Identity and Difference

1. Wherein Identity consists.

1. What identity consists of.

ANOTHER occasion the mind often takes of comparing, is the very being of things, when, considering ANYTHING AS EXISTING AT ANY DETERMINED TIME AND PLACE, we compare it with ITSELF EXISTING AT ANOTHER TIME, and thereon form the ideas of IDENTITY and DIVERSITY. When we see anything to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another which at that same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: and in this consists IDENTITY, when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present. For we never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the same kind should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly conclude, that, whatever exists anywhere at any time, excludes all of the same kind, and is there itself alone. When therefore we demand whether anything be the SAME or no, it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain, at that instant, was the same with itself, and no other. From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning; it being impossible for two things of the same kind to be or exist in the same instant, in the very same place; or one and the same thing in different places. That, therefore, that had one beginning, is the same thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same, but diverse. That which has made the difficulty about this relation has been the little care and attention used in having precise notions of the things to which it is attributed.

ANOTHER reason the mind often compares things is their very existence. We consider ANYTHING AS EXISTING AT A PARTICULAR TIME AND PLACE. Then we compare it with ITSELF EXISTING AT ANOTHER TIME, forming the ideas of IDENTITY and DIFFERENCE. When we see anything in a particular place at a particular instant, we know it is that very thing. Whatever the thing may be, it is not another thing existing elsewhere at the same time. This remains true however alike or indistinguishable the two things may be in every other respect. IDENTITY consists in this: the ideas to which we attribute identity remain entirely unchanged from the earlier moment we consider. We compare their present existence with their existence at that earlier moment. We never find two things of the same kind existing in the same place at the same time. Nor can we conceive of this as possible. So we rightly conclude that anything existing anywhere at any time excludes everything else of the same kind. That thing alone occupies that place at that time. So when we ask whether anything is the SAME, we always refer to something existing at a particular time and place. At that instant, the thing was certainly the same as itself and was no other thing. It follows that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor can two things have one beginning. Two things of the same kind cannot exist at the same instant in the very same place. Nor can one and the same thing exist in different places at the same instant. Therefore, whatever had one beginning is the same thing. Whatever had a different beginning in time and place is not the same thing, but a different one. The difficulty surrounding this relationship comes from a lack of care and attention. We have not formed precise ideas of the things to which we attribute identity or difference.

2. Identity of Substances.

2. The Identity of Substances.

We have the ideas but of three sorts of substances: 1. GOD. 2. FINITE INTELLIGENCES. 3. BODIES.

We have ideas of only three kinds of substances: 1. God. 2. Finite intelligent beings. 3. Bodies.

First, GOD is without beginning, eternal, unalterable, and everywhere, and therefore concerning his identity there can be no doubt.

First, GOD has no beginning, is eternal and unchanging, and is everywhere. So there can be no doubt about his identity.

Secondly, FINITE SPIRITS having had each its determinated time and place of beginning to exist, the relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its identity, as long as it exists.

Secondly, each FINITE SPIRIT began to exist at a specific time and place. Its relation to that time and place will always determine its identity, as long as the spirit exists.

Thirdly, The same will hold of every PARTICLE OF MATTER, to which no addition or subtraction of matter being made, it is the same. For, though these three sorts of substances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the same place, yet we cannot conceive but that they must necessarily each of them exclude any of the same kind out of the same place: or else the notions and names of identity and diversity would be in vain, and there could be no such distinctions of substances, or anything else one from another. For example: could two bodies be in the same place at the same time; then those two parcels of matter must be one and the same, take them great or little; nay, all bodies must be one and the same. For, by the same reason that two particles of matter may be in one place, all bodies may be in one place: which, when it can be supposed, takes away the distinction of identity and diversity of one and more, and renders it ridiculous. But it being a contradiction that two or more should be one, identity and diversity are relations and ways of comparing well founded, and of use to the understanding.

Thirdly, the same holds for every PARTICLE OF MATTER. A particle remains the same as long as no matter is added or removed. These three kinds of substances, as we call them, do not prevent one another from occupying the same place. Yet we must understand each substance as necessarily excluding any other of the same kind from that place. Otherwise, the ideas and names of identity and difference would be useless. We could not distinguish substances, or anything else, from one another. For example, suppose two bodies could occupy the same place at the same time. Then those two portions of matter, large or small, would have to be one and the same. Indeed, all bodies would have to be one and the same. For if two particles of matter could occupy one place, then, by the same reasoning, all bodies could. Accepting that possibility would erase the distinction between identity and difference, between one and many, and make that distinction ridiculous. But saying that two or more things are one is a contradiction. So identity and difference are well-founded relations and useful ways for the mind to compare things.

3. Identity of modes and relations.

3. Identity of modes and relations.

All other things being but modes or relations ultimately terminated in substances, the identity and diversity of each particular existence of them too will be by the same way determined: only as to things whose existence is in succession, such as are the actions of finite beings, v. g. MOTION and THOUGHT, both which consist in a continued train of succession, concerning THEIR diversity there can be no question: because each perishing the moment it begins, they cannot exist in different times, or in different places, as permanent beings can at different times exist in distant places; and therefore no motion or thought, considered as at different times, can be the same, each part thereof having a different beginning of existence.

All other things are merely modes or relations that ultimately depend on substances. The identity and difference of each particular instance of these things are therefore determined in the same way. But some things exist as a succession, such as the actions of finite beings, for example, MOTION and THOUGHT. Both consist of a continuous sequence. There can be no question that successive instances of THESE are distinct, because each vanishes the moment it begins. Such instances cannot exist at different times or in different places, as lasting beings can occupy distant places at different times. Therefore, no motion or thought at one time can be the same as a motion or thought at another. Each part of a motion or thought begins to exist at a different moment.

4. Principium Individuationis.

4. The principle of individuation.

From what has been said, it is easy to discover what is so much inquired after, the PRINCIPIUM INDIVIDUATIONIS; and that, it is plain, is existence itself; which determines a being of any sort to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of the same kind. This, though it seems easier to conceive in simple substances or modes; yet, when reflected on, is not more difficult in compound ones, if care be taken to what it is applied: v.g. let us suppose an atom, i.e. a continued body under one immutable superficies, existing in a determined time and place; it is evident, that, considered in any instant of its existence, it is in that instant the same with itself. For, being at that instant what it is, and nothing else, it is the same, and so must continue as long as its existence is continued; for so long it will be the same, and no other. In like manner, if two or more atoms be joined together into the same mass, every one of those atoms will be the same, by the foregoing rule: and whilst they exist united together, the mass, consisting of the same atoms, must be the same mass, or the same body, let the parts be ever so differently jumbled. But if one of these atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the same mass or the same body. In the state of living creatures, their identity depends not on a mass of the same particles, but on something else. For in them the variation of great parcels of matter alters not the identity: an oak growing from a plant to a great tree, and then lopped, is still the same oak; and a colt grown up to a horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while the same horse: though, in both these cases, there may be a manifest change of the parts; so that truly they are not either of them the same masses of matter, though they be truly one of them the same oak, and the other the same horse. The reason whereof is, that, in these two cases—a MASS OF MATTER and a LIVING BODY—identity is not applied to the same thing.

From what has been said, we can easily identify the much-debated PRINCIPIUM INDIVIDUATIONIS, or principle of individuation. Clearly, this principle is existence itself. Existence fixes a being of any kind at a particular time and place. Two beings of the same kind cannot share that time and place. This principle may seem easier to understand in simple substances or modes. But on reflection, it is no harder to understand in compound ones, provided we carefully consider what we apply it to. For example, suppose an atom exists at a definite time and place. By an atom, I mean a continuous body enclosed by a single, unchanging surface. Clearly, at any instant of its existence, the atom is identical with itself. For at that instant, the atom is what it is and nothing else. The atom must remain the same as long as its existence continues. Throughout that existence, it will be the same atom and no other. Likewise, if two or more atoms join into one mass, each atom remains the same, according to the rule just given. While the atoms remain joined, the mass consists of the same atoms and must remain the same mass or body. This holds no matter how differently the parts are rearranged. But if one atom is removed or a new one added, the mass or body is no longer the same. In living creatures, identity depends not on a mass of the same particles, but on something else. For in living creatures, changes in large amounts of matter do not alter identity. An oak growing from a young plant into a large tree, and then having branches cut off, remains the same oak. A colt growing into a horse remains the same horse throughout, sometimes fat and sometimes thin. Yet in both cases, the parts may clearly change. So neither remains the same mass of matter, although one truly remains the same oak and the other the same horse. The reason is that identity applies to different things in these two cases: a MASS OF MATTER and a LIVING BODY.

5. Identity of Vegetables.

5. Identity of Plants.

We must therefore consider wherein an oak differs from a mass of matter, and that seems to me to be in this, that the one is only the cohesion of particles of matter any how united, the other such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an oak; and such an organization of those parts as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment, so as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, &c., of an oak, in which consists the vegetable life. That being then one plant which has such an organization of parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life, it continues to be the same plant as long as it partakes of the same life, though that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued organization conformable to that sort of plants. For this organization, being at any one instant in any one collection of matter, is in that particular concrete distinguished from all other, and IS that individual life, which existing constantly from that moment both forwards and backwards, in the same continuity of insensibly succeeding parts united to the living body of the plant, it has that identity which makes the same plant, and all the parts of it, parts of the same plant, during all the time that they exist united in that continued organization, which is fit to convey that common life to all the parts so united.

We must therefore consider how an oak differs from a mass of matter. The difference seems to me to be this: a mass is merely particles of matter held together in any arrangement. An oak has particles arranged to form the parts of an oak. Those parts are organized to receive and distribute nourishment, so as to maintain and form wood, bark, leaves, and so on. The oak’s life as a plant consists in this organization. A single plant, then, has parts organized into one connected body, sharing one common life. The plant remains the same plant as long as it shares in that same life. This remains true even though that life passes to new particles of matter joined to the living plant. The particles maintain a continuous organization suited to that kind of plant. At any given moment, this organization in a particular collection of matter is distinct from every other instance. This organization IS that individual life. From that moment, the life extends continuously both forward and backward through gradually changing parts joined to the living plant. This continuity gives the plant the identity that makes it the same plant. It also makes all the plant’s parts belong to that same plant for as long as they remain united in this continuous organization. This organization is suited to carrying the common life to all the parts united in it.

6. Identity of Animals.

6. The Identity of Animals.

The case is not so much different in BRUTES but that any one may hence see what makes an animal and continues it the same. Something we have like this in machines, and may serve to illustrate it. For example, what is a watch? It is plain it is nothing but a fit organization or construction of parts to a certain end, which, when a sufficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we would suppose this machine one continued body, all whose organized parts were repaired, increased, or diminished by a constant addition or separation of insensible parts, with one common life, we should have something very much like the body of an animal; with this difference, That, in an animal the fitness of the organization, and the motion wherein life consists, begin together, the motion coming from within; but in machines the force coming sensibly from without, is often away when the organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.

The case of animals is similar enough for anyone to see what makes an animal and keeps it the same animal. We find something similar in machines, which may help explain the point. For example, what is a watch? Clearly, a watch is simply a set of parts arranged to achieve a particular purpose when enough force is applied. Suppose we imagined this machine as one continuous body, with all its organized parts sharing one life. Suppose those parts were repaired, enlarged, or reduced by constantly adding or removing particles too small to notice. We would then have something very much like an animal’s body, but with this difference. In an animal, the proper arrangement of parts and the movement that constitutes life begin together. The movement comes from within. But in machines, the force comes from outside in a way we can perceive. That force is often absent even when the mechanism is in working order and ready to receive it.

7. The Identity of Man.

7. The Identity of a Human Being.

This also shows wherein the identity of the same MAN consists; viz. in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body. He that shall place the identity of man in anything else, but, like that of other animals, in one fitly organized body, taken in any one instant, and from thence continued, under one organization of life, in several successively fleeting particles of matter united to it, will find it hard to make an embryo, one of years, mad and sober, the SAME man, by any supposition, that will not make it possible for Seth, Ismael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin, and Caesar Borgia, to be the same man. For if the identity of SOUL ALONE makes the same MAN; and there be nothing in the nature of matter why the same individual spirit may not be united to different bodies, it will be possible that those men, living in distant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the same man: which way of speaking must be from a very strange use of the word man, applied to an idea out of which body and shape are excluded. And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the notions of those philosophers who allow of transmigration, and are of opinion that the souls of men may, for their miscarriages, be detruded into the bodies of beasts, as fit habitations, with organs suited to the satisfaction of their brutal inclinations. But yet I think nobody, could he be sure that the SOUL of Heliogabalus were in one of his hogs, would yet say that hog were a MAN or Heliogabalus.

This also shows what makes someone the same MAN over time: nothing but sharing in the same continuing life. Particles of matter constantly come and go, successively joining the same organized body as living parts. Suppose someone bases human identity on anything else. For humans, as for other animals, identity consists in one suitably organized body, considered at any given moment. That body then continues through time under one living organization, as successive particles of matter join and leave it. Anyone who rejects this account will struggle to explain how an embryo and an adult can be the SAME man. The same difficulty applies to a man who is mad at one time and sane at another. Any alternative explanation risks allowing Seth, Ismael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin, and Caesar Borgia to be the same man. For suppose the SOUL ALONE makes someone the same MAN. And suppose nothing in the nature of matter prevents the same individual spirit from joining different bodies. Then those men, living in distant ages and having different temperaments, could have been the same man. But calling them the same man would use the word man very strangely. It would apply the word to an idea that excludes both body and shape. This way of speaking would fit even worse with the views of philosophers who accept the migration of souls. These philosophers believe that human souls may be forced into animals’ bodies as punishment for their wrongdoing. They consider these bodies suitable homes, with organs suited to satisfying the souls’ animal inclinations. But suppose someone could be certain that the SOUL of Heliogabalus was in one of his hogs. Even then, I think nobody would call that hog a MAN or Heliogabalus.

8. Idea of Identity suited to the Idea it is applied to.

8. The idea of identity depends on the idea to which it is applied.

It is not therefore unity of substance that comprehends all sorts of identity, or will determine it in every case; but to conceive and judge of it aright, we must consider what idea the word it is applied to stands for: it being one thing to be the same SUBSTANCE, another the same MAN, and a third the same PERSON, if PERSON, MAN, and SUBSTANCE, are three names standing for three different ideas;—for such as is the idea belonging to that name, such must be the identity; which, if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would possibly have prevented a great deal of that confusion which often occurs about this matter, with no small seeming difficulties, especially concerning PERSONAL identity, which therefore we shall in the next place a little consider.

So sameness of substance does not cover all kinds of identity or determine identity in every case. To understand and judge identity correctly, we must consider the idea represented by the word we apply identity to. Being the same SUBSTANCE is one thing, being the same MAN another, and being the same PERSON a third. These distinctions hold if PERSON, MAN, and SUBSTANCE are three names representing three different ideas. For the nature of identity must match the idea represented by the name. A little more careful attention to this point might have prevented much of the confusion that often surrounds this subject. It might also have prevented many seemingly serious difficulties, especially those concerning PERSONAL identity. So we will now consider PERSONAL identity briefly.

9. Same man.

9. The same man.

An animal is a living organized body; and consequently the same animal, as we have observed, is the same continued LIFE communicated to different particles of matter, as they happen successively to be united to that organized living body. And whatever is talked of other definitions, ingenious observation puts it past doubt, that the idea in our minds, of which the sound man in our mouths is the sign, is nothing else but of an animal of such a certain form. Since I think I may be confident, that, whoever should see a creature of his own shape or make, though it had no more reason all its life than a cat or a parrot, would call him still a MAN; or whoever should hear a cat or a parrot discourse, reason, and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a CAT or a PARROT; and say, the one was a dull irrational man, and the other a very intelligent rational parrot.

An animal is a living body with an organized structure. So, as we have observed, the same animal consists in the same continuing LIFE, passed on to different particles of matter. These particles become part of that organized living body one after another. Whatever other definitions people offer, careful observation puts one point beyond doubt. The idea in our minds represented by the word man is simply an animal with a certain bodily form. For I think I can confidently say that anyone seeing a creature shaped like themselves would still call that creature a MAN. They would do so even if the creature had no more reason throughout its life than a cat or parrot. Likewise, anyone hearing a cat or parrot discuss ideas, reason, and philosophize would still consider the creature a CAT or PARROT. They would call the human-shaped creature a dull, irrational man, and the talking bird a very intelligent, rational parrot.

10. Same man.

10. The same man.

For I presume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the IDEA OF A MAN in most people’s sense: but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to it; and if that be the idea of a man, the same successive body not shifted all at once, must, as well as the same immaterial spirit, go to the making of the same man.

For I assume that most people’s IDEA OF A MAN includes more than just a thinking or rational being. It also includes a body of a certain shape joined to that being. If that is the idea of a man, then being the same man requires the same body continuing over time. The body must not be replaced all at once, and the same nonphysical spirit must also continue.

11. Personal Identity.

11. Personal Identity.

This being premised, to find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what PERSON stands for;—which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive without PERCEIVING that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions: and by this every one is to himself that which he calls SELF:—it not being considered, in this case, whether the same self be continued in the same or divers substances. For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done.

With these points established, we must consider what PERSON means to discover what personal identity consists in. A person, I think, is a thinking, intelligent being with reason and the ability to reflect. Such a being can recognize itself as itself, the same thinking being at different times and places. A person does so only through consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking and seems to me essential to thinking. No one can perceive anything without PERCEIVING that they perceive it. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know we are doing so. This awareness always accompanies our present sensations and perceptions. Through this awareness, each of us is, to ourselves, what we call SELF. Here, we are not considering whether the same self continues in the same substance or in different substances. For consciousness always accompanies thinking and makes each of us what we call our self. Through consciousness, each of us distinguishes ourselves from all other thinking beings. Personal identity, meaning the continued identity of a rational being, consists in consciousness alone. A person's identity reaches back just as far as their consciousness can extend to any past action or thought. The self is the same now as it was then. The self that performed that past action is the very same self that now reflects on the action.

12. Consciousness makes personal Identity.

12. Consciousness defines personal identity.

But it is further inquired, whether it be the same identical substance. This few would think they had reason to doubt of, if these perceptions, with their consciousness, always remained present in the mind, whereby the same thinking thing would be always consciously present, and, as would be thought, evidently the same to itself. But that which seems to make the difficulty is this, that this consciousness being interrupted always by forgetfulness, there being no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our past actions before our eyes in one view, but even the best memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are viewing another; and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of our lives, not reflecting on our past selves, being intent on our present thoughts, and in sound sleep having no thoughts at all, or at least none with that consciousness which remarks our waking thoughts,—I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the sight of our past selves, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, i.e. the same SUBSTANCE or no. Which, however reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not PERSONAL identity at all. The question being what makes the same person; and not whether it be the same identical substance, which always thinks in the same person, which, in this case, matters not at all: different substances, by the same consciousness (where they do partake in it) being united into one person, as well as different bodies by the same life are united into one animal, whose identity is preserved in that change of substances by the unity of one continued life. For, it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed solely to one individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances. For as far as any intelligent being CAN repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same personal self. For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions, that it is SELF TO ITSELF now, and so will be the same self, as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come; and would be by distance of time, or change of substance, no more two persons, than a man be two men by wearing other clothes to-day than he did yesterday, with a long or a short sleep between: the same consciousness uniting those distant actions into the same person, whatever substances contributed to their production.

But a further question arises: is the thinking thing the very same substance? Few would see reason for doubt if these perceptions, together with awareness of them, always remained present in the mind. The same thinking thing would then always be consciously present to itself. And, people would think, the thinking thing would clearly recognize itself as the same. The difficulty seems to arise because forgetfulness constantly interrupts this consciousness. At no moment in our lives do we see the whole sequence of our past actions at once. Even the best memories lose sight of one part while considering another. Sometimes, indeed for most of our lives, we do not reflect on our past selves. Instead, we focus on our present thoughts. In deep sleep, we have no thoughts at all. Or at least, we have none accompanied by the consciousness that marks our waking thoughts. In all these cases, consciousness is interrupted, and we lose sight of our past selves. These interruptions raise doubts about whether we remain the same thinking thing, that is, the same SUBSTANCE. But whether these doubts are reasonable or unreasonable, they have nothing to do with PERSONAL identity. The question is what makes someone the same person. The question is not whether the very same substance always does the thinking in that person. For this purpose, whether the substance remains the same does not matter at all. Different substances can share the same consciousness and, through that shared consciousness, be united into one person. Similarly, different bodies are united into one animal by sharing the same life. The animal remains the same through changes of substance because one continuous life unites those changes. The same consciousness makes someone recognize himself as himself, so personal identity depends on consciousness alone. Consciousness might belong only to one individual substance, or consciousness might continue through a succession of different substances. Either way, personal identity depends on consciousness alone. An intelligent being CAN recall a past action with the same consciousness originally accompanying that action. The being can also have the same consciousness of that action as of a present action. As far as an intelligent being can do so, the being remains the same personal self. Awareness of present thoughts and actions makes the being a SELF TO ITSELF now. That being will remain the same self as far as the same consciousness can extend to past or future actions. Neither a gap in time nor a change of substance would make that being two persons. A man is no more two men because he wears different clothes today than yesterday, after a long or short sleep. The same consciousness unites those actions, however far apart, into one person, whatever substances helped produce the actions.

13. Personal Identity in Change of Substance.

13. Personal Identity When Substance Changes.

That this is so, we have some kind of evidence in our very bodies, all whose particles, whilst vitally united to this same thinking conscious self, so that WE FEEL when they are touched, and are affected by, and conscious of good or harm that happens to them, are a part of ourselves; i.e. of our thinking conscious self. Thus, the limbs of his body are to every one a part of himself; he sympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off a hand, and thereby separate it from that consciousness he had of its heat, cold, and other affections, and it is then no longer a part of that which is himself, any more than the remotest part of matter. Thus, we see the SUBSTANCE whereof personal self consisted at one time may be varied at another, without the change of personal identity; there being no question about the same person, though the limbs which but now were a part of it, be cut off.

We have some evidence for this in our own bodies. All their particles are part of ourselves as long as they remain vitally connected to the same thinking, conscious self. We FEEL when these particles are touched, and we experience and are aware of any good or harm to them. In this sense, they are part of our thinking, conscious self. Thus, everyone’s limbs are part of themselves. Each person shares in what their limbs feel and cares about them. Cut off a hand, separating it from the person’s awareness of its heat, cold, and other sensations. The hand is then no more a part of that person’s self than the most distant piece of matter. Thus, we see that the SUBSTANCE making up a person’s self may change over time without changing personal identity. There is no question that someone remains the same person, even though limbs just belonging to them are cut off.

14. Personality in Change of Substance.

14. Personal Identity When Substance Changes.

But the question is, Whether if the same substance which thinks be changed, it can be the same person; or, remaining the same, it can be different persons?

But the question is this: if the thinking substance changes, can the person remain the same? Or, if the thinking substance remains the same, can it be different persons?

And to this I answer: First, This can be no question at all to those who place thought in a purely material animal constitution, void of an immaterial substance. For, whether their supposition be true or no, it is plain they conceive personal identity preserved in something else than identity of substance; as animal identity is preserved in identity of life, and not of substance. And therefore those who place thinking in an immaterial substance only, before they can come to deal with these men, must show why personal identity cannot be preserved in the change of immaterial substances, or variety of particular immaterial substances, as well as animal identity is preserved in the change of material substances, or variety of particular bodies: unless they will say, it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same life in brutes, as it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same person in men; which the Cartesians at least will not admit, for fear of making brutes thinking things too.

To this I answer: First, this is no question at all for those who place thought in a purely material animal body. They allow no immaterial substance. Whether their assumption is true or not, they clearly believe personal identity rests on something other than sameness of substance. Similarly, an animal remains the same animal through continuity of life, not sameness of substance. So those who place thought only in an immaterial substance must explain something before they can challenge this view. Why cannot personal identity survive a change of immaterial substances, or a succession of different immaterial substances? After all, an animal’s identity survives changes in material substances, or a succession of different bodies. Unless, that is, they claim that one immaterial spirit preserves the same life in animals, just as one immaterial spirit preserves the same person in humans. But the Cartesians, at least, will not accept that claim, for fear of making animals thinking beings too.

15. Whether in Change of thinking Substances there can be one Person.

15. Whether the same person can exist when the thinking substance changes.

But next, as to the first part of the question, Whether, if the same thinking substance (supposing immaterial substances only to think) be changed, it can be the same person? I answer, that cannot be resolved but by those who know there can what kind of substances they are that do think; and whether the consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one thinking substance to another. I grant were the same consciousness the same individual action it could not: but it being a present representation of a past action, why it may not be possible, that that may be represented to the mind to have been which really never was, will remain to be shown. And therefore how far the consciousness of past actions is annexed to any individual agent, so that another cannot possibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of action it is that cannot be done without a reflex act of perception accompanying it, and how performed by thinking substances, who cannot think without being conscious of it. But that which we call the same consciousness, not being the same individual act, why one intellectual substance may not have represented to it, as done by itself, what IT never did, and was perhaps done by some other agent—why, I say, such a representation may not possibly be without reality of matter of fact, as well as several representations in dreams are, which yet whilst dreaming we take for true—will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things. And that it never is so, will by us, till we have clearer views of the nature of thinking substances, be best resolved into the goodness of God; who, as far as the happiness or misery of any of his sensible creatures is concerned in it, will not, by a fatal error of theirs, transfer from one to another that consciousness which draws reward or punishment with it. How far this may be an argument against those who would place thinking in a system of fleeting animal spirits, I leave to be considered. But yet, to return to the question before us, it must be allowed, that, if the same consciousness (which, as has been shown, is quite a different thing from the same numerical figure or motion in body) can be transferred from one thinking substance to another, it will be possible that two thinking substances may make but one person. For the same consciousness being preserved, whether in the same or different substances, the personal identity is preserved.

Next, consider the first part of the question: If the thinking substance changes, can the person remain the same? Here we assume that only immaterial substances can think. My answer is that only those who know what kinds of substances think can resolve this question. They must also know whether consciousness of past actions can pass from one thinking substance to another. I admit that such a transfer would be impossible if the same consciousness were the very same individual action. But consciousness is a present representation of a past action. Why, then, could the mind not represent something as having happened when it never really happened? Anyone denying this possibility must still explain why it is impossible. So we will find it hard to determine how closely consciousness of past actions belongs to any individual agent. We cannot yet say whether another agent could possibly have that consciousness. First, we must understand what kind of action necessarily involves an accompanying awareness of that action. We must also understand how thinking substances perform such actions, since they cannot think without being conscious of their thinking. But what we call the same consciousness is not the very same individual act. Why, then, could one thinking substance not have an action represented to it as its own, although IT never performed it? Perhaps some other agent performed the action. Why could such a representation not occur without matching the facts? Several representations in dreams do not match the facts, yet while dreaming we take them as true. It will be difficult to rule out such false representations on the basis of the nature of things. Until we understand thinking substances more clearly, our best basis for believing such transfers never happen is God's goodness. Such consciousness brings reward or punishment with it. Where the happiness or misery of his conscious creatures is at stake, God will not transfer that consciousness between them through a disastrous error on their part. I leave readers to consider how far this argument counts against those who locate thought in a system of fleeting animal spirits. But to return to our question, we must allow the following possibility. If the same consciousness can pass from one thinking substance to another, two thinking substances may make up one person. As already shown, the same consciousness is quite different from the very same individual shape or motion in a body. For as long as the same consciousness is preserved, personal identity is preserved, whether the substances remain the same or change.

16. Whether, the same immaterial Substance remaining, there can be two Persons.

16. Whether two persons can exist while the same immaterial substance remains.

As to the second part of the question, Whether the same immaterial substance remaining, there may be two distinct persons; which question seems to me to be built on this,—Whether the same immaterial being, being conscious of the action of its past duration, may be wholly stripped of all the consciousness of its past existence, and lose it beyond the power of ever retrieving it again: and so as it were beginning a new account from a new period, have a consciousness that CANNOT reach beyond this new state. All those who hold pre-existence are evidently of this mind; since they allow the soul to have no remaining consciousness of what it did in that pre-existent state, either wholly separate from body, or informing any other body; and if they should not, it is plain experience would be against them. So that personal identity, reaching no further than consciousness reaches, a pre-existent spirit not having continued so many ages in a state of silence, must needs make different persons. Suppose a Christian Platonist or a Pythagorean should, upon God’s having ended all his works of creation the seventh day, think his soul hath existed ever since; and should imagine it has revolved in several human bodies; as I once met with one, who was persuaded his had been the SOUL of Socrates (how reasonably I will not dispute; this I know, that in the post he filled, which was no inconsiderable one, he passed for a very rational man, and the press has shown that he wanted not parts or learning;)—would any one say, that he, being not conscious of any of Socrates’s actions or thoughts, could be the same PERSON with Socrates? Let any one reflect upon himself, and conclude that he has in himself an immaterial spirit, which is that which thinks in him, and, in the constant change of his body keeps him the same: and is that which he calls HIMSELF: let him also suppose it to be the same soul that was in Nestor or Thersites, at the siege of Troy, (for souls being, as far as we know anything of them, in their nature indifferent to any parcel of matter, the supposition has no apparent absurdity in it,) which it may have been, as well as it is now the soul of any other man: but he now having no consciousness of any of the actions either of Nestor or Thersites, does or can he conceive himself the same person with either of them? Can he be concerned in either of their actions? attribute them to himself, or think them his own more than the actions of any other men that ever existed? So that this consciousness, not reaching to any of the actions of either of those men, he is no more one SELF with either of them than of the soul of immaterial spirit that now informs him had been created, and began to exist, when it began to inform his present body; though it were never so true, that the same SPIRIT that informed Nestor’s or Thersites’ body were numerically the same that now informs his. For this would no more make him the same person with Nestor, than if some of the particles of smaller that were once a part of Nestor were now a part of this man the same immaterial substance, without the same consciousness, no more making the same person, by being united to any body, than the same particle of matter, without consciousness, united to any body, makes the same person. But let him once find himself conscious of any of the actions of Nestor, he then finds himself the same person with Nestor.

The second part of the question asks whether the same immaterial substance can remain while forming two distinct persons. To me, this question seems to rest on another question. Can the same immaterial being lose all consciousness of its past existence, despite once being conscious of its past actions? Can it lose that consciousness so completely that it can never recover it? Could it then, in effect, begin a new account from a new starting point? Its consciousness would then be unable to reach beyond this new state. All who believe that souls exist before their present lives clearly take this view. They accept that the soul retains no consciousness of what it did in its earlier existence. This applies whether the soul existed entirely apart from a body or animated another body. If they denied this loss of consciousness, ordinary experience would plainly contradict them. Personal identity extends only as far as consciousness extends. So a pre-existing spirit must form different persons, unless it has remained inactive for all those ages. Suppose a Christian Platonist or a Pythagorean believes his soul has existed since God finished creating everything on the seventh day. Suppose he also imagines that his soul has passed through several human bodies. I once met someone who was convinced that his soul had been the SOUL of Socrates. I will not debate how reasonable that belief was. I do know that he was considered a very rational man in the important position he held. His published writings also showed that he lacked neither ability nor learning. Yet he had no consciousness of any of Socrates’s actions or thoughts. Would anyone say that he could be the same PERSON as Socrates? Let someone reflect on himself and conclude that he has an immaterial spirit within him. This spirit does his thinking and keeps him the same despite the constant changes in his body. He calls this spirit HIMSELF. Let him also suppose that his soul was once in Nestor or Thersites at the siege of Troy. As far as we know, souls have no natural attachment to any particular portion of matter. So this supposition contains no obvious absurdity. His soul may once have been theirs, just as it is now the soul of another man. But he now has no consciousness of any of Nestor’s or Thersites’ actions. Does he, or can he, think of himself as the same person as either man? Can he consider himself involved in either man’s actions? Can he attribute those actions to himself? Can he think them his own any more than the actions of any other men who ever lived? His consciousness does not extend to any of those men’s actions. So he is no more one SELF with either man than if his immaterial soul had just been created. Suppose that soul began existing only when it began animating his present body. His relation to Nestor or Thersites would be no different. This remains true even if the SPIRIT now animating him is the very same spirit that animated either man’s body. The same spirit would no more make him Nestor than would sharing some particles of matter once belonging to Nestor. Without the same consciousness, the same immaterial substance united to a body does not make the same person. Neither does the same particle of matter, without consciousness, make the same person when united to a body. But let him once become conscious of any of Nestor’s actions, and he finds himself the same person as Nestor.

17. The body, as well as the soul, goes to the making of a Man.

17. The body, as well as the soul, is part of what makes a human being.

And thus may we be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the same person at the resurrection, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here,—the same consciousness going along with the soul that inhabits it. But yet the soul alone, in the change of bodies, would scarce to any one but to him that makes the soul the man, be enough to make the same man. For should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince’s past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by his own soul, every one sees he would be the same PERSON with the prince, accountable only for the prince’s actions: but who would say it was the same MAN? The body too goes to the making the man, and would, I guess, to everybody determine the man in this case, wherein the soul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man: but he would be the same cobbler to every one besides himself. I know that, in the ordinary way of speaking, the same person, and the same man, stand for one and the same thing. And indeed every one will always have a liberty to speak as he pleases, and to apply what articulate sounds to what ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases. But yet, when we will inquire what makes the same SPIRIT, MAN, or PERSON, we must fix the ideas of spirit, man, or person in our minds; and having resolved with ourselves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine, in either of them, or the like, when it is the same, and when not.

In this way, we can easily imagine the same person at the resurrection, though in a somewhat different body. That body need not have exactly the same structure or parts as the body the person had here. The same consciousness would accompany the soul inhabiting the new body. But when bodies change, the soul alone would hardly be enough to make someone the same man. Only someone who takes the soul to be the man would think otherwise. Suppose a prince’s soul carried with it the consciousness of the prince’s past life. Suppose that soul entered and gave life to a cobbler’s body as soon as the cobbler’s own soul left it. Everyone sees that he would be the same PERSON as the prince, accountable only for the prince’s actions. But who would say he was the same MAN? The body, too, is part of what makes the man. In this case, I think everyone would identify the man by his body. The soul, with all its princely thoughts, would not make him a different man. To everyone but himself, he would still be the same cobbler. I know that, in ordinary speech, “the same person” and “the same man” mean the same thing. And indeed, everyone is always free to speak as they please. They can attach whatever spoken words they choose to whatever ideas they think fit, and change those choices whenever they please. But when we ask what makes someone the same SPIRIT, MAN, or PERSON, we must clearly define these ideas in our minds. Once we have decided what we mean by these terms, the question will not be hard to answer. We can then determine, in each of these cases or similar ones, when something remains the same and when it does not.

18. Consciousness alone unites actions into the same Person.

18. Only consciousness links actions as belonging to the same person.

But though the same immaterial substance or soul does not alone, wherever it be, and in whatsoever state, make the same MAN; yet it is plain, consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended—should it be to ages past—unites existences and actions very remote in time into the same PERSON, as well as it does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment: so that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions, is the same person to whom they both belong. Had I the same consciousness that I saw the ark and Noah’s flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, or as that I write now, I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that saw the Thames overflowed last winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the same SELF,—place that self in what SUBSTANCE you please—than that I who write this am the same MYSELF now whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same substance material or immaterial, or no) that I was yesterday. For as to this point of being the same self, it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances—I being as much concerned, and as justly accountable for any action that was done a thousand years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment.

But the same immaterial substance or soul alone does not make someone the same MAN, wherever or however it exists. Yet consciousness clearly unites experiences and actions far apart in time into the same PERSON. It does so as far back as it can reach, even into distant ages. It unites those experiences and actions just as it unites those of the moment immediately before. So whatever is conscious of both present and past actions is the same person to whom both belong. Suppose I were as conscious of seeing the ark and Noah’s flood as of seeing the Thames overflow last winter. Suppose I were as conscious of both as I am of writing now. Then I could not doubt that the writer, the witness to the Thames overflowing, and the witness to the great flood were the same SELF. That self could exist in whatever SUBSTANCE you please. I could no more doubt that identity than I can doubt that I am the same MYSELF now, while writing, as yesterday. This holds whether or not I consist of exactly the same material or immaterial substance. For being the same self, it makes no difference whether my present self consists of the same substances or different ones. Suppose my present self-consciousness identifies an action done a thousand years ago as mine. I have as much stake in that action, and am as justly accountable for it, as for my last action.

19. Self depends on Consciousness, not on Substance.

19. The self depends on consciousness, not on substance.

SELF is that conscious thinking thing,—whatever substance made up of, (whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters not)—which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds that, whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little finger is as much a part of himself as what is most so. Upon separation of this little finger, should this consciousness go along with the little finger, and leave the rest of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the person, the same person; and self then would have nothing to do with the rest of the body. As in this case it is the consciousness that goes along with the substance, when one part is separate from another, which makes the same person, and constitutes this inseparable self: so it is in reference to substances remote in time. That with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing CAN join itself, makes the same person, and is one self with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to itself, and owns all the actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no further; as every one who reflects will perceive.

SELF is the conscious, thinking thing, whatever substance it consists of. (Whether the substance is spiritual or material, simple or made of several parts, does not matter.) The self feels or is conscious of pleasure and pain, and is capable of happiness or misery. So the self cares about itself as far as its consciousness extends. Thus, everyone finds that their little finger is as much a part of themselves as any other part. This remains true as long as the finger is included within their consciousness. Suppose the little finger were cut off, and this consciousness went with the finger, leaving the rest of the body. Clearly, the little finger would then be the person, the same person. The self would then have nothing to do with the rest of the body. In this case, consciousness follows the substance when one part is separated from another. That consciousness makes the person remain the same and constitutes the self that cannot be separated from it. The same holds for substances at different times. Whatever this present thinking thing's consciousness CAN connect itself with belongs to the same person. It forms one self with that thinking thing, and nothing else does. So the present thinking thing attributes to itself all the actions of whatever its consciousness connects with. It accepts those actions as its own, as far as its consciousness reaches, and no further. Anyone who reflects on this will see that it is so.

20. Persons, not Substances, the Objects of Reward and Punishment.

20. Persons, not substances, are rewarded and punished.

In this personal identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment; happiness and misery being that for which every one is concerned for HIMSELF, and not mattering what becomes of any SUBSTANCE, not joined to, or affected with that consciousness. For, as it is evident in the instance I gave but now, if the consciousness went along with the little finger when it was cut off, that would be the same self which was concerned for the whole body yesterday, as making part of itself, whose actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Though, if the same body should still live, and immediately from the separation of the little finger have its own peculiar consciousness, whereof the little finger knew nothing, it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of itself, or could own any of its actions, or have any of them imputed to him.

Personal identity is the basis of all the right and justice of reward and punishment. Everyone cares about happiness and misery for HIMSELF. What happens to any SUBSTANCE does not matter unless that substance shares in or is affected by that consciousness. As the example I just gave makes clear, suppose consciousness followed the little finger when the finger was cut off. The finger would then be the same self that cared about the whole body yesterday as part of itself. That self must now acknowledge the body's actions yesterday as its own. But suppose the same body continued to live after the finger was cut off. Suppose the body immediately had a separate consciousness that the little finger knew nothing about. The self in the finger would have no concern for that body as part of itself. Nor could that self claim any of the body's actions as its own, or be held responsible for them.

21. Which shows wherein Personal identity consists.

21. This shows what personal identity consists of.

This may show us wherein personal identity consists: not in the identity of substance, but, as I have said, in the identity of consciousness, wherein if Socrates and the present mayor of Queenborough agree, they are the same person: if the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the same consciousness, Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same person. And to punish Socrates waking for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more of right, than to punish one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such twins have been seen.

This may show us what personal identity consists in. As I have said, it lies not in having the same substance, but in having the same consciousness. If Socrates and the present mayor of Queenborough share the same consciousness, they are the same person. If Socrates awake and Socrates asleep do not share the same consciousness, they are not the same person. Suppose Socrates were punished while awake for thoughts he had while asleep, thoughts he was never conscious of while awake. Such punishment would be no more just than punishing one twin for something his brother did, without his knowledge. In that case, the punishment would be based on the twins looking so alike that no one could distinguish them. Such twins have been seen.

22. Absolute oblivion separates what is thus forgotten from the person, but not from the man.

22. Complete forgetting separates what has been forgotten from the person, but not from the human being.

But yet possibly it will still be objected,—Suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life, beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the same person that did those actions, had those thoughts that I once was conscious of, though I have now forgot them? To which I answer, that we must here take notice what the word I is applied to; which, in this case, is the MAN only. And the same man being presumed to be the same person, I is easily here supposed to stand also for the same person. But if it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same man would at different times make different persons; which, we see, is the sense of mankind in the solemnest declaration of their opinions, human laws not punishing the mad man for the sober man’s actions, nor the sober man for what the mad man did,—thereby making them two persons: which is somewhat explained by our way of speaking in English when we say such an one is ‘not himself,’ or is ‘beside himself’; in which phrases it is insinuated, as if those who now, or at least first used them, thought that self was changed; the selfsame person was no longer in that man.

But someone may still object: Suppose I completely lose my memory of some parts of my life, with no possibility of recovering those memories. Perhaps I will never again be conscious of those parts of my life. Yet am I not the same person who performed those actions and had those thoughts? I was once conscious of them, even though I have now forgotten them. I answer that we must notice what the word I refers to here. In this case, it refers only to the MAN. People assume that the same man is the same person. So they easily suppose that I also refers here to the same person. But suppose the same man can have separate states of consciousness at different times, with no connection between them. Then, beyond doubt, the same man would be different persons at different times. We can see that people understand this distinction in their most solemn statements of their views: human laws. These laws do not punish a mad man for his actions when sane, or a sane man for his actions when mad. By treating him this way, the laws make him two persons. Our English expressions partly explain this distinction. We say that someone is ‘not himself,’ or is ‘beside himself’. These phrases suggest that those who use them now, or at least those who first used them, thought the self had changed. It is as if the very same person were no longer present in that man.

23. Difference between Identity of Man and of Person.

23. The Difference Between Human Identity and Personal Identity.

But yet it is hard to conceive that Socrates, the same individual man, should be two persons. To help us a little in this, we must consider what is meant by Socrates, or the same individual MAN.

Yet it is hard to imagine that Socrates, one individual man, could be two persons. To help us understand this difficulty a little, we must consider what we mean by Socrates, or the same individual MAN.

First, it must be either the same individual, immaterial, thinking substance; in short, the same numerical soul, and nothing else.

First, it must be either the same individual, nonphysical, thinking substance. In short, it must be the very same soul and nothing else.

Secondly, or the same animal, without any regard to an immaterial soul.

Second, or the same animal, without considering an immaterial soul.

Thirdly, or the same immaterial spirit united to the same animal.

Third, or the same nonphysical spirit joined to the same living creature.

Now, take which of these suppositions you please, it is impossible to make personal identity to consist in anything but consciousness; or reach any further than that does.

Now, choose whichever of these assumptions you like. Personal identity cannot consist of anything but consciousness, nor can personal identity extend beyond consciousness.

For, by the first of them, it must be allowed possible that a man born of different women, and in distant times, may be the same man. A way of speaking which, whoever admits, must allow it possible for the same man to be two distinct persons, as any two that have lived in different ages without the knowledge of one another’s thoughts.

For, under the first of these, we must accept that the same man could be born to different women at widely separated times. Anyone who accepts this way of speaking must allow that the same man could be two distinct persons. These persons could be as distinct as any two people who lived in different ages without knowing each other’s thoughts.

By the second and third, Socrates, in this life and after it, cannot be the same man any way, but by the same consciousness; and so making human identity to consist in the same thing wherein we place personal identity, there will be difficulty to allow the same man to be the same person. But then they who place human identity in consciousness only, and not in something else, must consider how they will make the infant Socrates the same man with Socrates after the resurrection. But whatsoever to some men makes a man, and consequently the same individual man, wherein perhaps few are agreed, personal identity can by us be placed in nothing but consciousness, (which is that alone which makes what we call SELF,) without involving us in great absurdities.

According to the second and third, Socrates can be the same man in this life and afterward only through the same consciousness. So human identity would consist in the same thing as personal identity. It would then be difficult to accept that the same man is the same person. But those who base human identity on consciousness alone, rather than anything else, must consider a problem. How can they make the infant Socrates the same man as Socrates after the resurrection? People may disagree about what makes someone a man and, consequently, the same individual man. Perhaps few agree on this. But whatever their answer, we can base personal identity on nothing but consciousness without falling into great absurdities. Consciousness alone makes what we call SELF.

But is not a man drunk and sober the same person? why else is he punished for the fact he commits when drunk, though he be never afterwards conscious of it? Just as much the same person as a man that walks, and does other things in his sleep, is the same person, and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Human laws punish both, with a justice suitable to THEIR way of knowledge;—because, in these cases, they cannot distinguish certainly what is real, what counterfeit: and so the ignorance in drunkenness or sleep is not admitted as a plea. But in the Great Day, wherein the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of; but shall receive his doom, his conscience accusing or excusing him.

But is a man not the same person when drunk as when sober? Why else is he punished for an act committed while drunk, though he never remembers it afterward? He is the same person just as much as a man who walks and does other things in his sleep. The sleepwalker is held responsible for any harm he does while asleep. Human laws punish both, with a justice suited to THEIR limited knowledge. For in these cases, human authorities cannot tell for certain whether the lack of awareness is real or faked. So a lack of awareness during drunkenness or sleep is not accepted as a defense. But on the Great Day, the secrets of all hearts will be revealed. It may be reasonable to think that no one will then answer for anything he knows nothing about. Instead, each person will receive his judgment, with his conscience accusing or excusing him.

25. Consciousness alone unites remote existences into one Person.

25. Consciousness alone unites existence at different times into one person.

Nothing but consciousness can unite remote existences into the same person: the identity of substance will not do it; for whatever substance there is, however framed, without consciousness there is no person: and a carcass may be a person, as well as any sort of substance be so, without consciousness.

Only consciousness can unite existences at different times into the same person. The continued existence of the same substance cannot do so. For without consciousness, no substance is a person, whatever the substance is or however it is formed. And without consciousness, any substance has no more claim to be a person than a corpse does.

Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same body, the one constantly by day, the other by night; and, on the other side, the same consciousness, acting by intervals, two distinct bodies: I ask, in the first case, whether the day and the night—man would not be two as distinct persons as Socrates and Plato? And whether, in the second case, there would not be one person in two distinct bodies, as much as one man is the same in two distinct clothings? Nor is it at all material to say, that this same, and this distinct consciousness, in the cases above mentioned, is owing to the same and distinct immaterial substances, bringing it with them to those bodies; which, whether true or no, alters not the case: since it is evident the personal identity would equally be determined by the consciousness, whether that consciousness were annexed to some individual immaterial substance or no. For, granting that the thinking substance in man must be necessarily supposed immaterial, it is evident that immaterial thinking thing may sometimes part with its past consciousness, and be restored to it again: as appears in the forgetfulness men often have of their past actions; and the mind many times recovers the memory of a past consciousness, which it had lost for twenty years together. Make these intervals of memory and forgetfulness to take their turns regularly by day and night, and you have two persons with the same immaterial spirit, as much as in the former instance two persons with the same body. So that self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance, which it cannot be sure of, but only by identity of consciousness.

Suppose two separate consciousnesses, unable to communicate with each other, controlled the same body, one always by day, the other by night. Suppose, on the other hand, that the same consciousness controlled two separate bodies at different times. In the first case, I ask, would the day person and the night person not be as distinct as Socrates and Plato? And in the second case, would there not be one person in two separate bodies? Would that person not remain the same, just as one man remains the same in two different sets of clothes? It makes no difference to say that the same or separate immaterial substances bring these consciousnesses into those bodies. Whether that claim is true or not, the cases remain unchanged. For personal identity would clearly depend equally on consciousness, whether or not consciousness was attached to a particular immaterial substance. Suppose we grant that the thinking substance in a human being must necessarily be immaterial. Even then, that immaterial thinking thing can clearly lose awareness of its past and later regain it. People often forget their past actions. And the mind often recovers the memory of a past awareness after losing it for twenty years. Suppose these periods of memory and forgetfulness alternated regularly between day and night. You would then have two persons sharing the same immaterial spirit, just as the earlier example had two persons sharing one body. So the self does not depend on whether the substance is the same or different, something the self cannot know for certain. Instead, the self depends only on the sameness of consciousness.

26. Not the substance with which the consciousness may be united.

26. Not the substance that consciousness may be joined to.

Indeed it may conceive the substance whereof it is now made up to have existed formerly, united in the same conscious being: but, consciousness removed, that substance is no more itself, or makes no more a part of it, than any other substance; as is evident in the instance we have already given of a limb cut off, of whose heat, or cold, or other affections, having no longer any consciousness, it is no more of a man’s self than any other matter of the universe. In like manner it will be in reference to any immaterial substance, which is void of that consciousness whereby I am myself to myself: so that I cannot upon recollection join with that present consciousness whereby I am now myself, it is, in that part of its existence, no more MYSELF than any other immaterial being. For, whatsoever any substance has thought or done, which I cannot recollect, and by my consciousness make my own thought and action, it will no more belong to me, whether a part of me thought or did it, than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial being anywhere existing.

Indeed, the self may conceive that the substance now making it up once existed within the same conscious being. But without consciousness, that substance is no more the self, or part of the self, than any other substance. The example already given of a severed limb makes this clear. A person is no longer conscious of the limb’s heat, cold, or other sensations. So the limb is no more part of that person’s self than any other matter in the universe. The same applies to any immaterial substance lacking the consciousness through which I recognize myself as myself. If I cannot, through memory, connect that substance’s past existence with my present consciousness, the same conclusion follows. During that part of its existence, the substance is no more MYSELF than any other immaterial being. For whatever any substance has thought or done belongs to me only if I can remember it. Through consciousness, I must be able to recognize the thought or action as my own. Otherwise, even if a part of me thought or did it, the thought or action belongs no more to me than if any other immaterial being anywhere had thought or done it.

27. Consciousness unites substances, material or spiritual, with the same personality.

27. Consciousness unites substances, whether physical or spiritual, into a single personal identity.

I agree, the more probable opinion is, that this consciousness is annexed to, and the affection of, one individual immaterial substance.

I agree that the following view is more probable. This consciousness is attached to one individual immaterial substance and is a property of that substance.

But let men, according to their diverse hypotheses, resolve of that as they please. This every intelligent being, sensible of happiness or misery, must grant—that there is something that is HIMSELF, that he is concerned for, and would have happy; that this self has existed in a continued duration more than one instant, and therefore it is possible may exist, as it has done, months and years to come, without any certain bounds to be set to its duration; and may be the same self, by the same consciousness continued on for the future. And thus, by this consciousness he finds himself to be the same self which did such and such an action some years since, by which he comes to be happy or miserable now. In all which account of self, the same numerical SUBSTANCE is not considered a making the same self; but the same continued CONSCIOUSNESS, in which several substances may have been united, and again separated from it, which, whilst they continued in a vital union with that wherein this consciousness then resided, made a part of that same self. Thus any part of our bodies, vitally united to that which is conscious in us, makes a part of ourselves: but upon separation from the vital union by which that consciousness is communicated, that which a moment since was part of ourselves, is now no more so than a part of another man’s self is a part of me: and it is not impossible but in a little time may become a real part of another person. And so we have the same numerical substance become a part of two different persons; and the same person preserved under the change of various substances. Could we suppose any spirit wholly stripped of all its memory of consciousness of past actions, as we find our minds always are of a great part of ours, and sometimes of them all; the union or separation of such a spiritual substance would make no variation of personal identity, any more than that of any particle of matter does. Any substance vitally united to the present thinking being is a part of that very same self which now is; anything united to it by a consciousness of former actions, makes also a part of the same self, which is the same both then and now.

But let people settle that question as they please, according to their different theories. Every intelligent being capable of happiness or misery must admit that something is HIMSELF. He cares about this self and wants it to be happy. This self has continued to exist for more than a single instant. So it may continue to exist for months and years, with no definite limit that can be set. And it may remain the same self through the continuation of the same consciousness into the future. Through this consciousness, he recognizes himself as the same self who performed certain actions years ago. Those actions now make him happy or miserable. In this account, what makes someone the same self is not the continued existence of the very same SUBSTANCE. Instead, it is the same continuing CONSCIOUSNESS. Various substances may have been joined to this consciousness and later separated from it. While those substances remained vitally connected to whatever then held this consciousness, they formed part of the same self. Thus, any part of our bodies vitally connected to whatever is conscious in us forms part of ourselves. But suppose a bodily part loses the vital connection through which consciousness is shared. What was part of ourselves a moment ago is now no more part of us than another person's body is. And before long, that separated part may actually become part of another person. So the very same substance can become part of two different persons. And the same person can continue to exist while the substances that make up that person change. Suppose a spirit completely lost all conscious memory of its past actions. Our minds, as we know, always lack such memories of many of our actions, and sometimes of them all. Joining or separating such a spiritual substance would not change personal identity, any more than joining or separating a particle of matter. Any substance vitally connected to the being that now thinks is part of the very same self that now exists. Anything connected to that being through consciousness of past actions also forms part of the same self. That self is the same both then and now.

28. Person a forensic Term.

28. Person is a legal term.

PERSON, as I take it, is the name for this self. Wherever a man finds what he calls himself, there, I think, another may say is the same person. It is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents, capable of a law, and happiness, and misery. This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness,—whereby it becomes concerned and accountable; owns and imputes to itself past actions, just upon the same ground and for the same reason as it does the present. All which is founded in a concern for happiness, the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness; that which is conscious of pleasure and pain, desiring that that self that is conscious should be happy. And therefore whatever past actions it cannot reconcile or APPROPRIATE to that present self by consciousness, it can be no more concerned in than if they had never been done: and to receive pleasure or pain, i.e. reward or punishment, on the account of any such action, is all one as to be made happy or miserable in its first being, without any demerit at all. For, supposing a MAN punished now for what he had done in another life, whereof he could be made to have no consciousness at all, what difference is there between that punishment and being CREATED miserable? And therefore, conformable to this, the apostle tells us, that, at the great day, when every one shall ‘receive according to his doings, the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open.’ The sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all persons shall have, that THEY THEMSELVES, in what bodies soever they appear, or what substances soever that consciousness adheres to, are the SAME that committed those actions, and deserve that punishment for them.

PERSON, as I understand it, is the name for this self. Wherever someone finds what he calls himself, there, I think, another may say is the same person. “Person” is a legal term that assigns actions and the credit or blame for them to someone. So the term applies only to intelligent beings capable of living under a law and experiencing happiness and misery. This personal identity reaches beyond the present into the past only through consciousness. Through consciousness, a person becomes concerned with past actions and accountable for them. He claims those actions as his own on exactly the same grounds and for the same reason as present actions. All this rests on a concern for happiness, which inevitably accompanies consciousness. A being conscious of pleasure and pain desires happiness for the self that experiences them. Therefore, a person cannot be concerned with past actions that consciousness cannot connect to his present self or APPROPRIATE as his own. Those actions can concern him no more than if they had never happened. Receiving pleasure or pain, meaning reward or punishment, for such actions would be like being made happy or miserable at birth. He would have done nothing at all to deserve it. Suppose a MAN is punished now for something he did in another life. Suppose he could not be made conscious of that action at all. How would that punishment differ from being CREATED miserable? In keeping with this, the apostle tells us what will happen on the great day. Everyone will ‘receive according to his doings, the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open.’ The judgment will be justified by every person's consciousness that THEY THEMSELVES committed those actions and deserve that punishment. This remains true whatever bodies they appear in, or whatever substances carry that consciousness. They will be conscious of being the SAME persons who committed those actions.

29. Suppositions that look strange are pardonable in our ignorance.

29. Assumptions that seem strange are excusable, given how little we know.

I am apt enough to think I have, in treating of this subject, made some suppositions that will look strange to some readers, and possibly they are so in themselves. But yet, I think they are such as are pardonable, in this ignorance we are in of the nature of that thinking thing that is in us, and which we look on as OURSELVES. Did we know what it was; or how it was tied to a certain system of fleeting animal spirits; or whether it could or could not perform its operations of thinking and memory out of a body organized as ours is; and whether it has pleased God that no one such spirit shall ever be united to any but one such body, upon the right constitution of whose organs its memory should depend; we might see the absurdity of some of those suppositions I have made. But taking, as we ordinarily now do (in the dark concerning these matters,) the soul of a man for an immaterial substance, independent from matter, and indifferent alike to it all; there can, from the nature of things, be no absurdity at all to suppose that the same SOUL may at different times be united to different BODIES, and with them make up for that time one MAN: as well as we suppose a part of a sheep’s body yesterday should be a part of a man’s body to-morrow, and in that union make a vital part of Meliboeus himself, as well as it did of his ram.

I am inclined to think that, in discussing this subject, I have made some assumptions that some readers will find strange. Perhaps these assumptions really are strange. Still, I think they are forgivable, given our ignorance about the thinking thing within us that we regard as OURSELVES. If we knew what that thinking thing was, we might see the absurdity of some assumptions I have made. The same might be true if we knew how it was linked to a particular system of fleeting animal spirits. Or if we knew whether it could think and remember outside a body organized like ours. Or whether God has chosen that each such spirit should be united with only one body, its memory depending on that body's properly functioning organs. But we are in the dark about these matters. We commonly take the human soul to be an immaterial substance, independent of matter and equally suited to any matter. On that understanding, nothing in the nature of things makes the following assumption absurd. The same SOUL may be united with different BODIES at different times, forming one MAN with each body while united. This is just like supposing that part of a sheep's body yesterday could become part of a man's body tomorrow. United with the man's body, that part could become a living part of Meliboeus himself, just as it was of his ram.

30. The Difficulty from ill Use of Names.

30. The Difficulty Caused by Misusing Names.

To conclude: Whatever substance begins to exist, it must, during its existence, necessarily be the same: whatever compositions of substances begin to exist, during the union of those substances, the concrete must be the same: whatsoever mode begins to exist, during its existence it is the same: and so if the composition be of distinct substances and different modes, the same rule holds. Whereby it will appear, that the difficulty or obscurity that has been about this matter rather rises from the names ill-used, than from any obscurity in things themselves. For whatever makes the specific idea to which the name is applied, if that idea be steadily kept to, the distinction of anything into the same and divers will easily be conceived, and there can arise no doubt about it.

To conclude: Any substance that begins to exist must remain the same substance throughout its existence. Any combination of substances must remain the same whole as long as those substances remain united. Any mode that begins to exist remains the same mode throughout its existence. The same rule holds if the combination consists of distinct substances and different modes. So the difficulty or confusion surrounding this matter comes more from misused names than from anything unclear in things themselves. For whatever defines the specific idea that a name refers to, we need only hold consistently to that idea. Then we can easily understand whether something is the same or different, and no doubt can arise about it.

31. Continuance of that which we have made to be our complex idea of man makes the same man.

31. A man remains the same man as long as what we include in our complex idea of man continues.

For, supposing a rational spirit be the idea of a MAN, it is easy to know what is the same man, viz. the same spirit—whether separate or in a body—will be the SAME MAN. Supposing a rational spirit vitally united to a body of a certain conformation of parts to make a man; whilst that rational spirit, with that vital conformation of parts, though continued in a fleeting successive body, remains, it will be the SAME MAN. But if to any one the idea of a man be but the vital union of parts in a certain shape; as long as that vital union and shape remain in a concrete, no otherwise the same but by a continued succession of fleeting particles, it will be the SAME MAN. For, whatever be the composition whereof the complex idea is made, whenever existence makes it one particular thing under any denomination, THE SAME EXISTENCE CONTINUED preserves it the SAME individual under the same denomination.

For, suppose our idea of a MAN is a rational spirit. Then knowing what makes someone the same man is easy. The same spirit, whether apart from a body or within one, will be the SAME MAN. Suppose instead that a man is a rational spirit joined in life to a body with a particular arrangement of parts. As long as that spirit and that living arrangement of parts remain, the man will be the SAME MAN. This remains true even though the body’s particles constantly change and replace one another. But suppose someone’s idea of a man is simply the living union of parts in a particular shape. As long as that living union and shape remain in an actual body, the man will be the SAME MAN. The body remains the same only through a continuous succession of changing particles. For, whatever elements make up a complex idea, existence makes the thing represented by that idea one particular thing under a given name. THE SAME EXISTENCE CONTINUED keeps that thing the SAME individual under the same name.