Complex Ideas

1. Made by the Mind out of simple Ones.

1. Made by the mind from simple ideas.

We have hitherto considered those ideas, in the reception whereof the mind is only passive, which are those simple ones received from sensation and reflection before mentioned, whereof the mind cannot make one to itself, nor have any idea which does not wholly consist of them. As simple ideas are observed to exist in several combinations united together, so the mind has a power to consider several of them united together as one idea; and that not only as they are united in external objects, but as itself has joined them together. Ideas thus made up of several simple ones put together, I call COMPLEX;—such as are beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe; which, though complicated of various simple ideas, or complex ideas made up of simple ones, yet are, when the mind pleases, considered each by itself, as one entire thing, signified by one name.

So far, we have considered ideas that the mind receives passively. These are the simple ideas received through sensation and reflection mentioned earlier. The mind cannot create even one simple idea for itself, nor have any idea not made entirely from simple ideas. We observe simple ideas joined together in various combinations. Likewise, the mind can consider several simple ideas together as one idea. These combinations need not be limited to those found in external objects. The mind can also join simple ideas together itself. I call ideas made by combining several simple ideas COMPLEX. Examples include beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, and the universe. These consist of various simple ideas, or of complex ideas that are themselves made from simple ideas. Yet whenever the mind chooses, it can consider each combination as one whole thing, represented by one name.

2. Made voluntarily.

2. Made by choice.

In this faculty of repeating and joining together its ideas, the mind has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts, infinitely beyond what sensation or reflection furnished it with: but all this still confined to those simple ideas which it received from those two sources, and which are the ultimate materials of all its compositions. For simple ideas are all from things themselves, and of these the mind CAN have no more, nor other than what are suggested to it. It can have no other ideas of sensible qualities than what come from without [*dropped word] the senses; nor any ideas of other kind of operations of a thinking substance, than what it finds in itself. But when it has once got these simple ideas, it is not confined barely to observation, and what offers itself from without; it can, by its own power, put together those ideas it has, and make new complex ones, which it never received so united.

By repeating and combining its ideas, the mind has great power to vary and multiply the objects of its thoughts. This power extends infinitely beyond what sensation or reflection has supplied. But the mind remains limited to the simple ideas received from these two sources. These simple ideas are the basic materials of everything the mind puts together. For all simple ideas come from things themselves. The mind CANNOT have more simple ideas, or different ones, than those presented to it. Ideas of qualities perceived by the senses can come only from outside the mind through [*dropped word] the senses. Likewise, ideas of the operations of a thinking being can come only from operations the mind finds within itself. But once the mind has these simple ideas, the mind is not limited to observation and what comes from outside. The mind can use its own power to combine existing ideas into new complex ones, never received in that combination.

3. Complex ideas are either of Modes, Substances, or Relations.

3. Complex ideas are of three kinds: modes, substances, or relations.

COMPLEX IDEAS, however compounded and decompounded, though their number be infinite, and the variety endless, wherewith they fill and entertain the thoughts of men; yet I think they may be all reduced under these three heads:—1. MODES. 2. SUBSTANCES. 3. RELATIONS.

COMPLEX IDEAS, however combined and recombined, are infinite in number and endlessly varied, filling and occupying people's thoughts. Yet I think all these complex ideas can be grouped under three headings: 1. MODES. 2. SUBSTANCES. 3. RELATIONS.

4. Ideas of Modes.

4. Ideas of Modes.

First, MODES I call such complex ideas which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on, or affections of substances;—such as are the ideas signified by the words triangle, gratitude, murder, &c. And if in this I use the word mode in somewhat a different sense from its ordinary signification, I beg pardon; it being unavoidable in discourses, differing from the ordinary received notions, either to make new words, or to use old words in somewhat a new signification; the later whereof, in our present case, is perhaps the more tolerable of the two.

First, I call certain complex ideas MODES. However these ideas are combined, they do not include the assumption that they can exist on their own. Instead, they are understood as depending on substances or as qualities or states of substances. Examples include the ideas expressed by the words triangle, gratitude, murder, and so on. And if I use the word mode in a somewhat different sense from its usual meaning, I ask your pardon. When discussing ideas that differ from commonly accepted views, we must either invent new words or give existing words somewhat new meanings. In the present case, the second option is perhaps the more acceptable of the two.

5. Simple and mixed Modes of Ideas.

5. Simple and mixed modes of ideas.

Of these MODES, there are two sorts which deserve distinct consideration:—

Of these MODES, two types deserve separate consideration:

First, there are some which are only variations, or different combinations of the same simple idea, without the mixture of any other;—as a dozen, or score; which are nothing but the ideas of so many distinct units added together, and these I call SIMPLE MODES as being contained within the bounds of one simple idea.

First, some are only variations or different combinations of the same simple idea, with no other idea mixed in. Examples include a dozen or a score (twenty). These are simply ideas of that many distinct units added together. I call these SIMPLE MODES because they stay within the bounds of one simple idea.

Secondly, there are others compounded of simple ideas of several kinds, put together to make one complex one;—v.g. beauty, consisting of a certain composition of colour and figure, causing delight to the beholder; theft, which being the concealed change of the possession of anything, without the consent of the proprietor, contains, as is visible, a combination of several ideas of several kinds: and these I call MIXED MODES.

Secondly, other complex ideas combine simple ideas of several kinds into a single idea. For example, beauty consists of a particular combination of colour and shape that delights the viewer. Theft is a secret change in possession of anything without the owner's consent. As is clear, theft combines several ideas of different kinds. I call these complex ideas MIXED MODES.

6. Ideas of Substances, single or collective.

6. Ideas of substances, individually or in groups.

Secondly, the ideas of SUBSTANCES are such combinations of simple ideas as are taken to represent distinct PARTICULAR things subsisting by themselves; in which the supposed or confused idea of substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief. Thus if to substance be joined the simple idea of a certain dull whitish colour, with certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility, and fusibility, we have the idea of lead; and a combination of the ideas of a certain sort of figure, with the powers of motion, thought and reasoning, joined to substance, make the ordinary idea of a man. Now of substances also, there are two sorts of ideas:—one of SINGLE substances, as they exist separately, as of a man or a sheep; the other of several of those put together, as an army of men, or flock of sheep—which COLLECTIVE ideas of several substances thus put together are as much each of them one single idea as that of a man or an unit.

Secondly, ideas of SUBSTANCES combine simple ideas to represent distinct PARTICULAR things that exist on their own. In these combinations, the assumed or unclear idea of substance, whatever it amounts to, always comes first and matters most. Thus, suppose we add to substance the simple idea of a certain dull, whitish colour. If we also add certain degrees of weight, hardness, flexibility under shaping, and ability to melt, we have the idea of lead. Similarly, combining a certain shape with the abilities to move, think, and reason, and adding substance, gives the ordinary idea of a man. There are also two sorts of ideas of substances. One concerns SINGLE substances existing separately, such as a man or a sheep. The other concerns several substances grouped together, such as an army of men or a flock of sheep. These COLLECTIVE ideas combine several substances. Yet each collective idea is just as much one single idea as the idea of a man or a unit.

7. Ideas of Relation.

7. Ideas of Relationships.

Thirdly, the last sort of complex ideas is that we call RELATION, which consists in the consideration and comparing one idea with another.

Third, the final kind of complex idea is what we call RELATION. Relation involves considering one idea and comparing it with another.

Of these several kinds we shall treat in their order.

We will discuss these different kinds in order.

8. The abstrusest Ideas we can have are all from two Sources.

8. The most complex ideas we can have all come from two sources.

If we trace the progress of our minds, and with attention observe how it repeats, adds together, and unites its simple ideas received from sensation or reflection, it will lead us further than at first perhaps we should have imagined. And, I believe, we shall find, if we warily observe the originals of our notions, that EVEN THE MOST ABSTRUSE IDEAS, how remote soever they may seem from sense, or from any operations of our own minds, are yet only such as the understanding frames to itself, by repeating and joining together ideas that it had either from objects of sense, or from its own operations about them: so that those even large and abstract ideas are derived from sensation or reflection, being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties, employed about ideas received from objects of sense, or from the operations it observes in itself about them, may, and does, attain unto.

If we trace how our minds develop, we can carefully observe how the mind repeats, adds, and combines simple ideas. These ideas come from sensation or reflection. Following this process will take us further than we might at first have imagined. And I believe we will discover something if we carefully examine the origins of our ideas. EVEN THE MOST ABSTRACT IDEAS are formed only by the understanding repeating and combining ideas it already has. However far removed these ideas may seem from sensation or our minds’ activities, their sources remain the same. They come either from objects we sense or from the mind’s own activities concerning those objects. So even these broad, abstract ideas come from sensation or reflection. They are nothing more than ideas the mind can and does reach through the ordinary use of its abilities. The mind uses these abilities on ideas received from objects we sense, or from observing its own activities concerning them.

This I shall endeavour to show in the ideas we have of space, time, and infinity, and some few others that seem the most remote, from those originals.

I will try to show this by examining our ideas of space, time, and infinity. I will also examine a few other ideas that seem furthest removed from those original sources.