originals they refer to, or represent those originals incompletely. On this basis, it is clear that,

2. Adequate Ideas are such as perfectly represent their Archetypes. Simple Ideas all adequate.

2. Adequate ideas perfectly represent the originals they are based on. All simple ideas are adequate.

First, that ALL OUR SIMPLE IDEAS ARE ADEQUATE. Because, being nothing but the effects of certain powers in things, fitted and ordained by God to produce such sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those powers: and we are sure they agree to the reality of things. For, if sugar produce in us the ideas which we call whiteness and sweetness, we are sure there is a power in sugar to produce those ideas in our minds, or else they could not have been produced by it. And so each sensation answering the power that operates on any of our senses, the idea so produced is a real idea, (and not a fiction of the mind, which has no power to produce any simple idea); and cannot but be adequate, since it ought only to answer that power: and so all simple ideas are adequate. It is true, the things producing in us these simple ideas are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the CAUSES of them; but as if those ideas were real beings IN them. For, though fire be called painful to the touch, whereby is signified the power of producing in us the idea of pain, yet it is denominated also light and hot; as if light and heat were really something in the fire, more than a power to excite these ideas in us; and therefore are called qualities in or of the fire. But these being nothing, in truth, but powers to excite such ideas in us, I must in that sense be understood, when I speak of secondary qualities as being in things; or of their ideas as being the objects that excite them in us. Such ways of speaking, though accommodated to the vulgar notions, without which one cannot be well understood, yet truly signify nothing but those powers which are in things to excite certain sensations or ideas in us. Since were there no fit organs to receive the impressions fire makes on the sight and touch, nor a mind joined to those organs to receive the ideas of light and heat by those impressions from the fire or sun, there would yet be no more light or heat in the world than there would be pain if there were no sensible creature to feel it, though the sun should continue just as it is now, and Mount AEtna flame higher than ever it did. Solidity and extension, and the termination of it, figure, with motion and rest, whereof we have the ideas, would be really in the world as they are, whether there were any sensible being to perceive them or no: and therefore we have reason to look on those as the real modifications of matter, and such as are the exciting causes of all our various sensations from bodies. But this being an inquiry not belonging to this place, I shall enter no further into it, but proceed to show what complex ideas are adequate, and what not.

First, ALL OUR SIMPLE IDEAS ARE ADEQUATE. They are nothing but the effects of certain powers in things. God designed and appointed these powers to produce particular sensations in us. So our simple ideas must correspond to those powers and adequately represent them. We can therefore be sure that these ideas agree with the reality of things. For example, if sugar produces the ideas we call whiteness and sweetness, sugar must have the power to produce those ideas. Otherwise, sugar could not have produced them in our minds. Each sensation thus corresponds to a power acting on one of our senses. So the resulting idea is real, not an invention of the mind. The mind has no power to produce any simple idea. Such an idea must also be adequate, since it needs only to correspond to the power producing it. So all simple ideas are adequate. It is true that we rarely name things producing these simple ideas as if they were merely the ideas’ CAUSES. Instead, we name things as if the ideas were real things existing IN them. For example, we call fire painful to touch. By this we mean that fire has the power to produce the idea of pain in us. Yet we also call fire bright and hot. We speak as if light and heat were really something in fire beyond its power to produce these ideas in us. We therefore call light and heat qualities in or of fire. But these qualities are, in truth, nothing but powers to produce such ideas in us. This is what I mean when I speak of secondary qualities as existing in things. The same applies when I speak of ideas of these qualities as though they were the objects producing them in us. Such expressions fit ordinary ways of thinking, without which we cannot easily make ourselves understood. Yet these expressions truly mean only the powers in things to produce certain sensations or ideas in us. Suppose there were no suitable sense organs to receive the impressions fire makes on sight and touch. Suppose, too, that no mind was connected to those organs to receive ideas of light and heat from those impressions. Then fire or the sun would produce no more light or heat in the world than pain could exist without feeling creatures. This would remain true even if the sun continued exactly as it is now, and Mount AEtna blazed higher than ever. Solidity, extension, and shape, the boundary of extension, would still really exist in the world, as would motion and rest. These features, of which we have ideas, would exist as they are, whether any sensing being perceived them or not. We therefore have reason to regard these features as actual properties of matter. We also have reason to regard them as the causes producing all our different sensations of bodies. But that inquiry does not belong here, so I will take it no further. Instead, I will explain which complex ideas are adequate and which are not.

3. Modes are all adequate.

3. All modes are adequate.

Secondly, OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF MODES, being voluntary collections of simple ideas, which the mind puts together, without reference to any real archetypes, or standing patterns, existing anywhere, are and cannot but be ADEQUATE IDEAS. Because they, not being intended for copies of things really existing, but for archetypes made by the mind, to rank and denominate things by, cannot want anything; they having each of them that combination of ideas, and thereby that perfection, which the mind intended they should: so that the mind acquiesces in them, and can find nothing wanting. Thus, by having the idea of a figure with three sides meeting at three angles, I have a complete idea, wherein I require nothing else to make it perfect. That the mind is satisfied with the perfection of this its idea is plain, in that it does not conceive that any understanding hath, or can have, a more complete or perfect idea of that thing it signifies by the word triangle, supposing it to exist, than itself has, in that complex idea of three sides and three angles, in which is contained all that is or can be essential to it, or necessary to complete it, wherever or however it exists. But in our IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES it is otherwise. For there, desiring to copy things as they really do exist, and to represent to ourselves that constitution on which all their properties depend, we perceive our ideas attain not that perfection we intend: we find they still want something we should be glad were in them; and so are all inadequate. But MIXED MODES and RELATIONS, being archetypes without patterns, and so having nothing to represent but themselves, cannot but be adequate, everything being so to itself. He that at first put together the idea of danger perceived, absence of disorder from fear, sedate consideration of what was justly to be done, and executing that without disturbance, or being deterred by the danger of it, had certainly in his mind that complex idea made up of that combination: and intending it to be nothing else but what is, nor to have in it any other simple ideas but what it hath, it could not also but be an adequate idea: and laying this up in his memory, with the name COURAGE annexed to it, to signify to others, and denominate from thence any action he should observe to agree with it, had thereby a standard to measure and denominate actions by, as they agreed to it. This idea, thus made and laid up for a pattern, must necessarily be adequate, being referred to nothing else but itself, nor made by any other original but the good liking and will of him that first made this combination.

Secondly, OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF MODES are collections of simple ideas that the mind freely puts together. The mind does not base these collections on any real models or fixed patterns existing anywhere. These ideas are, and must be, ADEQUATE IDEAS. They are not intended as copies of things that really exist. Instead, they are models made by the mind for classifying and naming things. Because of this, they cannot lack anything. Each has exactly the combination of ideas, and therefore the completeness, that the mind intended. So the mind accepts these ideas and finds nothing missing. For example, my idea of a figure with three sides meeting at three angles is complete. I require nothing else to make the idea perfect. The mind's satisfaction with the completeness of this idea is clear. The mind does not suppose that any other understanding has, or could have, a more complete or perfect idea of a triangle. This assumes that a triangle exists. The complex idea of three sides and three angles contains everything essential to a triangle or necessary to complete it. This holds wherever or however the triangle exists. But our IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES are different. With these ideas, we want to copy things as they really exist. We also want to represent the underlying makeup on which all their properties depend. Yet we see that our ideas fall short of the completeness we intend. We find that these ideas still lack something we wish they contained. So they are all inadequate. But MIXED MODES and RELATIONS are models that follow no existing patterns. They have nothing to represent but themselves. So they must be adequate, since everything adequately represents itself. Consider whoever first combined these ideas: awareness of danger, freedom from fear's unsettling effects, and calm consideration of the right action. He also included carrying out that action without distress or being deterred by its danger. He certainly had in mind the complex idea formed from that combination. He intended the idea to be nothing beyond what it was, containing no simple ideas beyond those it contained. So the idea necessarily was adequate. He then stored the idea in his memory and attached the name COURAGE to it. He used the name to communicate the idea to others. He also used it to name any action he observed that matched the idea. In this way, he had a standard for judging and naming actions according to how they matched the idea. This idea, created and stored as a pattern, must necessarily be adequate. It is measured against nothing but itself. And its creation followed no original model beyond the preference and choice of whoever first made the combination.

4. Modes, in reference to settled Names, may be inadequate.

4. Modes may be inadequate in relation to established names.

Indeed another coming after, and in conversation learning from him the word COURAGE, may make an idea, to which he gives the name courage, different from what the first author applied it to, and has in his mind when he uses it. And in this case, if he designs that his idea in thinking should be conformable to the other’s idea, as the name he uses in speaking is conformable in sound to his from whom he learned it, his idea may be very wrong and inadequate: because in this case, making the other man’s idea the pattern of his idea in thinking, as the other man’s word or sound is the pattern of his in speaking, his idea is so far defective and inadequate, as it is distant from the archetype and pattern he refers it to, and intends to express and signify by the name he uses for it; which name he would have to be a sign of the other man’s idea, (to which, in its proper use, it is primarily annexed,) and of his own, as agreeing to it: to which if his own does not exactly correspond, it is faulty and inadequate.

Indeed, someone who later learns the word COURAGE in conversation with its original user may form a different idea. The learner may call this idea courage, though it differs from what the original user means and has in mind. Suppose the learner intends his idea to match the original user’s idea, just as their spoken words match in sound. In that case, the learner’s idea may be very mistaken and inadequate. This is because he takes the other man’s idea as his model for thinking, just as he copies the spoken word. His idea is defective and inadequate to the extent that it differs from the model he intends to follow. That model is the idea he intends to express and signify by the name he uses. He wants the name to stand for the other man’s idea and for his own idea as matching it. In its proper use, the name is primarily attached to the other man’s idea. If the learner’s own idea does not match that idea exactly, his idea is faulty and inadequate.

5. Because then means, in propriety of speech, to correspond to the ideas in some other mind.

5. Because in that case, strictly speaking, it means matching the ideas in another mind.

Therefore these complex ideas of MODES, which they are referred by the mind, and intended to correspond to the ideas in the mind of some other intelligent being, expressed by the names we apply to them, they may be very deficient, wrong, and inadequate; because they agree not to that which the mind designs to be their archetype and pattern: in which respect only any idea of modes can be wrong, imperfect, or inadequate. And on this account our ideas of mixed modes are the most liable to be faulty of any other; but this refers more to proper speaking than knowing right.

The mind intends these complex ideas of MODES to match ideas in the mind of some other intelligent being. The names we give these complex ideas express that intended match. These ideas may therefore be very deficient, wrong, and inadequate, because they fail to match their intended model and pattern. Only in this respect can any idea of modes be wrong, imperfect, or inadequate. For this reason, our ideas of mixed modes are more liable to be faulty than any other ideas. But this concerns speaking correctly more than knowing correctly.

6. Ideas of Substances, as referred to real Essences, not adequate.

6. Ideas of substances are inadequate when taken to represent their real essences.

Thirdly, what IDEAS WE HAVE OF SUBSTANCES, I have above shown. Now, those ideas have in the mind a double reference: 1. Sometimes they are referred to a supposed real essence of each species of things. 2. Sometimes they are only designed to be pictures and representations in the mind of things that do exist, by ideas of those qualities that are discoverable in them. In both which ways these copies of those originals and archetypes are imperfect and inadequate.

Thirdly, I have already explained what IDEAS WE HAVE OF SUBSTANCES. These ideas relate to things in two ways: 1. Sometimes they refer to a supposed real essence of each kind of thing. 2. Sometimes they are intended only as mental pictures and representations of things that exist. These representations consist of ideas of the qualities we can discover in those things. In both cases, these copies are imperfect and inadequate representations of their originals and models.

First, it is usual for men to make the names of substances stand for things as supposed to have certain real essences, whereby they are of this or that species: and names standing for nothing but the ideas that are in men’s minds, they must constantly refer their ideas to such real essences, as to their archetypes. That men (especially such as have been bred up in the learning taught in this part of the world) do suppose certain specific essences of substances, which each individual in its several kinds is made conformable to and partakes of, is so far from needing proof that it will be thought strange if any one should do otherwise. And thus they ordinarily apply the specific names they rank particular substances under, to things as distinguished by such specific real essences. Who is there almost, who would not take it amiss if it should be doubted whether he called himself a man, with any other meaning than as having the real essence of a man? And yet if you demand what those real essences are, it is plain men are ignorant, and know them not. From whence it follows, that the ideas they have in their minds, being referred to real essences, as to archetypes which are unknown, must be so far from being adequate that they cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all. The complex ideas we have of substances are, as it has been shown, certain collections of simple ideas that have been observed or supposed constantly to exist together. But such a complex idea cannot be the real essence of any substance; for then the properties we discover in that body would depend on that complex idea, and be deducible from it, and their necessary connexion with it be known; as all properties of a triangle depend on, and, as far as they are discoverable, are deducible from the complex idea of three lines including a space. But it is plain that in our complex ideas of substances are not contained such ideas, on which all the other qualities that are to be found in them do depend. The common idea men have of iron is, a body of a certain colour, weight, and hardness; and a property that they look on as belonging to it, is malleableness. But yet this property has no necessary connexion with that complex idea, or any part of it: and there is no more reason to think that malleableness depends on that colour, weight, and hardness, than that colour or that weight depends on its malleableness. And yet, though we know nothing of these real essences, there is nothing more ordinary than that men should attribute the sorts of things to such essences. The particular parcel of matter which makes the ring I have on my finger is forwardly by most men supposed to have a real essence, whereby it is gold; and from whence those qualities flow which I find in it, viz. its peculiar colour, weight, hardness, fusibility, fixedness, and change of colour upon a slight touch of mercury, &c. This essence, from which all these properties flow, when I inquire into it and search after it, I plainly perceive I cannot discover: the furthest I can go is, only to presume that, it being nothing but body, its real essence or internal constitution, on which these qualities depend, can be nothing but the figure, size, and connexion of its solid parts; of neither of which having any distinct perception at all can I have any idea of its essence: which is the cause that it has that particular shining yellowness; a greater weight than anything I know of the same bulk; and a fitness to have its colour changed by the touch of quicksilver. If any one will say, that the real essence and internal constitution, on which these properties depend, is not the figure, size, and arrangement or connexion of its solid parts, but something else, called its particular FORM, I am further from having any idea of its real essence than I was before. For I have an idea of figure, size, and situation of solid parts in general, though I have none of the particular figure, size, or putting together of parts, whereby the qualities above mentioned are produced; which qualities I find in that particular parcel of matter that is on my finger, and not in another parcel of matter, with which I cut the pen I write with. But, when I am told that something besides the figure, size, and posture of the solid parts of that body in its essence, something called SUBSTANTIAL FORM, of that I confess I have no idea at all, but only of the sound form; which is far enough from an idea of its real essence or constitution. The like ignorance as I have of the real essence of this particular substance, I have also of the real essence of all other natural ones: of which essences I confess I have no distinct ideas at all; and, I am apt to suppose, others, when they examine their own knowledge, will find in themselves, in this one point, the same sort of ignorance.

First, people commonly use the names of substances for things they suppose have certain real essences. They believe these essences make things belong to one species or another. Yet names stand only for ideas in people’s minds. So people must continually refer their ideas to these real essences as their original models. People suppose that substances have specific essences, which every individual of each kind conforms to and shares. This is especially true of people educated in the learning taught in this part of the world. This belief hardly needs proof. Indeed, anyone who thought otherwise would seem strange. So people ordinarily apply the names they use to classify particular substances to things distinguished by these supposed real essences. Almost everyone would take offense if someone questioned what they meant by calling themselves human. They would insist that they meant they possessed the real essence of a human being. Yet if you ask what these real essences are, people plainly do not know. It follows that people’s ideas are measured against real essences as original models, although those models are unknown. These ideas are therefore far from adequate. They cannot even be supposed to represent those essences at all. As already shown, our complex ideas of substances are collections of simple ideas observed or supposed to occur together consistently. But such a complex idea cannot be the real essence of any substance. If it were, the properties we discover in that body would depend on the complex idea. Those properties could be deduced from the idea, and we would know their necessary connection with it. All the properties of a triangle, for example, depend on the complex idea of three lines enclosing a space. As far as those properties can be discovered, they can be deduced from that idea. But our complex ideas of substances plainly contain no ideas on which all their other qualities depend. The common idea of iron is a body with a certain color, weight, and hardness. People also regard malleability, the ability to be hammered into shape, as one of iron’s properties. Yet malleability has no necessary connection with that complex idea or any part of it. There is no more reason to think malleability depends on that color, weight, and hardness than the reverse. That color or weight might just as well depend on malleability. Yet although we know nothing of these real essences, people very commonly explain the kinds of things through such essences. Most people readily suppose that the piece of matter forming the ring on my finger has a real essence. They suppose this essence makes the ring gold and produces the qualities I find in it. These include its distinctive color, weight, hardness, ability to melt, resistance to evaporation, and so on. They also include its change of color after slight contact with mercury. But when I investigate the essence that produces all these properties, I plainly find that I cannot discover it. The furthest I can go is to make a presumption. Since gold is nothing but matter, its real essence, or internal structure, can only consist in its solid parts. More precisely, it must consist in their shape, size, and connections, on which these qualities depend. I have no clear perception of any of these features, so I can have no idea of gold’s essence. That essence causes its particular shining yellowness and its greater weight than anything I know of the same volume. It also makes gold capable of changing color when touched by mercury. Someone may say that these properties do not depend on the shape, size, arrangement, or connections of gold’s solid parts. Instead, they may say its real essence and internal structure are something else, called its particular FORM. If so, I am even further from having any idea of gold’s real essence than before. For I do have a general idea of the shape, size, and position of solid parts. But I have no idea of the particular shapes, sizes, or combinations of parts that produce the qualities mentioned above. I find these qualities in the particular piece of matter on my finger. I do not find them in another piece of matter, the knife I use to trim my writing pen. But suppose I am told that the body’s essence includes something beyond its solid parts’ shape, size, and position. Suppose this additional thing is called SUBSTANTIAL FORM. I confess that I have no idea of it at all, only of the sound of the word form. That is far from an idea of the body’s real essence or structure. I am equally ignorant of the real essences of all other natural substances. I confess that I have no clear ideas of any of these essences. And I am inclined to suppose that others, when they examine their own knowledge, will find the same ignorance here.

7. Because men know not the real essence of substances.

7. Because people do not know the true essence of substances.

Now, then, when men apply to this particular parcel of matter on my finger a general name already in use, and denominate it GOLD, do they not ordinarily, or are they not understood to give it that name, as belonging to a particular species of bodies, having a real internal essence; by having of which essence this particular substance comes to be of that species, and to be called by that name? If it be so, as it is plain it is, the name by which things are marked as having that essence must be referred primarily to that essence; and consequently the idea to which that name is given must be referred also to that essence, and be intended to represent it. Which essence, since they who so use the names know not, their ideas of substances must be all inadequate in that respect, as not containing in them that real essence which the mind intends they should.

Now, people apply an established general name to this particular piece of matter on my finger and call it GOLD. Do they not ordinarily mean, or are they not understood to mean, that it belongs to a particular kind of body? Do they not assume that this kind has a real internal essence? By possessing that essence, this particular substance belongs to that kind and receives that name. If so, as is plainly the case, the name identifying things as possessing that essence must refer primarily to that essence. Consequently, the idea given that name must also refer to that essence and be intended to represent it. But people who use these names in this way do not know that essence. Their ideas of substances must therefore all be inadequate in that respect. For those ideas do not contain the real essence that the mind intends them to contain.

8. Ideas of Substances, when regarded as Collections of their Qualities, are all inadequate.

8. Ideas of substances, when viewed as collections of their qualities, are all incomplete.

Secondly, those who, neglecting that useless supposition of unknown real essences, whereby they are distinguished, endeavour to copy the substances that exist in the world, by putting together the ideas of those sensible qualities which are found co-existing in them, though they come much nearer a likeness of them than those who imagine they know not what real specific essences: yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate ideas of those substances they would thus copy into their minds: nor do those copies exactly and fully contain all that is to be found in their archetypes. Because those qualities and powers of substances, whereof we make their complex ideas, are so many and various, that no man’s complex idea contains them all. That our complex ideas of substances do not contain in them ALL the simple ideas that are united in the things themselves is evident, in that men do rarely put into their complex idea of any substance all the simple ideas they do know to exist in it. Because, endeavouring to make the signification of their names as clear and as little cumbersome as they can, they make their specific ideas of the sorts of substance, for the most part, of a few of those simple ideas which are to be found in them: but these having no original precedency, or right to be put in, and make the specific idea, more than others that are left out, it is plain that both these ways our ideas of substances are deficient and inadequate. The simple ideas whereof we make our complex ones of substances are all of them (bating only the figure and bulk of some sorts) powers; which being relations to other substances, we can never be sure that we know ALL the powers that are in any one body, till we have tried what changes it is fitted to give to or receive from other substances in their several ways of application: which being impossible to be tried upon any one body, much less upon all, it is impossible we should have adequate ideas of any substance made up of a collection of all its properties.

Secondly, some people set aside the useless assumption that substances are distinguished by unknown real essences. Instead, they try to copy substances existing in the world by combining ideas of their observable qualities. They combine ideas of qualities found together in those substances. These people come much closer to representing substances than those who imagine real essences without knowing what those essences are. Yet their ideas still do not perfectly represent the substances they try to copy into their minds. Nor do these mental copies contain exactly and fully everything found in the originals. This is because substances have so many different qualities and powers that no one’s complex idea contains them all. Our complex ideas of substances do not contain ALL the simple ideas united in the substances themselves. This is clear because people rarely include even all the simple ideas they know belong to a substance. They want the meanings of their names for substances to be as clear and manageable as possible. So their defining ideas of kinds of substances usually contain only a few of the simple ideas found in them. But the chosen ideas have no natural priority over the ideas left out. Nor do the chosen ideas have any greater right to be included in the defining idea. Clearly, then, our ideas of substances are deficient and inadequate in both these ways. The simple ideas making up our complex ideas of substances are all powers, with one exception. The exception is the shape and size of some kinds of substances. These powers are relations to other substances. So we can never be sure we know ALL the powers in any one body without testing them. We must test every change that body can cause in other substances or receive from them through their various interactions. But testing every such interaction is impossible for even one body, much less for all bodies. So we cannot have adequate ideas of any substance made up of a collection of all its properties.

9. Their powers usually make up our complex ideas of substances.

9. Our complex ideas of substances usually consist of their powers.

Whosoever first lighted on a parcel of that sort of substance we denote by the word GOLD, could not rationally take the bulk and figure he observed in that lump to depend on its real essence, or internal constitution. Therefore those never went into his idea of that species of body; but its peculiar colour, perhaps, and weight, were the first he abstracted from it, to make the complex idea of that species. Which both are but powers; the one to affect our eyes after such a manner, and to produce in us that idea we call yellow; and the other to force upwards any other body of equal bulk, they being put into a pair of equal scales, one against another. Another perhaps added to these the ideas of fusibility and fixedness, two other passive powers, in relation to the operation of fire upon it; another, its ductility and solubility in aqua regia, two other powers, relating to the operation of other bodies, in changing its outward figure, or separation of it into insensible parts. These, or parts of these, put together, usually make the complex idea in men’s minds of that sort of body we call GOLD.

Whoever first found a lump of the substance we call GOLD could not reasonably make a certain assumption about it. He could not assume its size and shape depended on its real essence, or internal structure. So he did not include size and shape in his idea of that kind of substance. Instead, perhaps he first singled out its distinctive colour and weight to form his complex idea of that kind. Both colour and weight are only powers. One is the power to affect our eyes in a particular way, producing the idea we call yellow. The other is the power to push another body of equal size upwards when placed opposite it on balanced scales. Someone else perhaps added the ideas of fusibility and fixedness, meaning its ability to melt and resist being vaporized. These are two other passive powers, relating to how fire acts on gold. Another person added its ductility and its ability to dissolve in aqua regia. These are two more powers, relating to how other bodies act on gold. Those bodies change its outward shape or separate it into parts too small to perceive. These qualities, or some of them, usually combine to form people's complex idea of the kind of substance called GOLD.

10. Substances have innumerable powers not contained in our complex ideas of them.

10. Substances have countless powers that our complex ideas of those substances do not include.

But no one who hath considered the properties of bodies in general, or this sort in particular, can doubt that this, called GOLD, has infinite other properties not contained in that complex idea. Some who have examined this species more accurately could, I believe, enumerate ten times as many properties in gold, all of them as inseparable from its internal constitution, as its colour or weight: and it is probable, if any one knew all the properties that are by divers men known of this metal, there would be an hundred times as many ideas go to the complex idea of gold as any one man yet has in his; and yet perhaps that not be the thousandth part of what is to be discovered in it. The changes that that one body is apt to receive, and make in other bodies, upon a due application, exceeding far not only what we know, but what we are apt to imagine. Which will not appear so much a paradox to any one who will but consider how far men are yet from knowing all the properties of that one, no very compound figure, a triangle; though it be no small number that are already by mathematicians discovered of it.

But no one who has considered the properties of bodies generally, or gold specifically, can doubt the following. The substance called GOLD has infinitely many other properties not included in that complex idea. Some people have examined gold more closely. I believe they could list ten times as many properties of gold as that idea contains. All those properties are as inseparable from gold’s internal constitution as its color or weight. Suppose someone knew all the properties of this metal known to different people. Their complex idea of gold would probably contain a hundred times as many ideas as any one person’s now contains. Yet perhaps even that would not include a thousandth of what remains to be discovered in gold. Under the right conditions, gold can undergo changes and cause changes in other bodies. These changes far exceed not only what we know, but what we are likely to imagine. This claim will seem less paradoxical to anyone who considers how far we remain from knowing every property of a triangle. A triangle is not a very complex shape, though mathematicians have already discovered a considerable number of its properties.

11. Ideas of Substances, being got only by collecting their qualities, are all inadequate.

11. Our ideas of substances come only from collecting their qualities, so all these ideas are inadequate.

So that all our complex ideas of substances are imperfect and inadequate. Which would be so also in mathematical figures, if we were to have our complex ideas of them, only by collecting their properties in reference to other figures. How uncertain and imperfect would our ideas be of an ellipsis, if we had no other idea of it, but some few of its properties? Whereas, having in our plain idea the WHOLE essence of that figure, we from thence discover those properties, and demonstratively see how they flow, and are inseparable from it.

So all our complex ideas of substances are imperfect and incomplete. Our complex ideas of mathematical figures would be too, if we formed them only by collecting properties involving other figures. How uncertain and imperfect would our idea of an ellipse be if we knew only a few of its properties? But our clear idea of that figure contains its WHOLE essence. From that essence, we discover the figure’s properties. We can prove how those properties follow from its essence and cannot be separated from it.

12. Simple Ideas, [word in Greek], and adequate.

12. Simple ideas, [word in Greek], and adequate.

Thus the mind has three sorts of abstract ideas or nominal essences:

So the mind has three types of abstract ideas, or nominal essences:

First, SIMPLE ideas, which are [word in Greek] or copies; but yet certainly adequate. Because, being intended to express nothing but the power in things to produce in the mind such a sensation, that sensation, when it is produced, cannot but be the effect of that power. So the paper I write on, having the power in the light (I speak according to the common notion of light) to produce in men the sensation which I call white, it cannot but be the effect of such a power in something without the mind; since the mind has not the power to produce any such idea in itself: and being meant for nothing else but the effect of such a power that simple idea is [* words missing] the sensation of white, in my mind, being the effect of that power which is in the paper to produce it, is perfectly adequate to that power; or else that power would produce a different idea.

First, SIMPLE ideas are [word in Greek], or copies, but they are nevertheless certainly adequate. These ideas are intended to represent only the power things have to produce a particular sensation in the mind. Because of this, when that sensation occurs, the sensation must be the effect of that power. So the paper I write on has the power, in light, to produce in people the sensation I call white. I am speaking here of light as it is commonly understood. That sensation must be the effect of such a power in something outside the mind. For the mind cannot produce any such idea by itself. And since the simple idea is meant to represent only the effect of such a power, that simple idea is [* words missing]. The sensation of white in my mind results from the paper’s power to produce that sensation. So the sensation is perfectly adequate to that power. Otherwise, that power would produce a different idea.

13. Ideas of Substances are Echthypa, and inadequate.

13. Ideas of substances are Echthypa (copies) and are incomplete.

Secondly, the COMPLEX ideas of SUBSTANCES are ectypes, copies too; but not perfect ones, not adequate: which is very evident to the mind, in that it plainly perceives, that whatever collection of simple ideas it makes of any substance that exists, it cannot be sure that it exactly answers all that are in that substance. Since, not having tried all the operations of all other substances upon it, and found all the alterations it would receive from, or cause in, other substances, it cannot have an exact adequate collection of all its active and passive capacities; and so not have an adequate complex idea of the powers of any substance existing, and its relations; which is that sort of complex idea of substances we have. And, after all, if we would have, and actually had, in our complex idea, an exact collection of all the secondary qualities or powers of any substance, we should not yet thereby have an idea of the ESSENCE of that thing. For, since the powers or qualities that are observable by us are not the real essence of that substance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any collection whatsoever of these qualities cannot be the real essence of that thing. Whereby it is plain, that our ideas of substances are not adequate; are not what the mind intends them to be. Besides, a man has no idea of substance in general, nor knows what substance is in itself.

Secondly, COMPLEX ideas of SUBSTANCES are also copies, but they are neither perfect nor complete. The mind clearly recognizes this limitation. Whatever collection of simple ideas the mind forms of an existing substance, it cannot be sure the collection matches everything in that substance. For we have not tested how all other substances act on that substance. Nor have we discovered all the changes that substance could undergo through other substances, or cause in them. So we cannot have an exact, complete collection of all its capacities to act and be acted upon. We therefore cannot have a complete complex idea of any existing substance’s powers and relations. Yet our complex ideas of substances consist of these powers and relations. Even if we wanted and actually had an exact collection of all a substance’s secondary qualities or powers, something would remain missing. We would still have no idea of that thing’s ESSENCE. For the powers or qualities we can observe are not the substance’s real essence. Instead, they depend on that essence and arise from it. So no collection of these qualities, however complete, can be the thing’s real essence. Clearly, then, our ideas of substances are incomplete. They are not what the mind intends them to be. Besides, a person has no idea of substance in general and does not know what substance is in itself.

14. Ideas of Modes and Relations are Archetypes, and cannot be adequate.

14. Ideas of modes and relations are original models and cannot be adequate.

Thirdly, COMPLEX ideas of MODES AND RELATIONS are originals, and archetypes; are not copies, nor made after the pattern of any real existence, to which the mind intends them to be conformable, and exactly to answer. These being such collections of simple ideas that the mind itself puts together, and such collections that each of them contains in it precisely all that the mind intends that it should, they are archetypes and essences of modes that may exist; and so are designed only for, and belong only to such modes as, when they do exist, have an exact conformity with those complex ideas The ideas, therefore, of modes and relations cannot but be adequate.

Thirdly, COMPLEX ideas of MODES AND RELATIONS are originals and archetypes, not copies. They are not modeled on any real thing that the mind intends them to match exactly. These ideas are collections of simple ideas put together by the mind itself. Each collection contains precisely everything the mind intends it to contain. These complex ideas are therefore archetypes and essences of modes that may exist. They are intended to apply only to modes that, when they exist, match these complex ideas exactly. The ideas of modes and relations therefore cannot fail to be adequate.