Chapter 13
Complex Ideas: Simple Modes, Beginning with Space
1. Simple modes of simple ideas.
1. Simple modes of simple ideas.
Though in the foregoing part I have often mentioned simple ideas, which are truly the materials of all our knowledge; yet having treated of them there, rather in the way that they come into the mind, than as distinguished from others more compounded, it will not be perhaps amiss to take a view of some of them again under this consideration, and examine those different modifications of the SAME idea; which the mind either finds in things existing, or is able to make within itself without the help of any extrinsical object, or any foreign suggestion.
In the previous section, I often mentioned simple ideas, which are truly the building blocks of all our knowledge. But I discussed how simple ideas enter the mind, rather than how they differ from more complex ideas. So perhaps it would be useful to revisit some simple ideas with this distinction in mind. We can examine the different forms of the SAME idea. The mind either finds these forms in existing things or creates them within itself, without any outside object or suggestion.
Those modifications of any ONE simple idea (which, as has been said, I call SIMPLE MODES) are as perfectly different and distinct ideas in the mind as those of the greatest distance or contrariety. For the idea of two is as distinct from that of one, as blueness from heat, or either of them from any number: and yet it is made up only of that simple idea of an unit repeated; and repetitions of this kind joined together make those distinct simple modes, of a dozen, a gross, a million. Simple Modes of Idea of Space.
Variations of any ONE simple idea are completely distinct ideas in the mind. As I have said, I call these variations SIMPLE MODES. They are as distinct as ideas that differ most widely or are most opposed. For the idea of two is as distinct from one as blueness is from heat, or either from any number. Yet the idea of two consists only of the simple idea of a unit repeated. Such repetitions, joined together, form the distinct simple modes of a dozen, a gross, and a million. Simple Modes of the Idea of Space.
2. Idea of Space.
2. The Idea of Space.
I shall begin with the simple idea of SPACE. I have showed above, chap. 4, that we get the idea of space, both by our sight and touch; which, I think, is so evident, that it would be as needless to go to prove that men perceive, by their sight, a distance between bodies of different colours, or between the parts of the same body, as that they see colours themselves: nor is it less obvious, that they can do so in the dark by feeling and touch.
I will begin with the simple idea of SPACE. As I showed above in chapter 4, we get the idea of space through both sight and touch. I think this is so obvious that it needs no proof. People see distances between bodies of different colours, or between parts of the same body. Proving that people see these distances would be as unnecessary as proving that people see colours themselves. It is just as obvious that people can judge these distances in the dark through touch.
3. Space and Extension.
3. Space and Extension.
This space, considered barely in length between any two beings, without considering anything else between them, is called DISTANCE: if considered in length, breadth, and thickness, I think it may be called CAPACITY. When considered between the extremities of matter, which fills the capacity of space with something solid, tangible, and moveable, it is properly called EXTENSION. And so extension is an idea belonging to body only; but space may, as is evident, be considered without it. At least I think it most intelligible, and the best way to avoid confusion, if we use the word extension for an affection of matter or the distance of the extremities of particular solid bodies; and space in the more general signification, for distance, with or without solid matter possessing it.
Space considered only as the length between two things, without considering anything between them, is called DISTANCE. If considered in length, breadth, and thickness, I think space may be called CAPACITY. When considered between the outer limits of matter, space is properly called EXTENSION. That matter fills the capacity of space with something solid, tangible, and movable. So extension is an idea that belongs only to bodies. But space can clearly be considered without bodies. At least, I think the following use of these words is clearest and best avoids confusion. We should use extension for a property of matter, or the distance between the outer limits of particular solid bodies. We should use space more generally for distance, whether or not solid matter occupies that space.
4. Immensity.
4. Boundless space.
Each different distance is a different modification of space; and each idea of any different distance, or space, is a SIMPLE MODE of this idea. Men having, by accustoming themselves to stated lengths of space, which they use for measuring other distances—as a foot, a yard or a fathom, a league, or diameter of the earth—made those ideas familiar to their thoughts, can, in their minds, repeat them as often as they will, without mixing or joining to them the idea of body, or anything else; and frame to themselves the ideas of long, square, or cubic feet, yards or fathoms, here amongst the bodies of the universe, or else beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies; and, by adding these still one to another, enlarge their ideas of space as much as they please. The power of repeating or doubling any idea we have of any distance, and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being ever able to come to any stop or stint, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is that which gives us the idea of IMMENSITY.
Each different distance is a different form of space. Each idea of a particular distance, or space, is a SIMPLE MODE of the idea of space. People become familiar with fixed lengths of space by using those lengths to measure other distances. Such measures include a foot, a yard, a fathom, a league, or the earth’s diameter. They can repeat these familiar lengths in their minds as often as they wish. They need not combine these lengths with the idea of a physical body or anything else. In this way, they can form ideas of linear, square, or cubic feet, yards, or fathoms. They can imagine these spaces here among the physical bodies of the universe, or beyond the outermost limits of all bodies. By continuing to add these spaces together, they can expand their ideas of space as much as they please. We can repeat or double our idea of any distance, adding that distance to the previous total whenever we wish. However far we extend the distance, we can never reach a limit. This ability gives us the idea of IMMENSITY.
5. Figure.
5. Shape.
There is another modification of this idea, which is nothing but the relation which the parts of the termination of extension, or circumscribed space, have amongst themselves. This the touch discovers in sensible bodies, whose extremities come within our reach; and the eye takes both from bodies and colours, whose boundaries are within its view: where, observing how the extremities terminate,—either in straight lines which meet at discernible angles, or in crooked lines wherein no angles can be perceived; by considering these as they relate to one another, in all parts of the extremities of any body or space, it has that idea we call FIGURE, which affords to the mind infinite variety. For, besides the vast number of different figures that do really exist in the coherent masses of matter, the stock that the mind has in its power, by varying the idea of space, and thereby making still new compositions, by repeating its own ideas, and joining them as it pleases, is perfectly inexhaustible. And so it can multiply figures IN INFINITUM.
There is another form of this idea: the relationship between the different parts of the boundary of extension, or enclosed space. Touch discovers this relationship in physical bodies whose outer edges are within reach. Sight discovers it in both bodies and colours whose boundaries are visible. We observe how these boundaries are formed. Some consist of straight lines meeting at noticeable angles. Others consist of curved lines with no noticeable angles. By considering how all parts of a body's or space's boundary relate, we gain the idea we call FIGURE. This idea offers the mind infinite variety. For countless different figures actually exist in solid masses of matter. Beyond these, the mind has a completely inexhaustible supply of figures it can create by varying its idea of space. The mind makes new combinations by repeating its own ideas and joining them as it pleases. In this way, the mind can multiply figures WITHOUT LIMIT.
6. Endless variety of figures.
6. Endless variety of shapes.
For the mind having a power to repeat the idea of any length directly stretched out, and join it to another in the same direction, which is to double the length of that straight line; or else join another with what inclination it thinks fit, and so make what sort of angle it pleases: and being able also to shorten any line it imagines, by taking from it one half, one fourth, or what part it pleases, without being able to come to an end of any such divisions, it can make an angle of any bigness. So also the lines that are its sides, of what length it pleases, which joining again to other lines, of different lengths, and at different angles, till it has wholly enclosed any space, it is evident that it can multiply figures, both in their shape and capacity, IN INFINITUM; all which are but so many different simple modes of space.
The mind can repeat its idea of any straight length and join the two lengths in the same direction. Doing so doubles the length of the straight line. Or the mind can join another line at whatever slant it chooses, making any angle it pleases. The mind can also shorten any imagined line by taking away half, a quarter, or whatever portion it chooses. These divisions can continue without end, so the mind can make an angle of any size. Likewise, the mind can make the sides of the angle as long as it pleases. The mind can then join these sides to other lines of different lengths and at different angles. By continuing until a space is completely enclosed, the mind can clearly create infinitely many figures of different shapes and sizes. All these figures are simply different simple modes of space.
The same that it can do with straight lines, it can also do with crooked, or crooked and straight together; and the same it can do in lines, it can also in superficies; by which we may be led into farther thoughts of the endless variety of figures that the mind has a power to make, and thereby to multiply the simple modes of space.
The mind can do the same with curved lines, or curved and straight lines together, as with straight lines. And what the mind can do with lines, it can also do with surfaces. This may lead us to think further about the endless variety of shapes the mind can create. By creating these shapes, the mind can multiply the simple modes of space.
Another idea coming under this head, and belonging to this tribe, is that we call PLACE. As in simple space, we consider the relation of distance between any two bodies or points; so in our idea of place, we consider the relation of distance betwixt anything, and any two or more points, which are considered as keeping the same distance one with another, and so considered as at rest. For when we find anything at the same distance now which it was yesterday, from any two or more points, which have not since changed their distance one with another, and with which we then compared it, we say it hath kept the same place: but if it hath sensibly altered its distance with either of those points, we say it hath changed its place: though, vulgarly speaking, in the common notion of place, we do not always exactly observe the distance from these precise points, but from larger portions of sensible objects, to which we consider the thing placed to bear relation, and its distance from which we have some reason to observe.
Another idea in this category, belonging to the same group, is what we call PLACE. In simple space, we consider the distance between any two bodies or points. Similarly, in our idea of place, we consider the distance between something and two or more points. We treat these points as remaining the same distance apart, and therefore as being at rest. Suppose we find something at the same distances from two or more points today as yesterday. If those points have remained the same distance apart since yesterday, we say the thing has stayed in the same place. But if its distance from either point has noticeably changed, we say it has changed place. Yet in everyday speech, our ordinary idea of place does not always involve measuring distances from these precise points. Instead, we judge place in relation to larger parts of objects we can perceive. We have some reason to notice the thing’s distance from those objects.
8. Place relative to particular bodies.
8. Position in relation to specific objects.
Thus, a company of chess-men, standing on the same squares of the chess-board where we left them, we say they are all in the SAME place, or unmoved, though perhaps the chessboard hath been in the mean time carried out of one room into another; because we compared them only to the parts of the chess-board, which keep the same distance one with another. The chess-board, we also say, is in the same place it was, if it remain in the same part of the cabin, though perhaps the ship which it is in sails all the while. And the ship is said to be in the same place, supposing it kept the same distance with the parts of the neighbouring land; though perhaps the earth hath turned round, and so both chess-men, and board, and ship, have every one changed place, in respect of remoter bodies, which have kept the same distance one with another. But yet the distance from certain parts of the board being that which determines the place of the chess-men; and the distance from the fixed parts of the cabin (with which we made the comparison) being that which determined the place of the chess-board; and the fixed parts of the earth that by which we determined the place of the ship,—these things may be said to be in the same place in those respects: though their distance from some other things, which in this matter we did not consider, being varied, they have undoubtedly changed place in that respect; and we ourselves shall think so, when we have occasion to compare them with those other.
Suppose a set of chess pieces stands on the same squares of the chessboard where we left them. We say the pieces are all in the SAME place, or have not moved. Yet perhaps the chessboard has meanwhile been carried from one room to another. We say this because we compare the pieces only with parts of the chessboard, whose distances from one another remain unchanged. We also say the chessboard is in the same place if it remains in the same part of the cabin. Yet perhaps the ship containing the board has been sailing the whole time. And we say the ship is in the same place if its distances from parts of the nearby land remain unchanged. Yet perhaps the earth has turned. In that case, the chess pieces, board, and ship have all changed place relative to more distant bodies. Those distant bodies have remained the same distances from one another. But the chess pieces’ positions are determined by their distances from certain parts of the board. The board’s position is determined by its distances from the fixed parts of the cabin used for comparison. And the ship’s position is determined by its distances from fixed parts of the earth. So the pieces, board, and ship may be said to remain in the same place relative to those reference points. Yet their distances from some other things, which we did not consider in making these comparisons, have changed. Relative to those other things, the pieces, board, and ship have undoubtedly changed place. And we ourselves will recognize that change when we have reason to compare them with those other things.
9. Place relative to a present purpose.
9. Place in relation to the purpose at hand.
But this modification of distance we call place, being made by men for their common use, that by it they might be able to design the particular position of things, where they had occasion for such designation; men consider and determine of this place by reference to those adjacent things which best served to their present purpose, without considering other things which, to another purpose, would better determine the place of the same thing. Thus in the chess-board, the use of the designation of the place of each chess-man being determined only within that chequered piece of wood, it would cross that purpose to measure it by anything else; but when these very chess-men are put up in a bag, if any one should ask where the black king is, it would be proper to determine the place by the part of the room it was in, and not by the chessboard; there being another use of designing the place it is now in, than when in play it was on the chessboard, and so must be determined by other bodies. So if any one should ask, in what place are the verses which report the story of Nisus and Euryalus, it would be very improper to determine this place, by saying, they were in such a part of the earth, or in Bodley’s library: but the right designation of the place would be by the parts of Virgil’s works; and the proper answer would be, that these verses were about the middle of the ninth book of his AEneids, and that they have been always constantly in the same place ever since Virgil was printed: which is true, though the book itself hath moved a thousand times, the use of the idea of place here being, to know in what part of the book that story is, that so, upon occasion, we may know where to find it, and have recourse to it for use.
But this way of defining distance, which we call place, was developed for everyday use. People needed a way to identify the particular position of things when necessary. So they define a thing’s place by reference to nearby things that best serve their present purpose. They do not consider other things that would better define the same thing’s place for another purpose. Thus, in chess, the purpose of identifying each piece’s place concerns only its position on the checkered board. Measuring its position by anything else would defeat that purpose. But suppose these same chess pieces are put away in a bag, and someone asks where the black king is. The proper answer would identify its place by the part of the room containing it, not by the chessboard. Identifying the king’s place now serves a different purpose from identifying its place during play. So its place must be defined by reference to other objects. Similarly, suppose someone asks where the verses telling the story of Nisus and Euryalus are. It would be quite inappropriate to say they are in a certain part of the earth, or in Bodley’s library. Instead, their place should be identified by reference to the parts of Virgil’s works. The proper answer would be that these verses are about the middle of the ninth book of his AEneids. They have remained in that same place ever since Virgil’s works were first printed. This is true even though the book itself has moved a thousand times. Here, the purpose of the idea of place is to identify the part of the book containing that story. Then, when needed, we know where to find the story and can refer to it for use.
10. Place of the universe.
10. The location of the universe.
That our idea of place is nothing else but such a relative position of anything as I have before mentioned, I think is plain, and will be easily admitted, when we consider that we can have no idea of the place of the universe, though we can of all the parts of it; because beyond that we have not the idea of any fixed, distinct, particular beings, in reference to which we can imagine it to have any relation of distance; but all beyond it is one uniform space or expansion, wherein the mind finds no variety, no marks. For to say that the world is somewhere, means no more than that it does exist; this, though a phrase borrowed from place, signifying only its existence, not location: and when one can find out, and frame in his mind, clearly and distinctly the place of the universe, he will be able to tell us whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguishable inane of infinite space: though it be true that the word place has sometimes a more confused sense, and stands for that space which anybody takes up; and so the universe is in a place. The idea, therefore, of place we have by the same means that we get the idea of space, (whereof this is but a particular limited consideration,) viz. by our sight and touch; by either of which we receive into our minds the ideas of extension or distance.
Our idea of place is simply the relative position of something, as I described earlier. I think this is clear and will be readily accepted when we consider the universe. We can have an idea of the place of every part of the universe, but not of the universe itself. Beyond the universe, we have no idea of any fixed, distinct, particular things to measure its distance from. Instead, everything beyond the universe is one uniform space or expanse, where the mind finds no differences or landmarks. For saying that the world is somewhere means only that the world exists. Although the phrase borrows the language of place, it expresses only existence, not location. When someone can discover and clearly picture the universe’s place, that person can tell us whether the universe moves. They can tell us whether it moves or stands still in the featureless void of infinite space. Yet the word place sometimes has a less precise meaning, referring to the space a body occupies. In that sense, the universe does have a place. We therefore gain our idea of place in the same way we gain our idea of space. Place is simply a particular, limited way of considering space. We gain both ideas through sight and touch. Through either sense, we receive ideas of extension or distance into our minds.
11. Extension and Body not the same.
11. Extension and body are not the same.
There are some that would persuade us, that body and extension are the same thing, who either change the signification of words, which I would not suspect them of,—they having so severely condemned the philosophy of others, because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning, or deceitful obscurity of doubtful or insignificant terms. If, therefore, they mean by body and extension the same that other people do, viz. by BODY something that is solid and extended, whose parts are separable and movable different ways; and by EXTENSION, only the space that lies between the extremities of those solid coherent parts, and which is possessed by them,—they confound very different ideas one with another; for I appeal to every man’s own thoughts, whether the idea of space be not as distinct from that of solidity, as it is from the idea of scarlet colour? It is true, solidity cannot exist without extension, neither can scarlet colour exist without extension, but this hinders not, but that they are distinct ideas. Many ideas require others, as necessary to their existence or conception, which yet are very distinct ideas. Motion can neither be, nor be conceived, without space; and yet motion is not space, nor space motion; space can exist without it, and they are very distinct ideas; and so, I think, are those of space and solidity. Solidity is so inseparable an idea from body, that upon that depends its filling of space, its contact, impulse, and communication of motion upon impulse. And if it be a reason to prove that spirit is different from body, because thinking includes not the idea of extension in it; the same reason will be as valid, I suppose, to prove that space is not body, because it includes not the idea of solidity in it; SPACE and SOLIDITY being as distinct ideas as THINKING and EXTENSION, and as wholly separable in the mind one from another. Body then and extension, it is evident, are two distinct ideas. For,
Some people would persuade us that body and extension are the same thing. Either they change the meanings of words, or they confuse very different ideas. I would not suspect them of changing meanings. They have so severely criticized others’ philosophy for relying too heavily on uncertain meanings or misleadingly obscure, ambiguous, or meaningless terms. So suppose they mean by body and extension what other people mean. By BODY, they mean something solid and extended, with parts that can be separated and moved in different directions. By EXTENSION, they mean only the space between the outer limits of those connected solid parts, occupied by those parts. If these are their meanings, they confuse very different ideas. I ask everyone to consult their own thoughts. Is the idea of space not as distinct from solidity as it is from scarlet colour? It is true that solidity cannot exist without extension. Neither can scarlet colour exist without extension. But this dependence does not prevent solidity and extension, or scarlet colour and extension, from being distinct ideas. Many ideas require other ideas for their existence or conception, yet remain very distinct from those other ideas. Motion cannot exist, or even be conceived, without space. Yet motion is not space, nor is space motion. Space can exist without motion, and the two ideas are very distinct. So too, I think, are the ideas of space and solidity. Solidity is inseparable from the idea of body. A body’s filling space, making contact, exerting force, and transferring motion through impact all depend on solidity. Suppose thinking’s not including the idea of extension is a reason to prove that spirit differs from body. Then the same reasoning, I suppose, is equally valid as proof that space is not body. For the idea of space does not include solidity. SPACE and SOLIDITY are as distinct as THINKING and EXTENSION. The mind can separate space and solidity just as completely as thinking and extension. Clearly, then, body and extension are two distinct ideas. For,
12. Extension not solidity.
12. Extension is not solidity.
First, Extension includes no solidity, nor resistance to the motion of body, as body does.
First, extension has neither solidity nor resistance to the movement of bodies, whereas a physical body has both.
13. The parts of space inseparable, both really and mentally.
13. The parts of space cannot be separated, either in reality or in thought.
Secondly, The parts of pure space are inseparable one from the other; so that the continuity cannot be separated, both neither really nor mentally. For I demand of any one to remove any part of it from another, with which it is continued, even so much as in thought. To divide and separate actually is, as I think, by removing the parts one from another, to make two superficies, where before there was a continuity: and to divide mentally is, to make in the mind two superficies, where before there was a continuity, and consider them as removed one from the other; which can only be done in things considered by the mind as capable of being separated; and by separation, of acquiring new distinct superficies, which they then have not, but are capable of. But neither of these ways of separation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, compatible to pure space.
Secondly, the parts of pure space cannot be separated from one another. So the continuity of space cannot be broken, either in reality or in thought. I challenge anyone to move any part of space away from a part adjoining it, even in thought. Actually dividing and separating something means, I think, moving its parts apart, creating two surfaces where there was continuity before. Dividing something mentally means imagining two surfaces where there was continuity before, and considering those surfaces as moved apart. But the mind can do this only with things it considers capable of being separated. Through separation, such things can acquire new, distinct surfaces that they do not yet have but could have. But neither kind of separation, real or mental, is possible with pure space, I think.
It is true, a man may consider so much of such a space as is answerable or commensurate to a foot, without considering the rest, which is, indeed, a partial consideration, but not so much as mental separation or division; since a man can no more mentally divide, without considering two superficies separate one from the other, than he can actually divide, without making two superficies disjoined one from the other: but a partial consideration is not separating. A man may consider light in the sun without its heat, or mobility in body without its extension, without thinking of their separation. One is only a partial consideration, terminating in one alone; and the other is a consideration of both, as existing separately.
It is true that someone may consider a foot-sized portion of a space without considering the rest. This is indeed a partial consideration, but it does not amount to mentally separating or dividing the space. To divide a space mentally, someone must consider two surfaces as separate from each other. Likewise, to divide a space physically, someone must make two surfaces separate from each other. But considering something partially is not separating it. Someone may consider the sun’s light without its heat, or a body’s ability to move without its spatial extent. They may do so without thinking of these qualities as separate. Partial consideration focuses on just one quality. Separation involves considering both qualities as existing separately.
14. The parts of space immovable.
14. The parts of space cannot move.
Thirdly, The parts of pure space are immovable, which follows from their inseparability; motion being nothing but change of distance between any two things; but this cannot be between parts that are inseparable, which, therefore, must needs be at perpetual rest one amongst another.
Thirdly, the parts of pure space cannot move because they cannot be separated. Motion is nothing but a change in distance between any two things. But the distance between inseparable parts cannot change. Therefore, the parts of pure space must always remain at rest relative to one another.
Thus the determined idea of simple space distinguishes it plainly and sufficiently from body; since its parts are inseparable, immovable, and without resistance to the motion of body.
Thus, the clearly defined idea of space alone clearly and sufficiently distinguishes space from physical bodies. This is because the parts of space cannot be separated or moved. Nor do they resist the movement of physical bodies.
15. The Definition of Extension explains it not.
15. The definition of extension does not explain extension.
If any one ask me WHAT this space I speak of IS, I will tell him when he tells me what his extension is. For to say, as is usually done, that extension is to have partes extra partes, is to say only, that extension is extension. For what am I the better informed in the nature of extension, when I am told that extension is to have parts that are extended, exterior to parts that are extended, i. e. extension consists of extended parts? As if one, asking what a fibre was, I should answer him,—that it was a thing made up of several fibres. Would he thereby be enabled to understand what a fibre was better than he did before? Or rather, would he not have reason to think that my design was to make sport with him, rather than seriously to instruct him?
If anyone asks me WHAT this space I speak of IS, I will answer when he explains his extension. For the usual definition, that extension has partes extra partes (parts outside parts), merely says that extension is extension. How does this definition help me understand the nature of extension? I am told that extension has extended parts outside other extended parts. In other words, extension consists of extended parts. Suppose someone asked me what a fibre was, and I answered that a fibre consists of several fibres. Would my answer help him understand a fibre any better than he did before? Or would he not have reason to think I meant to mock him rather than seriously teach him?
16. Division of Beings into Bodies and Spirits proves not Space and Body the same.
16. Dividing beings into bodies and spirits does not prove that space and body are the same.
Those who contend that space and body are the same, bring this dilemma:—either this space is something or nothing; if nothing be between two bodies, they must necessarily touch; if it be allowed to be something, they ask, Whether it be body or spirit? To which I answer by another question, Who told them that there was, or could be, nothing; but SOLID BEINGS, WHICH COULD NOT THINK, and THINKING BEINGS THAT WERE NOT EXTENDED?—which is all they mean by the terms BODY and SPIRIT.
Those who argue that space and body are the same present this dilemma: either space is something or nothing. If nothing lies between two bodies, the bodies must touch. If space is admitted to be something, these people ask whether space is body or spirit. I answer with another question: Who told them that only two kinds of beings exist, or could exist? These are SOLID BEINGS THAT CANNOT THINK and THINKING BEINGS THAT DO NOT EXTEND IN SPACE. These are all they mean by the terms BODY and SPIRIT.
17. Substance, which we know not, no Proof against Space without Body.
17. Substance, whose nature we do not know, does not disprove the existence of space without matter.
If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether this space, void of body, be SUBSTANCE or ACCIDENT, I shall readily answer I know not; nor shall be ashamed to own my ignorance, till they that ask show me a clear distinct idea of substance.
If asked (as I usually am) whether this space without matter is SUBSTANCE or ACCIDENT, I will readily answer: I do not know. Nor will I be ashamed to admit my ignorance until those asking give me a clear, distinct idea of substance.
18. Different meanings of substance.
18. Different meanings of substance.
I endeavour as much as I can to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves, by taking words for things. It helps not our ignorance to feign a knowledge where we have none, by making a noise with sounds, without clear and distinct significations. Names made at pleasure, neither alter the nature of things, nor make us understand them, but as they are signs of and stand for determined ideas. And I desire those who lay so much stress on the sound of these two syllables, SUBSTANCE, to consider whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite, incomprehensible God, to finite spirits, and to body, it be in the same sense; and whether it stands for the same idea, when each of those three so different beings are called substances. If so, whether it will thence follow—that God, spirits, and body, agreeing in the same common nature of substance, differ not any otherwise than in a bare different MODIFICATION of that substance; as a tree and a pebble, being in the same sense body, and agreeing in the common nature of body, differ only in a bare modification of that common matter, which will be a very harsh doctrine. If they say, that they apply it to God, finite spirit, and matter, in three different significations and that it stands for one idea when God is said to be a substance; for another when the soul is called substance; and for a third when body is called so;—if the name substance stands for three several distinct ideas, they would do well to make known those distinct ideas, or at least to give three distinct names to them, to prevent in so important a notion the confusion and errors that will naturally follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term; which is so far from being suspected to have three distinct, that in ordinary use it has scarce one clear distinct signification. And if they can thus make three distinct ideas of substance, what hinders why another may not make a fourth?
I try as much as I can to avoid deceiving myself by mistaking words for things. We do nothing to overcome our ignorance by pretending to know what we do not know. We merely make noises with words that have no clear, distinct meanings. Names invented at will neither change the nature of things nor help us understand them, except by representing definite ideas. I ask those who place so much weight on the sound of these two syllables, SUBSTANCE, to consider something. They apply the word to the infinite, incomprehensible God, to finite spirits, and to bodies. Do they use the word in the same sense in all three cases? Does the word represent the same idea when these three very different kinds of beings are called substances? If so, does it follow that God, spirits, and bodies share the same common nature as substance? Would they then differ only in a different MODIFICATION of that substance? A tree and a pebble are bodies in the same sense and share the common nature of bodies. They differ only in a modification of that common matter. Applying this comparison to God, spirits, and bodies would be a very harsh doctrine. Perhaps these people say they apply the word to God, finite spirits, and matter in three different senses. The word then represents one idea when God is called a substance, another when the soul is called a substance. It represents a third when a body is called a substance. If substance represents three distinct ideas, they would do well to explain those ideas. Or they should at least give the ideas three distinct names. This would prevent confusion and errors concerning such an important concept. Such confusion and errors naturally follow from using so ambiguous a term indiscriminately. Far from being thought to have three distinct meanings, the word in ordinary use hardly has one clear, distinct meaning. And if they can form three distinct ideas of substance in this way, what prevents someone else from forming a fourth?
19. Substance and accidents of little use in Philosophy.
19. Substance and accidents are of little use in philosophy.
They who first ran into the notion of ACCIDENTS, as a sort of real beings that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find out the word SUBSTANCE to support them. Had the poor Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth also wanted something to bear it up) but thought of this word substance, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to support it, and a tortoise to support his elephant: the word substance would have done it effectually. And he that inquired might have taken it for as good an answer from an Indian philosopher,—that substance, without knowing what it is, is that which supports the earth, as take it for a sufficient answer and good doctrine from our European philosophers,—that substance, without knowing what it is, is that which supports accidents. So that of substance, we have no idea of what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does.
Those who first thought of ACCIDENTS as real beings believed these beings needed something to exist in. So they had to invent the word SUBSTANCE to support them. The poor Indian philosopher imagined that the earth also needed something to hold it up. If only he had thought of the word substance, he could have saved himself some trouble. He would not have needed an elephant to support the earth, or a tortoise to support the elephant. The word substance would have done the job perfectly well. Anyone asking the Indian philosopher what supported the earth could have accepted this answer: substance, though we do not know what substance is. That answer would have been just as good as the supposedly sound teaching offered by our European philosophers. They say that substance supports accidents, though they do not know what substance is. So we have no idea what substance is, only a vague, confused idea of what substance does.
20. Sticking on and under-propping.
20. Attaching and supporting from below.
Whatever a learned man may do here, an intelligent American, who inquired into the nature of things, would scarce take it for a satisfactory account, if, desiring to learn our architecture, he should be told that a pillar is a thing supported by a basis, and a basis something that supported a pillar. Would he not think himself mocked, instead of taught, with such an account as this? And a stranger to them would be very liberally instructed in the nature of books, and the things they contained, if he should be told that all learned books consisted of paper and letters, and that letters were things inhering in paper, and paper a thing that held forth letters: a notable way of having clear ideas of letters and paper. But were the Latin words, inhaerentia and substantio, put into the plain English ones that answer them, and were called STICKING ON and UNDER-PROPPING, they would better discover to us the very great clearness there is in the doctrine of substance and accidents, and show of what use they are in deciding of questions in philosophy.
Whatever a learned man might make of this, an intelligent American investigating the nature of things would hardly be satisfied. Suppose he wanted to learn about our architecture. He is told that a pillar is something supported by a base, and a base is something supporting a pillar. Would he not think he was being mocked rather than taught? And someone unfamiliar with books would learn a great deal about books and their contents from the following explanation. All learned books consist of paper and letters. Letters are things attached to paper, and paper is something that displays letters. What a remarkable way to gain clear ideas of letters and paper. But suppose the Latin words, inhaerentia and substantio, were replaced by their plain English equivalents, STICKING ON and UNDER-PROPPING. These terms would better reveal the extraordinary clarity of the doctrine of substance and accidents. They would also show how useful that doctrine is in settling philosophical questions.
21. A Vacuum beyond the utmost Bounds of Body.
21. A vacuum beyond the outermost limits of matter.
But to return to our idea of space. If body be not supposed infinite, (which I think no one will affirm,) I would ask, whether, if God placed a man at the extremity of corporeal beings, he could not stretch his hand beyond his body? If he could, then he would put his arm where there was before space without body; and if there he spread his fingers, there would still be space between them without body. If he could not stretch out his hand, it must be because of some external hindrance; (for we suppose him alive, with such a power of moving the parts of his body that he hath now, which is not in itself impossible, if God so pleased to have it; or at least it is not impossible for God so to move him:) and then I ask,—whether that which hinders his hand from moving outwards be substance or accident, something or nothing? And when they have resolved that, they will be able to resolve themselves,—what that is, which is or may be between two bodies at a distance, that is not body, and has no solidity. In the mean time, the argument is at least as good, that, where nothing hinders, (as beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies,) a body put in motion may move on, as where there is nothing between, there two bodies must necessarily touch. For pure space between is sufficient to take away the necessity of mutual contact; but bare space in the way is not sufficient to stop motion. The truth is, these men must either own that they think body infinite, though they are loth to speak it out, or else affirm that space is not body. For I would fain meet with that thinking man that can in his thoughts set any bounds to space, more than he can to duration; or by thinking hope to arrive at the end of either. And therefore, if his idea of eternity be infinite, so is his idea of immensity; they are both finite or infinite alike.
But to return to our idea of space. Suppose physical matter is not infinite, as I think no one will claim it is. If God placed a man at the outermost edge of all physical things, could the man stretch his hand beyond his body? If he could, he would put his arm where there had previously been space without matter. And if he spread his fingers there, space without matter would still remain between them. If he could not stretch out his hand, some external obstacle must prevent him. For we suppose the man is alive and can move his body as he can now. Such movement is not itself impossible, if God chose to allow it. Or at least, it is not impossible for God to move the man’s body in that way. Then I ask whether the obstacle preventing his hand from moving outward is a substance or a property, something or nothing. Once my opponents have answered that question, they can answer another. What is or may be between two bodies some distance apart, without being matter or having solidity? Meanwhile, consider these two arguments. One says that where nothing blocks a moving body, as beyond the outermost limits of all matter, the body may continue moving. The other says that where nothing lies between two bodies, those bodies must necessarily touch. The first argument is at least as good as the second. For empty space between bodies is enough to remove any necessity for them to touch. But empty space in a body’s path is not enough to stop its motion. The truth is that my opponents must admit one of two things. Either they think matter is infinite, though they are reluctant to say so, or space is not matter. For I would like to meet anyone who can mentally set limits to space any more than to duration. Or anyone who can hope, through thought, to reach the end of either. Therefore, if a person’s idea of eternity is infinite, so is that person’s idea of boundless space. Both ideas are finite or infinite alike.
22. The Power of Annihilation proves a Vacuum.
22. The power to make matter cease to exist proves that empty space is possible.
Farther, those who assert the impossibility of space existing without matter, must not only make body infinite, but must also deny a power in God to annihilate any part of matter. No one, I suppose, will deny that God can put an end to all motion that is in matter, and fix all the bodies of the universe in a perfect quiet and rest, and continue them so long as he pleases. Whoever then will allow that God can, during such a general rest, ANNIHILATE either this book or the body of him that reads it, must necessarily admit the possibility of a vacuum. For, it is evident that the space that was filled by the parts of the annihilated body will still remain, and be a space without body. For the circumambient bodies being in perfect rest, are a wall of adamant, and in that state make it a perfect impossibility for any other body to get into that space. And indeed the necessary motion of one particle of matter into the place from whence another particle of matter is removed, is but a consequence from the supposition of plenitude; which will therefore need some better proof than a supposed matter of fact, which experiment can never make out;—our own clear and distinct ideas plainly satisfying that there is no necessary connexion between space and solidity, since we can conceive the one without the other. And those who dispute for or against a vacuum, do thereby confess they have distinct IDEAS of vacuum and plenum, i. e. that they have an idea of extension void of solidity, though they deny its EXISTENCE; or else they dispute about nothing at all. For they who so much alter the signification of words, as to call extension body, and consequently make the whole essence of body to be nothing but pure extension without solidity, must talk absurdly whenever they speak of vacuum; since it is impossible for extension to be without extension. For vacuum, whether we affirm or deny its existence, signifies space without body; whose very existence no one can deny to be possible, who will not make matter infinite, and take from God a power to annihilate any particle of it.
Furthermore, those who claim that space cannot exist without matter must accept that matter is infinite. They must also deny that God has the power to annihilate any part of matter. No one, I suppose, will deny that God can stop all motion in matter. He can hold all the bodies in the universe completely still and keep them so as long as he pleases. Suppose someone accepts that, while everything is at rest, God can ANNIHILATE either this book or its reader’s body. That person must necessarily admit that a vacuum is possible. Clearly, the space occupied by the parts of the annihilated body would remain, but would contain no body. Because the surrounding bodies are completely still, they form an impenetrable wall. In that state, they make it completely impossible for any other body to enter that space. Some claim that when one particle of matter is removed, another must move into its place. But that necessity follows only from assuming that all space is filled with matter. This assumption therefore needs better proof than a supposed fact that experiment can never establish. Our own clear and distinct ideas plainly show that space and solidity have no necessary connection. We can conceive of one without the other. Those who argue for or against a vacuum thereby admit that they have distinct IDEAS of a vacuum and a plenum. That is, they can conceive of space without solidity, though they deny its EXISTENCE. Otherwise, they are arguing about nothing at all. Some people change the meaning of words so much that they call spatial extension itself a body. They consequently make the entire essence of a body nothing but spatial extension without solidity. Such people must talk nonsense whenever they speak of a vacuum, since spatial extension cannot exist without spatial extension. For a vacuum means space without a body, whether we affirm or deny that a vacuum exists. No one can deny that such space could exist unless they make matter infinite. They must also deny God the power to annihilate any particle of matter.
23. Motion proves a Vacuum.
23. Motion proves that a vacuum exists.
But not to go so far as beyond the utmost bounds of body in the universe, nor appeal to God’s omnipotency to find a vacuum, the motion of bodies that are in our view and neighbourhood seems to me plainly to evince it. For I desire any one so to divide a solid body, of any dimension he pleases, as to make it possible for the solid parts to move up and down freely every way within the bounds of that superficies, if there be not left in it a void space as big as the least part into which he has divided the said solid body. And if, where the least particle of the body divided is as big as a mustard-seed, a void space equal to the bulk of a mustard-seed be requisite to make room for the free motion of the parts of the divided body within the bounds of its superficies, where the particles of matter are 100,000,000 less than a mustard-seed, there must also be a space void of solid matter as big as 100,000,000 part of a mustard-seed; for if it hold in the one it will hold in the other, and so on IN INFINITUM. And let this void space be as little as it will, it destroys the hypothesis of plenitude. For if there can be a space void of body equal to the smallest separate particle of matter now existing in nature, it is still space without body; and makes as great a difference between space and body as if it were mega chasma, a distance as wide as any in nature. And therefore, if we suppose not the void space necessary to motion equal to the least parcel of the divided solid matter, but to 1/10 or 1/1000 of it, the same consequence will always follow of space without matter.
But we need not go beyond the furthest limits of matter in the universe to find a vacuum. Nor need we appeal to God’s unlimited power. The movement of bodies around us seems to me to prove plainly that empty space exists. I ask anyone to divide a solid body of any size into parts that can move freely in every direction. Those parts must stay within the body’s outer boundary. How could they move unless the body contained empty space at least as large as its smallest part? Suppose the smallest particle in the divided body is as large as a mustard seed. Then free movement within the body’s outer boundary requires empty space as large as a mustard seed. Suppose instead that the particles are 100,000,000 times smaller than a mustard seed. Then there must also be space without solid matter equal to 1/100,000,000 of a mustard seed. For if the argument holds in one case, it holds in the other, and so on WITHOUT END. However small this empty space may be, it disproves the theory that matter fills all space. Suppose there can be empty space equal in size to the smallest separate particle of matter now existing in nature. That space is still space without a body. It establishes just as great a distinction between space and body as an immense gulf, as wide as any in nature. So suppose the empty space needed for motion is not equal to the smallest part of the divided solid body. Suppose instead that the empty space is only 1/10 or 1/1000 of that part. The same conclusion will always follow: there is space without matter.
24. The Ideas of Space and Body distinct.
24. The ideas of space and body are distinct.
But the question being here,—Whether the idea of space or extension be the same with the idea of body? it is not necessary to prove the real existence of a VACUUM, but the idea of it; which it is plain men have when they inquire and dispute whether there be a VACUUM or no. For if they had not the idea of space without body, they could not make a question about its existence: and if their idea of body did not include in it something more than the bare idea of space, they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the world; and it would be as absurd to demand, whether there were space without body, as whether there were space without space, or body without body, since these were but different names of the same idea.
But the question here is whether the idea of space or extension is the same as the idea of body. We need not prove that a VACUUM really exists, only that people have the idea of a VACUUM. People clearly have this idea when they ask and debate whether a VACUUM exists. For if people had no idea of space without body, they could not question whether such space exists. And if their idea of body included nothing beyond space alone, they could not doubt that the world is completely filled with body. Asking whether space could exist without body would then be as absurd as asking whether space could exist without space. It would also be as absurd as asking whether body could exist without body. For space and body would simply be different names for the same idea.
25. Extension being inseparable from Body, proves it not the same.
25. Extension is inseparable from body, but that does not prove extension and body are the same.
It is true, the idea of extension joins itself so inseparably with all visible, and most tangible qualities, that it suffers us to SEE no one, or FEEL very few external objects, without taking in impressions of extension too. This readiness of extension to make itself be taken notice of so constantly with other ideas, has been the occasion, I guess, that some have made the whole essence of body to consist in extension; which is not much to be wondered at, since some have had their minds, by their eyes and touch, (the busiest of all our senses,) so filled with the idea of extension, and, as it were, wholly possessed with it, that they allowed no existence to anything that had not extension. I shall not now argue with those men, who take the measure and possibility of all being only from their narrow and gross imaginations: but having here to do only with those who conclude the essence of body to be extension, because they say they cannot imagine any sensible quality of any body without extension,—I shall desire them to consider, that, had they reflected on their ideas of tastes and smells as much as on those of sight and touch; nay, had they examined their ideas of hunger and thirst, and several other pains, they would have found that THEY included in them no idea of extension at all, which is but an affection of body, as well as the rest, discoverable by our senses, which are scarce acute enough to look into the pure essences of things.
It is true that the idea of extension, or occupying space, is inseparable from all visible qualities and most tangible ones. We cannot SEE any external object, and can FEEL very few, without also receiving impressions of extension. Extension so consistently draws our attention alongside other ideas that some have made it the entire essence of physical bodies. At least, I suppose this explains their conclusion. Nor is their conclusion very surprising. Sight and touch, the busiest of all our senses, have filled some people’s minds with the idea of extension. Their minds have become, as it were, so completely possessed by this idea that they deny anything without extension exists. I will not now argue with those who judge the limits and possibilities of all existence by their narrow, crude imaginations. Here I am concerned only with those who conclude that extension is the essence of physical bodies. Their reason is that they cannot imagine any sensory quality of any body without extension. I ask them to consider what would follow if they reflected as much on taste and smell as on sight and touch. Indeed, suppose they had examined their ideas of hunger, thirst, and various other pains. They would have found that THESE ideas contain no idea of extension at all. Extension is only a property of physical bodies, like the other properties our senses can discover. Our senses are hardly sharp enough to reveal the true essences of things.
26. Essences of Things.
26. The Essential Nature of Things.
If those ideas which are constantly joined to all others, must therefore be concluded to be the essence of those things which have constantly those ideas joined to them, and are inseparable from them; then unity is without doubt the essence of everything. For there is not any object of sensation or reflection which does not carry with it the idea of one: but the weakness of this kind of argument we have already shown sufficiently.
If ideas must be considered a thing’s essence because they always accompany its other ideas and are inseparable from them, then unity is undoubtedly the essence of everything. For every object of sensation or reflection carries with it the idea of being one. But we have already shown clearly enough how weak this kind of argument is.
27. Ideas of Space and Solidity distinct.
27. The ideas of space and solidity are distinct.
To conclude: whatever men shall think concerning the existence of a VACUUM, this is plain to me—that we have as clear an idea of space distinct from solidity, as we have of solidity distinct from motion, or motion from space. We have not any two more distinct ideas; and we can as easily conceive space without solidity, as we can conceive body or space without motion, though it be never so certain that neither body nor motion can exist without space. But whether any one will take space to be only a RELATION resulting from the existence of other beings at a distance; or whether they will think the words of the most knowing King Solomon, ‘The heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee;’ or those more emphatical ones of the inspired philosopher St. Paul, ‘In him we live, move, and have our being,’ are to be understood in a literal sense, I leave every one to consider: only our idea of space is, I think, such as I have mentioned, and distinct from that of body. For, whether we consider, in matter itself, the distance of its coherent solid parts, and call it, in respect of those solid parts, extension; or whether, considering it as lying between the extremities of any body in its several dimensions, we call it length, breadth, and thickness; or else, considering it as lying between any two bodies or positive beings, without any consideration whether there be any matter or not between, we call it distance;—however named or considered, it is always the same uniform simple idea of space, taken from objects about which our senses have been conversant; whereof, having settled ideas in our minds, we can revive, repeat, and add them one to another as often as we will, and consider the space or distance so imagined, either as filled with solid parts, so that another body cannot come there without displacing and thrusting out the body that was there before; or else as void of solidity, so that a body of equal dimensions to that empty or pure space may be placed in it, without the removing or expulsion of anything that was there.
To conclude, whatever people may think about the existence of a VACUUM, one thing is clear to me. Our idea of space is as clearly distinct from solidity as solidity is from motion, or motion from space. No two ideas we have are more distinct than space and solidity. We can imagine space without solidity as easily as we can imagine a body or space without motion. This remains true even if neither body nor motion can exist without space. But some may regard space as only a RELATION arising from the existence of other beings at a distance. Others may take literally the words of the deeply knowledgeable King Solomon: ‘The heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee.’ Or they may take literally the more emphatic words of the inspired philosopher St. Paul: ‘In him we live, move, and have our being.’ I leave these questions for everyone to consider. My only point is that our idea of space is, I think, as I have described, and distinct from our idea of body. We may consider the distance between the solid parts joined together in matter itself. In relation to those solid parts, we call that distance extension. Or we may consider space between the outer limits of a body in its different dimensions. We then call that space length, breadth, and thickness. Or we may consider space between any two bodies or existing beings, regardless of whether any matter lies between them. We call that space distance. Whatever we call space, or however we consider space, we always have the same uniform, simple idea. We get this idea from objects we have experienced through our senses. Once these ideas are established in our minds, we can recall, repeat, and add them together as often as we wish. We can imagine the resulting space or distance as filled with solid parts. Another body then cannot enter that space without displacing and pushing out the body already there. Or we can imagine the space as empty of solidity. A body matching the dimensions of that empty or pure space could then be placed there. Nothing already there would need to be removed or pushed out.
28. Men differ little in clear, simple ideas.
28. People differ little in their clear, simple ideas.
The knowing precisely what our words stand for, would, I imagine, in this as well as a great many other cases, quickly end the dispute. For I am apt to think that men, when they come to examine them, find their simple ideas all generally to agree, though in discourse with one another they perhaps confound one another with different names. I imagine that men who abstract their thoughts, and do well examine the ideas of their own minds, cannot much differ in thinking; however they may perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking of the several schools or sects they have been bred up in: though amongst unthinking men, who examine not scrupulously and carefully their own ideas, and strip them not from the marks men use for them, but confound them with words, there must be endless dispute, wrangling, and jargon; especially if they be learned, bookish men, devoted to some sect, and accustomed to the language of it, and have learned to talk after others. But if it should happen that any two thinking men should really have different ideas, I do not see how they could discourse or argue one with another. Here I must not be mistaken, to think that every floating imagination in men’s brains is presently of that sort of ideas I speak of. It is not easy for the mind to put off those confused notions and prejudices it has imbibed from custom, inadvertency, and common conversation. It requires pains and assiduity to examine its ideas, till it resolves them into those clear and distinct simple ones, out of which they are compounded; and to see which, amongst its simple ones, have or have not a NECESSARY connexion and dependence one upon another. Till a man doth this in the primary and original notions of things, he builds upon floating and uncertain principles, and will often find himself at a loss.
Knowing exactly what our words mean would, I imagine, quickly end this dispute, as well as many others. For I tend to think that, when people examine their simple ideas, they find those ideas generally all agree. Yet in conversation, they perhaps confuse one another by using different names. I imagine that people cannot differ much in their thinking if they set words aside and carefully examine their ideas. They may still confuse themselves with words drawn from the schools or sects in which they were brought up. But endless disputes, quarrels, and jargon are inevitable among unthinking people who do not carefully examine their own ideas. Such people do not separate their ideas from the signs used to represent them, but confuse ideas with words. This is especially true of learned, bookish people devoted to a sect and accustomed to its language. They have learned to speak by copying others. But if two thoughtful people really did have different ideas, I do not see how they could discuss or argue together. Here I must not be misunderstood as counting every passing fancy in people's minds among the ideas I mean. The mind cannot easily free itself from confused notions and prejudices absorbed through habit, inattention, and everyday conversation. Examining its ideas takes effort and persistence. The mind must break down those ideas into the clear and distinct simple ideas that make them up. It must also discover which simple ideas have a NECESSARY connection with, and dependence on, one another, and which do not. Until someone examines their first and most basic ideas about things in this way, they build on unstable, uncertain principles. They will often find themselves at a loss.