NO INBORN THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES

1. The way shown how we come by any Knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate.

1. Showing how we acquire any knowledge is enough to prove that the knowledge is not innate.

It is an established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain INNATE PRINCIPLES; some primary notions, Κοινὰι εὔνοιαι, characters, as it were stamped upon the mind of man; which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only show (as I hope I shall in the following parts of this Discourse) how men, barely by the use of their natural faculties may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions; and may arrive at certainty, without any such original notions or principles. For I imagine any one will easily grant that it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature to whom God hath given sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects: and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature, and innate characters, when we may observe in ourselves faculties fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.

Some people firmly believe that the understanding contains certain INNATE PRINCIPLES. These are basic notions, Κοινὰι εὔνοιαι, like marks stamped on the human mind. They believe the soul receives these marks when it first exists and brings them into the world. To convince unbiased readers that this belief is false, I would only need to show how we acquire knowledge naturally. I hope to show this in the later parts of this work. People can gain all their knowledge simply by using their natural abilities, without any help from innate impressions. They can also reach certainty without any such original notions or principles. For I think anyone will readily agree that supposing ideas of colours to be innate would be unnecessary. Consider a creature to whom God has given sight and the ability to receive these ideas through its eyes from external objects. Attributing various truths to natural impressions and innate marks would be just as unreasonable. For we can observe in ourselves abilities suited to gaining knowledge of these truths. Through these abilities, we can know these truths as easily and certainly as if they were originally stamped on the mind.

But because a man is not permitted without censure to follow his own thoughts in the search of truth, when they lead him ever so little out of the common road, I shall set down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one; which I leave to be considered by those who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it.

But a person cannot follow his own thoughts in searching for truth without criticism if he strays even slightly from the usual path. So I will explain the reasons that led me to doubt that opinion. These reasons may excuse my mistake, if I am mistaken. I leave them for consideration by those who, like me, are willing to accept truth wherever they find it.

2. General Assent the great Argument.

2. General agreement is the main argument.

There is nothing more commonly taken for granted than that there are certain PRINCIPLES, both SPECULATIVE and PRACTICAL, (for they speak of both), universally agreed upon by all mankind: which therefore, they argue, must needs be the constant impressions which the souls of men receive in their first beings, and which they bring into the world with them, as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties.

Nothing is more commonly taken for granted than that all humanity agrees on certain PRINCIPLES, both THEORETICAL and PRACTICAL. (Those making this claim speak of both kinds.) They therefore argue that these principles must be lasting impressions stamped on human souls when those souls first exist. Souls bring these principles into the world with them, as necessarily and as truly as their own natural abilities.

3. Universal Consent proves nothing innate.

3. Universal agreement does not prove that anything is innate.

This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown how men may come to that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in, which I presume may be done.

The argument from universal agreement has this weakness. Even if all people agreed on certain truths, their agreement would not prove those truths were innate. That proof would fail if another explanation could show how people come to agree on those truths. I believe such an explanation can be given.

4. “What is is,” and “It is possible for the same Thing to be and not to be,” not universally assented to.

4. “What is, is” and “The same thing can both be and not be” are not universally accepted.

But, which is worse, this argument of universal consent, which is made use of to prove innate principles, seems to me a demonstration that there are none such: because there are none to which all mankind give an universal assent. I shall begin with the speculative, and instance in those magnified principles of demonstration, “Whatsoever is, is,” and “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be”; which, of all others, I think have the most allowed title to innate. These have so settled a reputation of maxims universally received, that it will no doubt be thought strange if any one should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from having an universal assent, that there are a great part of mankind to whom they are not so much as known.

But worse still, the argument from universal agreement is used to prove that innate principles exist. Yet to me, the argument seems to prove that no such principles exist, because no principles command everyone’s agreement. I shall begin with principles of abstract thought, taking as examples those celebrated foundations of proof: “Whatever is, is,” and “The same thing cannot both exist and not exist.” Of all principles, I think these have the strongest claim to being considered innate. Their reputation as universally accepted truths is so firmly established that anyone questioning their acceptance will undoubtedly seem strange. But I take the liberty of saying that these statements are far from universally accepted. A large part of humanity does not even know them.

5. Not on Mind naturally imprinted, because not known to Children, Idiots, &c.

5. Not naturally imprinted on the mind, because children, people with intellectual disabilities, and others do not know them.

For, first, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them. And the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not: imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind’s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, THEY must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths; which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions. For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. For if any one may, then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: since, if any one can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it; and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on the mind which it never did, nor ever shall know; for a man may live long, and die at last in ignorance of many truths which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know will, by this account, be every one of them innate; and this great point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which, whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those who deny innate principles. For nobody, I think, ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing several truths. The capacity, they say, is innate; the knowledge acquired. But then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived, I can see no difference there can be between any truths the mind is CAPABLE of knowing in respect of their original: they must all be innate or all adventitious: in vain shall a man go about to distinguish them. He therefore that talks of innate notions in the understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mean such truths to be in the understanding as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these words “to be in the understanding” have any propriety, they signify to be understood. So that to be in the understanding, and not to be understood; to be in the mind and never to be perceived, is all one as to say anything is and is not in the mind or understanding. If therefore these two propositions, “Whatsoever is, is,” and “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” are by nature imprinted, children cannot be ignorant of them: infants, and all that have souls, must necessarily have them in their understandings, know the truth of them, and assent to it.

First, it is clear that all children and people with profound intellectual disabilities lack any understanding or thought of these truths. That lack alone disproves the universal agreement that must necessarily accompany all innate truths. To me, it seems almost contradictory to say that truths are imprinted on the soul without being perceived or understood. If imprinting means anything, it means making certain truths known to the mind. For imprinting something on the mind without the mind perceiving it seems to me hardly intelligible. Suppose, then, that children and people with profound intellectual disabilities have souls or minds bearing these impressions. THEY must inevitably perceive these truths, know them, and agree with them. Since they do not, it is clear that no such impressions exist. For if these ideas are not naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? And if these ideas are imprinted, how can they be unknown? Saying an idea is imprinted on the mind, yet remains unknown and unnoticed, makes that impression meaningless. No statement can be said to be in the mind if the mind has never known or been aware of it. For suppose that even one unknown statement can be said to be in the mind. By the same reasoning, every true statement the mind could ever accept could be called present and imprinted there. An unknown statement could be called present in the mind only because the mind is capable of knowing it. And the mind has that capacity for every truth it will ever know. Indeed, this reasoning allows truths to be imprinted on the mind even if the mind never knows them. For someone may live a long life and finally die without knowing many truths they could have known with certainty. So suppose the natural impression being argued for is simply the capacity to know. On that account, every truth anyone ever learns will be innate. This supposedly important point will then amount to nothing more than a very misleading use of words. While claiming to say the opposite, it says nothing different from those who deny innate principles. For nobody, I think, has ever denied that the mind can know various truths. Those who deny innate principles say that the capacity is innate, but knowledge is acquired. Why, then, argue so fiercely for certain innate principles? If truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived, I can see no difference in their origin. All truths the mind is CAPABLE of knowing must be either innate or acquired from outside. Any attempt to distinguish their origins would be pointless. Therefore, anyone speaking of innate ideas in the understanding cannot mean truths the mind has never perceived and remains entirely ignorant of. At least, they cannot mean that if they intend to identify a distinct kind of truth. For if the words “to be in the understanding” have any proper meaning, they mean to be understood. So consider saying that something is in the understanding but is not understood, or in the mind but never perceived. That amounts to saying that something both is and is not in the mind or understanding. Suppose, then, that these two statements are naturally imprinted: “Whatever exists, exists,” and “The same thing cannot both exist and not exist.” Children cannot be ignorant of these statements. Infants and all beings with souls must necessarily have these statements in their understanding, know their truth, and accept them.

6. That men know them when they come to the Use of Reason answered.

6. Answering the claim that people know them when they begin to use reason.

To avoid this, it is usually answered, that all men know and assent to them, WHEN THEY COME TO THE USE OF REASON; and this is enough to prove them innate. I answer:

To avoid this, people usually reply that everyone knows and accepts them WHEN THEY BECOME ABLE TO REASON. They say this is enough to prove that these ideas are innate. I answer:

7. Doubtful expressions, that have scarce any signification, go for clear reasons to those who, being prepossessed, take not the pains to examine even what they themselves say. For, to apply this answer with any tolerable sense to our present purpose, it must signify one of these two things: either that as soon as men come to the use of reason these supposed native inscriptions come to be known and observed by them; or else, that the use and exercise of men’s reason, assists them in the discovery of these principles, and certainly makes them known to them.

7. Vague expressions with hardly any meaning pass for clear reasons among people whose minds are already made up. Such people do not bother to examine even their own words. For this answer to make reasonable sense in our discussion, it must mean one of two things. Either people know and notice these supposed inborn principles as soon as they become capable of reasoning. Or using and exercising their reason helps people discover these principles and makes the principles known to them with certainty.

8. If Reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate.

8. If reason discovered them, that would not prove they were innate.

If they mean, that by the use of reason men may discover these principles, and that this is sufficient to prove them innate; their way of arguing will stand thus, viz. that whatever truths reason can certainly discover to us, and make us firmly assent to, those are all naturally imprinted on the mind; since that universal assent, which is made the mark of them, amounts to no more but this,—that by the use of reason we are capable to come to a certain knowledge of and assent to them; and, by this means, there will be no difference between the maxims of the mathematicians, and theorems they deduce from them: all must be equally allowed innate; they being all discoveries made by the use of reason, and truths that a rational creature may certainly come to know, if he apply his thoughts rightly that way.

If they mean that people can discover these principles through reason, and that this proves the principles are innate, their argument amounts to this: All truths that reason can reveal with certainty and make us firmly accept are naturally imprinted on the mind. For the universal agreement they use to identify innate principles means no more than this: Through reason, we can come to know these principles with certainty and accept them. By this argument, there will be no difference between mathematicians’ basic principles and the theorems they derive from those principles. All must be considered equally innate. All are discoveries made through reason. All are truths that a rational being may come to know with certainty by directing their thoughts properly toward them.

9. It is false that Reason discovers them.

9. The claim that reason discovers them is false.

But how can these men think the use of reason necessary to discover principles that are supposed innate, when reason (if we may believe them) is nothing else but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from principles or propositions that are already known? That certainly can never be thought innate which we have need of reason to discover; unless, as I have said, we will have all the certain truths that reason ever teaches us, to be innate. We may as well think the use of reason necessary to make our eyes discover visible objects, as that there should be need of reason, or the exercise thereof, to make the understanding see what is originally engraven on it, and cannot be in the understanding before it be perceived by it. So that to make reason discover those truths thus imprinted, is to say, that the use of reason discovers to a man what he knew before: and if men have those innate impressed truths originally, and before the use of reason, and yet are always ignorant of them till they come to the use of reason, it is in effect to say, that men know and know them not at the same time.

But how can these men think reason is needed to discover principles they suppose are innate? If we believe these men, reason is simply the ability to deduce unknown truths from principles or statements already known. Surely no truth can be considered innate if we need reason to discover it. Otherwise, as I have said, we must call all the certain truths reason ever teaches us innate. We might as well think we need reason for our eyes to see visible objects. Yet these men think we need reason, or its exercise, for the mind to see what was imprinted on it from the beginning. But a truth cannot be in the mind before the mind perceives it. So saying that reason discovers truths imprinted in this way means saying that reason reveals what a person already knew. Suppose people have these innate truths imprinted on their minds from the beginning, before they use reason. Yet suppose they remain entirely unaware of these truths until they begin to use reason. This amounts to saying that people know these truths and do not know them at the same time.

10. No use made of reasoning in the discovery of these two maxims.

10. Reasoning plays no part in discovering these two basic principles.

It will here perhaps be said that mathematical demonstrations, and other truths that are not innate, are not assented to as soon as proposed, wherein they are distinguished from these maxims and other innate truths. I shall have occasion to speak of assent upon the first proposing, more particularly by and by. I shall here only, and that very readily, allow, that these maxims and mathematical demonstrations are in this different: that the one have need of reason, using of proofs, to make them out and to gain our assent; but the other, as soon as understood, are, without any the least reasoning, embraced and assented to. But I withal beg leave to observe, that it lays open the weakness of this subterfuge, which requires the use of reason for the discovery of these general truths: since it must be confessed that in their discovery there is no use made of reasoning at all. And I think those who give this answer will not be forward to affirm that the knowledge of this maxim, “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” is a deduction of our reason. For this would be to destroy that bounty of nature they seem so fond of, whilst they make the knowledge of those principles to depend on the labour of our thoughts. For all reasoning is search, and casting about, and requires pains and application. And how can it with any tolerable sense be supposed, that what was imprinted by nature, as the foundation and guide of our reason, should need the use of reason to discover it?

Perhaps someone will say that mathematical proofs and other truths that are not innate are not accepted when first presented. In this respect, they differ from these maxims and other innate truths. I will discuss acceptance on first presentation more fully later. Here I will readily admit one difference between these maxims and mathematical demonstrations. Mathematical demonstrations require reasoning and proofs to establish them and win our agreement. But these maxims, once understood, are accepted without the slightest reasoning. Yet let me point out how this difference exposes the weakness of the attempt to evade the issue. That response claims we need reason to discover these general truths. Yet we must admit that discovering them involves no reasoning at all. I think those who offer this answer will hesitate to make the following claim: that our knowledge of the maxim, “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” comes from reasoning. For making knowledge of these principles depend on the work of thought would destroy nature’s gift, which they seem so fond of. All reasoning involves searching and exploring possibilities, and requires effort and attention. How, then, can anyone reasonably suppose that we need reason to discover something nature has imprinted on us as reason’s foundation and guide?

11. And if there were this would prove them not innate.

11. And if there were, that would prove they were not innate.

Those who will take the pains to reflect with a little attention on the operations of the understanding, will find that this ready assent of the mind to some truths, depends not, either on native inscription, or the use of reason, but on a faculty of the mind quite distinct from both of them, as we shall see hereafter. Reason, therefore, having nothing to do in procuring our assent to these maxims, if by saying, that “men know and assent to them, when they come to the use of reason,” be meant, that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge of these maxims, it is utterly false; and were it true, would prove them not to be innate.

Anyone who takes the trouble to think carefully about how the understanding works will discover something. The mind’s ready acceptance of some truths depends neither on ideas imprinted at birth nor on reasoning. Instead, this acceptance depends on a mental ability quite distinct from both, as we will see later. Reason, then, has no role in getting us to accept these basic principles. Consider the claim that “people know and accept these principles when they become able to reason.” If this means that reasoning helps us know these principles, the claim is completely false. And even if the claim were true, it would prove that these principles are not innate.

12. The coming of the Use of Reason not the Time we come to know these Maxims.

12. We do not come to know these maxims when we first develop the ability to reason.

If by knowing and assenting to them “when we come to the use of reason,” be meant, that this is the time when they come to be taken notice of by the mind; and that as soon as children come to the use of reason, they come also to know and assent to these maxims; this also is false and frivolous. First, it is false; because it is evident these maxims are not in the mind so early as the use of reason; and therefore the coming to the use of reason is falsely assigned as the time of their discovery. How many instances of the use of reason may we observe in children, a long time before they have any knowledge of this maxim, “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be?” And a great part of illiterate people and savages pass many years, even of their rational age, without ever thinking on this and the like general propositions. I grant, men come not to the knowledge of these general and more abstract truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the use of reason; and I add, nor then neither. Which is so, because, till after they come to the use of reason, those general abstract ideas are not framed in the mind, about which those general maxims are, which are mistaken for innate principles, but are indeed discoveries made and verities introduced and brought into the mind by the same way, and discovered by the same steps, as several other propositions, which nobody was ever so extravagant as to suppose innate. This I hope to make plain in the sequel of this Discourse. I allow therefore, a necessity that men should come to the use of reason before they get the knowledge of those general truths; but deny that men’s coming to the use of reason is the time of their discovery.

Suppose knowing and accepting these principles “when we come to the use of reason” means first noticing them then. Suppose it also means that children know and accept these principles as soon as they begin to reason. This claim, too, is false and trivial. First, it is false because these principles clearly do not enter the mind as early as reasoning begins. So the beginning of reasoning is wrongly identified as the time when these principles are discovered. How many examples of reasoning can we observe in children long before they know this principle: “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be?” And many people without formal education, and people called savages, spend years capable of reasoning without considering such general statements. I grant that people do not know these general, more abstract truths, supposedly innate, before they begin to reason. But I would add that they do not know them even then. The reason is that the mind forms the general, abstract ideas these principles concern only after reasoning has begun. These general principles are mistaken for innate truths. In fact, they are discoveries brought into the mind in the same way, and through the same steps, as various other statements. No one has ever been so unreasonable as to suppose those other statements innate. I hope to make this clear later in this discussion. I therefore agree that people must begin to reason before they can know these general truths. But I deny that the beginning of reasoning is the moment when people discover these truths.

13. By this they are not distinguished from other knowable Truths.

13. This does not set them apart from other truths we can know.

In the mean time it is observable, that this saying that men know and assent to these maxims “when they come to the use of reason,” amounts in reality of fact to no more but this,—that they are never known nor taken notice of before the use of reason, but may possibly be assented to some time after, during a man’s life; but when is uncertain. And so may all other knowable truths, as well as these which therefore have no advantage nor distinction from other by this note of being known when we come to the use of reason; nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary.

Meanwhile, consider the claim that people know and accept these maxims “when they come to the use of reason.” In fact, the claim amounts to no more than this: people never know or notice these maxims before they begin to reason. But people may accept the maxims at some uncertain point afterward, during their lives. The same is true of all other knowable truths. So being known when people begin to reason gives these maxims no advantage over other truths and does not distinguish them. Nor does being known then prove that these maxims are innate. Quite the contrary.

14. If coming to the Use of Reason were the Time of their Discovery, it would not prove them innate.

14. If they were discovered when people first began to reason, that would not prove they were innate.

But, secondly, were it true that the precise time of their being known and assented to were, when men come to the use of reason; neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing is as frivolous as the supposition itself is false. For, by what kind of logic will it appear that any notion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind in its first constitution, because it comes first to be observed and assented to when a faculty of the mind, which has quite a distinct province, begins to exert itself? And therefore the coming to the use of speech, if it were supposed the time that these maxims are first assented to, (which it may be with as much truth as the time when men come to the use of reason,) would be as good a proof that they were innate, as to say they are innate because men assent to them when they come to the use of reason. I agree then with these men of innate principles, that there is no knowledge of these general and self-evident maxims in the mind, till it comes to the exercise of reason: but I deny that the coming to the use of reason is the precise time when they are first taken notice of; and if that were the precise time, I deny that it would prove them innate. All that can with any truth be meant by this proposition, that men ‘assent to them when they come to the use of reason,’ is no more but this,—that the making of general abstract ideas, and the understanding of general names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty, and growing up with it, children commonly get not those general ideas, nor learn the names that stand for them, till, having for a good while exercised their reason about familiar and more particular ideas, they are, by their ordinary discourse and actions with others, acknowledged to be capable of rational conversation. If assenting to these maxims, when men come to the use of reason, can be true in any other sense, I desire it may be shown; or at least, how in this, or any other sense, it proves them innate.

But, secondly, suppose people first knew and accepted these principles at the exact moment they began using reason. Even then, that would not prove the principles innate. This argument is as flimsy as the assumption itself is false. How could any logic show that an idea was naturally stamped into the mind from its very beginning merely because people first notice and accept that idea when another mental faculty begins working? That faculty has an entirely different role. We might just as truthfully suppose that people first accept these maxims when they begin speaking. On that assumption, learning to speak would offer just as much proof that the maxims were innate. It would prove as much as saying the maxims are innate because people accept them when they begin using reason. I agree, then, with these supporters of innate principles on one point. The mind has no knowledge of these general, self-evident maxims until it begins exercising reason. But I deny that people first notice these maxims at the exact moment they begin using reason. And even if that were the exact moment, I deny that the timing would prove the maxims innate. The claim that people ‘accept them when they begin using reason’ can truthfully mean only the following. The ability to form general, abstract ideas and understand general terms accompanies the capacity to reason and develops alongside it. Children commonly acquire those general ideas and learn the terms for them only after reasoning for some time. Their reasoning during that time concerns familiar, more specific ideas. By then, their everyday conversations and dealings with others show that they can take part in rational conversation. If accepting these maxims when people begin using reason can mean anything else, I ask to be shown how. Or at least, show how this meaning, or any other meaning, proves the maxims innate.

15. The Steps by which the Mind attains several Truths.

15. The steps by which the mind comes to understand various truths.

The senses at first let in PARTICULAR ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet, and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards, the mind proceeding further, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the MATERIALS about which to exercise its discursive faculty. And the use of reason becomes daily more visible, as these materials that give it employment increase. But though the having of general ideas and the use of general words and reason usually grow together, yet I see not how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge of some truths, I confess, is very early in the mind; but in a way that shows them not to be innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it still to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired; it being about those first which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earliest to do, which make the most frequent impressions on their senses. In ideas thus got, the mind discovers that some agree and others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of memory; as soon as it is able to retain and perceive distinct ideas. But whether it be then or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has the use of words; or comes to that which we commonly call “the use of reason.” For a child knows as certainly before it can speak the difference between the ideas of sweet and bitter (i.e. that sweet is not bitter), as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) that wormwood and sugarplums are not the same thing.

The senses first bring in PARTICULAR ideas, furnishing the mind like an empty cabinet. As the mind gradually becomes familiar with some of these ideas, they are stored in memory and given names. Later, the mind goes further, forming abstract ideas and gradually learning to use general names. In this way, the mind gains ideas and language, the MATERIALS on which to exercise its ability to reason. The use of reason becomes more apparent each day as the materials it works with increase. General ideas, general words, and reason usually develop together. But I do not see how this shared development proves that any of them are innate. I admit that the mind knows some truths very early. But the way the mind learns these truths shows that they are not innate. If we observe carefully, we find that this early knowledge always concerns ideas that are acquired, not innate. The first such ideas come from external things that infants encounter earliest and that most often affect their senses. Among these acquired ideas, the mind discovers that some agree and others differ. This probably happens as soon as the mind can use memory, retaining and recognizing distinct ideas. But whether this discovery happens then or not, one thing is certain. The mind recognizes these similarities and differences long before it can use words or reaches what we commonly call “the use of reason.” Before a child can speak, the child knows the difference between the ideas of sweet and bitter with certainty. In other words, the child knows that sweet is not bitter. This knowledge is just as certain as the child's later knowledge, after learning to speak, that wormwood and sugarplums differ.

16. Assent to supposed innate truths depends on having clear and distinct ideas of what their terms mean, and not on their innateness.

16. Accepting supposedly innate truths depends on a clear, precise understanding of what their terms mean. Acceptance does not depend on those truths being innate.

A child knows not that three and four are equal to seven, till he comes to be able to count seven, and has got the name and idea of equality; and then, upon explaining those words, he presently assents to, or rather perceives the truth of that proposition. But neither does he then readily assent because it is an innate truth, nor was his assent wanting till then because he wanted the use of reason; but the truth of it appears to him as soon as he has settled in his mind the clear and distinct ideas that these names stand for. And then he knows the truth of that proposition upon the same ground and by the same means, that he knew before that a rod and a cherry are not the same thing; and upon the same ground also that he may come to know afterwards “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” as shall be more fully shown hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general ideas about which those maxims are; or to know the signification of those generic terms that stand for them; or to put together in his mind the ideas they stand for; the later also will it be before he comes to assent to those maxims;—whose terms, with the ideas they stand for, being no more innate than those of a cat or a weasel he must stay till time and observation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of these maxims, upon the first occasion that shall make him put together those ideas in his mind, and observe whether they agree or disagree, according as is expressed in those propositions. And therefore it is that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty-seven, by the same self-evidence that he knows one and two to be equal to three: yet a child knows this not so soon as the other; not for want of the use of reason, but because the ideas the words eighteen nineteen, and thirty-seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those which are signified by one, two, and three.

A child does not know that three and four equal seven until he can count to seven. He must also learn the word and idea of equality. Once these words are explained, he immediately accepts the statement, or rather, sees that the statement is true. But he does not accept the truth so readily because it is innate. Nor did he fail to accept the truth earlier because he lacked the ability to reason. Instead, the truth becomes clear once he has clear, distinct ideas of what these words mean. He then knows the statement is true on the same basis, and by the same means, as an earlier truth. That earlier truth was that a rod and a cherry are not the same thing. On the same basis, he may later learn “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” as I will explain more fully later. So the longer someone takes to acquire the general ideas behind these principles, the later he will accept the principles. The same delay follows if he takes longer to understand the general terms that express those ideas. The same is also true if he takes longer to bring those ideas together in his mind. These terms and ideas are no more innate than the words and ideas for a cat or a weasel. He must wait until time and observation have made him familiar with the terms and ideas. Then he will be able to recognize the truth of these principles at the first opportunity to compare the ideas. He must notice whether the ideas agree or disagree, as the statements express. That is why someone knows that eighteen and nineteen equal thirty-seven through the same self-evidence as one and two equal three. Yet a child learns the first truth later than the second. The delay is not caused by a lack of reasoning ability. Rather, the child takes longer to acquire the ideas expressed by eighteen, nineteen, and thirty-seven than by one, two, and three.

17. Assenting as soon as proposed and understood, proves them not innate.

17. Accepting them as soon as they are presented and understood does not prove they are innate.

This evasion therefore of general assent when men come to the use of reason, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between those supposed innate and other truths that are afterwards acquired and learnt, men have endeavoured to secure an universal assent to those they call maxims, by saying, they are generally assented to as soon as proposed, and the terms they are proposed in understood: seeing all men, even children, as soon as they hear and understand the terms, assent to these propositions, they think it is sufficient to prove them innate. For, since men never fail after they have once understood the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer, that certainly these propositions were first lodged in the understanding, which, without any teaching, the mind, at the very first proposal immediately closes with and assents to, and after that never doubts again.

The claim that everyone agrees once they can reason therefore fails as a way around the problem. It leaves no difference between supposedly innate truths and other truths acquired and learned later. So defenders of innate truths have tried another way to establish universal agreement with what they call maxims. They say people generally accept these maxims as soon as they hear them and understand their terms. All people, even children, agree with these statements as soon as they hear and understand the terms. Defenders of innate truths think this agreement is enough to prove the statements innate. For once people understand the words, they never fail to acknowledge these statements as unquestionable truths. From this agreement, defenders of innate truths infer that the statements must have been in the understanding from the start. Without any teaching, the mind immediately accepts and agrees with these statements when first presented, and never doubts them afterward.

18. If such an Assent be a Mark of Innate, then “that one and two are equal to three, that Sweetness is not Bitterness,” and a thousand the like, must be innate.

18. If such agreement marks an innate idea, then “one plus two equals three, sweetness is not bitterness,” and a thousand similar ideas must be innate.

In answer to this, I demand whether ready assent given to a proposition, upon first hearing and understanding the terms, be a certain mark of an innate principle? If it be not, such a general assent is in vain urged as a proof of them: if it be said that it is a mark of innate, they must then allow all such propositions to be innate which are generally assented to as soon as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate principles. For upon the same ground, viz. of assent at first hearing and understanding the terms, that men would have those maxims pass for innate, they must also admit several propositions about numbers to be innate; and thus, that one and two are equal to three, that two and two are equal to four, and a multitude of other the like propositions in numbers, that everybody assents to at first hearing and understanding the terms, must have a place amongst these innate axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone, and propositions made about several of them; but even natural philosophy, and all the other sciences, afford propositions which are sure to meet with assent as soon as they are understood. That “two bodies cannot be in the same place” is a truth that nobody any more sticks at than at these maxims, that “it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” that “white is not black,” that “a square is not a circle,” that “bitterness is not sweetness.” These and a million of such other propositions, as many at least as we have distinct ideas of, every man in his wits, at first hearing, and knowing, what the names stand for, must necessarily assent to. If these men will be true to their own rule, and have assent at first hearing and understanding the terms to be a mark of innate, they must allow not only as many innate propositions, as men have distinct ideas; but as many as men can make propositions wherein, different ideas are denied one of another. Since every proposition wherein one different idea is denied of another, will as certainly find assent at first hearing and understanding the terms as this general one, “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” or that which is the foundation of it and is the easier understood of the two, “The same is not different”; by which account they will have legions of innate propositions of this one sort, without mentioning any other. But, since no proposition can be innate unless the ideas about which it is be innate, this will be to suppose all our ideas of colours, sounds, tastes, figure, &c., innate, than which there cannot be anything more opposite to reason and experience. Universal and ready assent upon hearing and understanding the terms is, I grant, a mark of self-evidence; but self-evidence, depending not on innate impressions, but on something else, (as we shall show hereafter,) belongs to several propositions which nobody was yet so extravagant as to pretend to be innate.

In reply, I ask this: Is immediate agreement with a statement, on first hearing it and understanding its terms, a sure sign of an innate principle? If not, appealing to such general agreement proves nothing about innate principles. If immediate agreement is such a sign, its defenders must accept all statements generally accepted as soon as they are heard. All such statements must be innate, leaving these defenders with a plentiful supply of innate principles. They claim certain basic principles are innate because people agree on first hearing them and understanding their terms. But on the same grounds, they must also accept several statements about numbers as innate. So one and two equal three, two and two equal four, and countless similar statements must count as innate axioms. Everyone agrees with these statements on first hearing them and understanding their terms. Nor is this distinction limited to numbers and statements about them. Natural philosophy and all the other sciences also supply statements certain to gain agreement as soon as they are understood. Nobody hesitates over the truth that “two bodies cannot be in the same place” any more than over these principles: “it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” “white is not black,” “a square is not a circle,” and “bitterness is not sweetness.” Every person of sound mind must agree with these statements on first hearing them and understanding what their words mean. The same holds for a million other statements, at least as many as we have distinct ideas. Suppose these defenders remain true to their rule. Suppose they treat agreement on first hearing and understanding the terms as a sign that a statement is innate. They must then accept not merely as many innate statements as people have distinct ideas. They must accept as many as people can form by stating that one distinct idea is not another. Every statement denying that one distinct idea is another will gain agreement on first hearing and understanding its terms. Agreement will be just as certain as with the general principle, “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.” It will also be as certain as with “The same is not different.” This second principle is the foundation of the first and is easier to understand. By this reckoning, they will have legions of innate statements of this kind alone, without mentioning any others. But no statement can be innate unless the ideas it concerns are innate. So their position requires all our ideas of colours, sounds, tastes, shapes, and so on to be innate. Nothing could be more contrary to reason and experience. I grant that universal and immediate agreement on hearing and understanding the terms is a sign that a statement is self-evident. But self-evidence does not depend on innate impressions. It depends on something else, as we shall show later. Several statements are self-evident that nobody has yet been unreasonable enough to claim are innate.

19. Such less general Propositions known before these universal Maxims.

19. Such less general statements are known before these universal principles.

Nor let it be said, that those more particular self-evident propositions, which are assented to at first hearing, as that “one and two are equal to three,” that “green is not red,” &c., are received as the consequences of those more universal propositions which are looked on as innate principles; since any one, who will but take the pains to observe what passes in the understanding, will certainly find that these, and the like less general propositions, are certainly known, and firmly assented to by those who are utterly ignorant of those more general maxims; and so, being earlier in the mind than those (as they are called) first principles, cannot owe to them the assent wherewith they are received at first hearing.

Nor should anyone claim that particular self-evident statements, accepted as soon as they are heard, follow from more universal statements considered innate principles. Examples include “one and two are equal to three,” “green is not red,” and so on. Anyone who takes the trouble to observe how the mind works will certainly find otherwise. People know these and similar, less general statements with certainty and firmly accept them, even without knowing the general principles. So these particular statements enter the mind before the so-called first principles. They therefore cannot owe their immediate acceptance to those general principles.

20. One and one equal to Two, &c., not general nor useful answered.

20. Answer to the objection that one and one equals two, etc., is neither general nor useful.

If it be said, that these propositions, viz. “two and two are equal to four,” “red is not blue,” &c., are not general maxims nor of any great use, I answer, that makes nothing to the argument of universal assent upon hearing and understanding. For, if that be the certain mark of innate, whatever propositions can be found that receives general assent as soon as heard understood, that must be admitted for an innate proposition as well as this maxim, “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” they being upon this ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this maxim more remote from being innate; those general and abstract ideas being more strangers to our first apprehensions than those of more particular self-evident propositions; and therefore it is longer before they are admitted, and assented to by the growing understanding. And as to the usefulness of these magnified maxims, that perhaps will not be found so great as is generally conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully considered.

Someone may object that statements such as “two and two are equal to four,” “red is not blue,” and so on are not general principles. Nor are they particularly useful. My answer is that neither objection affects the argument based on universal agreement upon hearing and understanding a statement. For if such agreement is a sure sign of an innate truth, every statement meeting that test must count as innate. Such statements must count as innate just as much as the principle, “It is impossible for something both to exist and not to exist.” By this test, all these statements stand on equal terms. As for being more general, that difference makes this principle less likely to be innate. General, abstract ideas are less familiar to our earliest understanding than the ideas in more specific, self-evident statements. So the developing mind takes longer to accept and agree with those general principles. As for the usefulness of these much-praised principles, perhaps they will prove less useful than people generally suppose. We will consider their usefulness more fully in its proper place.

21. These Maxims not being known sometimes till proposed, proves them not innate.

21. Sometimes these principles are not known until presented. This proves that these principles are not innate.

But we have not yet done with “assenting to propositions at first hearing and understanding their terms.” It is fit we first take notice that this, instead of being a mark that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary; since it supposes that several, who understand and know other things, are ignorant of these principles till they are proposed to them; and that one may be unacquainted with these truths till he hears them from others. For, if they were innate, what need they be proposed in order to gaining assent, when, by being in the understanding, by a natural and original impression, (if there were any such,) they could not but be known before? Or doth the proposing them print them clearer in the mind than nature did? If so, then the consequence will be, that a man knows them better after he has been thus taught them than he did before. Whence it will follow that these principles may be made more evident to us by others’ teaching than nature has made them by impression: which will ill agree with the opinion of innate principles, and give but little authority to them; but, on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other knowledge; as they are pretended to be. This cannot be denied, that men grow first acquainted with many of these self-evident truths upon their being proposed: but it is clear that whosoever does so, finds in himself that he then begins to know a proposition, which he knew not before, and which from thenceforth he never questions; not because it was innate, but because the consideration of the nature of the things contained in those words would not suffer him to think otherwise, how, or whensoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is assented to at first hearing and understanding the terms must pass for an innate principle, every well-grounded observation, drawn from particulars into a general rule, must be innate. When yet it is certain that not all, but only sagacious heads, light at first on these observations, and reduce them into general propositions: not innate but collected from a preceding acquaintance and reflection on particular instances. These, when observing men have made them, unobserving men, when they are proposed to them cannot refuse their assent to.

But we have not yet finished with “agreeing with propositions on first hearing them and understanding their terms.” We should first notice that such agreement, far from showing that these propositions are innate, proves the opposite. It assumes that many people who understand and know other things remain ignorant of these principles until someone presents them. It also assumes that someone may not know these truths until hearing them from others. For if these principles were innate, why would anyone need to present them to gain agreement? If nature had originally imprinted them in the understanding, they could not have remained unknown. That is, if any such natural imprint existed. Or does presenting these principles imprint them more clearly on the mind than nature did? If so, a person knows them better after being taught them than before. It would follow that others can make these principles clearer through teaching than nature has made them through imprinting. That conclusion fits poorly with the belief in innate principles and gives them little authority. On the contrary, it makes them unfit to serve as the foundations of all our other knowledge, as claimed. We cannot deny that people first learn many of these self-evident truths when someone presents them. But anyone who learns them this way clearly recognizes that they are beginning to know a previously unknown proposition. From then on, they never question that proposition. This is not because the proposition was innate. Rather, considering the nature of the things its words describe leaves them unable to think otherwise. This holds however or whenever they are led to reflect on those things. And suppose every proposition accepted on first hearing it and understanding its terms must count as an innate principle. Then every sound observation drawn from particular cases into a general rule must be innate. Yet certainly not everyone first discovers these observations and turns them into general propositions. Only perceptive minds do so. These propositions are not innate, but are drawn from prior knowledge of particular cases and reflection on them. Once observant people have formed these propositions, even unobservant people cannot refuse to agree when the propositions are presented.

22. Implicitly known before proposing, signifies that the Mind is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing.

22. Saying things are implicitly known before they are presented means the mind is capable of understanding them. Otherwise, the claim means nothing.

If it be said, the understanding hath an IMPLICIT knowledge of these principles, but not an EXPLICIT, before this first hearing (as they must who will say “that they are in the understanding before they are known,”) it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a principle imprinted on the understanding implicitly, unless it be this,—that the mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly to such propositions. And thus all mathematical demonstrations, as well as first principles, must be received as native impressions on the mind; which I fear they will scarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonstrate a proposition than assent to it when demonstrated. And few mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the diagrams they have drawn were but copies of those innate characters which nature had engraven upon their minds.

Some may say the understanding has IMPLICIT knowledge of these principles, but not EXPLICIT knowledge, before first hearing them. Those who claim “that they are in the understanding before they are known,” must take this position. But what does it mean for a principle to be implicitly imprinted on the understanding? The meaning is hard to grasp unless it simply means the mind can understand and firmly accept such propositions. But then all mathematical proofs, as well as first principles, must count as impressions present in the mind from birth. I fear those who find proving a proposition harder than accepting it once proved will hardly agree. And few mathematicians will readily believe that all the diagrams they have drawn were merely copies of innate patterns. Yet these would be patterns that nature had engraved on their minds.

23. The Argument of assenting on first hearing, is upon a false supposition of no precedent teaching.

23. The argument based on agreement at first hearing rests on the false assumption that no prior teaching has occurred.

There is, I fear, this further weakness in the foregoing argument, which would persuade us that therefore those maxims are to be thought innate, which men admit at first hearing; because they assent to propositions which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any argument or demonstration, but a bare explication or understanding of the terms. Under which there seems to me to lie this fallacy, that men are supposed not to be taught nor to learn anything de novo; when, in truth, they are taught, and do learn something they were ignorant of before. For, first, it is evident that they have learned the terms, and their signification; neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquired knowledge in the case: the ideas themselves, about which the proposition is, are not born with them, no more than their names, but got afterwards. So that in all propositions that are assented to at first hearing, the terms of the proposition, their standing for such ideas, and the ideas themselves that they stand for, being neither of them innate, I would fain know what there is remaining in such propositions that is innate. For I would gladly have any one name that proposition whose terms or ideas were either of them innate. We by degrees get ideas and names, and learn their appropriated connexion one with another; and then to propositions made in such terms, whose signification we have learnt, and wherein the agreement or disagreement we can perceive in our ideas when put together is expressed, we at first hearing assent; though to other propositions, in themselves as certain and evident, but which are concerning ideas not so soon or so easily got, we are at the same time no way capable of assenting. For, though a child quickly assents to this proposition, “That an apple is not fire,” when by familiar acquaintance he has got the ideas of those two different things distinctly imprinted on his mind, and has learnt that the names apple and fire stand for them; yet it will be some years after, perhaps, before the same child will assent to this proposition, “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be”; because that, though perhaps the words are as easy to be learnt, yet the signification of them being more large, comprehensive, and abstract than of the names annexed to those sensible things the child hath to do with, it is longer before he learns their precise meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his mind those general ideas they stand for. Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any child assent to a proposition made up of such general terms; but as soon as ever he has got those ideas, and learned their names, he forwardly closes with the one as well as the other of the forementioned propositions: and with both for the same reason; viz. because he finds the ideas he has in his mind to agree or disagree, according as the words standing for them are affirmed or denied one of another in the proposition. But if propositions be brought to him in words which stand for ideas he has not yet in his mind, to such propositions, however evidently true or false in themselves, he affords neither assent nor dissent, but is ignorant. For words being but empty sounds, any further than they are signs of our ideas, we cannot but assent to them as they correspond to those ideas we have, but no further than that. But the showing by what steps and ways knowledge comes into our minds; and the grounds of several degrees of assent, being; the business of the following Discourse, it may suffice to have only touched on it here, as one reason that made me doubt of those innate principles.

I fear there is another weakness in the argument just given. The argument would have us believe that principles people accept on first hearing must be innate. People accept these statements without being taught them, and without any argument or proof. They need only an explanation or understanding of the terms. But this reasoning seems to me to contain a fallacy. It assumes that people are not being taught anything or learning anything new. In fact, they are being taught and are learning something they did not know before. First, people have clearly learned the terms and their meanings. Neither the terms nor their meanings were present at birth. But these are not the only things learned here. The ideas themselves, which the statement concerns, are no more innate than their names. People acquire those ideas later. So consider any statement people accept on first hearing. Its terms, the connection between those terms and their ideas, and the ideas themselves are not innate. I would like to know what remains in such a statement that could be innate. I would gladly have anyone name a statement whose terms or ideas were innate. We gradually acquire ideas and names, and learn the proper connections between them. Then we hear statements using terms whose meanings we have learned. These statements express agreements or differences that we can perceive when we bring our ideas together. We accept such statements on first hearing. Yet we cannot then accept other statements that are just as certain and clear in themselves. Those other statements concern ideas that take longer or are harder to acquire. For example, a child quickly accepts the statement, “An apple is not fire.” Through familiar experience, the child has gained clear, distinct ideas of these two different things. The child has also learned that the names apple and fire stand for those ideas. Yet perhaps several years will pass before the same child accepts this statement: “It is impossible for the same thing both to exist and not to exist.” The words may be just as easy to learn. But their meanings are broader, more comprehensive, and more abstract than names for things the child encounters through the senses. So the child takes longer to learn their exact meanings. The child also needs more time to form clearly the general ideas those words represent. Until the child has formed those ideas, attempts to secure agreement with statements using such general terms will be useless. But once the child has those ideas and knows their names, the child readily accepts either statement. The reason for accepting both is the same. The child finds that the ideas agree or differ, just as the statement affirms or denies their agreement. But suppose the child hears statements containing words for ideas the child does not yet have. However clearly true or false those statements may be in themselves, the child neither accepts nor rejects them. The child simply does not know. Words are only empty sounds unless they represent our ideas. We cannot help accepting what words express when they match the ideas we have, but our acceptance goes no further. The discussion that follows will explain the steps and methods by which knowledge enters our minds. It will also explain the grounds for our different degrees of acceptance. For now, briefly touching on this subject may be enough. It gives one reason why I came to doubt those innate principles.

24. Not innate because not universally assented to.

24. Not innate because not everyone agrees with it.

To conclude this argument of universal consent, I agree with these defenders of innate principles,—that if they are innate, they must needs have universal assent. For that a truth should be innate and yet not assented to, is to me as unintelligible as for a man to know a truth and be ignorant of it at the same time. But then, by these men’s own confession, they cannot be innate; since they are not assented to by those who understand not the terms; nor by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet never heard nor thought of those propositions; which, I think, is at least one half of mankind. But were the number far less, it would be enough to destroy universal assent, and thereby show these propositions not to be innate, if children alone were ignorant of them.

To conclude this argument about universal agreement, I agree with the defenders of innate principles on one point. If these principles are innate, everyone must accept them as true. To me, an innate truth that someone does not accept is impossible to understand. It is like someone knowing a truth and being ignorant of that truth at the same time. But by these defenders’ own admission, these principles cannot be innate. People who do not understand the terms do not accept the principles. Nor do many who understand the terms but have never heard or thought of these statements. I think these two groups make up at least half of humanity. But even if the number were much smaller, that would be enough to disprove universal agreement. Even if children alone were ignorant of these statements, their ignorance would show that the statements are not innate.

25. These Maxims not the first known.

25. These principles are not the first things we know.

But that I may not be accused to argue from the thoughts of infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude from what passes in their understandings before they express it; I say next, that these two general propositions are not the truths that first possess the minds of children, nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious notions: which, if they were innate, they must needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a time when children begin to think, and their words and actions do assure us that they do so. When therefore they are capable of thought, of knowledge, of assent, can it rationally be supposed they can be ignorant of those notions that nature has imprinted, were there any such? Can it be imagined, with any appearance of reason, that they perceive the impressions from things without, and be at the same time ignorant of those characters which nature itself has taken care to stamp within? Can they receive and assent to adventitious notions, and be ignorant of those which are supposed woven into the very principles of their being, and imprinted there in indelible characters, to be the foundation and guide of all their acquired knowledge and future reasonings? This would be to make nature take pains to no purpose; or at least to write very ill; since its characters could not be read by those eyes which saw other things very well: and those are very ill supposed the clearest parts of truth, and the foundations of all our knowledge, which are not first known, and without which the undoubted knowledge of several other things may be had. The child certainly knows, that the nurse that feeds it is neither the cat it plays with, nor the blackmoor it is afraid of: that the wormseed or mustard it refuses, is not the apple or sugar it cries for: this it is certainly and undoubtedly assured of: but will any one say, it is by virtue of this principle, “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” that it so firmly assents to these and other parts of its knowledge? Or that the child has any notion or apprehension of that proposition at an age, wherein yet, it is plain, it knows a great many other truths? He that will say, children join in these general abstract speculations with their sucking-bottles and their rattles, may perhaps, with justice, be thought to have more passion and zeal for his opinion, but less sincerity and truth, than one of that age.

But I do not want to be accused of arguing from infants’ thoughts, which are unknown to us. Nor do I want to draw conclusions about their understanding before they can express it. So my next point is this: these two general propositions are not the first truths children grasp. Nor do they come before all ideas acquired through experience. If these propositions were innate, they would have to come first. Whether we can identify the moment or not, children certainly begin to think at some point. Their words and actions assure us that they do. Once children can think, know, and accept something as true, can they reasonably be ignorant of ideas imprinted by nature? That is, if there are any such ideas. Can we reasonably imagine children noticing impressions from outside things while remaining unaware of marks nature itself has stamped within? Can children receive and accept ideas from experience while remaining ignorant of supposedly inborn ideas? Those inborn ideas are supposedly woven into the very foundations of their being and stamped there in indelible marks. They are supposed to provide the foundation and guide for all knowledge children acquire and all their future reasoning. This would mean nature had taken trouble for nothing, or at least had written very badly. For nature’s writing would be unreadable to eyes that saw other things perfectly well. We can hardly call these propositions the clearest truths and the foundations of all our knowledge. They are not known first, and we can have unquestionable knowledge of several other things without knowing them. A child certainly knows that the nurse who feeds it is not the cat it plays with. The child also knows that the nurse is not the black person it fears. The wormseed or mustard the child refuses is not the apple or sugar it cries for. The child knows these things with complete certainty. But will anyone say the child’s certainty about these and other things comes from this principle: “The same thing cannot both be and not be”? Or will anyone say the child has any understanding of that proposition at such an age? Yet plainly, the child already knows a great many other truths. Anyone who claims children take up these general, abstract speculations along with their feeding bottles and rattles may invite a judgment. Perhaps we may justly think such a person has more passion and zeal for his opinion than a child. But we may also think he has less honesty and truthfulness than a child of that age.

26. And so not innate.

26. And therefore not innate.

Though therefore there be several general propositions that meet with constant and ready assent, as soon as proposed to men grown up, who have attained the use of more general and abstract ideas, and names standing for them; yet they not being to be found in those of tender years, who nevertheless know other things, they cannot pretend to universal assent of intelligent persons, and so by no means can be supposed innate;—it being impossible that any truth which is innate (if there were any such) should be unknown, at least to any one who knows anything else. Since, if they are innate truths, they must be innate thoughts: there being nothing a truth in the mind that it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there be any innate truths, they must necessarily be the first of any thought on; the first that appear.

Some general statements, then, are always readily accepted by adults as soon as they hear them. These adults have learned to use broader, more abstract ideas and the words that represent those ideas. Yet young children do not know these statements, although they do know other things. So these statements cannot claim the agreement of all thinking people and cannot possibly be considered innate. For an innate truth, if any existed, could not be unknown to anyone who knows anything else. If these truths are innate, they must be innate thoughts. Nothing can be a truth in the mind unless the mind has thought about it. So clearly, if there are any innate truths, they must be the very first thoughts, the first to appear.

27. Not innate, because they appear least, where what is innate shows itself clearest.

27. Not innate, because they are least evident where innate qualities show themselves most clearly.

That the general maxims we are discoursing of are not known to children, idiots, and a great part of mankind, we have already sufficiently proved: whereby it is evident they have not an universal assent, nor are general impressions. But there is this further argument in it against their being innate: that these characters, if they were native and original impressions, should appear fairest and clearest in those persons in whom yet we find no footsteps of them; and it is, in my opinion, a strong presumption that they are not innate, since they are least known to those in whom, if they were innate, they must needs exert themselves with most force and vigour. For children, idiots, savages, and illiterate people, being of all others the least corrupted by custom, or borrowed opinions; learning and education having not cast their native thoughts into new moulds; nor by superinducing foreign and studied doctrines, confounded those fair characters nature had written there; one might reasonably imagine that in THEIR minds these innate notions should lie open fairly to every one’s view, as it is certain the thoughts of children do. It might very well be expected that these principles should be perfectly known to naturals; which being stamped immediately on the soul, (as these men suppose,) can have no dependence on the constitution or organs of the body, the only confessed difference between them and others. One would think, according to these men’s principles, that all these native beams of light (were there any such) should, in those who have no reserves, no arts of concealment, shine out in their full lustre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of pleasure and abhorrence of pain. But alas, amongst children, idiots, savages, and the grossly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found? what universal principles of knowledge? Their notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from those objects they have had most to do with, and which have made upon their senses the frequentest and strongest impressions. A child knows his nurse and his cradle, and by degrees the playthings of a little more advanced age; and a young savage has, perhaps, his head filled with love and hunting, according to the fashion of his tribe. But he that from a child untaught, or a wild inhabitant of the woods, will expect these abstract maxims and reputed principles of science, will, I fear find himself mistaken. Such kind of general propositions are seldom mentioned in the huts of Indians: much less are they to be found in the thoughts of children, or any impressions of them on the minds of naturals. They are the language and business of the schools and academies of learned nations accustomed to that sort of conversation or learning, where disputes are frequent; these maxims being suited to artificial argumentation and useful for conviction, but not much conducing to the discovery of truth or advancement of knowledge. But of their small use for the improvement of knowledge I shall have occasion to speak more at large, l.4, c. 7.

We have already shown sufficiently that children, people with intellectual disabilities, and much of humanity do not know these general principles. Clearly, then, these principles are not universally accepted or impressed on every mind. But this gives us a further argument against their being innate. If these marks were original impressions built into the mind, they should appear most clearly where we find no trace of them. In my opinion, this is strong evidence that they are not innate. They are least known to those in whom, if innate, they would have to show themselves most strongly. Children, people with intellectual disabilities, people living outside literate societies, and people without formal education are least corrupted by custom or borrowed opinions. Learning and education have not reshaped their original thoughts. Nor have imported, carefully developed doctrines obscured the clear marks that nature supposedly wrote in their minds. So we might reasonably imagine that these innate ideas would be plainly visible to everyone in THEIR minds. After all, children’s thoughts certainly are plainly visible. We might well expect these principles to be perfectly known to people born with intellectual disabilities. Those who defend innate principles suppose that these principles are stamped directly on the soul. If so, the principles cannot depend on the body’s structure or organs. Bodily differences are the only differences these defenders acknowledge between people with intellectual disabilities and everyone else. According to these defenders’ own principles, we would expect all these natural rays of light to shine at full brightness. That is, if any such rays existed, they should shine in people without reserve or any skill at concealment. Their presence should be as unmistakable as these people’s love of pleasure and hatred of pain. But alas, what general principles do we find among children, people with intellectual disabilities, people outside literate societies, and the thoroughly uneducated? What universal principles of knowledge? Their ideas are few and limited. Those ideas come only from the objects they have encountered most often. These objects have made the most frequent and strongest impressions on their senses. A child knows his nurse and cradle, and gradually comes to know the toys of a slightly later age. A young person living outside literate society may, perhaps, have his head filled with love and hunting, following his tribe’s customs. But suppose someone expects these abstract principles and supposed foundations of knowledge from an untaught child or a forest-dweller. I fear that person will be disappointed. General statements of this kind are seldom mentioned in the huts of Indians. Still less do we find them in children’s thoughts, or any impressions of them in people born with intellectual disabilities. Such principles belong to the language and work of schools and academies in learned nations. People there are accustomed to this kind of discussion or study, and disputes are frequent. These principles suit formal argument and help convince people. But they do little to discover truth or advance knowledge. I will have occasion to discuss their limited usefulness in advancing knowledge more fully in Book 4, Chapter 7.

28. Recapitulation.

28. Summary.

I know not how absurd this may seem to the masters of demonstration. And probably it will hardly go down with anybody at first hearing. I must therefore beg a little truce with prejudice, and the forbearance of censure, till I have been heard out in the sequel of this Discourse, being very willing to submit to better judgments. And since I impartially search after truth, I shall not be sorry to be convinced, that I have been too fond of my own notions; which I confess we are all apt to be, when application and study have warmed our heads with them.

I do not know how absurd this may seem to experts in logical proof. And probably hardly anyone will accept it on first hearing. So I ask readers to set aside prejudice and withhold criticism until they have heard the rest of my argument. I am very willing to defer to better judgment. And since I seek the truth impartially, I will welcome being convinced that I have grown too attached to my ideas. I admit that we are all prone to this attachment when sustained effort and study have fired our enthusiasm for our ideas.

Upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground to think these two speculative Maxims innate: since they are not universally assented to; and the assent they so generally find is no other than what several propositions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in with them: and since the assent that is given them is produced another way, and comes not from natural inscription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following Discourse. And if THESE “first principles” of knowledge and science are found not to be innate, no OTHER speculative maxims can (I suppose), with better right pretend to be so.

Overall, I see no reason to think these two theoretical principles are innate, since not everyone accepts them. And the widespread acceptance they receive is no different from that given to several statements not considered innate. Moreover, people come to accept these principles in another way, not because the principles are naturally imprinted on the mind. I have no doubt that I will show this in the discussion that follows. And if THESE “first principles” of knowledge and science prove not to be innate, the same applies to other theoretical principles. No OTHER theoretical principles can, I suppose, have any better claim to being innate.