Mixed Modes

1. Mixed Modes, what.

1. What Mixed Modes Are.

Having treated of SIMPLE MODES in the foregoing chapters, and given several instances of some of the most considerable of them, to show what they are, and how we come by them; we are now in the next place to consider those we call MIXED MODES; such are the complex ideas we mark by the names OBLIGATION, DRUNKENNESS, a LIE, &c.; which consisting of several combinations of simple ideas of DIFFERENT kinds, I have called mixed modes, to distinguish them from the more simple modes, which consist only of simple ideas of the SAME kind. These mixed modes, being also such combinations of simple ideas as are not looked upon to be characteristical marks of any real beings that have a steady existence, but scattered and independent ideas put together by the mind, are thereby distinguished from the complex ideas of substances.

In the previous chapters, I discussed SIMPLE MODES and gave several examples of some of the most important ones. These examples showed what simple modes are and how we acquire them. We now turn to what we call MIXED MODES. These are complex ideas we name OBLIGATION, DRUNKENNESS, a LIE, and so on. They consist of various combinations of simple ideas of DIFFERENT kinds. I have called them mixed modes to distinguish them from simpler modes, which contain simple ideas of the SAME kind. Mixed modes are also combinations of simple ideas that we do not regard as characteristic features of any steadily existing beings. Instead, they are separate, independent ideas brought together by the mind. This distinguishes mixed modes from complex ideas of substances.

2. Made by the Mind.

2. Created by the mind.

That the mind, in respect of its simple ideas, is wholly passive, and receives them all from the existence and operations of things, such as sensation or reflection offers them, without being able to MAKE any one idea, experience shows us. But if we attentively consider these ideas I call mixed modes, we are now speaking of, we shall find their origin quite different. The mind often exercises an ACTIVE power in making these several combinations. For, it being once furnished with simple ideas, it can put them together in several compositions, and so make variety of complex ideas, without examining whether they exist so together in nature. And hence I think it is that these ideas are called NOTIONS: as they had their original, and constant existence, more in the thoughts of men, than in the reality of things; and to form such ideas, it sufficed that the mind put the parts of them together, and that they were consistent in the understanding without considering whether they had any real being: though I do not deny but several of them might be taken from observation, and the existence of several simple ideas so combined, as they are put together in the understanding. For the man who first framed the idea of HYPOCRISY, might have either taken it at first from the observation of one who made show of good qualities which he had not; or else have framed that idea in his mind without having any such pattern to fashion it by. For it is evident that, in the beginning of languages and societies of men, several of those complex ideas, which were consequent to the constitutions established amongst them, must needs have been in the minds of men before they existed anywhere else; and that many names that stood for such complex ideas were in use, and so those ideas framed, before the combinations they stood for ever existed.

Experience shows that the mind is entirely passive in receiving simple ideas. All simple ideas come from the existence and activity of things, as presented through sensation or reflection. The mind cannot MAKE even one simple idea. But if we carefully consider the ideas I call mixed modes, now under discussion, we find a different origin. The mind often exercises an ACTIVE power in making these combinations. Once supplied with simple ideas, the mind can combine them in various ways to form many complex ideas. The mind need not check whether those ideas exist together in nature. For this reason, I think, these ideas are called NOTIONS. Their origin and continuing existence lie more in human thought than in the reality of things. To form such ideas, the mind only needed to combine their parts into something consistent in the understanding. The mind did not need to consider whether those combinations actually existed. Still, I do not deny that several such ideas might come from observation. Someone might observe simple ideas existing together in the same combinations later formed in the understanding. For example, the man who first formed the idea of HYPOCRISY might have drawn it from observation. He might have seen someone pretending to have good qualities he did not possess. Or he might have formed the idea in his mind without any such example to follow. For clearly, when languages and human societies began, several complex ideas must have existed in people's minds before existing anywhere else. These were ideas arising from the arrangements people established among themselves. Many names for such complex ideas were already in use before the combinations those names represented ever existed. The ideas themselves must therefore also have been formed before those combinations existed.

3. Sometimes got by the Explication of their Names.

3. Sometimes gained by explaining their names.

Indeed, now that languages are made, and abound with words standing for such combinations, an usual way of GETTING these complex ideas is, by the explication of those terms that stand for them. For, consisting of a company of simple ideas combined, they may, by words standing for those simple ideas, be represented to the mind of one who understands those words, though that complex combination of simple ideas were never offered to his mind by the real existence of things. Thus a man may come to have the idea of SACRILEGE or MURDER, by enumerating to him the simple ideas which these words stand for; without ever seeing either of them committed.

Indeed, now that languages exist, they have many words for such combinations of ideas. A common way of GETTING these complex ideas is through explanations of the words that represent them. For complex ideas consist of simple ideas combined. So words representing those simple ideas can convey the combination to someone who understands the words. This is possible even if the person has never encountered the combination in real life. Thus, someone may gain the idea of SACRILEGE or MURDER by having the simple ideas represented by these words listed. They need never have seen either act committed.

4. The Name ties the Parts of mixed Modes into one Idea.

4. The name unites the parts of mixed modes into one idea.

Every mixed mode consisting of many distinct simple ideas, it seems reasonable to inquire, Whence it has its unity; and how such a precise multitude comes to make but one idea; since that combination does not always exist together in nature? To which I answer, it is plain it has its unity from an act of the mind, combining those several simple ideas together, and considering them as one complex one, consisting of those parts; and the mark of this union, or that which is looked on generally to complete it, is one NAME given to that combination. For it is by their names that men commonly regulate their account of their distinct species of mixed modes, seldom allowing or considering any number of simple ideas to make one complex one, but such collections as there be names for. Thus, though the killing of an old man be as fit in nature to be united into one complex idea, as the killing a man’s father; yet, there being no name standing precisely for the one, as there is the name of PARRICIDE to mark the other, it is not taken for a particular complex idea, nor a distinct species of actions from that of killing a young man, or any other man.

Every mixed mode consists of many distinct simple ideas. So it seems reasonable to ask what gives a mixed mode its unity. How does that particular collection become a single idea, when its parts do not always occur together in nature? My answer is clear: its unity comes from an act of the mind. The mind combines those simple ideas and treats them as one complex idea made up of those parts. A single NAME given to the combination marks this union, or is generally seen as completing it. For people commonly use names to determine which distinct kinds of mixed modes they recognize. They seldom recognize or consider a collection of simple ideas as one complex idea unless the collection has a name. Thus, killing an old man is naturally just as suitable for forming one complex idea as killing one’s father. Yet no name refers precisely to killing an old man, while PARRICIDE names the killing of one’s father. So killing an old man is not treated as a particular complex idea. Nor is it treated as a distinct kind of action from killing a young man or any other man.

5. The Cause of making mixed Modes.

5. Why mixed modes are created.

If we should inquire a little further, to see what it is that occasions men to make several combinations of simple ideas into distinct, and, as it were, settled modes, and neglect others, which in the nature of things themselves, have as much an aptness to be combined and make distinct ideas, we shall find the reason of it to be the end of language; which being to mark, or communicate men’s thoughts to one another with all the dispatch that may be, they usually make SUCH collections of ideas into complex modes, and affix names to them, as they have frequent use of in their way of living and conversation, leaving others which they have but seldom an occasion to mention, loose and without names that tie them together: they rather choosing to enumerate (when they have need) such ideas as make them up, by the particular names that stand for them, than to trouble their memories by multiplying of complex ideas with names to them, which they seldom or never have any occasion to make use of.

We might look further into why people combine some simple ideas into distinct and seemingly fixed modes, while neglecting others. Those other ideas are, by their nature, equally suited to being combined into distinct ideas. If we investigate, we will find the reason in the purpose of language. Language serves to record thoughts or communicate them to others as quickly as possible. So people usually form SUCH collections of ideas into complex modes and name them when they frequently need them. These are the combinations people use in daily life and conversation. People leave other combinations loose and unnamed because they seldom need to mention them. When needed, people prefer to list the ideas making up those combinations, using each idea’s particular name. They prefer this to burdening their memories with more named complex ideas that they seldom or never need to use.

6. Why Words in one Language have none answering in another.

6. Why words in one language have no equivalents in another.

This shows us how it comes to pass that there are in every language many particular words which cannot be rendered by any one single word of another. For the several fashions, customs, and manners of one nation, making several combinations of ideas familiar and necessary in one, which another people have had never an occasion to make, or perhaps so much as take notice of, names come of course to be annexed to them, to avoid long periphrases in things of daily conversation; and so they become so many distinct complex ideas in their minds. Thus ostrakismos amongst the Greeks, and proscriptio amongst the Romans, were words which other languages had no names that exactly answered; because they stood for complex ideas which were not in the minds of the men of other nations. Where there was no such custom, there was no notion of any such actions; no use of such combinations of ideas as were united, and, as it were, tied together, by those terms: and therefore in other countries there were no names for them.

This shows why every language has many words that cannot be translated by a single word in another language. A nation’s fashions, customs, and ways of life make certain combinations of ideas familiar and necessary to its people. Other peoples have never had reason to form these combinations, or perhaps even to notice them. So people naturally give these combinations names to avoid lengthy explanations in everyday conversation. These combinations thus become distinct complex ideas in their minds. For example, ostrakismos among the Greeks and proscriptio among the Romans had no exact equivalents in other languages. These words stood for complex ideas that people of other nations did not have in their minds. Where no such custom existed, people had no concept of such actions. They had no use for the combinations of ideas joined and, as it were, tied together by these terms. So other countries had no names for these combinations.

7. And Languages change.

7. And languages change.

Hence also we may see the reason, why languages constantly change, take up new and lay by old terms. Because change of customs and opinions bringing with it new combinations of ideas, which it is necessary frequently to think on and talk about, new names, to avoid long descriptions, are annexed to them; and so they become new species of complex modes. What a number of different ideas are by this means wrapped up in one short sound, and how much of our time and breath is thereby saved, any one will see, who will but take the pains to enumerate all the ideas that either REPRIEVE or APPEAL stand for; and instead of either of those names, use a periphrasis, to make any one understand their meaning.

This also shows why languages constantly change, adopting new terms and dropping old ones. Changes in customs and opinions bring new combinations of ideas that people need to think and talk about frequently. To avoid long descriptions, people give these combinations new names. These combinations thus become new kinds of complex modes, or combinations of ideas. Anyone can see how many different ideas a single short sound can contain, and how much time and breath it saves. To see this, just take the trouble to list all the ideas that either REPRIEVE or APPEAL stands for. Then, instead of using either word, use a longer description to make someone understand its meaning.

8. Mixed Modes

8. Mixed Modes

Though I shall have occasion to consider this more at-large when I come to treat of Words and their use, yet I could not avoid to take thus much notice here of the NAMES OF MIXED MODES; which being fleeting and transient combinations of simple ideas, which have but a short existence anywhere but in the minds of men, and there too have no longer any existence than whilst they are thought on, have not so much anywhere the appearance of a constant and lasting existence as in their names: which are therefore, in this sort of ideas, very apt to be taken for the ideas themselves. For, if we should inquire where the idea of a TRIUMPH or APOTHEOSIS exists, it is evident they could neither of them exist altogether anywhere in the things themselves, being actions that required time to their performance, and so could never all exist together; and as to the minds of men, where the ideas of these actions are supposed to be lodged, they have there too a very uncertain existence: and therefore we are apt to annex them to the names that excite them in us.

Although I will discuss this further when I examine words and their use, I could not avoid mentioning the NAMES OF MIXED MODES here. Mixed modes are fleeting combinations of simple ideas. They exist only briefly anywhere outside human minds. Even in our minds, they exist only while we think about them. Nowhere do they seem to have so constant and lasting an existence as in their names. So, with ideas of this kind, we are very likely to mistake the names for the ideas themselves. For suppose we ask where the idea of a TRIUMPH or APOTHEOSIS exists. Clearly, neither could exist all at once in the actual events. These actions took time to perform, so all their parts could never exist together. Nor do the ideas have a certain existence in human minds, where the ideas of these actions supposedly reside. We therefore tend to attach these ideas to the names that bring them to mind.

9. How we get the Ideas of mixed Modes.

9. How we get ideas of mixed modes.

There are therefore three ways whereby we get these complex ideas of mixed modes:—(1) By experience and OBSERVATION of things themselves: thus, by seeing two men mixed wrestle or fence, we get the idea of wrestling or fencing. (2) By INVENTION, or voluntary putting together of several simple ideas in our own minds: so he that first invented printing or etching, had an idea of it in his mind before it ever existed. (3) Which is the most usual way, by EXPLAINING THE NAMES of actions we never saw, or motions we cannot see; and by enumerating, and thereby, as it were, setting before our imaginations all those ideas which go to the making them up, and are the constituent parts of them. For, having by sensation and reflection stored our minds with simple ideas, and by use got the names that stand for them, we can by those means represent to another any complex idea we would have him conceive; so that it has in it no simple ideas but what he knows, and has with us the same name for. For all our complex ideas are ultimately resolvable into simple ideas, of which they are compounded and originally made up, though perhaps their immediate ingredients, as I may so say, are also complex ideas. Thus, the mixed mode which the word LIE stands for is made of these simple ideas:—(1) Articulate sounds. (2) Certain ideas in the mind of the speaker. (3) Those words the signs of those ideas. (4) Those signs put together, by affirmation or negation, otherwise than the ideas they stand for are in the mind of the speaker. I think I need not go any further in the analysis of that complex idea we call a lie: what I have said is enough to show that it is made up of simple ideas. And it could not be but an offensive tediousness to my reader, to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every particular simple idea that goes to this complex one; which, from what has been said, he cannot but be able to make out to himself. The same may be done in all our complex ideas whatsoever; which, however compounded and decompounded, may at last be resolved into simple ideas, which are all the materials of knowledge or thought we have, or can have. Nor shall we have reason to fear that the mind is hereby stinted to too scanty a number of ideas, if we consider what an inexhaustible stock of simple modes number and figure alone afford us. How far then mixed modes, which admit of the various combinations of different simple ideas, and their infinite modes, are from being few and scanty, we may easily imagine. So that, before we have done, we shall see that nobody need be afraid he shall not have scope and compass enough for his thoughts to range in, though they be, as I pretend, confined only to simple ideas, received from sensation or reflection, and their several combinations.

There are therefore three ways we gain these complex ideas of mixed modes: (1) Through experience and OBSERVATION of things themselves. For example, seeing two men wrestle or fence gives us the idea of wrestling or fencing. (2) Through INVENTION, or deliberately combining several simple ideas in our own minds. Thus, whoever first invented printing or etching had an idea of the process before the process ever existed. (3) The most usual way is by EXPLAINING THE NAMES of actions we have never seen or movements we cannot see. We list all the ideas that make up those actions or movements. By doing so, we place their parts before our imagination, so to speak. Through sensation and reflection, we have filled our minds with simple ideas. Through use, we have learned the names that stand for those ideas. These resources let us convey any complex idea we want another person to understand. The condition is that every simple idea within the complex idea must already be known to that person. We must also use the same names for those simple ideas. For all our complex ideas can ultimately be broken down into the simple ideas from which they were originally formed. Perhaps their immediate parts, if I may call them that, are themselves complex ideas. Thus, the mixed mode represented by the word LIE consists of these simple ideas: (1) Spoken sounds. (2) Certain ideas in the speaker’s mind. (3) Those words serving as signs of those ideas. (4) Those signs combined in statements or denials that do not match the ideas in the speaker’s mind. I think I need not go further in analyzing the complex idea we call a lie. What I have said sufficiently shows that a lie is made up of simple ideas. Listing every simple idea within this complex idea would only burden my reader with an unbearably tedious account. From what I have said, the reader cannot fail to work out that list independently. We can do the same with all our complex ideas. However often those ideas are combined and their combinations combined again, they can ultimately be broken down into simple ideas. Simple ideas are all the materials of knowledge or thought that we have or can have. Nor need we fear that this limits the mind to too few ideas. Consider the inexhaustible supply of simple modes that number and shape alone provide. Mixed modes allow different simple ideas and their infinitely varied modes to be combined in many ways. We can therefore easily imagine how far mixed modes are from being few or limited. So, before we finish, we shall see that no one need fear having too little room for thought to explore. This remains true even if thought is confined, as I maintain, to simple ideas from sensation or reflection and their various combinations.

10. Motion, Thinking, and Power have been most modified.

10. Motion, thinking, and power have been given the greatest variety of forms.

It is worth our observing, which of all our simple ideas have been MOST modified, and had most mixed ideas made out of them, with names given to them. And those have been these three:—THINKING and MOTION (which are the two ideas which comprehend in them all action,) and POWER, from whence these actions are conceived to flow. These simple ideas, I say, of thinking, motion, and power, have been those which have been most modified; and out of whose modifications have been made most complex modes, with names to them. For ACTION being the great business of mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws are conversant, it is no wonder that the several modes of thinking and motion should be taken notice of, the ideas of them observed, and laid up in the memory, and have names assigned to them; without which laws could be but ill made, or vice and disorders repressed. Nor could any communication be well had amongst men without such complex ideas, with names to them: and therefore men have settled names, and supposed settled ideas in their minds, of modes of actions, distinguished by their causes, means, objects, ends, instruments, time, place, and other circumstances; and also of their powers fitted for those actions: v.g. BOLDNESS is the power to speak or do what we intend, before others, without fear or disorder; and the Greeks call the confidence of speaking by a peculiar name, [word in Greek]: which power or ability in man of doing anything, when it has been acquired by frequent doing the same thing, is that idea we name HABIT; when it is forward, and ready upon every occasion to break into action, we call it DISPOSITION. Thus, TESTINESS is a disposition or aptness to be angry.

We should note which of our simple ideas have been MOST varied and combined into mixed ideas with names. These are three: THINKING, MOTION, and POWER. Thinking and motion together cover all action. Power is conceived as the source of these actions. These simple ideas of thinking, motion, and power have, I repeat, been varied most. Their variations have produced the greatest number of complex modes with names. For ACTION is humanity’s great concern, and all laws deal with action. So it is no wonder that people notice the different modes of thinking and motion. People observe the ideas of these modes, store them in memory, and give them names. Without these ideas and names, laws could hardly be made well, or wrongdoing and disorder restrained. Nor could people communicate well without such complex ideas and names. People have therefore established names for modes of action and assumed that corresponding ideas are settled in their minds. These modes are distinguished by their causes, means, objects, purposes, instruments, time, place, and other circumstances. People have also named the powers suited to those actions. For example, BOLDNESS is the power to say or do what we intend before others, without fear or loss of composure. The Greeks have a special name for confidence in speaking: [word in Greek]. When a person acquires a power or ability through repeatedly doing the same thing, we call that acquired ability HABIT. When a power is eager and ready to become action at every opportunity, we call it DISPOSITION. Thus, TESTINESS is a disposition or tendency to become angry.

To conclude: Let us examine any modes of action, v.g. CONSIDERATION and ASSENT, which are actions of the mind; RUNNING and SPEAKING, which are actions of the body; REVENGE and MURDER, which are actions of both together, and we shall find them but so many collections of simple ideas, which, together, make up the complex ones signified by those names.

To conclude, let us examine different kinds of action. For example, CONSIDERATION and ASSENT are actions of the mind. RUNNING and SPEAKING are actions of the body. REVENGE and MURDER are actions of both mind and body together. We will find that each is simply a collection of simple ideas. Together, these simple ideas form the complex ideas named by these words.

11. Several Words seeming to signify Action, signify but the effect.

11. Several words that seem to describe an action describe only its effect.

POWER being the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when they *[lost line??] exert this power into act, are called CAUSES, and the substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple ideas which are introduced into any subject by the exerting of that power, are called EFFECTS. The EFFICACY whereby the new substance or idea is produced is called, in the subject exerting that power, ACTION; but in the subject wherein any simple idea is changed or produced, it is called PASSION: which efficacy, however various, and the effects almost infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual agents, to be nothing else but modes of thinking and willing; in corporeal agents, nothing else but modifications of motion. I say I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two. For whatever sort of action besides these produces any effects, I confess myself to have no notion nor idea of; and so it is quite remote from my thoughts, apprehensions, and knowledge; and as much in the dark to me as five other senses, or as the ideas of colours to a blind man. And therefore many words which seem to express some action, signify nothing of the action or MODUS OPERANDI at all, but barely the effect, with some circumstances of the subject wrought on, or cause operating: v.g. CREATION, ANNIHILATION, contain in them no idea of the action or manner whereby they are produced, but barely of the cause, and the thing done. And when a countryman says the cold freezes water, though the word freezing seems to import some action, yet truly it signifies nothing but the effect, viz. that water that was before fluid is become hard and consistent, without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done.

POWER is the source of all action. Substances possessing powers are called CAUSES when they *[lost line??] put those powers into action. The substances produced as a result are called EFFECTS. So are the simple ideas introduced into anything through the exercise of that power. The EFFICACY that produces the new substance or idea is called ACTION in the substance exercising the power. But in the substance where a simple idea is changed or produced, that efficacy is called PASSION. This efficacy takes many forms, and its effects are almost infinite. Yet I think we can conceive of it in thinking agents only as forms of thinking and willing. In physical agents, we can conceive of it only as variations in motion. I say I think we cannot conceive of it as anything other than these two. For I admit that I have no notion or idea of any other kind of action that produces effects. Such action is entirely beyond my thoughts, understanding, and knowledge. It is as mysterious to me as five additional senses, or as ideas of colours are to a blind man. Therefore, many words that seem to express an action tell us nothing about the action or its MODUS OPERANDI. They name only the effect, with some details about the thing acted on or the cause at work. For example, CREATION and ANNIHILATION contain no idea of the action or the way the results are produced. They refer only to the cause and what is done. And when a countryman says that cold freezes water, the word freezing seems to describe an action. Yet freezing really signifies only the effect: water that was fluid has become hard and solid. The word contains no idea of the action that brings about this change.

12. Mixed Modes made also of other Ideas than those of Power and Action.

12. Mixed modes are also made from ideas other than those of power and action.

I think I shall not need to remark here that, though power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes, marked by names, and familiar in the minds and mouths of men, yet other simple ideas, and their several combinations, are not excluded: much less, I think, will it be necessary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes which have been settled, with names to them. That would be to make a dictionary of the greatest part of the words made use of in divinity, ethics, law, and politics, and several other sciences. All that is requisite to my present design, is to show what sort of ideas those are which I call mixed modes; how the mind comes by them; and that they are compositions made up of simple ideas got from sensation and reflection; which I suppose I have done.

I think I need hardly point out that power and action form most named mixed modes familiar in thought and speech. Yet other simple ideas and their various combinations are not excluded. Still less, I think, need I list all the mixed modes that have been established and given names. Such a list would be a dictionary covering most words used in theology, ethics, law, politics, and several other sciences. For my present purpose, I need only explain what kinds of ideas I call mixed modes and how the mind acquires them. I must also show that mixed modes combine simple ideas gained through sensation and reflection. I believe I have done so.