Other Relations

1. Ideas of Proportional relations.

1. Ideas of proportional relationships.

BESIDES the before-mentioned occasions of time, place, and causality of comparing or referring things one to another, there are, as I have said, infinite others, some whereof I shall mention.

I have already mentioned time, place, and causality as grounds for comparing things or relating them to one another. Besides these, as I have said, there are infinitely many other grounds. I will mention some of them.

First, The first I shall name is some one simple idea, which, being capable of parts or degrees, affords an occasion of comparing the subjects wherein it is to one another, in respect of that simple idea, v.g. whiter, sweeter, equal, more, &c. These relations depending on the equality and excess of the same simple idea, in several subjects, may be called, if one will, PROPORTIONAL; and that these are only conversant about those simple ideas received from sensation or reflection is so evident that nothing need be said to evince it.

First, I shall name a simple idea that can have parts or degrees. Such an idea allows us to compare different subjects in terms of that idea: whiter, sweeter, equal, more, and so on. These relations depend on whether the same simple idea is equal in different subjects or greater in one than another. We may call these relations, if we wish, PROPORTIONAL. These relations concern only simple ideas received through sensation or reflection. This is so evident that nothing needs to be said to prove it.

2. Natural relation.

2. Natural relationship.

Secondly, Another occasion of comparing things together, or considering one thing, so as to include in that consideration some other thing, is the circumstances of their origin or beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, make the relations depending thereon as lasting as the subjects to which they belong, v.g. father and son, brothers, cousin-germans, &c., which have their relations by one community of blood, wherein they partake in several degrees: countrymen, i.e. those who were born in the same country or tract of ground; and these I call NATURAL RELATIONS: wherein we may observe, that mankind have fitted their notions and words to the use of common life, and not to the truth and extent of things. For it is certain, that, in reality, the relation is the same betwixt the begetter and the begotten, in the several races of other animals as well as men; but yet it is seldom said, this bull is the grandfather of such a calf, or that two pigeons are cousin-germans. It is very convenient that, by distinct names, these relations should be observed and marked out in mankind, there being occasion, both in laws and other communications one with another, to mention and take notice of men under these relations: from whence also arise the obligations of several duties amongst men: whereas, in brutes, men having very little or no cause to mind these relations, they have not thought fit to give them distinct and peculiar names. This, by the way, may give us some light into the different state and growth of languages; which being suited only to the convenience of communication, are proportioned to the notions men have, and the commerce of thoughts familiar amongst them; and not to the reality or extent of things, nor to the various respects might be found among them; nor the different abstract considerations might be framed about them. Where they had no philosophical notions, there they had no terms to express them: and it is no wonder men should have framed no names for those things they found no occasion to discourse of. From whence it is easy to imagine why, as in some countries, they may have not so much as the name for a horse; and in others, where they are more careful of the pedigrees of their horses, than of their own, that there they may have not only names for particular horses, but also of their several relations of kindred one to another.

Secondly, another reason for comparing things is the circumstances of their origin or beginning. We consider one thing in a way that includes another. Since those circumstances cannot later change, the resulting relationships last as long as the things themselves. Examples include father and son, brothers, first cousins, and so on. These relatives share a blood connection in different degrees. Another example is countrymen, meaning people born in the same country or area. I call these NATURAL RELATIONS. Here we may notice that people have shaped their ideas and words to serve everyday life. They have not shaped them to reflect the full truth and range of things. For the relationship between parent and offspring is certainly the same in other animal species as in humans. Yet people seldom say that a bull is a particular calf’s grandfather, or that two pigeons are first cousins. Distinct names for these relationships are very useful among humans. Laws and other dealings between people give us reasons to mention and recognize people through these relationships. These relationships also give rise to various duties between people. But people have little or no reason to pay attention to such relationships among animals. So they have not thought it necessary to give those relationships distinct, specific names. This observation, incidentally, may help explain the different conditions and development of languages. Languages serve only the practical needs of communication. Their scope matches people’s ideas and the exchanges of thought familiar to them. Their scope does not match the reality or full range of things. Nor does it match the various relationships that might be found among things, or the abstract ways of considering them. Where people had no philosophical ideas, they had no words to express those ideas. And it is no surprise that people created no names for things they had no reason to discuss. So we can easily imagine why people in some countries may not even have a word for a horse. Elsewhere, people take more care over their horses’ pedigrees than their own. There, people may have names not only for individual horses but also for their various family relationships.

3. Ideas of Instituted or Voluntary relations.

3. Ideas of relationships established by convention or choice.

Thirdly, Sometimes the foundation of considering things with reference to one another, is some act whereby any one comes by a moral right, power, or obligation to do something. Thus, a general is one that hath power to command an army, and an army under a general is a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man. A citizen, or a burgher, is one who has a right to certain privileges in this or that place. All this sort depending upon men’s wills, or agreement in society, I call INSTITUTED, or VOLUNTARY; and may be distinguished from the natural, in that they are most, if not all of them, some way or other alterable, and separable from the persons to whom they have sometimes belonged, though neither of the substances, so related, be destroyed. Now, though these are all reciprocal, as well as the rest, and contain in them a reference of two things one to the other; yet, because one of the two things often wants a relative name, importing that reference, men usually take no notice of it, and the relation is commonly overlooked: v. g. a patron and client are easily allowed to be relations, but a constable or dictator are not so readily at first hearing considered as such. Because there is no peculiar name for those who are under the command of a dictator or constable, expressing a relation to either of them; though it be certain that either of them hath a certain power over some others, and so is so far related to them, as well as a patron is to his client, or general to his army.

Thirdly, we sometimes consider things in relation to one another because of an act that establishes a moral right, power, or obligation. Such an act gives someone the right, authority, or duty to do something. Thus, a general is someone with the authority to command an army. An army under a general is a group of armed men obliged to obey one man. A citizen, or burgher, is someone entitled to certain privileges in a particular place. All relations of this kind depend on people’s choices or agreements within society. I call these relations INSTITUTED, or VOLUNTARY. They differ from natural relations because most, if not all, can be changed in one way or another. People can also lose these relations without either of the persons or things involved being destroyed. Like all other relations, these are reciprocal: each involves two things considered in relation to each other. Yet one of the two often lacks a name expressing that relation. Because of this missing name, people usually fail to notice the connection, and the relation is commonly overlooked. For example, people readily recognize patron and client as terms expressing a relation. But on first hearing, they are less likely to recognize constable or dictator as terms of the same kind. This is because no special name expresses the relation of those under a dictator’s or constable’s command to that official. Yet each official certainly has a particular power over some other people and is therefore related to them in that respect. This is just as much a relation as that of a patron to his client, or a general to his army.

4. Ideas of Moral relations.

4. Ideas about moral relationships.

Fourthly, There is another sort of relation, which is the conformity or disagreement men’s VOLUNTARY ACTIONS have to a RULE to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of; which, I think, may be called MORAL RELATION, as being that which denominates our moral actions, and deserves well to be examined; there being no part of knowledge wherein we should be more careful to get determined ideas, and avoid, as much as may be, obscurity and confusion. Human actions, when with their various ends, objects, manners, and circumstances, they are framed into distinct complex ideas, are, as has been shown, so many MIXED MODES, a great part whereof have names annexed to them. Thus, supposing gratitude to be a readiness to acknowledge and return kindness received; polygamy to be the having more wives than one at once: when we frame these notions thus in our minds, we have there so many determined ideas of mixed modes. But this is not all that concerns our actions: it is not enough to have determined ideas of them, and to know what names belong to such and such combinations of ideas. We have a further and greater concernment, and that is, to know whether such actions, so made up, are morally good or bad.

Fourth, there is another kind of relation: how people’s VOLUNTARY ACTIONS agree or disagree with a RULE. Their actions are compared with this rule and judged by it. I think this may be called MORAL RELATION, since it determines the moral character of our actions. This relation deserves careful examination. In no area of knowledge should we take greater care to form definite ideas and avoid obscurity and confusion wherever possible. As already shown, human actions become MIXED MODES when we combine their various aims, objects, manners, and circumstances into distinct, complex ideas. Many of these mixed modes have names. For example, suppose gratitude means a readiness to acknowledge and return kindness received. Suppose polygamy means having more than one wife at the same time. When we form these notions in our minds, we have definite ideas of mixed modes. But our concern with our actions does not end there. Having definite ideas of actions is not enough, nor is knowing the names for particular combinations of ideas. We have a further and greater concern: knowing whether actions made up in these ways are morally good or bad.

5. Moral Good and Evil.

5. Moral Good and Evil.

Good and evil, as hath been shown, (B. II. chap. xx. Section 2, and chap. xxi. Section 43,) are nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which occasions or procures pleasure or pain to us. MORAL GOOD AND EVIL, then, is only THE CONFORMITY OR DISAGREEMENT OF OUR VOLUNTARY ACTIONS TO SOME LAW, WHEREBY GOOD OR EVIL IS DRAWN ON US, FROM THE WILL AND POWER OF THE LAW-MAKER; which good and evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance or breach of the law by the decree of the law-maker, is that we call REWARD and PUNISHMENT.

Good and evil, as shown earlier, are nothing but pleasure or pain, or whatever causes us pleasure or pain (Book II, chapter xx, section 2, and chapter xxi, section 43). MORAL GOOD AND EVIL, then, is only WHETHER OUR VOLUNTARY ACTIONS FOLLOW OR VIOLATE SOME LAW. THROUGH THE LAWMAKER’S WILL AND POWER, FOLLOWING OR VIOLATING THAT LAW BRINGS GOOD OR EVIL UPON US. This good or evil, this pleasure or pain, follows our obedience to or violation of the law. The lawmaker decrees these consequences, which we call REWARD and PUNISHMENT.

6. Moral Rules.

6. Moral Rules.

Of these moral rules or laws, to which men generally refer, and by which they judge of the rectitude or gravity of their actions, there seem to me to be THREE SORTS, with their three different enforcements, or rewards and punishments. For, since it would be utterly in vain to suppose a rule set to the free actions of men, without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will, we must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that law. It would be in vain for one intelligent being to set a rule to the actions of another, if he had it not in his power to reward the compliance with, and punish deviation from his rule, by some good and evil, that is not the natural product and consequence of the action itself. For that, being a natural convenience or inconvenience, would operate of itself, without a law. This, if I mistake not, is the true nature of all law, properly so called.

People generally refer to moral rules or laws to judge the rightness or seriousness of their actions. These rules seem to me to fall into THREE SORTS, each with different means of enforcement, or rewards and punishments. For a rule governing people’s free actions would be utterly pointless without some good or evil to influence their will. So whenever we assume there is a law, we must also assume that some reward or punishment accompanies that law. One intelligent being would gain nothing by setting a rule for another’s actions without the power to enforce the rule. The rule-maker must be able to reward obedience with some good and punish disobedience with some evil. These rewards and punishments must not be the natural results and consequences of the action itself. For any natural benefit or harm would take effect on its own, without a law. This, if I am not mistaken, is the true nature of all law properly called by that name.

The laws that men generally refer their actions to, to judge of their rectitude or obliquity, seem to me to be these three:—1. The DIVINE law. 2. The CIVIL law. 3. The law of OPINION or REPUTATION, if I may so call it. By the relation they bear to the first of these, men judge whether their actions are sins or duties; by the second, whether they be criminal or innocent; and by the third, whether they be virtues or vices.

People generally judge whether their actions are right or wrong by comparing them with certain laws. These laws seem to me to be three: 1. The DIVINE law. 2. The CIVIL law. 3. The law of OPINION or REPUTATION, if I may call it that. By the first law, people judge whether their actions are sins or duties. By the second law, people judge whether their actions are criminal or innocent. By the third law, people judge whether their actions are virtues or vices.

8. Divine Law the Measure of Sin and Duty.

8. God's Law as the Standard for Sin and Duty.

First, the DIVINE LAW, whereby that law which God has set to the actions of men,—whether promulgated to them by the light of nature, or the voice of revelation. That God has given a rule whereby men should govern themselves, I think there is nobody so brutish as to deny. He has a right to do it; we are his creatures: he has goodness and wisdom to direct our actions to that which is best: and he has power to enforce it by rewards and punishments of infinite weight and duration in another life; for nobody can take us out of his hands. This is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude; and, by comparing them to this law, it is that men judge of the most considerable moral good or evil of their actions; that is, whether, as duties or sins, they are like to procure them happiness or misery from the hands of the ALMIGHTY.

First, the DIVINE LAW means the law God has given to govern human actions. God makes this law known through the light of nature or through revelation. I think nobody is so brutish as to deny that God has given people a rule to live by. He has the right to do so because we are his creatures. He has the goodness and wisdom to guide our actions toward what is best. And he has the power to enforce his law through rewards and punishments in another life. These rewards and punishments have infinite importance and duration, for nobody can take us out of his hands. This law is the only true standard of moral rightness. By comparing their actions with this law, people judge the most important moral good or evil in those actions. That is, they judge whether their actions, as duties or sins, are likely to bring them happiness or misery from the ALMIGHTY.

9. Civil Law the Measure of Crimes and Innocence.

9. Civil Law as the Standard for Crime and Innocence.

Secondly, the CIVIL LAW—the rule set by the commonwealth to the actions of those who belong to it—is another rule to which men refer their actions; to judge whether they be criminal or no. This law nobody overlooks: the rewards and punishments that enforce it being ready at hand, and suitable to the power that makes it: which is the force of the Commonwealth, engaged to protect the lives, liberties, and possessions of those who live according to its laws, and has power to take away life, liberty, or goods, from him who disobeys; which is the punishment of offences committed against his law.

Secondly, CIVIL LAW is the rule the commonwealth sets for the actions of its members. It is another standard people use to judge whether their actions are criminal. Nobody ignores this law, because the rewards and punishments enforcing it are readily available. These rewards and punishments match the power behind the law: the force of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth undertakes to protect the lives, liberties, and possessions of those who live according to its laws. It also has the power to take life, liberty, or property from anyone who disobeys. This loss is the punishment for offences against the Commonwealth’s law.

10. Philosophical Law the Measure of Virtue and Vice.

10. Philosophical Law as the Standard for Virtue and Vice.

Thirdly, the LAW OF OPINION OR REPUTATION. Virtue and vice are names pretended and supposed everywhere to stand for actions in their own nature right and wrong: and as far as they really are so applied, they so far are coincident with the divine law above mentioned. But yet, whatever is pretended, this is visible, that these names, virtue and vice, in the particular instances of their application, through the several nations and societies of men in the world, are constantly attributed only to such actions as in each country and society are in reputation or discredit. Nor is it to be thought strange, that men everywhere should give the name of virtue to those actions, which amongst them are judged praiseworthy; and call that vice, which they account blamable: since otherwise they would condemn themselves, if they should think anything right, to which they allowed not commendation, anything wrong, which they let pass without blame. Thus the measure of what is everywhere called and esteemed virtue and vice is this approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which, by a secret and tacit consent, establishes itself in the several societies, tribes, and clubs of men in the world: whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them, according to the judgment, maxims, or fashion of that place. For, though men uniting into politic societies, have resigned up to the public the disposing of all their force, so that they cannot employ it against any fellow-citizens any further than the law of the country directs: yet they retain still the power of thinking well or ill, approving or disapproving of the actions of those whom they live amongst, and converse with: and by this approbation and dislike they establish amongst themselves what they will call virtue and vice.

Thirdly, the LAW OF OPINION OR REPUTATION. Everywhere, virtue and vice are claimed and assumed to mean actions that are right or wrong in themselves. To the extent that these terms really are used this way, they agree with the divine law mentioned above. But whatever people claim, one thing is clear. Across the world's nations and societies, particular actions are called virtuous or vicious only according to their local reputation. Actions held in esteem are called virtuous, and actions held in disrepute are called vicious. Nor is it surprising that people everywhere call actions virtuous when they consider those actions praiseworthy. They likewise call actions vicious when they consider those actions blameworthy. Otherwise, people would condemn themselves by thinking an action right but withholding praise, or wrong but letting it pass without blame. Thus, the standard for what people everywhere call and consider virtue and vice is approval or disapproval, praise or blame. This standard becomes established through an unspoken, silent agreement within the world's various societies, tribes, and clubs. As a result, particular actions gain respect or bring disgrace according to local judgments, principles, or fashions. Although people who form political societies surrender control of all their force to the community, they retain their own opinions. They can use force against fellow citizens only as the country's law allows. Yet they can still think well or ill of the actions of those they live and associate with. They can still approve or disapprove of those actions. Through this approval and disapproval, they establish among themselves what they will call virtue and vice.

11. The Measure that Man commonly apply to determine what they call Virtue and Vice.

11. The standard people commonly use to decide what they call virtue and vice.

That this is the common MEASURE of virtue and vice, will appear to any one who considers, that, though that passes for vice in one country which is counted a virtue, or at least not vice, in another, yet everywhere virtue and praise, vice and blame, go together. Virtue is everywhere, that which is thought praiseworthy; and nothing else but that which has the allowance of public esteem is called virtue. Virtue and praise are so united, that they are called often by the same name. Sunt sua praemia laudi, says Virgil; and so Cicero, Nihil habet natura praestantius, quam honestatem, quam laudem, quam dignitatem, quam decus, which he tells you are all names for the same thing. This is the language of the heathen philosophers, who well understood wherein their notions of virtue and vice consisted. And though perhaps, by the different temper, education, fashion, maxims, or interest of different sorts of men, it fell out, that what was thought praiseworthy in one place, escaped not censure in another; and so in different societies, virtues and vices were changed; yet, as to the main, they for the most part kept the same everywhere. For, since nothing can be more natural than to encourage with esteem and reputation that wherein every one finds his advantage, and to blame and discountenance the contrary; it is no wonder that esteem and discredit, virtue and vice, should, in a great measure, everywhere correspond with the unchangeable rule of right and wrong, which the law of God hath established; there being nothing that so directly and visibly secures and advances the general good of mankind in this world, as obedience to the laws he had set them, and nothing that breeds such mischiefs and confusion, as the neglect of them. And therefore men, without renouncing all sense and reason, and their own interest, which they are so constantly true to, could not generally mistake, in placing their commendation and blame on that side that really deserved it not. Nay, even those men whose practice was otherwise, failed not to give their approbation right, few being depraved to that degree as not to condemn, at least in others, the faults they themselves were guilty of; whereby, even in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preferred. So that even the exhortations of inspired teachers, have not feared to appeal to common repute: ‘Whatsoever is lovely, whatsoever is of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise,’ &c. (Phil. iv. 8.)

Anyone who considers the matter will see that this is the common STANDARD of virtue and vice. One country may regard something as a vice that another considers a virtue, or at least not a vice. Yet everywhere virtue goes with praise, and vice with blame. Everywhere, virtue means what people consider worthy of praise. Nothing is called virtue unless it has public approval. Virtue and praise are so closely connected that they often share the same name. Virgil says, “Praise has its own rewards.” Cicero likewise says, “Nature offers nothing greater than moral goodness, praise, dignity, and honor.” He tells us that these are all names for the same thing. This is the language of the pagan philosophers. They understood well what their ideas of virtue and vice consisted in. Perhaps differences in temperament, education, fashion, principles, or interests led different groups to judge differently. What people praised in one place did not escape criticism in another. In this way, virtues and vices changed from one society to another. Yet in their main features, they mostly remained the same everywhere. For nothing is more natural than to reward with esteem and a good reputation whatever people find beneficial to themselves. It is equally natural to blame and discourage the opposite. So it is no wonder that public approval and disapproval, virtue and vice, largely agree everywhere with God's unchanging standard. This is the standard of right and wrong established by his law. Nothing so directly and visibly protects and promotes humanity's general good in this world as obedience to God's laws. And nothing causes such harm and confusion as neglecting those laws. Therefore, people could not generally praise and blame what did not truly deserve praise and blame. To do so, they would have to abandon all sense and reason, and their own interests. Yet people are so consistently faithful to their own interests. Indeed, even people whose conduct was wrong still gave their approval to what was right. Few were so corrupt that they did not condemn, at least in others, the faults they themselves committed. So even when conduct was corrupt, the true boundaries set by the law of nature remained fairly well preserved. That law ought to be the standard of virtue and vice. Thus even inspired teachers have not hesitated, in their exhortations, to appeal to public esteem: ‘Whatever is lovely, whatever has a good reputation, if there is any virtue, if there is any praise,’ etc. (Phil. iv. 8.)

12. Its Inforcement is Commendation and Discredit.

12. It is enforced through praise and disapproval.

If any one shall imagine that I have forgot my own notion of a law, when I make the law, whereby men judge of virtue and vice, to be nothing else but the consent of private men, who have not authority enough to make a law: especially wanting that which is so necessary and essential to a law, a power to enforce it: I think I may say, that he who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong motives to men to accommodate themselves to the opinions and rules of those with whom they converse, seems little skilled in the nature or history of mankind: the greatest part whereof we shall find to govern themselves chiefly, if not solely, by this LAW OF FASHION; and so they do that which keeps them in reputation with their company, little regard the laws of God, or the magistrate. The penalties that attend the breach of God’s laws some, nay perhaps most men, seldom seriously reflect on: and amongst those that do, many, whilst they break the law, entertain thoughts of future reconciliation, and making their peace for such breaches. And as to the punishments due from the laws of the commonwealth, they frequently flatter themselves with the hopes of impunity. But no man escapes the punishment of their censure and dislike, who offends against the fashion and opinion of the company he keeps, and would recommend himself to. Nor is there one of ten thousand, who is stiff and insensible enough, to bear up under the constant dislike and condemnation of his own club. He must be of a strange and unusual constitution, who can content himself to live in constant disgrace and disrepute with his own particular society. Solitude many men have sought, and been reconciled to: but nobody that has the least thought or sense of a man about him, can live in society under the constant dislike and ill opinion of his familiars, and those he converses with. This is a burden too heavy for human sufferance: and he must be made up of irreconcileable contradictions, who can take pleasure in company, and yet be insensible of contempt and disgrace from his companions.

Some may think I have forgotten my own definition of a law. I describe the law by which people judge virtue and vice as merely the agreement of private individuals. These individuals lack the authority to make a law. Above all, they lack the power to enforce it, which is necessary and essential to a law. But I think I can answer this objection. Anyone who doubts the power of praise and disgrace seems to know little about human nature or history. Praise and disgrace strongly motivate people to follow the opinions and rules of those they associate with. We will find that most people govern themselves chiefly, if not entirely, by this LAW OF FASHION. As long as their actions preserve their reputation among their companions, they care little for God’s laws or the magistrate’s. Some people, perhaps most, seldom think seriously about the penalties for breaking God’s laws. Even among those who do, many break those laws while expecting future reconciliation and peace with God. As for punishments under the laws of the state, people often comfort themselves with hopes of escaping punishment. But anyone who violates the customs and opinions of their companions cannot escape those companions’ criticism and disapproval. These are the very people whose approval the offender seeks. Not one person in ten thousand is stubborn and unfeeling enough to endure their own group’s constant disapproval and condemnation. Anyone content to live in constant disgrace and disrepute among their own circle must have a strange and unusual nature. Many people have sought solitude and learned to accept it. But no one with the least human thought or feeling can live among people who constantly dislike and condemn them. This is especially true of close acquaintances and those they regularly associate with. Such a burden is too heavy for human endurance. Anyone who enjoys company yet feels nothing at their companions’ contempt and scorn must be full of irreconcilable contradictions.

13. These three Laws the Rules of moral Good and Evil.

13. These three laws are the standards for moral good and evil.

These three then, first, the law of God; secondly, the law of politic societies; thirdly, the law of fashion, or private censure, are those to which men variously compare their actions: and it is by their conformity to one of these laws that they take their measures, when they would judge of their moral rectitude, and denominate their actions good or bad.

These, then, are the three laws: first, God's law. Second, the law of political societies. Third, the law of fashion, or private judgment. People compare their actions with these different laws. When judging whether their actions are morally right, people measure how well those actions follow one of these laws. On that basis, people call their actions good or bad.

14. Morality is the Relation of Voluntary Actions to these Rules.

14. Morality is how voluntary actions relate to these rules.

Whether the rule to which, as to a touchstone, we bring our voluntary actions, to examine them by, and try their goodness, and accordingly to name them, which is, as it were, the mark of the value we set upon them: whether, I say, we take that rule from the fashion of the country, or the will of a law-maker, the mind is easily able to observe the relation any action hath to it, and to judge whether the action agrees or disagrees with the rule; and so hath a notion of moral goodness or evil, which is either conformity or not conformity of any action to that rule: and therefore is often called moral rectitude. This rule being nothing but a collection of several simple ideas, the conformity thereto is but so ordering the action, that the simple ideas belonging to it may correspond to those which the law requires. And thus we see how moral beings and notions are founded on, and terminated in, these simple ideas we have received from sensation or reflection. For example: let us consider the complex idea we signify by the word murder: and when we have taken it asunder, and examined all the particulars, we shall find them to amount to a collection of simple ideas derived from reflection or sensation, viz. First, from REFLECTION on the operations of our own minds, we have the ideas of willing, considering, purposing beforehand, malice, or wishing ill to another; and also of life, or perception, and self-motion. Secondly, from SENSATION we have the collection of those simple sensible ideas which are to be found in a man, and of some action, whereby we put an end to perception and motion in the man; all which simple ideas are comprehended in the word murder. This collection of simple ideas, being found by me to agree or disagree with the esteem of the country I have been bred in, and to be held by most men there worthy praise or blame, I call the action virtuous or vicious: if I have the will of a supreme invisible Lawgiver for my rule, then, as I supposed the action commanded or forbidden by God, I call it good or evil, sin or duty: and if I compare it to the civil law, the rule made by the legislative power of the country, I call it lawful or unlawful, a crime or no crime. So that whencesoever we take the rule of moral actions; or by what standard soever we frame in our minds the ideas of virtues or vices, they consist only, and are made up of collections of simple ideas, which we originally received from sense or reflection: and their rectitude or obliquity consists in the agreement or disagreement with those patterns prescribed by some law.

We use a rule as a touchstone to test our voluntary actions and judge their goodness. We then name those actions accordingly, marking, as it were, the value we place on them. We may take this rule from our country’s customs or from a lawmaker’s will. Either way, the mind can easily see how an action relates to the rule. The mind can judge whether the action agrees or disagrees with the rule. In this way, we gain a notion of moral goodness or evil. Moral goodness or evil consists in an action’s conformity or lack of conformity to that rule. This relation to the rule is therefore often called moral rectitude. The rule itself is nothing more than a collection of simple ideas. Conforming to the rule means arranging the action so that its simple ideas match those required by the law. Thus, moral things and concepts rest on, and ultimately come down to, simple ideas received through sensation or reflection. For example, consider the complex idea we express with the word murder. If we break this idea down and examine every detail, we find a collection of simple ideas. These ideas come from reflection or sensation. First, through REFLECTION on the workings of our own minds, we gain ideas of willing, considering, and planning beforehand. We also gain ideas of malice, or wishing harm to another, and of life, or perception and self-movement. Second, through SENSATION, we gain the collection of simple sensory ideas found in a human being. We also gain sensory ideas of an action by which we end that person’s perception and movement. All these simple ideas are included in the word murder. I may find that this collection of simple ideas agrees or disagrees with what my country values. That is, I compare the action with the values of the country where I was raised. If most people there consider the action worthy of praise or blame, I call the action virtuous or vicious. If I take the will of a supreme invisible Lawgiver as my rule, I judge the action differently. Depending on whether I suppose God commands or forbids the action, I call it good or evil, sin or duty. If I compare the action with civil law, I call the action lawful or unlawful, a crime or no crime. Civil law is the rule made by the country’s legislative authority. So the source of our rule for moral actions makes no difference to what our moral ideas contain. Nor does the standard we use to form our ideas of virtues or vices. Those ideas consist entirely of collections of simple ideas originally received through sensation or reflection. Their moral rightness or wrongness consists in agreement or disagreement with the standards prescribed by some law.

15. Moral actions may be regarded either absolutely, or as ideas of relation.

15. Moral actions may be considered either on their own or in terms of their relation to something else.

To conceive rightly of moral actions, we must take notice of them under this two-fold consideration. First, as they are in themselves, each made up of such a collection of simple ideas. Thus drunkenness, or lying, signify such or such a collection of simple ideas, which I call mixed modes: and in this sense they are as much POSITIVE ABSOLUTE ideas, as the drinking of a horse, or speaking of a parrot. Secondly, our actions are considered as good, bad, or indifferent; and in this respect they are RELATIVE, it being their conformity to, or disagreement with some rule that makes them to be regular or irregular, good or bad; and so, as far as they are compared with a rule, and thereupon denominated, they come under relation. Thus the challenging and fighting with a man, as it is a certain positive mode, or particular sort of action, by particular ideas, distinguished from all others, is called DUELLING: which, when considered in relation to the law of God, will deserve the name of sin; to the law of fashion, in some countries, valour and virtue; and to the municipal laws of some governments, a capital crime. In this case, when the positive mode has one name, and another name as it stands in relation to the law, the distinction may as easily be observed as it is in substances, where one name, v.g. MAN, is used to signify the thing; another, v.g. FATHER, to signify the relation.

To understand moral actions correctly, we must consider them in two ways. First, we consider actions in themselves, each made up of a collection of simple ideas. Thus drunkenness and lying each signify a particular collection of simple ideas, which I call mixed modes. In this sense, they are just as much POSITIVE ABSOLUTE ideas as a horse drinking or a parrot speaking. Second, we consider our actions as good, bad, or neither. In this respect, actions are RELATIVE. Their agreement or disagreement with some rule makes them conform to or break that rule, and makes them good or bad. So, when actions are compared with a rule and named accordingly, they fall under relation. For example, challenging a man and fighting him is a definite mode, or particular kind of action. The particular ideas that distinguish this action from all others give it the name DUELLING. Considered in relation to God's law, duelling deserves the name of sin. In relation to the law of fashion, in some countries, it deserves the names of courage and virtue. In relation to the local laws of some governments, it deserves the name of a capital crime. Here, the definite mode has one name, and its relation to a law gives it another. This distinction is as easy to recognize as the distinction between names for substances and names for their relations. For example, MAN names the thing itself, while FATHER names the relation.

16. The Denominations of Actions often mislead us.

16. The names we give to actions often mislead us.

But because very frequently the positive idea of the action, and its moral relation, are comprehended together under one name, and the same word made use of to express both the mode or action, and its moral rectitude or obliquity: therefore the relation itself is less taken notice of; and there is often no distinction made between the positive idea of the action, and the reference it has to a rule. By which confusion of these two distinct considerations under one term, those who yield too easily to the impressions of sounds, and are forward to take names for things, are often misled in their judgment of actions. Thus, the taking from another what is his, without his knowledge or allowance, is properly called STEALING: but that name, being commonly understood to signify also the moral gravity of the action, and to denote its contrariety to the law, men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called stealing, as an ill action, disagreeing with the rule of right. And yet the private taking away his sword from a madman, to prevent his doing mischief, though it be properly denominated stealing, as the name of such a mixed mode; yet when compared to the law of God, and considered in its relation to that supreme rule, it is no sin or transgression, though the name stealing ordinarily carries such an intimation with it.

But very often, one name covers both the idea of an action itself and its relation to a moral rule. The same word describes both the action and its moral rightness or wrongness. Because of this, the relation itself receives less attention. People often fail to distinguish the idea of the action from its relation to a rule. Combining these two distinct considerations under one term often misleads people in judging actions. Those misled are too easily influenced by the sound of words and too quick to mistake names for things. Thus, taking someone else’s property without their knowledge or permission is properly called STEALING. But that name is commonly understood to express the action’s moral seriousness and its conflict with the law. So people tend to condemn whatever they hear called stealing as a bad action that violates the rule of right. Yet consider secretly taking a madman’s sword away to prevent him from causing harm. This action is properly called stealing, when the name describes that particular combination of acts and circumstances. Yet compared with the law of God, and judged by that supreme rule, the action is no sin or violation. This is so even though the name stealing ordinarily suggests such wrongdoing.

17. Relations innumerable, and only the most considerable here mentioned.

17. Relations are countless, and only the most important are mentioned here.

And thus much for the relation of human actions to a law, which, therefore, I call MORAL RELATIONS.

That concludes my discussion of how human actions relate to a law. I therefore call these relationships MORAL RELATIONS.

It would make a volume to go over all sorts of RELATIONS: it is not, therefore, to be expected that I should here mention them all. It suffices to our present purpose to show by these, what the ideas are we have of this comprehensive consideration called RELATION. Which is so various, and the occasions of it so many, (as many as there can be of comparing things one to another,) that it is not very easy to reduce it to rules, or under just heads. Those I have mentioned, I think, are some of the most considerable; and such as may serve to let us see from whence we get our ideas of relations, and wherein they are founded. But before I quit this argument, from what has been said give me leave to observe:

It would take a whole volume to cover all kinds of RELATIONS. So no one should expect me to mention them all here. For our present purpose, these examples sufficiently show what ideas we have of the broad way of considering things called RELATION. Relations vary greatly, and there are as many occasions for them as there are ways of comparing things. So relations are not very easy to bring under rules or organize into suitable categories. I think the relations I have mentioned are some of the most important. These examples may help us see where we get our ideas of relations and what those ideas are based on. But before I leave this subject, let me make the following observations based on what has been said:

18. All Relations terminate in simple Ideas.

18. All relations ultimately come down to simple ideas.

First, That it is evident, that all relation terminates in, and is ultimately founded on, those simple ideas we have got from sensation or reflection: so that all we have in our thoughts ourselves, (if we think of anything, or have any meaning,) or would signify to others, when we use words standing for relations, is nothing but some simple ideas, or collections of simple ideas, compared one with another. This is so manifest in that sort called proportional, that nothing can be more. For when a man says ‘honey is sweeter than wax,’ it is plain that his thoughts in this relation terminate in this simple idea, sweetness; which is equally true of all the rest: though, where they are compounded, or decompounded, the simple ideas they are made up of, are, perhaps, seldom taken notice of: v.g. when the word father is mentioned: first, there is meant that particular species, or collective idea, signified by the word man; secondly, those sensible simple ideas, signified by the word generation; and, thirdly, the effects of it, and all the simple ideas signified by the word child. So the word friend, being taken for a man who loves and is ready to do good to another, has all these following ideas to the making of it up: first, all the simple ideas, comprehended in the word man, or intelligent being; secondly, the idea of love; thirdly, the idea of readiness or disposition; fourthly, the idea of action, which is any kind of thought or motion; fifthly, the idea of good, which signifies anything that may advance his happiness, and terminates at last, if examined, in particular simple ideas, of which the word good in general signifies any one; but, if removed from all simple ideas quite, it signifies nothing at all. And thus also all moral words terminate at last, though perhaps more remotely, in a collection of simple ideas: the immediate signification of relative words, being very often other supposed known relations; which, if traced one to another, still end in simple ideas.

First, it is clear that all relations ultimately rest on simple ideas gained through sensation or reflection. When we think about relations, we compare simple ideas or collections of simple ideas with one another. That is all our thoughts contain, if we think of anything or mean anything at all. It is also all we mean to convey to others when we use words expressing relations. Nothing could be clearer than this in relations of proportion. For when someone says ‘honey is sweeter than wax,’ the comparison plainly comes down to the simple idea of sweetness. The same is true of all other relations. Some relations, however, combine ideas, or combine ideas already combined. In such cases, perhaps we seldom notice the simple ideas that make up those relations. For example, consider the word father. First, it means the particular species, or collection of ideas, expressed by the word man. Second, it includes the simple ideas gained through the senses that the word generation expresses. Third, it includes the effects of generation and all the simple ideas expressed by the word child. Similarly, friend means a man who loves another person and is ready to do good to that person. The word therefore includes all the following ideas. First, all the simple ideas included in man or intelligent being. Second, the idea of love. Third, the idea of readiness or willingness. Fourth, the idea of action, meaning any kind of thought or motion. Fifth, the idea of good, meaning anything that may increase the other person's happiness. If examined, good ultimately comes down to particular simple ideas. The general word good can signify any one of those ideas. But if separated entirely from all simple ideas, good means nothing at all. Likewise, all moral words ultimately come down to a collection of simple ideas, though perhaps by a less direct route. Words expressing relations very often refer directly to other relations assumed to be known. If we trace those relations from one to another, however, they always end in simple ideas.

19. We have ordinarily as clear a Notion of the Relation, as of the simple ideas in things on which it is founded.

19. We usually understand a relation as clearly as we understand the simple ideas in things that form its basis.

Secondly, That in relations, we have for the most part, if not always, as clear a notion of THE RELATION as we have of THOSE SIMPLE IDEAS WHEREIN IT IS FOUNDED: agreement or disagreement, whereon relation depends, being things whereof we have commonly as clear ideas as of any other whatsoever; it being but the distinguishing simple ideas, or their degrees one from another, without which we could have no distinct knowledge at all. For, if I have a clear idea of sweetness, light, or extension, I have, too, of equal, or more, or less, of each of these: if I know what it is for one man to be born of a woman, viz. Sempronia, I know what it is for another man to be born of the same woman Sempronia; and so have as clear a notion of brothers as of births, and perhaps clearer. For if I believed that Sempronia digged Titus out of the parsley-bed, (as they used to tell children,) and thereby became his mother; and that afterwards, in the same manner, she digged Caius out of the parsley-bed, I had as clear a notion of the relation of brothers between them, as if I had all the skill of a midwife: the notion that the same woman contributed, as mother, equally to their births, (though I were ignorant or mistaken in the manner of it,) being that on which I grounded the relation; and that they agreed in the circumstance of birth, let it be what it will. The comparing them then in their descent from the same person, without knowing the particular circumstances of that descent, is enough to found my notion of their having, or not having, the relation of brothers. But though the ideas of PARTICULAR RELATIONS are capable of being as clear and distinct in the minds of those who will duly consider them as those of mixed modes, and more determinate than those of substances: yet the names belonging to relation are often of as doubtful and uncertain signification as those of substances or mixed modes; and much more than those of simple ideas. Because relative words, being the marks of this comparison, which is made only by men’s thoughts, and is an idea only in men’s minds, men frequently apply them to different comparisons of things, according to their own imaginations; which do not always correspond with those of others using the same name.

Secondly, our idea of THE RELATION is usually, if not always, as clear as our ideas of its foundation. That foundation consists of THOSE SIMPLE IDEAS ON WHICH IT IS BASED. Relations depend on agreement or disagreement. Our ideas of agreement and disagreement are generally as clear as any ideas we have. We simply distinguish simple ideas, or their degrees, from one another. Without such distinctions, we could have no clear knowledge at all. For if I have a clear idea of sweetness, light, or extension, I also understand comparisons between them. I understand what equal, more, or less means for each. If I understand one man's being born to a woman, namely Sempronia, I understand another's being born to Sempronia too. So my idea of brothers is as clear as my idea of births, and perhaps clearer. Suppose I believed Sempronia dug Titus out of the parsley bed and thereby became his mother. People used to tell children such stories. Suppose I also believed she later dug Caius out of the parsley bed in the same way. My idea of their relationship as brothers would be as clear as if I had all a midwife's skill. I would base that relationship on the idea that the same woman contributed equally, as mother, to their births. I might be ignorant or mistaken about how she contributed. Still, the two would share the same circumstance of birth, whatever that circumstance might be. Comparing their descent from the same person is therefore enough to establish my idea of whether they are brothers. I need not know the particular circumstances of that descent. But people who carefully consider PARTICULAR RELATIONS can have ideas of them as clear and distinct as ideas of mixed modes. Their ideas of these relations can also be more precisely defined than their ideas of substances. Yet words for relations often have meanings as doubtful and uncertain as words for substances or mixed modes. Their meanings are much more doubtful and uncertain than those of words for simple ideas. This is because relative words stand for comparisons made only in people's thoughts. Such comparisons are ideas existing only in people's minds. People therefore often apply relative words to different comparisons between things, according to their own imaginings. Those imaginings do not always match those of other people using the same word.

20. The Notion of Relation is the same, whether the Rule any Action is compared to be true or false.

20. The idea of relation stays the same whether the rule used to judge an action is true or false.

Thirdly, That in these I call MORAL RELATIONS, I have a true notion of relation, by comparing the action with the rule, whether the rule be true or false. For if I measure anything by a yard, I know whether the thing I measure be longer or shorter than that supposed yard, though perhaps the yard I measure by be not exactly the standard: which indeed is another inquiry. For though the rule be erroneous, and I mistaken in it; yet the agreement or disagreement observable in that which I compare with, makes me perceive the relation. Though, measuring by a wrong rule, I shall thereby be brought to judge amiss of its moral rectitude; because I have tried it by that which is not the true rule: yet I am not mistaken in the relation which that action bears to that rule I compare it to, which is agreement or disagreement.

Thirdly, in what I call MORAL RELATIONS, I gain an accurate understanding of a relation by comparing an action with a rule. This is so whether the rule is true or false. For if I measure something with a yardstick, I know whether the object is longer or shorter than that yardstick. Perhaps the yardstick does not exactly match the standard yard. But that is a separate question. For although the rule may be wrong, and I may be mistaken about it, I still perceive the relation. I see whether what I am comparing agrees or disagrees with the rule. Although measuring by a wrong rule will lead me to judge the action's moral rightness incorrectly, the relation remains clear. My moral judgment is wrong because I have tested the action against a rule that is not the true rule. Yet I am not mistaken about the action's relation to the rule I use: agreement or disagreement.