The Principles of Human Knowledge

1. OBJECTS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.--It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either IDEAS actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination--either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name APPLE. Other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things--which as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth.

1. OBJECTS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. Anyone who surveys the objects of human knowledge can see that they fall into three groups. First, there are IDEAS actually impressed on the senses. Second, there are ideas perceived by paying attention to the emotions and operations of the mind. Finally, there are ideas formed with the help of memory and imagination. These combine, divide, or simply represent ideas originally perceived in the other two ways. Through sight, I have ideas of light and colors, with their various degrees and variations. Through touch, I perceive hardness and softness, heat and cold, motion and resistance. I also perceive differences in their quantity or degree. Smell provides me with odors, taste with flavors, and hearing brings sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. Several of these ideas are observed to occur together. As a result, they come to be called by one name and regarded as one thing. For example, a certain color, taste, smell, shape, and texture have been observed to occur together. They are therefore considered one distinct thing, called an APPLE. Other collections of ideas make up a stone, a tree, a book, and similar things perceived by the senses. These things arouse emotions such as love, hatred, joy, and grief, depending on whether they are pleasant or unpleasant.

2. MIND--SPIRIT--SOUL.--But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call MIND, SPIRIT, SOUL, or MYSELF. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, WHEREIN THEY EXIST, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived--for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived.

2. MIND, SPIRIT, SOUL. But besides this endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is also something that knows or perceives them. This being also acts on them by willing, imagining, and remembering. I call this perceiving, active being MIND, SPIRIT, SOUL, or MYSELF. By these words, I do not mean any one of my ideas. I mean something entirely distinct from them, IN WHICH THEY EXIST. This is the same as saying that ideas are perceived by this being, because an idea exists by being perceived.

3. HOW FAR THE ASSENT OF THE VULGAR CONCEDED.--That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist WITHOUT the mind, is what EVERYBODY WILL ALLOW. And it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than IN a mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by any one that shall attend to WHAT IS MEANT BY THE TERM EXIST, when applied to sensible things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed--meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.¹¹ There was an odour, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their ESSE is PERCIPI, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.

3. HOW FAR ORDINARY PEOPLE AGREE. Everyone agrees that our thoughts, feelings, and imagined ideas do not exist outside the mind. It seems just as clear that sensations or ideas received through the senses cannot exist except in a mind that perceives them. This holds however those sensations or ideas are blended or combined, and whatever objects they make up. I think anyone can grasp this directly by considering what it means to say that things we perceive exist. I say that the table I write on exists. By that, I mean that I see and feel it. If I were out of my study, I would still say it existed. I would mean that I could perceive it if I were in my study, or that some other spirit actually perceives it.¹¹ There was a smell, meaning that it was smelled. There was a sound, meaning that it was heard. There was a color or shape, meaning that it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all I can understand by these and similar expressions. Some speak of things that do not think as existing absolutely, without any relation to their being perceived. That seems completely unintelligible to me. Their ESSE is PERCIPI: their being is being perceived. They cannot exist outside the minds or thinking things that perceive them.

4. THE VULGAR OPINION INVOLVES A CONTRADICTION.--It is indeed an opinion STRANGELY prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the fore-mentioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we PERCEIVE BESIDES OUR OWN IDEAS OR SENSATIONS? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?

4. THE COMMON OPINION INVOLVES A CONTRADICTION. The belief that houses, mountains, rivers, and all objects of the senses exist independently of being perceived by the mind is STRANGELY widespread. People may accept this belief with great confidence and without question. But anyone willing to question it may, if I am not mistaken, see that it involves an obvious contradiction. For what are these objects but the things we perceive through our senses? And what do we PERCEIVE APART FROM OUR OWN IDEAS OR SENSATIONS? Is it not plainly contradictory to say that any one of these, or any combination of them, could exist unperceived?

5. CAUSE OF THIS PREVALENT ERROR.--If we thoroughly examine this tenet it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of ABSTRACT IDEAS. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures--in a word the things we see and feel--what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which, perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, I can abstract--if that may properly be called ABSTRACTION which extends only to the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it.¹²

5. CAUSE OF THIS WIDESPREAD ERROR. If we examine this belief closely, we may find that it rests on the doctrine of ABSTRACT IDEAS. What could be a finer act of abstraction than separating the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived? For that would mean conceiving of them as existing unperceived. Light and colors, heat and cold, extension and shapes, in short, the things we see and feel: what are they but sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the senses? Is it possible to separate any of these from perception, even in thought? For my part, I might as easily separate a thing from itself. I can, indeed, think of things separately even if I have perhaps never perceived them separately through my senses. For example, I can imagine a human torso without limbs, or the smell of a rose without thinking of the rose itself. I will not deny that I can abstract to that extent. But that can properly be called ABSTRACTION only if the term includes conceiving separately objects that could exist or be perceived separately. My power to conceive or imagine does not extend beyond what could really exist or be perceived. I cannot see or feel anything without actually sensing it. In the same way, I cannot conceive of any sensible thing or object apart from the sensation or perception of it.¹²

6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their BEING (ESSE) is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other CREATED SPIRIT, they must either have no existence at all, OR ELSE SUBSIST IN THE MIND OF SOME ETERNAL SPIRIT--it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit¹³. To be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived.

6. Some truths are so close and obvious to the mind that a person need only open their eyes to see them. I believe this important truth is one of them: all the heavens and everything on earth, in short, all the bodies that make up the vast structure of the world, cannot exist outside a mind. Their BEING (ESSE) consists in being perceived or known. So, as long as I do not actually perceive them, and they do not exist in my mind or in the mind of any other CREATED SPIRIT, they must either have no existence at all OR EXIST IN THE MIND OF SOME ETERNAL SPIRIT. To say that any single part of them exists independently of a spirit is completely unintelligible and involves all the absurdity of abstraction¹³. To be convinced of this, the reader need only reflect and try to separate, in thought, the existence of a perceptible thing from its being perceived.

7. SECOND ARGUMENT.¹⁴--From what has been said it follows there is NOT ANY OTHER SUBSTANCE THAN SPIRIT, or that which perceives. But, for the fuller proof of this point, let it be considered the sensible qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, etc., i.e. the ideas perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction, for TO HAVE AN IDEA IS ALL ONE AS TO PERCEIVE; that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist must perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no UNTHINKING substance or SUBSTRATUM of those ideas.

7. SECOND ARGUMENT.¹⁴ From what has been said, it follows that there is NO SUBSTANCE OTHER THAN SPIRIT, or what perceives. But to prove this point more fully, consider the qualities we perceive through our senses. These include color, shape, motion, smell, taste, and so on. They are the ideas we perceive through our senses. Now, it is plainly contradictory for an idea to exist in something that does not perceive. This is because TO HAVE AN IDEA IS THE SAME AS TO PERCEIVE. Therefore, whatever contains color, shape, and similar qualities must perceive them. So clearly there can be no UNTHINKING substance or SUBSTRATUM in which these ideas exist.

8. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things LIKE them, whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance. I ANSWER, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, THEN THEY ARE IDEAS and we have gained our point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so of the rest.

8. OBJECTION. ANSWER. But, you say, although ideas themselves do not exist outside the mind, there may be things that resemble them. Ideas may be copies or likenesses of these things, which exist outside the mind in a substance that does not think. I answer that an idea can resemble nothing but another idea. A color or shape can resemble nothing but another color or shape. If we look even briefly into our thoughts, we will find that we cannot conceive of a likeness except between ideas. Again, I ask whether the supposed originals or external things that our ideas depict or represent can themselves be perceived. If they can, then they are ideas, and we have made our point. But if you say they cannot be perceived, I ask anyone whether it makes sense to say that a color resembles something invisible. Does it make sense to say that something hard or soft resembles something that cannot be touched? The same applies to everything else.

9. THE PHILOSOPHICAL NOTION OF MATTER INVOLVES A CONTRADICTION.--Some there are who make a DISTINCTION betwixt PRIMARY and SECONDARY qualities. By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call MATTER. By MATTER, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion DO ACTUALLY SUBSIST. But it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension, figure, and motion are ONLY IDEAS EXISTING IN THE MIND, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an UNPERCEIVING substance. Hence, it is plain that the very notion of what is called MATTER or CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE, involves a contradiction in it.¹⁵

9. THE PHILOSOPHICAL IDEA OF MATTER INVOLVES A CONTRADICTION. Some people distinguish between primary and secondary qualities. By primary qualities, they mean extension, shape, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number. By secondary qualities, they mean all other qualities perceived by the senses, such as colors, sounds, and tastes. They admit that our ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble anything that exists outside the mind or unperceived. But they claim that our ideas of primary qualities are patterns or images of things that exist outside the mind. They claim that these things exist in an unthinking substance they call matter. By matter, then, we must understand an inert substance without sensation, in which extension, shape, and motion actually exist. But what we have already shown makes it clear that extension, shape, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind. It also shows that an idea can resemble nothing but another idea. Consequently, neither these ideas nor the things they supposedly resemble can exist in a substance that does not perceive. So the very idea of what is called matter or corporeal substance plainly involves a contradiction.¹⁵

10. ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM.--They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not--which they tell us are sensations existing IN THE MIND ALONE, that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those original qualities ARE INSEPARABLY UNITED WITH THE OTHER SENSIBLE QUALITIES, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is ACKNOWLEDGED to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else.

10. ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM. Those who claim that shape, motion, and other primary or original qualities exist outside the mind in unthinking substances also admit something else. They admit that colors, sounds, heat, cold, and similar secondary qualities do not exist outside the mind. They say these secondary qualities are sensations that exist IN THE MIND ALONE. According to them, these sensations depend on and are caused by differences in the size, texture, and motion of tiny particles of matter. They consider this an undoubted truth, which they can prove beyond any objection. Now, suppose that the original qualities ARE INSEPARABLY UNITED WITH THE OTHER SENSIBLE QUALITIES. Suppose also that they cannot be separated from those qualities, even in thought. It plainly follows that the original qualities exist only in the mind. But I ask anyone to reflect and try to imagine the extension and motion of a body apart from all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I clearly see that I cannot form an idea of an extended, moving body without also giving it some color or other sensible quality. Such qualities are ACKNOWLEDGED to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, shape, and motion cannot be conceived apart from all other qualities. Therefore, they must exist wherever the other sensible qualities exist, namely, in the mind and nowhere else.

11. A SECOND ARGUMENT AD HOMINEM.--Again, GREAT and SMALL, SWIFT and SLOW, ARE ALLOWED TO EXIST NOWHERE WITHOUT THE MIND, being entirely RELATIVE, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of sense varies. The extension therefore which exists without the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow, that is, they are nothing at all. But, say you, they are extension in general, and motion in general: thus we see how much the tenet of extended movable substances existing without the mind depends on the strange doctrine of ABSTRACT IDEAS. And here I cannot but remark how nearly the vague and indeterminate description of Matter or corporeal substance, which the modern philosophers are run into by their own principles, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of MATERIA PRIMA, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. Without extension solidity cannot be conceived; since therefore it has been shown that extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same must also be true of solidity.

11. A SECOND ARGUMENT AD HOMINEM. Again, greatness and smallness, speed and slowness, are accepted as existing only in the mind. They are entirely relative and change with the condition or position of the sense organs. Therefore, extension that exists outside the mind is neither great nor small, and motion is neither swift nor slow. In other words, they are nothing at all. But, you say, they are extension in general and motion in general. This shows how much the belief in extended, movable substances existing outside the mind depends on the strange doctrine of abstract ideas. Here I cannot help noticing how closely this vague and indefinite account of Matter, or corporeal substance, resembles the old and much-ridiculed notion of MATERIA PRIMA. Modern philosophers have arrived at this account through their own principles. The notion of MATERIA PRIMA can be found in Aristotle and his followers. Solidity cannot be conceived without extension. Since extension has been shown not to exist in an unthinking substance, the same must be true of solidity.

12. That NUMBER is entirely THE CREATURE OF THE MIND, even though the other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as the mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on men's understanding, that it is strange to think how any one should give it an absolute existence without the mind. We say one book, one page, one line, etc.; all these are equally units, though some contain several of the others. And in each instance, it is plain, the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind.

12. NUMBER is entirely a CREATION OF THE MIND, even if we allow that other qualities exist outside it. This becomes clear when we consider how we assign different numbers to the same thing, depending on how we view it. For example, the same length is one, three, or thirty-six, depending on whether we measure it in yards, feet, or inches. Number is so clearly relative and dependent on human understanding that it is strange anyone should think it exists independently outside the mind. We say one book, one page, one line, and so on. All these are equally units, though some contain several of the others. In each case, the unit clearly refers to a particular combination of ideas that the mind has arbitrarily put together.

13. UNITY I know some will have to be A SIMPLE OR UNCOMPOUNDED IDEA, accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any such idea answering the word UNITY I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could not miss finding it: on the contrary, it should be the most familiar to my understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to be perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflexion. To say no more, it is an ABSTRACT IDEA.

13. I know that some people consider UNITY a SIMPLE OR UNCOMPOUNDED IDEA that accompanies all other ideas into the mind. I cannot find any such idea corresponding to the word UNITY. If I had such an idea, I think I could not fail to find it. On the contrary, it should be the idea most familiar to my understanding. After all, unity is said to accompany all other ideas and to be perceived through every kind of sensation and reflection. To say no more, it is an ABSTRACT IDEA.

14. A THIRD ARGUMENT AD HOMINEM.--I shall farther add, that, after the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence in Matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings, existing in the corporeal substances which excite them, for that the same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another. Now, why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter, because to the same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at the same station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of anything SETTLED AND DETERMINATE WITHOUT THE MIND? Again, it is proved that SWEETNESS is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say that MOTION is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without any alteration in any external object?

14. A THIRD ARGUMENT AD HOMINEM: I will add another point. Modern philosophers prove that certain qualities perceived by the senses do not exist in Matter, or outside the mind. In the same way, we can prove this of all other such qualities. For example, they say that heat and cold are only feelings in the mind. They do not represent anything real in the physical substances that cause them. This is because the same body can feel cold to one hand and warm to the other. Why can we not argue in the same way about shape and extension? They cannot represent or resemble qualities existing in Matter, because they appear different to the same eye from different positions. They also appear different to differently structured eyes from the same position. Therefore, they cannot be images of anything FIXED AND DEFINITE OUTSIDE THE MIND. Again, philosophers prove that SWEETNESS is not really in the thing being tasted. This is because sweetness can turn into bitterness while the thing itself remains unchanged. This can happen during a fever or when the sense of taste is otherwise impaired. Is it not just as reasonable to say that MOTION does not exist outside the mind? For if ideas pass through the mind more quickly, motion will appear slower, as philosophers acknowledge, without any change in an external object.

15. NOT CONCLUSIVE AS TO EXTENSION.--In short, let any one consider those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and taste exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in an outward object, as that we do not know by SENSE which is the TRUE extension or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing plainly show it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an UNTHINKING subject without the mind, or in truth, that there should be any such thing as an outward object.

15. NOT CONCLUSIVE ABOUT EXTENSION. In short, consider the arguments thought to prove clearly that colors and tastes exist only in the mind. You will find that they can prove the same thing about extension, shape, and motion with equal force. But we must admit that this line of argument does not really prove that an external object has no extension or color. Rather, it shows that our senses cannot tell us the object’s true extension or color. But the preceding arguments clearly show that no color, extension, or other sensible quality can exist in an unthinking subject outside the mind. Indeed, they show that no external object can exist at all.

16. But let us examine a little the received opinion.--It is said EXTENSION is a MODE or accident OF MATTER, and that Matter is the SUBSTRATUM that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain to me what is meant by Matter's SUPPORTING extension. Say you, I have no idea of Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have no positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have a relative idea of Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant by its supporting them. It is evident SUPPORT cannot here be taken in its usual or literal sense--as when we say that pillars support a building; in what sense therefore must it be taken?¹⁶

16. But let us examine the accepted opinion more closely. It is said that EXTENSION is a MODE or attribute OF MATTER, and that Matter is the SUBSTRATUM that supports it. Now I ask you to explain what it means to say that Matter SUPPORTS extension. You say, I have no idea of Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer that, though you have no positive idea of Matter, you must at least have a relative idea of it if you mean anything at all. Though you do not know what Matter is, you must be assumed to know its relation to attributes and what it means for Matter to support them. Clearly, SUPPORT cannot be understood here in its usual or literal sense, as when we say that pillars support a building. In what sense, then, must it be understood?¹⁶

17. PHILOSOPHICAL MEANING OF "MATERIAL SUBSTANCE" DIVISIBLE INTO TWO PARTS.--If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare themselves to mean by MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, we shall find them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of BEING IN GENERAL, together WITH THE RELATIVE NOTION OF ITS SUPPORTING ACCIDENTS. The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents, this, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common sense of those words; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the TWO PARTS or branches which make the signification of the words MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material SUBSTRATUM or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?

17. THE PHILOSOPHICAL MEANING OF "MATERIAL SUBSTANCE" HAS TWO PARTS. If we ask what the most precise philosophers mean by MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, we find that they acknowledge only two ideas attached to those words. These are the idea of BEING IN GENERAL and the related notion that it SUPPORTS ACCIDENTS. The general idea of Being seems to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all ideas. As for its supporting accidents, we have just seen that this cannot be understood in the ordinary sense. It must therefore be understood in some other sense, but the philosophers do not explain what that sense is. So, when I consider the TWO PARTS that make up the meaning of MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, I am convinced that the words have no distinct meaning. But why should we go any further in discussing this material SUBSTRATUM, or support, of figure, motion, and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose that these qualities exist outside the mind? And is that not a direct contradiction, and altogether inconceivable?

18. THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES WANTS PROOF.--But, though it were possible that solid, figured, movable substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet HOW IS IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO KNOW THIS? Either we must know it by sense or by reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge ONLY OF OUR SENSATIONS, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be by REASON, inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is ANY NECESSARY CONNEXION BETWIXT THEM AND OUR IDEAS? I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that IT IS POSSIBLE WE MIGHT BE AFFECTED WITH ALL THE IDEAS WE HAVE NOW, THOUGH THERE WERE NO BODIES EXISTING WITHOUT RESEMBLING THEM. Hence, it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same order, we see them in at present, without their concurrence.

18. THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES NEEDS PROOF. Even if solid, shaped, movable substances could exist outside the mind and correspond to our ideas of bodies, how could we know it? We must know it either through our senses or through reason. Our senses tell us only about our sensations, ideas, or whatever we call the things we perceive directly. But they do not tell us that things resembling what we perceive exist outside the mind, unperceived. Materialists themselves admit this. Therefore, if we have any knowledge of external things, we must gain it through reason. We must infer their existence from what we perceive directly through our senses. But what reason could lead us to believe, from what we perceive, that bodies exist outside the mind? Even the defenders of Matter do not claim that there is any necessary connection between bodies and our ideas. Everyone agrees that we could experience all the ideas we have now, even if no bodies resembling them existed outside the mind. What happens in dreams, delirium, and similar states puts this beyond dispute. Clearly, then, external bodies are not needed to produce our ideas. For everyone agrees that our ideas are sometimes produced without external bodies. They could also always be produced without them, in the same order we now experience.

19. THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES AFFORDS NO EXPLICATION OF THE MANNER IN WHICH OUR IDEAS ARE PRODUCED.--But, though we might possibly have all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought EASIER to conceive and explain the MANNER of their production, by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said; for, though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner BODY CAN ACT UPON SPIRIT, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production of ideas or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose Matter or corporeal substances, SINCE THAT IS ACKNOWLEDGED TO REMAIN EQUALLY INEXPLICABLE WITH OR WITHOUT THIS SUPPOSITION. If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so, must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings THAT ARE ENTIRELY USELESS, AND SERVE TO NO MANNER OF PURPOSE.

19. THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES DOES NOT EXPLAIN HOW OUR IDEAS ARE PRODUCED. Although we might have all our sensations without external bodies, someone might still think they make those sensations EASIER to explain. Perhaps it is easier to conceive how sensations are produced if we suppose that external bodies resemble them. And so it might at least be probable that bodies exist and produce their ideas in our minds. But even this cannot be said. For even if we grant materialists their external bodies, they admit they are no closer to knowing how our ideas are produced. They acknowledge that they cannot understand HOW BODY CAN ACT UPON SPIRIT. Nor can they understand how a body could impress any idea on the mind. Clearly, then, the production of ideas or sensations in our minds gives us no reason to suppose that Matter or bodily substances exist. For it is acknowledged to be JUST AS INEXPLICABLE WHETHER WE MAKE THIS SUPPOSITION OR NOT. Even if bodies could exist outside the mind, the belief that they do would therefore be very uncertain. It would suppose, without any reason, that God created countless beings THAT ARE ENTIRELY USELESS AND SERVE NO PURPOSE.

20. DILEMMA.--In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose--what no one can deny possible--an intelligence without the help of external bodies, to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask whether that intelligence has not all the reason to believe the existence of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same thing? Of this there can be no question--which one consideration were enough to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever arguments be may think himself to have, for the existence of bodies without the mind.

20. DILEMMA. In short, if external bodies existed, we could never know it. And if they did not exist, we could have exactly the same reasons we now have for believing they do. Suppose a mind receives the same sequence of sensations or ideas that you do, without the help of external bodies. No one can deny that this is possible. Suppose these sensations or ideas appear in the same order and with the same vividness as yours. Would that mind not have all the reasons you could possibly have for believing in physical substances? These substances would be represented by its ideas and would cause those ideas in its mind. There can be no question that it would. This consideration alone should make any reasonable person doubt the strength of whatever arguments they think they have for the existence of bodies outside the mind.

21. Were it necessary to add any FURTHER PROOF AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER after what has been said, I could instance several of those errors and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from that tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. But I shall not enter into the detail of them in this place, as well because I think arguments A POSTERIORI are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated A PRIORI, as because I shall hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them.

21. If further proof against the existence of matter were needed after what has been said, I could give examples. I could point to several errors and difficulties that have arisen from the belief in matter, not to mention impieties. This belief has caused countless controversies and disputes in philosophy. It has also caused quite a few disputes of far greater importance in religion. But I will not discuss these in detail here. For one thing, I believe arguments based on experience are unnecessary to confirm what, if I am not mistaken, has been sufficiently demonstrated by reasoning alone. For another, I will have occasion to say something about these disputes later.

22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix in handling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one that is capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived. This easy trial may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon this issue:--If you can but CONCEIVE it possible for one extended movable substance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause. And, as for all that COMPAGES of external bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, THOUGH (1.) YOU CANNOT EITHER GIVE ME ANY REASON WHY YOU BELIEVE IT EXISTS [Vide sect. lviii.], OR (2.) ASSIGN ANY USE TO IT WHEN IT IS SUPPOSED TO EXIST [Vide sect. lx.]. I say, the bare possibility of your opinions being true shall pass for an argument that it is so.¹⁷

22. I fear I have given you reason to think I am unnecessarily wordy on this subject. Why elaborate on what can be demonstrated with the greatest clarity in a line or two? Anyone capable of the slightest reflection can see it. You need only look into your own thoughts and try to imagine a sound, shape, motion, or color existing outside the mind, unperceived. This simple test may perhaps show you that what you argue for is an outright contradiction. Indeed, I am willing to rest the whole case on this point: If you can even CONCEIVE it possible for one extended, movable substance, or, more generally, any one idea or anything like an idea, to exist except in a mind perceiving it, I will readily give up my case. And I will grant the existence of that whole STRUCTURE of external bodies you argue for. I will do so EVEN THOUGH (1.) YOU CANNOT GIVE ME ANY REASON WHY YOU BELIEVE IT EXISTS (see section 58), OR (2.) SAY WHAT USE IT HAS IF IT DOES EXIST (see section 60). I mean that the mere possibility that your opinions are true will count as an argument that they are true.¹⁷

23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call BOOKS and TREES, and the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? BUT DO NOT YOU YOURSELF PERCEIVE OR THINK OF THEM ALL THE WHILE? This therefore is nothing to the purpose; it only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind: but it does not show that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make out this, IT IS NECESSARY THAT YOU CONCEIVE THEM EXISTING UNCONCEIVED OR UNTHOUGHT OF, WHICH IS A MANIFEST REPUGNANCY. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material substance.

23. But you say, surely nothing is easier than imagining trees in a park, or books in a closet, with nobody there to perceive them. I answer, yes, you can do that. There is no difficulty in it. But what more are you doing than forming certain ideas in your mind that you call BOOKS and TREES? At the same time, you leave out the idea of anyone who might perceive them. BUT ARE YOU NOT YOURSELF PERCEIVING OR THINKING OF THEM ALL THE WHILE? So this does not address the point. It only shows that you can imagine or form ideas in your mind. It does not show that you can conceive it possible for the objects of your thought to exist outside the mind. To establish that, YOU MUST CONCEIVE OF THEM EXISTING WITHOUT BEING CONCEIVED OR THOUGHT OF, WHICH IS CLEARLY CONTRADICTORY. When we try our utmost to conceive of external bodies existing, we are all the while contemplating only our own ideas. But the mind fails to notice itself. So it is misled into thinking that it can and does conceive of bodies existing unthought of or outside the mind. Yet at the same time, those bodies are perceived by the mind, or exist within it. A little attention will show anyone the truth and evidence of what I have said here. It will also make any further proofs against the existence of material substance unnecessary.

24. THE ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OF UNTHINKING THINGS ARE WORDS WITHOUT A MEANING.--It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our thoughts, to know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by the ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OF SENSIBLE OBJECTS IN THEMSELVES, OR WITHOUT THE MIND. To me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own thoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for the conviction. It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the ABSOLUTE existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning, or which include a contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader.

24. THE ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OF UNTHINKING THINGS IS MEANINGLESS. By examining our thoughts even briefly, we can easily see whether we understand what is meant by the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or outside the mind. To me, those words clearly express either a direct contradiction or nothing at all. To convince others, I know no better or fairer way than to ask them to consider their own thoughts calmly. If this consideration reveals that those expressions are empty or contradictory, surely nothing more is needed to convince them. So I insist that the absolute existence of unthinking things is either meaningless or involves a contradiction. I repeat and emphasize this point, and earnestly ask the reader to consider it carefully.

25. THIRD ARGUMENT.¹⁸--REFUTATION OF LOCKE.--All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive--there is nothing of power or agency included in them. So that ONE IDEA or object of thought CANNOT PRODUCE or make ANY ALTERATION IN ANOTHER. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived: but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity; there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything: neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident from sect. 8. Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles, must certainly be false.¹⁹

25. THIRD ARGUMENT.¹⁸ REFUTATION OF LOCKE. All our ideas, sensations, notions, or things we perceive, whatever we call them, are clearly inactive. They contain no power or agency. So ONE IDEA or object of thought CANNOT PRODUCE or cause ANY CHANGE IN ANOTHER. To see that this is true, we need only observe our ideas. Ideas and every part of them exist only in the mind. So they contain nothing that is not perceived. But anyone who examines their ideas, whether of sense or reflection, will perceive no power or activity in them. Therefore, ideas contain no power or activity. A little attention will show us that an idea is passive and inert by its very nature. An idea cannot do anything or, strictly speaking, cause anything. Nor can an idea resemble or serve as a pattern for any active being, as section 8 makes clear. It plainly follows that extension, shape, and motion cannot cause our sensations. It must therefore be false to say that our sensations result from powers arising from the arrangement, number, motion, and size of corpuscles.¹⁹

26. CAUSE OF IDEAS.--We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be a substance; but it has been shown that there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains therefore that the CAUSE OF IDEAS is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit.

26. CAUSE OF IDEAS: We perceive a continual succession of ideas. Some arise anew, while others change or disappear completely. There must therefore be a cause on which these ideas depend and which produces and changes them. The preceding section makes clear that this cause cannot be a quality, an idea, or a combination of ideas. It must therefore be a substance. But it has been shown that there is no bodily or material substance. The CAUSE OF IDEAS must therefore be an immaterial, active substance, or Spirit.

27. NO IDEA OF SPIRIT.--A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being--as it perceives ideas it is called the UNDERSTANDING, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the WILL. Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert (vide sect. 25), they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or LIKENESS, that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to any one, that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of SPIRIT, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, BUT ONLY BY THE EFFECTS WHICH IT PRODUCETH. If any man shall doubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame the idea of any power or active being, and whether he has ideas of two principal powers, marked by the names WILL and UNDERSTANDING, distinct from each other as well as from a third idea of Substance or Being in general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject of the aforesaid powers--which is signified by the name SOUL or SPIRIT. This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words WILL²⁰, SOUL, SPIRIT, do not stand for different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. Though it must be owned at the same time that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind: such as willing, loving, hating--inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words.

27. NO IDEA OF SPIRIT. A spirit is a single, undivided, active being. When it perceives ideas, it is called the UNDERSTANDING. When it produces ideas or otherwise acts upon them, it is called the WILL. Therefore, no idea of a soul or spirit can be formed. All ideas are passive and inert (see section 25), so no idea can represent an active being by resembling it. A little attention will make it clear to anyone that such a resemblance is absolutely impossible. No idea can be like the active principle that causes ideas to move and change. Such is the nature of SPIRIT, or that which acts. It cannot be perceived directly, BUT ONLY THROUGH THE EFFECTS IT PRODUCES. If anyone doubts the truth of this account, let them reflect and try to form an idea of any power or active being. Let them also consider whether they have distinct ideas of the two principal powers called WILL and UNDERSTANDING. Are these ideas distinct from each other and from a third idea of substance or being in general? Does this third idea include a relative notion of substance as supporting or being the subject of those powers? This substance is what is meant by the name SOUL or SPIRIT. Some people hold this view. But, as far as I can see, WILL²⁰, SOUL, and SPIRIT do not stand for different ideas. In truth, they do not stand for any idea at all. They stand for something very different from ideas. Because it is an agent, it cannot resemble or be represented by any idea whatsoever. At the same time, we must admit that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind, such as willing, loving, and hating. We have this notion because we know or understand the meaning of these words.

28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and grounded on experience; but when we think of unthinking agents or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words.

28. I find that I can bring ideas into my mind whenever I please and change them as often as I wish. I need only will it, and an idea immediately arises in my imagination. By the same power, I can erase it and make way for another. This ability to create and erase ideas rightly makes the mind active. This much is certain and based on experience. But when we think of agents that do not think, or of bringing about ideas without willing them, we are merely playing with words.

29. IDEAS OF SENSATION DIFFER FROM THOSE OF REFLECTION OR MEMORY.--But, whatever power I may have over MY OWN thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is THEREFORE SOME OTHER WILL OR SPIRIT that PRODUCES THEM.

29. IDEAS OF SENSATION DIFFER FROM THOSE OF REFLECTION OR MEMORY. Whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find that ideas I actually perceive through my senses do not depend on my will in the same way. When I open my eyes in broad daylight, I cannot choose whether or not to see. Nor can I decide which particular objects will appear before me. The same is true of hearing and the other senses. The ideas impressed on my senses are not created by my will. Therefore, some other will or spirit produces them.

30. LAWS OF NATURE.--The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and DISTINCT than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series, the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. Now THE SET RULES OR ESTABLISHED METHODS WHEREIN THE MIND WE DEPEND ON EXCITES IN US THE IDEAS OF SENSE, ARE CALLED THE LAWS OF NATURE; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things.

30. LAWS OF NATURE. Ideas received through the senses are stronger, more vivid, and more DISTINCT than those of the imagination. They are also steady, orderly, and coherent. Unlike ideas produced by human wills, they do not often arise at random. Instead, they occur in a regular sequence. The admirable connections in this sequence amply show the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. THE FIXED RULES OR ESTABLISHED METHODS BY WHICH THE MIND WE DEPEND ON PRODUCES IDEAS OF SENSE IN US ARE CALLED THE LAWS OF NATURE. We learn these laws through experience. Experience teaches us that, in the ordinary course of things, certain ideas are accompanied by certain other ideas.

31. KNOWLEDGE OF THEM NECESSARY FOR THE CONDUCT OF WORLDLY AFFAIRS.--This gives us a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life. And without this we should be eternally at a loss; we could not know how to act anything that might procure us the least pleasure, or remove the least pain of sense. That food nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; that to sow in the seed-time is the way to reap in the harvest; and in general that to obtain such or such ends, such or such means are conducive--all this we know, NOT BY DISCOVERING ANY NECESSARY CONNEXION BETWEEN OUR IDEAS, but only by the observation of the settled laws of nature, without which we should be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born.

31. KNOWLEDGE OF THEM IS NECESSARY FOR MANAGING EVERYDAY AFFAIRS. This gives us a kind of foresight that lets us guide our actions for our benefit. Without it, we would always be at a loss. We would not know how to gain even the slightest pleasure or relieve the slightest physical pain. Food nourishes us, sleep refreshes us, and fire warms us. Sowing at planting time is the way to reap a harvest. More generally, certain means help us achieve certain ends. We know all this NOT BY DISCOVERING ANY NECESSARY CONNECTION BETWEEN OUR IDEAS, but only by observing the fixed laws of nature. Without those laws, we would all be uncertain and confused. A grown man would know no better than a newborn infant how to manage his affairs.

32. And yet THIS consistent UNIFORM WORKING, which so evidently displays the goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes the laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that it rather SENDS THEM A WANDERING AFTER SECOND CAUSES. For, when we perceive certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other ideas and WE KNOW THIS IS NOT OF OUR OWN DOING, we forthwith attribute power and agency to the ideas themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called HEAT, we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former.

32. Yet this consistent, uniform working clearly shows the goodness and wisdom of the governing spirit whose will makes the laws of nature. Even so, far from leading our thoughts to him, it sends them wandering after secondary causes. We perceive certain ideas of sense constantly followed by others, and we know we did not bring this about ourselves. So we immediately attribute power and agency to the ideas themselves and make one the cause of another. Nothing could be more absurd or unintelligible. For example, when we see a certain round, luminous figure, we also feel the sensation called heat. From this, we conclude that the sun causes heat. In the same way, we perceive sound accompanying the motion and collision of bodies. So we are inclined to think that the motion and collision cause the sound.

33. OF REAL THINGS AND IDEAS OR CHIMERAS.--The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called REAL THINGS; and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed IDEAS, or IMAGES OF THINGS, which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless IDEAS, that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more (1)STRONG, (2)ORDERLY, and (3)COHERENT than the creatures of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are also (4)LESS DEPENDENT ON THE SPIRIT²¹, or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more powerful spirit; yet still they are IDEAS, and certainly no IDEA, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it.

33. REAL THINGS AND IDEAS OR CHIMERAS. The ideas impressed on our senses by the Author of nature are called REAL THINGS. Those produced in the imagination are less regular, vivid, and constant. They are more properly called IDEAS, or IMAGES OF THINGS, which they copy and represent. But however vivid and distinct our sensations may be, they are still IDEAS. That is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, just as surely as the ideas the mind creates. Ideas of sense are acknowledged to have more reality in them. That is, they are (1)STRONGER, (2)MORE ORDERLY, and (3)MORE COHERENT than the mind’s creations. But this is no argument that ideas of sense exist outside the mind. They are also (4)LESS DEPENDENT ON THE SPIRIT²¹, or thinking substance, that perceives them. This is because they are produced by the will of another, more powerful spirit. Yet they are still IDEAS. And certainly no IDEA, whether faint or strong, can exist except in a mind that perceives it.

34. FIRST GENERAL OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we spend some time in answering objections which may probably be made against the principles we have hitherto laid down. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick apprehensions, I hope it may be pardoned, since all men do not equally apprehend things of this nature, and I am willing to be understood by every one.

34. FIRST GENERAL OBJECTION. ANSWER. Before we go any further, we must spend some time answering likely objections to the principles we have established so far. In doing so, I may seem too wordy to those who understand quickly. If so, I hope they will forgive me. Not everyone understands matters of this kind equally well, and I want everyone to understand me.

FIRST, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles ALL THAT IS REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL IN NATURE IS BANISHED OUT OF THE WORLD, and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. All things that exist, exist only in the mind, that is, they are purely notional. What therefore becomes of the sun, moon and stars? What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy? To all which, and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I ANSWER, that by the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive or understand remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a RERUM NATURA, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force. This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have shown what is meant by REAL THINGS in opposition to CHIMERAS or ideas of our own framing; but then they both equally exist in the mind, and in that sense they are alike IDEAS.

First, someone will object that these principles BANISH EVERYTHING REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL IN NATURE FROM THE WORLD. In its place, they put a fanciful system of ideas. Everything that exists exists only in the mind, so it is purely an idea. What, then, becomes of the sun, moon, and stars? What are we to think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones, and even our own bodies? Are all these merely fantasies and illusions of the imagination? To all these objections, and any others like them, I ANSWER that these principles deprive us of nothing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or in any way conceive or understand remains as secure and as real as ever. There is a RERUM NATURA, a natural world, and the distinction between realities and fantasies remains fully valid. This is clear from sections 29, 30, and 33. There we showed what is meant by REAL THINGS, as opposed to FANTASIES or ideas of our own making. But both real things and fantasies exist equally in the mind, and in that sense both are IDEAS.

35. THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER, AS UNDERSTOOD BY PHILOSOPHERS, DENIED.[Vide sect. lxxxiv.]--I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflexion. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny IS THAT WHICH PHILOSOPHERS CALL MATTER or corporeal substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist indeed will want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety; and the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great handle for trifling and disputation.

35. THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER, AS PHILOSOPHERS UNDERSTAND IT, DENIED. [See section lxxxiv.] I do not argue against the existence of anything we can perceive through the senses or reflection. I have no doubt that the things I see and touch really exist. The only thing we deny exists IS WHAT PHILOSOPHERS CALL MATTER, or corporeal substance. Denying its existence does no harm to the rest of mankind. I dare say they will never miss it. The Atheist, however, will lack the cover of an empty name to support his impiety. And the Philosophers may find they have lost a great source of trivial arguments and disputes.

36. READILY EXPLAINED.--If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what has been premised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an abstract of what has been said:--There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves at pleasure; but these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by sense--which, being impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. These latter are said to have more REALITY in them than the former:--by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them. And in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here given of REALITY it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general each part of the mundane system, is as much a REAL BEING by our principles as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term REALITY different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own thoughts and see.

36. EASILY EXPLAINED. If anyone thinks this view diminishes the existence or reality of things, they have misunderstood what I have already explained as plainly as I could. Here is a summary of what I have said. There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which can produce ideas in themselves at will. But these ideas are faint, weak, and unsteady compared with the ideas they perceive through their senses. Sensory ideas are impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature. This shows that sensory ideas are the effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. Sensory ideas are said to have more REALITY than ideas produced at will. This means that sensory ideas affect us more strongly, are more orderly and distinct, and are not inventions of the mind perceiving them. In this sense, the sun I see by day is the real sun. The sun I imagine at night is an idea of the real sun. Given this meaning of REALITY, every plant, star, and mineral is clearly just as much a REAL BEING under our principles as under any others. The same is true of every part of the system of the world. If others mean something different by REALITY, I urge them to examine their own thoughts and see.

37. THE PHILOSOPHIC, NOT THE VULGAR SUBSTANCE, TAKEN AWAY.--I will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word SUBSTANCE be taken in the vulgar sense--for a combination of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like--this we cannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic sense--for the SUPPORT of accidents or QUALITIES WITHOUT THE MIND--then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination.

37. PHILOSOPHICAL SUBSTANCE, NOT SUBSTANCE IN THE ORDINARY SENSE, IS REMOVED. It will be argued that at least this much is true: we remove all bodily substances. My answer is that the word SUBSTANCE can be understood in its ordinary sense. It then means a combination of qualities we can perceive, such as size, shape, solidity, and weight. We cannot be accused of removing substance in this sense. But SUBSTANCE can also be understood in a philosophical sense. It then means the SUPPORT of properties or QUALITIES OUTSIDE THE MIND. I admit that we remove substance in this sense, if we can be said to remove something that never existed, not even in the imagination.

38. But, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so--the word IDEA not being used in common discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible qualities which are called THINGS; and it is certain that any expression which varies from the familiar use of language will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the truth of the proposition, which in other words is no more than to say, we are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by our senses. The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, or suchlike qualities, which combined together constitute the several sorts of victuals and apparel, have been shown to exist only in the mind that perceives them; and this is all that is meant by calling them IDEAS; which word if it was as ordinarily used as THING, would sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about the propriety, but the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense, which cannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall readily grant it is more proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things rather than ideas.

38. But, you say, it sounds very strange to say that we eat and drink ideas and wear ideas. I admit that it does. In everyday speech, the word IDEA is not used for the combinations of sensory qualities we call THINGS. And any expression that differs from familiar usage will certainly seem strange and ridiculous. But that does not affect the truth of the statement. In other words, it says only that we are fed and clothed by the things we perceive directly through our senses. Food and clothing consist of qualities such as hardness or softness, color, taste, warmth, and shape, combined in various ways. These qualities have been shown to exist only in the mind that perceives them. That is all I mean by calling them IDEAS. If IDEA were used as commonly as THING, it would sound no stranger or more ridiculous. I do not want to argue about whether the expression is proper, but whether it is true. So, if you agree with me that we eat, drink, and wear the immediate objects of sense, I will readily concede something. These objects cannot exist unperceived or outside the mind. But it is more proper and customary to call them things rather than ideas.

39. THE TERM IDEA PREFERABLE TO THING.--If it be demanded why I make use of the word IDEA, and do not rather in compliance with custom call them THINGS. I answer, I do it for two reasons:--first, because the term THING in contra-distinction to IDEA, is generally supposed to denote somewhat existing without the mind; secondly, because THING has a more comprehensive signification than IDEA, including SPIRIT or thinking things as well as IDEAS. Since therefore the objects of sense exist only in the mind, and are withal thoughtless and inactive, I chose to mark them by the word IDEA, which implies those properties.

39. WHY I PREFER THE TERM IDEA TO THING. If asked why I use the word IDEA instead of calling them THINGS, as is customary, I have two reasons. First, when contrasted with IDEA, the term THING is generally understood to mean something that exists outside the mind. Second, THING has a broader meaning than IDEA. It includes SPIRIT, or thinking things, as well as IDEAS. Objects of sense exist only in the mind, and they do not think or act. So I chose to call them IDEAS, a word that implies these properties.

40. THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES NOT DISCREDITED.--But, say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so; assert the evidence of sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the same. That what I see, hear, and feel DOTH EXIST, THAT IS to say, IS PERCEIVED BY ME, I no more doubt than I do of my own being. But I do not see how the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of anything which is not perceived by sense. We are not for having any man turn SCEPTIC and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give them all the stress and assurance imaginable; nor are there any principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down²², as shall be hereafter clearly shown.

40. THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES IS NOT DISCREDITED. But whatever we say, someone may perhaps reply that he will still believe his senses. He will never let any arguments, however plausible, outweigh their certainty. So be it. Insist on the evidence of the senses as strongly as you please. We are willing to do the same. I do not doubt that what I see, hear, and feel exists, that is, is perceived by me. I doubt this no more than I doubt my own existence. But I do not see how the evidence of the senses can prove the existence of anything they do not perceive. We do not want anyone to become a skeptic and distrust his senses. On the contrary, we place all imaginable weight and confidence in them. Nor are any principles more opposed to skepticism than those we have set out²², as we shall clearly show later.

41. SECOND OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Secondly, it will be OBJECTED that there is a great difference betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt, and actually being so: if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see, do but put your hand into it and you will be convinced with a witness. This and the like may be urged in opposition to our tenets. To all which the ANSWER is evident from what has been already said; and I shall only add in this place, that if real fire be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in an unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its idea.

41. SECOND OBJECTION. ANSWER. Second, someone will object that there is a great difference between real fire and the idea of fire. There is also a great difference between dreaming or imagining that you are burned and actually being burned. If you suspect that what you see is only the idea of fire, just put your hand into it. You will be convinced, and painfully so. This and similar objections may be raised against our views. The answer to all of them is clear from what has already been said. I will add only this: if real fire is very different from the idea of fire, the real pain it causes is also very different from the idea of that pain. Yet nobody will claim that real pain is, or could possibly be, in a thing that cannot perceive. Nor will anyone claim that real pain could exist outside the mind, any more than the idea of that pain could.

42. THIRD OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Thirdly, it will be objected that we see things actually without or at distance from us, and which consequently do not exist in the mind; it being absurd that those things which are seen at the distance of several miles should be as near to us as our own thoughts. In answer to this, I desire it may be considered that in a DREAM we do oft perceive things as existing at a great distance off, and yet for all that, those things are acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind.

42. THIRD OBJECTION. ANSWER. Thirdly, someone will object that we see things outside us or at a distance from us. Therefore, those things do not exist in the mind. It would be absurd for things seen several miles away to be as close to us as our own thoughts. In answer, I ask you to consider that in a DREAM we often perceive things as existing far away. Yet those things are acknowledged to exist only in the mind.

43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth while to consider how it is that we perceive distance and things placed at a distance by sight. For, that we should in truth see EXTERNAL space, and bodies actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther off, seems to carry with it some opposition to what has been said of their existing nowhere without the mind. The consideration of this difficulty it was that gave birth to my "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision," which was published not long since, wherein it is shown (1) that DISTANCE or outness is NEITHER IMMEDIATELY of itself PERCEIVED by sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that has a necessary connexion with it; but (2) that it is ONLY SUGGESTED to our thoughts by certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which in their own nature have no manner of similitude or relation either with distance or things placed at a distance; but, by a connexion taught us BY EXPERIENCE, they come to signify and suggest them to us, after the same manner that WORDS of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for; insomuch that a man BORN blind and afterwards made to see, would not, at first sight, think the things he saw to be without his mind, or at any distance from him. See sect. 41 of the fore-mentioned treatise.

43. But to make this point clearer, it may be worth considering how sight lets us perceive distance and distant things. For we seem to see space outside us and bodies actually existing in it, some nearer and others farther away. This seems to conflict with what has been said about their existing nowhere outside the mind. Considering this difficulty led me to write my "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision," published not long ago. In that essay, I show (1) that distance or being outside us is not directly perceived by sight. Nor do we grasp or judge distance by lines and angles, or anything necessarily connected with it. Instead, (2) distance is only suggested to our thoughts by certain visible ideas and sensations that accompany vision. In their own nature, these ideas and sensations do not resemble distance or distant things, or have any relation to them. But experience teaches us a connection, so that they come to signify and suggest distance and distant things to us. They do this just as the words of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for. So a man born blind who later gains sight would not, at first sight, think the things he saw were outside his mind or at any distance from him. See section 41 of the treatise mentioned above.

44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely distinct and heterogeneous. THE FORMER ARE MARKS AND PROGNOSTICS OF THE LATTER. That the proper objects of sight neither exist without mind, nor are the images of external things, was shown even in that treatise. Though throughout the same the contrary be supposed true of tangible objects--not that to suppose that vulgar error was necessary for establishing the notion therein laid down, but because it was beside my purpose to examine and refute it in a discourse concerning VISION. So that in strict truth the ideas of sight, when we apprehend by them distance and things placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark out to us things ACTUALLY existing at a distance, but only admonish us what ideas of touch will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances of time, and in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say, evident from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, and in sect. 147 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that visible ideas are the Language whereby the governing Spirit on whom we depend informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in case we excite this or that motion in our own bodies. But for a fuller information in this point I refer to the Essay itself.

44. The ideas of sight and touch belong to two entirely distinct and different kinds. THE IDEAS OF SIGHT ARE SIGNS AND FOREWARNINGS OF THE IDEAS OF TOUCH. Even in that treatise, I showed that the proper objects of sight do not exist outside the mind and are not images of external things. Yet throughout that treatise I assumed that the opposite was true of tangible objects. This common error was not necessary to establish the idea presented there. Rather, examining and refuting it was beside my purpose in a discussion of VISION. So, strictly speaking, ideas of sight do not indicate things ACTUALLY existing at a distance, even when we use them to perceive distance and distant things. Instead, they tell us what ideas of touch will be imprinted on our minds after certain intervals of time and as a result of certain actions. I say that this is evident from the earlier parts of this Treatise, and from section 147 and other parts of the Essay concerning Vision. Visible ideas are the Language by which the governing Spirit on whom we depend informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint on us if we make this or that movement with our bodies. But for a fuller account of this point, I refer the reader to the Essay itself.

45. FOURTH OBJECTION, FROM PERPETUAL ANNIHILATION AND CREATION.--ANSWER.--Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment annihilated and created anew. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them. Upon SHUTTING MY EYES all the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again created. In ANSWER to all which, I refer the reader to what has been said in sect. 3, 4, &c., and desire he will consider whether he means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could make, I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by those words; and I once more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts, and not suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it possible either for his ideas or their archetypes to exist without being perceived, then I give up the cause; but if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity the not assenting to those propositions which at bottom have no meaning in them.

45. FOURTH OBJECTION: CONTINUAL DESTRUCTION AND CREATION. ANSWER. Fourthly, someone will object that the preceding principles imply that things are destroyed and created anew at every moment. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived. Trees are therefore in the garden, and chairs in the parlor, only as long as someone is there to perceive them. When I CLOSE MY EYES, all the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing. Simply by opening them again, I create it anew. In ANSWER, I refer the reader to what I said in sections 3, 4, and following. I ask him to consider whether an idea’s actual existence means anything other than its being perceived. For my part, after the most careful inquiry I could make, I cannot find that those words mean anything else. Once again, I urge the reader to examine his own thoughts and not let words mislead him. If he can conceive it possible for either his ideas or their archetypes to exist without being perceived, I give up the cause. But if he cannot, he will acknowledge that he is defending something he knows not what. He will also acknowledge that he has no reason to accuse me of absurdity for rejecting propositions that, at bottom, have no meaning.

46. ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM.--It will not be amiss to observe how far the received principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable with those pretended absurdities. (1) It is thought strangely absurd that upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects around me should be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what philosophers commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that light and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived? (2)Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things should be every moment creating, yet this very notion is commonly taught in the schools. For the SCHOOLMEN, though they acknowledge the existence of Matter, and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine conservation, which by them is expounded to be a continual creation.

46. ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM. It is worth considering how far accepted philosophical principles themselves are subject to these supposed absurdities. (1) It is considered strangely absurd that all visible objects around me should vanish when I close my eyes. Yet do philosophers not commonly acknowledge this? They all agree that light and colors are the only proper and immediate objects of sight. They also agree that light and colors are mere sensations that exist only while they are perceived. (2) Again, some may perhaps find it incredible that things are created at every moment. Yet this very idea is commonly taught in the schools. The Schoolmen acknowledge the existence of Matter and hold that the whole structure of the world is made from it. Nevertheless, they believe that Matter cannot exist without divine conservation. They explain divine conservation as continuous creation.

47. (3) Further, a little thought will discover to us that though we allow the existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will unavoidably follow, FROM THE PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE NOW GENERALLY ADMITTED, that the PARTICULAR bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst they are not perceived. For, it is evident from sect. II and the following sections, that the Matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensible somewhat, WHICH HAS NONE OF THOSE PARTICULAR QUALITIES WHEREBY THE BODIES FALLING UNDER OUR SENSES ARE DISTINGUISHED ONE FROM ANOTHER. (2) But, to make this more plain, it must be remarked that the infinite divisibility of Matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most approved and considerable philosophers, who on the received principles demonstrate it beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is an infinite number of parts in each particle of Matter which are not perceived by sense. The reason therefore that any particular body seems to be of a finite magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts to sense, is, not because it contains no more, since in itself it contains an infinite number of parts, BUT BECAUSE THE SENSE IS NOT ACUTE ENOUGH TO DISCERN THEM. In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more acute, it perceives a greater number of parts in the object, that is, the object appears greater, and its figure varies, those parts in its extremities which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound it in very different lines and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense. And at length, after various changes of size and shape, when the sense becomes infinitely acute the body shall seem infinite. During all which there is no alteration in the body, but only in the sense. EACH BODY THEREFORE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, IS INFINITELY EXTENDED, AND CONSEQUENTLY VOID OF ALL SHAPE OR FIGURE. From which it follows that, though we should grant the existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal as certain, the materialists themselves are by their own principles forced to acknowledge, that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense, nor anything like them, exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each particle thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless, AND IT IS THE MIND THAT FRAMES ALL THAT VARIETY OF BODIES WHICH COMPOSE THE VISIBLE WORLD, ANY ONE WHEREOF DOES NOT EXIST LONGER THAN IT IS PERCEIVED.

47. (3) Further, a little thought will show us what follows even if we allow that Matter, or corporeal substance, exists. FROM THE PRINCIPLES NOW GENERALLY ACCEPTED, it inevitably follows that PARTICULAR bodies of every kind cease to exist when they are not perceived. Sections II and those following make this clear. The Matter philosophers argue for is an incomprehensible something. IT HAS NONE OF THE PARTICULAR QUALITIES THAT DISTINGUISH THE BODIES WE PERCEIVE FROM ONE ANOTHER. (2) But to make this clearer, we must note that the infinite divisibility of Matter is now universally accepted. At least, it is accepted by the most respected and important philosophers. Using accepted principles, they demonstrate this divisibility beyond all objection. It follows that every particle of Matter has infinitely many parts that cannot be perceived by the senses. A particular body seems to have a finite size and to have only a finite number of parts. This is not because the body has no more parts. In itself, it has infinitely many parts. IT IS BECAUSE THE SENSES ARE NOT SHARP ENOUGH TO DISCERN THEM. So, as a sense becomes sharper, it perceives more parts of the object. In other words, the object appears larger, and its shape changes. Parts at its edges that were previously imperceptible now appear to form its boundaries. These boundaries have lines and angles very different from those perceived by a less sharp sense. Finally, after various changes in size and shape, the body will seem infinite when the sense becomes infinitely sharp. Throughout all this, there is no change in the body, only in the sense. THEREFORE, EACH BODY, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, IS INFINITELY EXTENDED AND CONSEQUENTLY HAS NO SHAPE OR FORM. It follows that, however certain we grant the existence of Matter to be, another conclusion is equally certain. By their own principles, materialists are forced to acknowledge that the particular bodies we perceive do not exist outside the mind. Nor does anything like those bodies exist outside the mind. According to materialists, Matter and every particle of it are infinite and shapeless. AND THE MIND FORMS ALL THE VARIETY OF BODIES THAT MAKE UP THE VISIBLE WORLD. NONE OF THESE BODIES EXISTS ANY LONGER THAN IT IS PERCEIVED.

48. If we consider it, the objection proposed in sect. 45 will not be found reasonably charged on the principles we have premised, so as in truth to make any objection at all against our notions. For, though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence except only while they are perceived by US, since THERE MAY BE SOME OTHER SPIRIT THAT PERCEIVES THEM THOUGH WE DO NOT. Wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind, but ALL MINDS WHATSOEVER. It does not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them.

48. On reflection, the objection raised in section 45 cannot reasonably be brought against the principles we have stated. It is not really an objection to our views at all. We do hold that the objects of sense are nothing but ideas that cannot exist unless perceived. But we cannot conclude that they exist only while WE perceive them. SOME OTHER SPIRIT MAY PERCEIVE THEM EVEN WHEN WE DO NOT. When I say that bodies cannot exist outside the mind, I do not mean any particular mind. I mean ALL MINDS WHATSOEVER. Our principles therefore do not imply that bodies are destroyed and created every moment. Nor do they imply that bodies cease to exist between our perceptions of them.

49. FIFTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Fifthly, it may perhaps be OBJECTED that if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured; since extension is a mode or attribute which (to speak with the schools) is predicated of the subject in which it exists. I ANSWER, (1) Those qualities are in the mind ONLY AS THEY ARE PERCEIVED BY IT--that is, not by way of MODE or ATTRIBUTE, but only by way of IDEA; and it no more follows the soul or mind is extended, because extension exists in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are ON ALL HANDS acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else. (2) As to what philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless and unintelligible. For instance, in this proposition "a die is hard, extended, and square," they will have it that the word die denotes a subject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot comprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. And, to say a die is hard, extended, and square is not to attribute those qualities to a subject distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning of the word DIE.

49. FIFTH OBJECTION. ANSWER. Fifth, someone may perhaps object that if extension and shape exist only in the mind, the mind must be extended and shaped. For extension is a mode or attribute that, in the language of the schools, is predicated of the subject in which it exists. I answer: (1) These qualities are in the mind only as the mind perceives them. They are there as ideas, not as modes or attributes. Extension exists only in the soul or mind, but that does not mean the soul or mind is extended. Nor does the fact that colours exist in the mind mean that the mind is red or blue. Yet everyone agrees that those colours exist in the mind and nowhere else. (2) What philosophers say about subject and mode seems quite groundless and unintelligible. Take the statement "a die is hard, extended, and square." Philosophers claim that the word die names a subject or substance distinct from the hardness, extension, and shape attributed to it. They also claim that those qualities exist in the substance. I cannot understand this. To me, a die seems to be nothing distinct from what are called its modes or accidents. And to say that a die is hard, extended, and square is not to attribute those qualities to a distinct subject that supports them. It is only to explain the meaning of the word DIE.

50. SIXTH OBJECTION, FROM NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.--ANSWER.--Sixthly, you will say there have been a great many things explained by matter and motion; take away these and you destroy the whole corpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechanical principles which have been applied with so much success to account for the PHENOMENA. In short, whatever advances have been made, either by ancient or modern philosophers, in the study of nature do all proceed on the supposition that corporeal substance or Matter doth really exist. To this I ANSWER that there is not any one PHENOMENON explained on that supposition which may not as well be explained without it, as might easily be made appear by an INDUCTION OF PARTICULARS. To explain the PHENOMENA, is all one as to show why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with such and such ideas. But (1) how Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce any idea in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is therefore evident there can be no use of Matter in natural philosophy. Besides, (2) they who attempt to account for things do it not by CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE, but by figure, motion, and other qualities, which are in truth no more than mere ideas, and, therefore, cannot be the cause of anything, as has been already shown. See sect. 25.

50. SIXTH OBJECTION, FROM NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. ANSWER. Sixth, you will say that matter and motion have explained many things. Remove them, and you destroy the whole corpuscular philosophy. You also undermine the mechanical principles that have been so successfully applied to explain natural phenomena. In short, all advances made by ancient or modern philosophers in studying nature rest on one assumption. They assume that corporeal substance, or Matter, really exists. I ANSWER that every phenomenon explained on that assumption could be explained equally well without it. This could easily be shown by examining individual cases. To explain phenomena is to show why, on particular occasions, we experience particular ideas. But (1) no philosopher claims to explain how Matter could act on a Spirit or produce any idea in it. So clearly Matter can be of no use in natural philosophy. Besides, (2) those who try to explain things do not do so by means of CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE. They explain things by shape, motion, and other qualities. In truth, these qualities are no more than mere ideas. As already shown, they therefore cannot be the cause of anything. See section 25.

51. SEVENTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Seventhly, it will upon this be demanded whether it does not seem ABSURD TO TAKE AWAY NATURAL CAUSES, AND ASCRIBE EVERYTHING TO THE IMMEDIATE OPERATION OF SPIRITS? We must no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water cools, but that a Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I ANSWER, he would so; in such things we ought to THINK WITH THE LEARNED, AND SPEAK WITH THE VULGAR. They who to demonstration are convinced of the truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say "the sun rises," "the sun sets," or "comes to the meridian"; and if they affected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appear very ridiculous. A little reflexion on what is here said will make it manifest that the common use of language would receive no manner of alteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets.

51. SEVENTH OBJECTION. ANSWER. Seventh, someone will ask: Does it not seem absurd to reject natural causes and attribute everything to the direct action of spirits? According to these principles, we must no longer say that fire heats or water cools. Instead, we must say that a spirit heats, and so on. Would someone who spoke this way not deserve to be laughed at? I answer, yes. In such matters, we should think like the learned and speak like ordinary people. Those who are convinced by proof that the Copernican system is true nevertheless say "the sun rises," "the sun sets," or "comes to the meridian". If they deliberately spoke otherwise in everyday conversation, they would undoubtedly seem very ridiculous. A little thought about what I have said here will show that accepting our principles would not change or disturb ordinary language in any way.

52. IN THE ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF LIFE, ANY PHRASES MAY BE RETAINED, so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary for our WELL-BEING, how false soever they may be if taken in a strict and SPECULATIVE SENSE. Nay, this is unavoidable, since, propriety being regulated by CUSTOM, language is suited to the RECEIVED opinions, which are not always the truest. Hence it is impossible, even in the most rigid, philosophic reasonings, so far to alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak, as never to give a handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But, a fair and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor and connexion of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate modes of speech which use has made inevitable.

52. In everyday life, we may keep any phrases that inspire the right feelings or inclinations to act as our well-being requires. This is true however false the phrases may be in a strict, theoretical sense. Indeed, such language is unavoidable. Custom determines what is considered proper, so language reflects accepted opinions, which are not always the truest. For this reason, even in the most rigorous philosophical arguments, we cannot change the habits and character of our language enough to leave faultfinders no opportunity to claim that there are difficulties and inconsistencies. But a fair and open-minded reader will gather the meaning from the purpose, course, and connections of the discussion. Such a reader will make allowances for the inaccurate ways of speaking that custom has made unavoidable.

53. As to the OPINION THAT THERE ARE NO CORPOREAL CAUSES, this has been heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by others among the modern philosophers, who though they allow Matter to exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all things. These men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was none which had any power or activity included in it; and that by consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed to exist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense. But then, that they should suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings, which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose, since God might have done everything as well without them: this I say, though we should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable and extravagant supposition.

53. As for the OPINION THAT THERE ARE NO CORPOREAL CAUSES, some Scholastics held this view in the past. More recently, some modern philosophers have held it too. Although they accept that Matter exists, they maintain that God alone is the immediate efficient cause of all things. These philosophers saw that none of the objects of sense contained any power or activity. They concluded that the same was true of whatever bodies they supposed to exist outside the mind, resembling the immediate objects of sense. But they also supposed that there were countless created beings, although they admitted that these beings could produce no effect in nature. Such beings would therefore have been made for no purpose, since God could have done everything just as well without them. Even if we allow that such beings could exist, I say that this supposition must be very hard to explain and extravagant.

54. EIGHTH OBJECTION.--TWOFOLD ANSWER.--In the eighth place, the universal concurrent assent of mankind may be thought by some an invincible argument in behalf of Matter, or the existence of external things. Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken? And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error? I answer, FIRST, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be found so many as is imagined do really believe the existence of Matter or things without the mind. Strictly speaking, to believe that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it, is impossible; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort, I refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense, indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter exists, that is, they ACT as if the immediate cause of their sensations, which affects them every moment, and is so nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinking being. But, that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those words, and form thereof a settled SPECULATIVE opinion, is what I am not able to conceive. This is not the only instance wherein men impose upon themselves, by imagining they believe those propositions which they have often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them.

54. EIGHTH OBJECTION. TWO ANSWERS. Eighth, some may think that the agreement of all humankind is an unanswerable argument for Matter, or the existence of external things. Must we suppose that the whole world is mistaken? If so, what could explain such a widespread and prevailing error? I answer, FIRST, that a close examination may show that fewer people than imagined really believe in Matter or things outside the mind. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to believe something that involves a contradiction or has no meaning. I leave it to the reader to judge impartially whether the expressions just mentioned are of that kind. In one sense, people can indeed be said to believe that Matter exists. They ACT as if the immediate cause of their sensations were some insensible, unthinking being. This cause affects them every moment and is so close to them. But I cannot conceive that they clearly grasp any meaning in those words and form a settled THEORETICAL opinion from them. This is not the only case in which people deceive themselves. They imagine they believe propositions they have often heard, though those propositions have no meaning at all.

55. But SECONDLY, though we should grant a notion to be never so universally and steadfastly adhered to, yet this is weak argument of its truth to whoever considers what a vast number of prejudices and false opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by the unreflecting (which are the far greater) part of mankind. There was a time when the antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon as monstrous absurdities even by men of learning: and if it be considered what a small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find that at this day those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable footing in the world.

55. But SECONDLY, suppose we grant that a belief is held universally and with complete certainty. Even so, this is weak evidence that the belief is true. Consider the vast number of prejudices and false opinions that unreflective people everywhere cling to. Such people make up the far greater part of humanity. There was a time when even learned people regarded the antipodes and the motion of the earth as monstrous absurdities. And if we consider how few learned people there are compared with the rest of humanity, we will see that even today these ideas have gained very little acceptance in the world.

56. NINTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But it is demanded that we assign A CAUSE OF THIS PREJUDICE, and account for its obtaining in the world. To this I ANSWER, that men knowing they perceived several ideas, WHEREOF THEY THEMSELVES WERE NOT THE AUTHORS--as not being excited from within nor depending on the operation of their wills--this made them maintain those ideas, or objects of perception had an EXISTENCE INDEPENDENT OF AND WITHOUT THE MIND, without ever dreaming that a contradiction was involved in those words. But, philosophers having plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception do not exist without the mind, THEY IN SOME DEGREE CORRECTED the mistake of the vulgar; but at the same time run into another which seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really existing without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being perceived, OF WHICH OUR IDEAS ARE ONLY IMAGES or resemblances, imprinted by those objects on the mind. And this notion of the philosophers owes its origin to the same cause with the former, namely, their being conscious that they were not the authors of their own sensations, which they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which therefore must have some cause distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted.

56. NINTH OBJECTION. ANSWER. But we are asked to explain the cause of this prejudice and how it came to be widely held. I answer that people knew they perceived several ideas that they had not created themselves. These ideas did not arise from within them or depend on their will. So people maintained that those ideas, or objects of perception, existed outside and independently of the mind. They never imagined that these words involved a contradiction. But philosophers saw clearly that the immediate objects of perception do not exist outside the mind. In this way, they corrected the common mistake to some degree. At the same time, however, they fell into another mistake that seems no less absurd. They held that certain objects really exist outside the mind, or have an existence distinct from being perceived. They held that our ideas are only images or likenesses of those objects, imprinted on the mind by them. The philosophers’ notion arose from the same cause as the earlier mistake. They knew that they were not the authors of their own sensations. They knew clearly that those sensations were imprinted from outside. The sensations must therefore have some cause distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted.

57. BUT WHY THEY SHOULD SUPPOSE THE IDEAS OF SENSE TO BE EXCITED IN US BY THINGS IN THEIR LIKENESS, and not rather have recourse to SPIRIT which alone can act, may be accounted for, FIRST, because they were not aware of the repugnancy there is, (1) as well in supposing things like unto our ideas existing without, as in (2) attributing to them POWER OR ACTIVITY. SECONDLY, because the Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our minds, is not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite collection of sensible ideas, as human agents are by their size, complexion, limbs, and motions. And thirdly, because His operations are regular and uniform. Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by a miracle, men are ready to own the presence of a superior agent. But, when we see things go on in the ordinary course they do not excite in us any reflexion; their order and concatenation, though it be an argument of the greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their creator, is yet so constant and familiar to us that we do not think them the immediate effects of a Free Spirit; especially since inconsistency and mutability in acting, though it be an imperfection, is looked on as a mark of freedom.

57. Why do they suppose that things resembling our ideas produce the ideas of sense in us, rather than turn to spirit, which alone can act? This can be explained, first, because they did not recognize the contradiction involved in two assumptions. One is that things resembling our ideas exist outside us. The other is that those things have power or activity. Second, the Supreme Spirit produces those ideas in our minds. But no particular, limited collection of sensible ideas marks him out and makes him visible to us. Human agents, by contrast, are marked out by their size, complexion, limbs, and movements. Third, his operations are regular and uniform. Whenever a miracle interrupts the course of nature, people readily acknowledge the presence of a superior agent. But when we see things proceed in their ordinary course, they do not make us reflect. Their order and connection are evidence of the greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their creator. Yet their order and connection are so constant and familiar that we do not consider them the immediate effects of a Free Spirit. This is especially so because inconsistent and changeable action is regarded as a sign of freedom, although it is an imperfection.

58. TENTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Tenthly, it will be objected that the notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths in philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth is now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing principles, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only an idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not; but the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense. I answer, that tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the principles we have premised; for, the question whether the earth moves or no amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have reason to conclude, from what has been observed by astronomers, that if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such a position and distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like one of them; and this, by the established rules of nature which we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the phenomena.

58. TENTH OBJECTION. ANSWER. Tenth, someone may object that our ideas conflict with several sound truths in philosophy and mathematics. For example, astronomers now universally accept that the earth moves. They regard its motion as a truth supported by the clearest and most convincing reasons. But according to the principles already stated, the earth cannot move. Motion is only an idea, so if it is not perceived, it does not exist. Yet the earth's motion is not perceived by the senses. I answer that, rightly understood, the belief that the earth moves agrees with the principles we have set out. The question of whether the earth moves really comes down to this: Do astronomers' observations give us reason to draw a certain conclusion? If we were placed in particular circumstances, positions, and distances from both the earth and the sun, would we perceive the earth moving among the planets and looking in every respect like one of them? The observed phenomena give us reason to conclude that we would, according to the established rules of nature. We have no reason to distrust those rules.

59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train and succession of ideas in our minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures, but sure and well--grounded predictions concerning the ideas we shall be affected with pursuant to a great train of actions, and be enabled to pass a right judgment of what would have appeared to us, in case we were placed in circumstances very different from those we are in at present. Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve its use and certainty very consistently with what has been said. It will be easy to apply this to whatever objections of the like sort may be drawn from the magnitude of the stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature.

59. Experience shows us how ideas follow one another in our minds. From this experience, we can often make predictions about the ideas we will experience after a long series of actions. I do not mean uncertain guesses, but reliable, well-founded predictions. We can also judge correctly what would have appeared to us if our circumstances were very different from those we are in now. This is what knowledge of nature consists in. Such knowledge can remain useful and certain, entirely consistently with what has been said. It will be easy to apply this reasoning to similar objections drawn from the size of the stars or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature.

60. ELEVENTH OBJECTION.--In the eleventh place, it will be demanded to what purpose serves that curious organization of plants, and the animal mechanism in the parts of animals; might not vegetables grow, and shoot forth leaves of blossoms, and animals perform all their motions as well without as with all that variety of internal parts so elegantly contrived and put together; which, being ideas, have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary connexion with the effects ascribed to them? If it be a Spirit that immediately produces every effect by a fiat or act of his will, we must think all that is fine and artificial in the works, whether of man or nature, to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though an artist has made the spring and wheels, and every movement of a watch, and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew would produce the motions he designed, yet he must think all this done to no purpose, and that it is an Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the hour of the day. If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does not an empty case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass that whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is some corresponding disorder to be found in the movements, which being mended by a skilful hand all is right again? The like may be said of all the clockwork of nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be asked, how, upon our principles, any tolerable account can be given, or any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies and machines, framed with the most exquisite art, which in the common philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain abundance of phenomena?

60. ELEVENTH OBJECTION: The eleventh objection asks what purpose is served by the intricate structure of plants and the mechanisms in animal bodies. Could plants not grow and produce leaves or blossoms without their many internal parts? Could animals not perform all their movements just as well without their parts? These parts are so elegantly designed and fitted together. Yet, since they are ideas, they have no power to act. Nor do they have any necessary connection with the effects attributed to them. If a Spirit directly produces every effect by a command or an act of his will, all the fine and skillful workmanship in human works and nature must seem pointless. Consider a watchmaker who has made a watch’s spring, wheels, and every moving part. He has arranged them in a way he knew would produce the movements he intended. Yet, according to this doctrine, he must think all this work pointless. He must think that an Intelligence directs the hand and points to the hour of the day. If so, why could the Intelligence not do this without the watchmaker taking the trouble to make and assemble the moving parts? Why would an empty case not serve just as well? And why, whenever a watch does not run properly, is there a corresponding problem in its moving parts? Once a skilled hand repairs the parts, the watch runs properly again. The same may be said of all the clockwork of nature. Much of it is so wonderfully delicate and subtle that even the best microscope can scarcely reveal it. In short, the objection asks how our principles can adequately account for innumerable bodies and machines made with the most exquisite skill. What purpose can our principles assign to them? In the usual philosophy, these bodies and machines are assigned very suitable uses and serve to explain many phenomena.

61. ANSWER.--To all which I answer, first, that though there were some difficulties relating to the administration of Providence, and the uses by it assigned to the several parts of nature, which I could not solve by the foregoing principles, yet this objection could be of small weight against the truth and certainty of those things which may be proved a priori, with the utmost evidence and rigor of demonstration. Secondly, but neither are the received principles free from the like difficulties; for, it may still be demanded to what end God should take those roundabout methods of effecting things by instruments and machines, which no one can deny might have been effected by the mere command of His will without all that apparatus; nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shall find the objection may be retorted with greater force on those who hold the existence of those machines without of mind; for it has been made evident that solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like have no activity or efficacy in them, so as to be capable of producing any one effect in nature. See sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes them to exist (allowing the supposition possible) when they are not perceived does it manifestly to no purpose; since the only use that is assigned to them, as they exist unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable effects which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit.

61. ANSWER: To all this, I answer, first, that I may be unable to resolve some difficulties using the foregoing principles. These difficulties concern the workings of Providence and the uses it assigns to the various parts of nature. Even so, this objection would carry little weight against the truth and certainty of what can be proved a priori, with the utmost clarity and rigor of demonstration. Second, the accepted principles are not free from similar difficulties either. We may still ask why God would use such roundabout methods, relying on instruments and machines. No one can deny that he could have accomplished the same things simply by willing them, without all that apparatus. Indeed, on closer examination, we find that the objection can be turned with greater force against those who believe these machines exist outside the mind. For it has been made clear that solidity, size, shape, motion, and the like have no activity or power of their own. They cannot produce any effect in nature. See section 25. Suppose, then, that someone believes these things exist when they are not perceived, granting that this is possible. That supposition clearly serves no purpose. For the only use assigned to these things while they exist unperceived is that they produce perceivable effects. Yet those effects can in truth be attributed only to Spirit.

62. (FOURTHLY.)--But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed that though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not absolutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of things in a constant regular way according to the laws of nature. There are certain general laws that run through the whole chain of natural effects; these are learned by the observation and study of nature, and are by men applied as well to the framing artificial things for the use and ornament of life as to the explaining various phenomena--which explication consists only in showing the conformity any particular phenomenon has to the general laws of nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering the uniformity there is in the production of natural effects; as will be evident to whoever shall attend to the several instances wherein philosophers pretend to account for appearances. That there is a great and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of working observed by the Supreme Agent has been shown in sect. 31. And it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are necessary, though not absolutely to the producing any effect, yet to the producing it according to the standing mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, or the Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things, might if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the movements and put them in it: but yet, if He will act agreeably to the rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and maintained in the creation, it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker, whereby he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the production of the aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder in them be attended with the perception of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which being once corrected all is right again.

62. (FOURTHLY.) But to come closer to the difficulty, we must note that making all those parts and organs is not absolutely necessary to produce an effect. It is necessary, however, to produce things consistently and regularly according to the laws of nature. Certain general laws run through the whole chain of natural effects. People learn these laws by observing and studying nature. They apply them both to making artificial things for practical use and decoration and to explaining various phenomena. Explaining a particular phenomenon consists only in showing how it conforms to the general laws of nature. In other words, it consists in discovering the uniformity in the production of natural effects. This will be clear to anyone who considers the various cases in which philosophers claim to explain appearances. Section 31 has shown that these regular, consistent methods used by the Supreme Agent are greatly and obviously useful. It is equally clear that parts must have a particular size, shape, motion, and arrangement to produce an effect according to the established mechanical laws of nature. These features are not, however, absolutely necessary to produce an effect. For example, no one can deny that God, the Intelligence that sustains and governs the ordinary course of things, could produce a miracle if he chose. He could cause all the motions on a watch face, even if no one had ever made the mechanism and put it inside. But God has established and maintained the rules of mechanism in creation for wise purposes. If he acts according to those rules, the watchmaker must first make and correctly adjust the mechanism. Only then can the motions on the watch face occur. Any irregularity in those motions must also be accompanied by the perception of a corresponding defect in the mechanism. Once the defect is corrected, everything is right again.

63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the Author of nature display His overruling power in producing some appearance out of the ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the general rules of nature are proper to surprise and awe men into an acknowledgement of the Divine Being; but then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason why they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems to choose the convincing our reason of His attributes by the works of nature, which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, and are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous and surprising events.

63. On some occasions, the Author of nature may indeed need to display his overriding power by producing an event outside the ordinary course of things. Such exceptions to the general rules of nature can surprise and inspire awe in people, leading them to acknowledge the Divine Being. But they must be used rarely. Otherwise, there is an obvious reason why they would fail to have that effect. Besides, God seems to prefer convincing us of his attributes through the works of nature, rather than astounding us into believing in his existence through unusual and surprising events. The works of nature reveal so much harmony and design in their construction. They are clear signs of wisdom and goodness in their Author.

64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe that what has been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no more than this:--ideas are not anyhow and at random produced, there being a certain order and connexion between them, like to that of cause and effect; there are also several combinations of them made in a very regular and artificial manner, which seem like so many instruments in the hand of nature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secret operation in producing those appearances which are seen on the theatre of the world, being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the philosopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to what purpose is that connexion? And, since those instruments, being barely inefficacious perceptions in the mind, are not subservient to the production of natural effects, it is demanded why they are made; or, in other words, what reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon a close inspection into His works, behold so great variety of ideas so artfully laid together, and so much according to rule; it not being credible that He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all that art and regularity to no purpose.

64. To make this matter clearer, I will consider the objection raised in section 60. It really amounts to no more than this: ideas are not produced randomly or haphazardly. They have a certain order and connection, like that of cause and effect. Ideas are also combined in many regular and intricate ways. These combinations seem like instruments in the hand of nature. As if hidden behind the scenes, they work secretly to produce the appearances we see on the stage of the world. Only the curious eye of the philosopher can discern the instruments themselves. But since one idea cannot cause another, what purpose does this connection serve? And since these instruments are merely powerless perceptions in the mind, they do not help produce natural effects. So the question is why they are made. In other words, why should God make us see such a great variety of ideas arranged so skillfully and so regularly when we closely examine his works? It is not credible that he would go to the expense, if one may put it that way, of all that skill and regularity for no purpose.

65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof. Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for combining letters into words. That a few original ideas may be made to signify a great number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously combined together. And, to the end their use be permanent and universal, these combinations must be made by rule, and with wise contrivance. By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning what we are to expect from such and such actions and what methods are proper to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas; which in effect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said that, by discerning a figure, texture, and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several uses and properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing.

65. My answer to all this is, first, that a connection between ideas does not imply cause and effect. It implies only a relation between a sign and the thing it signifies. The fire I see does not cause the pain I suffer when I approach it. Rather, the fire is a sign that warns me of the pain. Likewise, the noise I hear is not the effect of some movement or collision of surrounding bodies. It is a sign of that movement or collision. Second, ideas are formed into machines, meaning artificial and orderly combinations, for the same reason letters are combined into words. A few basic ideas must be combined in different ways so that they can signify many effects and actions. And for these combinations to have lasting and universal use, they must be made according to rules and with wise design. In this way, they give us a great deal of information. They tell us what to expect from various actions and what methods to use to produce various ideas. In effect, I take this to be all that is clearly meant by the following claim. By understanding the shape, texture, and mechanism of the inner parts of bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may come to know their various uses and properties, which depend on those parts. In other words, we may come to know the nature of the thing.

66. PROPER EMPLOYMENT OF THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHER.--Hence, it is evident that those things which, under the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production of effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run us into great absurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them, when they are considered only as marks or signs for our information. And it is the searching after and endeavouring to understand those signs instituted by the Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment of the natural philosopher; and not the pretending to explain things by corporeal causes, which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds of men from that active principle, that supreme and wise Spirit "in whom we live, move, and have our being."

66. THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHER'S PROPER TASK. Thus, some things are completely inexplicable when regarded as causes that cooperate or contribute to producing effects. This view also leads us into great absurdities. But these same things can be explained quite naturally when considered only as marks or signs for our information. They can then be given a proper and obvious use. The natural philosopher's task should be to search for and try to understand the signs established by the Author of Nature. The natural philosopher should not pretend to explain things by physical causes. This doctrine seems to have drawn people's minds too far away from the active principle, the supreme and wise Spirit "in whom we live, move, and have our being."

67. TWELFTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--In the twelfth place, it may perhaps be objected that--though it be clear from what has been said that there can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, figured, movable substance existing without the mind, such as philosophers describe Matter--yet, if any man shall leave out of his idea of matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity and motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert, senseless substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived, which is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is pleased to excite ideas in us: it doth not appear but that Matter taken in this sense may possibly exist. In answer to which I say, first, that it seems no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents, than it is to suppose accidents without a substance. But secondly, though we should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it be supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind is agreed; and that it exists not in place is no less certain--since all place or extension exists only in the mind, as has been already proved. It remains therefore that it exists nowhere at all.

67. TWELFTH OBJECTION. ANSWER. Twelfth, someone might raise the following objection. What has been said makes clear that Matter, as philosophers describe it, cannot exist outside the mind. They describe Matter as an inert, senseless substance that is extended, solid, shaped, and movable. But someone might leave the positive ideas of extension, shape, solidity, and motion out of his idea of matter. He might say that by “matter” he means only an inert, senseless substance that exists outside the mind, or unperceived. This substance is the occasion of our ideas, or God chooses to cause ideas in us when it is present. In this sense, it does not appear that Matter could not possibly exist. In answer, I say, first, that a substance without properties seems no less absurd than properties without a substance. Second, even if we grant that this unknown substance could possibly exist, where could it be? We agree that it does not exist in the mind. It is no less certain that it does not exist in any place. For all place or extension exists only in the mind, as has already been proved. It follows, therefore, that the substance exists nowhere at all.

68. MATTER SUPPORTS NOTHING, AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ITS EXISTENCE.--Let us examine a little the description that is here given us of matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived; for this is all that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance; which is a definition entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the relative notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it must be observed that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to the description of a nonentity I desire may be considered. But, say you, it is the unknown occasion, at the presence of which ideas are excited in us by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion, nor capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor has any form, nor exists in any place. The words "to be present," when thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, and which I am not able to comprehend.

68. MATTER SUPPORTS NOTHING, AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ITS EXISTENCE. Let us examine the description of matter given here. Matter neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived. That is all we mean when we call matter an inactive, insensible, unknown substance. This definition consists entirely of negatives, except for the relative idea that matter stands under or supports something. But we must note that matter supports nothing at all. I ask you to consider how close this comes to describing something that does not exist. But, you say, matter is the unknown occasion whose presence causes God, by his will, to produce ideas in us. Now, I would like to know how anything can be present to us when we cannot perceive it through our senses or reflection. Nor can it produce any idea in our minds. It has no extension or shape, and it exists in no place. When applied in this way, the words "to be present" must have some abstract and strange meaning that I cannot understand.

69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion. So far as I can gather from the common use of language, that word signifies either the agent which produces any effect, or else something that is observed to accompany or go before it in the ordinary course of things. But when it is applied to Matter as above described, it can be taken in neither of those senses; for Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid of all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions in the latter sense: as when the burning my finger is said to be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant by calling matter an occasion? The term is either used in no sense at all, or else in some very distant from its received signification.

69. Let us also examine what is meant by “occasion.” As far as I can tell from common usage, the word has two meanings. It means either the agent that produces an effect or something observed to accompany or precede it in the ordinary course of events. But neither meaning applies to Matter as described above. Matter is said to be passive and inert, so it cannot be an agent or an efficient cause. Matter is also imperceptible, because it has no qualities that can be sensed. So it cannot be the occasion of our perceptions in the second sense. For example, burning my finger is said to be the occasion of the pain that accompanies the burn. What, then, can be meant by calling matter an occasion? The term is either meaningless here or used in a sense very different from its accepted meaning.

70. You will Perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds. For, say you, since we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their being produced. That is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as being altogether passive and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God, by whom they art perceived, as it were so many occasions to remind Him when and what ideas to imprint on our minds; that so things may go on in a constant uniform manner.

70. Perhaps you will say that although we do not perceive Matter, God does. You may say that Matter gives God occasions to produce ideas in our minds. We observe that our sensations are impressed on us in an orderly and constant way. You may therefore say it is reasonable to suppose that they are produced on certain constant and regular occasions. In other words, there are certain permanent and distinct pieces of Matter corresponding to our ideas. These pieces do not produce ideas in our minds or affect us directly in any way. They are entirely passive, and we cannot perceive them. Nevertheless, God perceives them, and they are, as it were, occasions that remind him when and what ideas to impress on our minds. In this way, things can proceed in a constant, uniform manner.

71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter is here stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing distinct from Spirit and idea, from perceiving and being perceived; but whether there are not certain ideas of I know not what sort, in the mind of God which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to produce sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method--much after the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a tune, though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be entirely ignorant of them. But, this notion of Matter seems too extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in effect no objection against what we have advanced, viz. that there is no senseless unperceived substance.

71. In answer to this, I observe that, with Matter defined in this way, the question has changed. It is no longer about whether something exists that is distinct from Spirit and idea, from perceiving and being perceived. Instead, the question is whether certain ideas of some unknown kind exist in the mind of God. These ideas would be marks or signs that guide him in producing sensations in our minds in a constant, regular way. In much the same way, musical notes guide a musician in producing the harmonious sequence and arrangement of sounds called a tune. Yet those who hear the music do not perceive the notes and may know nothing about them. But this notion of Matter seems too extravagant to deserve a refutation. Besides, it is not really an objection to what we have argued, namely, that there is no unperceived substance without sensation.

72. THE ORDER OF OUR PERCEPTIONS SHOWS THE GOODNESS OF GOD, BUT AFFORDS NO PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER.--If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the constant uniform method of our sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who excites them in our minds; but this is all that I can see reasonably concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that the being of a spirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances of nature. But, as for inert, senseless Matter, nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or leads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one explain any the meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or show any manner of reason, though in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence, or even make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. For, as to its being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently shown that with regard to us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts to we have just now seen.

72. THE ORDER OF OUR PERCEPTIONS SHOWS THE GOODNESS OF GOD, BUT PROVIDES NO PROOF THAT MATTER EXISTS. If we follow the light of reason, we can draw a conclusion from the constant, uniform pattern of our sensations. We can conclude that the Spirit who produces them in our minds is good and wise. But that is all I can see any reasonable grounds for concluding from this pattern. It is clear to me that the existence of an infinitely wise, good, and powerful spirit is more than enough to explain all the appearances of nature. But nothing I perceive has the slightest connection with inert, senseless Matter or leads me to think of it. I would like to see anyone use Matter to explain even the most insignificant phenomenon in nature. I would also like to see anyone give any reason, however weak, for believing that Matter exists. Or I would like to see anyone make any reasonable sense of that supposition. As for Matter being an occasion, I think we have clearly shown that it is no occasion with respect to us. Therefore, if Matter is an occasion at all, it must be the occasion for God to produce ideas in us. And we have just seen what that amounts to.

73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which induced men to suppose the existence of material substance; that so having observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons, we may proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded on them. First, therefore, it was thought that colour, figure, motion, and the rest of the sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist without the mind; and for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking substratum or substance wherein they did exist, since they could not be conceived to exist by themselves. Afterwards, in process of time, men being convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped this substratum or material substance of those qualities, leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which they still conceived to exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material support. But, it having been shown that none even of these can possibly exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them it follows that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter; nay, that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so long as that word is taken to denote an unthinking substratum of qualities or accidents wherein they exist without the mind.

73. It is worth considering why people supposed that material substance exists. As we see these reasons gradually disappear, we can withdraw our assent in proportion, since it was based on them. At first, people thought that color, shape, motion, and other sensible qualities or properties really existed outside the mind. They could not conceive of these qualities as existing on their own. So they thought it necessary to suppose that the qualities existed in some unthinking substratum or substance. Later, people became convinced that colors, sounds, and other sensible secondary qualities did not exist outside the mind. They therefore stripped the substratum, or material substance, of those qualities. They left only the primary qualities, such as shape and motion. They still thought that these existed outside the mind and therefore needed a material support. But it has been shown that even these primary qualities can exist only in a Spirit or Mind that perceives them. So we no longer have any reason to suppose that Matter exists. Indeed, Matter is utterly impossible, as long as the word means an unthinking substratum in which qualities or properties exist outside the mind.

74. But though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matter was thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents, and, the reason entirely ceasing, one might expect the mind should naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely grounded thereon; yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts, that we can scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the thing itself is indefensible, at least to retain the name, which we apply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being, or occasion, though without any show of reason, at least so far as I can see. For, what is there on our part, or what do we perceive, amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on our minds, either by sense or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on the other hand, on the part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should make us believe or even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to excite ideas in our minds?

74. Even materialists admit that Matter was proposed only to support properties. Since that reason has entirely disappeared, we might expect the mind to give up belief in Matter without any reluctance. After all, that belief rested entirely on the need to support properties. Yet the prejudice is so deeply fixed in our thoughts that we can hardly let it go. Since Matter itself cannot be defended, we are inclined at least to keep the name. We apply it to vague and indefinite abstract notions of being or occasion, though, as far as I can see, there is no apparent reason to do so. For what do we perceive among all the ideas, sensations, and notions imprinted on our minds by sense or reflection? What in them could lead us to infer the existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion? And, on the other hand, what about an All-sufficient Spirit could make us believe or even suspect that he is directed by an inert occasion to produce ideas in our minds?

75. ABSURDITY OF CONTENDING FOR THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER AS THE OCCASION OF IDEAS.--It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice, and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness, against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless somewhat, by the interposition whereof it would as it were screen itself from the Providence of God, and remove it farther off from the affairs of the world. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter, though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our opinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to make out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is, that there are certain unknown Ideas in the mind of God; for this, if anything, is all that I conceive to be meant by occasion with regard to God. And this at the bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the name.

75. THE ABSURDITY OF ARGUING THAT MATTER EXISTS AS THE OCCASION OF IDEAS. It is a remarkable example of the power of prejudice, and much to be regretted, that the human mind remains so attached to a mindless, thoughtless something, despite all the evidence of reason. By placing this something between itself and God, the mind would, as it were, shield itself from God’s providence and move God farther away from the affairs of the world. But suppose we do everything we can to secure belief in Matter. Suppose that, when reason fails us, we try to support our belief by the bare possibility that Matter exists. Suppose, too, that we give our imagination, unchecked by reason, free rein to establish that meager possibility. Even then, all this comes down to certain unknown Ideas in the mind of God. For, if it means anything, that is all I understand by an occasion with regard to God. At bottom, then, we are no longer arguing for the thing, but for the name.

76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, and whether they may be called by the name Matter, I shall not dispute. But, if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most evidently impossible there should be any such thing, since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported by an unperceiving substance.

76. Therefore, I will not dispute whether such ideas exist in the mind of God, or whether they may be called matter. But suppose you hold to the idea of a nonthinking substance that supports extension, motion, and other sensible qualities. To me, it is plainly impossible for any such substance to exist. For it is a clear contradiction for those qualities to exist in or be supported by a substance that cannot perceive.

77. THAT A SUBSTRATUM NOT PERCEIVED, MAY EXIST, UNIMPORTANT.--But, say you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless support of extension and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or substratum of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours are to a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them. But, if we had a new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of their existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and colours. I answer, first, if what you mean by the word Matter be only the unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us; and I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about what we know not what, and we know not why.

77. THE POSSIBLE EXISTENCE OF AN UNPERCEIVED SUBSTRATUM IS UNIMPORTANT. But you may say: Granted, there is no unthinking support for extension and the other qualities or properties we perceive. Still, perhaps some inactive, unperceiving substance or substratum supports other qualities. These qualities may be as incomprehensible to us as colors are to a person born blind, because we have no sense suited to perceiving them. But if we had a new sense, perhaps we would no longer doubt that these qualities exist. We would be like a blind person who, once able to see, no longer doubts that light and colors exist. I answer, first, that if by Matter you mean only the unknown support of unknown qualities, it does not matter whether such a thing exists. It does not concern us in any way. And I see no advantage in arguing about something when we know neither what we are arguing about nor why.

78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only furnish us with new ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same reason against their existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already offered with relation to figure, motion, colour and the like. Qualities, as has been shown, are nothing else but sensations or ideas, which exist only in a mind perceiving them; and this is true not only of the ideas we are acquainted with at present, but likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever.

78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense, it could only give us new ideas or sensations. We would then have the same reason to deny that they exist in a substance that does not perceive. This reason has already been given for shape, motion, color, and the like. As we have seen, qualities are nothing but sensations or ideas. They exist only in a mind that perceives them. This is true not only of the ideas we know now, but also of all possible ideas whatsoever.

79. But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe the existence of Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it or explain anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that word? yet still it is no contradiction to say that Matter exists, and that this Matter is in general a substance, or occasion of ideas; though indeed to go about to unfold the meaning or adhere to any particular explication of those words may be attended with great difficulties. I answer, when words are used without a meaning, you may put them together as you please without danger of running into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that twice two is equal to seven, so long as you declare you do not take the words of that proposition in their usual acceptation but for marks of you know not what. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an inert thoughtless substance without accidents which is the occasion of our ideas. And we shall understand just as much by one proposition as the other.

79. But you will insist: what if I have no reason to believe that Matter exists? What if I cannot say what use it has, explain anything by it, or even imagine what the word means? Still, there is no contradiction in saying that Matter exists and that it is, in general, a substance or occasion of ideas. Admittedly, explaining what those words mean or sticking to any particular explanation may involve great difficulties. I answer that when words have no meaning, you may put them together however you please without risking a contradiction. For example, you may say that twice two equals seven. You may do this as long as you declare that you do not use those words in their usual senses, but as signs for you know not what. For the same reason, you may say that an inactive, thoughtless substance without accidents is the occasion of our ideas. And we shall understand just as much by one statement as by the other.

80. In the last place, you will say, what if we give up the cause of material Substance, and stand to it that Matter is an unknown somewhat--neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea, inert, thoughtless, indivisible, immovable, unextended, existing in no place. For, say you, whatever may be urged against substance or occasion, or any other positive or relative notion of Matter, has no place at all, so long as this negative definition of Matter is adhered to. I answer, you may, if so it shall seem good, use the word "Matter" in the same sense as other men use "nothing," and so make those terms convertible in your style. For, after all, this is what appears to me to be the result of that definition, the parts whereof when I consider with attention, either collectively or separate from each other, I do not find that there is any kind of effect or impression made on my mind different from what is excited by the term nothing.

80. Finally, you may say, what if we give up the claim that Matter is a substance? Instead, we could insist that Matter is an unknown something, neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea. It is inert, thoughtless, indivisible, immovable, unextended, and exists nowhere. You might say that any objection to substance, occasion, or any other positive or relational idea of Matter no longer applies. It has no force as long as we hold to this negative definition of Matter. I answer that, if you wish, you may use the word "Matter" as other people use "nothing." You can make the two terms interchangeable in your own language. After all, that is what this definition seems to me to amount to. I consider its parts carefully, both together and separately. They make no different effect or impression on my mind from the one made by the term nothing.

81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the fore-said definition is included what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing--the positive abstract idea of quiddity, entity, or existence. I own, indeed, that those who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if they had such an idea, which is, say they, the most abstract and general notion of all; that is, to me, the most incomprehensible of all others. That there are a great variety of spirits of different orders and capacities, whose faculties both in number and extent are far exceeding those the Author of my being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. And for me to pretend to determine by my own few, stinted narrow inlets of perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit may imprint upon them were certainly the utmost folly and presumption--since there may be, for aught that I know, innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations, as different from one another, and from all that I have perceived, as colours are from sounds. But, how ready soever I may be to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension with regard to the endless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any one to pretend to a notion of Entity or Existence, abstracted from spirit and idea, from perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect, a downright repugnancy and trifling with words.--It remains that we consider the objections which may possibly be made on the part of Religion.

81. You may reply that the definition above includes something that sufficiently distinguishes it from nothing: the positive abstract idea of quiddity, entity, or existence. I admit that those who claim to be able to form abstract general ideas speak as if they had such an idea. They say it is the most abstract and general notion of all. To me, that means it is the most incomprehensible of all. I see no reason to deny that there are many kinds of spirits, of different orders and capacities. Their faculties, both in number and extent, far exceed those that the Author of my being has given me. My own few, limited ways of perceiving are narrow. It would surely be the height of folly and presumption to use them to decide what ideas the Supreme Spirit, in his inexhaustible power, may impress on those spirits. For all I know, there may be countless kinds of ideas or sensations. They may differ from one another and from everything I have perceived as much as colors differ from sounds. But I readily admit how little I can comprehend of the endless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist. Even so, I suspect that anyone who claims to have a notion of entity or existence apart from spirit and idea, from perceiving and being perceived, is simply contradicting themselves and playing with words. It remains for us to consider the objections that may possibly be made on behalf of religion.

82. OBJECTIONS DERIVED FROM THE SCRIPTURES ANSWERED.--Some there are who think that, though the arguments for the real existence of bodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount to demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point as will sufficiently convince every good Christian that bodies do really exist, and are something more than mere ideas; there being in Holy Writ innumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies. To which I answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, which use those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have a meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in question by our doctrine. That all those things do really exist, that there are bodies, even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has been shown to be agreeable to our principles; and the difference betwixt things and ideas, realities and chimeras, has been distinctly explained. See sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what philosophers call Matter, or the existence of objects without the mind, is anywhere mentioned in Scripture.

82. OBJECTIONS FROM SCRIPTURE ANSWERED. Some people grant that arguments from reason do not prove the real existence of bodies. Yet they think the Holy Scriptures are clear enough on this point to convince every good Christian. They think Scripture shows that bodies really exist and are more than mere ideas. For Scripture relates countless events that plainly assume the reality of timber and stone, mountains and rivers, cities, and human bodies. I answer that our doctrine does not call the truth of any writings into question, whether sacred or secular. This is true of writings that use these and similar words in their ordinary sense, or give them any meaning. I have shown that our principles agree that all these things really exist. They agree that there are bodies, even corporeal substances, when these terms are understood in their ordinary sense. I have also clearly explained the difference between things and ideas, realities and fantasies. See sections 29, 30, 33, 36, and so on. And I do not think Scripture anywhere mentions either what philosophers call Matter or the existence of objects outside the mind.

83. NO OBJECTION AS TO LANGUAGE TENABLE.--Again, whether there can be or be not external things, it is agreed on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking our conceptions, or things only as they are known and perceived by us; whence it plainly follows that in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing inconsistent with the right use and significancy of language, and that discourse, of what kind soever, so far as it is intelligible, remains undisturbed. But all this seems so manifest, from what has been largely set forth in the premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it.

83. NO VALID OBJECTION CONCERNING LANGUAGE. Again, whether external things exist or not, everyone agrees on the proper use of words. Words express our conceptions, or things only as we know and perceive them. It plainly follows that the principles we have set out do not conflict with the proper use and meaning of language. And discourse of any kind remains unaffected, insofar as it is intelligible. But all this seems so clear from what has already been explained at length that there is no need to discuss it further.

84. But, secondly it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much of their stress and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses' rod? was it not really turned into a serpent; or was there only a change of ideas in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be supposed that our Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the sight, and smell, and taste of the guests, so as to create in them the appearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all other miracles; which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must be looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy. To this I reply, that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into real wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I have elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of real and imaginary has been already so plainly and fully explained, and so often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily answered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to the reader's understanding to resume the explication of it in its place. I shall only observe that if at table all who were present should see, and smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me there could be no doubt of its reality; so that at bottom the scruple concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the received principles, and consequently makes rather for than against what has been said.

84. But a second objection will be raised: our principles at least rob miracles of much of their force and significance. What must we think of Moses' rod? Was it not really turned into a serpent? Or did only the ideas in the spectators' minds change? And can we suppose that our Saviour did no more at the marriage feast in Cana than deceive the guests' sight, smell, and taste? Did he merely give them the appearance or idea of wine? The same may be said of all other miracles. According to the foregoing principles, all miracles must be regarded as mere tricks or illusions of the imagination. To this I reply that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into real wine. Sections 34 and 35 show clearly that this does not contradict anything I have said elsewhere. But I have already explained the distinction between real and imaginary things plainly and fully, and referred to it often. The difficulties about it are also easily answered from what has gone before. It would therefore be an insult to the reader's understanding to explain the distinction again here. I will only observe that, if everyone at a table saw, smelled, tasted, and drank wine, and felt its effects, I could not doubt that the wine was real. So, in the end, the objection concerning real miracles has no place at all under our principles. It arises only under the generally accepted principles. It therefore supports rather than opposes what I have said.

85. CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRECEDING TENETS.--Having done with the Objections, which I endeavoured to propose in the clearest light, and gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in the next place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences. Some of these appear at first sight--as that several difficult and obscure questions, on which abundance of speculation has been thrown away, are entirely banished from philosophy. "Whether corporeal substance can think," "whether Matter be infinitely divisible," and "how it operates on spirit"--these and like inquiries have given infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages; but depending on the existence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our principles. Many other advantages there are, as well with regard to religion as the sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce from what has been premised; but this will appear more plainly in the sequel.

85. CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRECEDING PRINCIPLES. I have now dealt with the objections. I tried to present them as clearly as possible and gave them all the force and weight I could. Next, let us consider the consequences of our principles. Some are obvious at once. For example, our principles entirely remove several difficult and obscure questions from philosophy, questions on which much speculation has been wasted. "Can corporeal substance think?" "Is Matter infinitely divisible?" "How does Matter act on spirit?" These and similar questions have occupied philosophers endlessly throughout the ages. But they depend on the existence of Matter, so they no longer have any place under our principles. Anyone can easily draw many other advantages from what has already been established, both for religion and for the sciences. But these advantages will become clearer in what follows.

86. THE REMOVAL OF MATTER GIVES CERTAINTY TO KNOWLEDGE.--From the principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads--that of ideas and that of spirits. Of each of these I shall treat in order.

86. REMOVING MATTER MAKES KNOWLEDGE CERTAIN. From the principles we have set out, it follows that human knowledge may naturally be divided into two categories: ideas and spirits. I will discuss each in turn.

And first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our knowledge of these has been very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence of the objects of sense--the one intelligible or in the mind, the other real and without the mind; whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural subsistence of their own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I mistake not, has been shown to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as men thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real things, it follows they could not be certain they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind?

First, consider ideas, or things that do not think. Our knowledge of them has been greatly obscured and confused. We have also been led into very dangerous errors by supposing that objects of sense have two kinds of existence. One is intelligible, or exists in the mind. The other is real, and exists outside the mind. This leads people to think that things that do not think can exist independently of being perceived by spirits. If I am not mistaken, I have shown that this notion is utterly groundless and absurd. It is the very root of skepticism. For as long as people thought real things existed outside the mind, they could not be certain they had any real knowledge at all. They also thought their knowledge was real only insofar as it matched real things. For how can we know that the things we perceive match those we do not perceive, or that exist outside the mind?

87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or images, referred to things or archetypes existing without the mind, then are we involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or motion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel may be only phantom and vain chimera, and not at all agree with the real things existing in rerum natura. All this scepticism follows from our supposing a difference between things and ideas, and that the former have a subsistence without the mind or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, and show how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition of external objects.

87. Color, shape, motion, extension, and the like are perfectly known when considered only as sensations in the mind. There is nothing in them that is not perceived. But if they are regarded as signs or images of things or originals existing outside the mind, we become caught up in skepticism. We see only appearances, not the real qualities of things. We cannot know what the extension, shape, or motion of anything is really and absolutely, or in itself. We can know only how these qualities relate to our senses. Things remain the same, but our ideas vary. We cannot determine which of our ideas, if any, represent the true quality that really exists in a thing. So, for all we know, everything we see, hear, and feel may be nothing but phantoms and empty fantasies. They may not agree at all with the real things that exist in nature. All this skepticism follows from supposing that things and ideas are different, and that things exist outside the mind, unperceived. It would be easy to expand on this subject. One could show how the arguments made by skeptics in every age depend on the assumption that external objects exist.

88. IF THERE BE EXTERNAL MATTER, NEITHER THE NATURE NOR EXISTENCE OF THINGS CAN BE KNOWN.--So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not only impossible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we see philosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the existence of heaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, even of their own bodies. And, after all their labour and struggle of thought, they are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible things. But, all this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words, and not amuse ourselves with the terms "absolute," "external," "exist," and such-like, signifying we know not what. I can as well doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which I actually perceive by sense; it being a manifest contradiction that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence of an unthinking being consists in being perceived.

88. IF EXTERNAL MATTER EXISTS, WE CAN KNOW NEITHER THE NATURE NOR THE EXISTENCE OF THINGS. As long as we believe that unthinking things exist independently of being perceived, two things are impossible. We cannot know with certainty the nature of any real unthinking being, or even whether it exists. This is why philosophers distrust their senses. They doubt the existence of heaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, and even of their own bodies. After all their hard thinking, they are forced to admit that we cannot know through self-evident or demonstrative reasoning that things perceived by the senses exist. But all this doubt vanishes if we give meaning to our words. This doubt bewilders and confuses the mind and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world. It vanishes if we stop playing with terms like "absolute," "external," "exist," and others whose meanings we do not know. I can no more doubt my own existence than the existence of things I actually perceive through my senses. It is an obvious contradiction to say that something is directly seen or touched and yet does not exist in nature. For an unthinking being exists precisely by being perceived.

89. OF THING OR BEING.--Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of what is meant by thing, reality, existence; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words. Thing or Being is the most general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the name. viz. spirits and ideas. The former are active, indivisible substances: the latter are inert, fleeting, dependent beings, which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual substances. We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflexion, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas. In like manner, we know and have a notion of relations between things or ideas--which relations are distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that ideas, spirits, and relations are all in their respective kinds the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse; and that the term idea would be improperly extended to signify everything we know or have any notion of.

89. ON THINGS OR BEINGS. Nothing seems more important for building a firm system of sound and genuine knowledge, resistant to skepticism, than beginning with a clear explanation of what we mean by thing, reality, and existence. For as long as we have not settled the meaning of these words, we will argue in vain about whether things really exist or claim to know whether they do. Thing or being is the most general name of all. It includes two entirely distinct and different kinds, which have nothing in common but the name: spirits and ideas. Spirits are active, indivisible substances. Ideas are inactive, fleeting, dependent beings. They do not exist on their own, but are sustained by, or exist in, minds or spiritual substances. We understand our own existence through inward feeling or reflection, and the existence of other spirits through reason. We may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds, spirits, and active beings, although strictly speaking we have no ideas of them. Similarly, we know and have a notion of relations between things or ideas. These relations are distinct from the ideas or things related, since we can perceive the latter without perceiving the relations. It seems to me that ideas, spirits, and relations are all, in their respective ways, objects of human knowledge and subjects of discussion. And it would be improper to extend the term idea to mean everything we know or have any notion of.

90. EXTERNAL THINGS EITHER IMPRINTED BY OR PERCEIVED BY SOME OTHER MIND.--Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really exist; this we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist without the minds which perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the mind; since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the things perceived by sense may be termed external, with regard to their origin--in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself, but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be "without the mind" in another sense, namely when they exist in some other mind; thus, when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind.

90. EXTERNAL THINGS ARE EITHER IMPRINTED BY OR PERCEIVED BY ANOTHER MIND. Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, and they really exist. We do not deny this. But we deny that these ideas can exist without the minds that perceive them. We also deny that they resemble any originals existing outside the mind. The very existence of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived, and an idea can resemble nothing but an idea. Again, things perceived by the senses may be called external because of their origin. They are not produced from within by the mind itself. Instead, they are imprinted by a Spirit distinct from the mind that perceives them. Objects of sense may also be said to be "without the mind" in another sense: they may exist in another mind. Thus, when I close my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but they must exist in another mind.

91. SENSIBLE QUALITIES REAL.--It were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates in the least from the reality of things. It is acknowledged, on the received principles, that extension, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities have need of a support, as not being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, and consequently cannot subsist by themselves. Thus far it is agreed on all hand. So that in denying the things perceived by sense an existence independent of a substance of support wherein they may exist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of their reality, and are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the difference is that, according to us, the unthinking beings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other substance than those unextended indivisible substances or spirits which act and think and perceive them; whereas philosophers vulgarly hold that the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, extended, unperceiving substance which they call Matter, to which they attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the eternal mind of the Creator, wherein they suppose only ideas of the corporeal substances created by him; if indeed they allow them to be at all created.

91. SENSIBLE QUALITIES ARE REAL. It would be a mistake to think that what I have said in any way diminishes the reality of things. According to the accepted view, extension, motion, and, in short, all sensible qualities need a support. They cannot exist by themselves. But the objects perceived by the senses are also understood to be nothing more than combinations of those qualities. Consequently, they cannot exist by themselves either. Everyone agrees up to this point. So, when we deny that things perceived by the senses can exist independently of a supporting substance, we do not diminish their reality as commonly understood. Nor do we introduce anything new in that respect. The only difference is that, in our view, the unthinking things perceived by the senses cannot exist without being perceived. They can therefore exist only in unextended, indivisible substances, or spirits, which act, think, and perceive them. Philosophers, on the other hand, commonly hold that sensible qualities exist in an inert, extended substance that does not perceive. They call this substance Matter. They attribute to Matter a natural existence outside all thinking beings, distinct from its being perceived by any mind. This includes the eternal mind of the Creator. They suppose that his mind contains only ideas of the bodily substances he has created, if indeed they allow that these substances are created at all.

92. OBJECTIONS OF ATHEISTS OVERTURNED.--For, as we have shown the doctrine of Matter or corporeal substance to have been the main pillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter produced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient philosophers, even of those who maintained the being of a God, have thought Matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with Him. How great a friend material substance has been to Atheists in all ages were needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a dependence on it that, when this corner-stone is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground, insomuch that it is no longer worth while to bestow a particular consideration on the absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists.

92. OBJECTIONS OF ATHEISTS OVERTURNED. We have shown that the doctrine of Matter, or corporeal substance, has been the main support of Skepticism. All the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion have also been built on the same foundation. Indeed, many have thought it very difficult to conceive of Matter being created from nothing. Even some of the most celebrated ancient philosophers who believed in God thought Matter was uncreated and had existed eternally alongside him. There is no need to recount how much material substance has helped Atheists in every age. All their monstrous systems depend on material substance so visibly and necessarily that, once this cornerstone is removed, the whole structure must fall. It is therefore no longer worth examining the absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists individually.

93. AND OF FATALISTS ALSO.--That impious and profane persons should readily fall in with those systems which favour their inclinations, by deriding immaterial substance, and supposing the soul to be divisible and subject to corruption as the body; which exclude all freedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things, and instead thereof make a self--existent, stupid, unthinking substance the root and origin of all beings; that they should hearken to those who deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior Mind over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity arising from the impulse of one body or another--all this is very natural. And, on the other hand, when men of better principles observe the enemies of religion lay so great a stress on unthinking Matter, and all of them use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it, methinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support, and driven from that only fortress, without which your Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence, but become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world.

93. AND OF FATALISTS ALSO. It is very natural for impious and irreverent people to embrace systems that favor their inclinations. Such systems ridicule immaterial substance and suppose that the soul, like the body, can be divided and decay. They exclude all freedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things. Instead, they make a self-existent, senseless, unthinking substance the root and origin of all beings. It is also natural for these people to listen to those who deny Providence. Such thinkers deny that a Superior Mind watches over the affairs of the world. They attribute the whole course of events either to blind chance or to inevitable necessity arising from bodies pushing one another. On the other hand, men of better principles see how much the enemies of religion rely on unthinking Matter. They see, too, how much effort and ingenuity all these enemies use to reduce everything to Matter. It seems to me that such men should rejoice to see the enemies of religion deprived of their chief support. They should rejoice to see them driven from their only fortress. Without that fortress, your Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like have not even a shadow of a claim to stand on. They become the easiest people in the world to defeat.

94. OF IDOLATORS.--The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, has not only been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the same principle doth Idolatry likewise in all its various forms depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses are only so many sensations in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship their own ideas, but rather address their homage to that ETERNAL INVISIBLE MIND which produces and sustains all things.

94. ON IDOLATERS. The existence of Matter, or bodies that are not perceived, has been the main support of atheists and fatalists. But idolatry in all its various forms also depends on the same principle. If people considered that the sun, moon, stars, and every other object of the senses are only sensations in their minds, they would surely never fall down and worship their own ideas. These sensations have no existence apart from being perceived. Instead, people would pay homage to the ETERNAL INVISIBLE MIND that produces and sustains all things.

95. AND SOCINIANS.--The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with the articles of our faith, has occasioned no small difficulties to Christians. For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples and objections have been raised by Socinians and others? But do not the most plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body is denominated the same, with regard not to the form or that which is perceived by sense, but the material substance, which remains the same under several forms? Take away this material substance, about the identity whereof all the dispute is, and mean by body what every plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas, and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing.

95. AND SOCINIANS. The same absurd principle has also mixed with the articles of our faith and caused Christians considerable difficulties. For example, how many doubts and objections have Socinians and others raised about the Resurrection? But don't the most plausible objections depend on a particular assumption about what makes a body the same? They assume that a body is called the same because of its material substance, not its form or what the senses perceive. They assume that this material substance remains the same under different forms. Remove this material substance, whose identity is the subject of the whole dispute. Then, by “body,” mean what every ordinary person means: what is immediately seen and felt. This is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas. The Socinians' most unanswerable objections then come to nothing.

96. SUMMARY OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXPELLING MATTER.--Matter being once expelled out of nature drags with it so many sceptical and impious notions, such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions, which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well as philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for mankind, that if the arguments we have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration (as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, peace, and religion have reason to wish they were.

96. SUMMARY OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF REMOVING MATTER. Once matter is removed from nature, many skeptical and impious ideas go with it. So does an incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions. These have troubled theologians and philosophers alike and given humanity so much fruitless work. I believe our arguments against matter clearly amount to a demonstration. But even if they do not, I am sure all friends of knowledge, peace, and religion have reason to wish they did.

97. Beside the external existence of the objects of perception, another great source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal knowledge is the doctrine of abstract ideas, such as it has been set forth in the Introduction. The plainest things in the world, those we are most intimately acquainted with and perfectly know, when they are considered in an abstract way, appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place, and motion, taken in particular or concrete, are what everybody knows, but, having passed through the hands of a metaphysician, they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary sense. Bid your servant meet you at such a time in such a place, and he shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those words; in conceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by which he is to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if time be taken exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that diversify the day, merely for the continuation of existence or duration in abstract, then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it.

97. Besides the belief that objects of perception exist outside the mind, another major source of errors and difficulties in our knowledge of ideas is the doctrine of abstract ideas, as described in the Introduction. The simplest things in the world are those we know most intimately and perfectly. Yet when we consider them abstractly, they seem strangely difficult and incomprehensible. Everyone knows time, place, and motion when they are considered in particular or concrete terms. But after a metaphysician has handled them, they become too abstract and refined for people of ordinary sense to grasp. Tell your servant to meet you at a certain time and place. He will never stop to consider what those words mean. He has no difficulty imagining that particular time and place, or the motion needed to get there. But suppose time is considered apart from all the particular actions and ideas that give variety to the day. If time is taken merely as the continuation of existence, or duration in the abstract, then perhaps even a philosopher will struggle to understand it.

98. DILEMMA.--For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all, only I hear others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a manner as leads me to entertain odd thoughts of my existence; since that doctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he passes away innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he is annihilated every moment of his life, both which seem equally absurd. Time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the sucession of ideas in our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence that the soul always thinks; and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his thoughts, or abstract the existence of a spirit from its cogitation, will, I believe, find it no easy task.

98. DILEMMA. For my part, whenever I try to form a simple idea of time apart from the succession of ideas in my mind, I become lost in hopeless difficulties. I mean time that flows uniformly and is shared by all beings. I have no idea of such time at all. I only hear others say that it is infinitely divisible. They speak of time in a way that leads me to strange thoughts about my existence. For that doctrine forces one to think either that one passes countless ages without a thought or that one is destroyed every moment of one’s life. Both seem equally absurd. Time, then, is nothing apart from the succession of ideas in our minds. It follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be measured by the number of ideas or actions succeeding one another in that spirit or mind. From this, it plainly follows that the soul always thinks. Indeed, I believe anyone who tries to separate a spirit’s existence from its thinking in their mind will find it no easy task.

99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and motion from all other qualities, and consider them by themselves, we presently lose sight of them, and run into great extravagances. All which depend on a twofold abstraction; first, it is supposed that extension, for example, may be abstracted from all other sensible qualities; and secondly, that the entity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived. But, whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he says, will, if I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike sensations and alike real; that where the extension is, there is the colour, too, i.e., in his mind, and that their archetypes can exist only in some other mind; and that the objects of sense are nothing but those sensations combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) concreted together; none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived.

99. Similarly, when we try to separate extension and motion from all other qualities and consider them alone, we immediately lose sight of them and fall into great absurdities. All these absurdities depend on two kinds of abstraction. First, we suppose that extension, for example, can be separated from all other qualities we perceive by the senses. Second, we suppose that the existence of extension can be separated from its being perceived. But anyone who reflects and takes care to understand what he says will, if I am not mistaken, acknowledge the following. All qualities perceived by the senses are equally sensations and equally real. Wherever extension is, color is there too, that is, in his mind. Their archetypes can exist only in some other mind. And the objects of sense are nothing but these sensations combined, blended, or, if one may say so, fused together. None of these sensations can be supposed to exist without being perceived.

100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one may think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded from all particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that is good, this is what few can pretend to. So likewise a man may be just and virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion that those and the like words stand for general notions, abstracted from all particular persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality very difficult, and the study thereof of small use to mankind. And in effect the doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge.

100. Everyone may think they know what it means for a person to be happy or an object to be good. But few can claim to form an abstract idea of happiness separated from every particular pleasure. Few can claim to form an abstract idea of goodness separated from everything that is good. Likewise, a person may be just and virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. Some believe that these and similar words stand for general ideas separated from all particular people and actions. This belief seems to have made morality very difficult and its study of little use to humanity. Indeed, the doctrine of abstraction has contributed considerably to spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge.

101. OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY AND MATHEMATICS.--The two great provinces of speculative science conversant about ideas received from sense, are Natural Philosophy and Mathematics; with regard to each of these I shall make some observations. And first I shall say somewhat of Natural Philosophy. On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph. All that stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn principally from this head, namely, that we are under an invincible blindness as to the true and real nature of things. This they exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they, by our senses, and amused only with the outside and show of things. The real essence, the internal qualities and constitution of every the meanest object, is hid from our view; something there is in every drop of water, every grain of sand, which it is beyond the power of human understanding to fathom or comprehend. But, it is evident from what has been shown that all this complaint is groundless, and that we are influenced by false principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend.

101. ON NATURAL PHILOSOPHY AND MATHEMATICS. The two great branches of theoretical science concerned with ideas received through the senses are Natural Philosophy and Mathematics. I shall make some observations about each, beginning with Natural Philosophy. This is the subject on which the skeptics triumph. They offer many arguments to belittle our faculties and make humanity seem ignorant and lowly. These arguments are drawn chiefly from the claim that we are hopelessly blind to the true and real nature of things. They exaggerate this claim and love to dwell on it. Our senses cruelly deceive us, they say, showing us only the outward appearance of things. The real essence, inner qualities, and constitution of even the most ordinary object are hidden from us. Every drop of water and every grain of sand contains something beyond the power of human understanding to fathom or comprehend. But what has been shown makes it clear that all this complaint is groundless. False principles lead us to distrust our senses and think we know nothing about things we understand perfectly.

102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the nature of things is the current opinion that everything includes within itself the cause of its properties; or that there is in each object an inward essence which is the source whence its discernible qualities flow, and whereon they depend. Some have pretended to account for appearances by occult qualities, but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical causes, to wit, the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, of insensible particles; whereas, in truth, there is no other agent or efficient cause than spirit, it being evident that motion, as well as all other ideas, is perfectly inert. See sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour to explain the production of colours or sounds, by figure, motion, magnitude, and the like, must needs be labour in vain. And accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory. Which may be said in general of those instances wherein one idea or quality is assigned for the cause of another. I need not say how many hypotheses and speculations are left out, and how much the study of nature is abridged by this doctrine.

102. One major reason we declare ourselves ignorant of the nature of things is a common belief about their properties. We believe that everything contains the cause of its own properties. In other words, we believe that each object has an inner essence that produces its observable qualities and sustains them. Some have claimed to explain appearances by hidden qualities. More recently, however, appearances have mostly been attributed to mechanical causes. These are the shape, motion, weight, and similar qualities of particles too small to be perceived. In truth, however, spirit is the only agent or efficient cause. Motion, like all other ideas, is clearly incapable of acting. See section 25. It follows that trying to explain the production of colors or sounds by shape, motion, size, and the like must be futile. And indeed, we see that such attempts are entirely unsatisfactory. The same may be said generally whenever one idea or quality is presented as the cause of another. I need not say how many hypotheses and speculations this doctrine rules out, or how much it shortens the study of nature.

103. ATTRACTION SIGNIFIES THE EFFECT, NOT THE MANNER OR CAUSE.--The great mechanical principle now in vogue is attraction. That a stone falls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the moon, may to some appear sufficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by being told this is done by attraction? Is it that that word signifies the manner of the tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of bodies instead of their being impelled or protruded towards each other? But, nothing is determined of the manner or action, and it may as truly (for aught we know) be termed "impulse," or "protrusion," as "attraction." Again, the parts of steel we see cohere firmly together, and this also is accounted for by attraction; but, in this as in the other instances, I do not perceive that anything is signified besides the effect itself; for as to the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the cause which produces it, these are not so much as aimed at.

103. ATTRACTION NAMES THE EFFECT, NOT THE MANNER OR CAUSE. Attraction is the great mechanical principle now in fashion. To some, it may seem enough to explain why a stone falls to earth or the sea swells toward the moon. But what do we learn by being told that attraction causes these things? Does the word describe how bodies move toward one another? Does it mean that they pull each other rather than being pushed or driven together? But nothing has been settled about how they act. For all we know, the action could just as truly be called "impulse" or "protrusion" as "attraction." We also see that the parts of steel hold firmly together, and attraction is offered as an explanation for this too. But in this case, as in the others, I cannot see that the word means anything beyond the effect itself. It does not even attempt to describe how the effect is produced or what causes it.

104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, and compare them together, we may observe some likeness and conformity between them. For example, in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising of the sea towards the moon, in cohesion, crystallization, etc, there is something alike, namely, an union or mutual approach of bodies. So that any one of these or the like phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to a man who has nicely observed and compared the effects of nature. For that only is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and out of the ordinary course of our observation. That bodies should tend towards the centre of the earth is not thought strange, because it is what we perceive every moment of our lives. But, that they should have a like gravitation towards the centre of the moon may seem odd and unaccountable to most men, because it is discerned only in the tides. But a philosopher, whose thoughts take in a larger compass of nature, having observed a certain similitude of appearances, as well in the heavens as the earth, that argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency towards each other, which he denotes by the general name "attraction," whatever can be reduced to that he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the moon, which to him does not appear odd or anomalous, but only a particular example of a general rule or law of nature.

104. Indeed, if we examine and compare various phenomena, we can see some similarities among them. For example, a stone falling to the ground, the sea rising towards the moon, cohesion, crystallization, and so on have something in common. In each case, bodies come together or move towards each other. So none of these or similar phenomena may seem strange or surprising to someone who has carefully observed and compared nature’s effects. Only what is uncommon, isolated, or outside our usual experience is considered strange or surprising. We do not think it strange that bodies tend towards the centre of the earth, because we perceive this every moment of our lives. But the idea that bodies similarly gravitate towards the centre of the moon may seem odd and inexplicable to most people, because this is seen only in the tides. A philosopher, however, considers a broader range of nature. The philosopher has observed similar appearances in the heavens and on earth, which suggest that countless bodies tend towards one another. The philosopher calls this tendency “attraction” and considers anything that can be brought under it to be properly explained. Thus the philosopher explains the tides through the attraction of the earth and its waters towards the moon. To the philosopher, this attraction does not seem odd or unusual. It is simply a particular example of a general rule or law of nature.

105. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural philosophers and other men, with regard to their knowledge of the phenomena, we shall find it consists not in an exacter knowledge of the efficient cause that produces them--for that can be no other than the will of a spirit--but only in a greater largeness of comprehension, whereby analogies, harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works of nature, and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced to general rules, see sect. 62, which rules, grounded on the analogy and uniformness observed in the production of natural effects, are most agreeable and sought after by the mind; for that they extend our prospect beyond what is present and near to us, and enable us to make very probable conjectures touching things that may have happened at very great distances of time and place, as well as to predict things to come; which sort of endeavour towards omniscience is much affected by the mind.

105. If we consider how natural philosophers differ from other people in their knowledge of natural phenomena, we find the following. The difference is not that natural philosophers know more precisely what produces these phenomena. The cause can only be the will of a spirit. Rather, natural philosophers have a broader understanding. This allows them to discover similarities, harmonies, and correspondences in the works of nature. It also allows them to explain particular effects, that is, to bring them under general rules. See section 62. These rules are based on the similarities and uniformity observed in the production of natural effects. The mind finds them most pleasing and seeks them out. This is because they extend our view beyond what is present and near us. They enable us to make very probable guesses about things that may have happened far away in time and place. They also enable us to predict what is to come. The mind is very drawn to this kind of striving toward knowing everything.

106. CAUTION AS TO THE USE OF ANALOGIES.--But we should proceed warily in such things, for we are apt to lay too great stress on analogies, and, to the prejudice of truth, humour that eagerness of the mind whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into general theorems. For example, in the business of gravitation or mutual attraction, because it appears in many instances, some are straightway for pronouncing it universal; and that to attract and be attracted by every other body is an essential quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each other; and, so far is that gravitation from being essential to bodies that in some instances a quite contrary principle seems to show itself; as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the elasticity of the air. There is nothing necessary or essential in the case, but it depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit, who causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each other according to various laws, whilst He keeps others at a fixed distance; and to some He gives a quite contrary tendency to fly asunder just as He sees convenient.

106. CAUTION IN USING ANALOGIES. We should be careful in such matters. We tend to place too much weight on analogies and indulge the mind’s eagerness to extend its knowledge into general rules. This can come at the expense of truth. For example, gravitation, or mutual attraction, appears in many instances. Because of this, some immediately declare it universal. They claim that attracting and being attracted by every other body is an essential quality inherent in all bodies. Yet the fixed stars evidently show no such tendency toward one another. Far from being essential to bodies, gravitation seems in some instances to be opposed by a contrary principle. We see this in the upward growth of plants and the elasticity of air. Nothing about this is necessary or essential. It depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit. He causes certain bodies to cling together or move toward one another according to various laws. Meanwhile, he keeps others at a fixed distance. To some he gives the opposite tendency, to move apart, just as he sees fit.

107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay down the following conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse themselves in vain, when they inquire for any natural efficient cause, distinct from a mind or spirit. Secondly, considering the whole creation is the workmanship of a wise and good Agent, it should seem to become philosophers to employ their thoughts (contrary to what some hold) about the final causes of things; and I confess I see no reason why pointing out the various ends to which natural things are adapted, and for which they were originally with unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought one good way of accounting for them, and altogether worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from what has been premised no reason can be drawn why the history of nature should not still be studied, and observations and experiments made, which, that they are of use to mankind, and enable us to draw any general conclusions, is not the result of any immutable habitudes or relations between things themselves, but only of God's goodness and kindness to men in the administration of the world. See sect. 30 and 31 Fourthly, by a diligent observation of the phenomena within our view, we may discover the general laws of nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena; I do not say demonstrate, for all deductions of that kind depend on a supposition that the Author of nature always operates uniformly, and in a constant observance of those rules we take for principles: which we cannot evidently know.

107. Given what has already been said, I think we may draw the following conclusions. First, philosophers plainly waste their time when they seek a natural efficient cause distinct from a mind or spirit. Second, the whole creation is the work of a wise and good Agent. So, contrary to what some maintain, philosophers should consider the final causes, or purposes, of things. Natural things were originally designed with inexpressible wisdom for various ends, and they are suited to those ends. I see no reason why pointing out those ends should not be considered a good way of explaining natural things. Nor do I see why doing so should not be entirely worthy of a philosopher. Third, nothing said so far gives us reason to stop studying the history of nature or making observations and experiments. Such studies are useful to humanity and enable us to draw general conclusions. But this usefulness does not result from any unchanging connections or relations between things themselves. It results only from God's goodness and kindness to humanity in governing the world. See sections 30 and 31. Fourth, by carefully observing the phenomena within our view, we may discover the general laws of nature. From those laws, we may deduce other phenomena. I do not say we may demonstrate them. All such deductions depend on a supposition about the Author of nature. They suppose that he always acts uniformly and consistently follows the rules we take as principles. We cannot know with certainty that he does so.

108. THREE ANALOGIES.--Those men who frame general rules from the phenomena and afterwards derive the phenomena from those rules, seem to consider signs rather than causes. A man may well understand natural signs without knowing their analogy, or being able to say by what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very possible to write improperly, through too strict an observance of general grammar rules; so, in arguing from general laws of nature, it is not impossible we may extend the analogy too far, and by that means run into mistakes.

108. THREE ANALOGIES. Those who form general rules from observed phenomena and then derive the phenomena from those rules seem to consider signs rather than causes. A person may understand natural signs without knowing the analogies between them. Nor need that person be able to say what rule explains why something is the way it is. Someone can write incorrectly by following general rules of grammar too strictly. Similarly, when reasoning from general laws of nature, we may take an analogy too far and make mistakes as a result.

109. As in reading other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks on the language; so, in perusing the volume of nature, it seems beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules, or showing how it follows from them. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, namely, to recreate and exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty, order. extent, and variety of natural things: hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator; and lastly, to make the several parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, subservient to the ends they were designed for, God's glory, and the sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures.

109. When reading books, a wise person focuses on their meaning and puts it to use, rather than dwelling on grammar. Similarly, when reading the book of nature, it seems beneath the dignity of the mind to pursue exactness in fitting each particular phenomenon to general rules, or in showing how it follows from those rules. We should aim for nobler things. We should refresh and uplift the mind by contemplating the beauty, order, extent, and variety of natural things. From these, we should draw sound conclusions that deepen our understanding of the Creator's greatness, wisdom, and goodness. Finally, as far as we can, we should put the various parts of creation to the purposes for which they were designed: God's glory, and the support and comfort of ourselves and our fellow creatures.

110. The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural Science will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise of Mechanics. In the entrance of which justly admired treatise, Time, Space, and Motion are distinguished into absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and vulgar; which distinction, as it is at large explained by the author, does suppose these quantities to have an existence without the mind; and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things, to which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no relation at all.

110. A celebrated Treatise of Mechanics will easily be recognized as the best key to the analogy, or natural science, described above. At the beginning of this rightly admired treatise, time, space, and motion are divided into absolute and relative, true and apparent, and mathematical and ordinary. As the author explains at length, this distinction assumes that these quantities exist outside the mind. It also assumes that we ordinarily conceive of them in relation to things we can sense, although by their nature they have no relation to such things at all.

111. As for Time, as it is there taken in an absolute or abstracted sense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things, I have nothing more to add concerning it after what has been already said on that subject. Sect. 97 and 98. For the rest, this celebrated author holds there is an absolute Space, which, being unperceivable to sense, remains in itself similar and immovable; and relative space to be the measure thereof, which, being movable and defined by its situation in respect of sensible bodies, is vulgarly taken for immovable space. Place he defines to be that part of space which is occupied by any body; and according as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place. Absolute Motion is said to be the translation of a body from absolute place to absolute place, as relative motion is from one relative place to another. And, because the parts of absolute space do not fall under our senses, instead of them we are obliged to use their sensible measures, and so define both place and motion with respect to bodies which we regard as immovable. But, it is said in philosophical matters we must abstract from our senses, since it may be that none of those bodies which seem to be quiescent are truly so, and the same thing which is moved relatively may be really at rest; as likewise one and the same body may be in relative rest and motion, or even moved with contrary relative motions at the same time, according as its place is variously defined. All which ambiguity is to be found in the apparent motions, but not at all in the true or absolute, which should therefore be alone regarded in philosophy. And the true as we are told are distinguished from apparent or relative motions by the following properties.--First, in true or absolute motion all parts which preserve the same position with respect of the whole, partake of the motions of the whole. Secondly, the place being moved, that which is placed therein is also moved; so that a body moving in a place which is in motion doth participate the motion of its place. Thirdly, true motion is never generated or changed otherwise than by force impressed on the body itself. Fourthly, true motion is always changed by force impressed on the body moved. Fifthly, in circular motion barely relative there is no centrifugal force, which, nevertheless, in that which is true or absolute, is proportional to the quantity of motion.

111. As for Time, understood there in an absolute or abstract sense as the duration or continued existence of things, I have nothing more to add. I have already discussed it in Sections 97 and 98. As for the rest, this celebrated author holds that there is an absolute Space. Absolute Space cannot be perceived by the senses and remains uniform and immovable in itself. He holds that relative space is its measure. Relative space is movable and is defined by its position in relation to bodies we can perceive. People commonly take relative space to be immovable space. He defines Place as the part of space occupied by a body. Place is absolute or relative according to whether the space is absolute or relative. Absolute Motion is said to be the movement of a body from one absolute place to another. Relative motion is movement from one relative place to another. We cannot perceive the parts of absolute space with our senses. So we must use their perceptible measures instead, defining both place and motion in relation to bodies we regard as immovable. But we are told that, in philosophy, we must set aside what our senses tell us. None of the bodies that seem to be at rest may truly be so. And a thing moving relative to them may really be at rest. Likewise, one and the same body may be in relative rest and motion at the same time. It may even have opposite relative motions at the same time, depending on how its place is defined. All this ambiguity is found in apparent motions, but not at all in true or absolute motions. Therefore, philosophy should consider only true or absolute motions. We are told that true motions are distinguished from apparent or relative motions by the following properties: First, in true or absolute motion, all parts that keep the same position in relation to the whole share its motion. Secondly, when a place moves, whatever is in it also moves. So a body moving in a place that is itself moving shares the motion of that place. Thirdly, true motion is never produced or changed except by a force applied to the body itself. Fourthly, true motion is always changed by a force applied to the moving body. Fifthly, there is no centrifugal force in merely relative circular motion. In true or absolute circular motion, however, centrifugal force is proportional to the quantity of motion.

112. MOTION, WHETHER REAL OR APPARENT, RELATIVE.--But, notwithstanding what has been said, I must confess it does not appear to me that there can be any motion other than relative; so that to conceive motion there must be at least conceived two bodies, whereof the distance or position in regard to each other is varied. Hence, if there was one only body in being it could not possibly be moved. This seems evident, in that the idea I have of motion doth necessarily include relation.

112. MOTION, WHETHER REAL OR APPARENT, IS RELATIVE. But despite what I have said, I must admit that I cannot see how motion can be anything but relative. To conceive of motion, we must conceive of at least two bodies. The distance or position of these bodies in relation to each other must change. So if only one body existed, it could not possibly move. This seems clear because my idea of motion necessarily includes a relation.

113. APPARENT MOTION DENIED.--But, though in every motion it be necessary to conceive more bodies than one, yet it may be that one only is moved, namely, that on which the force causing the change in the distance or situation of the bodies, is impressed. For, however some may define relative motion, so as to term that body moved which changes its distance from some other body, whether the force or action causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet as relative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded in the ordinary affairs of life, it should seem that every man of common sense knows what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now, I ask any one whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the stones he passes over may be said to move, because they change distance with his feet? To me it appears that though motion includes a relation of one thing to another, yet it is not necessary that each term of the relation be denominated from it. As a man may think of somewhat which does not think, so a body may be moved to or from another body which is not therefore itself in motion.

113. APPARENT MOTION DENIED. Although every motion requires us to conceive of more than one body, only one may be moving. That is the body on which the force is applied, causing the change in distance or position between the bodies. Some may define relative motion differently. They may say that a body moves if its distance from another body changes, whether or not the force or action causing the change is applied to it. Yet relative motion is what we perceive through our senses and consider in ordinary life. So it seems that everyone with common sense knows what relative motion is as well as the best philosopher does. Now I ask anyone to consider their own sense of motion while walking along the streets. Can the stones they pass over be said to move because their distance from the walker’s feet changes? It seems to me that motion involves a relation between one thing and another. Yet both things in that relation need not be described as moving. A person can think of something that does not think. In the same way, a body can move toward or away from another body that is not itself moving.

114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion which is related to it varies. A man in a ship may be said to be quiescent with relation to the sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to the land. Or he may move eastward in respect of the one, and westward in respect of the other. In the common affairs of life men never go beyond the earth to define the place of any body; and what is quiescent in respect of that is accounted absolutely to be so. But philosophers, who have a greater extent of thought, and juster notions of the system of things, discover even the earth itself to be moved. In order therefore to fix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal world as finite, and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby they estimate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I believe we may find all the absolute motion we can frame an idea of to be at bottom no other than relative motion thus defined. For, as has been already observed, absolute motion, exclusive of all external relation, is incomprehensible; and to this kind of relative motion all the above-mentioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolute motion will, if I mistake not, be found to agree. As to what is said of the centrifugal force, that it does not at all belong to circular relative motion, I do not see how this follows from the experiment which is brought to prove it. See Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, in Schol. Def. VIII. For the water in the vessel at that time wherein it is said to have the greatest relative circular motion, has, I think, no motion at all; as is plain from the foregoing section.

114. Motion varies according to how we define the place it is measured against. A man on a ship may be said to be at rest in relation to its sides, yet moving in relation to the land. Or he may move eastward in relation to the ship and westward in relation to the land. In everyday life, people never look beyond the earth to define the place of a body. They consider anything at rest in relation to the earth to be absolutely at rest. But philosophers have a broader outlook and a more accurate understanding of the system of things. They discover that even the earth itself moves. To make their ideas precise, they therefore seem to imagine the physical world as finite. They seem to take its outermost, unmoving walls or shell as the place against which they measure true motion. If we examine our own ideas, I believe we may find that every idea we can form of absolute motion is ultimately just this kind of relative motion. For, as already noted, absolute motion without any external relation is impossible to understand. And, unless I am mistaken, all the properties, causes, and effects mentioned above as belonging to absolute motion will be found to apply to this kind of relative motion. Some say that centrifugal force does not belong at all to relative circular motion. I do not see how this follows from the experiment offered as proof. See Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, in Schol. Def. VIII. At the time when the water in the vessel is said to have its greatest relative circular motion, I think it has no motion at all. This is clear from the previous section.

115. For, to denominate a body moved it is requisite, first, that it change its distance or situation with regard to some other body; and secondly, that the force occasioning that change be applied to it. If either of these be wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to the sense of mankind, or the propriety of language, a body can be said to be in motion. I grant indeed that it is possible for us to think a body which we see change its distance from some other to be moved, though it have no force applied to it (in which sense there may be apparent motion), but then it is because the force causing the change of distance is imagined by us to be applied or impressed on that body thought to move; which indeed shows we are capable of mistaking a thing to be in motion which is not, and that is all.

115. For a body to be called moving, two things are required. First, its distance or position must change in relation to another body. Second, the force causing that change must be applied to the body. If either condition is absent, I do not think the body can be said to be moving. That would not agree with how people understand motion or with proper language. I grant that we can think a body is moving when we see its distance from another body change, even though no force is applied to it. In this sense, there can be apparent motion. But this is because we imagine that the force causing the change in distance is applied to the body we think is moving. This only shows that we can mistake a body for moving when it is not.

116. ANY IDEA OF PURE SPACE RELATIVE.--From what has been said it follows that the philosophic consideration of motion does not imply the being of an absolute Space, distinct from that which is perceived by sense and related bodies; which that it cannot exist without the mind is clear upon the same principles that demonstrate the like of all other objects of sense. And perhaps, if we inquire narrowly, we shall find we cannot even frame an idea of pure Space exclusive of all body. This I must confess seems impossible, as being a most abstract idea. When I excite a motion in some part of my body, if it be free or without resistance, I say there is Space; but if I find a resistance, then I say there is Body; and in proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or less pure. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, it is not to be supposed that the word "space" stands for an idea distinct from or conceivable without body and motion--though indeed we are apt to think every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated from all others; which has occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore, supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say there still remains pure Space, thereby nothing else is meant but only that I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all sides without the least resistance, but if that, too, were annihilated then there could be no motion, and consequently no Space. Some, perhaps, may think the sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of pure space; but it is plain from what we have elsewhere shown, that the ideas of space and distance are not obtained by that sense. See the Essay concerning Vision.

116. ANY IDEA OF PURE SPACE IS RELATIVE. From what has been said, a philosophical examination of motion does not imply that absolute Space exists. Absolute Space would be distinct from the space perceived by the senses and from the bodies related to it. Space perceived by the senses cannot exist outside the mind. This is clear from the same principles that show that all other objects of sense cannot exist outside the mind. Perhaps, if we examine the matter closely, we will find that we cannot even form an idea of pure Space without any body. I must admit that this seems impossible, since it would be a most abstract idea. When I move some part of my body freely, without resistance, I say there is Space. But if I encounter resistance, I say there is Body. And as the resistance to motion is less or greater, I say the space is more or less pure. So when I speak of pure or empty space, the word "space" does not stand for an idea distinct from body and motion or conceivable without them. We are, however, inclined to think that every noun stands for a distinct idea that can be separated from all others. This has caused countless mistakes. Suppose, then, that the whole world except my own body were destroyed. If I say that pure Space would still remain, I mean only that I can conceive my limbs moving in every direction without the slightest resistance. But if my body were destroyed too, there could be no motion and consequently no Space. Some may think that sight gives them the idea of pure space. But what we have shown elsewhere makes it plain that the ideas of space and distance are not obtained through sight. See the Essay concerning Vision.

117. What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes and difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the nature of pure Space. But the chief advantage arising from it is that we are freed from that dangerous dilemma, to which several who have employed their thoughts on that subject imagine themselves reduced, to wit, of thinking either that Real Space is God, or else that there is something beside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is certain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great note, have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or annihilation of space, concluded it must be divine. And some of late have set themselves particularly to show the incommunicable attributes of God agree to it. Which doctrine, how unworthy soever it may seem of the Divine Nature, yet I do not see how we can get clear of it, so long as we adhere to the received opinions.

117. What I have set out here seems to end all the disputes and difficulties among scholars about the nature of pure Space. But its chief advantage is that it frees us from a dangerous dilemma. Several people who have thought about Space believe they must choose between two views. Either Real Space is God, or something besides God is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, and unchanging. Both views may rightly be considered harmful and absurd. Many theologians, as well as highly distinguished philosophers, have found it difficult to imagine either limits to space or its destruction. They have therefore concluded that space must be divine. Some have recently undertaken to show that space has attributes that belong to God alone. This doctrine may seem utterly unworthy of the Divine Nature. Yet I do not see how we can escape it as long as we hold to the accepted opinions.

118. THE ERRORS ARISING FROM THE DOCTRINES OF ABSTRACTION AND EXTERNAL MATERIAL EXISTENCES, INFLUENCE MATHEMATICAL REASONINGS.--Hitherto of Natural Philosophy: we come now to make some inquiry concerning that other great branch of speculative knowledge, to wit, Mathematics. These, how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness and certainty of demonstration, which is hardly anywhere else to be found, cannot nevertheless be supposed altogether free from mistakes, if in their principles there lurks some secret error which is common to the professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind. Mathematicians, though they deduce their theorems from a great height of evidence, yet their first principles are limited by the consideration of quantity: and they do not ascend into any inquiry concerning those transcendental maxims which influence all the particular sciences, each part whereof, Mathematics not excepted, does consequently participate of the errors involved in them. That the principles laid down by mathematicians are true, and their way of deduction from those principles clear and incontestible, we do not deny; but, we hold there may be certain erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathematics, and for that reason not expressly mentioned, though tacitly supposed throughout the whole progress of that science; and that the ill effects of those secret unexamined errors are diffused through all the branches thereof. To be plain, we suspect the mathematicians are as well as other men concerned in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind.

118. ERRORS ARISING FROM THE DOCTRINES OF ABSTRACTION AND EXTERNAL MATERIAL EXISTENCE AFFECT MATHEMATICAL REASONING. So much for natural philosophy. We now turn to another great branch of theoretical knowledge, namely mathematics. Mathematics is celebrated for the clarity and certainty of its proofs, which are hardly found anywhere else. Even so, we cannot suppose it entirely free from mistakes if a hidden error lurks in its principles, one that mathematicians share with the rest of humanity. Although mathematicians derive their theorems from highly evident principles, those principles are limited to the consideration of quantity. Mathematicians do not go on to examine the more general principles that influence all the individual sciences. As a result, every branch of science, including mathematics, shares in the errors contained in those principles. We do not deny that mathematicians' principles are true or that their deductions from those principles are clear and indisputable. But we hold that certain mistaken principles may have a wider scope than the subject of mathematics. For that reason, they may not be expressly stated, though they are silently assumed throughout the whole course of the science. The harmful effects of these hidden, unexamined errors may spread through every branch of mathematics. To put it plainly, we suspect that mathematicians, like other people, are subject to errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general ideas and the belief that objects exist outside the mind.

119. Arithmetic has been thought to have for its object abstract ideas of Number; of which to understand the properties and mutual habitudes, is supposed no mean part of speculative knowledge. The opinion of the pure and intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them in esteem with those philosophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness and elevation of thought. It has set a price on the most trifling numerical speculations which in practice are of no use, but serve only for amusement; and has therefore so far infected the minds of some, that they have dreamed of mighty mysteries involved in numbers, and attempted the explication of natural things by them. But, if we inquire into our own thoughts, and consider what has been premised, we may perhaps entertain a low opinion of those high flights and abstractions, and look on all inquiries, about numbers only as so many difficiles nugae, so far as they are not subservient to practice, and promote the benefit of life.

119. Arithmetic has been thought to study abstract ideas of number. Understanding their properties and relationships is supposed to be a significant part of theoretical knowledge. Some philosophers have prized numbers in the abstract because they consider them pure and intellectual. These philosophers seem to have sought an unusually refined and elevated style of thought. This view has given value to the most trivial speculations about numbers. These are of no practical use and serve only as amusement. It has also so infected some minds that they have imagined great mysteries hidden in numbers. They have even tried to explain natural things by means of numbers. But if we examine our own thoughts and consider what has already been said, we may perhaps take a low view of such lofty flights of abstraction. We may see all inquiries into numbers as nothing more than difficult trifles, insofar as they do not serve practical purposes and improve life.

120. Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect. 13, from which and what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly follows there is not any such idea. But, number being defined a "collection of units," we may conclude that, if there be no such thing as unity or unit in abstract, there are no ideas of number in abstract denoted by the numeral names and figures. The theories therefore in Arithmetic, if they are abstracted from the names and figures, as likewise from all use and practice, as well as from the particular things numbered, can be supposed to have nothing at all for their object; hence we may see how entirely the science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune and trifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation.

120. We considered abstract unity earlier, in section 13. From that discussion and what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly follows that there is no such idea. But number is defined as a "collection of units." So, if there is no such thing as abstract unity or an abstract unit, we may conclude the following. Numeral names and figures do not stand for any abstract ideas of number. Suppose, then, that we separate the theories of arithmetic from names and figures, from all use and practice, and from the particular things numbered. We can only suppose that these theories have no object at all. From this we can see how entirely the science of numbers is subordinate to practice. We can also see how empty and trivial it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation.

121. However, since there may be some who, deluded by the specious show of discovering abstracted verities, waste their time in arithmetical theorems and problems which have not any use, it will not be amiss if we more fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretence; and this will plainly appear by taking a view of Arithmetic in its infancy, and observing what it was that originally put men on the study of that science, and to what scope they directed it. It is natural to think that at first, men, for ease of memory and help of computation, made use of counters, or in writing of single strokes, points, or the like, each whereof was made to signify an unit, i.e., some one thing of whatever kind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they found out the more compendious ways of making one character stand in place of several strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation of the Arabians or Indians came into use, wherein, by the repetition of a few characters or figures, and varying the signification of each figure according to the place it obtains, all numbers may be most aptly expressed; which seems to have been done in imitation of language, so that an exact analogy is observed betwixt the notation by figures and names, the nine simple figures answering the nine first numeral names and places in the former, corresponding to denominations in the latter. And agreeably to those conditions of the simple and local value of figures, were contrived methods of finding, from the given figures or marks of the parts, what figures and how placed are proper to denote the whole, or vice versa. And having found the sought figures, the same rule or analogy being observed throughout, it is easy to read them into words; and so the number becomes perfectly known. For then the number of any particular things is said to be known, when we know the name of figures (with their due arrangement) that according to the standing analogy belong to them. For, these signs being known, we can by the operations of arithmetic know the signs of any part of the particular sums signified by them; and, thus computing in signs (because of the connexion established betwixt them and the distinct multitudes of things whereof one is taken for an unit), we may be able rightly to sum up, divide, and proportion the things themselves that we intend to number.

121. Some people may be misled by the appearance of discovering abstract truths. They waste their time on arithmetic theorems and problems that have no use. So it is worth examining more fully how empty this claim is. We can see this clearly by looking at arithmetic in its infancy. We can ask what first led people to study it and what purpose they had in mind. At first, people naturally seem to have used counters, or single strokes, dots, or similar marks in writing. These helped them remember and calculate. Each mark stood for one unit, meaning one thing of whatever kind they needed to count. Later, they found shorter ways to make one symbol stand for several strokes or dots. Finally, the Arabian or Indian system of notation came into use. It can express all numbers very effectively by repeating a few symbols or figures. Each figure’s value also varies according to its position. This system seems to have been modeled on language. There is an exact correspondence between notation using figures and notation using names. The nine simple figures correspond to the first nine number names. Positions in notation using figures correspond to denominations in notation using names. Based on the individual and positional values of figures, people devised methods for finding the figures that represent a whole. These methods also showed how to arrange them, given the figures or marks representing its parts. The methods also worked in reverse. Once we have found the figures, we can easily read them as words, since the same rule or correspondence holds throughout. The number is then completely known. For we say that we know the number of any particular things when we know the name or figures, properly arranged, that correspond to them under the established system. Once we know these signs, we can use arithmetic to find the signs for any part of the particular totals they represent. The signs are connected to distinct collections of things, with one thing taken as a unit. So, by calculating with signs, we can correctly add up, divide, and apportion the things themselves that we intend to count.

122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the things, but the signs, which nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake, but because they direct us how to act with relation to things, and dispose rightly of them. Now, agreeably to what we have before observed of words in general (sect. 19, Introd.) it happens here likewise that abstract ideas are thought to be signified by numeral names or characters, while they do not suggest ideas of particular things to our minds. I shall not at present enter into a more particular dissertation on this subject, but only observe that it is evident from what has been said, those things which pass for abstract truths and theorems concerning numbers, are in reality conversant about no object distinct from particular numeral things, except only names and characters, which originally came to be considered on no other account but their being signs, or capable to represent aptly whatever particular things men had need to compute. Whence it follows that to study them for their own sake would be just as wise, and to as good purpose as if a man, neglecting the true use or original intention and subserviency of language, should spend his time in impertinent criticisms upon words, or reasonings and controversies purely verbal.

122. In arithmetic, then, we consider not things themselves, but signs. Yet we do not consider these signs for their own sake. We consider them because they guide us in dealing with things and arranging them properly. Here, as with words in general, abstract ideas are thought to be what number names or symbols signify. This happens when those names or symbols do not bring ideas of particular things to mind. I have already made this observation about words in general (section 19, Introduction). I will not go into the subject in greater detail now. But what has been said clearly shows that the supposed abstract truths and theorems about numbers concern particular things that can be counted. Their only other objects are names and symbols. These were originally considered only because they were signs, capable of suitably representing whatever particular things people needed to count. It follows that studying them for their own sake would be just as wise and useful as neglecting the true use, original purpose, and service of language. It would be like spending one's time on pointless criticisms of words, or on reasoning and disputes that concern words alone.

123. From numbers we proceed to speak of Extension, which, considered as relative, is the object of Geometry. The infinite divisibility of finite extension, though it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom or theorem in the elements of that science, yet is throughout the same everywhere supposed and thought to have so inseparable and essential a connexion with the principles and demonstrations in Geometry, that mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make the least question of it. And, as this notion is the source from whence do spring all those amusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to the plain common sense of mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctance into a mind not yet debauched by learning; so it is the principal occasion of all that nice and extreme subtilty which renders the study of Mathematics so difficult and tedious. Hence, if we can make it appear that no finite extension contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely divisible, it follows that we shall at once clear the science of Geometry from a great number of difficulties and contradictions which have ever been esteemed a reproach to human reason, and withal make the attainment thereof a business of much less time and pains than it hitherto has been.

123. From numbers we turn to extension, which is the subject of Geometry when considered in relation to other extensions. The infinite divisibility of finite extension is not explicitly stated as an axiom or theorem in the elements of Geometry. Yet it is assumed throughout that science. Mathematicians believe it is so inseparably and essentially connected with the principles and proofs of Geometry that they never doubt or question it. This notion is the source of all those amusing geometrical paradoxes that so directly contradict ordinary human common sense. A mind not yet corrupted by learning accepts them with great reluctance. The notion is also the main source of all the fine and extreme subtlety that makes Mathematics so difficult and tedious to study. If we can show that no finite extension contains countless parts or is infinitely divisible, two things follow. We will at once clear Geometry of many difficulties and contradictions that have always been considered a reproach to human reason. We will also make the science much less time consuming and laborious to master than it has been until now.

124. Every particular finite extension which may possibly be the object of our thought is an idea existing only in the mind, and consequently each part thereof must be perceived. If, therefore, I cannot perceive innumerable parts in any finite extension that I consider, it is certain they are not contained in it; but, it is evident that I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line, surface, or solid, which I either perceive by sense, or figure to myself in my mind: wherefore I conclude they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer to me than that the extensions I have in view are no other than my own ideas; and it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into an infinite number of other ideas, that is, that they are not infinitely divisible. If by finite extension be meant something distinct from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot affirm or deny anything of it. But if the terms "extension," "parts," &c., are taken in any sense conceivable, that is, for ideas, then to say a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number is so manifest a contradiction, that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be so; and it is impossible it should ever gain the assent of any reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees, as a converted Gentile to the belief of transubstantiation. Ancient and rooted prejudices do often pass into principles; and those propositions which once obtain the force and credit of a principle, are not only themselves, but likewise whatever is deducible from them, thought privileged from all examination. And there is no absurdity so gross, which, by this means, the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow.

124. Every particular finite extension we can think of is an idea that exists only in the mind. So every part of it must be perceived. Therefore, if I cannot perceive countless parts in a finite extension I am considering, it certainly does not contain them. But clearly I cannot distinguish countless parts in any particular line, surface, or solid that I perceive or imagine. So I conclude that they are not contained in it. Nothing could be clearer to me than that the extensions I consider are simply my own ideas. It is equally clear that I cannot divide any one of my ideas into an infinite number of other ideas. In other words, my ideas are not infinitely divisible. If finite extension means something distinct from a finite idea, I admit that I do not know what it is. So I cannot affirm or deny anything about it. But suppose the terms "extension," "parts," and so on are used in any conceivable sense, that is, to mean ideas. Then to say that a finite quantity or extension consists of infinitely many parts is an obvious contradiction. Everyone recognizes it as such at first sight. No reasonable creature could ever accept it without being led to it by slow, gentle degrees. This is like a converted Gentile being led to believe in transubstantiation. Old, deeply rooted prejudices often come to be treated as principles. Once propositions gain the force and authority of principles, they are thought exempt from all examination. So too is everything that can be deduced from them. And by this means, the human mind can be prepared to swallow even the most outrageous absurdity.

125. He whose understanding is possessed with the doctrine of abstract general ideas may be persuaded that (whatever be thought of the ideas of sense) extension in abstract is infinitely divisible. And one who thinks the objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit that a line but an inch long may contain innumerable parts--really existing, though too small to be discerned. These errors are grafted as well in the minds of geometricians as of other men, and have a like influence on their reasonings; and it were no difficult thing to show how the arguments from Geometry made use of to support the infinite divisibility of extension are bottomed on them. At present we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathematicians are all so fond and tenacious of that doctrine.

125. Someone who believes in abstract general ideas may be persuaded that extension in the abstract is infinitely divisible, whatever they think about ideas derived from the senses. Someone who thinks that objects perceived by the senses exist outside the mind may, for that reason, be led to accept another claim. They may accept that a line only an inch long can contain countless parts that really exist, though they are too small to see. These errors are rooted in the minds of geometers as well as other people, and they have the same influence on their reasoning. It would not be difficult to show that the geometric arguments used to support the infinite divisibility of extension are based on these errors. For now, I shall only consider in general why mathematicians are all so fond of that doctrine and so reluctant to abandon it.

126. It has been observed in another place that the theorems and demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal ideas (sect. 15, Introd.); where it is explained in what sense this ought to be understood, to wit, the particular lines and figures included in the diagram are supposed to stand for innumerable others of different sizes; or, in other words, the geometer considers them abstracting from their magnitude--which does not imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only that he cares not what the particular magnitude is, whether great or small, but looks on that as a thing different to the demonstration. Hence it follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be spoken of as though it contained ten thousand parts, since it is regarded not in itself, but as it is universal; and it is universal only in its signification, whereby it represents innumerable lines greater than itself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand parts or more, though there may not be above an inch in it. After this manner, the properties of the lines signified are (by a very usual figure) transferred to the sign, and thence, through mistake, though to appertain to it considered in its own nature.

126. I have noted elsewhere that the theorems and proofs of Geometry concern universal ideas (section 15, Introduction). There I explained what this means. The particular lines and figures in a diagram are supposed to stand for countless others of different sizes. In other words, the geometer considers them without regard to their size. This does not mean that he forms an abstract idea. It means only that he does not care whether the particular size is large or small. He regards the size as irrelevant to the proof. It follows that a line only an inch long in a diagram must be described as if it contained ten thousand parts. For the line is considered not in itself, but as universal. It is universal only in what it signifies. It represents countless lines larger than itself, in which ten thousand parts or more can be distinguished, although the line in the diagram may be only an inch long. In this way, the properties of the lines represented are transferred to the sign, as often happens in figurative language. These properties are then mistakenly thought to belong to the sign itself.

127. Because there is no number of parts so great but it is possible there may be a line containing more, the inch-line is said to contain parts more than any assignable number; which is true, not of the inch taken absolutely, but only for the things signified by it. But men, not retaining that distinction in their thoughts, slide into a belief that the small particular line described on paper contains in itself parts innumerable. There is no such thing as the ten--thousandth part of an inch; but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which may be signified by that inch. When therefore I delineate a triangle on paper, and take one side not above an inch, for example, in length to be the radius, this I consider as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts or more; for, though the ten-thousandth part of that line considered in itself is nothing at all, and consequently may be neglected without an error or inconveniency, yet these described lines, being only marks standing for greater quantities, whereof it may be the ten--thousandth part is very considerable, it follows that, to prevent notable errors in practice, the radius must be taken of 10,000 parts or more.

127. A line can have more parts than any number we can name. For this reason, an inch-long line is said to contain more parts than any assignable number. This is true not of the inch itself, but only of the things it represents. But people fail to keep this distinction in mind. They slip into believing that the short line drawn on paper contains countless parts in itself. There is no such thing as the ten-thousandth part of an inch. But there is a ten-thousandth part of a mile or of the earth’s diameter, which that inch may represent. Suppose, then, that I draw a triangle on paper. I take one side, no more than an inch long, as the radius. I consider this radius as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts or more. The ten-thousandth part of that line, considered in itself, is nothing at all. So it may be neglected without error or inconvenience. Yet the lines drawn on paper are only marks representing greater quantities. The ten-thousandth part of one of those quantities may be very considerable. It follows that, to prevent significant errors in practice, the radius must be taken as having 10,000 parts or more.

128. LINES WHICH ARE INFINITELY DIVISIBLE.--From what has been said the reason is plain why, to the end any theorem become universal in its use, it is necessary we speak of the lines described on paper as though they contained parts which really they do not. In doing of which, if we examine the matter thoroughly, we shall perhaps discover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as consisting of, or being divisible into, a thousand parts, but only some other line which is far greater than an inch, and represented by it; and that when we say a line is infinitely divisible, we must mean a line which is infinitely great. What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause why, to suppose the infinite divisibility of finite extension has been thought necessary in geometry.

128. INFINITELY DIVISIBLE LINES. What we have said makes clear why we must describe lines on paper as though they contained parts they do not actually have. This is necessary if a theorem is to have universal application. If we examine the matter thoroughly, we may discover that we cannot imagine an inch itself as consisting of or being divisible into a thousand parts. We can only imagine a much longer line, represented by the inch, as having those parts. We may also discover that when we say a line is infinitely divisible, we must mean a line that is infinitely long. What we have observed here seems to be the chief reason why geometry has been thought to require the assumption that finite extension is infinitely divisible.

129. The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed from this false principle might, one would think, have been esteemed so many demonstrations against it. But, by I know not what logic, it is held that proofs a posteriori are not to be admitted against propositions relating to infinity, as though it were not impossible even for an infinite mind to reconcile contradictions; or as if anything absurd and repugnant could have a necessary connexion with truth or flow from it. But, whoever considers the weakness of this pretence will think it was contrived on purpose to humour the laziness of the mind which had rather acquiesce in an indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through with a severe examination of those principles it has ever embraced for true.

129. One would think that the absurdities and contradictions arising from this false principle would each be considered proof against it. But, by some logic I cannot understand, people hold that evidence from consequences cannot be used against claims about infinity. They speak as though even an infinite mind could reconcile contradictions. Or they speak as if something absurd and contradictory could necessarily be connected to truth or follow from it. Anyone who considers how weak this excuse is will think it was devised to indulge mental laziness. The mind would rather settle into an idle skepticism than take the trouble to examine rigorously the principles it has always accepted as true.

130. Of late the speculations about Infinities have run so high, and grown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no small scruples and disputes among the geometers of the present age. Some there are of great note who, not content with holding that finite lines may be divided into an infinite number of parts, do yet farther maintain that each of those infinitesimals is itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts or infinitesimals of a second order, and so on ad infinitum. These, I say, assert there are infinitesimals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c., without ever coming to an end; so that according to them an inch does not barely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of an infinity of an infinity ad infinitum of parts. Others there be who hold all orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at all; thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is any positive quantity or part of extension which, though multiplied infinitely, can never equal the smallest given extension. And yet on the other hand it seems no less absurd to think the square, cube or other power of a positive real root, should itself be nothing at all; which they who hold infinitesimals of the first order, denying all of the subsequent orders, are obliged to maintain.

130. Recently, speculation about infinities has reached such heights and produced such strange ideas that it has caused considerable doubts and disputes among today’s geometers. Some highly distinguished geometers are not content to say that finite lines can be divided into infinitely many parts. They also maintain that each of these infinitesimals can itself be divided into infinitely many other parts, or infinitesimals of a second order. They say this continues without end. In other words, they assert that there are infinitesimals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, and so on forever. According to them, an inch contains not merely an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of an infinity of an infinity of parts, and so on without end. Others hold that all orders of infinitesimals below the first are nothing at all. With good reason, they think it absurd to imagine a positive quantity or part of extension that could never equal the smallest given extension, even if multiplied infinitely. Yet it seems no less absurd to think that the square, cube, or other power of a positive real root could itself be nothing at all. Those who accept infinitesimals of the first order but deny all subsequent orders are obliged to maintain just that.

131. OBJECTION OF MATHEMATICIANS.--ANSWER.--Have we not therefore reason to conclude they are both in the wrong, and that there is in effect no such thing as parts infinitely small, or an infinite number of parts contained in any finite quantity? But you will say that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very foundations of Geometry are destroyed, and those great men who have raised that science to so astonishing a height, have been all the while building a castle in the air. To this it may be replied that whatever is useful in geometry, and promotes the benefit of human life, does still remain firm and unshaken on our principles; that science considered as practical will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what has been said. But to set this in a due light may be the proper business of another place. For the rest, though it should follow that some of the more intricate and subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may be pared off without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will be thence derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to be wished that men of great abilities and obstinate application would draw off their thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in the study of such things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or have a more direct influence on the manners.

131. OBJECTION OF MATHEMATICIANS. ANSWER. Have we not, then, reason to conclude that both are wrong? In fact, there are no infinitely small parts, nor does any finite quantity contain an infinite number of parts. But you will say that, if this doctrine is accepted, the very foundations of geometry will be destroyed. The great men who raised that science to such astonishing heights will have been building a castle in the air. In reply, whatever is useful in geometry and benefits human life remains firm and unshaken under our principles. As a practical science, geometry will benefit rather than suffer from what has been said. But explaining this properly may be a task for another place. As for the rest, some of the more intricate and subtle parts of speculative mathematics may prove dispensable without harm to truth. Even so, I do not see what harm this would do to mankind. On the contrary, I think it would be highly desirable for men of great ability and tireless application to turn away from such pastimes. They could instead study things closer to the concerns of life, or things that have a more direct influence on conduct.

132. SECOND OBJECTION OF MATHEMATICIANS.--ANSWER.--If it be said that several theorems undoubtedly true are discovered by methods in which infinitesimals are made use of, which could never have been if their existence included a contradiction in it; I answer that upon a thorough examination it will not be found that in any instance it is necessary to make use of or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even quantities less than the minimum sensible; nay, it will be evident this is never done, it being impossible.

132. SECOND OBJECTION OF MATHEMATICIANS. ANSWER. Someone might object that methods using infinitesimals have revealed several theorems that are undoubtedly true. They might argue that this could never have happened if the existence of infinitesimals involved a contradiction. I answer that a thorough examination will show that infinitesimals are never necessary. In no case is it necessary to use or imagine infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even quantities smaller than the smallest perceptible quantity. Indeed, it will be clear that this is never done, because it is impossible.

133. IF THE DOCTRINE WERE ONLY AN HYPOTHESIS IT SHOULD BE RESPECTED FOR ITS CONSEQUENCES.--By what we have premised, it is plain that very numerous and important errors have taken their rise from those false Principles which were impugned in the foregoing parts of this treatise; and the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be most fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable consequences highly advantageous to true philosophy, as well as to religion. Particularly Matter, or the absolute existence of corporeal objects, has been shown to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of all knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief strength and confidence. And surely, if by distinguishing the real existence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allowing them a subsistance of their own out of the minds of spirits, no one thing is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great many inexplicable difficulties arise; if the supposition of Matter is barely precarious, as not being grounded on so much as one single reason; if its consequences cannot endure the light of examination and free inquiry, but screen themselves under the dark and general pretence of "infinites being incomprehensible"; if withal the removal of this Matter be not attended with the least evil consequence; if it be not even missed in the world, but everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it; if, lastly, both Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing only spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable both to Reason and Religion: methinks we may expect it should be admitted and firmly embraced, though it were proposed only as an hypothesis, and the existence of Matter had been allowed possible, which yet I think we have evidently demonstrated that it is not.

133. EVEN IF THE DOCTRINE WERE ONLY A HYPOTHESIS, IT SHOULD BE RESPECTED FOR ITS CONSEQUENCES. From what we have already established, it is clear that many important errors arose from the false principles challenged earlier in this treatise. At the same time, the principles opposed to those errors prove highly fruitful. They lead to countless consequences of great benefit to true philosophy and religion. In particular, I have shown that matter, or the absolute existence of physical objects, has always been the chief source of strength and confidence for the most outspoken and dangerous enemies of all knowledge, both human and divine. Suppose we distinguish the real existence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allow that they exist independently, outside the minds of spirits. If this explains nothing in nature but instead creates many inexplicable difficulties, we should take notice. The same is true if the supposition of matter is baseless, unsupported by even a single reason. Its consequences may not withstand examination and free inquiry, but instead hide behind the vague and obscure excuse that "infinites are incomprehensible". And removing matter may have no bad consequences at all. Matter may not even be missed in the world, since everything can be conceived just as well, indeed much more easily, without it. Finally, suppose that skeptics and atheists are silenced forever simply by assuming that only spirits and ideas exist. Suppose, too, that this account of things agrees perfectly with both reason and religion. If all this is so, I think we may expect the doctrine to be accepted and firmly embraced, even if it were offered only as a hypothesis and the existence of matter were admitted to be possible. Yet I think we have clearly demonstrated that the existence of matter is not possible.

134. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing principles, several disputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning, are rejected as useless. But, how great a prejudice soever against our notions this may give to those who have already been deeply engaged, and make large advances in studies of that nature, yet by others we hope it will not be thought any just ground of dislike to the principles and tenets herein laid down, that they abridge the labour of study, and make human sciences far more clear, compendious and attainable than they were before.

134. It is true that the principles discussed above reject several disputes and speculations as useless. These are considered important parts of learning. As a result, people who have studied such matters deeply and made great progress may be strongly prejudiced against our ideas. But we hope others will not dislike the principles and beliefs set out here for reducing the work of study. Nor, we hope, will they dislike them for making human sciences much clearer, more concise, and easier to learn than before.

135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledge of IDEAS, the method we proposed leads us in the next place to treat of SPIRITS--with regard to which, perhaps, human knowledge is not so deficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great reason that is assigned for our being thought ignorant of the nature of spirits is our not having an idea of it. But, surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a human understanding that it does not perceive the idea of spirit, if it is manifestly impossible there should be any such idea. And this if I mistake not has been demonstrated in section 27; to which I shall here add that a spirit has been shown to be the only substance or support wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist; but that this substance which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea or like an idea is evidently absurd.

135. Having said what I intended about the knowledge of IDEAS, I will now turn to SPIRITS, as planned. Perhaps human knowledge of spirits is not as limited as people commonly suppose. The main reason we are thought ignorant of their nature is that we have no idea of it. But surely this should not be considered a defect in human understanding if it is clearly impossible to have such an idea. If I am not mistaken, I demonstrated that in section 27. I will add here that a spirit has been shown to be the only substance or support in which unthinking beings or ideas can exist. But it is clearly absurd to suppose that this substance, which supports or perceives ideas, could itself be an idea or be like one.

136. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--It will perhaps be said that we want a sense (as some have imagined) proper to know substances withal, which, if we had, we might know our own soul as we do a triangle. To this I answer, that, in case we had a new sense bestowed upon us, we could only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas of sense. But I believe nobody will say that what he means by the terms soul and substance is only some particular sort of idea or sensation. We may therefore infer that, all things duly considered, it is not more reasonable to think our faculties defective, in that they do not furnish us with an idea of spirit or active thinking substance, than it would be if we should blame them for not being able to comprehend a round square.

136. OBJECTION. ANSWER. Perhaps someone will say that we lack a sense specifically suited to knowing substances, as some have imagined. If we had such a sense, we might know our own soul as we know a triangle. My answer is that, if we were given a new sense, it could only give us new sensations or ideas of sense. But I believe nobody would say that, by soul and substance, they mean only some particular kind of idea or sensation. We may therefore conclude that, all things considered, it is no more reasonable to think our faculties defective because they give us no idea of spirit or active thinking substance than it would be to blame them for not being able to comprehend a round square.

137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an idea or sensation have risen many absurd and heterodox tenets, and much scepticism about the nature of the soul. It is even probable that this opinion may have produced a doubt in some whether they had any soul at all distinct from their body since upon inquiry they could not find they had an idea of it. That an idea which is inactive, and the existence whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other refutation than barely attending to what is meant by those words. But, perhaps you will say that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects; and it is not necessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original.

137. The belief that spirits are known in the same way as an idea or sensation has led to many absurd and unorthodox doctrines. It has also led to much skepticism about the nature of the soul. This belief has probably even led some people to doubt whether they have a soul distinct from their body. For when they looked for one, they could find no idea of it. An idea is inactive, and its existence consists in being perceived. An agent, by contrast, exists independently. To see that an idea cannot be an image or likeness of such an agent, we need only consider what those words mean. But perhaps you will say that an idea can resemble a spirit in some other respects, though not in its thinking, acting, or existing independently. An idea or image does not have to resemble the original in every respect.

138. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible it should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of the term. If therefore it is impossible that any degree of those powers should be represented in an idea, it is evident there can be no idea of a spirit.

138. I answer that if it does not represent it in the respects mentioned, it cannot represent it in any other respect. Leave out the power to will, think, and perceive ideas, and there is nothing else in which an idea can resemble a spirit. By spirit, we mean only something that thinks, wills, and perceives. This alone is what the word means. Therefore, if an idea cannot represent any degree of those powers, there can clearly be no idea of a spirit.

139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea signified by the terms soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing, which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance. If it be said that this is only quarreling at a word, and that, since the immediately significations of other names are by common consent called ideas, no reason can be assigned why that which is signified by the name spirit or soul may not partake in the same appellation. I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between spirit and idea. See sect. 27.

139. But someone may object that, if the terms soul, spirit, and substance signify no idea, they are entirely meaningless. I answer that these words do signify something real. It is neither an idea nor like an idea. Rather, it is what perceives ideas, wills, and reasons about them. What I am, the being I mean by “I,” is the same as what is meant by soul or spiritual substance. Someone may say that this is merely a dispute over a word. By common agreement, what other names immediately signify is called an idea. So, the objection goes, there is no reason why what the name spirit or soul signifies cannot also be called an idea. I answer that all the nonthinking objects of the mind are alike in being entirely passive. Their existence consists only in being perceived. A soul or spirit, on the other hand, is an active being. Its existence consists not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking. We must therefore distinguish between spirit and idea. Otherwise, we risk using words ambiguously and confusing things whose natures are completely different and unlike. See section 27.

140. OUR IDEA OF SPIRIT.--In a large sense, indeed, we may be said to have an idea or rather a notion of spirit; that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be resemblances of them; so we know other spirits by means of our own soul--which in that sense is the image or idea of them; it having a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived has to those ideas perceived by another.

140. OUR IDEA OF SPIRIT. In a broad sense, we may be said to have an idea, or rather a notion, of spirit. That is, we understand what the word means. Otherwise, we could not affirm or deny anything about spirit. We form a conception of the ideas in other spirits’ minds through our own ideas, which we suppose resemble theirs. In the same way, we know other spirits through our own soul, which in that sense is their image or idea. Our soul relates to other spirits as the blueness or heat I perceive relates to the ideas another person perceives.

141. THE NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL IS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE OF THE FOREGOING DOCTRINE.--It must not be supposed that they who assert the natural immortality of the soul are of opinion that it is absolutely incapable of annihilation even by the infinite power of the Creator who first gave it being, but only that it is not liable to be broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion. They indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin vital flame, or system of animal spirits, make it perishing and corruptible as the body; since there is nothing more easily dissipated than such a being, which it is naturally impossible should survive the ruin of the tabernacle wherein it is enclosed. And this notion has been greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind, as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue and religion. But it has been made evident that bodies, of what frame or texture soever, are barely passive ideas in the mind, which is more distant and heterogeneous from them than light is from darkness. We have shown that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural bodies (and which is what we mean by the course of nature) cannot possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance; such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature; that is to say, "the soul of man is naturally immortal."

141. THE NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL IS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE OF THE PRECEDING DOCTRINE. Those who assert the soul’s natural immortality do not believe that it is absolutely incapable of being destroyed. Even the Creator’s infinite power, which first gave the soul existence, could destroy it. They mean only that the soul cannot be broken apart or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion. Those who believe the human soul is merely a thin vital flame or a system of animal spirits make it perishable and subject to decay, like the body. Nothing is more easily dispersed than such a being. It is naturally impossible for it to survive the destruction of the body in which it is enclosed. The worst part of mankind has eagerly embraced and cherished this idea as the most effective antidote to all influences of virtue and religion. But it has been made clear that bodies, whatever their structure or texture, are merely passive ideas in the mind. The mind is more different in kind from bodies than light is from darkness. We have shown that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, and without physical extent. It is therefore incapable of decay. Nothing could be clearer than that the motions, changes, decay, and dissolution we see natural bodies undergo every hour cannot affect an active, simple substance made of no parts. These changes are what we mean by the course of nature. Such a being therefore cannot be dissolved by the force of nature. That is to say, "the human soul is naturally immortal."

142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless, inactive objects, or by way of idea. Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different, that when we say "they exist," "they are known," or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing alike or common in them: and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle, seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound. This is inculcated because I imagine it may be of moment towards clearing several important questions, and preventing some very dangerous errors concerning the nature of the soul. We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an idea of an active being, or of an action, although we may be said to have a notion of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my mind, and its acts about ideas, inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by these words. What I know, that I have some notion of. I will not say that the terms idea and notion may not be used convertibly, if the world will have it so; but yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety that we distinguish things very different by different names. It is also to be remarked that, all relations including an act of the mind, we cannot so properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of the relations and habitudes between things. But if, in the modern way, the word idea is extended to spirits, and relations, and acts, this is, after all, an affair of verbal concern.

142. After what has been said, I suppose it is clear that we do not know our souls as we know insensible, inactive objects, or through ideas. Spirits and ideas are entirely different things. So when we say "they exist," "they are known," or the like, we must not think these words mean anything common to both kinds of being. There is nothing alike or common in them. We might expect that adding to or expanding our faculties could enable us to know a spirit as we know a triangle. But that seems as absurd as hoping to see a sound. I stress this point because I think it may help clarify several important questions. It may also prevent some very dangerous errors about the nature of the soul. I do not think we can strictly be said to have an idea of an active being or of an action, although we can be said to have a notion of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my mind and its acts concerning ideas, because I know or understand what these words mean. Whatever I know, I have some notion of. I will not say that the terms idea and notion cannot be used interchangeably, if people insist on doing so. But it makes for clarity and precision to distinguish very different things by different names. It is also worth noting that all relations involve an act of the mind. So we cannot properly be said to have an idea of the relations and connections between things, but rather a notion of them. But if, in the modern way, the word idea is extended to spirits, relations, and acts, this is, after all, a matter of words.

143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of abstract ideas has had no small share in rendering those sciences intricate and obscure which are particularly conversant about spiritual things. Men have imagined they could frame abstract notions of the powers and acts of the mind, and consider them prescinded as well from the mind or spirit itself, as from their respective objects and effects. Hence a great number of dark and ambiguous terms, presumed to stand for abstract notions, have been introduced into metaphysics and morality, and from these have grown infinite distractions and disputes amongst the learned.

143. It is worth adding that the doctrine of abstract ideas has played a major part in making the sciences concerned with spiritual things complicated and obscure. People have imagined that they could form abstract ideas of the mind’s powers and actions. They thought they could consider these powers and actions apart from the mind or spirit itself, as well as from their respective objects and effects. As a result, many obscure and ambiguous terms have been introduced into metaphysics and morality. These terms are presumed to stand for abstract ideas, and they have given rise to endless confusion and disputes among scholars.

144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in controversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and operations of the mind, than the being used to speak of those things in terms borrowed from sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed the motion of the soul; this infuses a belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of dangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not, may be cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but philosophers be prevailed on to retire into themselves, and attentively consider their own meaning.

144. But nothing seems to have contributed more to disputes and errors about the mind’s nature and operations than the habit of describing them in terms borrowed from sensory ideas. For example, the will is called the motion of the soul. This encourages the belief that the human mind is like a ball in motion. On this view, objects of sense propel and determine the mind as necessarily as a racket’s stroke propels and determines a ball. This gives rise to endless doubts and errors with dangerous consequences for morality. I have no doubt that all these doubts and errors could be cleared up, and that truth would appear plain, uniform, and consistent, if philosophers could only be persuaded to look inward and consider their own meaning carefully.

145. KNOWLEDGE OF SPIRITS NOT IMMEDIATE.--From what has been said, it is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited in us. I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them and concur in their production. Hence, the knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant signs.

145. KNOWLEDGE OF SPIRITS IS NOT IMMEDIATE. From what has been said, we can clearly know that other spirits exist only through their actions or the ideas they produce in us. I perceive various movements, changes, and combinations of ideas. These tell me that certain individual agents, like myself, accompany these events and help produce them. Thus, my knowledge of other spirits is not immediate, as my knowledge of my ideas is. Instead, it depends on ideas that I attribute to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as their effects or accompanying signs.

146. But, though there be some things which convince us human agents are concerned in producing them; yet it is evident to every one that those things which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent on, the wills of men. There is therefore some other Spirit that causes them; since it is repugnant that they should subsist by themselves. See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of creation, together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole, but above all the never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals; I say if we consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, "who works all in all," and "by whom all things consist."

146. Some things convince us that human agents play a part in producing them. But everyone can see that what we call the Works of Nature does not depend on human wills. These works make up by far the greater part of the ideas or sensations we perceive. Human wills do not produce them. Therefore, some other Spirit causes them, since they cannot exist by themselves. See section 29. But let us consider the constant regularity, order, and connection of natural things. Let us consider the astonishing magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger parts of creation. Let us also consider the exquisite design of the smaller parts, and the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole. Above all, let us consider the laws of pain and pleasure, which we can never admire enough. Let us also consider the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals. If we consider all these things, while also considering what we mean by One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we will clearly see that these attributes belong to that Spirit, "who works all in all," and "by whom all things consist."

147. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD MORE EVIDENT THAN THAT OF MAN.--Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men; because the effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents. There is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author of Nature. For, it is evident that in affecting other persons the will of man has no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body; but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it is who, "upholding all things by the word of His power," maintains that intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other. And yet this pure and clear light which enlightens every one is itself invisible.

147. GOD’S EXISTENCE IS MORE EVIDENT THAN MAN’S. It follows that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit distinct from ourselves. We may even say that God’s existence is far more clearly perceived than the existence of other people. This is because the effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and significant than those attributed to human agents. Every sign of a person’s presence and every effect a person produces is stronger evidence of the Spirit who is the Author of Nature. For it is clear that, when a person affects others, his will can do no more than move his own limbs. Whether that movement is accompanied by or produces an idea in another person’s mind depends entirely on the Creator’s will. He alone, “upholding all things by the word of His power,” maintains the connection between spirits that allows them to perceive one another’s existence. Yet this pure, clear light that enlightens everyone is itself invisible.

148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, we should believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, we need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow--creatures. Not that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is, I must confess, to me incomprehensible. But I shall explain my meaning;--A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea; when therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man--if by man is meant that which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do--but only such a certain collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and represented by it. And after the same manner we see God; all the difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view, we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men.

148. The unthinking crowd often claims that it cannot see God. If only we could see him as we see a man, they say, we would believe that he exists. And if we believed, we would obey his commands. But alas, we need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things. We can see him more fully and clearly than we see any of our fellow creatures. I do not mean that we see God directly and immediately, as some claim. Nor do I mean that we see physical things indirectly, by seeing what represents them in the essence of God. I must confess that this doctrine is incomprehensible to me. But let me explain what I mean. A human spirit or person is not an idea, and so cannot be perceived by the senses. Therefore, when we see a man’s color, size, shape, and movements, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas. These arise in our own minds. They appear to us in various distinct groups, pointing us to the existence of finite, created spirits like ourselves. So clearly we do not see a man, if by “man” we mean what lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do. We see only a particular group of ideas. This group leads us to think that a distinct source of thought and motion, like ourselves, accompanies it and is represented by it. And we see God in the same way. The only difference is that a limited group of ideas points to a particular human mind. But wherever we look, at all times and in all places, we perceive clear signs of God. Everything we see, hear, feel, or perceive in any way through our senses is a sign or effect of God’s power. Even our perception of movements made by humans is such a sign or effect.

149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one that is capable of the least reflexion than the existence of God, or a Spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short "in whom we live, and move, and have our being." That the discovery of this great truth, which lies so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reason of so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of men, who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations of the Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they seem, as it were, blinded with excess of light.

149. It is therefore clear that nothing is more evident to anyone capable of the least reflection than God’s existence. God is a Spirit who is intimately present to our minds. He produces in them all the variety of ideas or sensations that continually affect us. We depend on him absolutely and entirely. In short, he is the one "in whom we live, and move, and have our being." This great truth lies so close to the mind and is so obvious. Yet very few people discover it through reason. This is a sad example of human stupidity and inattention. Though people are surrounded by such clear signs of God, they are so little affected by them that they seem blinded by an excess of light.

150. OBJECTION ON BEHALF OF NATURE.--ANSWER.--But you will say, has Nature no share in the production of natural things, and must they be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of God? I answer, if by Nature is meant only the visible series of effects or sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed and general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce anything at all. But, if by Nature is meant some being distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and things perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, it is more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians, professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. "The Lord He causeth the vapours to ascend; He maketh lightnings with rain; He bringeth forth the wind out of his treasures." Jerem. 10. 13. "He turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night." Amos, 5. 8. "He visiteth the earth, and maketh it soft with showers: He blesseth the springing thereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness; so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn." See Psalm 65. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in His stead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul) "He be not far from every one of us."

150. OBJECTION ON BEHALF OF NATURE. ANSWER. But you will say, does Nature play no part in producing natural things? Must they all be attributed solely and directly to God? I answer that Nature cannot produce anything if it means only the visible sequence of effects or sensations impressed on our minds according to certain fixed and general laws. But suppose Nature means some being distinct from God, the laws of nature, and things perceived by the senses. In that case, I must confess that the word is an empty sound to me, with no understandable meaning. Nature, in this sense, is a pointless fantasy. It was introduced by those heathens who did not have a correct understanding of God's omnipresence and infinite perfection. But it is even harder to explain why Christians should accept this idea. They profess belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly attribute to God's direct action the effects that heathen philosophers usually attribute to Nature. "The Lord causes the vapors to rise. He makes lightning with rain. He brings the wind out of his storehouses." Jeremiah 10.13. "He turns the shadow of death into morning and darkens the day into night." Amos 5.8. "He visits the earth and softens it with showers. He blesses its growth and crowns the year with his goodness. The pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered with grain." See Psalm 65. But although Scripture constantly speaks this way, we have some unexplained reluctance to believe that God is so closely involved in our affairs. We would prefer to suppose that he is far away and put some blind, unthinking deputy in his place. Yet, if we may believe Saint Paul, "he is not far from any one of us."

151. OBJECTION TO THE HAND OF GOD BEING THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE, THREEFOLD.--ANSWER.--It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow and gradual methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem to have for their cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent. Besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like, are so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain from sect. 62; it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary, in order to working by the most simple and general rules, and after a steady and consistent manner; which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood. "Verily" (saith the prophet) "thou art a God that hidest thyself." Isaiah, 45. 15. But, though the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy, who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to an unbiased and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates and sustains the whole system of beings. It is clear, from what we have elsewhere observed, that the operating according to general and stated laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of nature, that without it all reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of purpose; it were even impossible there should be any such faculties or powers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise.

151. THREE OBJECTIONS TO GOD’S HAND AS THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE. ANSWER. I have no doubt that some will object that nature’s slow, gradual methods do not seem to result directly from an Almighty Agent. They will also point to deformities, premature births, fruit destroyed while still in blossom, rain falling in deserts, the miseries of human life, and similar things. These, they will say, are arguments against the whole of nature being directly set in motion and governed by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer is largely clear from section 62. Nature’s methods are clearly necessary for it to operate by the simplest and most general rules, in a steady and consistent way. These methods therefore show both God’s wisdom and his goodness. This mighty machine of nature is so skillfully designed that its movements and various phenomena strike our senses. Yet the hand that moves the whole machine cannot itself be perceived by people of flesh and blood. As the prophet says, "Verily, thou art a God that hidest thyself." Isaiah, 45. 15. The Lord conceals himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy, who will not make the slightest effort to think. Yet to an unbiased and attentive mind, nothing could be clearer than the close presence of an All-wise Spirit. This Spirit shapes, governs, and sustains the whole system of beings. As we have observed elsewhere, action according to general and established laws is necessary for guiding us in life and revealing nature’s secrets. Without such laws, all the reach and scope of thought, and all human intelligence and planning, would serve no purpose. Indeed, without them, the mind could not have any such faculties or powers. See section 31. This consideration alone far outweighs any particular inconveniences that may arise from those laws.

152. We should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to examine whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before they come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and saving mortals. In man indeed a thrifty management of those things which he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed wisdom. But, we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble in its production than a pebble does; nothing being more evident than that an Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fiat or act of His will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of His power.

152. We should also consider that even nature’s flaws and defects have their uses. They create a pleasing variety and add to the beauty of the rest of creation. In the same way, shadows in a picture bring out the brighter, better-lit parts. We should also consider why we blame the Author of nature for being careless. We accuse him of wasting seeds and embryos and allowing plants and animals to be destroyed before they fully mature. But is this accusation the result of a prejudice we have acquired from knowing powerless and thrifty mortals? In humans, careful management of things that require much work to obtain may indeed be considered wise. But we must not imagine that the great Creator takes more trouble to produce an animal or plant, with its incredibly intricate machinery, than to produce a pebble. Nothing is more evident than that an all-powerful Spirit can produce anything just as easily, simply by willing it. So nature’s splendid abundance should not be taken as a sign of weakness or wastefulness in its creator. Rather, it should be seen as evidence of the richness of his power.

153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world, pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain into our thoughts, and account it evil; whereas, if we enlarge our view, so as to comprehend the various ends, connexions, and dependencies of things, on what occasions and in what proportions we are affected with pain and pleasure, the nature of human freedom, and the design with which we are put into the world; we shall be forced to acknowledge that those particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole system of beings.

153. The world contains pain and discomfort because of the general laws of nature and the actions of finite, imperfect spirits. In our present condition, this pain and discomfort are absolutely necessary to our well-being. But our view is too narrow. For example, we think of one particular pain and consider it evil. But suppose we broaden our view to include the various purposes, connections, and dependencies of things. Suppose we also consider when we experience pain and pleasure, and in what proportions, along with the nature of human freedom and the purpose for which we are put into the world. Then we will have to acknowledge that particular things that seem evil in themselves are good when considered as part of the whole system of beings.

154. ATHEISM AND MANICHEISM WOULD HAVE FEW SUPPORTERS IF MANKIND WERE IN GENERAL ATTENTIVE.--From what has been said, it will be manifest to any considering person, that it is merely for want of attention and comprehensiveness of mind that there are any favourers of Atheism or the Manichean Heresy to be found. Little and unreflecting souls may indeed burlesque the works of Providence, the beauty and order whereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the pains, to comprehend; but those who are masters of any justness and extent of thought, and are withal used to reflect, can never sufficiently admire the divine traces of Wisdom and Goodness that shine throughout the Economy of Nature. But what truth is there which shineth so strongly on the mind that by an aversion of thought, a wilful shutting of the eyes, we may not escape seeing it? Is it therefore to be wondered at, if the generality of men, who are ever intent on business or pleasure, and little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, should not have all that conviction and evidence of the Being of God which might be expected in reasonable creatures?

154. ATHEISM AND MANICHEISM WOULD HAVE FEW SUPPORTERS IF PEOPLE WERE GENERALLY ATTENTIVE. From what has been said, any thoughtful person will see why anyone supports Atheism or the Manichean Heresy. It is simply because people lack attention and breadth of mind. Narrow and unthinking souls may indeed mock the works of Providence. They cannot understand their beauty and order, or will not take the trouble to do so. But those who think clearly and broadly, and are accustomed to reflection, can never sufficiently admire the divine signs of Wisdom and Goodness. These shine throughout the order of Nature. Yet what truth shines so brightly on the mind that we cannot avoid seeing it by turning away our thoughts and deliberately closing our eyes? Most people are always occupied with business or pleasure. They are little accustomed to opening their minds or focusing their thoughts. Is it any wonder, then, that they lack the full conviction and evidence of God's existence that might be expected of reasonable creatures?

155. We should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid as to neglect, than that neglecting they should be unconvinced of such an evident and momentous truth. And yet it is to be feared that too many of parts and leisure, who live in Christian countries, are, merely through a supine and dreadful negligence, sunk into Atheism. Since it is downright impossible that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough sense of the omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that Almighty Spirit should persist in a remorseless violation of His laws. We ought, therefore, earnestly to meditate and dwell on those important points; that so we may attain conviction without all scruple "that the eyes of the Lord are in every place beholding the evil and the good; that He is with us and keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat and raiment to put on"; that He is present and conscious to our innermost thoughts; and that we have a most absolute and immediate dependence on Him. A clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill our hearts with an awful circumspection and holy fear, which is the strongest incentive to Virtue, and the best guard against Vice.

155. We should be more surprised that people can be so foolish as to neglect this obvious and important truth than that neglect leaves them unconvinced of it. Yet it is to be feared that too many capable people with leisure, who live in Christian countries, have fallen into atheism through sheer complacent and dreadful negligence. For a soul deeply aware of the omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that almighty Spirit could not possibly continue to violate his laws without remorse. We should therefore think earnestly and at length about these important matters. In this way, we may become convinced beyond all doubt "that the eyes of the Lord are in every place beholding the evil and the good; that He is with us and keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat and raiment to put on". We may also become convinced that he is present and aware of our innermost thoughts, and that we depend on him absolutely and immediately. A clear understanding of these great truths cannot fail to fill our hearts with reverent caution and holy fear. This is the strongest incentive to virtue and the best guard against vice.

156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies is the consideration of GOD and our DUTY; which to promote, as it was the main drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the Presence of God; and, having shown the falseness or vanity of those barren speculations which make the chief employment of learned men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary truths of the Gospel, which to know and to practice is the highest perfection of human nature.

156. After all, the study of GOD and our DUTY deserves first place in our studies. Promoting that study was the main purpose of my work. So I will consider my work entirely useless and ineffective if my words cannot inspire my readers with a devout sense of God's presence. I have shown that the empty speculations occupying most of the time of learned people are false or pointless. If I cannot thereby make my readers more willing to revere and embrace the saving truths of the Gospel, I will also consider my work entirely useless and ineffective. Knowing and practicing those truths is the highest perfection of human nature.