Introduction

1. Philosophy being nothing else but THE STUDY OF WISDOM AND TRUTH, it may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high-road of plain common sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing THAT IS FAMILIAR appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming SCEPTICS. But no sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a superior principle, to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds concerning those things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts discover themselves to our view; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in speculation, till at length, having wandered through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism.

1. Philosophy is nothing more than THE STUDY OF WISDOM AND TRUTH. So we might reasonably expect those who have devoted the most time and effort to it to have calmer, more peaceful minds and clearer, better supported knowledge than others. We might also expect them to be less troubled by doubts and difficulties. Yet we see that most ordinary, uneducated people follow the straightforward path of common sense and are guided by nature. For the most part, they are at ease and undisturbed. Nothing FAMILIAR seems unexplainable or hard to understand to them. They do not complain that their senses provide too little evidence, and they are in no danger of becoming SCEPTICS. But as soon as we leave sense and instinct behind to follow a higher principle, doubts arise. We begin to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of things. Then a thousand doubts arise about things we once seemed to understand completely. Prejudices and errors of sense reveal themselves on every side. As we try to correct them through reason, we are gradually drawn into strange paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies. These multiply and grow as we continue to speculate. At last, after wandering through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves back where we started. Or, worse still, we give up and settle into hopeless Scepticism.

2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or the natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said, the faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the SUPPORT and comfort of life, and not to penetrate into the INWARD ESSENCE and constitution of things. Besides, the mind of man being finite, when it treats of things which partake of infinity, it is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and contradictions, out of which it is impossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite.

2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things or the natural weakness and imperfection of our minds. It is said that we have few mental faculties. Nature designed these faculties to SUPPORT and comfort us in life, not to penetrate the INNER ESSENCE and structure of things. Besides, the human mind is finite. So when it considers things that partake of infinity, it is no wonder that it falls into absurdities and contradictions. It can never escape them, because the infinite cannot, by its nature, be understood by anything finite.

3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of them. IT IS A HARD THING TO SUPPOSE THAT RIGHT DEDUCTIONS FROM TRUE PRINCIPLES SHOULD EVER END IN CONSEQUENCES WHICH CANNOT BE MAINTAINED or made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites it may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves--that we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.

3. But perhaps we are too quick to excuse ourselves by blaming our faculties rather than our misuse of them. IT IS HARD TO SUPPOSE THAT SOUND REASONING FROM TRUE PRINCIPLES COULD EVER LEAD TO CONCLUSIONS THAT CANNOT BE DEFENDED OR RECONCILED. We should believe that God has been more generous to human beings than to give them a strong desire for knowledge he has placed entirely beyond their reach. That would not fit the usual generosity of Providence. Whatever desires Providence has given creatures, it usually provides the means to satisfy them, if those means are used properly. All in all, I am inclined to think that we ourselves are entirely responsible for most, if not all, of the difficulties that have puzzled philosophers and blocked the way to knowledge. We have first raised a cloud of dust and then complained that we cannot see.

4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects of philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation of our faculties. And surely it is a work well deserving our pains to make a strict inquiry concerning the First Principles of Human Knowledge, to sift and examine them on all sides, especially since there may be some grounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and embarrass the mind in its search after truth, do not spring from any darkness and intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the understanding, so much as from false Principles which have been insisted on, and might have been avoided.

4. My purpose, then, is to try to discover which principles have brought all that doubt and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the various schools of philosophy. As a result, the wisest people have thought our ignorance incurable. They believe it arises from the natural dullness and limits of our faculties. Surely it is well worth the effort to investigate the First Principles of Human Knowledge closely and examine them from every angle. This is especially true since there may be reason to suspect that the obstacles and difficulties that stop and hinder the mind in its search for truth come less from obscurity and complexity in the objects of inquiry, or from natural defects in our understanding, than from false principles that have been upheld and might have been avoided.

5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I consider how many great and extraordinary men have gone before me in the like designs, yet I am not without some hopes--upon the consideration that the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is short--sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far better eyes.

5. This attempt may seem difficult and discouraging, especially when I consider how many great and extraordinary men have tried similar things before me. Yet I have some hope. The broadest views are not always the clearest. A short-sighted person must bring an object closer to see it. By examining it closely and narrowly, he may perhaps notice something that far better eyes have missed.

6. A CHIEF SOURCE OF ERROR IN ALL PARTS OF KNOWLEDGE.--In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction, concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravelling this matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mind has a power of framing ABSTRACT IDEAS or notions of things. He who is not a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers must needs acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract ideas. These are in a more especial manner thought to be the object of those sciences which go by the name of LOGIC and METAPHYSICS, and of all that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime learning, in all which one shall scarce find any question handled in such a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is well acquainted with them.

6. A CHIEF SOURCE OF ERROR IN ALL AREAS OF KNOWLEDGE. To help prepare the reader’s mind to understand what follows, I should first introduce the nature and misuse of language. But explaining this matter leads me to anticipate my argument somewhat. I must consider what seems to have played a chief part in making philosophical inquiry intricate and confusing. It also seems to have caused countless errors and difficulties in almost all areas of knowledge. This is the belief that the mind has the power to form ABSTRACT IDEAS or notions of things. Anyone with more than a passing familiarity with philosophers’ writings and disputes must acknowledge that much of them concerns abstract ideas. These ideas are thought to be especially the subject of the sciences called LOGIC and METAPHYSICS. They are also thought to be the subject of everything considered the most abstract and elevated learning. In all these fields, one can hardly find a question treated without assuming that abstract ideas exist in the mind and that the mind is well acquainted with them.

7. PROPER ACCEPTATION OF ABSTRACTION.--It is agreed on all hands that the qualities or modes of things do never REALLY EXIST EACH OF THEM APART BY ITSELF, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together, several in the same object. But, we are told, the mind being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to itself abstract ideas. For example, there is perceived by sight an object extended, coloured, and moved: this mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its simple, constituent parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without extension; but only that the mind can frame to itself by ABSTRACTION the idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both colour and extension.

7. THE PROPER MEANING OF ABSTRACTION. Everyone agrees that the qualities or properties of things never really exist separately from one another. Instead, several qualities are mixed and blended together in the same object. But we are told that the mind can consider each quality separately, apart from the other qualities joined to it. By doing so, it forms abstract ideas. For example, we see an object that has extension, colour, and motion. The mind separates this mixed or compound idea into its simple parts and considers each one apart from the others. In this way, it forms the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. This does not mean that colour or motion can exist without extension. It means only that, by abstraction, the mind can form an idea of colour without extension, and an idea of motion without either colour or extension.

8. OF GENERALIZING¹.--Again, the mind having observed that in the particular extensions perceived by sense there is something COMMON and alike IN ALL, and some other things peculiar, as this or that figure or magnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it considers apart or singles out by itself that which is common, making thereof a most abstract idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has any figure or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded from all these. So likewise the mind, by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by sense that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that only which is COMMON TO ALL, makes an idea of colour in abstract which is neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate colour. And, in like manner, by considering motion abstractedly not only from the body moved, but likewise from the figure it describes, and all particular directions and velocities, the abstract idea of motion is framed; which equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be perceived by sense.

8. ON GENERALIZING¹. The mind observes that the particular forms of extension perceived by the senses have something in common. Each also has features, such as its particular shape or size, that distinguish it from the others. The mind considers what is common on its own, forming a highly abstract idea of extension. This idea is neither a line, a surface, nor a solid. It has no shape or size, but is entirely separated from all of these. Similarly, the mind leaves out what distinguishes the particular colors perceived by the senses from one another. It retains only what all colors have in common, forming an abstract idea of color. This idea is neither red, blue, white, nor any other specific color. In the same way, the mind considers motion apart from the body moving. It also considers motion apart from the path it describes and from all particular directions and speeds. In this way, the mind forms an abstract idea of motion. This idea corresponds equally to all particular motions that can be perceived by the senses.

9. OF COMPOUNDING.--And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities or MODES, so does it, by the same precision or mental separation, attain abstract ideas of the more compounded BEINGS which include several coexistent qualities. For example, the mind having observed that Peter, James, and John resemble each other in certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded idea it has of Peter, James, and any other particular man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is common to all, and so makes an abstract idea wherein all the particulars equally partake--abstracting entirely from and cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might determine it to any particular existence. And after this manner it is said we come by the abstract idea of MAN, or, if you please, humanity, or human nature; wherein it is true there is included colour, because there is no man but has some colour, but then it can be neither white, nor black, nor any particular colour, because there is no one particular colour wherein all men partake. So likewise there is included stature, but then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet middle stature, but something abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. Moreover, their being a great variety of other creatures that partake in some parts, but not all, of the complex idea of MAN, the mind, leaving out those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only which are common to all the living creatures, frames the idea of ANIMAL, which abstracts not only from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects. The constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal are body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By BODY is meant body without any particular shape or figure, there being no one shape or figure common to all animals, without covering, either of hair, or feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked: hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness being the distinguishing properties of particular animals, and for that reason left out of the ABSTRACT IDEA. Upon the same account the spontaneous motion must be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping; it is nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is not easy to conceive².

9. COMBINING IDEAS. Just as the mind forms abstract ideas of qualities or modes, it also forms abstract ideas of more complex beings. These beings have several qualities that exist together. The mind forms these ideas by the same process of mental separation. For example, the mind observes that Peter, James, and John resemble one another in shape and other qualities. It then leaves out what is peculiar to each from its complex idea of Peter, James, and any other individual man. The mind keeps only what all have in common. In this way, it forms an abstract idea in which all individuals equally share. It leaves out entirely every circumstance and difference that might make the idea apply to any particular individual. In this way, it is said, we arrive at the abstract idea of MAN, or, if you prefer, humanity or human nature. This idea does include color, because every man has some color. But it can be neither white, nor black, nor any other particular color, because no particular color is shared by all men. The idea also includes height, but not tall, short, or medium height. Instead, it includes something abstracted from all of these. The same is true of the other qualities. Moreover, many other creatures share some, but not all, parts of the complex idea of MAN. The mind leaves out the parts peculiar to men and keeps only those common to all living creatures. In this way, it forms the idea of ANIMAL. This idea abstracts not only from all individual men, but also from all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects. The parts that make up the abstract idea of animal are body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By BODY is meant a body without any particular shape or form, since no single shape or form is common to all animals. It has no covering of hair, feathers, scales, and so on, yet it is not naked. Hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness are properties that distinguish particular animals, and for that reason they are left out of the ABSTRACT IDEA. For the same reason, the spontaneous motion must be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping. It is nevertheless a motion, but what kind of motion it is is not easy to imagine².

10. TWO OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.--Whether others have this wonderful faculty of ABSTRACTING THEIR IDEAS, they best can tell: for myself, I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own myself able to abstract IN ONE SENSE, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract from one another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can frame a general notion, by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid--which last are the two proper acceptations of ABSTRACTION. And there are grounds to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men which are simple and illiterate never pretend to ABSTRACT NOTIONS. It is said they are difficult and not to be attained without pains and study; we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are confined only to the learned.

10. TWO OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF ABSTRACT IDEAS. Others can best say whether they have this wonderful ability to ABSTRACT THEIR IDEAS. For my part, I find that I can imagine, or picture to myself, the ideas of particular things I have perceived. I can also combine and separate these ideas in various ways. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper body of a man joined to a horse’s body. I can consider the hand, the eye, or the nose, each on its own, separated from the rest of the body. But whatever hand or eye I imagine must have some particular shape and color. Likewise, the idea of a man I form must be of a man who is white, black, or brown. He must be straight or crooked, tall, short, or of medium height. No matter how hard I try, I cannot conceive the abstract idea described above. It is equally impossible for me to form an abstract idea of motion apart from the moving body. Such motion would be neither fast nor slow, neither curved nor straight. The same can be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I admit that I can abstract IN ONE SENSE. I can consider particular parts or qualities separately from others, even though they are joined together in some object. I can do this when those parts or qualities could actually exist apart from the others. But I deny that I can separate in thought, or conceive separately, qualities that cannot possibly exist apart. I also deny that I can form a general notion by abstracting from particulars in the way described above. These last two are the proper meanings of ABSTRACTION. There are grounds for thinking that most people will admit that they are in the same position as I am. Most ordinary, uneducated people never claim to have ABSTRACT NOTIONS. We are told that abstract notions are difficult to attain and require effort and study. We may therefore reasonably conclude that, if there are such notions, they are confined to educated people.

11. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in DEFENCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACTION, and try if I can discover what it is that inclines the men of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from common sense as that seems to be. There has been a late deservedly esteemed philosopher who, no doubt, has given it very much countenance, by seeming to think the having abstract general ideas is what puts the widest difference in point of understanding betwixt man and beast. "The having of general ideas," saith he, "is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto. For, it is evident we observe no foot-steps in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the FACULTY OF ABSTRACTING, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other general signs." And a little after: "Therefore, I think, we may suppose that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from men, and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For, if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do, some of them, in certain instances reason as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of ABSTRACTION." Essay on Human Understanding, II. xi. 10 and 11. I readily agree with this learned author, that the faculties of brutes can by no means attain to ABSTRACTION. But then if this be made the distinguishing property of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of those that pass for men must be reckoned into their number. The reason that is here assigned why we have no grounds to think brutes have abstract general ideas is, that we observe in them no use of words or any other general signs; which is built on this supposition--that the making use of words implies the having general ideas. From which it follows that men who use language are able to ABSTRACT or GENERALIZE their ideas. That this is the sense and arguing of the author will further appear by his answering the question he in another place puts: "Since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms?" His answer is: "Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas."--Essay on Human Understanding, IV. iii. 6. But³ it seems that a word becomes general by being made the sign, not of an ABSTRACT general idea, but of several particular ideas⁴, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind. For example, when it is said "the change of motion is proportional to the impressed force," or that "whatever has extension is divisible," these propositions are to be understood of motion and extension in general; and nevertheless it will not follow that they suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion without a body moved, or any determinate direction and velocity, or that I must conceive an abstract general idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, nor of any other determinate colour. It is only implied that whatever particular motion I consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning it holds equally true. As does the other of every particular extension, it matters not whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this or that magnitude or figure.

11. I will now examine what can be said IN DEFENSE OF THE DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACTION. I will also try to discover why speculative thinkers embrace an opinion that seems so far removed from common sense. A recent and deservedly respected philosopher has undoubtedly given the doctrine considerable support. He seems to think that having abstract general ideas marks the greatest difference between human and animal understanding. "Having general ideas," he says, "is what makes a complete distinction between humans and animals. It is an excellence that the faculties of animals can in no way attain. For we clearly observe no trace of their using general signs for universal ideas. This gives us reason to think that they lack the FACULTY OF ABSTRACTING, or forming general ideas, since they do not use words or any other general signs." A little later, he says: "Therefore, I think we may suppose that this distinguishes animal species from humans. It is the defining difference that separates them completely and eventually opens up such a wide distance between them. For if animals have any ideas at all, and are not mere machines (as some would have them be), we cannot deny that they have some reason. It seems as clear to me that some animals reason in certain cases as that they have senses. But they reason only with particular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses. Even the best of them are confined within those narrow limits. They do not, I think, have the faculty to extend those limits through any kind of ABSTRACTION." Essay on Human Understanding, II. xi. 10 and 11. I readily agree with this learned author that the faculties of animals can in no way attain ABSTRACTION. But if abstraction is what distinguishes humans from animals, I fear that many who pass for humans must be counted among the animals. The reason given here for thinking that animals have no abstract general ideas is that we see them use no words or other general signs. This argument assumes that using words involves having general ideas. It follows that humans who use language are able to ABSTRACT or GENERALIZE their ideas. That this is what the author means, and how he argues, becomes even clearer in his answer to a question he asks elsewhere: "Since all existing things are only particulars, how do we come to have general terms?" He answers: "Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas." Essay on Human Understanding, IV. iii. 6. But³ it seems that a word becomes general by being made the sign, not of an ABSTRACT general idea, but of several particular ideas⁴. The word brings any one of those particular ideas equally well to mind. For example, we say that "the change of motion is proportional to the impressed force," or that "whatever has extension is divisible." These propositions are to be understood as applying to motion and extension in general. Yet it does not follow that they bring to my mind an idea of motion without a body moving, or without any definite direction or speed. Nor does it follow that I must conceive an abstract general idea of extension that is neither line, surface, nor solid. Such an idea would also be neither large nor small, black, white, red, nor any other definite color. The first proposition implies only that the principle holds equally true for whatever particular motion I consider. It holds whether the motion is fast or slow, vertical, horizontal, or slanting, and whatever object is moving. The second proposition holds equally true for every particular extension. It does not matter whether the extension is a line, surface, or solid, or what size or shape it has.

12. EXISTENCE OF GENERAL IDEAS ADMITTED.--By observing how ideas become general we may the better judge how words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely there are general ideas, but only that there are any ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS; for, in the passages we have quoted wherein there is mention of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are formed by ABSTRACTION, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9. Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the SAME SORT. To make this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, as it is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in general. And, as that particular line becomes general by being made a sign, so the name LINE, which taken absolutely is PARTICULAR, by being a sign is made GENERAL. And as the former owes its generality not to its being the sign of an abstract or general line, but of ALL PARTICULAR right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must be thought to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, the VARIOUS PARTICULAR lines which it indifferently denotes.⁵

12. THE EXISTENCE OF GENERAL IDEAS ADMITTED. By observing how ideas become general, we can better judge how words become general. I do not deny that general ideas exist. I deny only that there are any ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS. In the passages we have quoted, general ideas are always assumed to be formed by ABSTRACTION. Sections 8 and 9 describe how this is supposed to happen. Now, let us give our words meaning and speak only of what we can conceive. If we do, I believe we shall acknowledge the following. An idea that is particular when considered in itself becomes general when it represents all other particular ideas of the SAME SORT. To make this clear, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating how to divide a line into two equal parts. He draws, for example, a black line one inch long. The line is particular in itself. Yet it is general in what it signifies, since it represents all particular lines whatsoever in this demonstration. So what is demonstrated of this line is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in general. Just as the particular line becomes general by serving as a sign, so does the name LINE. The name, considered on its own, is PARTICULAR, but it becomes GENERAL by serving as a sign. The particular line is general not because it signifies an abstract or general line. It is general because it signifies ALL PARTICULAR straight lines that could possibly exist. In the same way, we must understand the name to be general for the same reason. It denotes any of the VARIOUS PARTICULAR lines without distinction.⁵

13. ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS NECESSARY, ACCORDING TO LOCKE.--To give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas, and the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more passage out of the Essay on Human Understanding, (IV. vii. 9) which is as follows: "ABSTRACT IDEAS are not so obvious or easy to children or the yet unexercised mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For, when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult); for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but ALL AND NONE of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and INCONSISTENT ideas are put together. It is true the mind in this imperfect state has need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the CONVENIENCY OF COMMUNICATION AND ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE, to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this is enough to show that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about."--If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task for anyone to perform. What more easy than for anyone to look a little into his own thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with the description that is here given of the general idea of a triangle, which is NEITHER OBLIQUE NOR RECTANGLE, EQUILATERAL, EQUICRURAL NOR SCALENON, BUT ALL AND NONE OF THESE AT ONCE?

13. ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS ARE NECESSARY, ACCORDING TO LOCKE. To give the reader a clearer view of abstract ideas and the uses for which they are thought necessary, I will add one more passage from the Essay on Human Understanding (IV. vii. 9): "ABSTRACT IDEAS are not as obvious or easy for children or untrained minds as particular ideas. If they seem easy to adults, that is only because constant, familiar use has made them so. When we examine them carefully, we find that general ideas are inventions and constructions of the mind. They are difficult and do not come to mind as easily as we tend to imagine. For example, does it not take some effort and skill to form the general idea of a triangle? Yet this is not one of the most abstract, broad, or difficult ideas. The triangle must be neither oblique nor right-angled, neither equilateral, isosceles, nor scalene, but ALL AND NONE of these at once. In fact, it is something imperfect that cannot exist. It is an idea in which parts of several different and INCONSISTENT ideas are combined. It is true that the mind, in its imperfect state, needs such ideas and moves toward them as quickly as it can. It does so for the CONVENIENCE OF COMMUNICATION AND THE EXPANSION OF KNOWLEDGE, both of which it naturally has a strong inclination toward. But we still have reason to suspect that such ideas are signs of our imperfection. At least this is enough to show that the most abstract and general ideas are not those the mind encounters first or most easily, nor are they the ones its earliest knowledge concerns." If anyone can form in their mind an idea of a triangle like the one described here, it would be pointless to try to argue them out of it, and I would not try. All I ask is that the reader make completely sure whether they have such an idea or not. This, it seems to me, should not be hard for anyone to do. What could be easier than to look into one's own thoughts for a moment and see whether one has, or can form, an idea matching the general idea of a triangle described here? That idea is NEITHER OBLIQUE NOR RIGHT-ANGLED, EQUILATERAL, ISOSCELES, NOR SCALENE, BUT ALL AND NONE OF THESE AT ONCE.

14. BUT THEY ARE NOT NECESSARY FOR COMMUNICATION.--Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with them, and the pains and skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind, to emancipate our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them to those sublime speculations that are conversant about abstract ideas. From all which the natural consequence should seem to be, that so DIFFICULT a thing as the forming abstract ideas was not necessary for COMMUNICATION, which is so EASY and familiar to ALL SORTS OF MEN. But, we are told, if they seem obvious and easy to grown men, IT IS ONLY BECAUSE BY CONSTANT AND FAMILIAR USE THEY ARE MADE SO. Now, I would fain know at what time it is men are employed in surmounting that difficulty, and furnishing themselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for then it seems they are not conscious of any such painstaking; it remains therefore to be the business of their childhood. And surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract notions will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of their sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till they have first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in their minds ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS, and annexed them to every common name they make use of?

14. BUT THEY ARE NOT NECESSARY FOR COMMUNICATION. Much has been said about the difficulty of forming abstract ideas, and the effort and skill required. Everyone agrees that freeing our thoughts from particular objects takes great mental effort. So does raising them to those lofty speculations concerned with abstract ideas. From all this, the natural conclusion would seem to be that forming abstract ideas is too difficult to be necessary for communication. After all, communication is easy and familiar to all sorts of people. But we are told that, if abstract ideas seem obvious and easy to adults, it is only because constant, familiar use has made them so. I would like to know when people overcome that difficulty and acquire these necessary aids to conversation. It cannot be when they are grown up, because then they seem unaware of any such effort. So it must be the work of childhood. And surely the great and repeated labor of forming abstract notions would be a hard task at that tender age. Is it not hard to imagine that two children cannot chatter together about their candies, rattles, and other little toys until they have first pieced together countless contradictions? Must they form ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS in their minds and attach them to every common name they use?

15. NOR FOR THE ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE.--Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the ENLARGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE than for COMMUNICATION. It is, I know, a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to which I fully agree: but then it doth not appear to me that those notions are formed by ABSTRACTION in the manner PREMISED--UNIVERSALITY, so far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, POSITIVE nature or conception of anything, but in the RELATION it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or notions, being in their own nature PARTICULAR, are rendered UNIVERSAL. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition concerning triangles, it is to be supposed that I have in view the universal idea of a triangle; which ought not to be understood as if I could frame an idea of a triangle which was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural; but only that the particular triangle I consider, whether of this or that sort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense UNIVERSAL. All which seems very plain and not to include any difficulty in it.

15. NOR FOR THE EXPANSION OF KNOWLEDGE. I do not think abstract ideas are any more necessary for expanding knowledge than for communication. I know that many insist all knowledge and demonstration concern universal notions, and I fully agree. But it does not seem to me that these notions are formed by abstraction in the way described earlier. As far as I can understand, universality does not consist in the inherent, positive nature or conception of anything. Rather, it consists in the relation a thing bears to the particular things it signifies or represents. This relation makes things, names, or notions universal, even though they are particular in their own nature. For example, when I demonstrate any proposition about triangles, I am supposed to have a universal idea of a triangle in mind. This does not mean that I can form an idea of a triangle that is neither equilateral, scalene, nor isosceles. It means only that the particular triangle I consider represents all triangles with straight sides equally well. It does not matter what kind of triangle I consider. In this sense, the particular triangle is universal. All of this seems very plain and presents no difficulty.

16. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But here it will be demanded, HOW WE CAN KNOW ANY PROPOSITION TO BE TRUE OF ALL PARTICULAR TRIANGLES, EXCEPT we have first seen it DEMONSTRATED OF THE ABSTRACT IDEA OF A TRIANGLE which equally agrees to all? For, because a property may be demonstrated to agree to some one particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally belongs to any other triangle, which in all respects is not the same with it. For example, having demonstrated that the three angles of an isosceles rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither a right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain this proposition is universally true, we must either make a particular demonstration for every particular triangle, which is impossible, or once for all demonstrate it of the ABSTRACT IDEA OF A TRIANGLE, in which all the particulars do indifferently partake and by which they are all equally represented. To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in view whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles, of what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at all concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have in view includes all these particulars, but then there is not the least mention made of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three angles are equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, or because the sides comprehending it are of the same length. Which sufficiently shows that the right angle might have been oblique, and the sides unequal, and for all that the demonstration have held good. And for this reason it is that I conclude that to be true of any obliquangular or scalenon which I had demonstrated of a particular right--angled equicrural triangle, and not because I demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a triangle And here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far he may abstract; but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract, general, inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may consider Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal without framing the fore-mentioned abstract idea, either of man or of animal, inasmuch as all that is perceived is not considered.

16. OBJECTION. ANSWER. But someone will ask: How can we know that a proposition is true of all individual triangles? Must we not first see it demonstrated for the abstract idea of a triangle, which applies equally to them all? A property may be demonstrated to belong to one particular triangle. But it does not follow that the property equally belongs to another triangle that is not identical in every respect. For example, suppose I demonstrate that the three angles of an isosceles right triangle equal two right angles. I cannot therefore conclude that this property belongs to all other triangles, which have neither a right angle nor two equal sides. So it seems that we have two choices if we want to be certain this proposition is universally true. We must either give a separate demonstration for every individual triangle, which is impossible, or demonstrate it once and for all for the abstract idea of a triangle. All individual triangles share equally in this abstract idea, and it represents them all equally. I answer that the idea I have in mind during the demonstration may be an isosceles right triangle with sides of a particular length. Even so, I can be certain that the demonstration applies to all other triangles with straight sides, whatever their kind or size. This is because the demonstration does not depend on the right angle, the equal sides, or their particular length. The diagram I have in mind does include all these features. But the proof of the proposition makes no mention of them. It does not say that the three angles equal two right angles because one is a right angle. Nor does it say so because the sides that form the right angle are equal in length. This shows clearly enough that the right angle could have been an oblique angle and the sides unequal. Even so, the demonstration would still have held. For this reason, I conclude that what I demonstrated for a particular isosceles right triangle is true of any triangle with no right angle or any triangle with unequal sides. I do not conclude this because I demonstrated the proposition for the abstract idea of a triangle. And here we must acknowledge that someone may consider a figure simply as a triangle, without attending to the particular qualities of its angles or the relations between its sides. In this sense, someone can abstract. But this will never prove that a person can form an abstract, general, inconsistent idea of a triangle. In the same way, we can consider Peter as a man, or as an animal, without forming the abstract idea of a man or an animal mentioned above. This is because we do not consider everything we perceive.

17. ADVANTAGE OF INVESTIGATING THE DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS.--It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the SCHOOLMEN, those great masters of abstraction, through all the manifold inextricable labyrinths of error and dispute which their doctrine of abstract natures and notions seems to have led them into. What bickerings and controversies, and what a learned dust have been raised about those matters, and what mighty advantage has been from thence derived to mankind, are things at this day too clearly known to need being insisted on. And it had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine were confined to those only who make the most avowed profession of it. When men consider the great pains, industry, and parts that have for so many ages been laid out on the cultivation and advancement of the sciences, and that notwithstanding all this the far greater part of them remains full of darkness and uncertainty, and disputes that are like never to have an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by the most clear and cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that, taking all together, a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion and amusement--I say the consideration of all this is apt to throw them into a despondency and perfect contempt of all study. But this may perhaps cease upon a view of the false principles that have obtained in the world, amongst all which there is none, methinks, has a more wide and extended sway over the thoughts of speculative men than⁶ this of abstract general ideas.

17. THE BENEFIT OF EXAMINING THE DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS. It would be both endless and pointless to follow the Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction, through every tangled maze of error and dispute. Their doctrine of abstract natures and notions seems to have led them into these mazes. Everyone now knows too well what quarrels and controversies, and what a cloud of learned dust, these matters have stirred up. Everyone also knows what a great benefit all this has brought to humanity. There is no need to dwell on it. And it would have been better if the harmful effects of the doctrine were confined to its most declared followers. For many ages, people have devoted great effort, industry, and talent to developing and advancing the sciences. Yet the great majority of the sciences remain full of obscurity, uncertainty, and disputes that seem unlikely ever to end. Even those sciences thought to rest on the clearest and most compelling demonstrations contain paradoxes that people simply cannot make sense of. Taken together, very few of the sciences offer any real benefit to humanity, except as an innocent diversion and amusement. When people consider all this, they are apt to become discouraged and to feel complete contempt for study. But perhaps this discouragement and contempt may cease if they examine the false principles that have taken hold in the world. Among all those principles, none seems to me to have more widespread influence on the thoughts of people engaged in speculation than⁶ the principle of abstract general ideas.

18. I come now to consider the SOURCE OF THIS PREVAILING NOTION, and that seems to me to be LANGUAGE. And surely nothing of less extent than reason itself could have been the source of an opinion so universally received. The truth of this appears as from other reasons so also from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in order to naming; from which it is a clear consequence that if there had been no such things as speech or universal signs there never had been any thought of abstraction. See III. vi. 39, and elsewhere of the Essay on Human Understanding. Let us examine the manner wherein words have contributed to the origin of that mistake.--First [Vide sect. xix.] then, it is thought that every name has, or ought to have, ONE ONLY precise and settled signification, which inclines men to think there are certain ABSTRACT, DETERMINATE IDEAS that constitute the true and only immediate signification of each general name; and that it is by the mediation of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to any general name, they all signifying indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All which doth evidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly appear to anyone by a little reflexion. To this it will be OBJECTED that every name that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain signification. For example, a TRIANGLE is defined to be A PLAIN SURFACE COMPREHENDED BY THREE RIGHT LINES, by which that name is limited to denote one certain idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the definition it is not said whether the surface be great or small, black or white, nor whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, nor with what angles they are inclined to each other; in all which there may be great variety, and consequently there is NO ONE SETTLED IDEA which limits the signification of the word TRIANGLE. It is one thing for to keep a name constantly to the same definition, and another to make it stand everywhere for the same idea; the one is necessary, the other useless and impracticable.

18. I now turn to the SOURCE OF THIS WIDESPREAD NOTION. Its source seems to me to be LANGUAGE. Surely nothing less widespread than reason itself could have produced an opinion so universally accepted. Among other reasons, the leading defenders of abstract ideas plainly admit that these ideas are made for naming. It follows clearly that, without speech or universal signs, there would never have been any thought of abstraction. See III. vi. 39 and other parts of the Essay on Human Understanding. Let us examine how words have contributed to this mistake. First (see section xix), people think that every name has, or ought to have, ONE precise and fixed meaning. This leads them to think that certain ABSTRACT, DEFINITE IDEAS are the true and only immediate meanings of general names. They also think that a general name refers to any particular thing by means of these abstract ideas. In truth, however, no general name has a single precise and definite meaning attached to it. Every general name refers equally to a great number of particular ideas. All this follows plainly from what has already been said. It will also become clear to anyone who reflects a little. Someone will OBJECT that every name with a definition is thereby limited to one particular meaning. For example, a TRIANGLE is defined as A FLAT SURFACE ENCLOSED BY THREE STRAIGHT LINES. This definition, the objection goes, limits the name to one particular idea and no other. I answer that the definition does not say whether the surface is large or small, black or white. Nor does it say whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal. Nor does it say what angles the sides make with one another. All these features can vary greatly. Consequently, NO SINGLE FIXED IDEA limits the meaning of the word TRIANGLE. Keeping a name consistently tied to the same definition is one thing. Making it stand for the same idea everywhere is another. The first is necessary. The second is useless and impractical.

19. SECONDLY, But, to give a farther account how WORDS came to PRODUCE THE DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACT IDEAS, it must be observed that it is a received opinion that language has NO OTHER END but the communicating our ideas, and that every significant name stands for an idea. This being so, and it being withal certain that names which yet are not thought altogether insignificant do not always mark out PARTICULAR conceivable ideas, it is straightway concluded that THEY STAND FOR ABSTRACT NOTIONS. That there are many names in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest to others determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what nobody will deny. And a little attention will discover that it is not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant names which stand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to stand for--in reading and discoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are in ALGEBRA, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for.⁷

19. SECONDLY, let me explain further how WORDS came to PRODUCE THE DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACT IDEAS. It is commonly believed that language has NO OTHER PURPOSE than to communicate our ideas, and that every meaningful name stands for an idea. Yet some names are not considered entirely meaningless, even though they do not always point to particular ideas we can conceive. From this, people immediately conclude that THOSE NAMES STAND FOR ABSTRACT NOTIONS. No one will deny that thinkers use many names that do not always suggest definite, particular ideas to others, or indeed suggest anything at all. And a little attention will show that even the strictest reasoning does not require meaningful names to call their corresponding ideas to mind every time they are used. In reading and discussion, names are mostly used like letters in ALGEBRA. Each letter represents a particular quantity, but we need not think of that quantity at every step to proceed correctly.⁷

20. SOME OF THE ENDS OF LANGUAGE.--Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition--to which the former is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think does not unfrequently happen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either in hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred, admiration, disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain words, without any ideas coming between. At first, indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas that were fitting to produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that, when language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sight of the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions which at first were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are now quite omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the promise of a GOOD THING, though we have not an idea of what it is? Or is not the being threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we think not of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to ourselves an idea of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever so little reflexion of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the propriety of language without the speaker's designing them for marks of ideas in his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of the hearer. Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken with a design to bring into our view the ideas of those individuals that are supposed to be marked by them. For example, when a schoolman tells me "Aristotle has said it," all I conceive he means by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which custom has annexed to that name. And this effect is often so instantly produced in the minds of those who are accustomed to resign their judgment to authority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of his person, writings, or reputation should go before⁸. Innumerable examples of this kind may be given, but why should I insist on those things which every one's experience will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him?

20. SOME PURPOSES OF LANGUAGE. Besides, as people commonly suppose, communicating the ideas that words signify is not the chief and only purpose of language. Language has other purposes. It can stir emotions, encourage or discourage action, or put the mind in a particular state. In many cases, communicating ideas merely serves these other purposes. Sometimes it is left out entirely, when these purposes can be achieved without it. I think this happens fairly often in everyday language. I ask the reader to reflect on this. When hearing or reading a passage, do you not often feel fear, love, hatred, admiration, disdain, and similar emotions immediately upon encountering certain words, without any ideas coming between? At first, the words might have prompted ideas suited to produce those emotions. But, unless I am mistaken, once language becomes familiar, we often feel those emotions immediately upon hearing or seeing the words. At first, ideas produced the emotions, but now those ideas are left out entirely. For example, may we not be moved by the promise of a GOOD THING, even though we have no idea what it is? Or is a threat of danger not enough to arouse dread, even if we do not think of any particular harm likely to befall us, or form an abstract idea of danger? If anyone gives even a little thought to what I have said, I believe the following will become clear. General names are often used properly in language without the speaker intending them to signify ideas in their own mind that they want to bring into the listener's mind. Even proper names themselves do not always seem to be spoken with the aim of bringing to mind ideas of the individuals they are supposed to signify. For example, when a scholar tells me "Aristotle has said it," I understand him to mean only that I should accept his opinion with the deference and submission that custom has attached to that name. This effect is often produced instantly in people accustomed to yielding their judgment to the authority of that philosopher. It happens so quickly that no idea of his person, writings, or reputation could possibly come before it⁸. Innumerable examples of this kind could be given. But why should I dwell on things that, I have no doubt, everyone's experience will amply suggest?

21. CAUTION IN THE USE OF LANGUAGE NECESSARY.--We have, I think, shown the impossibility of ABSTRACT IDEAS. We have considered what has been said for them by their ablest patrons; and endeavored to show they are of no use for those ends to which they are thought necessary. And lastly, we have traced them to the source from whence they flow, which appears evidently to be language.--It cannot be denied that words are of excellent use, in that by their means all that stock of knowledge which has been purchased by the joint labours of inquisitive men in all ages and nations may be drawn into the view and made the possession of one single person. But at the same time it must be owned that most parts of knowledge have been strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse of words, and general ways of speech wherein they are delivered.⁹ Since therefore words are so apt to impose on the understanding¹⁰, whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts so far as I am able, those names which long and constant use has so strictly united with them; from which I may expect to derive the following advantages:

21. CAUTION IN THE USE OF LANGUAGE IS NECESSARY. I think we have shown that abstract ideas are impossible. We have considered what their strongest defenders have said in their favor. We have also tried to show that abstract ideas serve none of the purposes for which they are thought necessary. Finally, we have traced abstract ideas to their source, which is evidently language. Words are undeniably very useful. Through words, one person can gain access to and possess all the knowledge acquired through the combined efforts of inquisitive people of all ages and nations. But we must also admit that the misuse of words has made most areas of knowledge strangely confused and obscure. So have the general ways of speaking in which knowledge is expressed.⁹ Words can so easily mislead the understanding¹⁰ that I will try to consider each idea bare and on its own. As far as I can, I will keep out of my thoughts the names that long and constant use has so closely linked with those ideas. From this practice, I may expect to gain the following advantages:

22. FIRST, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies PURELY VERBAL--the springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences has been a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound knowledge. SECONDLY, this seems to be a sure way to extricate myself out of that fine and subtle net of ABSTRACT IDEAS which has so miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of men; and that with this peculiar circumstance, that by how much the finer and more curious was the wit of any man, by so much the deeper was he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein. THIRDLY, so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine that any of my own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To discern the agreements or disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideas are included in any compound idea and what not, there is nothing more requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own understanding.

22. FIRST, I will be sure to avoid all purely verbal disputes. These weeds have sprung up in almost every science, greatly hindering the growth of true and sound knowledge. SECONDLY, this seems a sure way to free myself from the fine and subtle net of abstract ideas. This net has so miserably confused and entangled people's minds. And it has this peculiar feature: the more subtle and ingenious a person's mind, the more deeply and firmly it was likely to be caught in the net. THIRDLY, as long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas, without words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. I know the objects I consider clearly and fully. I cannot be deceived into thinking I have an idea that I do not have. Nor can I imagine that any of my ideas are alike or different when they are not. To see where my ideas agree or disagree, I need only pay close attention to what happens in my own mind. The same is true when I consider which ideas are included in a compound idea and which are not.

23. But the attainment of all THESE ADVANTAGES doth PRESUPPOSE AN ENTIRE DELIVERANCE FROM THE DECEPTION OF WORDS, which I dare hardly promise myself; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an union so early begun, and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas. Which difficulty seems to have been very much increased by the doctrine of ABSTRACTION. For, so long as men thought abstract ideas were annexed to their words, it doth not seem strange that they should use words for ideas--it being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word, and RETAIN THE ABSTRACT IDEA IN THE MIND, WHICH IN ITSELF WAS PERFECTLY INCONCEIVABLE. This seems to me the principal cause why those men who have so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside all use of words in their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas, have yet failed to perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of the abuse of words. And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise well, that we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from the words which signify them. But, how good soever this advice may be they have given others, it is plain they could not have a due regard to it themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use of words was to signify ideas, and that the immediate signification of every general name was a DETERMINATE ABSTRACT IDEA.

23. But gaining all these advantages requires complete freedom from the deception of words. I hardly dare promise myself that I can achieve this freedom. The union between words and ideas begins so early and is strengthened by such long habit that it is difficult to break. The doctrine of abstraction seems to have made this difficulty much greater. For as long as people thought that abstract ideas were attached to their words, it is not surprising that they used words in place of ideas. They found it impossible to set aside the word and keep the abstract idea in mind, because the idea itself was completely inconceivable. This seems to me the main reason why some people have failed to follow their own advice. They have strongly urged others to set aside all use of words in their thinking and contemplate their ideas alone. Recently, many people have become very aware of the absurd opinions and meaningless disputes that arise from the misuse of words. To remedy these evils, they rightly advise us to attend to the ideas that words signify and turn our attention away from the words themselves. But however good this advice may be, they plainly could not follow it properly themselves. They believed that the only immediate use of words was to signify ideas. They also believed that every general name immediately signified a definite abstract idea.

24. But, THESE BEING KNOWN TO BE MISTAKES, A MAN MAY with greater ease PREVENT HIS BEING IMPOSED ON BY WORDS. He that knows he has no other than particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name. And he that knows names do not always stand for ideas will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to be wished that everyone would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider, separating from them all that dress and incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind the judgment and divide the attention. In vain do we extend our view into the heavens and pry into the entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult the writings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity--we need only draw the curtain of words, to hold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand.

24. But once people know these are mistakes, they can more easily avoid being misled by words. Anyone who knows that they have only particular ideas will not waste time trying to conceive the abstract idea attached to a name. And anyone who knows that names do not always stand for ideas will not look for ideas where none can be found. Everyone should therefore do their utmost to see clearly the ideas they want to consider. They should separate the ideas from all the trappings and burdens of words, which do so much to cloud judgment and divide attention. It is no use looking into the heavens and searching deep within the earth. It is no use consulting the writings of learned people and tracing the obscure footsteps of antiquity. We need only draw back the curtain of words to see the fairest tree of knowledge, whose excellent fruit is within our reach.

25. Unless we take care TO CLEAR THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE FROM THE embarras and DELUSION OF WORDS, we may make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose; we may draw consequences from consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him to make my words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them. By this means it will be easy for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I say. He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words, and I do not see how he can be led into an error by considering his own naked, undisguised ideas.

25. Unless we take care TO CLEAR THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE FROM THE confusion and DECEPTION OF WORDS, we may reason endlessly about them to no purpose. We may draw one conclusion after another and never become any wiser. The further we go, the more hopelessly lost we will become, and the more deeply entangled in difficulties and mistakes. So I ask anyone who intends to read the following pages to use my words as a starting point for their own thinking. Try to follow the same train of thought in reading that I followed in writing. In this way, it will be easy to discover whether what I say is true or false. The reader will be in no danger of being deceived by my words. And I do not see how anyone can be led into error by considering their own ideas, bare and undisguised.