Introduction

Section 2

17 min

Nature in the aspect which she presented to a Greek philosopher of the fourth century before Christ is not easily reproduced to modern eyes. The associations of mythology and poetry have to be added, and the unconscious influence of science has to be subtracted, before we can behold the heavens or the earth as they appeared to the Greek. The philosopher himself was a child and also a man—a child in the range of his attainments, but also a great intelligence having an insight into nature, and often anticipations of the truth. He was full of original thoughts, and yet liable to be imposed upon by the most obvious fallacies. He occasionally confused numbers with ideas, and atoms with numbers; his a priori notions were out of all proportion to his experience. He was ready to explain the phenomena of the heavens by the most trivial analogies of earth. The experiments which nature worked for him he sometimes accepted, but he never tried experiments for himself which would either prove or disprove his theories. His knowledge was unequal; while in some branches, such as medicine and astronomy, he had made considerable proficiency, there were others, such as chemistry, electricity, mechanics, of which the very names were unknown to him. He was the natural enemy of mythology, and yet mythological ideas still retained their hold over him. He was endeavouring to form a conception of principles, but these principles or ideas were regarded by him as real powers or entities, to which the world had been subjected. He was always tending to argue from what was near to what was remote, from what was known to what was unknown, from man to the universe, and back again from the universe to man. While he was arranging the world, he was arranging the forms of thought in his own mind; and the light from within and the light from without often crossed and helped to confuse one another. He might be compared to a builder engaged in some great design, who could only dig with his hands because he was unprovided with common tools; or to some poet or musician, like Tynnichus (Ion), obliged to accommodate his lyric raptures to the limits of the tetrachord or of the flute.

It is hard for modern readers to see nature as a Greek philosopher did in the fourth century BC. We must add the associations of mythology and poetry and subtract the unconscious influence of science. Only then can we see the heavens and the earth as they appeared to him. The philosopher himself was both a child and a man. His achievements were limited, like a child’s. Yet he also had a great intelligence, with insight into nature and frequent glimpses of the truth. He was full of original thoughts, yet easily taken in by the most obvious errors. He sometimes confused numbers with ideas, and atoms with numbers. His ideas formed before experience went far beyond what his experience could support. He was ready to explain events in the heavens through the most trivial comparisons with things on earth. He sometimes accepted the experiments nature performed for him. But he never conducted his own experiments to prove or disprove his theories. His knowledge was uneven. He had made considerable progress in some fields, such as medicine and astronomy. But he did not even know the names of others, such as chemistry, electricity, and mechanics. He was a natural enemy of mythology, yet mythological ideas still had a hold on him. He was trying to form an idea of basic principles. But he saw these principles or ideas as real powers or entities to which the world had been subjected. He was always inclined to reason from the near to the distant, and from the known to the unknown. He reasoned from man to the universe, and back again from the universe to man. As he put the world in order, he was also putting the forms of thought in his mind in order. The light from within and the light from outside often crossed, adding to each other’s confusion. He might be compared to a builder working on a great design. The builder could only dig with his hands because he lacked ordinary tools. Or he might be compared to a poet or musician such as Tynnichus (Ion). Tynnichus had to fit his lyrical raptures within the limits of the tetrachord or the flute.

The Hesiodic and Orphic cosmogonies were a phase of thought intermediate between mythology and philosophy and had a great influence on the beginnings of knowledge. There was nothing behind them; they were to physical science what the poems of Homer were to early Greek history. They made men think of the world as a whole; they carried the mind back into the infinity of past time; they suggested the first observation of the effects of fire and water on the earth’s surface. To the ancient physics they stood much in the same relation which geology does to modern science. But the Greek was not, like the enquirer of the last generation, confined to a period of six thousand years; he was able to speculate freely on the effects of infinite ages in the production of physical phenomena. He could imagine cities which had existed time out of mind (States.; Laws), laws or forms of art and music which had lasted, ‘not in word only, but in very truth, for ten thousand years’ (Laws); he was aware that natural phenomena like the Delta of the Nile might have slowly accumulated in long periods of time (Hdt.). But he seems to have supposed that the course of events was recurring rather than progressive. To this he was probably led by the fixedness of Egyptian customs and the general observation that there were other civilisations in the world more ancient than that of Hellas.

Hesiodic and Orphic accounts of the origin of the world represented a stage of thought between mythology and philosophy. They greatly influenced the beginnings of knowledge. Nothing came before them. They were to physical science what Homer’s poems were to early Greek history. They led people to think of the world as a whole and to look back into the infinite past. They prompted the first observations of how fire and water affect the earth’s surface. Their relation to ancient physics was much like that of geology to modern science. But the Greek was not limited to a period of six thousand years, as the researcher of the last generation was. He could freely speculate about how infinite ages produced physical phenomena. He could imagine cities that had existed since time immemorial (States.; Laws). He could also imagine laws or forms of art and music that had lasted ‘not just in name, but in truth, for ten thousand years’ (Laws). He knew that natural features like the Delta of the Nile might have accumulated slowly over long periods (Hdt.). But he seems to have thought that events repeated themselves rather than progressing. He was probably led to this view by the unchanging nature of Egyptian customs. He also observed that other civilizations were older than that of Hellas.

The ancient philosophers found in mythology many ideas which, if not originally derived from nature, were easily transferred to her—such, for example, as love or hate, corresponding to attraction or repulsion; or the conception of necessity allied both to the regularity and irregularity of nature; or of chance, the nameless or unknown cause; or of justice, symbolizing the law of compensation; are of the Fates and Furies, typifying the fixed order or the extraordinary convulsions of nature. Their own interpretations of Homer and the poets were supposed by them to be the original meaning. Musing in themselves on the phenomena of nature, they were relieved at being able to utter the thoughts of their hearts in figures of speech which to them were not figures, and were already consecrated by tradition. Hesiod and the Orphic poets moved in a region of half-personification in which the meaning or principle appeared through the person. In their vaster conceptions of Chaos, Erebus, Aether, Night, and the like, the first rude attempts at generalization are dimly seen. The Gods themselves, especially the greater Gods, such as Zeus, Poseidon, Apollo, Athene, are universals as well as individuals. They were gradually becoming lost in a common conception of mind or God. They continued to exist for the purposes of ritual or of art; but from the sixth century onwards or even earlier there arose and gained strength in the minds of men the notion of ‘one God, greatest among Gods and men, who was all sight, all hearing, all knowing’ (Xenophanes).

The ancient philosophers found many ideas in mythology that could easily be applied to nature, even if they did not originally come from it. Love and hate, for example, corresponded to attraction and repulsion. Necessity was linked to both the regularity and irregularity of nature. Chance was the nameless or unknown cause. Justice symbolized the law of compensation. The Fates and Furies represented the fixed order of nature or its extraordinary upheavals. The philosophers believed that their own interpretations of Homer and the poets were what those writers had originally meant. As they reflected on natural phenomena, they were relieved to express their deepest thoughts in language already honored by tradition. To them, this language was not figurative. Hesiod and the Orphic poets wrote in a realm of partial personification, where the meaning or principle showed through the person. Their grander conceptions of Chaos, Erebus, Aether, Night, and the like show faint traces of the first crude attempts at generalization. The Gods themselves, especially the greater Gods such as Zeus, Poseidon, Apollo, and Athene, are universal ideas as well as individuals. They were gradually merging into a common conception of mind or God. They continued to exist for ritual and art. But from the sixth century onward, or even earlier, an idea arose and grew stronger in people's minds: ‘one God, greatest among Gods and men, who was all sight, all hearing, all knowing’ (Xenophanes).

Under the influence of such ideas, perhaps also deriving from the traditions of their own or of other nations scraps of medicine and astronomy, men came to the observation of nature. The Greek philosopher looked at the blue circle of the heavens and it flashed upon him that all things were one; the tumult of sense abated, and the mind found repose in the thought which former generations had been striving to realize. The first expression of this was some element, rarefied by degrees into a pure abstraction, and purged from any tincture of sense. Soon an inner world of ideas began to be unfolded, more absorbing, more overpowering, more abiding than the brightest of visible objects, which to the eye of the philosopher looking inward, seemed to pale before them, retaining only a faint and precarious existence. At the same time, the minds of men parted into the two great divisions of those who saw only a principle of motion, and of those who saw only a principle of rest, in nature and in themselves; there were born Heracliteans or Eleatics, as there have been in later ages born Aristotelians or Platonists. Like some philosophers in modern times, who are accused of making a theory first and finding their facts afterwards, the advocates of either opinion never thought of applying either to themselves or to their adversaries the criterion of fact. They were mastered by their ideas and not masters of them. Like the Heraclitean fanatics whom Plato has ridiculed in the Theaetetus, they were incapable of giving a reason of the faith that was in them, and had all the animosities of a religious sect. Yet, doubtless, there was some first impression derived from external nature, which, as in mythology, so also in philosophy, worked upon the minds of the first thinkers. Though incapable of induction or generalization in the modern sense, they caught an inspiration from the external world. The most general facts or appearances of nature, the circle of the universe, the nutritive power of water, the air which is the breath of life, the destructive force of fire, the seeming regularity of the greater part of nature and the irregularity of a remnant, the recurrence of day and night and of the seasons, the solid earth and the impalpable aether, were always present to them.

Influenced by such ideas, people began to observe nature. Perhaps they also drew fragments of medicine and astronomy from their own traditions or those of other nations. The Greek philosopher looked at the blue circle of the heavens, and it suddenly occurred to him that all things were one. The noise of the senses died down, and his mind found rest in a thought that earlier generations had struggled to grasp. This thought first found expression in a single element. Step by step, it was refined into a pure abstraction, free of any trace of the senses. Soon, an inner world of ideas began to emerge. These ideas were more absorbing, more overwhelming, and more lasting than the brightest visible objects. To the philosopher looking inward, visible objects seemed to fade before the ideas, retaining only a faint and uncertain existence. At the same time, thinkers divided into two great groups. One saw only a principle of motion in nature and in themselves. The other saw only a principle of rest. Thus Heracliteans and Eleatics were born, just as Aristotelians and Platonists have been born in later ages. Some modern philosophers are accused of making a theory first and finding facts afterward. Similarly, supporters of either view never thought to test their own ideas or their opponents' against the facts. Their ideas controlled them, rather than the other way around. Like the Heraclitean fanatics Plato mocked in the Theaetetus, they could not give reasons for their beliefs. They also had all the hostility of a religious sect. Yet the first thinkers surely drew some initial impression from the natural world. In philosophy, as in mythology, this impression influenced their minds. Though they were incapable of induction or generalization in the modern sense, they drew inspiration from the world around them. The most general facts or appearances of nature were always present to them: the circle of the universe, the power of water to nourish, the air that is the breath of life, and the destructive force of fire. They also saw the apparent regularity of most of nature and the irregularity of the rest. They saw the return of day and night and the seasons, the solid earth, and the intangible aether.

The great source of error and also the beginning of truth to them was reasoning from analogy; they could see resemblances, but not differences; and they were incapable of distinguishing illustration from argument. Analogy in modern times only points the way, and is immediately verified by experiment. The dreams and visions, which pass through the philosopher’s mind, of resemblances between different classes of substances, or between the animal and vegetable world, are put into the refiner’s fire, and the dross and other elements which adhere to them are purged away. But the contemporary of Plato and Socrates was incapable of resisting the power of any analogy which occurred to him, and was drawn into any consequences which seemed to follow. He had no methods of difference or of concomitant variations, by the use of which he could distinguish the accidental from the essential. He could not isolate phenomena, and he was helpless against the influence of any word which had an equivocal or double sense.

Reasoning by analogy was both their greatest source of error and their starting point for truth. They could see similarities, but not differences. They could not distinguish an illustration from an argument. In modern times, analogy only points the way. It is immediately tested by experiment. A philosopher may dream or imagine similarities between different classes of substances, or between the animal and plant worlds. These ideas are put through a refiner’s fire. The impurities and other elements clinging to them are purged away. But a contemporary of Plato and Socrates could not resist the power of any analogy that came to mind. He was drawn into accepting any conclusions that seemed to follow. He had no methods of difference or of concomitant variation to distinguish what was accidental from what was essential. He could not isolate phenomena. He was helpless against the influence of any word with an ambiguous or double meaning.

Yet without this crude use of analogy the ancient physical philosopher would have stood still; he could not have made even ‘one guess among many’ without comparison. The course of natural phenomena would have passed unheeded before his eyes, like fair sights or musical sounds before the eyes and ears of an animal. Even the fetichism of the savage is the beginning of reasoning; the assumption of the most fanciful of causes indicates a higher mental state than the absence of all enquiry about them. The tendency to argue from the higher to the lower, from man to the world, has led to many errors, but has also had an elevating influence on philosophy. The conception of the world as a whole, a person, an animal, has been the source of hasty generalizations; yet this general grasp of nature led also to a spirit of comprehensiveness in early philosophy, which has not increased, but rather diminished, as the fields of knowledge have become more divided. The modern physicist confines himself to one or perhaps two branches of science. But he comparatively seldom rises above his own department, and often falls under the narrowing influence which any single branch, when pursued to the exclusion of every other, has over the mind. Language, two, exercised a spell over the beginnings of physical philosophy, leading to error and sometimes to truth; for many thoughts were suggested by the double meanings of words (Greek), and the accidental distinctions of words sometimes led the ancient philosopher to make corresponding differences in things (Greek). ‘If they are the same, why have they different names; or if they are different, why have they the same name?’—is an argument not easily answered in the infancy of knowledge. The modern philosopher has always been taught the lesson which he still imperfectly learns, that he must disengage himself from the influence of words. Nor are there wanting in Plato, who was himself too often the victim of them, impressive admonitions that we should regard not words but things (States.). But upon the whole, the ancients, though not entirely dominated by them, were much more subject to the influence of words than the moderns. They had no clear divisions of colours or substances; even the four elements were undefined; the fields of knowledge were not parted off. They were bringing order out of disorder, having a small grain of experience mingled in a confused heap of a priori notions. And yet, probably, their first impressions, the illusions and mirages of their fancy, created a greater intellectual activity and made a nearer approach to the truth than any patient investigation of isolated facts, for which the time had not yet come, could have accomplished.

Yet without this crude use of analogy, the ancient philosopher of nature could not have made progress. Without comparison, he could not have made even ‘one guess among many’. Natural events would have passed before his eyes unnoticed, like beautiful sights and musical sounds before an animal’s eyes and ears. Even the fetishism of the savage is a beginning of reasoning. Assuming even the most fanciful causes shows a higher mental state than asking no questions about causes at all. The tendency to reason from the higher to the lower, from humanity to the world, has led to many errors. But it has also had an elevating influence on philosophy. The idea of the world as a whole, a person, or an animal has led to hasty generalizations. Yet this broad view of nature also gave early philosophy a comprehensive spirit. That spirit has not grown as fields of knowledge have become more divided. Rather, it has diminished. The modern physicist confines himself to one or perhaps two branches of science. He relatively seldom looks beyond his own field. He often falls under the narrowing influence that any single branch has on the mind when pursued to the exclusion of all others. Language, too, cast a spell over the beginnings of natural philosophy, sometimes leading to error and sometimes to truth. Words with double meanings (Greek) suggested many thoughts. Accidental differences between words sometimes led the ancient philosopher to imagine corresponding differences between things (Greek). ‘If they are the same, why do they have different names? Or if they are different, why do they have the same name?’ This argument is not easily answered when knowledge is in its infancy. The modern philosopher has always been taught to free himself from the influence of words. Yet he still learns this lesson imperfectly. Plato, who himself too often fell victim to words, gives us impressive warnings to look at things, not words (States.). But on the whole, the ancients were much more influenced by words than modern thinkers are, though they were not entirely ruled by them. The ancients had no clear divisions between colors or substances. Even the four elements were undefined, and the fields of knowledge had not been separated. They were bringing order out of disorder, with a small grain of experience mixed into a confused heap of ideas formed before experience. Yet their first impressions, the illusions and mirages of their imagination, probably created greater intellectual activity. They probably also brought them closer to the truth than any patient study of isolated facts could have done. The time for such study had not yet come.

There was one more illusion to which the ancient philosophers were subject, and against which Plato in his later dialogues seems to be struggling—the tendency to mere abstractions; not perceiving that pure abstraction is only negation, they thought that the greater the abstraction the greater the truth. Behind any pair of ideas a new idea which comprehended them—the (Greek), as it was technically termed—began at once to appear. Two are truer than three, one than two. The words ‘being,’ or ‘unity,’ or essence,’ or ‘good,’ became sacred to them. They did not see that they had a word only, and in one sense the most unmeaning of words. They did not understand that the content of notions is in inverse proportion to their universality—the element which is the most widely diffused is also the thinnest; or, in the language of the common logic, the greater the extension the less the comprehension. But this vacant idea of a whole without parts, of a subject without predicates, a rest without motion, has been also the most fruitful of all ideas. It is the beginning of a priori thought, and indeed of thinking at all. Men were led to conceive it, not by a love of hasty generalization, but by a divine instinct, a dialectical enthusiasm, in which the human faculties seemed to yearn for enlargement. We know that ‘being’ is only the verb of existence, the copula, the most general symbol of relation, the first and most meagre of abstractions; but to some of the ancient philosophers this little word appeared to attain divine proportions, and to comprehend all truth. Being or essence, and similar words, represented to them a supreme or divine being, in which they thought that they found the containing and continuing principle of the universe. In a few years the human mind was peopled with abstractions; a new world was called into existence to give law and order to the old. But between them there was still a gulf, and no one could pass from the one to the other.

Ancient philosophers were subject to another illusion, which Plato seems to struggle against in his later dialogues. This was the tendency toward mere abstractions. They did not see that pure abstraction is only negation. Instead, they thought that the greater the abstraction, the greater the truth. Behind any pair of ideas, they immediately saw a new idea that included both. This was technically called the (Greek). Two are truer than three, and one is truer than two. The words ‘being,’ ‘unity,’ ‘essence,’ and ‘good’ became sacred to them. They did not see that they had only a word, and in one sense the most meaningless kind of word. They did not understand that the more widely an idea applies, the less content it has. The element spread most widely is also the thinnest. Or, in the language of ordinary logic, the greater the extension, the less the comprehension. Yet this empty idea has also been the most fruitful of all ideas. It is the idea of a whole without parts, a subject without predicates, and rest without motion. It is the beginning of a priori thought, and indeed of all thinking. People were led to conceive it not by a love of hasty generalization, but by a divine instinct. They were moved by a dialectical enthusiasm in which human faculties seemed to yearn for expansion. We know that ‘being’ is only the verb of existence, the copula. It is the most general symbol of relation, the first and most meagre of abstractions. But to some ancient philosophers, this little word seemed to take on divine proportions and contain all truth. To them, ‘being,’ ‘essence,’ and similar words represented a supreme or divine being. In this being they thought they had found the principle that contains and sustains the universe. Within a few years, the human mind was filled with abstractions. A new world was brought into existence to give law and order to the old one. But a gulf still lay between the two worlds, and no one could cross it.

Number and figure were the greatest instruments of thought which were possessed by the Greek philosopher; having the same power over the mind which was exerted by abstract ideas, they were also capable of practical application. Many curious and, to the early thinker, mysterious properties of them came to light when they were compared with one another. They admitted of infinite multiplication and construction; in Pythagorean triangles or in proportions of 1:2:4:8 and 1:3:9:27, or compounds of them, the laws of the world seemed to be more than half revealed. They were also capable of infinite subdivision—a wonder and also a puzzle to the ancient thinker (Rep.). They were not, like being or essence, mere vacant abstractions, but admitted of progress and growth, while at the same time they confirmed a higher sentiment of the mind, that there was order in the universe. And so there began to be a real sympathy between the world within and the world without. The numbers and figures which were present to the mind’s eye became visible to the eye of sense; the truth of nature was mathematics; the other properties of objects seemed to reappear only in the light of number. Law and morality also found a natural expression in number and figure. Instruments of such power and elasticity could not fail to be ‘a most gracious assistance’ to the first efforts of human intelligence.

Number and shape were the greatest tools of thought available to the Greek philosopher. Like abstract ideas, they had power over the mind, but they also had practical uses. When numbers and shapes were compared, they revealed many curious properties that seemed mysterious to early thinkers. They could be multiplied and combined without end. In Pythagorean triangles, in the proportions 1:2:4:8 and 1:3:9:27, or in combinations of these, the laws of the world seemed to be more than half revealed. Numbers and shapes could also be divided endlessly. This was a wonder and a puzzle to the ancient thinker (Rep.). Unlike being or essence, they were not empty abstractions. They allowed for progress and growth, while confirming a deeper conviction that the universe was ordered. And so a real connection began to emerge between the inner world and the outer world. The numbers and shapes seen in the mind became visible to the senses. The truth of nature was mathematics. The other properties of objects seemed to appear only in the light of number. Law and morality also found natural expression in number and shape. Tools so powerful and flexible were bound to be ‘a most gracious assistance’ to the first efforts of human intelligence.

There was another reason why numbers had so great an influence over the minds of early thinkers—they were verified by experience. Every use of them, even the most trivial, assured men of their truth; they were everywhere to be found, in the least things and the greatest alike. One, two, three, counted on the fingers was a ‘trivial matter (Rep.), a little instrument out of which to create a world; but from these and by the help of these all our knowledge of nature has been developed. They were the measure of all things, and seemed to give law to all things; nature was rescued from chaos and confusion by their power; the notes of music, the motions of the stars, the forms of atoms, the evolution and recurrence of days, months, years, the military divisions of an army, the civil divisions of a state, seemed to afford a ‘present witness’ of them—what would have become of man or of the world if deprived of number (Rep.)? The mystery of number and the mystery of music were akin. There was a music of rhythm and of harmonious motion everywhere; and to the real connexion which existed between music and number, a fanciful or imaginary relation was superadded. There was a music of the spheres as well as of the notes of the lyre. If in all things seen there was number and figure, why should they not also pervade the unseen world, with which by their wonderful and unchangeable nature they seemed to hold communion?

There was another reason numbers had such a strong influence on early thinkers: experience confirmed them. Every use of numbers, even the most trivial, assured people that they were true. Numbers were found everywhere, in the smallest things and the greatest alike. Counting one, two, three on the fingers was a ‘trivial matter (Rep.), a little tool for creating a world. Yet all our knowledge of nature has been developed from and with the help of these numbers. Numbers were the measure of all things, and seemed to give laws to all things. Their power rescued nature from chaos and confusion. Many things seemed to offer ‘present witness’ to their power: musical notes, the movements of the stars, and the shapes of atoms. So did the unfolding and recurrence of days, months, and years, the divisions of an army, and the civil divisions of a state. What would have become of humanity or the world without number (Rep.)? The mystery of number and the mystery of music were related. There was music in rhythm and harmonious movement everywhere. And people added an imagined connection to the real connection between music and number. There was music of the spheres as well as music from the notes of the lyre. Number and shape were present in everything visible. So why should they not also fill the unseen world? Their wonderful and unchanging nature seemed to put them in communion with it.

Two other points strike us in the use which the ancient philosophers made of numbers. First, they applied to external nature the relations of them which they found in their own minds; and where nature seemed to be at variance with number, as for example in the case of fractions, they protested against her (Rep.; Arist. Metaph.). Having long meditated on the properties of 1:2:4:8, or 1:3:9:27, or of 3, 4, 5, they discovered in them many curious correspondences and were disposed to find in them the secret of the universe. Secondly, they applied number and figure equally to those parts of physics, such as astronomy or mechanics, in which the modern philosopher expects to find them, and to those in which he would never think of looking for them, such as physiology and psychology. For the sciences were not yet divided, and there was nothing really irrational in arguing that the same laws which regulated the heavenly bodies were partially applied to the erring limbs or brain of man. Astrology was the form which the lively fancy of ancient thinkers almost necessarily gave to astronomy. The observation that the lower principle, e.g. mechanics, is always seen in the higher, e.g. in the phenomena of life, further tended to perplex them. Plato’s doctrine of the same and the other ruling the courses of the heavens and of the human body is not a mere vagary, but is a natural result of the state of knowledge and thought at which he had arrived.

Two other points stand out in how ancient philosophers used numbers. First, they applied numerical relationships they found in their own minds to the natural world. When nature seemed to conflict with number, as in the case of fractions, they protested against nature (Rep.; Arist. Metaph.). They spent a long time thinking about the properties of 1:2:4:8, 1:3:9:27, and 3, 4, 5. They found many curious correspondences in these numbers and were inclined to see them as the secret of the universe. Second, they applied numbers and figures to fields such as astronomy and mechanics, where a modern philosopher expects to find them. But they also applied them to fields where a modern philosopher would never think to look, such as physiology and psychology. The sciences were not yet separate. So it was not really irrational to argue that the laws governing heavenly bodies also partly governed people’s wandering limbs or brains. Ancient thinkers had lively imaginations, and they almost necessarily gave astronomy the form of astrology. They also observed that a lower principle, such as mechanics, always appears in a higher one, such as the phenomena of life. This observation tended to confuse them further. Plato taught that the same and the other governed the courses of the heavens and of the human body. His doctrine is not merely a whim. It follows naturally from the state of knowledge and thought he had reached.

When in modern times we contemplate the heavens, a certain amount of scientific truth imperceptibly blends, even with the cursory glance of an unscientific person. He knows that the earth is revolving round the sun, and not the sun around the earth. He does not imagine the earth to be the centre of the universe, and he has some conception of chemistry and the cognate sciences. A very different aspect of nature would have been present to the mind of the early Greek philosopher. He would have beheld the earth a surface only, not mirrored, however faintly, in the glass of science, but indissolubly connected with some theory of one, two, or more elements. He would have seen the world pervaded by number and figure, animated by a principle of motion, immanent in a principle of rest. He would have tried to construct the universe on a quantitative principle, seeming to find in endless combinations of geometrical figures or in the infinite variety of their sizes a sufficient account of the multiplicity of phenomena. To these a priori speculations he would add a rude conception of matter and his own immediate experience of health and disease. His cosmos would necessarily be imperfect and unequal, being the first attempt to impress form and order on the primaeval chaos of human knowledge. He would see all things as in a dream.

Today, when we look at the heavens, even an unscientific person's casual glance is quietly informed by some scientific knowledge. That person knows that the earth revolves around the sun, not the sun around the earth. They do not imagine that the earth is the center of the universe. They also have some understanding of chemistry and related sciences. An early Greek philosopher would have seen nature very differently. He would have seen the earth as a surface, not reflected, however faintly, through the lens of science. Instead, it would have been inseparably linked to some theory of one, two, or more elements. He would have seen the world as pervaded by number and shape, animated by a principle of motion, and existing within a principle of rest. He would have tried to construct the universe according to a principle of quantity. He would have seemed to find a sufficient explanation for the variety of phenomena in endless combinations of geometric shapes or in the infinite variety of their sizes. To these speculations based on reasoning alone, he would have added a crude idea of matter and his own direct experience of health and disease. His picture of the universe would necessarily have been imperfect and uneven. It was the first attempt to give form and order to the original chaos of human knowledge. He would have seen all things as if in a dream.

The ancient physical philosophers have been charged by Dr. Whewell and others with wasting their fine intelligences in wrong methods of enquiry; and their progress in moral and political philosophy has been sometimes contrasted with their supposed failure in physical investigations. ‘They had plenty of ideas,’ says Dr. Whewell, ‘and plenty of facts; but their ideas did not accurately represent the facts with which they were acquainted.’ This is a very crude and misleading way of describing ancient science. It is the mistake of an uneducated person—uneducated, that is, in the higher sense of the word—who imagines every one else to be like himself and explains every other age by his own. No doubt the ancients often fell into strange and fanciful errors: the time had not yet arrived for the slower and surer path of the modern inductive philosophy. But it remains to be shown that they could have done more in their age and country; or that the contributions which they made to the sciences with which they were acquainted are not as great upon the whole as those made by their successors. There is no single step in astronomy as great as that of the nameless Pythagorean who first conceived the world to be a body moving round the sun in space: there is no truer or more comprehensive principle than the application of mathematics alike to the heavenly bodies, and to the particles of matter. The ancients had not the instruments which would have enabled them to correct or verify their anticipations, and their opportunities of observation were limited. Plato probably did more for physical science by asserting the supremacy of mathematics than Aristotle or his disciples by their collections of facts. When the thinkers of modern times, following Bacon, undervalue or disparage the speculations of ancient philosophers, they seem wholly to forget the conditions of the world and of the human mind, under which they carried on their investigations. When we accuse them of being under the influence of words, do we suppose that we are altogether free from this illusion? When we remark that Greek physics soon became stationary or extinct, may we not observe also that there have been and may be again periods in the history of modern philosophy which have been barren and unproductive? We might as well maintain that Greek art was not real or great, because it had nihil simile aut secundum, as say that Greek physics were a failure because they admire no subsequent progress.

Dr. Whewell and others have accused ancient philosophers of nature of wasting their brilliant minds on misguided methods of inquiry. People have sometimes contrasted their progress in moral and political philosophy with their supposed failure in physical science. ‘They had plenty of ideas,’ says Dr. Whewell, ‘and plenty of facts. But their ideas did not accurately represent the facts they knew.’ This is a very crude and misleading description of ancient science. It is the mistake of an uneducated person, uneducated in the higher sense of the word. Such a person imagines that everyone else is like himself and explains every other age in terms of his own. The ancients certainly often made strange and fanciful mistakes. The time had not yet come for the slower, more reliable path of modern inductive philosophy. But it remains to be shown that they could have done more in their own age and country. It also remains to be shown that their overall contributions to the sciences they knew were less than those of their successors. No single advance in astronomy is as great as that of the unnamed Pythagorean who first conceived of the world as a body moving through space around the sun. And no principle is more sound or comprehensive than applying mathematics to both the heavenly bodies and the particles of matter. The ancients lacked instruments that would have allowed them to correct or verify their predictions. Their opportunities for observation were also limited. Plato probably did more for physical science by asserting the supremacy of mathematics than Aristotle or his followers did by collecting facts. When modern thinkers, following Bacon, dismiss or belittle the speculations of ancient philosophers, they seem to forget the conditions under which those philosophers investigated the world. They forget both the state of the world and the state of the human mind. When we accuse the ancients of being misled by words, do we suppose we are entirely free from this illusion? And when we note that Greek physics soon stopped advancing or died out, might we not also note something else? Modern philosophy has had barren and unproductive periods, and may have them again. We might as well argue that Greek art was neither genuine nor great because it had nihil simile aut secundum. That would be no less reasonable than calling Greek physics a failure because it allowed no later progress.

The charge of premature generalization which is often urged against ancient philosophers is really an anachronism. For they can hardly be said to have generalized at all. They may be said more truly to have cleared up and defined by the help of experience ideas which they already possessed. The beginnings of thought about nature must always have this character. A true method is the result of many ages of experiment and observation, and is ever going on and enlarging with the progress of science and knowledge. At first men personify nature, then they form impressions of nature, at last they conceive ‘measure’ or laws of nature. They pass out of mythology into philosophy. Early science is not a process of discovery in the modern sense; but rather a process of correcting by observation, and to a certain extent only, the first impressions of nature, which mankind, when they began to think, had received from poetry or language or unintelligent sense. Of all scientific truths the greatest and simplest is the uniformity of nature; this was expressed by the ancients in many ways, as fate, or necessity, or measure, or limit. Unexpected events, of which the cause was unknown to them, they attributed to chance (Thucyd.). But their conception of nature was never that of law interrupted by exceptions,—a somewhat unfortunate metaphysical invention of modern times, which is at variance with facts and has failed to satisfy the requirements of thought.

The frequent charge that ancient philosophers generalized too quickly is really an anachronism. They can hardly be said to have generalized at all. Rather, they used experience to clarify and define ideas they already had. Thinking about nature must always begin this way. A sound method results from many ages of experiment and observation. It continues to develop and expand as science and knowledge advance. At first, people personify nature. Then they form impressions of it. Finally, they conceive of ‘measure’ or laws of nature. They move from mythology to philosophy. Early science was not a process of discovery in the modern sense. Rather, it was a process of using observation to correct first impressions of nature, and only to a limited extent. When people began to think, they had received those impressions from poetry, language, or unreflective sense experience. The greatest and simplest scientific truth is that nature is uniform. The ancients expressed this truth in many ways, as fate, necessity, measure, or limit. They attributed unexpected events whose causes they did not know to chance (Thucyd.). But they never thought of nature as a system of laws interrupted by exceptions. That somewhat unfortunate metaphysical invention of modern times conflicts with the facts and has failed to meet the needs of thought.