Introduction
Section 5
The soul of the world is framed on the analogy of the soul of man, and many traces of anthropomorphism blend with Plato’s highest flights of idealism. The heavenly bodies are endowed with thought; the principles of the same and other exist in the universe as well as in the human mind. The soul of man is made out of the remains of the elements which had been used in creating the soul of the world; these remains, however, are diluted to the third degree; by this Plato expresses the measure of the difference between the soul human and divine. The human soul, like the cosmical, is framed before the body, as the mind is before the soul of either—this is the order of the divine work—and the finer parts of the body, which are more akin to the soul, such as the spinal marrow, are prior to the bones and flesh. The brain, the containing vessel of the divine part of the soul, is (nearly) in the form of a globe, which is the image of the gods, who are the stars, and of the universe.
The soul of the world is modeled on the human soul. Many traces of human traits appear even in Plato’s highest flights of idealism. The heavenly bodies have thought. The principles of the same and the other exist in the universe as well as in the human mind. The human soul is made from what remained of the elements used to create the soul of the world. These remains, however, are diluted to the third degree. Plato uses this dilution to express the degree of difference between the human and divine souls. The human soul, like the soul of the world, is made before the body. In both cases, mind comes before soul. This is the order of the divine work. The finer parts of the body, which are closer to the soul, are made before the bones and flesh. These finer parts include the spinal marrow. The brain holds the divine part of the soul. It is almost spherical, reflecting the shape of the gods, who are the stars, and of the universe.
There is, however, an inconsistency in Plato’s manner of conceiving the soul of man; he cannot get rid of the element of necessity which is allowed to enter. He does not, like Kant, attempt to vindicate for men a freedom out of space and time; but he acknowledges him to be subject to the influence of external causes, and leaves hardly any place for freedom of the will. The lusts of men are caused by their bodily constitution, though they may be increased by bad education and bad laws, which implies that they may be decreased by good education and good laws. He appears to have an inkling of the truth that to the higher nature of man evil is involuntary. This is mixed up with the view which, while apparently agreeing with it, is in reality the opposite of it, that vice is due to physical causes. In the Timaeus, as well as in the Laws, he also regards vices and crimes as simply involuntary; they are diseases analogous to the diseases of the body, and arising out of the same causes. If we draw together the opposite poles of Plato’s system, we find that, like Spinoza, he combines idealism with fatalism.
There is, however, an inconsistency in Plato’s view of the human soul. He cannot get rid of the element of necessity he allows into it. Unlike Kant, he does not try to establish a human freedom outside space and time. Instead, he acknowledges that people are subject to external causes, leaving hardly any room for free will. Human desires are caused by bodily constitution, though bad education and bad laws may make them stronger. This implies that good education and good laws may make them weaker. Plato seems to glimpse the truth that evil is involuntary for the higher part of human nature. He mixes this idea with another view that seems to agree with it, but is actually its opposite. This is the view that vice has physical causes. In the Timaeus, as in the Laws, he also regards vices and crimes as simply involuntary. They are diseases like those of the body and arise from the same causes. If we bring together the opposite poles of Plato’s system, we find that he combines idealism with fatalism, like Spinoza.
The soul of man is divided by him into three parts, answering roughly to the charioteer and steeds of the Phaedrus, and to the (Greek) of the Republic and Nicomachean Ethics. First, there is the immortal nature of which the brain is the seat, and which is akin to the soul of the universe. This alone thinks and knows and is the ruler of the whole. Secondly, there is the higher mortal soul which, though liable to perturbations of her own, takes the side of reason against the lower appetites. The seat of this is the heart, in which courage, anger, and all the nobler affections are supposed to reside. There the veins all meet; it is their centre or house of guard whence they carry the orders of the thinking being to the extremities of his kingdom. There is also a third or appetitive soul, which receives the commands of the immortal part, not immediately but mediately, through the liver, which reflects on its surface the admonitions and threats of the reason.
He divides the human soul into three parts. These correspond roughly to the charioteer and horses in the Phaedrus, and to the (Greek) in the Republic and Nicomachean Ethics. First, there is the immortal part, which resides in the brain and is related to the soul of the universe. It alone thinks and knows, and it rules the whole soul. Second, there is the higher mortal soul. Although it is subject to disturbances of its own, it sides with reason against the lower appetites. It resides in the heart, where courage, anger, and all the nobler feelings are thought to dwell. All the veins meet there. The heart is their center, or guardhouse, from which they carry the commands of the thinking being to the farthest reaches of his kingdom. There is also a third soul, the appetitive soul. It receives the commands of the immortal part indirectly, through the liver. The liver reflects reason’s warnings and threats on its surface.
The liver is imagined by Plato to be a smooth and bright substance, having a store of sweetness and also of bitterness, which reason freely uses in the execution of her mandates. In this region, as ancient superstition told, were to be found intimations of the future. But Plato is careful to observe that although such knowledge is given to the inferior parts of man, it requires to be interpreted by the superior. Reason, and not enthusiasm, is the true guide of man; he is only inspired when he is demented by some distemper or possession. The ancient saying, that ‘only a man in his senses can judge of his own actions,’ is approved by modern philosophy too. The same irony which appears in Plato’s remark, that ‘the men of old time must surely have known the gods who were their ancestors, and we should believe them as custom requires,’ is also manifest in his account of divination.
Plato imagines the liver as smooth and bright, with a store of sweetness and bitterness. Reason freely uses both to carry out its commands. According to ancient superstition, signs of the future could be found in the liver. But Plato takes care to note that although this knowledge is given to the lower parts of a person, the higher parts must interpret it. Reason, not enthusiasm, is the true guide for human beings. A person is inspired only when driven out of their senses by illness or possession. Modern philosophy also approves the ancient saying that ‘only a person in their senses can judge their own actions.’ Plato shows the same irony in his account of divination as in his remark about the gods. He says that ‘people in ancient times must surely have known the gods who were their ancestors, and we should believe them, as custom requires.’
The appetitive soul is seated in the belly, and there imprisoned like a wild beast, far away from the council chamber, as Plato graphically calls the head, in order that the animal passions may not interfere with the deliberations of reason. Though the soul is said by him to be prior to the body, yet we cannot help seeing that it is constructed on the model of the body—the threefold division into the rational, passionate, and appetitive corresponding to the head, heart and belly. The human soul differs from the soul of the world in this respect, that it is enveloped and finds its expression in matter, whereas the soul of the world is not only enveloped or diffused in matter, but is the element in which matter moves. The breath of man is within him, but the air or aether of heaven is the element which surrounds him and all things.
The appetitive soul is located in the belly, imprisoned there like a wild beast. It is far from what Plato vividly calls the council chamber, the head. This keeps the animal passions from interfering with reason’s deliberations. Although Plato says that the soul comes before the body, we cannot help seeing that he models it on the body. Its three parts, the rational, passionate, and appetitive, correspond to the head, heart, and belly. The human soul differs from the soul of the world in one respect. The human soul is enclosed in matter and expresses itself through matter. But the soul of the world is not only enclosed or spread throughout matter. It is also the element in which matter moves. A person’s breath is inside them, but the air or ether of heaven is the element surrounding them and all things.
Pleasure and pain are attributed in the Timaeus to the suddenness of our sensations—the first being a sudden restoration, the second a sudden violation, of nature (Phileb.). The sensations become conscious to us when they are exceptional. Sight is not attended either by pleasure or pain, but hunger and the appeasing of hunger are pleasant and painful because they are extraordinary.
In the Timaeus, pleasure and pain result from the suddenness of our sensations. Pleasure is a sudden return to the natural state, while pain is a sudden disruption of it (Phileb.). We become conscious of sensations when they are unusual. Sight causes neither pleasure nor pain. But hunger is painful and satisfying it is pleasant because both are unusual sensations.