Further Thoughts on Innate Theoretical and Practical Principles

1. Principles not innate, unless their Ideas be innate

1. Principles cannot be innate unless the ideas they contain are innate.

Had those who would persuade us that there are innate principles not taken them together in gross, but considered separately the parts out of which those propositions are made, they would not, perhaps, have been so forward to believe they were innate. Since, if the IDEAS which made up those truths were not, it was impossible that the PROPOSITIONS made up of them should be innate, or our knowledge of them be born with us. For, if the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without those principles; and then they will not be innate, but be derived from some other original. For, where the ideas themselves are not, there can be no knowledge, no assent, no mental or verbal propositions about them.

Some people try to persuade us that certain principles are innate. Perhaps they would have been less ready to believe this if they had examined those principles differently. Instead of taking the propositions as a whole, they should have considered separately the parts making up each proposition. For if the IDEAS making up those truths were not innate, the PROPOSITIONS formed from those ideas could not be innate. Nor could our knowledge of those propositions be something we were born with. For if the ideas are not innate, there was a time when the mind lacked those principles. The principles would therefore not be innate, but would come from some other source. For without the ideas themselves, there can be no knowledge or acceptance of those ideas as true. Nor can there be any propositions about those ideas, either in thought or in words.

2. Ideas, especially those belonging to Principles, not born with children

2. Children are not born with ideas, especially ideas related to principles.

If we will attentively consider new-born children, we shall have little reason to think that they bring many ideas into the world with them. For, bating perhaps some faint ideas of hunger, and thirst, and warmth, and some pains, which they may have felt in the womb, there is not the least appearance of any settled ideas at all in them; especially of IDEAS ANSWERING THE TERMS WHICH MAKE UP THOSE UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS THAT ARE ESTEEMED INNATE PRINCIPLES. One may perceive how, by degrees, afterwards, ideas come into their minds; and that they get no more, nor other, than what experience, and the observation of things that come in their way, furnish them with; which might be enough to satisfy us that they are not original characters stamped on the mind.

If we carefully observe newborn children, we have little reason to think they bring many ideas into the world. Perhaps they have some faint ideas of hunger, thirst, warmth, and some pains they may have felt in the womb. But beyond these, there is no sign at all of any settled ideas in them. This is especially true of IDEAS CORRESPONDING TO THE TERMS IN THOSE UNIVERSAL STATEMENTS THAT ARE CONSIDERED INNATE PRINCIPLES. We can observe how ideas gradually enter children's minds afterward. Children acquire only the ideas that experience and observation of the things they encounter provide. This might be enough to convince us that ideas are not marks stamped on the mind from the beginning.

3. Impossibility and Identity not innate ideas

3. Impossibility and identity are not ideas we are born with

“It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be,” is certainly (if there be any such) an innate PRINCIPLE. But can any one think, or will any one say, that “impossibility” and “identity” are two innate IDEAS? Are they such as all mankind have, and bring into the world with them? And are they those which are the first in children, and antecedent to all acquired ones? If they are innate, they must needs be so. Hath a child an idea of impossibility and identity, before it has of white or black, sweet or bitter? And is it from the knowledge of this principle that it concludes, that wormwood rubbed on the nipple hath not the same taste that it used to receive from thence? Is it the actual knowledge of IMPOSSIBILE EST IDEM ESSE, ET NON ESSE, that makes a child distinguish between its mother and a stranger; or that makes it fond of the one and flee the other? Or does the mind regulate itself and its assent by ideas that it never yet had? Or the understanding draw conclusions from principles which it never yet knew or understood? The names IMPOSSIBILITY and IDENTITY stand for two ideas, so far from being innate, or born with us, that I think it requires great care and attention to form them right in our understandings. They are so far from being brought into the world with us, so remote from the thoughts of infancy and childhood, that I believe, upon examination it will be found that many grown men want them.

“It is impossible for the same thing both to exist and not to exist” is certainly an innate PRINCIPLE, if any principle is innate. But can anyone think, or will anyone say, that “impossibility” and “identity” are two innate IDEAS? Does everyone have these ideas and bring them into the world at birth? Are these the first ideas children have, before any acquired ideas? If these ideas are innate, they must come first. Does a child understand impossibility and identity before having ideas of white or black, sweet or bitter? Does knowing this principle tell a child that wormwood rubbed on the nipple tastes different from what the child tasted there before? Does actually knowing IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING BOTH TO EXIST AND NOT TO EXIST explain a child’s behavior? Does this knowledge make a child distinguish its mother from a stranger, or love its mother and flee the stranger? Or does the mind guide its thinking and decide what to accept using ideas it has never had? Or does the understanding draw conclusions from principles it has never known or understood? The names IMPOSSIBILITY and IDENTITY stand for two ideas that are far from being innate, or present at birth. I think forming these ideas correctly in our minds requires great care and attention. These ideas are far from being brought into the world with us, and far removed from infant and childhood thought. Indeed, I believe examination will show that many grown men lack these ideas.

4. Identity, an Idea not innate.

4. The idea of identity is not innate.

If IDENTITY (to instance that alone) be a native impression, and consequently so clear and obvious to us that we must needs know it even from our cradles, I would gladly be resolved by any one of seven, or seventy years old, whether a man, being a creature consisting of soul and body, be the same man when his body is changed? Whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras, having had the same soul, were the same men, though they lived several ages asunder? Nay, whether the cock too, which had the same soul, were not the same, with both of them? Whereby, perhaps, it will appear that our idea of SAMENESS is not so settled and clear as to deserve to be thought innate in us. For if those innate ideas are not clear and distinct, so as to be universally known and naturally agreed on, they cannot be subjects of universal and undoubted truths, but will be the unavoidable occasion of perpetual uncertainty. For, I suppose every one’s idea of identity will not be the same that Pythagoras and thousands of his followers have. And which then shall be true? Which innate? Or are there two different ideas of identity, both innate?

Suppose IDENTITY, to take just that example, is an idea we are born with. It must then be so clear and obvious that we know it even from infancy. I would gladly have anyone, whether seven or seventy years old, answer this question: Is a man, a creature made up of soul and body, still the same man when his body changes? Were Euphorbus and Pythagoras the same man because they had the same soul, though they lived centuries apart? Indeed, was the rooster that also had the same soul not the same as both men? Perhaps these questions will show that our idea of SAMENESS is not settled and clear enough to count as innate. For if innate ideas are not clear and distinct, everyone cannot know them and naturally agree about them. In that case, those ideas cannot form the basis of universal and unquestionable truths. Instead, they will inevitably cause endless uncertainty. For I suppose not everyone has the same idea of identity as Pythagoras and thousands of his followers. Which idea, then, is true? Which is innate? Or are there two different ideas of identity, both innate?

5. What makes the same man?

5. What makes someone the same human being?

Nor let any one think that the questions I have here proposed about the identity of man are bare empty speculations; which, if they were, would be enough to show, that there was in the understandings of men no innate idea of identity. He that shall with a little attention reflect on the resurrection, and consider that divine justice will bring to judgment, at the last day, the very same persons, to be happy or miserable in the other, who did well or ill in this life, will find it perhaps not easy to resolve with himself, what makes the same man, or wherein identity consists; and will not be forward to think he, and every one, even children themselves, have naturally a clear idea of it.

Nor should anyone think my questions about human identity are merely empty speculation. Even if they were, that alone would show that people have no inborn idea of identity. Anyone who reflects with a little care on the resurrection should consider what divine justice requires. On the last day, the very same people who did good or evil in this life will face judgment. They will be happy or miserable in the next life. Anyone who considers this may find it difficult to determine what makes someone the same human being, or what identity consists in. Nor will such a person be quick to assume that everyone, including themselves and even children, naturally understands identity clearly.

6. Whole and Part not innate ideas.

6. The ideas of whole and part are not innate.

Let us examine that principle of mathematics, viz. THAT THE WHOLE IS BIGGER THAN A PART. This, I take it, is reckoned amongst innate principles. I am sure it has as good a title as any to be thought so; which yet nobody can think it to be, when he considers the ideas it comprehends in it, WHOLE and PART, are perfectly relative; but the positive ideas to which they properly and immediately belong are extension and number, of which alone whole and part are relations. So that if whole and part are innate ideas, extension and number must be so too; it being impossible to have an idea of a relation, without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs, and in which it is founded. Now, whether the minds of men have naturally imprinted on them the ideas of extension and number, I leave to be considered by those who are the patrons of innate principles.

Let us examine this mathematical principle: THE WHOLE IS BIGGER THAN A PART. I take this to be counted among innate principles. Certainly, it has as strong a claim as any principle to be considered innate. Yet no one can consider it innate after examining the ideas it contains. WHOLE and PART are entirely relative ideas. But the underlying ideas to which they directly belong are extension and number. Whole and part describe relations only within extension and number. So if whole and part are innate ideas, extension and number must be innate too. We cannot have an idea of a relation without any idea of what that relation concerns and rests on. Now, are the ideas of extension and number naturally imprinted on the human mind? I leave that question for the supporters of innate principles to consider.

7. Idea of Worship not innate.

7. The idea of worship is not inborn.

That GOD IS TO BE WORSHIPPED, is, without doubt, as great a truth as any that can enter into the mind of man, and deserves the first place amongst all practical principles. But yet it can by no means be thought innate, unless the ideas of GOD and WORSHIP are innate. That the idea the term worship stands for is not in the understanding of children, and a character stamped on the mind in its first original, I think will be easily granted, by any one that considers how few there be amongst grown men who have a clear and distinct notion of it. And, I suppose, there cannot be anything more ridiculous than to say, that children have this practical principle innate, “That God is to be worshipped,” and yet that they know not what that worship of God is, which is their duty. But to pass by this.

That GOD IS TO BE WORSHIPPED is undoubtedly as great a truth as any the human mind can grasp. It deserves first place among all principles of conduct. Yet this principle cannot possibly be considered innate unless the ideas of GOD and WORSHIP are innate. Children do not understand the idea expressed by the word worship, nor is that idea stamped on their minds at birth. I think anyone who considers how few adults clearly and distinctly understand worship will readily agree. And I suppose nothing could be more ridiculous than saying children are born knowing this principle: “That God is to be worshipped,” yet do not know what the worship they owe God actually is. But let us move on.

8. Idea of God not innate.

8. The idea of God is not inborn.

If any idea can be imagined innate, the idea of GOD may, of all others, for many reasons, be thought so; since it is hard to conceive how there should be innate moral principles, without an innate idea of a Deity. Without a notion of a law-maker, it is impossible to have a notion of a law, and an obligation to observe it. Besides the atheists taken notice of amongst the ancients, and left branded upon the records of history, hath not navigation discovered, in these later ages, whole nations, at the bay of Soldania, in Brazil, and in the Caribbee islands, &c., amongst whom there was to be found no notion of a God, no religion? Nicholaus del Techo, in Literis ex Paraquaria, de Caiguarum Conversione, has these words: Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere quod Deum, et hominis animam significet; nulla sacra habet, nulla idola.

If any idea can be considered inborn, the idea of God may, for many reasons, be the strongest candidate. It is hard to imagine inborn moral principles without an inborn idea of a Deity. Without an idea of a lawmaker, we cannot have an idea of a law or an obligation to obey it. History records and condemns atheists among the ancients. But have not voyages in more recent times also revealed whole nations with no idea of God and no religion? Such nations were found at the bay of Soldania, in Brazil, in the Caribbee islands, and elsewhere. Nicholaus del Techo, in Literis ex Paraquaria, de Caiguarum Conversione, writes: I found that this people had no word for God or for the human soul. They have no religious rites and no idols.

And perhaps, if we should with attention mind the lives and discourses of people not so far off, we should have too much reason to fear, that many, in more civilized countries, have no very strong and clear impressions of a Deity upon their minds, and that the complaints of atheism made from the pulpit are not without reason. And though only some profligate wretches own it too barefacedly now; yet perhaps we should hear more than we do of it from others, did not the fear of the magistrate’s sword, or their neighbour’s censure, tie up people’s tongues; which, were the apprehensions of punishment or shame taken away, would as openly proclaim their atheism as their lives do.

And perhaps, if we carefully observed the lives and conversations of people closer to home, we would have much to fear. Many in more civilized countries may have no very strong or clear sense of God in their minds. And complaints about atheism made from the pulpit may not be without reason. Although only some shameless wretches openly admit their atheism now, perhaps we would hear more about it from others. Fear of legal punishment or their neighbors’ disapproval may be keeping those others silent. If the fear of punishment or shame were removed, they would proclaim their atheism as openly as their lives do.

9. The name of God not universal or obscure in meaning.

9. The name of God is not used everywhere, and its meaning is not unclear.

But had all mankind everywhere a notion of a God, (whereof yet history tells us the contrary,) it would not from thence follow, that the idea of him was innate. For, though no nation were to be found without a name, and some few dark notions of him, yet that would not prove them to be natural impressions on the mind; no more than the names of fire, or the sun, heat, or number, do prove the ideas they stand for to be innate; because the names of those things, and the ideas of them, are so universally received and known amongst mankind. Nor, on the contrary, is the want of such a name, or the absence of such a notion out of men’s minds, any argument against the being of a God; any more than it would be a proof that there was no loadstone in the world, because a great part of mankind had neither a notion of any such thing nor a name for it; or be any show of argument to prove that there are no distinct and various species of angels, or intelligent beings above us, because we have no ideas of such distinct species, or names for them. For, men being furnished with words, by the common language of their own countries, can scarce avoid having some kind of ideas of those things whose names those they converse with have occasion frequently to mention to them. And if they carry with it the notion of excellency, greatness, or something extraordinary; if apprehension and concernment accompany it; if the fear of absolute and irresistible power set it on upon the mind,—the idea is likely to sink the deeper, and spread the further; especially if it be such an idea as is agreeable to the common light of reason, and naturally deducible from every part of our knowledge, as that of a God is. For the visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so plainly in all the works of the creation, that a rational creature, who will but seriously reflect on them, cannot miss the discovery of a Deity. And the influence that the discovery of such a Being must necessarily have on the minds of all that have but once heard of it is so great, and carries such a weight of thought and communication with it, that it seems stranger to me that a whole nation of men should be anywhere found so brutish as to want the notion of a God, than that they should be without any notion of numbers, or fire.

But even if everyone everywhere had some idea of God, that would not mean the idea was inborn. History, however, tells us that not everyone has such an idea. Suppose every nation had a name for God and a few vague ideas about him. Even then, those ideas would not be proved to be naturally stamped on the mind. The same is true of the names for fire, the sun, heat, and number. These names and the ideas they represent are known and accepted throughout humanity. But their widespread use does not prove that the ideas are inborn. On the other hand, lacking a name or an idea of God is no argument against his existence. Much of humanity has neither an idea of a lodestone, a natural magnet, nor a name for one. But that would not prove that no lodestone existed anywhere in the world. Nor could our lack of ideas or names for different kinds of angels prove that no such kinds exist. The same applies to other intelligent beings above us. People learn words through the common language of their own countries. They can hardly avoid forming some ideas of things that people around them frequently mention. Suppose those ideas suggest excellence, greatness, or something extraordinary, and bring anxiety and concern with them. If fear of absolute, irresistible power also presses an idea upon the mind, the idea will likely take deeper root. It will also likely spread more widely. This is especially true if the idea agrees with ordinary reason and follows naturally from every part of our knowledge. The idea of God is such an idea. Clear signs of extraordinary wisdom and power appear throughout creation. A rational being who seriously reflects on those signs cannot fail to discover a Deity. Discovering such a Being must necessarily have a great influence on everyone who has even once heard of him. The discovery gives people so much to think about and communicate to others. So I find one thing more surprising than a whole nation having no idea of numbers or fire. It is that any whole nation could be so brutish as to have no idea of God.

10. Ideas of God and idea of Fire.

10. Ideas of God and the idea of fire.

The name of God being once mentioned in any part of the world, to express a superior, powerful, wise, invisible Being, the suitableness of such a notion to the principles of common reason, and the interest men will always have to mention it often, must necessarily spread it far and wide; and continue it down to all generations: though yet the general reception of this name, and some imperfect and unsteady notions conveyed thereby to the unthinking part of mankind, prove not the idea to be innate; but only that they who made the discovery had made a right use of their reason, thought maturely of the causes of things, and traced them to their original; from whom other less considering people having once received so important a notion, it could not easily be lost again.

Once the name of God is mentioned anywhere in the world, it describes a superior, powerful, wise, invisible being. Such an idea fits the principles of ordinary reason, and people will always have reasons to mention it often. These factors must spread the idea far and wide and preserve it through all generations. Yet the widespread acceptance of this name does not prove that the idea is innate. Nor do the imperfect and uncertain notions the name conveys to people who give little thought to such matters. These facts show only that those who discovered the idea used their reason well. They thought carefully about the causes of things and traced those causes to their source. Other, less thoughtful people then received this important idea from those who discovered it. Once received, such an important idea could not easily be lost again.

11. Idea of God not innate.

11. The idea of God is not inborn.

This is all could be inferred from the notion of a God, were it to be found universally in all the tribes of mankind, and generally acknowledged, by men grown to maturity in all countries. For the generality of the acknowledging of a God, as I imagine, is extended no further than that; which, if it be sufficient to prove the idea of God innate, will as well prove the idea of fire innate; since I think it may be truly said, that there is not a person in the world who has a notion of a God, who has not also the idea of fire. I doubt not but if a colony of young children should be placed in an island where no fire was, they would certainly neither have any notion of such a thing, nor name for it, how generally soever it were received and known in all the world besides; and perhaps too their apprehensions would be as far removed from any name, or notion, of a God, till some one amongst them had employed his thoughts to inquire into the constitution and causes of things, which would easily lead him to the notion of a God; which having once taught to others, reason, and the natural propensity of their own thoughts, would afterwards propagate, and continue amongst them.

This is all we could infer from the idea of a God, even if every human community had that idea. The same would hold if adults in every country generally acknowledged a God. For I believe the claim that belief in a God is widespread extends no further than that. If such widespread belief proves that the idea of God is innate, it equally proves that the idea of fire is innate. For I think we can truly say that everyone who has an idea of a God also has an idea of fire. I have no doubt that children placed together on an island without fire would have neither an idea nor a name for fire. This would be true however widely fire was known and recognized throughout the rest of the world. And perhaps those children would likewise have no name or idea of a God. They might remain that way until someone among them began investigating the structure and causes of things. Such an inquiry would easily lead that person to the idea of a God. Once that person had taught the idea to others, reason and their thoughts’ natural tendency would spread and preserve it among them.

12. Suitable to God’s goodness, that all Men should have an idea of Him, therefore naturally imprinted by Him, answered.

12. An argument answered: It suits God’s goodness that all people should have an idea of him. Therefore, he has naturally imprinted this idea in everyone.

Indeed it is urged, that it is suitable to the goodness of God, to imprint upon the minds of men characters and notions of himself, and not to leave them in the dark and doubt in so grand a concernment; and also, by that means, to secure to himself the homage and veneration due from so intelligent a creature as man; and therefore he has done it.

Indeed, some argue that God's goodness would lead him to stamp signs and ideas of himself on human minds. He would not leave people ignorant and uncertain about so important a matter. They also argue that doing so would secure him the worship and reverence owed by an intelligent creature like man. Therefore, they conclude, God has done so.

This argument, if it be of any force, will prove much more than those who use it in this case expect from it. For, if we may conclude that God hath done for men all that men shall judge is best for them, because it is suitable to his goodness so to do, it will prove, not only that God has imprinted on the minds of men an idea of himself, but that he hath plainly stamped there, in fair characters, all that men ought to know or believe of him; all that they ought to do in obedience to his will; and that he hath given them a will and affections conformable to it. This, no doubt, every one will think better for men, than that they should, in the dark, grope after knowledge, as St. Paul tells us all nations did after God (Acts xvii. 27); than that their wills should clash with their understandings, and their appetites cross their duty. The Romanists say it is best for men, and so suitable to the goodness of God, that there should be an infallible judge of controversies on earth; and therefore there is one. And I, by the same reason, say it is better for men that every man himself should be infallible. I leave them to consider, whether, by the force of this argument, they shall think that every man IS so. I think it a very good argument to say,—the infinitely wise God hath made it so; and therefore it is best. But it seems to me a little too much confidence of our own wisdom to say,—‘I think it best; and therefore God hath made it so.’ And in the matter in hand, it will be in vain to argue from such a topic, that God hath done so, when certain experience shows us that he hath not. But the goodness of God hath not been wanting to men, without such original impressions of knowledge or ideas stamped on the mind; since he hath furnished man with those faculties which will serve for the sufficient discovery of all things requisite to the end of such a being; and I doubt not but to show, that a man, by the right use of his natural abilities, may, without any innate principles, attain a knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him. God having endued man with those faculties of knowledge which he hath, was no more obliged by his goodness to plant those innate notions in his mind, than that, having given him reason, hands, and materials, he should build him bridges or houses,—which some people in the world, however of good parts, do either totally want, or are but ill provided of, as well as others are wholly without ideas of God and principles of morality, or at least have but very ill ones; the reason in both cases being, that they never employed their parts, faculties, and powers industriously that way, but contented themselves with the opinions, fashions, and things of their country, as they found them, without looking any further. Had you or I been born at the Bay of Soldania, possibly our thoughts and notions had not exceeded those brutish ones of the Hottentots that inhabit there. And had the Virginia king Apochancana been educated in England, he had been perhaps as knowing a divine, and as good a mathematician as any in it; the difference between him and a more improved Englishman lying barely in this, that the exercise of his faculties was bounded within the ways, modes, and notions of his own country, and never directed to any other or further inquiries. And if he had not any idea of a God, it was only because he pursued not those thoughts that would have led him to it.

If this argument has any force, it proves much more than its supporters expect in this case. They argue that God has done everything people judge best for them, because doing so suits his goodness. But that reasoning would prove more than that God has imprinted an idea of himself on human minds. It would also prove that he has clearly written there everything people ought to know or believe about him. He would also have written everything they ought to do to obey his will. And he would have given them wills and feelings that agree with his will. Everyone will surely think this better for people than having to grope for knowledge in the dark. St. Paul tells us that all nations searched for God in this way (Acts 17:27). Surely everyone would also think it better than having their wills conflict with their understanding, and their desires oppose their duty. The Romanists say that an infallible judge of religious disputes on earth is best for people. Such a judge, they argue, therefore suits God’s goodness, and so one exists. By the same reasoning, I say it would be better for every person to be infallible. I leave them to consider whether this argument should make them think that every person IS infallible. I think this is a very good argument: the infinitely wise God has made things this way, so it is best. But the reverse seems to place rather too much confidence in our own wisdom: ‘I think it best. Therefore God has made it so.’ In the present case, arguing on such grounds that God has given us innate knowledge is pointless. Certain experience shows us that he has not. Yet God has not failed to show people goodness by leaving them without knowledge or ideas imprinted on their minds from birth. He has given people abilities sufficient to discover everything needed to fulfill the purpose of beings like themselves. I have no doubt that I can show how people may gain knowledge of God without any innate principles. They may do so by using their natural abilities properly, and may also learn other things that concern them. Having given people these abilities to gain knowledge, God’s goodness did not oblige him to plant innate ideas in their minds. Nor, having given them reason, hands, and materials, was he obliged to build them bridges or houses. Some people in the world lack bridges or houses entirely, or have only poor ones, despite having considerable abilities. Likewise, others have no ideas of God or principles of morality, or at least have only very poor ones. The reason in both cases is that they never diligently used their abilities and powers for those purposes. Instead, they accepted their country’s opinions, customs, and possessions as they found them, without looking further. Had you or I been born at the Bay of Soldania, our thoughts might not have surpassed those of its inhabitants. Those inhabitants are the Hottentots, whose ideas are so brutish. Had the Virginia king Apochancana been educated in England, perhaps he would have been as learned a theologian as anyone there. Perhaps he would also have been as good a mathematician as anyone there. The difference between him and a more educated Englishman lay only in how he used his abilities. His use of them was confined to his own country’s practices, customs, and ideas. Those abilities were never directed toward any other or further inquiries. And if he had no idea of a God, it was only because he never pursued the thoughts that would have led him to that idea.

13. Ideas of God various in different Men.

13. Ideas of God differ from person to person.

I grant that if there were any ideas to be found imprinted on the minds of men, we have reason to expect it should be the notion of his Maker, as a mark God set on his own workmanship, to mind man of his dependence and duty; and that herein should appear the first instances of human knowledge. But how late is it before any such notion is discoverable in children? And when we find it there, how much more does it resemble the opinion and notion of the teacher, than represent the true God? He that shall observe in children the progress whereby their minds attain the knowledge they have, will think that the objects they do first and most familiarly converse with are those that make the first impressions on their understandings; nor will he find the least footsteps of any other. It is easy to take notice how their thoughts enlarge themselves, only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of sensible objects; to retain the ideas of them in their memories; and to get the skill to compound and enlarge them, and several ways put them together. How, by these means, they come to frame in their minds an idea men have of a Deity, I shall hereafter show.

I admit that if any ideas were imprinted on human minds, we would expect the idea of our Maker among them. Such an idea would be a mark God placed on his own creation, reminding us of our dependence and duty. And we would expect this idea to be among the first signs of human knowledge. But how long does it take before any such idea appears in children? And when we find the idea, how much more does it resemble the teacher’s beliefs than represent the true God? Anyone who watches how children gain knowledge will see how their understanding develops. The objects children first encounter, and know most closely, seem to make the first impressions on their understanding. Nor will the observer find the slightest trace of any other impressions. We can easily see how children’s thoughts expand only as they become familiar with more objects through their senses. They remember ideas of these objects and learn to combine and expand those ideas in different ways. Later, I will show how these processes lead children to form the idea people have of a Deity.

14. Contrary and inconsistent ideas of God under the same name.

14. Conflicting and incompatible ideas of God under the same name.

Can it be thought that the ideas men have of God are the characters and marks of himself, engraven in their minds by his own finger, when we see that, in the same country, under one and the same name, men have far different, nay often contrary and inconsistent ideas and conceptions of him? Their agreeing in a name, or sound, will scarce prove an innate notion of him.

Can we think that people’s ideas of God are marks of himself, carved into their minds by his own finger? How can we, when people in the same country use the same name for God but have very different ideas of him? Indeed, their ideas are often opposite and inconsistent. Agreement on a name or sound hardly proves that people are born with an idea of God.

15. Gross ideas of God.

15. Crude ideas about God.

What true or tolerable notion of a Deity could they have, who acknowledged and worshipped hundreds? Every deity that they owned above one was an infallible evidence of their ignorance of Him, and a proof that they had no true notion of God, where unity, infinity, and eternity were excluded. To which, if we add their gross conceptions of corporeity, expressed in their images and representations of their deities; the amours, marriages, copulations, lusts, quarrels, and other mean qualities attributed by them to their gods; we shall have little reason to think that the heathen world, i.e. the greatest part of mankind, had such ideas of God in their minds as he himself, out of care that they should not be mistaken about him, was author of. And this universality of consent, so much argued, if it prove any native impressions, it will be only this:—that God imprinted on the minds of all men speaking the same language, a NAME for himself, but not any IDEA; since those people who agreed in the name, had, at the same time, far different apprehensions about the thing signified. If they say that the variety of deities worshipped by the heathen world were but figurative ways of expressing the several attributes of that incomprehensible Being, or several parts of his providence, I answer: what they might be in the original I will not here inquire; but that they were so in the thoughts of the vulgar I think nobody will affirm. And he that will consult the voyage of the Bishop of Beryte, c. 13, (not to mention other testimonies,) will find that the theology of the Siamites professedly owns a plurality of gods: or, as the Abbe de Choisy more judiciously remarks in his Journal du Voyage de Siam, 107/177, it consists properly in acknowledging no God at all.

What true or even acceptable idea of a Deity could people have if they acknowledged and worshipped hundreds? Every deity they recognized beyond one was unmistakable evidence of their ignorance of God. It proved they had no true idea of God, since their idea excluded his oneness, infinity, and eternity. Add to this their crude belief that their gods had bodies, expressed in images and representations of those gods. Add also the love affairs, marriages, sexual relations, lusts, quarrels, and other base qualities they attributed to their gods. We then have little reason to think the pagan world, meaning most of humanity, possessed ideas of God supplied by God himself to prevent misunderstandings about him. Much has been made of this supposed universal agreement. But if such agreement proves any inborn impressions, it proves only this: God imprinted a NAME for himself on the minds of all people speaking the same language, but not an IDEA. For people who agreed on the name nevertheless had very different understandings of what the name meant. Some may say the many deities worshipped by pagans were merely symbolic expressions of that incomprehensible Being’s various attributes. Or they may say those deities represented different aspects of his providence. I will not inquire here into what those deities may originally have represented. But I think nobody will claim that ordinary people understood those deities in this symbolic way. Anyone who consults the account of the Bishop of Beryte’s voyage, chapter 13, will find an explicit acknowledgment of multiple gods in the theology of the Siamites. Other accounts could also be cited. Or, as the Abbe de Choisy more judiciously observes in his Journal du Voyage de Siam, 107/177, their theology really amounts to acknowledging no God at all.

16. Idea of God not innate although wise men of all nations come to have it.

16. The idea of God is not inborn, although wise men of all nations come to have this idea.

If it be said, that wise men of all nations came to have true conceptions of the unity and infinity of the Deity, I grant it. But then this,

If someone says wise men of all nations came to understand God's oneness and infinity, I agree. But then this,

First, excludes universality of consent in anything but the name; for those wise men being very few, perhaps one of a thousand, this universality is very narrow.

First, this leaves universal agreement in name only. For those wise men are very few, perhaps one in a thousand. So this supposed universal agreement is very limited.

Secondly, it seems to me plainly to prove, that the truest and best notions men have of God were not imprinted, but acquired by thought and meditation, and a right use of their faculties: since the wise and considerate men of the world, by a right and careful employment of their thoughts and reason, attained true notions in this as well as other things; whilst the lazy and inconsiderate part of men, making far the greater number, took up their notions by chance, from common tradition and vulgar conceptions, without much beating their heads about them. And if it be a reason to think the notion of God innate, because all wise men had it, virtue too must be thought innate; for that also wise men have always had.

Secondly, to me, this seems clear proof that people’s truest and best ideas of God were not inborn. Instead, people acquired these ideas through thought, reflection, and the proper use of their mental abilities. For wise and thoughtful people reached true ideas about God, as about other things, by reasoning carefully and properly. But lazy and thoughtless people, who make up by far the greater number, picked up their ideas by chance. Their ideas came from common traditions and popular beliefs, without much effort to think them through. And if we think the idea of God is inborn because all wise people had it, virtue must be inborn too. For wise people have also always had virtue.

17. Odd, low, and pitiful ideas of God common among men.

17. Strange, demeaning, and pitiful ideas of God are common among people.

This was evidently the case of all Gentilism. Nor hath even amongst Jews, Christians, and Mahometans, who acknowledged but one God, this doctrine, and the care taken in those nations to teach men to have true notions of a God, prevailed so far as to make men to have the same and the true ideas of him. How many even amongst us, will be found upon inquiry to fancy him in the shape of a man sitting in heaven; and to have many other absurd and unfit conceptions of him? Christians as well as Turks have had whole sects owning and contending earnestly for it,—that the Deity was corporeal, and of human shape: and though we find few now amongst us who profess themselves Anthropomorphites, (though some I have met with that own it,) yet I believe he that will make it his business may find amongst the ignorant and uninstructed Christians many of that opinion. Talk but with country people, almost of any age, or young people almost of any condition, and you shall find that, though the name of God be frequently in their mouths, yet the notions they apply this name to are so odd, low, and pitiful, that nobody can imagine they were taught by a rational man; much less that they were characters written by the finger of God himself. Nor do I see how it derogates more from the goodness of God, that he has given us minds unfurnished with these ideas of himself, than that he hath sent us into the world with bodies unclothed; and that there is no art or skill born with us. For, being fitted with faculties to attain these, it is want of industry and consideration in us, and not of bounty in him, if we have them not. It is as certain that there is a God, as that the opposite angles made by the intersection of two straight lines are equal. There was never any rational creature that set himself sincerely to examine the truth of these propositions that could fail to assent to them; though yet it be past doubt that there are many men, who, having not applied their thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmost of its extent) UNIVERSAL CONSENT, such an one I easily allow; but such an universal consent as this proves not the idea of God, any more than it does the idea of such angles, innate.

This was clearly the case with all Gentilism, or pagan religion. Nor have Jews, Christians, and Mahometans, who acknowledge only one God, all formed the same, true ideas of him. Their belief in one God has not achieved this, despite their nations’ efforts to teach people accurate ideas about God. How many even among us, if questioned, would imagine him as a man sitting in heaven? And how many would have other absurd and inappropriate ideas about him? Christians as well as Turks have had entire sects that firmly maintained and passionately defended this belief: God has a body shaped like a human being. Few among us now call themselves Anthropomorphites, though I have met some who admit to that belief. Yet I believe anyone who deliberately investigates may find many ignorant and uneducated Christians who hold that opinion. Just talk with country people of almost any age, or young people of almost any social standing. You will find that, although they frequently speak God’s name, their ideas about him are strange, crude, and pitiful. No one could imagine that a rational person had taught them such ideas. Still less could anyone imagine that God himself had written those ideas in their minds with his own finger. Nor do I see why God’s goodness is diminished because he gave us minds without these ideas of himself. That no more diminishes his goodness than his sending us into the world with unclothed bodies and no inborn skills. He has given us the abilities to acquire these things. So if we lack them, the fault lies in our lack of effort and thought, not his lack of generosity. God’s existence is as certain as the equality of opposite angles formed when two straight lines cross. No rational creature who sincerely set out to examine the truth of these statements could fail to accept them. Yet there is no doubt that many people know neither truth because they have not thought about either subject. If anyone chooses to call this UNIVERSAL CONSENT, I readily accept that use of the term. But this is the most that such consent amounts to. Such universal consent no more proves that the idea of God is innate than that the idea of such angles is innate.

18. If the Idea of God be not innate, no other can be supposed innate.

18. If the idea of God is not innate, no other idea can be considered innate.

Since then though the knowledge of a God be the most natural discovery of human reason, yet the idea of him is not innate, as I think is evident from what has been said; I imagine there will be scarce any other idea found that can pretend to it. Since if God hath set any impression, any character, on the understanding of men, it is most reasonable to expect it should have been some clear and uniform idea of Himself; as far as our weak capacities were capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an object. But our minds being at first void of that idea which we are most concerned to have, it is a strong presumption against all other innate characters. I must own, as far as I can observe, I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any other.

Although knowledge of God is the most natural discovery of human reason, the idea of him is not innate. I think what I have said makes this clear. So I imagine hardly any other idea can claim to be innate. For if God has left any mark on the human understanding, we should most reasonably expect a clear, consistent idea of himself. Such an idea would extend only as far as our weak abilities could grasp so incomprehensible and infinite a being. But our minds initially lack the very idea we most need to have. This absence is strong grounds for doubting all other claims of innate marks on the mind. I must admit that, as far as I can observe, I can find none. I would be glad if anyone else could point any out to me.

19. Idea of Substance not innate.

19. The idea of substance is not inborn.

I confess there is another idea which would be of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general talk as if they had it; and that is the idea of SUBSTANCE; which we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any ideas, we might well expect they should be such as by our own faculties we cannot procure to ourselves; but we see, on the contrary, that since, by those ways whereby other ideas are brought into our minds, this is not, we have no such clear idea at all; and therefore signify nothing by the word SUBSTANCE but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what, i. e. of something whereof we have no idea, which we take to be the substratum, or support, of those ideas we do know.

I admit there is another idea that would be useful to humanity in general. People commonly talk as if they have this idea: the idea of SUBSTANCE. Yet we neither have nor can gain this idea through sensation or reflection. If nature took care to provide us with any ideas, we might well expect ideas beyond our own abilities to acquire. But we find the opposite. The idea of substance does not enter our minds through the means that bring us other ideas. As a result, we have no clear idea of substance at all. So by the word SUBSTANCE we mean only a vague assumption of something we know nothing about. That is, we assume something of which we have no idea supports or underlies the ideas we do know.

20. No Propositions can be innate, since no Ideas are innate.

20. No statements can be innate, because no ideas are innate.

Whatever then we talk of innate, either speculative or practical, principles, it may with as much probability be said, that a man hath 100 pounds sterling in his pocket, and yet denied that he hath there either penny, shilling, crown, or other coin out of which the sum is to be made up; as to think that certain PROPOSITIONS are innate when the IDEAS about which they are can by no means be supposed to be so. The general reception and assent that is given doth not at all prove, that the ideas expressed in them are innate; for in many cases, however the ideas came there, the assent to words expressing the agreement or disagreement of such ideas, will necessarily follow. Every one that hath a true idea of GOD and WORSHIP, will assent to this proposition, ‘That God is to be worshipped,’ when expressed in a language he understands; and every rational man that hath not thought on it to-day, may be ready to assent to this proposition to-morrow; and yet millions of men may be well supposed to want one or both those ideas to-day. For, if we will allow savages, and most country people, to have ideas of God and worship, (which conversation with them will not make one forward to believe,) yet I think few children can be supposed to have those ideas, which therefore they must begin to have some time or other; and then they will also begin to assent to that proposition, and make very little question of it ever after. But such an assent upon hearing, no more proves the IDEAS to be innate, than it does that one born blind (with cataracts which will be couched to-morrow) had the innate ideas of the sun, or light, or saffron, or yellow; because, when his sight is cleared, he will certainly assent to this proposition, “That the sun is lucid, or that saffron is yellow.” And therefore, if such an assent upon hearing cannot prove the ideas innate, it can much less the PROPOSITIONS made up of those ideas. If they have any innate ideas, I would be glad to be told what, and how many, they are.

Whatever we say about innate principles, whether speculative or practical, consider this comparison. We might say that a man has 100 pounds sterling in his pocket. Yet we might deny that he has any pennies, shillings, crowns, or other coins making up that sum. This claim is just as plausible as saying that certain PROPOSITIONS are innate when their IDEAS cannot possibly be innate. Widespread acceptance and agreement do not prove that the ideas expressed in those propositions are innate. For in many cases, however the ideas were acquired, agreement with statements comparing those ideas will necessarily follow. Everyone with a true idea of GOD and WORSHIP will accept this proposition: ‘That God is to be worshipped.’ They will accept it when it is expressed in a language they understand. Any rational person who has not considered the proposition today may be ready to accept it tomorrow. Yet we may reasonably suppose that millions of people lack one or both of those ideas today. Suppose we grant that savages and most country people have ideas of God and worship. Conversation with them would hardly encourage that belief. Even so, I think few children can be supposed to have those ideas. Children must therefore begin to have those ideas at some point. Then they will also begin to accept that proposition and will question it very little afterward. But accepting a proposition on hearing it does not prove that the IDEAS are innate. Consider someone born blind with cataracts that will be surgically treated tomorrow. Once his sight is restored, he will certainly accept this proposition: “That the sun is lucid, or that saffron is yellow.” His acceptance no more proves that he had innate ideas of the sun, light, saffron, or yellow. Therefore, if agreement on hearing a statement cannot prove its ideas innate, still less can it prove its PROPOSITIONS innate. If people have any innate ideas, I would be glad to hear what those ideas are and how many.

21. No innate Ideas in the Memory.

21. No inborn ideas in memory.

To which let me add: if there be any innate ideas, any ideas in the mind which the mind does not actually think on, they must be lodged in the memory; and from thence must be brought into view by remembrance; i. e. must be known, when they are remembered, to have been perceptions in the mind before; unless remembrance can be without remembrance. For, to remember is to perceive anything with memory, or with a consciousness that it was perceived or known before. Without this, whatever idea comes into the mind is new, and not remembered; this consciousness of its having been in the mind before, being that which distinguishes remembering from all other ways of thinking. Whatever idea was never PERCEIVED by the mind was never in the mind. Whatever idea is in the mind, is, either an actual perception, or else, having been an actual perception, is so in the mind that, by the memory, it can be made an actual perception again. Whenever there is the actual perception of any idea without memory, the idea appears perfectly new and unknown before to the understanding. Whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view, it is with a consciousness that it had been there before, and was not wholly a stranger to the mind. Whether this be not so, I appeal to every one’s observation. And then I desire an instance of an idea, pretended to be innate, which (before any impression of it by ways hereafter to be mentioned) any one could revive and remember, as an idea he had formerly known; without which consciousness of a former perception there is no remembrance; and whatever idea comes into the mind without THAT consciousness is not remembered, or comes not out of the memory, nor can be said to be in the mind before that appearance. For what is not either actually in view or in the memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one as if it had never been there. Suppose a child had the use of his eyes till he knows and distinguishes colours; but then cataracts shut the windows, and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark; and in that time perfectly loses all memory of the ideas of colours he once had. This was the case of a blind man I once talked with, who lost his sight by the small-pox when he was a child, and had no more notion of colours than one born blind. I ask whether any one can say this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind? And I think nobody will say that either of them had in his mind any ideas of colours at all. His cataracts are couched, and then he has the ideas (which he remembers not) of colours, DE NOVO, by his restored sight, conveyed to his mind, and that without any consciousness of a former acquaintance. And these now he can revive and call to mind in the dark. In this case all these ideas of colours which, when out of view, can be revived with a consciousness of a former acquaintance, being thus in the memory, are said to be in the mind. The use I make of this is,—that whatever idea, being not actually in view, is in the mind, is there only by being in the memory; and if it be not in the memory, it is not in the mind; and if it be in the memory, it cannot by the memory be brought into actual view without a perception that it comes out of the memory; which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remembered. If therefore there be any innate ideas, they must be in the memory, or else nowhere in the mind; and if they be in the memory, they can be revived without any impression from without; and whenever they are brought into the mind they are remembered, i. e. they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being a constant and distinguishing difference between what is, and what is not in the memory, or in the mind;—that what is not in the memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly new and unknown before; and what is in the memory, or in the mind, whenever it is suggested by the memory, appears not to be new, but the mind finds it in itself, and knows it was there before. By this it may be tried whether there be any innate ideas in the mind before impression from sensation or reflection. I would fain meet with the man who, when he came to the use of reason, or at any other time, remembered any of them; and to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will say, there are ideas in the mind that are NOT in the memory, I desire him to explain himself, and make what he says intelligible.

Let me add this: if there are any innate ideas, any ideas the mind is not actually thinking about, they must be stored in memory. They must then be brought into view by remembering. When remembered, they must be recognized as perceptions the mind has had before. Otherwise, remembering would be possible without remembering. For to remember something is to perceive it with an awareness that it was perceived or known before. Without that awareness, any idea entering the mind is new, not remembered. The awareness that an idea has been in the mind before distinguishes remembering from every other kind of thinking. Any idea the mind has never PERCEIVED has never been in the mind. Every idea in the mind is either a current perception or something previously perceived that memory can bring into view again. Whenever an idea is actually perceived without being remembered, it seems completely new and previously unknown to the understanding. Whenever memory brings an idea into view, we recognize that the idea was there before, not entirely unfamiliar to the mind. I ask everyone to judge from their own experience whether this is true. I then ask for an example of an allegedly innate idea that anyone could recall as something previously known. They must recall it before receiving any impression of it through the means I will discuss later. Without awareness of an earlier perception, there is no remembering. Any idea entering the mind without THAT awareness is not remembered and does not come from memory. Nor can we say that the idea was in the mind before it appeared. For anything neither currently in view nor stored in memory is not in the mind at all. It is just as if the idea had never been there. Suppose a child can see until he learns to recognize and distinguish colours. But then cataracts block his sight, leaving him completely in darkness for forty or fifty years. During that time, he completely loses all memory of the ideas of colours he once had. This was the case with a blind man I once spoke to. He had lost his sight through smallpox as a child. He had no more idea of colours than someone born blind. Could anyone say that this man then had ideas of colours in his mind any more than someone born blind? I think nobody will say that either man had any ideas of colours in his mind at all. Suppose the cataracts are surgically displaced, restoring his sight. His restored sight then brings ideas of colours into his mind afresh, though he does not remember them. He has no awareness of having known those colours before. Now he can recall these ideas in the dark. In this case, the ideas of colours can be recalled when they are no longer in view. Recalling them includes an awareness of having known them before. Because these ideas are stored in memory, we say they are in the mind. My point is this: any idea in the mind but not currently in view is there only because it is stored in memory. If an idea is not in memory, it is not in the mind. If an idea is in memory, memory cannot bring it into view without an awareness that it comes from memory. That means recognizing that the idea was known before and is now being remembered. So if there are any innate ideas, they must be in memory, or nowhere in the mind. If they are in memory, they can be recalled without any impression from outside. Whenever they are brought into the mind, they are remembered. In other words, they come with an awareness that they are not entirely new to the mind. This is a constant, distinguishing difference between what is and is not in memory, or in the mind. An idea not in memory seems completely new and previously unknown whenever it appears in the mind. But an idea brought forward by memory does not seem new. The mind finds the idea within itself and knows it was there before. This distinction lets us test whether the mind contains any innate ideas before receiving impressions through sensation or reflection. I would like to meet someone who remembered any such ideas upon developing the ability to reason, or at any other time. These ideas must never have been new to that person after birth. If anyone says there are ideas in the mind that are NOT in memory, I ask him to explain himself. He must make his claim understandable.

22. Principles not innate, because of little use or little certainty.

22. Principles are not inborn because they are of little use or offer little certainty.

Besides what I have already said, there is another reason why I doubt that neither these nor any other principles are innate. I that am fully persuaded that the infinitely wise God made all things in perfect wisdom, cannot satisfy myself why he should be supposed to print upon the minds of men some universal principles; whereof those that are pretended innate, and concern SPECULATION, are of no great use; and those that concern PRACTICE, not self-evident; and neither of them distinguishable from some other truths not allowed to be innate. For, to what purpose should characters be graven on the mind by the finger of God, which are not clearer there than those which are afterwards introduced, or cannot be distinguished from them? If any one thinks there are such innate ideas and propositions, which by their clearness and usefulness are distinguishable from all that is adventitious in the mind and acquired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us WHICH THEY ARE; and then every one will be a fit judge whether they be so or no. Since if there be such innate ideas and impressions, plainly different from all other perceptions and knowledge, every one will find it true in himself. Of the evidence of these supposed innate maxims, I have spoken already: of their usefulness I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.

Besides what I have already said, I have another reason to doubt that these or any other principles are innate. I am fully convinced that the infinitely wise God made all things with perfect wisdom. So I cannot understand why he would imprint certain universal principles on human minds. The supposedly innate principles concerning SPECULATION are not very useful. Those concerning PRACTICE are not self-evident. Neither kind can be distinguished from some other truths that are not accepted as innate. For what purpose would God’s finger engrave truths on the mind if those truths were no clearer than truths acquired later? What purpose would such an engraving serve if the engraved truths could not be distinguished from acquired truths? Perhaps someone believes there are innate ideas and propositions whose clarity and usefulness distinguish them from everything the mind acquires. If so, that person should easily be able to tell us WHICH THEY ARE. Then everyone will be able to judge whether those ideas and propositions really have those qualities. For if innate ideas and impressions plainly differ from all other perceptions and knowledge, everyone will recognize that difference within themselves. I have already discussed the evidence for these supposed innate principles. I will have occasion to say more about their usefulness later.

23. Difference of Men’s Discoveries depends upon the different Application of their Faculties.

23. Differences in people's discoveries depend on how differently they use their mental abilities.

To conclude: some ideas forwardly offer themselves to all men’s understanding; and some sorts of truths result from any ideas, as soon as the mind puts them into propositions: other truths require a train of ideas placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention, before they can be discovered and assented to. Some of the first sort, because of their general and easy reception, have been mistaken for innate: but the truth is, ideas and notions are no more born with us than arts and sciences; though some of them indeed offer themselves to our faculties more readily than others; and therefore are more generally received: though that too be according as the organs of our bodies and powers of our minds happen to be employed; God having fitted men with faculties and means to discover, receive, and retain truths, according as they are employed. The great difference that is to be found in the notions of mankind is, from the different use they put their faculties to. Whilst some (and those the most) taking things upon trust, misemploy their power of assent, by lazily enslaving their minds to the dictates and dominion of others, in doctrines which it is their duty carefully to examine, and not blindly, with an implicit faith, to swallow; others, employing their thoughts only about some few things, grow acquainted sufficiently with them, attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let their thoughts loose in the search of other inquiries. Thus, that the three angles of a triangle are quite equal to two right ones is a truth as certain as anything can be, and I think more evident than many of those propositions that go for principles; and yet there are millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all, because they never set their thoughts on work about such angles. And he that certainly knows this proposition may yet be utterly ignorant of the truth of other propositions, in mathematics itself, which are as clear and evident as this; because, in his search of those mathematical truths, he stopped his thoughts short and went not so far. The same may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a Deity. For, though there be no truth which a man may more evidently make out to himself than the existence of a God, yet he that shall content himself with things as he finds them in this world, as they minister to his pleasures and passions, and not make inquiry a little further into their causes, ends, and admirable contrivances, and pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention, may live long without any notion of such a Being. And if any person hath by talk put such a notion into his head, he may perhaps believe it; but if he hath never examined it, his knowledge of it will be no perfecter than his, who having been told, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, takes it upon trust, without examining the demonstration; and may yield his assent as a probable opinion, but hath no knowledge of the truth of it; which yet his faculties, if carefully employed, were able to make clear and evident to him. But this only, by the by, to show how much OUR KNOWLEDGE DEPENDS UPON THE RIGHT USE OF THOSE POWERS NATURE HATH BESTOWED UPON US, and how little upon SUCH INNATE PRINCIPLES AS ARE IN VAIN SUPPOSED TO BE IN ALL MANKIND FOR THEIR DIRECTION; which all men could not but know if they were there, or else they would be there to no purpose. And which since all men do not know, nor can distinguish from other adventitious truths, we may well conclude there are no such.

To conclude: some ideas readily present themselves to everyone’s understanding. Some kinds of truths follow from ideas as soon as the mind puts those ideas into statements. Other truths require a sequence of ideas arranged in order, carefully compared, and used to draw conclusions. Only then can those truths be discovered and accepted. Some truths of the first kind have been mistaken for innate truths because people accept them so widely and easily. But ideas and notions are no more born with us than arts and sciences are. Some do present themselves to our mental abilities more readily than others, and so are more widely accepted. Yet even this depends on how we happen to use our bodily organs and mental powers. God has given people abilities and means to discover, receive, and retain truths, according to how those abilities are used. The great differences in people’s ideas arise from the different ways they use their abilities. Some people, indeed most, accept things on trust. They misuse their power to judge what to believe by lazily submitting their minds to others’ dictates and authority. They blindly accept doctrines on unquestioning faith, although they have a duty to examine those doctrines carefully. Others direct their thoughts toward only a few subjects. They become thoroughly familiar with those subjects and gain considerable knowledge of them. Yet they remain ignorant of everything else, having never allowed their thoughts to explore other questions. For example, the three angles of a triangle together equal two right angles. This truth is as certain as anything can be. I think it is also more evident than many statements accepted as basic principles. Yet millions of people, however skilled in other things, know nothing of this truth. They have never put their minds to work on such angles. Someone who knows this statement with certainty may still be completely ignorant of other mathematical truths just as clear and evident. In searching for mathematical truths, that person stopped thinking before reaching those further truths. The same may happen with our ideas about the existence of a Deity. No truth can be established more clearly for oneself than the existence of a God. Yet someone may be satisfied with things in this world merely as those things serve their pleasures and passions. Such a person may never investigate further into the causes, purposes, and wonderful design of those things. Without pursuing these thoughts diligently and attentively, that person may live a long time without any idea of such a Being. If someone introduces this idea through conversation, the hearer may perhaps believe it. But without examining the idea, the hearer’s knowledge will be no better than someone’s unexamined belief about a triangle’s angles. That person has been told that the three angles equal two right angles, but accepts the claim without examining its demonstration. The hearer may likewise accept God’s existence as a probable opinion, but has no knowledge of its truth. Yet careful use of the hearer’s abilities could make that truth clear and evident. But this is only an aside, showing how much OUR KNOWLEDGE DEPENDS ON THE PROPER USE OF OUR NATURAL POWERS. It also shows how little knowledge depends on SUCH INNATE PRINCIPLES AS ARE FALSELY SUPPOSED TO GUIDE ALL HUMANITY. If those principles were present, everyone would necessarily know them, or else their presence would serve no purpose. Yet not everyone knows those principles or can distinguish them from other truths acquired through experience. We may therefore reasonably conclude that no such innate principles exist.

24. Men must think and know for themselves.

24. People must think and know for themselves.

What censure doubting thus of innate principles may deserve from men, who will be apt to call it pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and certainty, I cannot tell;—I persuade myself at least that the way I have pursued, being conformable to truth, lays those foundations surer. This I am certain, I have not made it my business either to quit or follow any authority in the ensuing Discourse. Truth has been my only aim; and wherever that has appeared to lead, my thoughts have impartially followed, without minding whether the footsteps of any other lay that way or not. Not that I want a due respect to other men’s opinions; but, after all, the greatest reverence is due to truth: and I hope it will not be thought arrogance to say, that perhaps we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge, if we sought it in the fountain, IN THE CONSIDERATION OF THINGS THEMSELVES; and made use rather of our own thoughts than other men’s to find it. For I think we may as rationally hope to see with other men’s eyes, as to know by other men’s understandings. So much as we ourselves consider and comprehend of truth and reason, so much we possess of real and true knowledge. The floating of other men’s opinions in our brains, makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was science, is in us but opiniatrety; whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names, and do not, as they did, employ our own reason to understand those truths which gave them reputation. Aristotle was certainly a knowing man, but nobody ever thought him so because he blindly embraced, and confidently vented the opinions of another. And if the taking up of another’s principles, without examining them, made not him a philosopher, I suppose it will hardly make anybody else so. In the sciences, every one has so much as he really knows and comprehends. What he believes only, and takes upon trust, are but shreds; which, however well in the whole piece, make no considerable addition to his stock who gathers them. Such borrowed wealth, like fairy money, though it were gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use.

I cannot tell what criticism I may deserve for questioning innate principles in this way. Some people will be quick to call this an attack on the old foundations of knowledge and certainty. But I believe my approach, being consistent with truth, makes those foundations more secure. Of one thing I am certain. In the discussion that follows, I have not set out either to reject or to follow any authority. Truth has been my only aim. Wherever truth seemed to lead, my thoughts followed impartially. I paid no attention to whether anyone else had gone that way before. This does not mean I lack proper respect for other people’s opinions. But truth deserves the greatest respect of all. I hope no one will think me arrogant for making this suggestion. Perhaps we would make greater progress in discovering knowledge through reason and reflection if we sought knowledge at its source, IN THE CONSIDERATION OF THINGS THEMSELVES. We should use our own thoughts, rather than other people’s, to find that knowledge. I think we can no more reasonably hope to know through other people’s understanding than to see through their eyes. We possess real, true knowledge only to the extent that we ourselves examine and understand truth and reason. Other people’s opinions floating through our minds do not make us any more knowledgeable, even when those opinions are true. What was knowledge for them is merely stubborn opinion for us if we agree only out of respect for famous names. Unlike those thinkers, we fail to use our own reason to understand the truths that earned them their reputations. Aristotle was certainly knowledgeable. But nobody ever thought him knowledgeable because he blindly accepted and confidently repeated someone else’s opinions. Accepting another person’s principles without examining them did not make Aristotle a philosopher. So I suppose doing so will hardly make anyone else a philosopher. In the sciences, each person possesses only as much knowledge as they truly know and understand. Whatever a person merely believes and accepts on trust amounts to scraps. However well those scraps fit into the whole, they add little to the knowledge of the person who collects them. Such borrowed wealth is like fairy money. Though it was gold in the giver’s hand, it will be only leaves and dust when put to use.

25. Whence the Opinion of Innate Principles.

25. Where the Belief in Innate Principles Comes From.

When men have found some general propositions that could not be doubted of as soon as understood, it was, I know, a short and easy way to conclude them innate. This being once received, it eased the lazy from the pains of search, and stopped the inquiry of the doubtful concerning all that was once styled innate. And it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be masters and teachers, to make this the principle of principles,—THAT PRINCIPLES MUST NOT BE QUESTIONED. For, having once established this tenet,—that there are innate principles, it put their followers upon a necessity of receiving SOME doctrines as such; which was to take them off from the use of their own reason and judgment, and put them on believing and taking them upon trust without further examination: in which posture of blind credulity, they might be more easily governed by, and made useful to some sort of men, who had the skill and office to principle and guide them. Nor is it a small power it gives one man over another, to have the authority to be the dictator of principles, and teacher of unquestionable truths; and to make a man swallow that for an innate principle which may serve to his purpose who teacheth them. Whereas had they examined the ways whereby men came to the knowledge of many universal truths, they would have found them to result in the minds of men from the being of things themselves, when duly considered; and that they were discovered by the application of those faculties that were fitted by nature to receive and judge of them, when duly employed about them.

People found some general statements that could not be doubted once understood. I know it was a short, easy step to conclude that these statements were innate. Once this belief was accepted, it spared the lazy the effort of investigation. It also stopped those with doubts from questioning anything that had been called innate. Those who claimed to be masters and teachers gained a considerable advantage by making this the most fundamental principle: PRINCIPLES MUST NOT BE QUESTIONED. Once they established that innate principles existed, their followers had to accept SOME doctrines as innate. This led their followers to stop using their own reason and judgment. Instead, they believed these doctrines and took them on trust without further examination. In this state of blind belief, their followers could more easily be controlled and made useful to certain people. These people had the skill and authority to instill principles in their followers and guide them. One person gains considerable power over another by claiming authority to dictate principles and teach unquestionable truths. Such a teacher can make someone swallow an idea as an innate principle because it may serve the teacher’s purposes. But suppose they had examined how people came to know many universal truths. They would have found that these truths arise in people’s minds from the nature of things themselves, when properly considered. People discovered these truths by using the faculties that nature had equipped to grasp and judge them. These faculties had to be properly applied to those truths.

26. Conclusion.

26. Conclusion.

To show HOW the understanding proceeds herein is the design of the following Discourse; which I shall proceed to when I have first premised, that hitherto,—to clear my way to those foundations which I conceive are the only true ones, whereon to establish those notions we can have of our own knowledge,—it hath been necessary for me to give an account of the reasons I had to doubt of innate principles. And since the arguments which are against them do, some of them, rise from common received opinions, I have been forced to take several things for granted; which is hardly avoidable to any one, whose task is to show the falsehood or improbability of any tenet;—it happening in controversial discourses as it does in assaulting of towns; where, if the ground be but firm whereon the batteries are erected, there is no further inquiry of whom it is borrowed, nor whom it belongs to, so it affords but a fit rise for the present purpose. But in the future part of this Discourse, designing to raise an edifice uniform and consistent with itself, as far as my own experience and observation will assist me, I hope to erect it on such a basis that I shall not need to shore it up with props and buttresses, leaning on borrowed or begged foundations: or at least, if mine prove a castle in the air, I will endeavour it shall be all of a piece and hang together. Wherein I warn the reader not to expect undeniable cogent demonstrations, unless I may be allowed the privilege, not seldom assumed by others, to take my principles for granted; and then, I doubt not, but I can demonstrate too. All that I shall say for the principles I proceed on is, that I can only appeal to men’s own unprejudiced experience and observation whether they be true or not; and this is enough for a man who professes no more than to lay down candidly and freely his own conjectures, concerning a subject lying somewhat in the dark, without any other design than an unbiassed inquiry after truth.

The purpose of the following discussion is to show HOW the understanding works in this matter. But before proceeding, I must explain why I have so far questioned innate principles. I needed to clear the way for what I consider the only true foundations for understanding our own knowledge. Some arguments against innate principles draw on commonly accepted opinions. So I have been forced to take several things for granted. Anyone trying to show that a belief is false or improbable can hardly avoid making such assumptions. Arguments in a controversy are like attacks on towns. If the ground supporting the artillery is firm, no one asks who lent the ground or who owns it. The ground need only provide a suitable position for the immediate purpose. But in the rest of this discussion, I intend to build a structure whose parts form a consistent whole. I will go as far as my own experience and observation can help me. I hope to build on foundations that need no props or buttresses resting on borrowed or unproven assumptions. Or at least, if my structure proves to be a castle in the air, I will try to keep it whole. All its parts should hang together. Here I warn the reader not to expect undeniable, compelling proofs. Such proofs would require allowing me a privilege that others often claim: taking my principles for granted. With that privilege, I have no doubt that I too can offer proofs. In support of my starting principles, I can only appeal to people's own unbiased experience and observation. They must judge from that experience and observation whether these principles are true. That is enough for someone who claims only to present his own conjectures openly and honestly. The subject remains somewhat obscure, and my only purpose is an unbiased search for truth.