NO INBORN RULES OF CONDUCT

1. No moral Principles so clear and so generally received as the forementioned speculative Maxims.

1. No moral principles are as clear or as widely accepted as the theoretical principles mentioned earlier.

If those speculative Maxims, whereof we discoursed in the foregoing chapter, have not an actual universal assent from all mankind, as we there proved, it is much more visible concerning PRACTICAL Principles, that they come short of an universal reception: and I think it will be hard to instance any one moral rule which can pretend to so general and ready an assent as, “What is, is”; or to be so manifest a truth as this, that “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.” Whereby it is evident that they are further removed from a title to be innate; and the doubt of their being native impressions on the mind is stronger against those moral principles than the other. Not that it brings their truth at all in question. They are equally true, though not equally evident. Those speculative maxims carry their own evidence with them: but moral principles require reasoning and discourse, and some exercise of the mind, to discover the certainty of their truth. They lie not open as natural characters engraved on the mind; which, if any such were, they must needs be visible by themselves, and by their own light be certain and known to everybody. But this is no derogation to their truth and certainty; no more than it is to the truth or certainty of the three angles of a triangle being equal to two right ones because it is not so evident as “the whole is bigger than a part,” nor so apt to be assented to at first hearing. It may suffice that these moral rules are capable of demonstration: and therefore it is our own faults if we come not to a certain knowledge of them. But the ignorance wherein many men are of them, and the slowness of assent wherewith others receive them, are manifest proofs that they are not innate, and such as offer themselves to their view without searching.

If the theoretical maxims discussed in the previous chapter are not actually accepted by all humanity, as we proved there, the lack of universal acceptance is even clearer for PRACTICAL principles. I think it would be hard to name any moral rule accepted as widely and readily as “What is, is”. Nor would it be easy to find one as obviously true as “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.” So moral principles have even less claim to be innate. There is stronger reason to doubt that moral principles are inborn impressions on the mind than to doubt those theoretical maxims. This doubt does not call the truth of moral principles into question at all. Moral principles are equally true, though not equally obvious. Those theoretical maxims are self-evident. But discovering the certain truth of moral principles requires reasoning, discussion, and some mental effort. Moral principles are not plainly visible like natural marks engraved on the mind. If any such marks existed, they would have to be visible without help. Their own clarity would make them certain and known to everyone. But this does not reduce the truth or certainty of moral principles. The same applies to the truth that a triangle’s three angles equal two right angles. That truth is less obvious than “the whole is bigger than a part”. People are also less likely to accept it on first hearing. Yet neither difference makes the truth about triangles any less true or certain. It may be enough that these moral rules can be proved. Therefore, we ourselves are at fault if we fail to gain certain knowledge of them. But many people remain ignorant of these rules, while others are slow to accept them. These facts clearly prove that moral rules are not innate truths that present themselves to the mind without any search.

2. Faith and Justice not owned as Principles by all Men.

2. Not everyone accepts faithfulness and justice as principles.

Whether there be any such moral principles, wherein all men do agree, I appeal to any who have been but moderately conversant in the history of mankind, and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimneys. Where is that practical truth that is universally received, without doubt or question, as it must be if innate? JUSTICE, and keeping of contracts, is that which most men seem to agree in. This is a principle which is thought to extend itself to the dens of thieves, and the confederacies of the greatest villains; and they who have gone furthest towards the putting off of humanity itself, keep faith and rules of justice one with another. I grant that outlaws themselves do this one amongst another: but it is without receiving these as the innate laws of nature. They practise them as rules of convenience within their own communities: but it is impossible to conceive that he embraces justice as a practical principle who acts fairly with his fellow-highwayman, and at the same time plunders or kills the next honest man he meets with. Justice and truth are the common ties of society; and therefore even outlaws and robbers, who break with all the world besides, must keep faith and rules of equity amongst themselves; or else they cannot hold together. But will any one say, that those that live by fraud or rapine have innate principles of truth and justice which they allow and assent to?

Are there any moral principles on which all people agree? I appeal to anyone with even a modest knowledge of human history who has looked beyond their own doorstep. What practical truth does everyone accept without doubt or question, as everyone must if that truth is innate? JUSTICE and keeping agreements seem to command the widest agreement. These principles are thought to reach even thieves’ dens and gangs of the worst criminals. Even those who have gone furthest toward abandoning humanity itself keep their word and treat one another fairly. I grant that outlaws themselves behave this way toward one another. But they do not accept these principles as innate laws of nature. They follow these rules for convenience within their own communities. A highway robber may treat his fellow robber fairly, yet rob or kill the next honest person he meets. But we cannot possibly think that such a man embraces justice as a principle of conduct. Justice and truth are the shared bonds of society. So even outlaws and robbers, who turn against everyone else, must keep their word and treat one another fairly. Otherwise, they cannot stay together. But will anyone say that people who live by fraud or robbery have innate principles of truth and justice? Will anyone say they acknowledge and accept those principles?

3. Objection: though Men deny them in their Practice, yet they admit them in their Thoughts answered.

3. Answer to the objection: although people deny them through their actions, they still accept them in their thoughts.

Perhaps it will be urged, that the tacit assent of their minds agrees to what their practice contradicts. I answer, first, I have always thought the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts. But, since it is certain that most men’s practices, and some men’s open professions, have either questioned or denied these principles, it is impossible to establish an universal consent, (though we should look for it only amongst grown men,) without which it is impossible to conclude them innate. Secondly, it is very strange and unreasonable to suppose innate practical principles, that terminate only in contemplation. Practical principles, derived from nature, are there for operation, and must produce conformity of action, not barely speculative assent to their truth, or else they are in vain distinguished from speculative maxims. Nature, I confess, has put into man a desire of happiness and an aversion to misery: these indeed are innate practical principles which (as practical principles ought) DO continue constantly to operate and influence all our actions without ceasing: these may be observed in all persons and all ages, steady and universal; but these are INCLINATIONS OF THE APPETITE to good, not impressions of truth on the understanding. I deny not that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men; and that from the very first instances of sense and perception, there are some things that are grateful and others unwelcome to them; some things that they incline to and others that they fly: but this makes nothing for innate characters on the mind, which are to be the principles of knowledge regulating our practice. Such natural impressions on the understanding are so far from being confirmed hereby, that this is an argument against them; since, if there were certain characters imprinted by nature on the understanding, as the principles of knowledge, we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us and influence our knowledge, as we do those others on the will and appetite; which never cease to be the constant springs and motives of all our actions, to which we perpetually feel them strongly impelling us.

Perhaps someone will argue that people silently accept in their minds what their actions contradict. My first answer is that I have always considered people’s actions the best guide to their thoughts. But most people’s actions, and some people’s open statements, have certainly questioned or denied these principles. So universal agreement cannot be established, even if we look only among adults. Without universal agreement, we cannot conclude that these principles are innate. Secondly, it is very strange and unreasonable to suppose that innate practical principles do nothing beyond occupying our thoughts. Practical principles that come from nature exist to guide action. They must produce actions that conform to them, not merely intellectual agreement that they are true. Otherwise, there is no point in distinguishing practical principles from purely theoretical rules. I admit that nature has given human beings a desire for happiness and an aversion to misery. These are indeed innate practical principles. As practical principles should, they DO constantly operate and influence all our actions without stopping. These desires can be observed in all people and at all ages, consistently and universally. But these are INCLINATIONS OF THE APPETITE toward good, not truths stamped on the understanding. I do not deny that natural tendencies are stamped on people’s minds. From our very first experiences of sensation and perception, some things please us and others are unwelcome. We are drawn toward some things and flee from others. But these tendencies provide no support for innate marks on the mind that serve as principles of knowledge governing our conduct. Far from confirming such natural impressions on the understanding, these tendencies provide an argument against them. For suppose nature had stamped certain marks on the understanding as principles of knowledge. We could not fail to notice those principles constantly operating within us and influencing our knowledge. We notice just such constant activity in the natural tendencies of the will and appetite. Those tendencies never stop being the sources and motives of all our actions. We continually feel them driving us strongly toward those actions.

4. Moral Rules need a Proof, ergo not innate.

4. Moral rules need proof, so they are not innate.

Another reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical principles is, that I think there cannot any one moral Rule be propos’d whereof a Man may not justly demand a Reason: which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd if they were innate; or so much as self-evident, which every innate principle must needs be, and not need any proof to ascertain its truth, nor want any reason to gain it approbation. He would be thought void of common sense who asked on the one side, or on the other side went to give a reason WHY “it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.” It carries its own light and evidence with it, and needs no other proof: he that understands the terms assents to it for its own sake or else nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it. But should that most unshaken rule of morality and foundation of all social virtue, “That one should do as he would be done unto,” be proposed to one who never heard of it before, but yet is of capacity to understand its meaning; might he not without any absurdity ask a reason why? And were not he that proposed it bound to make out the truth and reasonableness of it to him? Which plainly shows it not to be innate; for if it were it could neither want nor receive any proof; but must needs (at least as soon as heard and understood) be received and assented to as an unquestionable truth, which a man can by no means doubt of. So that the truth of all these moral rules plainly depends upon some other antecedent to them, and from which they must be deduced; which could not be if either they were innate or so much as self-evident.

Another reason I doubt that any practical principles are innate is this: I think anyone may reasonably ask for a reason behind any moral rule. Asking would be completely ridiculous and absurd if moral rules were innate, or even self-evident. Every innate principle must be self-evident. Such a principle needs no proof to establish its truth and no reason to win acceptance. Anyone would be thought to lack common sense for asking why “the same thing cannot both exist and not exist.” The same would be true of anyone who tried to give a reason for that principle. The principle is clear and evident in itself and needs no further proof. Anyone who understands the terms accepts the principle for its own sake. Otherwise, nothing could ever persuade that person to accept it. But consider the firmest rule of morality and the foundation of all social virtue: “Treat others as you would want them to treat you.” Suppose someone had never heard this rule before but could understand its meaning. Could that person not reasonably ask why? And would the person proposing the rule not have to explain its truth and reasonableness? This plainly shows that the rule is not innate. For if the rule were innate, it would neither need nor admit of proof. Instead, at least as soon as someone heard and understood the rule, they would have to accept it as unquestionable. They could not possibly doubt its truth. So the truth of all these moral rules plainly depends on some prior principle from which they must be derived. This dependence would be impossible if the rules were innate or even self-evident.

5. Instance in keeping Compacts

5. An example: keeping agreements

That men should keep their compacts is certainly a great and undeniable rule in morality. But yet, if a Christian, who has the view of happiness and misery in another life, be asked why a man must keep his word, he will give this as a reason:—Because God, who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it of us. But if a Hobbist be asked why? he will answer:—Because the public requires it, and the Leviathan will punish you if you do not. And if one of the old philosophers had been asked, he would have answered:—Because it was dishonest, below the dignity of a man, and opposite to virtue, the highest perfection of human nature, to do otherwise.

People should keep their agreements. This is certainly an important and undeniable moral rule. But suppose a Christian, who looks ahead to happiness and misery in another life, is asked why people must keep their word. He will give this reason: Because God, who has power over eternal life and death, requires us to do so. But if a Hobbist is asked why, he will answer: Because the public requires people to keep their word. And the Leviathan will punish you if you do not. And if one of the ancient philosophers had been asked, he would have answered: Because breaking your word was dishonest. It was beneath human dignity and contrary to virtue, the highest perfection of human nature.

6. Virtue generally approved not because innate, but because profitable.

6. Virtue is generally approved of not because it is innate, but because it is beneficial.

Hence naturally flows the great variety of opinions concerning moral rules which are to be found among men, according to the different sorts of happiness they have a prospect of, or propose to themselves; which could not be if practical principles were innate, and imprinted in our minds immediately by the hand of God. I grant the existence of God is so many ways manifest, and the obedience we owe him so congruous to the light of reason, that a great part of mankind give testimony to the law of nature: but yet I think it must be allowed that several moral rules may receive from mankind a very general approbation, without either knowing or admitting the true ground of morality; which can only be the will and law of a God, who sees men in the dark, has in his hand rewards and punishments, and power enough to call to account the proudest offender. For, God having, by an inseparable connexion, joined virtue and public happiness together, and made the practice thereof necessary to the preservation of society, and visibly beneficial to all with whom the virtuous man has to do; it is no wonder that every one should not only allow, but recommend and magnify those rules to others, from whose observance of them he is sure to reap advantage to himself. He may, out of interest as well as conviction, cry up that for sacred, which, if once trampled on and profaned, he himself cannot be safe nor secure. This, though it takes nothing from the moral and eternal obligation which these rules evidently have, yet it shows that the outward acknowledgment men pay to them in their words proves not that they are innate principles: nay, it proves not so much as that men assent to them inwardly in their own minds, as the inviolable rules of their own practice; since we find that self-interest, and the conveniences of this life, make many men own an outward profession and approbation of them, whose actions sufficiently prove that they very little consider the Lawgiver that prescribed these rules; nor the hell that he has ordained for the punishment of those that transgress them.

This naturally explains the wide variety of opinions about moral rules among people. Their opinions vary with the kinds of happiness they expect or seek for themselves. Such differences could not exist if practical principles were innate, written directly into our minds by God’s hand. I grant that God’s existence is evident in many ways, and that obeying him agrees closely with reason. As a result, a large part of humanity bears witness to the law of nature. Yet I think we must admit that several moral rules may win very widespread approval without people understanding or accepting morality’s true foundation. That foundation can only be the will and law of God. He sees people in the dark, holds rewards and punishments in his hands, and can hold even the proudest offender accountable. For God has inseparably linked virtue with public happiness. He has made virtuous conduct necessary to preserve society and visibly beneficial to everyone a virtuous person deals with. So it is no wonder that everyone should approve of these rules and recommend and praise them to others. Each person is sure to benefit when others follow these rules. Out of self-interest as well as conviction, someone may praise such rules as sacred. If those rules were trampled on and treated with contempt, that person could no longer be safe or secure. None of this lessens the moral and eternal obligation these rules clearly carry. Yet people’s outward, spoken acknowledgment of these rules does not prove that the rules are innate principles. Indeed, their words do not even prove that they inwardly accept these rules as unbreakable guides to their own conduct. For we find that self-interest and the advantages of this life lead many people to publicly profess and approve these rules. Yet their actions clearly show how little they consider the Lawgiver who prescribed the rules. Their actions also show how little they consider the hell he has established to punish those who break them.

7. Men’s actions convince us, that the Rule of Virtue is not their internal Principle.

7. People’s actions convince us that the rule of virtue is not their inner guiding principle.

For, if we will not in civility allow too much sincerity to the professions of most men, but think their actions to be the interpreters of their thoughts, we shall find that they have no such internal veneration for these rules, nor so full a persuasion of their certainty and obligation. The great principle of morality, ‘To do as one would be done to,’ is more commended than practised. But the breach of this rule cannot be a greater vice, than to teach others, that it is no moral rule, nor obligatory, would be thought madness, and contrary to that interest men sacrifice to, when they break it themselves. Perhaps CONSCIENCE will be urged as checking us for such breaches, and so the internal obligation and establishment of the rule be preserved.

For if we do not politely assume that most people sincerely mean everything they profess, we should judge their thoughts by their actions. We will then find no such inward respect for these rules. Nor will we find such firm conviction that these rules are certain and binding. The great moral principle, ‘Treat others as you would want them to treat you,’ is praised more than practised. But breaking this rule cannot be considered more wicked than teaching others to reject it would be considered mad. Teaching that the rule is neither moral nor binding would also go against the self-interest people serve by breaking it themselves. Perhaps CONSCIENCE will be offered as something that reproaches us for breaking the rule. In that way, the claim that the rule is established within us and inwardly binding would be preserved.

8. Conscience no Proof of any innate Moral Rule.

8. Conscience does not prove that any moral rule is innate.

To which I answer, that I doubt not but, without being written on their hearts, many men may, by the same way that they come to the knowledge of other things, come to assent to several moral rules, and be convinced of their obligation. Others also may come to be of the same mind, from their education, company, and customs of their country; which persuasion, however got, will serve to set conscience on work; which is nothing else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or gravity of our own actions; and if conscience be a proof of innate principles, contraries may be innate principles; since some men with the same bent of conscience prosecute what others avoid.

My answer is that I have no doubt many people may accept several moral rules without having them written on their hearts. They may learn these rules just as they learn other things, and become convinced they must obey them. Others may reach the same views through their education, the company they keep, and their country's customs. However these beliefs arise, they will put conscience to work. Conscience is simply our own opinion or judgment about the moral rightness or seriousness of our own actions. And if conscience proves that principles are innate, then opposing principles may be innate. For some people, following their conscience with equal conviction, pursue what others avoid.

9. Instances of Enormities practised without Remorse.

9. Examples of terrible acts committed without remorse.

But I cannot see how any men should ever transgress those moral rules, with confidence and serenity, were they innate, and stamped upon their minds. View but an army at the sacking of a town, and see what observation or sense of moral principles, or what touch of conscience for all the outrages they do. Robberies, murders, rapes, are the sports of men set at liberty from punishment and censure. Have there not been whole nations, and those of the most civilized people, amongst whom the exposing their children, and leaving them in the fields to perish by want or wild beasts has been the practice; as little condemned or scrupled as the begetting them? Do they not still, in some countries, put them into the same graves with their mothers, if they die in childbirth; or despatch them, if a pretended astrologer declares them to have unhappy stars? And are there not places where, at a certain age, they kill or expose their parents, without any remorse at all? In a part of Asia, the sick, when their case comes to be thought desperate, are carried out and laid on the earth before they are dead; and left there, exposed to wind and weather, to perish without assistance or pity. It is familiar among the Mingrelians, a people professing Christianity, to bury their children alive without scruple. There are places where they eat their own children. The Caribbees were wont to geld their children, on purpose to fat and eat them. And Garcilasso de la Vega tells us of a people in Peru which were wont to fat and eat the children they got on their female captives, whom they kept as concubines for that purpose, and when they were past breeding, the mothers themselves were killed too and eaten. The virtues whereby the Tououpinambos believed they merited paradise, were revenge, and eating abundance of their enemies. They have not so much as a name for God, and have no religion, no worship. The saints who are canonized amongst the Turks, lead lives which one cannot with modesty relate. A remarkable passage to this purpose, out of the voyage of Baumgarten, which is a book not every day to be met with, I shall set down at large, in the language it is published in.

But I cannot see how anyone could break moral rules confidently and calmly if those rules were innate, stamped on their minds. Just look at an army looting a town. What respect or feeling for moral principles do the soldiers show? What pang of conscience do they feel for all their outrages? Robbery, murder, and rape become games for men freed from punishment and condemnation. Have not whole nations, including some of the most civilized peoples, routinely abandoned their children in fields? They left the children to die from hunger or wild beasts. Was this not condemned or questioned as little as bringing children into the world? In some countries, do people not still bury children with their mothers if the mothers die in childbirth? Or kill the children if a supposed astrologer declares that they were born under unlucky stars? And are there not places where people kill or abandon their parents at a certain age, without any remorse? In one part of Asia, sick people are carried outside when their condition is thought hopeless. They are laid on the ground while still alive, exposed to the weather, and left to die without help or pity. Among the Mingrelians, a people who profess Christianity, it is common to bury their children alive without any misgivings. There are places where people eat their own children. The Caribbees used to castrate their children to fatten them for eating. And Garcilasso de la Vega tells us of a people in Peru who kept female captives as concubines. They did so to father children whom they would fatten and eat. When the mothers could no longer bear children, they too were killed and eaten. The Tououpinambos believed that taking revenge and eating great numbers of their enemies were virtues that earned them paradise. They do not even have a name for God, and they have no religion or worship. The saints canonized among the Turks lead lives that cannot be described without offending decency. A striking passage illustrating this appears in Baumgarten’s account of his voyage, a book not often found. I will quote the passage in full, in the language in which it was published.

Ibi (sc. prope Belbes in Aegypto) vidimus sanctum unum Saracenicum inter arenarum cumulos, ita ut ex utero matris prodiit nudum sedentem. Mos est, ut didicimus, Mahometistis, ut eos, qui amentes et sine ratione sunt, pro sanctis colant et venerentur. Insuper et eos, qui cum diu vitam egerint inquinatissimam, voluntariam demum poenitentiam et paupertatem, sanctitate venerandos deputant. Ejusmodi vero genus hominum libertatem quandam effrenem habent, domos quos volunt intrandi, edendi, bibendi, et quod majus est, concumbendi; ex quo concubitu, si proles secuta fuerit, sancta similiter habetur. His ergo hominibus dum vivunt, magnos exhibent honores; mortuis vero vel templa vel monumenta extruunt amplissima, eosque contingere ac sepelire maximae fortunae ducunt loco. Audivimus haec dicta et dicenda per interpretem a Mucrelo nostro. Insuper sanctum ilium, quern eo loco vidimus, publicitus apprime commendari, eum esse hominem sanctum, divinum ac integritate praecipuum; eo quod, nec faminarum unquam esset, nec puerorum, sed tantummodo asellarum concubitor atque mularum. (Peregr. Baumgarten, 1. ii. c. i. p. 73.)

There (near Belbes in Aegypto) we saw a Saracen holy man sitting among heaps of sand, naked as a newborn. We learned that Muslims customarily honor and revere people who are mad and lack reason as saints. They also regard others as worthy of reverence for their holiness. These are people who, after living deeply corrupt lives for years, finally choose penance and poverty. Such people have unrestricted freedom to enter whatever houses they please, eat, drink, and, more importantly, have sex. If children result from these encounters, the children are likewise considered holy. So these people receive great honors while alive. After their deaths, people build them magnificent shrines or monuments. People consider touching and burying them an exceptionally good fortune. We heard these accounts, and those that follow, from our Mucrelo through an interpreter. Moreover, the holy man we saw there was publicly praised in the highest terms as holy, divine, and exceptionally virtuous. The reason was that he never had sex with women or boys, but only with female donkeys and mules. (Peregr. Baumgarten, 1. ii. c. i. p. 73.)

Where then are those innate principles of justice, piety, gratitude, equity, chastity? Or where is that universal consent that assures us there are such inbred rules? Murders in duels, when fashion has made them honourable, are committed without remorse of conscience: nay, in many places innocence in this case is the greatest ignominy. And if we look abroad to take a view of men as they are, we shall find that they have remorse, in one place, for doing or omitting that which others, in another place, think they merit by.

Where, then, are those inborn principles of justice, piety, gratitude, fairness, and chastity? Or where is the universal agreement that proves we have such inborn rules? When fashion makes killing in duels honorable, people commit these murders without any pangs of conscience. Indeed, in many places, being innocent of such killing brings the greatest disgrace. And if we look around at people as they are, we will find that moral judgments differ from place to place. People in one place feel remorse for doing or failing to do something. Yet people elsewhere think the same actions or failures deserve praise.

10. Men have contrary practical Principles.

10. People have conflicting principles about how to act.

He that will carefully peruse the history of mankind, and look abroad into the several tribes of men, and with indifferency survey their actions, will be able to satisfy himself, that there is scarce that principle of morality to be named, or, rule of virtue to be thought on, (those only excepted that are absolutely necessary to hold society together, which commonly too are neglected betwixt distinct societies,) which is not, somewhere or other, slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, governed by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others.

Anyone who carefully studies human history and impartially examines the actions of different peoples can see the following. There is hardly a moral principle or rule of virtue that whole societies somewhere do not dismiss and condemn. The only exceptions are rules absolutely necessary to hold society together. Even these rules are commonly ignored in dealings between different societies. These societies follow practical beliefs and rules of conduct directly opposed to those of other societies.

11. Whole Nations reject several Moral Rules.

11. Entire nations reject several moral rules.

Here perhaps it will be objected, that it is no argument that the rule is not known, because it is broken. I grant the objection good where men, though they transgress, yet disown not the law; where fear of shame, censure, or punishment, carries the mark of some awe it has upon them. But it is impossible to conceive that a whole nation of men should all publicly reject and renounce what every one of them certainly and infallibly knew to be a law; for so they must who have it naturally imprinted on their minds. It is possible men may sometimes own rules of morality which in their private thoughts they do not believe to be true, only to keep themselves in reputation and esteem amongst those who are persuaded of their obligation. But it is not to be imagined that a whole society of men should publicly and professedly disown and cast off a rule which they could not in their own minds but be infallibly certain was a law; nor be ignorant that all men they should have to do with knew it to be such: and therefore must every one of them apprehend from others all the contempt and abhorrence due to one who professes himself void of humanity: and one who, confounding the known and natural measures of right and wrong, cannot but be looked on as the professed enemy of their peace and happiness. Whatever practical principle is innate, cannot but be known to every one to be just and good. It is therefore little less than a contradiction to suppose, that whole nations of men should, both in their professions and practice, unanimously and universally give the lie to what, by the most invincible evidence, every one of them knew to be true, right, and good. This is enough to satisfy us that no practical rule which is anywhere universally, and with public approbation or allowance, transgressed, can be supposed innate.—But I have something further to add in answer to this objection.

Perhaps someone will object that breaking a rule does not prove that the rule is unknown. I accept this objection when people break a law but do not deny its authority. Their fear of shame, criticism, or punishment shows that the law still commands some respect from them. But we cannot imagine a whole nation publicly rejecting and renouncing what every member knew with absolute certainty was a law. Yet everyone would have this certainty if the law were naturally imprinted on their minds. People may sometimes publicly accept moral rules that they privately do not believe are true. They may do so only to preserve their reputation and standing among people who believe those rules are binding. But we cannot imagine a whole society openly and explicitly rejecting a rule that every member knew with absolute certainty was a law. Nor could those people be unaware that everyone they dealt with knew the rule was a law. Each person would therefore have to expect contempt and disgust from others. Such contempt is due to anyone who openly declares himself devoid of humanity. By overturning the known and natural standards of right and wrong, such a person openly threatens others' peace and happiness. Others cannot help seeing him as their declared enemy. Any innate moral principle must be known by everyone to be right and good. So it is almost a contradiction to suppose that whole nations unanimously deny such a principle in both statements and actions. Every member would know, from evidence impossible to overcome, that the principle was true, right, and good. This is enough to show that no moral rule can be considered innate if everyone anywhere breaks it with public approval or permission. But I have something further to add in answer to this objection.

12. The generally allowed breach of a rule proof that it is not innate.

12. Widespread acceptance of breaking a rule proves that the rule is not innate.

The breaking of a rule, say you, is no argument that it is unknown. I grant it: but the GENERALLY ALLOWED breach of it anywhere, I say, is a proof that it is not innate. For example: let us take any of these rules, which, being the most obvious deductions of human reason, and conformable to the natural inclination of the greatest part of men, fewest people have had the impudence to deny or inconsideration to doubt of. If any can be thought to be naturally imprinted, none, I think, can have a fairer pretence to be innate than this: “Parents, preserve and cherish your children.” When, therefore, you say that this is an innate rule, what do you mean? Either that it is an innate principle which upon all occasions excites and directs the actions of all men; or else, that it is a truth which all men have imprinted on their minds, and which therefore they know and assent to. But in neither of these senses is it innate. FIRST, that it is not a principle which influences all men’s actions, is what I have proved by the examples before cited: nor need we seek so far as the Mingrelia or Peru to find instances of such as neglect, abuse, nay, and destroy their children; or look on it only as the more than brutality of some savage and barbarous nations, when we remember that it was a familiar and uncondemned practice amongst the Greeks and Romans to expose, without pity or remorse, their innocent infants. SECONDLY, that it is an innate truth, known to all men, is also false. For, “Parents preserve your children,” is so far from an innate truth, that it is no truth at all: it being a command, and not a proposition, and so not capable of truth or falsehood. To make it capable of being assented to as true, it must be reduced to some such proposition as this: “It is the duty of parents to preserve their children.” But what duty is, cannot be understood without a law; nor a law be known or supposed without a lawmaker, or without reward and punishment; so that it is impossible that this, or any other, practical principle should be innate, i.e. be imprinted on the mind as a duty, without supposing the ideas of God, of law, of obligation, of punishment, of a life after this, innate: for that punishment follows not in this life the breach of this rule, and consequently that it has not the force of a law in countries where the generally allowed practice runs counter to it, is in itself evident. But these ideas (which must be all of them innate, if anything as a duty be so) are so far from being innate, that it is not every studious or thinking man, much less every one that is born, in whom they are to be found clear and distinct; and that one of them, which of all others seems most likely to be innate, is not so, (I mean the idea of God,) I think, in the next chapter, will appear very evident to any considering man.

You say that breaking a rule does not prove that the rule is unknown. I agree. But wherever breaking a rule is GENERALLY ACCEPTED, I say that this proves the rule is not innate. Take any of the rules that follow most obviously from human reason and suit most people’s natural inclinations. Very few people have been bold enough to deny these rules or thoughtless enough to doubt them. If any rule can be considered naturally imprinted on the mind, none, I think, has a stronger claim than this: “Parents, protect and care for your children.” When you say that this rule is innate, what do you mean? You must mean one of two things. Either it is an inborn principle that always motivates and directs everyone’s actions. Or it is a truth imprinted on everyone’s mind, which everyone therefore knows and accepts. But the rule is not innate in either sense. FIRST, the examples already given prove that this principle does not guide everyone’s actions. Nor must we look as far as Mingrelia or Peru to find people who neglect, abuse, and even destroy their children. Nor should we regard such conduct only as the worse-than-brutal behavior of some savage and barbarous nations. We must remember that the Greeks and Romans commonly abandoned their innocent infants, without pity or remorse. This practice went uncondemned. SECONDLY, it is also false that this rule is an innate truth known to everyone. For “Parents, protect your children” is not merely far from being an innate truth. It is not a truth at all. It is a command, not a statement, and therefore cannot be true or false. To make the rule something people can accept as true, we must express it as a statement like this: “It is the duty of parents to protect their children.” But duty cannot be understood without a law. Nor can a law be known or assumed without a lawmaker, or without reward and punishment. So neither this nor any other principle of conduct can be innate, or imprinted on the mind as a duty, unless certain ideas are also innate. These are the ideas of God, law, obligation, punishment, and life after death. For breaking this rule does not bring punishment in this life. Consequently, the rule has no force as a law in countries where generally accepted practice runs against it. This is evident in itself. But these ideas would all have to be innate if any duty were innate. Yet they are so far from innate that not even every studious or thoughtful person has them clearly and distinctly. Much less does everyone who is born have them. Of all these ideas, the idea of God seems the most likely to be innate. Yet even that idea is not innate. I think the next chapter will make this very clear to anyone who considers the matter carefully.

13. If men can be ignorant of what is innate, certainty is not described by innate principles.

13. If people can be unaware of what is innate, then innate principles do not define certainty.

From what has been said, I think we may safely conclude that whatever practical rule is in any place generally and with allowance broken, cannot be supposed innate; it being impossible that men should, without shame or fear, confidently and serenely, break a rule which they could not but evidently know that God had set up, and would certainly punish the breach of, (which they must, if it were innate,) to a degree to make it a very ill bargain to the transgressor. Without such a knowledge as this, a man can never be certain that anything is his duty. Ignorance or doubt of the law, hopes to escape the knowledge or power of the law-maker, or the like, may make men give way to a present appetite; but let any one see the fault, and the rod by it, and with the transgression, a fire ready to punish it; a pleasure tempting, and the hand of the Almighty visibly held up and prepared to take vengeance, (for this must be the case where any duty is imprinted on the mind,) and then tell me whether it be possible for people with such a prospect, such a certain knowledge as this, wantonly, and without scruple, to offend against a law which they carry about them in indelible characters, and that stares them in the face whilst they are breaking it? Whether men, at the same time that they feel in themselves the imprinted edicts of an Omnipotent Law-maker, can, with assurance and gaiety, slight and trample underfoot his most sacred injunctions? And lastly, whether it be possible that whilst a man thus openly bids defiance to this innate law and supreme Lawgiver, all the bystanders, yea, even the governors and rulers of the people, full of the same sense both of the law and Law-maker, should silently connive, without testifying their dislike or laying the least blame on it? Principles of actions indeed there are lodged in men’s appetites; but these are so far from being innate moral principles, that if they were left to their full swing they would carry men to the overturning of all morality. Moral laws are set as a curb and restraint to these exorbitant desires, which they cannot be but by rewards and punishments that will overbalance the satisfaction any one shall propose to himself in the breach of the law. If, therefore, anything be imprinted on the minds of all men as a law, all men must have a certain and unavoidable knowledge that certain and unavoidable punishment will attend the breach of it. For if men can be ignorant or doubtful of what is innate, innate principles are insisted on, and urged to no purpose; truth and certainty (the things pretended) are not at all secured by them; but men are in the same uncertain floating estate with as without them. An evident indubitable knowledge of unavoidable punishment, great enough to make the transgression very uneligible, must accompany an innate law; unless with an innate law they can suppose an innate Gospel too. I would not here be mistaken, as if, because I deny an innate law I thought there were none but positive laws. There is a great deal of difference between an innate law, and a law of nature between something imprinted on our minds in their very original, and something that we, being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of, by the use and due application of our natural faculties. And I think they equally forsake the truth who, running into contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law, or deny that there is a law knowable by the light of nature, i.e. without the help of positive revelation.

From what has been said, I think we may safely reach this conclusion. Any rule of conduct that people commonly break, with general acceptance, cannot be considered innate. People could not calmly and confidently break such a rule without shame or fear if they clearly knew two things. First, God had established the rule. Second, he would certainly punish anyone who broke it so severely that breaking it would be a very bad bargain. If the rule were innate, people would necessarily know both things. Without such knowledge, no one can ever be certain that anything is their duty. Ignorance or doubt about the law may lead people to give in to an immediate desire. So may hopes of escaping the lawmaker’s knowledge or power, or similar thoughts. But let someone see the offense and the rod beside it, with a fire ready to punish the wrongdoing. Let pleasure tempt them while the hand of the Almighty is visibly raised, ready to take revenge. This must be the situation if any duty is imprinted on the mind. Then tell me whether people with this prospect and this certain knowledge could deliberately offend without hesitation. Could they break a law written within them in permanent letters, staring them in the face as they break it? Could people confidently and cheerfully disregard and trample on the most sacred commands of an Almighty Lawmaker? Could they do so while feeling those commands imprinted within themselves? And finally, could someone openly defy this innate law and supreme Lawgiver while everyone watching silently tolerated it? Could even the people’s governors and rulers do so, without expressing disapproval or placing the slightest blame? All these witnesses would have the same awareness of both the law and the Lawmaker. Human desires do indeed contain principles that drive people to act. But these are very far from being innate moral principles. If given free rein, these desires would lead people to overthrow all morality. Moral laws are established to curb and restrain these excessive desires. But moral laws can restrain desire only through rewards and punishments that outweigh the satisfaction anyone expects from breaking them. So, if anything is imprinted as a law on everyone’s mind, everyone must have certain, inescapable knowledge of its punishment. They must know that breaking the law brings certain and unavoidable punishment. For if people can be ignorant or doubtful of what is innate, insisting on innate principles serves no purpose. Such principles do nothing to secure the truth and certainty they supposedly provide. People remain just as uncertain and unsettled with these principles as without them. An innate law must come with clear, unquestionable knowledge of unavoidable punishment, severe enough to make breaking it highly undesirable. The only exception would be if we could also suppose an innate Gospel alongside an innate law. I do not want to be misunderstood here. Denying an innate law does not mean I think there are only laws expressly established by a lawgiver. There is a great difference between an innate law and a law of nature. One is imprinted on our minds from the very beginning. The other may initially be unknown to us, but we can discover it by properly using our natural abilities. I think people depart equally from the truth when they take either of two opposite extremes. One extreme claims that there is an innate law. The other denies that any law can be known through natural reason, without the help of explicit revelation.

14. Those who maintain innate practical Principles tell us not what they are.

14. Those who claim that principles of conduct are innate do not tell us what those principles are.

The difference there is amongst men in their practical principles is so evident that I think I need say no more to evince, that it will be impossible to find any innate moral rules by this mark of general assent; and it is enough to make one suspect that the supposition of such innate principles is but an opinion taken up at pleasure; since those who talk so confidently of them are so sparing to tell us WHICH THEY ARE. This might with justice be expected from those men who lay stress upon this opinion; and it gives occasion to distrust either their knowledge or charity, who, declaring that God has imprinted on the minds of men the foundations of knowledge and the rules of living, are yet so little favourable to the information of their neighbours, or the quiet of mankind, as not to point out to them which they are, in the variety men are distracted with. But, in truth, were there any such innate principles there would be no need to teach them. Did men find such innate propositions stamped on their minds, they would easily be able to distinguish them from other truths that they afterwards learned and deduced from them; and there would be nothing more easy than to know what, and how many, they were. There could be no more doubt about their number than there is about the number of our fingers; and it is like then every system would be ready to give them us by tale. But since nobody, that I know, has ventured yet to give a catalogue of them, they cannot blame those who doubt of these innate principles; since even they who require men to believe that there are such innate propositions, do not tell us what they are. It is easy to foresee, that if different men of different sects should go about to give us a list of those innate practical principles, they would set down only such as suited their distinct hypotheses, and were fit to support the doctrines of their particular schools or churches; a plain evidence that there are no such innate truths. Nay, a great part of men are so far from finding any such innate moral principles in themselves, that, by denying freedom to mankind, and thereby making men no other than bare machines, they take away not only innate, but all moral rules whatsoever, and leave not a possibility to believe any such, to those who cannot conceive how anything can be capable of a law that is not a free agent. And upon that ground they must necessarily reject all principles of virtue, who cannot put MORALITY and MECHANISM together, which are not very easy to be reconciled or made consistent.

People differ so clearly in their principles of conduct that I think I need say no more on this point. Universal agreement cannot serve as a test for identifying any inborn moral rules. Indeed, we have reason to suspect that belief in such inborn principles is merely an opinion adopted without justification. Those who speak so confidently about these principles are remarkably reluctant to tell us WHAT THEY ARE. We could fairly expect an answer from people who place such importance on this belief. Their silence gives us reason to doubt either their knowledge or their goodwill. They declare that God has imprinted the foundations of knowledge and the rules of living on human minds. Yet they show little concern for enlightening their neighbors or bringing peace to humanity. They fail to identify these principles among the conflicting views that leave people bewildered. But in truth, if such inborn principles existed, there would be no need to teach them. If people found such statements stamped on their minds, they could easily distinguish them from truths learned later. They could also distinguish them from truths deduced from those inborn principles. Nothing would be easier than knowing what these principles were and how many there were. Their number would be no more doubtful than the number of our fingers. Presumably, then, every system of thought would readily provide a complete list. But nobody, as far as I know, has yet ventured to list them. So their supporters cannot blame anyone who doubts that these inborn principles exist. Even those who demand belief in such inborn statements do not tell us what the statements are. We can easily predict what would happen if people from different sects tried to list these inborn principles of conduct. Each would list only principles that suited their own theories and supported their particular schools or churches. This plainly shows that no such inborn truths exist. Indeed, a large portion of humanity is far from finding any inborn moral principles within themselves. By denying human freedom, these people make human beings nothing more than machines. In doing so, they abolish not only inborn moral rules, but all moral rules whatsoever. They leave no possibility of believing in moral rules for those who cannot see how laws could govern an unfree agent. On that basis, anyone unable to combine MORALITY and MECHANISM must necessarily reject all principles of virtue. And the two are not at all easy to reconcile or make consistent.

15. Lord Herbert’s innate Principles examined.

15. Examining Lord Herbert’s innate principles.

When I had written this, being informed that my Lord Herbert had, in his book De Veritate, assigned these innate principles, I presently consulted him, hoping to find in a man of so great parts, something that might satisfy me in this point, and put an end to my inquiry. In his chapter De Instinctu Naturali, I met with these six marks of his Notitice Communes:—1. Prioritas. 2. Independentia. 3. Universalitas. 4. Certitudo. 5. Necessitas, i. e. as he explains it, faciunt ad hominis conservationem. 6. Modus conformationis, i.e. Assensus nulla interposita mora. And at the latter end of his little treatise De Religione Laici, he says this of these innate principles: Adeo ut non uniuscujusvis religionis confinio arctentur quae ubique vigent veritates. Sunt enim in ipsa mente caelitus descriptae, nullisque traditionibus, sive scriptis, sive non scriptis, obnoxiae, p.3 And Veritates nostrae catholicae, quae tanquam indubia Dei emata in foro interiori descriptae.

After writing this, I learned that my Lord Herbert had identified these innate principles in his book De Veritate. I immediately consulted his book. I hoped that a man of such great ability might offer something to satisfy me and end my inquiry. In his chapter De Instinctu Naturali, I found these six features of his Notitice Communes, or common notions: 1. Priority. 2. Independence. 3. Universality. 4. Certainty. 5. Necessity, meaning, as he explains, that they contribute to human preservation. 6. The manner of agreement, meaning assent without any delay. Near the end of his short treatise De Religione Laici, he says this about these innate principles: These truths, which hold everywhere, are therefore not confined within the boundaries of any single religion. For they are inscribed by heaven in the mind itself, and depend on no traditions, whether written or unwritten, p.3. He also speaks of our universal truths, inscribed in the inner court of conscience as unquestionable pronouncements of God.

Thus, having given the marks of the innate principles or common notions, and asserted their being imprinted on the minds of men by the hand of God, he proceeds to set them down, and they are these:—1. Esse aliquod supremum numen. 2. Numen illud coli debere. 3. Virtutem cum pietate conjunctam optimum esse rationem cultus divini. 4. Resipiscendum esse a peccatis. 5. Dari praemium vel paenam post hanc vitam transactam. Though I allow these to be clear truths, and such as, if rightly explained, a rational creature can hardly avoid giving his assent to, yet I think he is far from proving them innate impressions in foro interiori descriptae. For I must take leave to observe:—

He has now described the signs of innate principles, or common notions. He has also claimed that God has imprinted these principles on human minds. He then lists them as follows: 1. There is a supreme divine being. 2. This divine being ought to be worshipped. 3. Virtue joined with piety is the best way to worship God. 4. People ought to repent of their sins. 5. There are rewards or punishments after this life. Although I accept these as clear truths, I think he is far from proving them innate impressions inscribed within the mind. If these truths are properly explained, a rational being can hardly avoid accepting them. But I must ask leave to make the following observations:

16. These five either not all, or more than all, if there are any.

16. These five are either too few or too many, if there are any at all.

First, that these five propositions are either not all, or more than all, those common notions written on our minds by the finger of God; if it were reasonable to believe any at all to be so written. Since there are other propositions which, even by his own rules, have as just a pretence to such an original, and may be as well admitted for innate principles, as at least some of these five he enumerates, viz. ‘Do as thou wouldst be done unto.’ And perhaps some hundreds of others, when well considered.

First, these five propositions either leave out some common notions or include more than God wrote on our minds. That is, if it were reasonable to believe God had written any notions there at all. For other propositions, even by his own rules, have an equally strong claim to that origin. They may qualify as innate principles just as well as at least some of the five he lists. One example is ‘Do to others as you would have them do to you.’ And perhaps hundreds of others would qualify when carefully considered.

17. The supposed marks wanting.

17. The supposed signs are missing.

Secondly, that all his marks are not to be found in each of his five propositions, viz. his first, second, and third marks agree perfectly to neither of them; and the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth marks agree but ill to his third, fourth, and fifth propositions. For, besides that we are assured from history of many men, nay whole nations, who doubt or disbelieve some or all of them, I cannot see how the third, viz. “That virtue joined with piety is the best worship of God,” can be an innate principle, when the name or sound virtue, is so hard to be understood; liable to so much uncertainty in its signification; and the thing it stands for so much contended about and difficult to be known. And therefore this cannot be but a very uncertain rule of human practice, and serve but very little to the conduct of our lives, and is therefore very unfit to be assigned as an innate practical principle.

Secondly, not all his criteria are met by each of his five propositions. His first, second, and third criteria are fully met by none of them. His third, fourth, and fifth propositions also fit his first, second, third, fourth, and sixth criteria poorly. History shows that many people, indeed whole nations, doubt or disbelieve some or all of these propositions. Besides this, I cannot see how the third proposition can be an innate principle: “That virtue joined with piety is the best worship of God,” The word virtue is so hard to understand, and its meaning is so uncertain. What virtue itself consists in is also much disputed and difficult to know. So this proposition can only be a very uncertain rule for human behavior. It can offer very little guidance in our lives. It is therefore very unsuitable to be considered an innate principle for how we should act.

18. Of little use if they were innate.

18. They would be of little use if they were innate.

For let us consider this proposition as to its meaning, (for it is the sense, and not sound, that is and must be the principle or common notion,) viz. “Virtue is the best worship of God,” i.e. is most acceptable to him; which, if virtue be taken, as most commonly it is, for those actions which, according to the different opinions of several countries, are accounted laudable, will be a proposition so far from being certain, that it will not be true. If virtue be taken for actions conformable to God’s will, or to the rule prescribed by God—which is the true and only measure of virtue when virtue is used to signify what is in its own nature right and good—then this proposition, “That virtue is the best worship of God,” will be most true and certain, but of very little use in human life: since it will amount to no more but this, viz. “That God is pleased with the doing of what he commands”;—which a man may certainly know to be true, without knowing what it is that God doth command; and so be as far from any rule or principle of his actions as he was before. And I think very few will take a proposition which amounts to no more than this, viz. “That God is pleased with the doing of what he himself commands,” for an innate moral principle written on the minds of all men, (however true and certain it may be,) since it teaches so little. Whosoever does so will have reason to think hundreds of propositions innate principles; since there are many which have as good a title as this to be received for such, which nobody yet ever put into that rank of innate principles.

Let us consider the meaning of this statement: “Virtue is the best worship of God,” meaning the worship most acceptable to him. (For a principle or common belief must lie in the meaning of the words, not their sound.) Suppose “virtue” means actions considered praiseworthy according to the different opinions of different countries, as it most commonly does. Then the statement will be far from certain. It will not even be true. But suppose “virtue” means actions that conform to God’s will, or to the rule God has prescribed. God’s rule is the true and only standard of virtue when virtue means what is inherently right and good. Then the statement, “That virtue is the best worship of God,” will be entirely true and certain. But the statement will be of very little use in human life. For it will mean no more than this: “That God is pleased when people do what he commands”. Someone can certainly know that this statement is true without knowing what God commands. So that person will be no closer than before to having a rule or principle to guide their actions. And I think very few people will accept such a statement as an innate moral principle written in everyone’s mind. However true and certain the statement may be, it teaches so little. It means only this: “That God is pleased when people do what he himself commands”. Anyone who accepts this as an innate principle will have reason to consider hundreds of other statements innate principles. For many statements have just as good a claim to that status. Yet no one has ever counted those statements among innate principles.

19. Scarce possible that God should engrave principles in words of uncertain meaning.

19. It is hardly possible that God would engrave principles in words with unclear meanings.

Nor is the fourth proposition (viz. “Men must repent of their sins”) much more instructive, till what those actions are that are meant by sins be set down. For the word peccata, or sins, being put, as it usually is, to signify in general ill actions that will draw punishment upon the doers, what great principle of morality can that be to tell us we should be sorry, and cease to do that which will bring mischief upon us; without knowing what those particular actions are that will do so? Indeed this is a very true proposition, and fit to be inculcated on and received by those who are supposed to have been taught WHAT actions in all kinds ARE sins: but neither this nor the former can be imagined to be innate principles; nor to be of any use if they were innate, unless the particular measures and bounds of all virtues and vices were engraven in men’s minds, and were innate principles also, which I think is very much to be doubted. And therefore, I imagine, it will scarcely seem possible that God should engrave principles in men’s minds, in words of uncertain signification, such as VIRTUES and SINS, which amongst different men stand for different things: nay, it cannot be supposed to be in words at all, which, being in most of these principles very general names, cannot be understood but by knowing the particulars comprehended under them. And in the practical instances, the measures must be taken from the knowledge of the actions themselves, and the rules of them,—abstracted from words, and antecedent to the knowledge of names; which rules a man must know, what language soever he chance to learn, whether English or Japan, or if he should learn no language at all, or never should understand the use of words, as happens in the case of dumb and deaf men. When it shall be made out that men ignorant of words, or untaught by the laws and customs of their country, know that it is part of the worship of God not to kill another man; not to know more women than one; not to procure abortion; not to expose their children; not to take from another what is his, though we want it ourselves, but on the contrary, relieve and supply his wants; and whenever we have done the contrary we ought to repent, be sorry, and resolve to do so no more;—when I say, all men shall be proved actually to know and allow all these and a thousand other such rules, all of which come under these two general words made use of above, viz. virtutes et peccata virtues and sins, there will be more reason for admitting these and the like, for common notions and practical principles. Yet, after all, universal consent (were there any in moral principles) to truths, the knowledge whereof may be attained otherwise, would scarce prove them to be innate; which is all I contend for.

Nor is the fourth proposition (“Men must repent of their sins”) much more instructive until the actions called sins are specified. For the word peccata, or sins, usually means bad actions in general that will bring punishment on those who commit them. What great moral principle tells us to regret and stop doing whatever will harm us, without identifying the particular actions? The proposition is certainly true. It is also worth impressing on people who are assumed to have learned WHAT actions of every kind ARE sins. Such people should accept it. But neither this proposition nor the previous one can reasonably be considered an innate principle. Nor would either be useful, even if innate, unless the precise standards and limits of every virtue and vice were also innate. Those standards would also have to be engraved in people’s minds, something I think there is much reason to doubt. Therefore, I think it will hardly seem possible that God would engrave principles in people’s minds using words with uncertain meanings. VIRTUES and SINS are such words, since different people use them to mean different things. Indeed, we cannot suppose that these principles are expressed in words at all. Most words in these principles are very general terms. We can understand those terms only by knowing the particular things they include. In practical cases, standards must come from knowing the actions themselves and the rules governing those actions. This knowledge must be independent of words and come before knowledge of names. A person must know these rules whatever language he happens to learn, whether English or Japan. He must know them even if he learns no language at all. The same applies if he never understands how words are used, as happens with people who cannot speak or hear. Suppose people who know no words, or have not learned their country’s laws and customs, are shown to know the following. They know that worshipping God includes not killing another person, not having sexual relations with more than one woman, and not causing abortion. They also know that worshipping God includes not abandoning their children and not taking another person’s possessions, even when they need them. Instead, they know they must help that person and meet his needs. And whenever they act otherwise, they know they ought to repent, feel sorry, and resolve not to do so again. These rules, and a thousand others like them, all fall under the two general terms used above, virtutes et peccata, virtues and sins. When all people are proved actually to know and accept all these rules, there will be more reason for accepting these principles and similar ones as shared ideas and practical principles. Yet even universal agreement on moral truths, if there were any, would hardly prove those truths innate. Knowledge of those truths may be gained in other ways. That is all I am arguing.

20. Objection, Innate Principles may be corrupted, answered.

20. Answer to the objection that innate principles may be corrupted.

Nor will it be of much moment here to offer that very ready but not very material answer, viz. that the innate principles of morality may, by education, and custom, and the general opinion of those amongst whom we converse, be darkened, and at last quite worn out of the minds of men. Which assertion of theirs, if true, quite takes away the argument of universal consent, by which this opinion of innate principles is endeavoured to be proved; unless those men will think it reasonable that their private persuasions, or that of their party, should pass for universal consent;—a thing not unfrequently done, when men, presuming themselves to be the only masters of right reason, cast by the votes and opinions of the rest of mankind as not worthy the reckoning. And then their argument stands thus:—“The principles which all mankind allow for true, are innate; those that men of right reason admit, are the principles allowed by all mankind; we, and those of our mind, are men of reason; therefore, we agreeing, our principles are innate”;—which is a very pretty way of arguing, and a short cut to infallibility. For otherwise it will be very hard to understand how there be some principles which all men do acknowledge and agree in; and yet there are none of those principles which are not, by depraved custom and ill education, blotted out of the minds of many men: which is to say, that all men admit, but yet many men do deny and dissent from them. And indeed the supposition of SUCH first principles will serve us to very little purpose; and we shall be as much at a loss with as without them, if they may, by any human power—such as the will of our teachers, or opinions of our companions—be altered or lost in us: and notwithstanding all this boast of first principles and innate light, we shall be as much in the dark and uncertainty as if there were no such thing at all: it being all one to have no rule, and one that will warp any way; or amongst various and contrary rules, not to know which is the right. But concerning innate principles, I desire these men to say, whether they can or cannot, by education and custom, be blurred and blotted out; if they cannot, we must find them in all mankind alike, and they must be clear in everybody; and if they may suffer variation from adventitious notions, we must then find them clearest and most perspicuous nearest the fountain, in children and illiterate people, who have received least impression from foreign opinions. Let them take which side they please, they will certainly find it inconsistent with visible matter of fact and daily observation.

It will not help much here to offer a ready but largely irrelevant answer. The answer is that education, custom, and public opinion may obscure innate moral principles and eventually erase them entirely. By public opinion, these defenders of innate principles mean the opinions of the people we associate with. But if their claim is true, it destroys the argument from universal agreement used to prove that principles are innate. The only escape is to treat their own convictions, or those of their group, as universal agreement. People do this often enough. They assume that they alone reason correctly and dismiss everyone else’s judgments and opinions as not worth counting. Their argument then runs like this: “The principles all humanity accepts as true are innate. The principles accepted by people who reason correctly are the principles all humanity accepts. We and those who agree with us are people who reason correctly. Therefore, since we agree, our principles are innate.” This is a very pretty argument, and a shortcut to infallibility. Otherwise, it is very hard to understand how some principles can be acknowledged and accepted by everyone. Yet, supposedly, every one of those principles has been erased from many minds by corrupt customs and bad education. This amounts to saying that everyone accepts those principles, yet many people deny and reject them. Indeed, assuming that SUCH first principles exist will do us very little good. We will be just as lost with them as without them if any human influence can alter or erase them. Such influences include our teachers’ wishes and our companions’ opinions. Despite all this boasting about first principles and innate understanding, we will remain just as uncertain and in the dark. We will be no better off than if no such thing existed. Having no rule is no different from having a rule that bends in any direction. Nor are we better off with several conflicting rules if we do not know which is right. But I ask these defenders of innate principles whether education and custom can obscure and erase those principles or not. If not, we must find the same principles in all humanity, and those principles must be clear to everyone. But if ideas acquired from outside can alter them, we must find them clearest nearest their source. That means in children and people without formal education, whose minds have been least influenced by others’ opinions. Whichever side these defenders choose, they will certainly find it conflicts with observable facts and everyday experience.

21. Contrary Principles in the World.

21. Conflicting Principles in the World.

I easily grant that there are great numbers of opinions which, by men of different countries, educations, and tempers, are received and embraced as first and unquestionable principles; many whereof, both for their absurdity as well as oppositions to one another, it is impossible should be true. But yet all those propositions, how remote soever from reason are so sacred somewhere or other, that men even of good understanding in other matters, will sooner part with their lives, and whatever is dearest to them, than suffer themselves to doubt, or others to question, the truth of them.

I readily admit that people from different countries, with different educations and temperaments, accept many opinions as basic, unquestionable principles. Many of these opinions cannot be true, both because they are absurd and because they contradict one another. Yet all these beliefs, however unreasonable, are held sacred somewhere. Even people who show good judgment in other matters would sooner give up their lives and everything dearest to them. They would make these sacrifices rather than allow themselves to doubt these beliefs or let others question their truth.

22. How men commonly come by their Principles.

22. How people usually acquire their principles.

This, however strange it may seem, is that which every day’s experience confirms; and will not, perhaps, appear so wonderful, if we consider the ways and steps by which it is brought about; and how really it may come to pass, that doctrines that have been derived from no better original than the superstition of a nurse, or the authority of an old woman, may, by length of time and consent of neighbours, grow up to the dignity of PRINCIPLES in religion or morality. For such, who are careful (as they call it) to principle children well, (and few there be who have not a set of those principles for them, which they believe in,) instil into the unwary, and as yet unprejudiced, understanding, (for white paper receives any characters,) those doctrines they would have them retain and profess. These being taught them as soon as they have any apprehension; and still as they grow up confirmed to them, either by the open profession or tacit consent of all they have to do with; or at least by those of whose wisdom, knowledge, and piety they have an opinion, who never suffer those propositions to be otherwise mentioned but as the basis and foundation on which they build their religion and manners, come, by these means, to have the reputation of unquestionable, self-evident, and innate truths.

However strange this may seem, everyday experience confirms it. And perhaps it will seem less surprising if we consider how it happens, step by step. Some doctrines may originate in nothing better than a nurse’s superstition or an old woman’s authority. Yet over time, and with the agreement of neighbors, these doctrines may gain the status of PRINCIPLES in religion or morality. For some people take care, as they put it, to give children sound principles. Few people lack a set of principles they believe in and want children to learn. They plant their chosen doctrines in children’s unsuspecting minds, which are not yet shaped by prejudice. After all, blank paper accepts any writing. These adults want children to hold on to those doctrines and openly affirm them. Children are taught these doctrines as soon as they can understand anything. As the children grow, everyone they deal with reinforces these teachings, either through open agreement or silent acceptance. Or at least the teachings are reinforced by people whose wisdom, knowledge, and religious devotion the children respect. These people never allow the doctrines to be mentioned except as the foundations of their religion and moral conduct. Through this process, the doctrines gain a reputation as unquestionable, self-evident truths that are present in the mind from birth.

23. Principles supposed innate because we do not remember when we began to hold them.

23. Principles are assumed to be innate because we do not remember when we first began to believe them.

To which we may add, that when men so instructed are grown up, and reflect on their own minds, they cannot find anything more ancient there than those opinions, which were taught them before their memory began to keep a register of their actions, or date the time when any new thing appeared to them; and therefore make no scruple to conclude, that those propositions of whose knowledge they can find in themselves no original, were certainly the impress of God and nature upon their minds, and not taught them by any one else. These they entertain and submit to, as many do to their parents with veneration; not because it is natural: nor do children do it where they are not so taught; but because, having been always so educated, and having no remembrance of the beginning of this respect, they think it is natural.

We may also add that people taught this way grow up and reflect on their own minds. They can find nothing there older than the opinions they were taught before their memories began recording their actions. Those opinions also predate their ability to remember when they first encountered anything new. So they readily conclude that beliefs whose origins they cannot trace were certainly imprinted on their minds by God and nature. They conclude that no one else taught them these beliefs. They accept and submit to these beliefs with reverence, just as many people revere their parents. But this reverence for parents is not natural, nor do children show it unless they are taught to. Rather, people have always been brought up to show this respect and cannot remember when it began. Because of this, they think their respect is natural.

24. How such principles come to be held.

24. How people come to accept such principles.

This will appear very likely, and almost unavoidable to come to pass, if we consider the nature of mankind and the constitution of human affairs; wherein most men cannot live without employing their time in the daily labours of their callings; nor be at quiet in their minds without SOME foundation or principle to rest their thoughts on. There is scarcely any one so floating and superficial in his understanding, who hath not some reverenced propositions, which are to him the principles on which he bottoms his reasonings, and by which he judgeth of truth and falsehood, right and wrong; which some, wanting skill and leisure, and others the inclination, and some being taught that they ought not to examine, there are few to be found who are not exposed by their ignorance, laziness, education, or precipitancy, to TAKE THEM UPON TRUST.

This will seem very likely, and almost inevitable, if we consider human nature and how human affairs are organized. Most people must spend their time on the daily work of their occupations to earn a living. Nor can they find peace of mind without SOME foundation or principle on which to rest their thoughts. Almost everyone, however unsettled and shallow their understanding, has some beliefs they deeply respect. They base their reasoning on these beliefs and use them to judge truth and falsehood, right and wrong. Some lack the skill and time to examine these beliefs, while others lack the desire. Some have been taught that they should not examine them. So few people escape being led by ignorance, laziness, education, or haste to ACCEPT THESE BELIEFS ON TRUST.

25. Further explained.

25. Explained in more detail.

This is evidently the case of all children and young folk; and custom, a greater power than nature, seldom failing to make them worship for divine what she hath inured them to bow their minds and submit their understandings to, it is no wonder that grown men, either perplexed in the necessary affairs of life, or hot in the pursuit of pleasures, should not seriously sit down to examine their own tenets; especially when one of their principles is, that principles ought not to be questioned. And had men leisure, parts, and will, who is there almost that dare shake the foundations of all his past thoughts and actions, and endure to bring upon himself the shame of having been a long time wholly in mistake and error? Who is there hardy enough to contend with the reproach which is everywhere prepared for those who dare venture to dissent from the received opinions of their country or party? And where is the man to be found that can patiently prepare himself to bear the name of whimsical, sceptical, or atheist; which he is sure to meet with, who does in the least scruple any of the common opinions? And he will be much more afraid to question those principles, when he shall think them, as most men do, the standards set up by God in his mind, to be the rule and touchstone of all other opinions. And what can hinder him from thinking them sacred, when he finds them the earliest of all his own thoughts, and the most reverenced by others?

This is clearly the case with all children and young people. Habit is more powerful than nature. It seldom fails to make them worship as divine whatever it has trained their minds and understanding to submit to. So it is no wonder that grown men do not sit down to examine their beliefs seriously. They are either caught up in life’s necessary business or eagerly pursuing pleasure. They are especially unlikely to examine their beliefs when one of their principles is that principles should not be questioned. Even if men had the time, ability, and willingness, who would dare question the foundations of all his past thoughts and actions? Who would accept the shame of admitting that he had been entirely mistaken and wrong for so long? Who is bold enough to face the condemnation awaiting anyone who dares challenge his country’s or party’s accepted opinions? And who can patiently prepare himself to be called eccentric, sceptical, or atheist? Anyone who questions even the smallest part of any common opinion is sure to face those labels. A man will be much more afraid to question those principles if he believes God placed them in his mind. Most men believe this, treating those principles as the standards for judging and testing all other opinions. And what could keep him from thinking those principles sacred? After all, they are his earliest thoughts and the beliefs others hold in the greatest reverence.

26. A worship of idols.

26. Worship of idols.

It is easy to imagine how, by these means, it comes to pass that men worship the idols that have been set up in their minds; grow fond of the notions they have been long acquainted with there; and stamp the characters of divinity upon absurdities and errors; become zealous votaries to bulls and monkeys, and contend too, fight, and die in defence of their opinions. Dum solos credit habendos esse deos, quos ipse colit. For, since the reasoning faculties of the soul, which are almost constantly, though not always warily nor wisely employed, would not know how to move, for want of a foundation and footing, in most men, who through laziness or avocation do not, or for want of time, or true helps, or for other causes, cannot penetrate into the principles of knowledge, and trace truth to its fountain and original, it is natural for them, and almost unavoidable, to take up with some borrowed principles; which being reputed and presumed to be the evident proofs of other things, are thought not to need any other proof themselves. Whoever shall receive any of these into his mind, and entertain them there with the reverence usually paid to principles, never venturing to examine them, but accustoming himself to believe them, because they are to be believed, may take up, from his education and the fashions of his country, any absurdity for innate principles; and by long poring on the same objects, so dim his sight as to take monsters lodged in his own brain for the images of the Deity, and the workmanship of his hands.

It is easy to imagine how these habits lead people to worship the idols set up in their minds. People grow fond of ideas they have long held and give absurdities and errors the stamp of divine authority. They become devoted worshippers of bulls and monkeys, and argue, fight, and die defending their opinions. They believe that only the gods they themselves worship should be regarded as gods. For the mind’s reasoning powers are almost constantly at work, though not always carefully or wisely. But in most people, reason would not know how to proceed without some foundation to stand on. Through laziness or distraction, these people do not explore the foundations of knowledge or trace truth to its source. Others cannot do so because they lack time, proper help, or something else prevents them. So accepting some borrowed principles is natural for these people and almost unavoidable. These principles are taken to provide clear proof of other things, so they are thought to need no proof themselves. Anyone who accepts such principles may treat them with the reverence usually given to fundamental truths. Such a person never dares to examine these principles, but grows used to believing them because they must be believed. In this way, someone may accept any absurdity learned through education or local customs as an inborn principle. And by staring too long at the same things, people may so dim their own vision that they mistake what they see. The monsters lodged in their own minds may seem to them images of the Deity and works of his hands.

27. Principles must be examined.

27. Principles must be examined.

By this progress, how many there are who arrive at principles which they believe innate may be easily observed, in the variety of opposite principles held and contended for by all sorts and degrees of men. And he that shall deny this to be the method wherein most men proceed to the assurance they have of the truth and evidence of their principles, will perhaps find it a hard matter any other way to account for the contrary tenets, which are firmly believed, confidently asserted, and which great numbers are ready at any time to seal with their blood. And, indeed, if it be the privilege of innate principles to be received upon their own authority, without examination, I know not what may not be believed, or how any one’s principles can be questioned. If they may and ought to be examined and tried, I desire to know how first and innate principles can be tried; or at least it is reasonable to demand the MARKS and CHARACTERS whereby the genuine innate principles may be distinguished from others: that so, amidst the great variety of pretenders, I may be kept from mistakes in so material a point as this. When this is done, I shall be ready to embrace such welcome and useful propositions; and till then I may with modesty doubt; since I fear universal consent, which is the only one produced, will scarcely prove a sufficient mark to direct my choice, and assure me of any innate principles.

We can easily see how many people come by this process to accept principles they believe are innate. We need only look at the many opposing principles held and defended by people of all kinds and ranks. Someone may deny that most people gain their certainty about the truth and obviousness of their principles this way. But that person may find it hard to explain in any other way why people hold such conflicting beliefs. People firmly believe these views and confidently defend them, and great numbers are always ready to die for them. Indeed, suppose innate principles have the privilege of being accepted on their own authority, without examination. Then I do not know what people might not believe, or how anyone’s principles could be questioned. If innate principles may and should be examined and tested, I want to know how first and innate principles can be tested. At least, it is reasonable to ask for the MARKS and FEATURES that distinguish genuine innate principles from other principles. Those signs would keep me from making mistakes on so important a matter, among so many claims to innate status. Once those signs are supplied, I will gladly accept such welcome and useful statements. Until then, I may reasonably remain modest in my doubts. Universal agreement is the only sign offered, and I fear it will hardly be enough to guide my choice. Nor will it be enough to assure me that any principles are innate.

From what has been said, I think it past doubt, that there are no practical principles wherein all men agree; and therefore none innate.

From what has been said, I think there is no doubt that no principles of conduct are universally accepted. Therefore, no such principles are innate.