Introduction

1. An Inquiry into the Understanding pleasant and useful.

1. Studying the mind’s ability to understand is enjoyable and useful.

Since it is the UNDERSTANDING that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to inquire into. The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires and art and pains to set it at a distance and make it its own object. But whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry; whatever it be that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves; sure I am that all the light we can let in upon our minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the search of other things.

UNDERSTANDING sets human beings above all other beings capable of sensation. It gives us all the advantages and power we have over them. So understanding is certainly worth the effort of studying, even for its importance alone. Like the eye, understanding lets us see and perceive everything else, but does not notice itself. Examining our own understanding requires skill and effort, as though we were stepping back to look at it. But whatever difficulties stand in the way of this inquiry, and whatever keeps us so ignorant of ourselves, I am certain of one thing. All the light we can shed on our minds, and all the knowledge we can gain of our own understanding, will be deeply rewarding. This knowledge will also greatly help us direct our thoughts as we investigate other things.

2. Design.

2. Purpose.

This, therefore, being my purpose—to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, together with the grounds and degrees of BELIEF, OPINION, and ASSENT;—I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind; or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists; or by what motions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies we come to have any SENSATION by our organs, or any IDEAS in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or not. These are speculations which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with. And I shall imagine I have not wholly misemployed myself in the thoughts I shall have on this occasion, if, in this historical, plain method, I can give any account of the ways whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have; and can set down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge; or the grounds of those persuasions which are to be found amongst men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted somewhere or other with such assurance and confidence, that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their opposition, and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have reason to suspect, that either there is no such thing as truth at all, or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it.

My purpose, then, is to investigate the origins, certainty, and limits of HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. I will also examine the grounds and degrees of BELIEF, OPINION, and ASSENT. For now, I will not consider the mind in physical terms or examine its essential nature. Nor will I investigate how movements of our spirits or changes in our bodies produce SENSATION through our sense organs. I will also leave aside how these movements or changes produce IDEAS in our understanding. Nor will I ask whether any or all of these ideas depend on matter for their formation. However intriguing and entertaining these questions may be, I will leave them aside because they fall outside my present purpose. For this purpose, I need only consider our faculties of understanding as we use them to examine their objects. I will consider my efforts not entirely wasted if this plain, descriptive approach can explain how we acquire our ideas about things. The same applies if I can offer any standards for judging the certainty of our knowledge. Or I may explain the grounds of people's convictions, which are so varied, different, and entirely contradictory. Yet somewhere or other, people assert these convictions with great assurance and confidence. Consider the conflicting opinions people hold, the affection and devotion with which they embrace them, and their determination and eagerness to defend them. Anyone who considers all this may perhaps have reason to suspect that there is no such thing as truth. Or they may suspect that humanity lacks adequate means to gain certain knowledge of truth.

3. Method.

3. Method.

It is therefore worth while to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what measures, in things whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our assent and moderate our persuasion. In order whereunto I shall pursue this following method:— First, I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.

It is therefore worth exploring the boundary between opinion and knowledge. We should also examine how to judge what to accept and how strongly to believe when we lack certain knowledge. To do so, I will follow this method: First, I will investigate the origin of ideas, notions, or whatever you choose to call them. These are the ideas a person notices and is aware of having in the mind. I will also examine how the understanding comes to acquire them.

Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.

Second, I will try to show what knowledge the mind gains through those ideas. I will also examine how certain that knowledge is, its supporting evidence, and how far it extends.

Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of FAITH or OPINION: whereby I mean that assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge. And here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of ASSENT.

Thirdly, I will explore the nature and basis of FAITH or OPINION. By these terms, I mean accepting a statement as true without knowing for certain that it is true. In doing so, we will examine the reasons for ASSENT and the degrees of certainty with which we accept statements.

4. Useful to know the Extent of our Comprehension.

4. Knowing the limits of our understanding is useful.

If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any degree proportionate; and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of an affectation of an universal knowledge, to raise questions, and perplex ourselves and others with disputes about things to which our understandings are not suited; and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all. If we can find out how far the understanding can extend its view; how far it has faculties to attain certainty; and in what cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state.

If this inquiry into the nature of understanding reveals its powers, I think the findings may be useful. The inquiry may show how far those powers reach, what they can handle, and where they fail us. These findings may encourage the busy human mind to be more cautious about tackling things beyond its comprehension. They may encourage the mind to stop at its limits. And they may help us peacefully accept ignorance of things that examination shows are beyond our abilities. Then perhaps we would be less eager to raise questions out of a desire to appear to know everything. We would be less eager to confuse ourselves and others with disputes about things our understanding cannot handle. We cannot form clear or distinct ideas of such things. Or, as has perhaps happened too often, we have no ideas about them at all. If we can discover how far our understanding reaches, we may learn where we can achieve certainty. We may also learn where we can only judge and guess. By discovering these limits, we may learn to be content with what we can attain in our present condition.

5. Our Capacity suited to our State and Concerns.

5. Our abilities are suited to our circumstances and concerns.

For though the comprehension of our understandings comes exceeding short of the vast extent of things, yet we shall have cause enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our being, for that proportion and degree of knowledge he has bestowed on us, so far above all the rest of the inhabitants of this our mansion. Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, since he hath given them (as St. Peter says) [words in Greek], whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their discovery, the comfortable provision for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their knowledge may come of an universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own duties. Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution, and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grasp everything. We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us; for of that they are very capable. And it will be an unpardonable, as well as childish peevishness, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us, because there are some things that are set out of the reach of it. It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant, who would not attend his business by candle light, to plead that he had not broad sunshine. The Candle that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our purposes. The discoveries we can make with this ought to satisfy us; and we shall then use our understandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are suited to our faculties, and upon those grounds they are capable of being proposed to us; and not peremptorily or intemperately require demonstration, and demand certainty, where probability only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things, we shall do much—what as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly.

Although our understanding falls far short of the vast range of things, we still have ample reason for gratitude. We should praise the generous Author of our being for the amount and level of knowledge he has given us. Our knowledge is far above that of all the other inhabitants of this world, our home. People have reason to be well satisfied with what God has judged suitable for them. For he has given them, as St. Peter says, [words in Greek], everything necessary for life's comforts and guidance in virtue. He has also made it possible for them to discover how to live comfortably and reach a better life. However far their knowledge falls short of understanding everything fully or perfectly, their greatest concerns are still provided for. They have enough light to know their Maker and recognize their own duties. People can find enough to occupy their minds and hands with variety, pleasure, and satisfaction. They need only avoid arrogantly complaining about their own nature and throwing away the blessings already in their hands. They should not reject those blessings because their hands are not large enough to grasp everything. We will have little reason to complain about our limited minds if we use them for what benefits us. Our minds are quite capable of such work. Some things lie beyond our knowledge. But that is no reason to undervalue the knowledge we have or neglect to develop it for its intended purposes. To do so would be both inexcusable and childishly petulant. A lazy, uncooperative servant who refuses to work by candlelight cannot excuse himself by saying he lacked full sunlight. The candle placed within us shines brightly enough for all our purposes. The discoveries we can make by that light ought to satisfy us. We use our understanding properly when we consider everything in ways and to degrees suited to our abilities. We must also judge things on the grounds available to us. We should not stubbornly or excessively demand proof and certainty where only probability is available. Such probability is enough to guide all our affairs. If we refuse to believe anything because we cannot know everything with certainty, we will act about as wisely as someone who refuses to use his legs. He sits still and dies because he has no wings to fly.

6. Knowledge of our Capacity a Cure of Scepticism and Idleness.

6. Understanding Our Abilities: A Cure for Skepticism and Idleness.

When we know our own strength, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success; and when we have well surveyed the POWERS of our own minds, and made some estimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit still, and not set our thoughts on work at all, in despair of knowing anything; nor on the other side, question everything, and disclaim all knowledge, because some things are not to be understood. It is of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom, at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon shoals that may ruin him. Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct. If we can find out those measures, whereby a rational creature, put in that state in which man is in this world, may and ought to govern his opinions, and actions depending thereon, we need not to be troubled that some other things escape our knowledge.

When we know our own strength, we can better judge what to attempt with hopes of success. The same is true when we carefully examine the POWERS of our minds and estimate what to expect from them. We will not be inclined to leave our minds idle because we despair of knowing anything. Nor will we question everything and reject all knowledge because some things cannot be understood. Knowing the length of his sounding line is very useful to a sailor. This is true even though he cannot use the line to measure every depth of the ocean. He benefits from knowing the line can reach the bottom wherever he needs measurements to guide his voyage. Those measurements also warn him against running onto shallows that could wreck his ship. Our task here is not to know everything, but to know what concerns our conduct. Suppose we can discover the standards by which a rational being in our situation in this world can and should judge. These standards would guide that being’s opinions and the actions based on those opinions. If we can discover those standards, we need not worry that some other things remain beyond our knowledge.

7. Occasion of this Essay.

7. What prompted this essay.

This was that which gave the first rise to this Essay concerning the understanding. For I thought that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was, to take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted. Till that was done I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and sure possession of truths that most concerned us, whilst we let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of Being; as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possession of our understandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its decisions, or that escaped its comprehension. Thus men, extending their inquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure footing, it is no wonder that they raise questions and multiply disputes, which, never coming to any clear resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect scepticism. Whereas, were the capacities of our understandings well considered, the extent of our knowledge once discovered, and the horizon found which sets the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things; between what is and what is not comprehensible by us, men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avowed ignorance of the one, and employ their thoughts and discourse with more advantage and satisfaction in the other.

This was what first led me to write this Essay concerning the understanding. I thought we first needed to examine our own understanding before answering questions the human mind so readily pursues. We needed to examine our mental powers and see what they were suited to. Until we had done so, I suspected we were starting at the wrong end. We sought in vain to gain a secure and settled grasp of the truths that mattered most to us. Meanwhile, we let our thoughts loose on the vast ocean of existence. We acted as if that boundless expanse were naturally and unquestionably within our understanding’s reach. We assumed nothing lay beyond our ability to judge or comprehend. So people extend their inquiries beyond their abilities, letting their thoughts wander into depths where they can find no firm footing. It is no wonder they raise questions and multiply disputes that never reach any clear resolution. Such questions and disputes only prolong and increase their doubts, finally confirming them in complete skepticism. But suppose we carefully considered the powers of our understanding and discovered the limits of our knowledge. Suppose we identified the boundary between what is clear and what remains dark, between what we can and cannot comprehend. People would perhaps then be less reluctant to accept their acknowledged ignorance of what they cannot comprehend. They would use their thoughts and discussions more productively and with greater satisfaction on what they can comprehend.

8. What Idea stands for.

8. What the word Idea means.

Thus much I thought necessary to say concerning the occasion of this inquiry into human Understanding. But, before I proceed on to what I have thought on this subject, I must here in the entrance beg pardon of my reader for the frequent use of the word IDEA, which he will find in the following treatise. It being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the OBJECT of the understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by PHANTASM, NOTION, SPECIES, or WHATEVER IT IS WHICH THE MIND CAN BE EMPLOYED ABOUT IN THINKING; and I could not avoid frequently using it. I presume it will be easily granted me, that there are such IDEAS in men’s minds: every one is conscious of them in himself; and men’s words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others.

I thought it necessary to explain this much about what prompted this inquiry into human understanding. But before presenting my thoughts on the subject, I must first ask my reader’s forgiveness. I will frequently use the word IDEA in the pages that follow. I think this word best represents whatever is the OBJECT of the understanding when a person thinks. I have used IDEA to mean a PHANTASM, NOTION, SPECIES, or ANYTHING THE MIND CAN THINK ABOUT. So I could not avoid using the word frequently. I assume readers will readily agree that such IDEAS exist in people’s minds. Everyone is aware of ideas in their own mind. Other people’s words and actions will convince each reader that ideas exist in other minds too.

Our first inquiry then shall be,—how they come into the mind.

Our first question, then, is how they enter the mind.