Our Complex Ideas of Substances

The mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch are called, so united in one subject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas together: because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas CAN subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some SUBSTRATUM wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call SUBSTANCE.

As I have explained, the mind is supplied with many simple ideas. These come through the senses from external things, or through reflection on the mind’s own activities. The mind also notices that certain simple ideas constantly occur together. We assume these ideas belong to one thing. Words reflect common ways of thinking and serve as shortcuts in communication. So we give a single name to these ideas united in one thing. Without noticing, we then tend to speak and think of this combination as one simple idea. In fact, it is a combination of many ideas. This happens because, as I have said, we cannot imagine how these simple ideas CAN exist on their own. So we become accustomed to assuming some underlying support, or SUBSTRATUM, in which these ideas exist and from which they arise. We therefore call this support SUBSTANCE.

2. Our obscure Idea of Substance in general.

2. Our unclear idea of substance in general.

So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what SUPPORT of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts; and if he were demanded, what is it that solidity and extension adhere in, he would not be in a much better case than the Indian before mentioned who, saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on; to which his answer was—a great tortoise: but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied—SOMETHING, HE KNEW NOT WHAT. And thus here, as in all other cases where we use words without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children: who, being questioned what such a thing is, which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, that it is SOMETHING: which in truth signifies no more, when so used, either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know, and talk of, is what they have no distinct idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea then we have, to which we give the GENERAL name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist SINE RE SUBSTANTE, without something to support them, we call that support SUBSTANTIA; which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, standing under or upholding.

So if anyone examines their own idea of pure substance in general, they will find only an assumption. They suppose there is some unknown SUPPORT for qualities capable of producing simple ideas in us. These qualities are commonly called accidents. If someone were asked what colour or weight exists in, they could only answer: solid, extended parts. If asked what solidity and extension themselves exist in, they would hardly be better off than the Indian mentioned earlier. He said the world rested on a great elephant. When asked what the elephant rested on, he answered: a great tortoise. But when pressed again about what supported the broad-backed tortoise, he replied: SOMETHING, HE KNEW NOT WHAT. Here, as in all other cases where we use words without clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children. When asked what something is, children who do not know readily give this satisfactory answer: it is SOMETHING. In truth, when children or adults use the word this way, they mean only that they do not know what. They have no distinct idea at all of the thing they claim to know and talk about. So they are completely ignorant of it and in the dark. The idea we give the GENERAL name substance is therefore nothing but a supposed, unknown support. It supports the qualities we find existing. We imagine these qualities cannot exist SINE RE SUBSTANTE, without something to support them. We call that support SUBSTANTIA. The word's actual meaning, in plain English, is standing under or upholding.

3. Of the Sorts of Substances.

3. Types of Substances.

An obscure and relative idea of SUBSTANCE IN GENERAL being thus made we come to have the ideas of PARTICULAR SORTS OF SUBSTANCES, by collecting SUCH combinations of simple ideas as are, by experience and observation of men’s senses, taken notice of to exist together; and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution, or unknown essence of that substance. Thus we come to have the ideas of a man, horse, gold, water, &c.; of which substances, whether any one has any other CLEAR idea, further than of certain simple ideas co-existent together, I appeal to every one’s own experience. It is the ordinary qualities observable in iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of those substances, which a smith or a jeweller commonly knows better than a philosopher; who, whatever SUBSTANTIAL FORMS he may talk of, has no other idea of those substances, than what is framed by a collection of those simple ideas which are to be found in them: only we must take notice, that our complex ideas of substances, besides all those simple ideas they are made up of, have always the confused idea of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist: and therefore when we speak of any sort of substance, we say it is a thing having such or such qualities; as body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion; spirit, a thing capable of thinking; and so hardness, friability, and power to draw iron, we say, are qualities to be found in a loadstone. These, and the like fashions of speaking, intimate that the substance is supposed always SOMETHING BESIDES the extension, figure, solidity, motion, thinking, or other observable ideas, though we know not what it is.

Having formed this vague, relative idea of SUBSTANCE IN GENERAL, we develop ideas of PARTICULAR KINDS OF SUBSTANCES. We do so by collecting SUCH combinations of simple ideas as experience and sensory observation reveal together. We therefore suppose these combinations arise from the particular internal structure, or unknown essence, of each substance. This is how we form ideas of a human being, a horse, gold, water, and so on. Does anyone have any other CLEAR idea of these substances beyond certain simple ideas existing together? I ask everyone to consult their own experience. The ordinary observable qualities of iron or a diamond, taken together, form the true complex idea of those substances. A blacksmith or jeweller commonly knows these qualities better than a philosopher does. Whatever SUBSTANTIAL FORMS a philosopher may discuss, the philosopher has no other idea of these substances. That idea comes from collecting the simple ideas found in them. But we must note something else about our complex ideas of substances. Besides all their simple ideas, these complex ideas always include a vague idea of something underlying them. We suppose the simple ideas belong to and exist in that underlying something. Therefore, when we speak of any kind of substance, we call the substance a thing with certain qualities. For example, a body is a thing that occupies space, has a shape, and can move. A spirit is a thing capable of thinking. Likewise, we say hardness, brittleness, and the power to attract iron are qualities found in a loadstone. These and similar ways of speaking suggest that substance is always assumed to be SOMETHING BESIDES its observable qualities. Those qualities include extension in space, shape, solidity, motion, thinking, and any others we observe. Yet we do not know what that underlying something is.

4. No clear or distinct idea of Substance in general.

4. No clear or distinct idea of substance in general.

Hence, when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances, as horse, stone, &c., though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we used to find united in the thing called horse or stone; yet, BECAUSE WE CANNOT CONCEIVE HOW THEY SHOULD SUBSIST ALONE, NOR ONE IN ANOTHER, we suppose them existing in and supported by some common subject; which support we denote by the name substance, though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support.

So, when we talk or think about particular kinds of physical substances, we mean things like horses, stones, and so on. Our idea of a horse or stone is only a collection of simple ideas of qualities perceived through our senses. These are the qualities we have usually found together in the thing called a horse or stone. Yet, BECAUSE WE CANNOT IMAGINE HOW THESE QUALITIES COULD EXIST ALONE OR IN ONE ANOTHER, we suppose something supports them. We suppose these qualities exist in a common underlying thing. We call this support substance, although we certainly have no clear or distinct idea of the supposed support.

5. As clear an Idea of spiritual substance as of corporeal substance.

5. Our idea of spiritual substance is as clear as our idea of physical substance.

The same happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, reasoning, fearing, &c., which we concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the actions of some other SUBSTANCE, which we call SPIRIT; whereby yet it is evident that, having no other idea or notion of matter, but something wherein those many sensible qualities which affect our senses do subsist; by supposing a substance wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c., do subsist, we have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit, as we have of body; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the SUBSTRATUM to those simple ideas we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the SUBSTRATUM to those operations we experiment in ourselves within. It is plain then, that the idea of CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE in matter is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions, as that of SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE, or spirit: and therefore, from our not having any notion of the substance of spirit, we can no more conclude its non-existence, than we can, for the same reason, deny the existence of body; it being as rational to affirm there is no body, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of matter, as to say there is no spirit, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of a spirit.

The same happens with the mind’s activities, such as thinking, reasoning, fearing, and so on. We conclude that these activities cannot exist on their own. Nor do we understand how these activities could belong to a body or be produced by a body. So we tend to think of these activities as the actions of some other SUBSTANCE, which we call SPIRIT. Yet clearly, our only idea of matter is something in which the many qualities affecting our senses exist. We likewise suppose a substance in which thinking, knowing, doubting, the power to move, and so on exist. By making this supposition, we have as clear an idea of the substance of spirit as we have of body. We suppose that body, without knowing what body’s substance is, provides the SUBSTRATUM underlying the simple ideas received from outside ourselves. Likewise, we suppose that spirit provides the SUBSTRATUM underlying the activities we experience within ourselves. We are equally ignorant of what spirit’s substance is. Clearly, then, the idea of CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE in matter is as far beyond our understanding as that of SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE, or spirit. So our lack of any idea of spirit’s substance gives us no more reason to deny spirit’s existence than body’s. Denying body’s existence because we have no clear and distinct idea of matter’s substance would be just as reasonable. It would be no different from denying spirit’s existence because we have no clear and distinct idea of spirit’s substance.

6. Our ideas of particular Sorts of Substances.

6. Our ideas of specific kinds of substances.

Whatever therefore be the secret abstract nature of substance in general, all the ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of substances are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas, co-existing in such, though unknown, cause of their union, as makes the whole subsist of itself. It is by such combinations of simple ideas, and nothing else, that we represent particular sorts of substances to ourselves; such are the ideas we have of their several species in our minds; and such only do we, by their specific names, signify to others, v.g. man, horse, sun, water, iron: upon hearing which words, every one who understands the language, frames in his mind a combination of those several simple ideas which he has usually observed, or fancied to exist together under that denomination; all which he supposes to rest in and be, as it were, adherent to that unknown common subject, which inheres not in anything else. Though, in the meantime, it be manifest, and every one, upon inquiry into his own thoughts, will find, that he has no other idea of any substance, v.g. let it be gold, horse, iron, man, vitriol, bread, but what he has barely of those sensible qualities, which he supposes to inhere; with a supposition of such a substratum as gives, as it were, a support to those qualities or simple ideas, which he has observed to exist united together. Thus, the idea of the sun,—what is it but an aggregate of those several simple ideas, bright, hot, roundish, having a constant regular motion, at a certain distance from us, and perhaps some other: as he who thinks and discourses of the sun has been more or less accurate in observing those sensible qualities, ideas, or properties, which are in that thing which he calls the sun.

Whatever the hidden, abstract nature of substance in general may be, all our ideas of particular substances are merely combinations of simple ideas. These simple ideas coexist in some unknown cause that unites them and makes the whole exist independently. We represent particular kinds of substances to ourselves through these combinations of simple ideas, and nothing else. These combinations are our mental ideas of the different kinds of substances. And these combinations alone are what we communicate to others through names such as man, horse, sun, water, and iron. Everyone who understands the language forms a combination of simple ideas in their mind upon hearing these words. These are the ideas they have usually observed, or imagined, existing together under that name. They suppose all these qualities rest in, and are, so to speak, attached to, a common but unknown underlying thing. This underlying thing does not itself exist as a quality of anything else. Yet anyone who examines their own thoughts will clearly find that their idea of any substance contains nothing more. Whether gold, horse, iron, man, vitriol, or bread, their idea consists only of qualities they perceive through their senses. They suppose these qualities exist in an underlying substance. They also suppose this underlying substance supports, so to speak, the qualities or simple ideas they have observed existing together. Thus, what is the idea of the sun but a collection of several simple ideas? These include brightness, heat, a roughly round shape, constant and regular motion, and a certain distance from us. Perhaps the collection includes other ideas too. The collection depends on how carefully the person thinking and speaking about the sun has observed its qualities or properties. These are the qualities perceived through the senses in the thing that person calls the sun.

7. Their active and passive Powers a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances.

7. Substances’ powers to act and be acted upon form a large part of our complex ideas of substances.

For he has the perfectest idea of any of the particular sorts of substances, who has gathered, and put together, most of those simple ideas which do exist in it; among which are to be reckoned its active powers, and passive capacities, which, though not simple ideas, yet in this respect, for brevity’s sake, may conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them. Thus, the power of drawing iron is one of the ideas of the complex one of that substance we call a loadstone; and a power to be so drawn is a part of the complex one we call iron: which powers pass for inherent qualities in those subjects. Because every substance, being as apt, by the powers we observe in it, to change some sensible qualities in other subjects, as it is to produce in us those simple ideas which we receive immediately from it, does, by those new sensible qualities introduced into other subjects, discover to us those powers which do thereby mediately affect our senses, as regularly as its sensible qualities do it immediately: v. g. we immediately by our senses perceive in fire its heat and colour; which are, if rightly considered, nothing but powers in it to produce those ideas in US: we also by our senses perceive the colour and brittleness of charcoal, whereby we come by the knowledge of another power in fire, which it has to change the colour and consistency of WOOD. By the former, fire immediately, by the latter, it mediately discovers to us these several powers; which therefore we look upon to be a part of the qualities of fire, and so make them a part of the complex idea of it. For all those powers that we take cognizance of, terminating only in the alteration of some sensible qualities in those subjects on which they operate, and so making them exhibit to us new sensible ideas, therefore it is that I have reckoned these powers amongst the simple ideas which make the complex ones of the sorts of substances; though these powers considered in themselves, are truly complex ideas. And in this looser sense I crave leave to be understood, when I name any of these POTENTIALITIES among the simple ideas which we recollect in our minds when we think of PARTICULAR SUBSTANCES. For the powers that are severally in them are necessary to be considered, if we will have true distinct notions of the several sorts of substances.

The person with the most complete idea of any particular kind of substance has gathered together the most simple ideas found in it. These include the substance’s powers to act and its capacities to be acted upon. These powers and capacities are not simple ideas, but for brevity, they may conveniently be counted among them. Thus, the power to attract iron forms part of our complex idea of the substance we call a loadstone. The capacity to be attracted forms part of our complex idea of iron. We regard these powers as inherent qualities of those substances. For every substance can change some qualities we perceive in other things through the powers we observe in that substance. A substance can do this just as it can produce the simple ideas we receive directly from it. By producing new perceptible qualities in other things, a substance reveals powers that affect our senses indirectly. These powers affect our senses as regularly as the substance’s perceptible qualities affect them directly. For example, our senses directly perceive the heat and colour of fire. Properly understood, these qualities are nothing but powers in fire to produce those ideas in us. We also perceive the colour and brittleness of charcoal through our senses. These qualities reveal another power in fire: its ability to change the colour and consistency of wood. Through heat and colour, fire reveals its powers directly. Through the qualities of charcoal, fire reveals its powers indirectly. We therefore regard these powers as qualities of fire and include them in our complex idea of fire. For all the powers we recognize ultimately change only some perceptible qualities in the things they act upon. These changes cause those things to present new simple ideas to us. That is why I have counted these powers among the simple ideas making up our complex ideas of kinds of substances. Yet these powers, considered in themselves, are truly complex ideas. I ask to be understood in this looser sense when I count any such capacities among simple ideas. I mean the simple ideas we bring together in our minds when we think of particular substances. For we must consider the powers found in each kind of substance if we want accurate, distinct ideas of those kinds.

8. And why.

8. And why.

Nor are we to wonder that powers make a great part of our complex ideas of substances; since their secondary qualities are those which in most of them serve principally to distinguish substances one from another, and commonly make a considerable part of the complex idea of the several sorts of them. For, our senses failing us in the discovery of the bulk, texture, and figure of the minute parts of bodies, on which their real constitutions and differences depend, we are fain to make use of their secondary qualities as the characteristical notes and marks whereby to frame ideas of them in our minds, and distinguish them one from another: all which secondary qualities, as has been shown, are nothing but bare powers. For the colour and taste of opium are, as well as its soporific or anodyne virtues, mere powers, depending on its primary qualities, whereby it is fitted to produce different operations on different parts of our bodies.

Nor should we be surprised that powers make up a large part of our complex ideas of substances. For in most substances, secondary qualities are the main features we use to distinguish one substance from another. These qualities also commonly form a considerable part of our complex ideas of different kinds of substances. Our senses cannot reveal the size, arrangement, and shape of the tiny parts of bodies. Yet the true makeup of bodies, and the differences between them, depend on these features. So we must use secondary qualities as identifying signs to form ideas of substances and distinguish them from one another. As already shown, all these secondary qualities are nothing but powers. For opium’s colour and taste, like its sleep-inducing and pain-relieving effects, are merely powers that depend on its primary qualities. Through these primary qualities, opium can produce different effects on different parts of our bodies.

9. Three sorts of Ideas make our complex ones of Corporeal Substances.

9. Three kinds of ideas make up our complex ideas of physical substances.

The ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal substances, are of these three sorts. First, the ideas of the primary qualities of things, which are discovered by our senses, and are in them even when we perceive them not; such are the bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion of the parts of bodies; which are really in them, whether we take notice of them or not. Secondly, the sensible secondary qualities, which, depending on these, are nothing but the powers those substances have to produce several ideas in us by our senses; which ideas are not in the things themselves, otherwise than as anything is in its cause. Thirdly, the aptness we consider in any substance, to give or receive such alterations of primary qualities, as that the substance so altered should produce in us different ideas from what it did before; these are called active and passive powers: all which powers, as far as we have any notice or notion of them, terminate only in sensible simple ideas. For whatever alteration a loadstone has the power to make in the minute particles of iron, we should have no notion of any power it had at all to operate on iron, did not its sensible motion discover it: and I doubt not, but there are a thousand changes, that bodies we daily handle have a power to cause in one another, which we never suspect, because they never appear in sensible effects.

The ideas that make up our complex ideas of physical substances fall into three kinds. First are ideas of the primary qualities of things, which our senses reveal. These qualities exist in things even when we do not perceive them. They include the size, shape, number, arrangement, and motion of the parts of bodies. These qualities really exist in bodies, whether we notice them or not. Second are the secondary qualities we perceive through our senses. These depend on the primary qualities. Secondary qualities are simply the powers substances have to produce various ideas in us through our senses. These ideas exist in the things themselves only in the sense that an effect exists in its cause. Third are the capacities we recognize in a substance to cause or undergo changes in primary qualities. These changes allow the altered substance to produce different ideas in us from those it produced before. These capacities are called active and passive powers. All these powers, as far as we know or understand them, lead only to simple ideas received through the senses. For example, a lodestone has the power to change the tiny particles of iron. Whatever those changes may be, we would have no idea that the lodestone could act on iron without observable movement. And I do not doubt that the bodies we handle daily can cause a thousand changes in one another. We never suspect these changes because they never produce effects we can perceive through our senses.

10. Powers thus make a great Part of our complex Ideas of particular Substances.

10. Powers thus make up a large part of our complex ideas of particular substances.

POWERS therefore justly make a great part of our complex ideas of substances. He that will examine his complex idea of gold, will find several of its ideas that make it up to be only powers; as the power of being melted, but of not spending itself in the fire; of being dissolved in AQUA REGIA, are ideas as necessary to make up our complex idea of gold, as its colour and weight: which, if duly considered, are also nothing but different powers. For, to speak truly, yellowness is not actually in gold, but is a power in gold to produce that idea in us by our eyes, when placed in a due light: and the heat, which we cannot leave out of our ideas of the sun, is no more really in the sun, than the white colour it introduces into wax. These are both equally powers in the sun, operating, by the motion and figure of its sensible parts, so on a man, as to make him have the idea of heat; and so on wax, as to make it capable to produce in a man the idea of white.

Powers therefore rightly form a large part of our complex ideas of substances. Anyone who examines their complex idea of gold will find that several of its component ideas are only powers. Gold can melt without being consumed by fire, and it can dissolve in AQUA REGIA. These powers are as necessary to our complex idea of gold as its colour and weight. Properly considered, colour and weight are also nothing more than different powers. Strictly speaking, yellowness is not actually in gold. Rather, gold has the power to produce the idea of yellow in us through our eyes, under suitable light. Likewise, heat is an essential part of our idea of the sun. Yet heat is no more really in the sun than the white colour the sun produces in wax. Both are equally powers of the sun, acting through the motion and shape of its perceptible parts. These powers act on a person to produce the idea of heat. They also act on wax, making the wax capable of producing the idea of white in a person.

11. The now secondary Qualities of Bodies would disappear, if we could discover the primary ones of their minute Parts.

11. Bodies’ secondary qualities would disappear if we could discover the primary qualities of their tiny parts.

Had we senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies, and the real constitution on which their sensible qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different ideas in us: and that which is now the yellow colour of gold, would then disappear, and instead of it we should see an admirable texture of parts, of a certain size and figure. This microscopes plainly discover to us; for what to our naked eyes produces a certain colour, is, by thus augmenting the acuteness of our senses, discovered to be quite a different thing; and the thus altering, as it were, the proportion of the bulk of the minute parts of a coloured object to our usual sight, produces different ideas from what it did before. Thus, sand or pounded glass, which is opaque, and white to the naked eye, is pellucid in a microscope; and a hair seen in this way, loses its former colour, and is, in a great measure, pellucid, with a mixture of some bright sparkling colours, such as appear from the refraction of diamonds, and other pellucid bodies. Blood, to the naked eye, appears all red; but by a good microscope, wherein its lesser parts appear, shows only some few globules of red, swimming in a pellucid liquor, and how these red globules would appear, if glasses could be found that could yet magnify them a thousand or ten thousand times more, is uncertain.

Suppose our senses were sharp enough to detect the tiny particles of bodies and their actual structure. This structure determines the qualities we perceive through our senses. I have no doubt that, under these conditions, bodies would produce quite different ideas in us. What we now see as gold’s yellow colour would disappear. Instead, we would see a remarkable arrangement of parts of a certain size and shape. Microscopes clearly show us this. Something that produces a certain colour to the naked eye appears quite different when our senses are sharpened this way. In effect, magnification changes how large a coloured object’s tiny parts appear compared with how we normally see them. This change produces different ideas from those we had before. For example, sand or powdered glass looks opaque and white to the naked eye, but transparent under a microscope. A hair viewed this way loses its former colour and becomes largely transparent, with some bright, sparkling colours mixed in. These colours resemble those produced by the refraction of light through diamonds and other transparent bodies. Blood appears entirely red to the naked eye. But a good microscope reveals its smaller parts, showing only a few red globules floating in a transparent liquid. How these red globules would look under lenses a thousand or ten thousand times more powerful remains uncertain.

12. Our Faculties for Discovery of the Qualities and powers of Substances suited to our State.

12. Our abilities to discover the qualities and powers of substances are suited to our condition.

The infinite wise Contriver of us, and all things about us, hath fitted our senses, faculties, and organs, to the conveniences of life, and the business we have to do here. We are able, by our senses, to know and distinguish things: and to examine them so far as to apply them to our uses, and several ways to accommodate the exigences of this life. We have insight enough into their admirable contrivances and wonderful effects, to admire and magnify the wisdom, power and goodness of their Author. Such a knowledge as this which is suited to our present condition, we want not faculties to attain. But it appears not that God intended we should have a perfect, clear, and adequate knowledge of them: that perhaps is not in the comprehension of any finite being. We are furnished with faculties (dull and weak as they are) to discover enough in the creatures to lead us to the knowledge of the Creator, and the knowledge of our duty; and we are fitted well enough with abilities to provide for the conveniences of living: these are our business in this world. But were our senses altered, and made much quicker and acuter, the appearance and outward scheme of things would have quite another face to us; and, I am apt to think, would be inconsistent with our being, or at least wellbeing, in the part of the universe which we inhabit. He that considers how little our constitution is able to bear a remove into part of this air, not much higher than that we commonly breathe in, will have reason to be satisfied, that in this globe of earth allotted for our mansion, the all-wise Architect has suited our organs, and the bodies that are to affect them, one to another. If our sense of hearing were but a thousand times quicker than it is, how would a perpetual noise distract us. And we should in the quietest retirement be less able to sleep or meditate than in the middle of a sea-fight. Nay, if that most instructive of our senses, seeing, were in any man a thousand or a hundred thousand times more acute than it is by the best microscope, things several millions of times less than the smallest object of his sight now would then be visible to his naked eyes, and so he would come nearer to the discovery of the texture and motion of the minute parts of corporeal things; and in many of them, probably get ideas of their internal constitutions: but then he would be in a quite different world from other people: nothing would appear the same to him and others: the visible ideas of everything would be different. So that I doubt, whether he and the rest of men could discourse concerning the objects of sight, or have any communication about colours, their appearances being so wholly different. And perhaps such a quickness and tenderness of sight could not endure bright sunshine, or so much as open daylight; nor take in but a very small part of any object at once, and that too only at a very near distance. And if by the help of such MICROSCOPICAL EYES (if I may so call them) a man could penetrate further than ordinary into the secret composition and radical texture of bodies, he would not make any great advantage by the change, if such an acute sight would not serve to conduct him to the market and exchange; if he could not see things he was to avoid, at a convenient distance; nor distinguish things he had to do with by those sensible qualities others do. He that was sharp-sighted enough to see the configuration of the minute particles of the spring of a clock, and observe upon what peculiar structure and impulse its elastic motion depends, would no doubt discover something very admirable: but if eyes so framed could not view at once the hand, and the characters of the hour-plate, and thereby at a distance see what o’clock it was, their owner could not be much benefited by that acuteness; which, whilst it discovered the secret contrivance of the parts of the machine, made him lose its use.

The infinitely wise Designer of us and everything around us has suited our senses, abilities, and organs to daily life. He has equipped us for the work we have to do here. Through our senses, we can recognize and distinguish things. We can examine things well enough to use them and meet the various needs of this life. We understand enough of their remarkable design and wonderful effects to admire and praise their Author’s wisdom, power, and goodness. We have the abilities needed to gain this knowledge, which suits our present condition. But God does not appear to have intended us to understand these things perfectly, clearly, and fully. Perhaps no finite being can have such knowledge. Our abilities, dull and weak as they are, reveal enough about created things to guide us toward knowing the Creator. They also guide us toward knowing our duty. And our abilities are adequate to provide for the comforts of life. These are our tasks in this world. But if our senses changed and became much sharper and more sensitive, things would look entirely different to us. I am inclined to think such senses would be incompatible with our existence in this part of the universe. Or they would at least be incompatible with our well-being here. Consider how poorly our bodies tolerate being taken into air only a little higher than the air we usually breathe. That gives us reason to be satisfied with the all-wise Architect’s arrangements on this earth, our allotted home. He has suited our organs and the bodies that affect them to one another. If our hearing were just a thousand times more sensitive, how distracting the constant noise would be! Even in the quietest retreat, we would find sleeping or meditating harder than in the middle of a naval battle. Now consider sight, the most informative of our senses. Suppose someone’s sight became a thousand or a hundred thousand times sharper than sight through the best microscope. Objects several million times smaller than the smallest thing he can now see would become visible to his naked eyes. He would come closer to discovering the structure and motion of the tiny parts of physical things. In many cases, he would probably gain some understanding of their internal makeup. But he would then live in a completely different world from other people. Nothing would look the same to him as to anyone else. His visual impressions of everything would be different. So I doubt whether he and other people could discuss visible objects or communicate about colors. Those objects and colors would look so completely different to them. And perhaps such sharp, sensitive sight could not bear bright sunshine, or even ordinary daylight. Perhaps he could see only a very small part of any object at once, and only from very close by. With such MICROSCOPICAL EYES, if I may call them that, someone might see further into the hidden makeup of bodies. He might see their most basic structure better than other people could. But the change would offer little advantage if such sharp sight could not guide him to the market and exchange. Nor would it help much if he could not see obstacles from a useful distance. He would also need to distinguish the things he dealt with by the same sensory qualities other people used. Someone might have sight sharp enough to see the arrangement of the tiny particles in a clock’s spring. He might observe exactly what structure and force gave the spring its elastic movement. He would undoubtedly discover something very remarkable. But suppose eyes like these could not see the clock’s hand and the numbers on its face together. He could not then tell the time from a distance, and his sharper sight would be of little benefit. While revealing the machine’s hidden design, his sight would prevent him from using it.

13. Conjecture about the corporeal organs of some Spirits.

13. Speculation about the bodily organs of some spirits.

And here give me leave to propose an extravagant conjecture of mine, viz. That since we have some reason (if there be any credit to be given to the report of things that our philosophy cannot account for) to imagine, that Spirits can assume to themselves bodies of different bulk, figure, and conformation of parts—whether one great advantage some of them have over us may not lie in this, that they can so frame and shape to themselves organs of sensation or perception, as to suit them to their present design, and the circumstances of the object they would consider. For how much would that man exceed all others in knowledge, who had but the faculty so to alter the structure of his eyes, that one sense, as to make it capable of all the several degrees of vision which the assistance of glasses (casually at first lighted on) has taught us to conceive? What wonders would he discover, who could so fit his eyes to all sorts of objects, as to see when he pleased the figure and motion of the minute particles in the blood, and other juices of animals, as distinctly as he does, at other times, the shape and motion of the animals themselves? But to us, in our present state, unalterable organs, so contrived as to discover the figure and motion of the minute parts of bodies, whereon depend those sensible qualities we now observe in them, would perhaps be of no advantage. God has no doubt made them so as is best for us in our present condition. He hath fitted us for the neighbourhood of the bodies that surround us, and we have to do with; and though we cannot, by the faculties we have, attain to a perfect knowledge of things, yet they will serve us well enough for those ends above-mentioned, which are our great concernment. I beg my reader’s pardon for laying before him so wild a fancy concerning the ways of perception of beings above us; but how extravagant soever it be, I doubt whether we can imagine anything about the knowledge of angels but after this manner, some way or other in proportion to what we find and observe in ourselves. And though we cannot but allow that the infinite power and wisdom of God may frame creatures with a thousand other faculties and ways of perceiving things without them than what we have, yet our thoughts can go no further than our own: so impossible it is for us to enlarge our very guesses beyond the ideas received from our own sensation and reflection. The supposition, at least, that angels do sometimes assume bodies, needs not startle us; since some of the most ancient and most learned Fathers of the church seemed to believe that they had bodies: and this is certain, that their state and way of existence is unknown to us.

Here, allow me to offer a wild guess of my own. We have some reason to imagine that spirits can take on bodies of different sizes, shapes, and arrangements of parts. That is, if we can trust reports of things our philosophy cannot explain. Might some spirits have a great advantage over us because they can shape their own organs of sensation or perception? They could adapt those organs to their immediate purpose and to the particular object they wished to examine. How much more knowledge would a man have than everyone else if he could change the structure of his eyes? Through that single sense, he could achieve every degree of vision that optical lenses have taught us to imagine. Those lenses were first discovered by chance. What wonders would he discover if he could adapt his eyes to every kind of object? Whenever he wished, he could clearly see the shape and movement of tiny particles in blood and other animal fluids. He could see those particles as clearly as, at other times, he sees the shape and movement of animals themselves. But fixed organs capable of revealing those tiny parts might be no advantage to us in our present state. The shapes and movements of those parts determine the qualities we now perceive in bodies. God has no doubt made our organs in the way best suited to our present condition. He has equipped us to live among the bodies that surround us and with which we must deal. Although our faculties cannot give us perfect knowledge of things, those faculties serve well enough for the purposes mentioned above. Those purposes are our chief concern. I ask my reader’s pardon for presenting so wild a fancy about how beings above us perceive things. Yet however extravagant my fancy may be, I doubt we can imagine angels’ knowledge in any other way. Our imaginings must somehow correspond to what we find and observe in ourselves. We must admit that God’s infinite power and wisdom may create beings with a thousand other faculties. Those beings may have ways of perceiving things outside themselves different from our own. Yet our thoughts cannot reach beyond our own faculties and ways of perceiving. We cannot extend even our guesses beyond the ideas we receive through our own sensation and reflection. At least, the suggestion that angels sometimes take on bodies need not shock us. Some of the most ancient and learned Fathers of the church seemed to believe that angels had bodies. And one thing is certain: their state and manner of existence are unknown to us.

14. Our specific Ideas of Substances.

14. Our ideas of different kinds of substances.

But to return to the matter in hand,—the ideas we have of substances, and the ways we come by them. I say, our SPECIFIC ideas of substances are nothing else but A COLLECTION OF CERTAIN NUMBER OF SIMPLE IDEAS, CONSIDERED AS UNITED IN ONE THING. These ideas of substances, though they are commonly simple apprehensions, and the names of them simple terms, yet in effect are complex and compounded. Thus the idea which an Englishman signifies by the name swan, is white colour, long neck, red beak, black legs, and whole feet, and all these of a certain size, with a power of swimming in the water, and making a certain kind of noise, and perhaps, to a man who has long observed this kind of birds, some other properties: which all terminate in sensible simple ideas, all united in one common subject.

But let us return to the subject: our ideas of substances and how we get those ideas. I say our SPECIFIC ideas of substances are simply A COLLECTION OF A CERTAIN NUMBER OF SIMPLE IDEAS, CONSIDERED AS UNITED IN ONE THING. These ideas of substances are commonly treated as simple concepts, and their names as simple terms. Yet the ideas are actually complex, made up of several parts. Thus, an Englishman’s idea of a swan includes white coloring, a long neck, a red beak, black legs, and webbed feet. All these features have a certain size. The idea also includes the ability to swim in water and make a certain kind of sound. And perhaps someone who has long observed this kind of bird includes some other properties. All these properties ultimately come down to simple ideas received through the senses, all united in one underlying thing.

15. Our Ideas of spiritual Substances, as clear as of bodily Substances.

15. Our ideas of spiritual substances are as clear as our ideas of physical substances.

Besides the complex ideas we have of material sensible substances, of which I have last spoken,—by the simple ideas we have taken from those operations of our own minds, which we experiment daily in ourselves, as thinking, understanding, willing, knowing, and power of beginning motion, &c., co-existing in some substance, we are able to frame the COMPLEX IDEA OF AN IMMATERIAL SPIRIT. And thus, by putting together the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty, and power of moving themselves and other things, we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances as we have of material. For putting together the ideas of thinking and willing, or the power of moving or quieting corporeal motion, joined to substance, of which we have no distinct idea, we have the idea of an immaterial spirit; and by putting together the ideas of coherent solid parts, and a power of being moved joined with substance, of which likewise we have no positive idea, we have the idea of matter. The one is as clear and distinct an idea as the other: the idea of thinking, and moving a body, being as clear and distinct ideas as the ideas of extension, solidity, and being moved. For our idea of substance is equally obscure, or none at all, in both: it is but a supposed I know not what, to support those ideas we call accidents. It is for want of reflection that we are apt to think that our senses show us nothing but material things. Every act of sensation, when duly considered, gives us an equal view of both parts of nature, the corporeal and spiritual. For whilst I know, by seeing or hearing, &c., that there is some corporeal being without me, the object of that sensation, I do more certainly know, that there is some spiritual being within me that sees and hears. This, I must be convinced, cannot be the action of bare insensible matter; nor ever could be, without an immaterial thinking being.

I have just discussed our complex ideas of physical substances perceived through the senses. Besides these, we can form the COMPLEX IDEA OF AN IMMATERIAL SPIRIT. We do so using simple ideas drawn from our minds’ activities, which we experience daily within ourselves. These include thinking, understanding, willing, knowing, and the power to start motion, among others. We conceive of these activities and powers as existing together in some substance. By combining ideas of thinking, perceiving, freedom, and the power to move themselves and other things, we form our notion of immaterial substances. This notion is as clear as our notion of material substances. To form the idea of an immaterial spirit, we combine thinking and willing with substance. We also include the power to start or stop bodily motion. Of substance itself, we have no distinct idea. To form the idea of matter, we combine solid parts that hold together, and the power to be moved, with substance. Here too, we have no definite idea of substance itself. One idea is as clear and distinct as the other. Thinking and moving a body are ideas as clear and distinct as extension, solidity, and being moved. In both cases, our idea of substance is equally obscure, if we have any idea of it at all. Substance is merely a supposed something, we know not what, that supports the qualities we call accidents. We tend to think our senses show us only material things because we fail to reflect. Every act of sensation, properly considered, reveals both parts of nature equally: the bodily and the spiritual. Through seeing or hearing, for example, I know that some bodily being outside me is the object of my sensation. Yet I know more certainly that some spiritual being within me sees and hears. I must be convinced that seeing and hearing cannot be the action of mere matter incapable of sensation. Nor could matter ever perform these actions without an immaterial thinking being.

16. No Idea of abstract Substance either in Body or Spirit.

16. No idea of substance in the abstract, whether in body or spirit.

By the complex idea of extended, figured, coloured, and all other sensible qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as far from the idea of the substance of body, as if we knew nothing at all: nor after all the acquaintance and familiarity which we imagine we have with matter, and the many qualities men assure themselves they perceive and know in bodies, will it perhaps upon examination be found, that they have any more or clearer primary ideas belonging to body, than they have belonging to immaterial spirit.

Our complex idea of a body includes its extension, shape, colour, and all its other qualities perceived through the senses. These qualities are all we know of a body. Yet we remain as far from understanding its underlying substance as if we knew nothing at all. We imagine we are thoroughly familiar with matter. People also feel certain they perceive and know many qualities in bodies. Yet closer examination may perhaps show that their basic ideas of body are no more numerous or clear than their basic ideas of immaterial spirit.

17. Cohesion of solid parts and Impulse, the primary ideas peculiar to Body.

17. Solid parts holding together and the push of impact are the basic ideas unique to physical bodies.

The primary ideas we have PECULIAR TO BODY, as contradistinguished to spirit, are the COHESION OF SOLID, AND CONSEQUENTLY SEPARABLE, PARTS, and a POWER OF COMMUNICATING MOTION BY IMPULSE. These, I think, are the original ideas proper and peculiar to body; for figure is but the consequence of finite extension.

Our basic ideas UNIQUE TO BODY, as distinct from spirit, are these: SOLID PARTS HOLDING TOGETHER, AND THEREFORE CAPABLE OF SEPARATION, and the POWER TO TRANSFER MOTION THROUGH IMPACT. These, I think, are the basic ideas unique to body. For shape is only a consequence of taking up a limited amount of space.

18. Thinking and Motivity

18. Thinking and the Power to Move

The ideas we have belonging and PECULIAR TO SPIRIT, are THINKING, and WILL, or A POWER OF PUTTING BODY INTO MOTION BY THOUGHT, AND, WHICH IS CONSEQUENT TO IT, LIBERTY. For, as body cannot but communicate its motion by impulse to another body, which it meets with at rest, so the mind can put bodies into motion, or forbear to do so, as it pleases. The ideas of EXISTENCE, DURATION, and MOBILITY, are common to them both.

The ideas we have that are UNIQUE TO SPIRIT are THINKING and WILL. WILL is A POWER TO MOVE BODIES BY THOUGHT. From this power follows LIBERTY. For just as a moving body must transfer motion by impact to another body at rest, the mind can move bodies. But the mind can also choose not to move bodies, as it pleases. The ideas of EXISTENCE, DURATION, and THE ABILITY TO MOVE apply to both body and spirit.

19. Spirits capable of Motion.

19. Spirits can move.

There is no reason why it should be thought strange that I make mobility belong to spirit; for having no other idea of motion, but change of distance with other beings that are considered as at rest; and finding that spirits, as well as bodies, cannot operate but where they are; and that spirits do operate at several times in several places, I cannot but attribute change of place to all finite spirits: (for of the Infinite Spirit I speak not here). For my soul, being a real being as well as my body, is certainly as capable of changing distance with any other body, or being, as body itself; and so is capable of motion. And if a mathematician can consider a certain distance, or a change of that distance between two points, one may certainly conceive a distance and a change of distance, between two spirits; and so conceive their motion, their approach or removal, one from another.

There is no reason to find it strange that I consider spirits capable of movement. For my only idea of motion is a change in distance from other beings considered to be at rest. And I find that spirits, like bodies, can act only where they are. Spirits also act in different places at different times. So I cannot help attributing a change of place to all finite spirits. (I am not speaking here of the Infinite Spirit.) For my soul is a real being, just as my body is. My soul can certainly change its distance from any other body or being, just as a body can. So my soul is capable of motion. And if a mathematician can consider a particular distance between two points, or a change in that distance, the same reasoning applies to spirits. We can certainly imagine a distance between two spirits and a change in that distance. So we can imagine their motion, their movement toward or away from one another.

20. Proof of this.

20. Proof of this.

Every one finds in himself that his soul can think, will, and operate on his body in the place where that is, but cannot operate on a body, or in a place, an hundred miles distant from it. Nobody can imagine that his soul can think or move a body at Oxford, whilst he is at London; and cannot but know, that, being united to his body, it constantly changes place all the whole journey between Oxford and London, as the coach or horse does that carries him, and I think may be said to be truly all that while in motion or if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear idea enough of its motion, its being separated from the body in death, I think, will; for to consider it as going out of the body, or leaving it, and yet to have no idea of its motion, seems to me impossible.

Everyone finds within himself that his soul can think, will, and act on his body wherever his body is. But his soul cannot act on a body, or in a place, a hundred miles away. Nobody can imagine his soul thinking or moving a body at Oxford while he is in London. And everyone must know that his soul, united to his body, constantly changes place throughout the journey between Oxford and London. The coach or horse carrying him changes place in the same way. I think his soul may truly be said to be moving throughout that journey. But if this does not give us a clear enough idea of the soul’s movement, its separation from the body at death will, I think. For it seems impossible to me to imagine the soul going out of the body, or leaving the body, without any idea of the soul moving.

21. God immoveable because infinite.

21. God cannot move because he is infinite.

If it be said by any one that it cannot change place, because it hath none, for the spirits are not IN LOCO, but UBI; I suppose that way of talking will not now be of much weight to many, in an age that is not much disposed to admire, or suffer themselves to be deceived by such unintelligible ways of speaking. But if any one thinks there is any sense in that distinction, and that it is applicable to our present purpose, I desire him to put it into intelligible English; and then from thence draw a reason to show that immaterial spirits are not capable of motion. Indeed motion cannot be attributed to God; not because he is an immaterial, but because he is an infinite spirit.

Someone may say that a spirit cannot change place because it has no place. For spirits, they say, are not IN LOCO, but UBI. I suppose such talk will carry little weight with many people today. We live in an age little inclined to admire such unintelligible language or let it deceive us. But if anyone thinks this distinction makes sense and applies to our present question, let him explain it in understandable English. Then let him use that explanation to show why immaterial spirits cannot move. Indeed, motion cannot be attributed to God. But this is not because he is an immaterial spirit, but because he is an infinite spirit.

22. Our complex idea of an immaterial Spirit and our complex idea of Body compared.

22. Comparing our complex idea of an immaterial spirit with our complex idea of a body.

Let us compare, then, our complex idea of an immaterial spirit with our complex idea of body, and see whether there be any more obscurity in one than in the other, and in which most. Our idea of BODY, as I think, is AN EXTENDED SOLID SUBSTANCE, CAPABLE OF COMMUNICATING MOTION BY IMPULSE: and our idea of SOUL, AS AN IMMATERIAL SPIRIT, is of A SUBSTANCE THAT THINKS, AND HAS A POWER OF EXCITING MOTION IN BODY, BY WILLING, OR THOUGHT. These, I think, are our complex ideas of soul and body, as contradistinguished; and now let us examine which has most obscurity in it, and difficulty to be apprehended. I know that people whose thoughts are immersed in matter, and have so subjected their minds to their senses that they seldom reflect on anything beyond them, are apt to say, they cannot comprehend a THINKING thing which perhaps is true: but I affirm, when they consider it well, they can no more comprehend an EXTENDED thing.

Let us compare, then, our complex idea of an immaterial spirit with our complex idea of body. Let us see whether one is harder to understand than the other, and if so, which one. Our idea of BODY, I think, is A SOLID SUBSTANCE THAT OCCUPIES SPACE AND CAN TRANSFER MOTION THROUGH IMPACT. Our idea of SOUL, AS AN IMMATERIAL SPIRIT, is A SUBSTANCE THAT THINKS AND CAN CAUSE BODILY MOTION THROUGH WILL OR THOUGHT. These, I think, are our complex ideas of soul and body, considered as distinct from each other. Now let us examine which idea is less clear and harder to grasp. I know that some people focus their thoughts on matter and make their minds so dependent on their senses. As a result, they seldom reflect on anything beyond their senses. Such people tend to say they cannot understand a THINKING thing. Perhaps that is true. But I maintain that, when they consider the matter carefully, they can no more understand a thing THAT OCCUPIES SPACE.

23. Cohesion of solid Parts in Body as hard to be conceived as thinking in a Soul.

23. How solid parts of a body hold together is as hard to understand as how a soul thinks.

If any one says he knows not what it is thinks in him, he means he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing: No more, say I, knows he what the substance is of that solid thing. Further, if he says he knows not how he thinks, I answer, Neither knows he how he is extended, how the solid parts of body are united or cohere together to make extension. For though the pressure of the particles of air may account for the cohesion of several parts of matter that are grosser than the particles of air, and have pores less than the corpuscles of air, yet the weight or pressure of the air will not explain, nor can be a cause of the coherence of the particles of air themselves. And if the pressure of the aether, or any subtiler matter than the air, may unite, and hold fast together, the parts of a particle of air, as well as other bodies, yet it cannot make bonds for ITSELF, and hold together the parts that make up every the least corpuscle of that MATERIA SUBTILIS. So that that hypothesis, how ingeniously soever explained, by showing that the parts of sensible bodies are held together by the pressure of other external insensible bodies, reaches not the parts of the aether itself; and by how much the more evident it proves, that the parts of other bodies are held together by the external pressure of the aether, and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion and union, by so much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the cohesion of the parts of the corpuscles of the aether itself: which we can neither conceive without parts, they being bodies, and divisible, nor yet how their parts cohere, they wanting that cause of cohesion which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all other bodies.

If someone says he does not know what thinks within him, he means he does not know that thinking thing’s substance. I reply that he knows no more about the substance of the solid thing. Further, if he says he does not know how he thinks, I answer that he does not know how he occupies space either. He does not know how the solid parts of his body join or hold together to occupy space. Air pressure may explain why some larger parts of matter hold together. Those parts are larger than air particles and have pores smaller than air particles. But the air’s weight or pressure cannot explain or cause the air particles themselves to hold together. And suppose the pressure of aether, or some matter finer than air, holds together the parts of an air particle. Such pressure may hold other bodies together too. Yet that finer matter cannot bind ITSELF together. It cannot hold together the parts making up even the smallest particle of that MATERIA SUBTILIS, or fine matter. So this hypothesis, however cleverly explained, does not account for how the parts of aether itself hold together. The hypothesis explains how bodies we can sense hold together through pressure from external bodies we cannot sense. But the more clearly this explanation succeeds, the more it leaves us in the dark about aether itself. The explanation presents external pressure from aether as the only conceivable cause holding other bodies’ parts together. Yet that explanation leaves unexplained how the parts within aether particles hold together. We cannot imagine aether particles having no parts, since they are bodies and can be divided. Nor can we imagine how their parts hold together. They lack the cause offered to explain how the parts of all other bodies hold together.

24. Not explained by an ambient fluid.

24. Not explained by a surrounding fluid.

But, in truth, the pressure of any ambient fluid, how great soever, can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of matter. For, though such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two polished superficies, one from another, in a line perpendicular to them, as in the experiment of two polished marbles; yet it can never in the least hinder the separation by a motion, in a line parallel to those surfaces. Because the ambient fluid, having a full liberty to succeed in each point of space, deserted by a lateral motion, resists such a motion of bodies, so joined, no more than it would resist the motion of that body were it on all sides environed by that fluid, and touched no other body; and therefore, if there were no other cause of cohesion, all parts of bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral sliding motion. For if the pressure of the aether be the adequate cause of cohesion, wherever that cause operates not, there can be no cohesion. And since it cannot operate against a lateral separation, (as has been shown,) therefore in every imaginary plane, intersecting any mass of matter, there could be no more cohesion than of two polished surfaces, which will always, notwithstanding any imaginable pressure of a fluid, easily slide one from another. So that perhaps, how clear an idea soever we think we have of the extension of body, which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts, he that shall well consider it in his mind, may have reason to conclude, That it is as easy for him to have a clear idea how the soul thinks as how body is extended. For, since body is no further, nor otherwise, extended, than by the union and cohesion of its solid parts, we shall very ill comprehend the extension of body, without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of its parts; which seems to me as incomprehensible as the manner of thinking, and how it is performed.

But in truth, pressure from any surrounding fluid, however great, cannot explain how the solid parts of matter hold together. Such pressure may prevent two polished surfaces from being pulled directly apart, as in the experiment with two polished marbles. Yet the pressure cannot prevent them from sliding apart along their surfaces, even in the slightest. For the surrounding fluid can freely fill every space left by this sideways movement. So the fluid offers no more resistance than if the moving body were surrounded entirely by fluid and touched nothing else. Therefore, if nothing else held bodies together, all their parts would slide apart easily. For if pressure from the aether fully explains cohesion, there can be no cohesion wherever that pressure has no effect. And, as shown, that pressure cannot prevent sideways separation. Therefore, along every imaginary plane cutting through any mass of matter, cohesion could be no stronger than between two polished surfaces. Such surfaces will always slide apart easily, despite any imaginable pressure from a fluid. So perhaps our idea of how bodies occupy space is not as clear as we think. A body's extension in space is nothing but its solid parts holding together. Anyone who carefully considers this may have reason to reach the following conclusion. Forming a clear idea of how the soul thinks is as easy as understanding how a body occupies space. For a body occupies space only through the union and cohesion of its solid parts, and in no other way. So we can hardly understand how a body occupies space without understanding what unites its parts and holds them together. To me, that union and cohesion seem as incomprehensible as the way thinking works and how thinking is performed.

We can as little understand how the parts cohere in extension as how our spirits perceive or move.

We understand how parts hold together in space no better than how our spirits perceive or move.

25. I allow it is usual for most people to wonder how any one should find a difficulty in what they think they every day observe. Do we not see (will they be ready to say) the parts of bodies stick firmly together? Is there anything more common? And what doubt can there be made of it? And the like, I say, concerning thinking and voluntary motion. Do we not every moment experiment it in ourselves, and therefore can it be doubted? The matter of fact is clear, I confess; but when we would a little nearer look into it, both in the one and the other; and can as little understand how the parts of body cohere, as how we ourselves perceive or move. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me how the parts of gold, or brass, (that but now in fusion were as loose from one another as the particles of water, or the sands of an hour-glass,) come in a few moments to be so united, and adhere so strongly one to another, that the utmost force of men’s arms cannot separate them? A considering man will, I suppose, be here at a loss to satisfy his own, or another man’s understanding.

25. I admit that most people are surprised when anyone finds difficulty in what they believe they observe every day. Do we not see, they will readily ask, the parts of physical bodies holding firmly together? Is anything more common? And how can anyone doubt that? The same applies, I say, to thinking and voluntary movement. Do we not experience both in ourselves every moment? How, then, can either be doubted? The facts are clear, I admit. But when we look more closely at both cases, we understand neither. We can no more understand how the parts of a body hold together than how we ourselves perceive or move. I would like someone to explain clearly how the parts of gold or brass become so firmly joined. Just moments earlier, when molten, those parts were as loose as particles of water or sand in an hourglass. How do they become so firmly joined within moments that even the greatest force of human arms cannot separate them? A thoughtful person will, I suppose, struggle to find an explanation that satisfies either their own understanding or anyone else’s.

26. The cause of coherence of atoms in extended substances incomprehensible.

26. We cannot understand what holds atoms together in substances that take up space.

The little bodies that compose that fluid we call water are so extremely small, that I have never heard of any one who, by a microscope, (and yet I have heard of some that have magnified to ten thousand; nay, to much above a hundred thousand times,) pretended to perceive their distinct bulk, figure, or motion; and the particles of water are also so perfectly loose one from another, that the least force sensibly separates them. Nay, if we consider their perpetual motion, we must allow them to have no cohesion one with another; and yet let but a sharp cold come, and they unite, they consolidate; these little atoms cohere, and are not, without great force, separable. He that could find the bonds that tie these heaps of loose little bodies together so firmly; he that could make known the cement that makes them stick so fast one to another, would discover a great and yet unknown secret: and yet when that was done, would he be far enough from making the extension of body (which is the cohesion of its solid parts) intelligible, till he could show wherein consisted the union, or consolidation of the parts of those bonds or of that cement, or of the least particle of matter that exists. Whereby it appears that this primary and supposed obvious quality of body will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehensible as anything belonging to our minds, and a solid extended substance as hard to be conceived as a thinking immaterial one, whatever difficulties some would raise against it.

The tiny bodies that make up the fluid we call water are extremely small. I have never heard of anyone claiming to see their individual size, shape, or motion through a microscope. Yet I have heard of microscopes that magnify ten thousand times, and even well over a hundred thousand times. Water particles are also so loosely connected that the slightest force noticeably separates them. Indeed, if we consider their constant motion, we must admit that they do not hold together at all. Yet let an intense cold arrive, and the particles unite and become solid. These tiny atoms hold together and cannot be separated without great force. Anyone who could discover the bonds holding these heaps of loose little bodies so firmly together would uncover a great secret. Anyone who could explain the cement making them stick so tightly together would reveal something still unknown. Yet even then, that person would be far from explaining how a body occupies space through its solid parts holding together. First, that person would need to explain what holds together the parts of those bonds or that cement. The same question applies to even the smallest particle of matter that exists. So this basic and supposedly obvious quality of bodies proves, on examination, as incomprehensible as anything about our minds. A solid substance occupying space is as hard to understand as a thinking substance without matter. This remains true whatever difficulties some people may raise against the idea of a thinking substance without matter.

27. The supposed pressure [*dropped word] explain cohesion is unintelligible.

27. The supposed pressure [*dropped word] used to explain cohesion cannot be understood.

For, to extend our thoughts a little further, the pressure which is brought to explain the cohesion of bodies [*dropped line] considered, as no doubt it is, finite, let any one send his contemplation to the extremities of the universe, and there see what conceivable hoops, what bond he can imagine to hold this mass of matter in so close a pressure together; from whence steel has its firmness, and the parts of a diamond their hardness and indissolubility. If matter be finite, it must have its extremes; and there must be something to hinder it from scattering asunder. If, to avoid this difficulty, any one will throw himself into the supposition and abyss of infinite matter, let him consider what light he thereby brings to the cohesion of body, and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible, by resolving it into a supposition the most absurd and most incomprehensible of all other: so far is our extension of body (which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts) from being clearer, or more distinct, when we would inquire into the nature, cause, or manner of it, than the idea of thinking.

To take our thinking a little further, consider the pressure used to explain why bodies hold together [*dropped line]. If matter is finite, as it undoubtedly is, let anyone turn their thoughts to the edges of the universe. What imaginable hoops or bonds could keep this mass of matter pressed so tightly together? Such pressure is supposed to give steel its firmness and make the parts of a diamond hard and inseparable. If matter is finite, it must have outer limits. And something must keep that matter from scattering apart. To avoid this difficulty, someone might plunge into the bottomless assumption that matter is infinite. If so, let them consider how much that assumption helps explain why bodies hold together. Does that assumption bring them any closer to making this cohesion understandable? Their explanation rests on the most absurd and incomprehensible assumption of all. So the idea of a body's extension, meaning nothing more than its solid parts holding together, is no clearer or more distinct than the idea of thinking. This becomes apparent when we investigate the nature of that extension, its cause, or how it occurs.

28. Communication of Motion by Impulse, or by Thought, equally unintelligible.

28. How motion is transferred by a push or by thought is equally impossible to understand.

Another idea we have of body is, THE POWER OF COMMUNICATION OF MOTION BY IMPULSE; and of our souls, THE POWER OF EXCITING MOTION BY THOUGHT. These ideas, the one of body, the other of our minds, every day’s experience clearly furnishes us with: but if here again we inquire how this is done, we are equally in the dark. For, in the communication of motion by impulse, wherein as much motion is lost to one body as is got to the other, which is the ordinariest case, we can have no other conception, but of the passing of motion out of one body into another; which, I think, is as obscure and inconceivable as how our minds move or stop our bodies by thought, which we every moment find they do. The increase of motion by impulse, which is observed or believed sometimes to happen, is yet harder to be understood. We have by daily experience clear evidence of motion produced both by impulse and by thought; but the manner how, hardly comes within our comprehension: we are equally at a loss in both. So that, however we consider motion, and its communication, either from body or spirit, the idea which belongs to spirit is at least as clear as that which belongs to body. And if we consider the active power of moving, or, as I may call it, motivity, it is much clearer in spirit than body; since two bodies, placed by one another at rest, will never afford us the idea of a power in the one to move the other, but by a borrowed motion: whereas the mind every day affords us ideas of an active power of moving of bodies; and therefore it is worth our consideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of spirits, and passive power of matter. Hence may be conjectured that created spirits are not totally separate from matter, because they are both active and passive. Pure spirit, viz. God, is only active; pure matter is only passive; those beings that are both active and passive, we may judge to partake of both. But be that as it will, I think, we have as many and as clear ideas belonging to spirit as we have belonging to body, the substance of each being equally unknown to us; and the idea of thinking in spirit, as clear as of extension in body; and the communication of motion by thought, which we attribute to spirit, is as evident as that by impulse, which we ascribe to body. Constant experience makes us sensible of both these, though our narrow understandings can comprehend neither. For, when the mind would look beyond those original ideas we have from sensation or reflection, and penetrate into their causes, and manner of production, we find still it discovers nothing but its own short-sightedness.

Another idea we have of body is THE POWER TO TRANSFER MOTION BY IMPACT. Another idea we have of our souls is THE POWER TO PRODUCE MOTION BY THOUGHT. Everyday experience clearly gives us these ideas, one about bodies and the other about our minds. But if we ask how either process happens, we are equally in the dark. When motion transfers by impact, one body usually loses as much motion as the other gains. We can only conceive of this as motion passing from one body into another. To me, this transfer seems as obscure and inconceivable as how our minds move or stop our bodies through thought. Yet we find our minds doing this at every moment. An increase in motion through impact, sometimes observed or believed to occur, is even harder to understand. Daily experience gives us clear evidence that both impact and thought produce motion. But how either produces motion is hardly within our understanding. We are equally at a loss in both cases. So, however we consider motion and its transfer, whether from body or spirit, the comparison remains the same. Our idea of motion produced by spirit is at least as clear as our idea of motion produced by body. And if we consider the active power to move things, our idea is much clearer in spirit than in body. I might call this power motivity. Two bodies placed next to each other at rest never suggest that either can move the other without receiving motion first. By contrast, the mind gives us daily examples of an active power to move bodies. So we should consider whether active power belongs specifically to spirits, and passive power to matter. From this we may guess that created spirits are not entirely separate from matter, because they are both active and passive. Pure spirit, namely God, is only active. Pure matter is only passive. We may judge that beings that are both active and passive share in both spirit and matter. But however that may be, I think we have as many clear ideas about spirit as we have about body. The underlying substance of each is equally unknown to us. Our idea of thinking in spirit is as clear as our idea of extension, or occupying space, in body. The transfer of motion by thought, which we attribute to spirit, is as evident as transfer by impact in bodies. Constant experience makes us aware of both, though our limited understanding can comprehend neither. For the mind tries to look beyond the basic ideas we gain through sensation or reflection. It tries to uncover their causes and how they are produced. But whenever the mind does so, it discovers only its own limited vision.

29. Summary.

29. Summary.

To conclude. Sensation convinces us that there are solid extended substances; and reflection, that there are thinking ones: experience assures us of the existence of such beings, and that the one hath a power to move body by impulse, the other by thought; this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I say, every moment furnishes us with the clear ideas both of the one and the other. But beyond these ideas, as received from their proper sources, our faculties will not reach. If we would inquire further into their nature, causes, and manner, we perceive not the nature of extension clearer than we do of thinking. If we would explain them any further, one is as easy as the other; and there is no more difficulty to conceive how A SUBSTANCE WE KNOW NOT should, by thought, set body into motion, than how A SUBSTANCE WE KNOW NOT should, by impulse, set body into motion. So that we are no more able to discover wherein the ideas belonging to body consist, than those belonging to spirit. From whence it seems probable to me, that the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts; beyond which the mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any discoveries, when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of those ideas.

To conclude, sensation convinces us that solid substances exist and occupy space. Reflection convinces us that thinking substances exist. Experience assures us that both kinds of beings exist. Solid substances can move bodies by impact, and thinking substances can move bodies by thought. We cannot doubt these powers. Experience, I repeat, supplies us every moment with clear ideas of both kinds of substance. But our faculties cannot reach beyond these ideas, received from their respective sources. If we investigate their nature, causes, and workings further, we understand the nature of occupying space no better than thinking. If we try to explain either further, one is as easy to explain as the other. Conceiving how A SUBSTANCE WE KNOW NOT moves a body by thought is no harder than conceiving the alternative: how A SUBSTANCE WE KNOW NOT moves a body by impact. So we are no better able to discover what the ideas associated with body consist in than those associated with spirit. It therefore seems probable to me that the simple ideas we receive through sensation and reflection mark our thoughts’ limits. However hard the mind tries, it cannot move even slightly beyond those limits. Nor can the mind make discoveries by probing the nature and hidden causes of those ideas.

30. Our idea of Spirit and our idea of Body compared.

30. Comparing our idea of spirit with our idea of body.

So that, in short, the idea we have of spirit, compared with the idea we have of body, stands thus: the substance of spirits is unknown to us; and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us. Two primary qualities or properties of body, viz. solid coherent parts and impulse, we have distinct clear ideas of: so likewise we know, and have distinct clear ideas, of two primary qualities or properties of spirit, viz. thinking, and a power of action; i.e. a power of beginning or stopping several thoughts or motions. We have also the ideas of several qualities inherent in bodies, and have the clear distinct ideas of them; which qualities are but the various modifications of the extension of cohering solid parts, and their motion. We have likewise the ideas of the several modes of thinking viz. believing, doubting, intending, fearing, hoping; all which are but the several modes of thinking. We have also the ideas of willing, and moving the body consequent to it, and with the body itself too; for, as has been shown, spirit is capable of motion.

So, in short, our idea of spirit compares with our idea of body in the following way. The substance of spirits is unknown to us, and the substance of body is equally unknown. We have clear, distinct ideas of two primary properties of body: solid parts held together, and the ability to transfer motion by impact. Likewise, we know and have clear, distinct ideas of two primary properties of spirit: thinking and the power to act. This power means being able to start or stop various thoughts or movements. We also have clear, distinct ideas of various qualities found in bodies. These qualities are simply different forms of the spatial extent and motion of solid parts held together. Likewise, we have ideas of the various forms of thinking: believing, doubting, intending, fearing, and hoping. All these are simply different forms of thinking. We also have ideas of willing, of moving the body as a result, and of moving along with the body itself. For, as has been shown, spirit is capable of motion.

31. The Notion of Spirit involves no more Difficulty in it than that of Body.

31. The idea of spirit is no harder to understand than the idea of body.

Lastly, if this notion of immaterial spirit may have, perhaps, some difficulties in it not easily to be explained, we have therefore no more reason to deny or doubt the existence of such spirits, than we have to deny or doubt the existence of body; because the notion of body is cumbered with some difficulties very hard, and perhaps impossible to be explained or understood by us. For I would fain have instanced anything in our notion of spirit more perplexed, or nearer a contradiction, than the very notion of body includes in it; the divisibility IN INFINITUM of any finite extension involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in consequences impossible to be explicated or made in our apprehensions consistent; consequences that carry greater difficulty, and more apparent absurdity, than anything can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing substance.

Finally, the idea of an immaterial spirit may perhaps involve some difficulties that are not easy to explain. But those difficulties give us no more reason to deny or doubt spirits than to deny or doubt physical bodies. For the idea of a physical body also involves difficulties that are very hard to explain or understand. Perhaps explaining or understanding them is impossible for us. I would welcome any example of something in our idea of spirit more puzzling or seemingly contradictory than physical bodies themselves. Consider whether any finite stretch of space can be divided infinitely. Whether we accept or deny infinite divisibility, we face consequences we cannot explain or reconcile in our minds. Those consequences present greater difficulties and seem more absurd than anything that could follow from an immaterial substance capable of knowing.

32. We know nothing of things beyond our simple Ideas of them.

32. We know nothing about things beyond our simple ideas of them.

Which we are not at all to wonder at, since we having but some few superficial ideas of things, discovered to us only by the senses from without, or by the mind, reflecting on what it experiments in itself within, have no knowledge beyond that, much less of the internal constitution, and true nature of things, being destitute of faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and discovering in ourselves knowledge, and the power of voluntary motion, as certainly as we experiment, or discover in things without us, the cohesion and separation of solid parts, which is the extension and motion of bodies; we have as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of immaterial spirit, as with our notion of body, and the existence of the one as well as the other. For it being no more a contradiction that thinking should exist separate and independent from solidity, than it is a contradiction that solidity should exist separate and independent from thinking, they being both but simple ideas, independent one from another and having as clear and distinct ideas in us of thinking as of solidity, I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without solidity, i.e. immaterial, to exist, as a solid thing without thinking, i.e. matter, to exist; especially since it is not harder to conceive how thinking should exist without matter, than how matter should think. For whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple ideas we have from sensation and reflection and dive further into the nature of things, we fall presently into darkness and obscurity, perplexedness and difficulties, and can discover nothing further but our own blindness and ignorance. But whichever of these complex ideas be clearest, that of body, or immaterial spirit, this is evident, that the simple ideas that make them up are no other than what we have received from sensation or reflection: and so is it of all our other ideas of substances, even of God himself.

We should not be at all surprised by this, since we have only a few superficial ideas of things. These ideas come only through our outward senses or through the mind’s reflection on its own inner experiences. We have no knowledge beyond these ideas, much less knowledge of things’ inner makeup and true nature. We lack the abilities needed to gain such knowledge. Yet we experience and discover knowledge and the power of voluntary movement within ourselves. We do so as certainly as we discover solid parts holding together and separating in things outside us. These are the extension and motion of bodies. So we have as much reason to accept our idea of immaterial spirit as our idea of body. We also have as much reason to accept the existence of one as of the other. There is no greater contradiction in thought existing independently of solidity than in solidity existing independently of thought. Thought and solidity are both simple ideas, independent of each other. Our idea of thought is as clear and distinct as our idea of solidity. So I see no reason to deny that a thinking thing without solidity, an immaterial thing, may exist. We may allow its existence just as readily as that of a solid thing without thought, or matter. This is especially true because imagining thought without matter is no harder than imagining how matter could think. Whenever we try to go beyond these simple ideas from sensation and reflection, we immediately encounter darkness and confusion. Trying to look deeper into the nature of things leaves us puzzled and facing difficulties. We discover nothing further except our own blindness and ignorance. But whichever complex idea is clearer, body or immaterial spirit, one point is evident. The simple ideas making up both come only from sensation or reflection. The same is true of all our other ideas of substances, even our idea of God himself.

33. Our complex idea of God.

33. Our complex idea of God.

For if we examine the idea we have of the incomprehensible Supreme Being, we shall find that we come by it the same way; and that the complex ideas we have both of God, and separate spirits, are made of the simple ideas we receive from reflection; v.g. having, from what we experiment in ourselves, got the ideas of existence and duration; of knowledge and power; of pleasure and happiness; and of several other qualities and powers, which it is better to have than to be without; when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the Supreme Being, we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity; and so putting them together, make our complex idea of God. For that the mind has such a power of enlarging some of its ideas, received from sensation and reflection, has been already shown.

For if we examine our idea of the incomprehensible Supreme Being, we will find that we acquire it in the same way. Our complex ideas of both God and spirits existing apart from bodies consist of simple ideas we gain through reflection. For example, through our experience of ourselves, we gain ideas of existence and duration, knowledge and power, pleasure and happiness. We also gain ideas of various other qualities and powers that are better to have than to lack. When we try to form the most fitting idea we can of the Supreme Being, we make each quality infinite. We then combine these ideas to form our complex idea of God. For, as already shown, the mind can enlarge some of the ideas it receives through sensation and reflection.

34. Our complex idea of God as infinite.

34. Our complex idea of God as infinite.

If I find that I know some few things, and some of them, or all, perhaps imperfectly, I can frame an idea of knowing twice as many; which I can double again, as often as I can add to number; and thus enlarge my idea of knowledge, by extending its comprehension to all things existing, or possible. The same also I can do of knowing them more perfectly; i.e. all their qualities, powers, causes, consequences, and relations, &c., till all be perfectly known that is in them, or can any way relate to them: and thus frame the idea of infinite or boundless knowledge. The same may also be done of power, till we come to that we call infinite; and also of the duration of existence, without beginning or end, and so frame the idea of an eternal being. The degrees or extent wherein we ascribe existence, power, wisdom, and all other perfections (which we can have any ideas of) to that sovereign Being, which we call G-d, being all boundless and infinite, we frame the best idea of him our minds are capable of: all which is done, I say, by enlarging those simple ideas we have taken from the operations of our own minds, by reflection; or by our senses, from exterior things, to that vastness to which infinity can extend them.

If I find that I know a few things, perhaps some or all imperfectly, I can imagine knowing twice as many. I can double that number again, as often as I can keep adding numbers. In this way, I can expand my idea of knowledge to include all things that exist or could exist. I can also imagine knowing those things more perfectly. That means knowing all their qualities, powers, causes, consequences, relations, and so on. I can continue until everything in them, or in any way related to them, is perfectly known. In this way, I can form the idea of infinite or boundless knowledge. I can do the same with power, until I reach what we call infinite power. I can also imagine existence lasting without beginning or end, and so form the idea of an eternal being. We attribute existence, power, wisdom, and all other perfections we can conceive of to the supreme Being we call G-d. We imagine all these qualities as boundless and infinite, forming the best idea of him our minds can grasp. All this, I say, comes from expanding our simple ideas. We gain these ideas by reflecting on how our own minds work, or through our senses from things outside us. We then expand these ideas to the vastness that infinity allows.

35. God in his own essence incognisable.

35. God’s true nature cannot be known.

For it is infinity, which, joined to our ideas of existence, power, knowledge, &c., makes that complex idea, whereby we represent to ourselves, the best we can, the Supreme Being. For, though in his own essence (which certainly we do not know, not knowing the real essence of a pebble, or a fly, or of our own selves) God be simple and uncompounded; yet I think I may say we have no other idea of him, but a complex one of existence, knowledge, power, happiness, &c., infinite and eternal: which are all distinct ideas, and some of them, being relative, are again compounded of others: all which being, as has been shown, originally got from sensation and reflection, go to make up the idea or notion we have of God.

For infinity, joined to our ideas of existence, power, knowledge, and so on, forms a complex idea. Through this complex idea, we represent the Supreme Being to ourselves as well as we can. Although God in his own essence is simple and not made up of parts, we certainly do not know that essence. We do not even know the real essence of a pebble, a fly, or ourselves. Yet I think I may say that our only idea of God is a complex one. It combines existence, knowledge, power, happiness, and so on, all infinite and eternal. These are all distinct ideas, and some express relationships and are themselves made up of other ideas. As has been shown, all these ideas originally come from sensation and reflection. Together, they make up our idea or notion of God.

36. No Ideas in our complex ideas of Spirits, but those got from Sensation or Reflection.

36. Our complex ideas of spirits contain only ideas gained through sensation or reflection.

This further is to be observed, that there is no idea we attribute to God, bating infinity, which is not also a part of our complex idea of other spirits. Because, being capable of no other simple ideas, belonging to anything but body, but those which by reflection we receive from the operation of our own minds, we can attribute to spirits no other but what we receive from thence: and all the difference we can put between them, in our contemplation of spirits, is only in the several extents and degrees of their knowledge, power, duration, happiness, &c. For that in our ideas, as well of spirits as of other things, we are restrained to THOSE WE RECEIVE FROM SENSATION AND REFLECTION, is evident from hence,—That, in our ideas of spirits, how much soever advanced in perfection beyond those of bodies, even to that of infinite, we cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein they discover their thoughts one to another: though we must necessarily conclude that separate spirits, which are beings that have perfecter knowledge and greater happiness than we, must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal signs, and particular sounds; which are therefore of most general use, as being the best and quickest we are capable of. But of immediate communication having no experiment in ourselves, and consequently no notion of it at all, we have no idea how spirits, which use not words, can with quickness; or much less how spirits that have no bodies can be masters of their own thoughts, and communicate or conceal them at pleasure, though we cannot but necessarily suppose they have such a power.

We should also note that every idea we attribute to God, except infinity, belongs to our complex idea of other spirits. This is because reflection on our own minds gives us our only simple ideas of anything other than bodies. So we can attribute to spirits only the ideas we gain from that reflection. When we think about spirits, we can distinguish them only by degrees of knowledge, power, duration, happiness, and so on. Our ideas of spirits, like our ideas of other things, are limited to THOSE WE RECEIVE FROM SENSATION AND REFLECTION. The following makes this clear. We may conceive of spirits as far more perfect than bodies, even infinitely perfect. Yet we have no idea how spirits reveal their thoughts to one another. Still, we must conclude that spirits without bodies have a more perfect way of communicating their thoughts than we do. Such spirits, after all, have more perfect knowledge and greater happiness than we have. We must rely on bodily signs and particular sounds. These sounds are therefore the most widely used means of communication, being the best and quickest available to us. But we have no experience of direct communication between minds, and consequently no notion of it at all. So we have no idea how spirits that do not use words can communicate quickly. Still less can we understand how spirits without bodies can control their own thoughts and communicate or conceal them at will. Yet we cannot avoid supposing that spirits have this power.

37. Recapitulation.

37. Summary.

And thus we have seen what kind of ideas we have of SUBSTANCES OF ALL KINDS, wherein they consist, and how we came by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident,

So we have seen what kinds of ideas we have about SUBSTANCES OF ALL KINDS. We have seen what these ideas consist of and how we acquired them. From this, I think it is very clear that

First, That all our ideas of the several SORTS of substances are nothing but collections of simple ideas: with a supposition of SOMETHING to which they belong, and in which they subsist; though of this supposed something we have no clear distinct idea at all.

First, all our ideas of the different SORTS of substances are nothing but collections of simple ideas. We suppose there is SOMETHING to which these simple ideas belong and in which they exist. Yet we have no clear, distinct idea at all of this supposed something.

Secondly, That all the simple ideas, that thus united in one common SUBSTRATUM, make up our complex ideas of several SORTS of substances, are no other but such as we have received from sensation or reflection. So that even in those which we think we are most intimately acquainted with, and that come nearest the comprehension of our most enlarged conceptions, we cannot go beyond those simple ideas. And even in those which seem most remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely surpass anything we can perceive in ourselves by reflection; or discover by sensation in other things, we can attain to nothing but those simple ideas, which we originally received from sensation or reflection; as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels, and particularly of God himself.

Secondly, all the simple ideas united in one shared underlying support (SUBSTRATUM) come from sensation or reflection. Together, these simple ideas form our complex ideas of different kinds (SORTS) of substances. So even with substances we think we know most intimately, we cannot go beyond those simple ideas. This remains true even when those substances come closest to what our broadest understanding can grasp. And the same holds for substances that seem most remote from anything we deal with. Such substances infinitely surpass anything we can perceive within ourselves through reflection or discover in other things through sensation. Even here, we can arrive at nothing beyond the simple ideas we originally received from sensation or reflection. This is clear from our complex ideas of angels, and especially of God himself.

Thirdly, That most of the simple ideas that make up our complex ideas of substances, when truly considered, are only POWERS, however we are apt to take them for positive qualities; v.g. the greatest part of the ideas that make our complex idea of GOLD are yellowness, great weight, ductility, fusibility, and solubility in AQUA REGIA, &c., all united together in an unknown SUBSTRATUM: all which ideas are nothing else but so many relations to other substances; and are not really in the gold, considered barely in itself, though they depend on those real and primary qualities of its internal constitution, whereby it has a fitness differently to operate, and be operated on by several other substances.

Thirdly, most simple ideas making up our complex ideas of substances are, properly understood, only POWERS. Yet we tend to take them for qualities that exist in the substances themselves. For example, our complex idea of GOLD consists mostly of yellowness, great weight, and the ability to be drawn into wire, melted, and dissolved in AQUA REGIA. These and other qualities are all united in an unknown SUBSTRATUM, or underlying substance. All these ideas are nothing more than relations to other substances. These qualities are not really in gold considered simply in itself. Yet they depend on the real, primary qualities of gold’s internal structure. That structure enables gold to act on various other substances, and to be acted on by them, in different ways.