REAL AND IMAGINARY IDEAS

1. Ideas considered in reference to their Archetypes.

1. Ideas considered in relation to the models they represent.

Besides what we have already mentioned concerning ideas, other considerations belong to them, in reference to THINGS FROM WHENCE THEY ARE TAKEN, or WHICH THEY MAY BE SUPPOSED TO REPRESENT; and thus, I think, they may come under a threefold distinction, and are:—First, either real or fantastical; Secondly, adequate or inadequate; Thirdly, true or false.

Beyond what we have already said about ideas, we can also consider their relationship to things. These are the THINGS IDEAS COME FROM, or THINGS IDEAS MAY BE SUPPOSED TO REPRESENT. From this perspective, I think ideas may be divided in three ways: First, real or imaginary. Secondly, adequate or inadequate. Thirdly, true or false.

First, by REAL IDEAS, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes. FANTASTICAL or CHIMERICAL, I call such as have no foundation in nature, nor have any conformity with that reality of being to which they are tacitly referred, as to their archetypes. If we examine the several sorts of ideas before mentioned, we shall find that,

First, by REAL IDEAS, I mean ideas grounded in nature. These ideas correspond to the actual being and existence of things, or to their original models. I call ideas FANTASTICAL or CHIMERICAL when they have no basis in nature. Nor do these ideas correspond to the reality implicitly taken as their original model. If we examine the different kinds of ideas mentioned earlier, we will find that,

2. Simple Ideas are all real appearances of things.

2. Simple ideas are all real appearances of things.

First, Our SIMPLE IDEAS are all real, all agree to the reality of things: not that they are all of them the images or representations of what does exist; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities of bodies, hath been already shown. But, though whiteness and coldness are no more in snow than pain is; yet those ideas of whiteness and coldness, pain, &c., being in us the effects of powers in things without us, ordained by our Maker to produce in us such sensations; they are real ideas in us, whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves. For, these several appearances being designed to be the mark whereby we are to know and distinguish things which we have to do with, our ideas do as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing characters, whether they be only CONSTANT EFFECTS, or else EXACT RESEMBLANCES of something in the things themselves: the reality lying in that steady correspondence they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings. But whether they answer to those constitutions, as to causes or patterns, it matters not; it suffices that they are constantly produced by them. And thus our simple ideas are all real and true, because they answer and agree to those powers of things which produce them on our minds; that being all that is requisite to make them real, and not fictions at pleasure. For in simple ideas (as has been shown) the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it, and can make to itself no simple idea, more than what it was received.

First, our SIMPLE IDEAS are all real. All correspond to the reality of things. This does not mean that all simple ideas are images or representations of what exists. As already shown, only ideas of the primary qualities of bodies resemble what exists. Whiteness and coldness are no more present in snow than pain is. Yet our ideas of whiteness, coldness, pain, and so on result from powers in things outside us. Our Maker established these powers to produce such sensations in us. These are real ideas in us, through which we distinguish the qualities that really exist in things themselves. These various appearances were designed as signs by which we recognize and distinguish the things we deal with. Our ideas serve this purpose equally well whether they are merely CONSTANT EFFECTS or EXACT RESEMBLANCES of something in things themselves. In either case, our ideas are real distinguishing signs. Their reality lies in their consistent correspondence with the distinct natures of real things. Whether those natures are causes of our ideas or models for them does not matter. It is enough that those natures consistently produce the ideas. Thus, our simple ideas are all real and true. They correspond to and agree with the powers in things that produce those ideas in our minds. This correspondence is all that is needed to make our ideas real rather than freely invented fictions. For with simple ideas, as already shown, the mind is entirely limited to the effects of things upon it. The mind cannot create any simple idea beyond those it has received.

3. Complex Ideas are voluntary Combinations.

3. Complex ideas are combinations we choose to make.

Though the mind be wholly passive in respect of its simple ideas; yet, I think, we may say it is not so in respect of its complex ideas. For those being combinations of simple ideas put together, and united under one general name, it is plain that the mind of man uses some kind of liberty in forming those complex ideas: how else comes it to pass that one man’s idea of gold, or justice, is different from another’s, but because he has put in, or left out of his, some simple idea which the other has not? The question then is, Which of these are real, and which barely imaginary combinations? What collections agree to the reality of things, and what not? And to this I say that,

Although the mind is entirely passive in receiving simple ideas, I think we may say it is not passive in forming complex ideas. Complex ideas combine simple ideas under one general name. So the human mind clearly has some freedom in forming complex ideas. How else could one person’s idea of gold, or justice, differ from another’s? The difference must arise because one person includes or leaves out some simple idea that the other does not. The question, then, is which combinations are real and which are merely imaginary? Which collections of ideas agree with the reality of things, and which do not? To this I answer that,

4. Mixed Modes and Relations, made of consistent Ideas, are real.

4. Mixed modes and relations made up of ideas that are consistent with one another are real.

Secondly, MIXED MODES and RELATIONS, having no other reality but what they have in the minds of men, there is nothing more required to this kind of ideas to make them real, but that they be so framed, that there be a possibility of existing conformable to them. These ideas themselves, being archetypes, cannot differ from their archetypes, and so cannot be chimerical, unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent ideas. Indeed, as any of them have the names of a known language assigned to them, by which he that has them in his mind would signify them to others, so bare possibility of existing is not enough; they must have a conformity to the ordinary signification of the name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantastical: as if a man would give the name of justice to that idea which common use calls liberality. But this fantasticalness relates more to propriety of speech, than reality of ideas. For a man to be undisturbed in danger, sedately to consider what is fittest to be done, and to execute it steadily, is a mixed mode, or a complex idea of an action which may exist. But to be undisturbed in danger, without using one’s reason or industry, is what is also possible to be; and so is as real an idea as the other. Though the first of these, having the name COURAGE given to it, may, in respect of that name, be a right or wrong idea; but the other, whilst it has not a common received name of any known language assigned to it, is not capable of any deformity, being made with no reference to anything but itself.

Secondly, MIXED MODES and RELATIONS have no reality beyond what they have in people’s minds. To be real, these ideas need only be formed so that something matching them could exist. These ideas are themselves models, so they cannot differ from their models. They therefore cannot be imaginary impossibilities unless someone combines inconsistent ideas in them. But suppose someone gives these ideas names from an established language to communicate them to others. In that case, the mere possibility that something matching the ideas could exist is not enough. To avoid seeming fanciful, the ideas must also match the usual meanings of their names. Someone might, for example, call an idea justice when ordinary usage calls it generosity. But this fancifulness concerns proper language use more than the reality of ideas. A person may remain calm in danger, calmly consider the best action, and carry it out steadily. This is a mixed mode, or a complex idea of an action that could occur. But remaining calm in danger without using reason or making any effort is also possible. So this second idea is just as real as the first. Though the first idea is called COURAGE, it may be right or wrong in relation to that name. But the second idea has no commonly accepted name in any known language. As long as it has no such name, it cannot fail to match a standard. It was formed with reference to nothing but itself.

5. Complex Ideas of Substances are real, when they agree with the existence of Things.

5. Complex ideas of substances are real when they match things that actually exist.

Thirdly, Our complex ideas of SUBSTANCES, being made all of them in reference to things existing without us, and intended to be representations of substances as they really are, are no further real than as they are such combinations of simple ideas as are really united, and co-exist in things without us. On the contrary, those are fantastical which are made up of such collections of simple ideas as were really never united, never were found together in any substance: v. g. a rational creature, consisting of a horse’s head, joined to a body of human shape, or such as the CENTAURS are described: or, a body yellow, very malleable, fusible, and fixed, but lighter than common water: or an uniform, unorganized body, consisting, as to sense, all of similar parts, with perception and voluntary motion joined to it. Whether such substances as these can possibly exist or no, it is probable we do not know: but be that as it will, these ideas of substances, being made conformable to no pattern existing that we know; and consisting of such collections of ideas as no substance ever showed us united together, they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary: but much more are those complex ideas so, which contain in them any inconsistency or contradiction of their parts.

Thirdly, all our complex ideas of SUBSTANCES refer to things existing outside us. These ideas are intended to represent substances as they really are. Such ideas are real only insofar as their simple ideas are actually combined and coexist in things outside us. By contrast, ideas are imaginary when their simple ideas have never actually been united or found together in any substance. For example, consider a rational creature with a horse’s head joined to a human-shaped body, or a creature like the CENTAURS. Or consider a yellow body, very easy to shape, able to melt, and resistant to evaporation, but lighter than ordinary water. Another example is a uniform body with no organized structure, whose parts all seem alike to the senses. Yet this body also has perception and the ability to move voluntarily. We probably do not know whether substances like these can possibly exist. But regardless, these ideas of substances match no existing model known to us. They combine ideas that no substance has ever shown us united together. So we should regard these ideas as merely imaginary. Still more should we regard as imaginary those complex ideas whose parts contain any inconsistency or contradiction.