Preface

Men would never be superstitious, if they could govern all their circumstances by set rules, or if they were always favoured by fortune: but being frequently driven into straits where rules are useless, and being often kept fluctuating pitiably between hope and fear by the uncertainty of fortune's greedily coveted favours, they are consequently, for the most part, very prone to credulity. The human mind is readily swayed this way or that in times of doubt, especially when hope and fear are struggling for the mastery, though usually it is boastful, over - confident, and vain.

People would never be superstitious if they could manage all their circumstances by fixed rules, or always had good fortune. But they are often driven into difficulties where rules are useless. They eagerly crave fortune’s favors, but uncertainty often leaves them wavering pitifully between hope and fear. As a result, they are generally very ready to believe things without question. The human mind is easily swayed one way or another in times of doubt, especially when hope and fear compete for control. Yet the mind is usually boastful, overconfident, and vain.

This as a general fact I suppose everyone knows, though few, I believe, know their own nature; no one can have lived in the world without observing that most people, when in prosperity, are so over-brimming with wisdom (however inexperienced they may be), that they take every offer of advice as a personal insult, whereas in adversity they know not where to turn, but beg and pray for counsel from every passer-by. No plan is then too futile, too absurd, or too fatuous for their adoption; the most frivolous causes will raise them to hope, or plunge them into despair - if anything happens during their fright which reminds them of some past good or ill, they think it portends a happy or unhappy issue, and therefore (though it may have proved abortive a hundred times before) style it a lucky or unlucky omen. Anything which excites their astonishment they believe to be a portent signifying the anger of the gods or of the Supreme Being, and, mistaking superstition for religion, account it impious not to avert the evil with prayer and sacrifice. Signs and wonders of this sort they conjure up perpetually, till one might think Nature as mad as themselves, they interpret her so fantastically.

I suppose everyone knows this general fact, though I believe few know their own nature. No one can have lived in the world without noticing how most people behave when things go well. They overflow with wisdom, however inexperienced they may be, and take every offer of advice as a personal insult. But when things go badly, they do not know where to turn. They beg and plead for advice from every passer-by. No plan is then too useless, too absurd, or too foolish for them to adopt. The most trivial causes raise their hopes or plunge them into despair. If something happens during their fear that recalls some past good or evil, they think it predicts the outcome. They therefore call it a lucky or unlucky omen, though it may have failed a hundred times before. Anything that astonishes them seems to them a sign of anger from the gods or the Supreme Being. Mistaking superstition for religion, they consider it impious not to ward off the evil through prayer and sacrifice. They constantly conjure up signs and wonders of this kind. They interpret Nature so wildly that one might think Nature as mad as they are.

Thus it is brought prominently before us, that superstition's chief victims are those persons who greedily covet temporal advantages; they it is, who (especially when they are in danger, and cannot help themselves) are wont with Prayers and womanish tears to implore help from God: upbraiding Reason as blind, because she cannot show a sure path to the shadows they pursue, and rejecting human wisdom as vain; but believing the phantoms of imagination, dreams, and other childish absurdities, to be the very oracles of Heaven. As though God had turned away from the wise, and written His decrees, not in the mind of man but in the entrails of beasts, or left them to be proclaimed by the inspiration and instinct of fools, madmen, and birds. Such is the unreason to which terror can drive mankind!

So we see clearly that superstition’s chief victims are those who greedily crave worldly advantages. Such people often beg God for help with prayers and womanish tears, especially when danger leaves them helpless. They accuse Reason of blindness because she cannot show a sure path to the shadows they pursue. They reject human wisdom as worthless. Yet they believe imaginary visions, dreams, and other childish absurdities are the very words of Heaven. As if God had turned away from the wise! As if he had written his decrees in the entrails of beasts rather than in the human mind! Or as if he had left fools, madmen, and birds to proclaim his decrees through inspiration and instinct! Such is the irrationality to which terror can drive humanity!

Superstition, then, is engendered, preserved, and fostered by fear. If anyone desire an example, let him take Alexander, who only began superstitiously to seek guidance from seers, when he first learnt to fear fortune in the passes of Sysis (Curtius, v. 4); whereas after he had conquered Darius he consulted prophets no more, till a second time frightened by reverses. When the Scythians were provoking a battle, the Bactrians had deserted, and he himself was lying sick of his wounds, "he once more turned to superstition, the mockery of human wisdom, and bade Aristander, to whom he confided his credulity, inquire the issue of affairs with sacrificed victims." Very numerous examples of a like nature might be cited, clearly showing the fact, that only while under the dominion of fear do men fall a prey to superstition; that all the portents ever invested with the reverence of misguided religion are mere phantoms of dejected and fearful minds; and lastly, that prophets have most power among the people, and are most formidable to rulers, precisely at those times when the state is in most peril. I think this is sufficiently plain to all, and will therefore say no more on the subject.

Fear, then, creates, preserves, and feeds superstition. If anyone wants an example, consider Alexander. He began seeking guidance from seers out of superstition only when he first feared fortune in the passes of Sysis (Curtius, v. 4). But after conquering Darius, he no longer consulted prophets until setbacks frightened him again. The Scythians were challenging him to battle, the Bactrians had deserted, and he lay sick from his wounds. Then "he turned once more to superstition, the mockery of human wisdom. He ordered Aristander, whom he trusted with his gullible beliefs, to learn the outcome of events by sacrificing animals." Many similar examples could be given. They clearly show that people fall prey to superstition only when fear rules them. They also show that all omens ever revered by misguided religion are mere phantoms of discouraged and fearful minds. Finally, prophets have the greatest power over the people, and pose the greatest threat to rulers, precisely when the state faces the greatest danger. I think these points are clear enough to everyone, so I will say no more on the subject.

The origin of superstition above given affords us a clear reason for the fact, that it comes to all men naturally, though some refer its rise to a dim notion of God, universal to mankind, and also tends to show, that it is no less inconsistent and variable than other mental hallucinations and emotional impulses, and further that it can only be maintained by hope, hatred, anger, and deceit; since it springs, not from reason, but solely from the more powerful phases of emotion. Furthermore, we may readily understand how difficult it is, to maintain in the same course men prone to every form of credulity. For, as the mass of mankind remains always at about the same pitch of misery, it never assents long to any one remedy, but is always best pleased by a novelty which has not yet proved illusive.

The account of superstition’s origin given above clearly explains why superstition comes naturally to all people. Some, though, trace its origin to a vague idea of God shared by all humanity. This account also suggests that superstition is as inconsistent and changeable as other mental delusions and emotional impulses. It further suggests that superstition can be sustained only by hope, hatred, anger, and deceit. For superstition arises not from reason, but solely from the more powerful emotions. We can also readily understand how difficult it is to keep people prone to every kind of gullibility on the same course. For most people remain at roughly the same level of misery, so they never trust any one remedy for long. Instead, they are always most pleased by something new that has not yet proved deceptive.

This element of inconsistency has been the cause of many terrible wars and revolutions; for, as Curtius well says (lib. iv. chap. 10): "The mob has no ruler more potent than superstition," and is easily led, on the plea of religion, at one moment to adore its kings as gods, and anon to execrate and abjure them as humanity's common bane. Immense pains have therefore been taken to counteract this evil by investing religion, whether true or false, with such pomp and ceremony, that it may rise superior to every shock, and be always observed with studious reverence by the whole people—a system which has been brought to great perfection by the Turks, for they consider even controversy impious, and so clog men's minds with dogmatic formulas, that they leave no room for sound reason, not even enough to doubt with.

This inconsistency has caused many terrible wars and revolutions. For, as Curtius rightly says (book iv, chapter 10): "The mob has no ruler more powerful than superstition." Under the pretext of religion, the mob is easily led to worship its kings as gods one moment. The next, it is led to curse and reject those kings as a threat to all humanity. So immense efforts have been made to counter this evil by surrounding religion, true or false, with pomp and ceremony. The aim is to make religion withstand every shock and ensure that all the people always observe it with careful reverence. The Turks have brought this system to a high degree of perfection, for they consider even religious debate impious. They so fill people's minds with rigid statements of belief that no room remains for sound reason, not even doubt.

But if, in despotic statecraft, the supreme and essential mystery be to hoodwink the subjects, and to mask the fear, which keeps them clown, with the specious garb of religion, so that men may fight as bravely for slavery as for safety, and count it not shame but highest honour to risk their blood and their lives for the vainglory of a tyrant; yet in a free state no more mischievous expedient could be planned or attempted. Wholly repugnant to the general freedom are such devices as enthralling men's minds with prejudices, forcing their judgment, or employing any of the weapons of quasi-religious sedition; indeed, such seditions only spring up, when law enters the domain of speculative thought, and opinions are put on trial and condemned on the same footing as crimes, while those who defend and follow them are sacrificed, not to public safety, but to their opponents' hatred and cruelty. If deeds only could be made the grounds of criminal charges, and words were always allowed to pass free, such seditions would be divested of every semblance of justification, and would be separated from mere controversies by a hard and fast line.

But if the supreme and essential secret of despotic rule is to deceive subjects and disguise their controlling fear as religion, so that people may fight as bravely for slavery as for safety, and consider it the highest honor rather than a disgrace to risk their blood and lives for a tyrant’s empty glory, yet in a free state nothing more harmful could be devised or attempted. Trapping people’s minds in prejudice, forcing their judgment, or using any weapon of supposedly religious rebellion utterly contradicts public freedom. Indeed, such rebellions arise only when the law intrudes into matters of abstract thought. Opinions are then tried and condemned as though they were crimes. Those who defend and follow these opinions are sacrificed, not for public safety, but to their opponents’ hatred and cruelty. If only actions could serve as grounds for criminal charges, and words were always left free, such rebellions would lose every appearance of justification. A firm and clear line would then separate such rebellions from mere disputes.

Now, seeing that we have the rare happiness of living in a republic, where everyone's judgment is free and unshackled, where each may worship God as his conscience dictates, and where freedom is esteemed before all things dear and precious, I have believed that I should be undertaking no ungrateful or unprofitable task, in demonstrating that not only can such freedom be granted without prejudice to the public peace, but also, that without such freedom, piety cannot flourish nor the public peace be secure.

We have the rare good fortune to live in a republic where everyone is free to think for themselves. Here, each person may worship God as their conscience directs, and freedom is valued above everything else. Given these conditions, I believed that showing the following would be a welcome and useful task. Such freedom can be granted without harming public peace. Moreover, without such freedom, devotion to God cannot flourish, nor can public peace be secure.

Such is the chief conclusion I seek to establish in this treatise; but, in order to reach it, I must first point out the misconceptions which, like scars of our former bondage, still disfigure our notion of religion, and must expose the false views about the civil authority which many have most impudently advocated, endeavouring to turn the mind of the people, still prone to heathen superstition, away from its legitimate rulers, and so bring us again into slavery. As to the order of my treatise I will speak presently, but first I will recount the causes which led me to write.

That is the main conclusion I seek to establish in this treatise. But to reach that conclusion, I must first point out the misconceptions that still distort our understanding of religion. These misconceptions are like scars left by our former bondage. I must also expose the false views about civil authority that many have promoted with shameless boldness. Their aim is to turn the people, still drawn to pagan superstition, against their rightful rulers. In doing so, they seek to bring us back into slavery. I will explain the structure of this treatise shortly, but first I will describe what led me to write.

I have often wondered, that persons who make a boast of professing the Christian religion, namely, love, joy, peace, temperance, and charity to all men, should quarrel with such rancorous animosity, and display daily towards one another such bitter hatred, that this, rather than the virtues they claim, is the readiest criterion of their faith. Matters have long since come to such a pass, that one can only pronounce a man Christian, Turk, Jew, or Heathen, by his general appearance and attire, by his frequenting this or that place of worship, or employing the phraseology of a particular sect - as for manner of life, it is in all cases the same. Inquiry into the cause of this anomaly leads me unhesitatingly to ascribe it to the fact, that the ministries of the Church are regarded by the masses merely as dignities, her offices as posts of emolument - in short, popular religion may be summed up as respect for ecclesiastics. The spread of this misconception inflamed every worthless fellow with an intense desire to enter holy orders, and thus the love of diffusing God's religion degenerated into sordid avarice and ambition. Every church became a theatre, where orators, instead of church teachers, harangued, caring not to instruct the people, but striving to attract admiration, to bring opponents to public scorn, and to preach only novelties and paradoxes, such as would tickle the ears of their congregation. This state of things necessarily stirred up an amount of controversy, envy, and hatred, which no lapse of time could appease; so that we can scarcely wonder that of the old religion nothing survives but its outward forms (even these, in the mouth of the multitude, seem rather adulation than adoration of the Deity), and that faith has become a mere compound of credulity and prejudices - aye, prejudices too, which degrade man from rational being to beast, which completely stifle the power of judgment between true and false, which seem, in fact, carefully fostered for the purpose of extinguishing the last spark of reason! Piety, great God! and religion are become a tissue of ridiculous mysteries; men, who flatly despise reason, who reject and turn away from understanding as naturally corrupt, these, I say, these of all men, are thought, O lie most horrible! to possess light from on High. Verily, if they had but one spark of light from on High, they would not insolently rave, but would learn to worship God more wisely, and would be as marked among their fellows for mercy as they now are for malice; if they were concerned for their opponents' souls, instead of for their own reputations, they would no longer fiercely persecute, but rather be filled with pity and compassion.

I have often wondered at people who boast of practicing the Christian religion. They profess love, joy, peace, self-control, and charity toward everyone. Yet they quarrel with such vicious hostility and show one another such bitter hatred every day. Their hatred, rather than their claimed virtues, is the clearest sign of their faith. Things have long since reached a point where only outward signs identify a person as Christian, Turk, Jew, or Heathen. We judge by appearance and clothing, attendance at a particular place of worship, or the language of a particular sect. As for how people live, their lives are all the same. When I investigate the cause of this contradiction, I have no hesitation in identifying it. Ordinary people regard Church ministries merely as positions of honor, and Church offices as sources of income. In short, popular religion amounts to respect for the clergy. As this misconception spread, every worthless fellow became intensely eager to enter holy orders. So the love of spreading God's religion sank into greedy ambition and the pursuit of money. Every church became a theater, where speakers delivered rousing speeches instead of teaching religion. They cared nothing for instructing the people. Instead, they sought admiration, exposed opponents to public ridicule, and preached only novel ideas and paradoxes to please their congregations. These conditions inevitably stirred up so much controversy, envy, and hatred that no amount of time could calm them. So we can hardly wonder that nothing remains of the old religion but its outward forms. Even these forms, on the lips of ordinary people, seem more like flattery than worship of God. Nor can we wonder that faith has become nothing but a mixture of gullibility and prejudice. Yes, prejudices that reduce human beings from rational creatures to beasts! These prejudices completely suppress the ability to judge between truth and falsehood. Indeed, they seem deliberately encouraged to extinguish the last spark of reason! Piety, great God, and religion have become a web of ridiculous mysteries. People openly despise reason and reject understanding, turning away from it as naturally corrupt. Yet these very people, I say, are thought to possess light from above. What a monstrous lie! Truly, if they had even one spark of light from above, they would not rant so arrogantly. Instead, they would learn to worship God more wisely. They would stand out among others for mercy as much as they now stand out for malice. If they cared about their opponents' souls instead of their own reputations, they would stop their fierce persecution. Instead, they would be filled with pity and compassion.

Furthermore, if any Divine light were in them, it would appear from their doctrine. I grant that they are never tired of professing their wonder at the profound mysteries of Holy Writ; still I cannot discover that they teach anything but speculations of Platonists and Aristotelians, to which (in order to save their credit for Christianity) they have made Holy Writ conform; not content to rave with the Greeks themselves, they want to make the prophets rave also; showing conclusively, that never even in sleep have they caught a glimpse of Scripture's Divine nature. The very vehemence of their admiration for the mysteries plainly attests, that their belief in the Bible is a formal assent rather than a living faith: and the fact is made still more apparent by their laying down beforehand, as a foundation for the study and true interpretation of Scripture, the principle that it is in every passage true and divine. Such a doctrine should be reached only after strict scrutiny and thorough comprehension of the Sacred Books (which would teach it much better, for they stand in need no human factions), and not be set up on the threshold, as it were, of inquiry.

Furthermore, if they had any divine light, it would show in their teachings. I grant that they never tire of expressing wonder at the profound mysteries of Holy Writ. Yet I can find nothing in their teaching but the speculations of Platonists and Aristotelians. They have forced Holy Writ to fit these speculations to protect their reputation as Christians. Not content to rave alongside the Greeks, they want to make the prophets rave too. This proves conclusively that they have never glimpsed Scripture's divine nature, even in their sleep. Their intense admiration for these mysteries plainly shows that their belief in the Bible is formal acceptance, not living faith. They make this still clearer by setting a principle in advance as the foundation for studying and truly interpreting Scripture. That principle is that every passage of Scripture is true and divine. Such a conclusion should come only after close examination and thorough understanding of the Sacred Books. Indeed, the Sacred Books would teach this much better themselves, since they need no support from human factions. This conclusion should not be placed, so to speak, at the very entrance to inquiry.

As I pondered over the facts that the light of reason is not only despised, but by many even execrated as a source of impiety, that human commentaries are accepted as divine records, and that credulity is extolled as faith; as I marked the fierce controversies of philosophers raging in Church and State, the source of bitter hatred and dissension, the ready instruments of sedition and other ills innumerable, I determined to examine the Bible afresh in a careful, impartial, and unfettered spirit, making no assumptions concerning it, and attributing to it no doctrines, which I do not find clearly therein set down. With these precautions I constructed a method of Scriptural interpretation, and thus equipped proceeded to inquire - what is prophecy? In what sense did God reveal himself to the prophets, and why were these particular men - chosen by him? Was it on account of the sublimity of their thoughts about the Deity and nature, or was it solely on account of their piety? These questions being answered, I was easily able to conclude, that the authority of the prophets has weight only in matters of morality, and that their speculative doctrines affect us little.

I reflected on how reason’s light is not only despised but even condemned by many as a source of impiety. Human commentaries are accepted as divine records, and gullibility is praised as faith. I also observed the fierce disputes among philosophers raging in Church and State. These disputes bred bitter hatred and division, readily fueling rebellion and countless other evils. So I decided to examine the Bible afresh, carefully, impartially, and with an open mind. I would make no assumptions about the Bible or attribute any teachings to it unless clearly stated there. With these precautions, I developed a method for interpreting Scripture. Using this method, I began to ask: What is prophecy? In what sense did God reveal himself to the prophets, and why did he choose these particular men? Was his choice based on their lofty thoughts about God and nature, or solely on their piety? Once I had answered these questions, I could easily conclude that the prophets’ authority carries weight only in moral matters. Their teachings on speculative questions have little bearing on us.

Next I inquired, why the Hebrews were called God's chosen people, and discovering that it was only because God had chosen for them a certain strip of territory, where they might live peaceably and at ease, I learnt that the Law revealed by God to Moses was merely the law of the individual Hebrew state, therefore that it was binding on none but Hebrews, and not even on Hebrews after the downfall of their nation. Further, in order to ascertain, whether it could be concluded from Scripture, that the human understanding is naturally corrupt, I inquired whether the Universal Religion, the Divine Law revealed through the Prophets and Apostles to the whole human race, differs from that which is taught by the light of natural reason, whether miracles can take place in violation of the laws of nature, and if so, whether they imply the existence of God more surely and clearly than events, which we understand plainly and distinctly through their immediate natural causes.

Next I asked why the Hebrews were called God's chosen people. I found that the reason was simply that God had chosen a particular stretch of land for them. There they could live peacefully and comfortably. From this I learned that the Law God revealed to Moses was only the law of the Hebrew state. It therefore bound no one but the Hebrews, and ceased to bind even them after their nation's downfall. Next I wanted to determine whether Scripture supported the conclusion that human understanding is naturally corrupt. To do so, I asked whether the Universal Religion differs from what natural reason teaches. By the Universal Religion, I mean the Divine Law revealed through the Prophets and Apostles to the whole human race. I also asked whether miracles can happen in violation of the laws of nature. If so, do miracles show God's existence more certainly and clearly than events whose immediate natural causes we understand clearly and distinctly?

Now, as in the whole course of my investigation I found nothing taught expressly by Scripture, which does not agree with our understanding, or which is repugnant thereto, and as I saw that the prophets taught nothing, which is not very simple and easily to be grasped by all, and further, that they clothed their teaching in the style, and confirmed it with the reasons, which would most deeply move the mind of the masses to devotion towards God, I became thoroughly convinced, that the Bible leaves reason absolutely free, that it has nothing in common with philosophy, in fact, that Revelation and Philosophy stand on different footings. In order to set this forth categorically and exhaust the whole question, I point out the way in which the Bible should be interpreted, and show that all of spiritual questions should be sought from it alone, and not from the objects of ordinary knowledge. Thence I pass on to indicate the false notions, which have from the fact that the multitude - ever prone to superstition, and caring more for the shreds of antiquity for eternal truths - pays homage to the Books of the Bible, rather than to the Word of God. I show that the Word of God has not been revealed as a certain number of books, was displayed to the prophets as a simple idea of the mind, namely, obedience to God in singleness of heart, and in the practice of justice and charity; and I further point out, that this doctrine is set forth in Scripture in accordance with the opinions and understandings of those, among whom the Apostles and Prophets preached, to the end that men might receive it willingly, and with their whole heart.

Throughout my investigation, I found no explicit teaching in Scripture that failed to agree with reason or contradicted it. I also saw that the prophets taught only very simple things, easily understood by everyone. They expressed their teachings in language and supported them with arguments best suited to inspire ordinary people’s devotion to God. These findings thoroughly convinced me that the Bible leaves reason entirely free and has nothing in common with philosophy. Revelation and Philosophy, in fact, rest on different foundations. To state this clearly and address the whole question, I explain how the Bible should be interpreted. I show that answers to all spiritual questions should be sought in the Bible alone, not in ordinary knowledge. I then identify the false beliefs arising from people’s reverence for the Books of the Bible rather than God’s Word. Ordinary people are always prone to superstition and care more for fragments of antiquity than for eternal truths. I show that God’s Word was not revealed as a fixed number of books. Instead, God’s Word appeared to the prophets as a simple idea in the mind: wholehearted obedience to God through justice and charity. I further explain that Scripture presents this teaching according to the beliefs and understanding of the Apostles’ and Prophets’ audiences. The purpose was to encourage people to accept the teaching willingly and wholeheartedly.

Having thus laid bare the bases of belief, I draw the conclusion that Revelation has obedience for its sole object, therefore, in purpose no less than in foundation and method, stands entirely aloof from ordinary knowledge; each has its separate province, neither can be called the handmaid of the other.

Having thus explained the foundations of belief, I conclude that Revelation has obedience as its sole purpose. Revelation therefore stands entirely apart from ordinary knowledge in its purpose, foundations, and method. Each has its own domain, and neither serves the other.

Furthermore, as men's habits of mind differ, so that some more readily embrace one form of faith, some another, for what moves one to pray may move another only to scoff, I conclude, in accordance with what has gone before, that everyone should be free to choose for himself the foundations of his creed, and that faith should be judged only by its fruits; each would then obey God freely with his whole heart, while nothing would be publicly honoured save justice and charity.

Furthermore, people differ in how they think, so some more readily accept one form of faith, and some another. What moves one person to pray may only make another scoff. So, in keeping with the argument so far, I conclude that everyone should freely choose the foundations of their faith. Faith should be judged only by its results. Then everyone would obey God freely and wholeheartedly, while only justice and charity would be publicly honored.

Having thus drawn attention to the liberty conceded to everyone by the revealed law of God, I pass on to another part of my subject, and prove that this same liberty can and should be accorded with safety to the state and the magisterial authority - in fact, that it cannot be withheld without great danger to peace and detriment to the community.

I have now highlighted the freedom that God's revealed law grants everyone. I turn next to another part of my subject. I will prove that this same freedom can and should be granted without endangering the state or its governing authorities. In fact, withholding this freedom poses a great danger to peace and harms the community.

In order to establish my point, I start from the natural rights of the individual, which are co-extensive with his desires and power, and from the fact that no one is bound to live as another pleases, but is the guardian of his own liberty. I show that these rights can only be transferred to those whom we depute to defend us, who acquire with the duties of defence the power of ordering our lives, and I thence infer that rulers possess rights only limited by their power, that they are the sole guardians of justice and liberty, and that their subjects should act in all things as they dictate: nevertheless, since no one can so utterly abdicate his own power of self-defence as to cease to be a man, I conclude that no one can be deprived of his natural rights absolutely, but that subjects, either by tacit agreement, or by social contract, retain a certain number, which cannot be taken from them without great danger to the state.

To establish my point, I begin with the natural rights of the individual. These rights extend as far as each person's desires and power. No one is bound to live as another person wishes. Instead, each person guards their own freedom. I show that these rights can be transferred only to those we appoint to defend us. Along with the duty to defend us, those appointed gain the power to direct our lives. From this I conclude that rulers' rights are limited only by their power. Rulers alone are the guardians of justice and freedom, and their subjects should follow their orders in all things. Nevertheless, no one can surrender their power of self-defense so completely that they cease to be human. I therefore conclude that no one can be entirely deprived of their natural rights. Subjects retain certain rights, either through unspoken agreement or through a social contract. These rights cannot be taken from subjects without putting the state in great danger.

From these considerations I pass on to the Hebrew State, which I describe at some length, in order to trace the manner in which Religion acquired the force of law, and to touch on other noteworthy points. I then prove, that the holders of sovereign power are the depositories and interpreters of religious no less than of civil ordinances, and that they alone have the right to decide what is just or unjust, pious or impious; lastly, I conclude by showing, that they best retain this right and secure safety to their state by allowing every man to think what he likes, and say what he thinks.

From these considerations, I turn to the Hebrew State and describe it in some detail. My purpose is to trace how religion gained the force of law and discuss other noteworthy points. I then prove that those who hold sovereign power are the guardians and interpreters of religious as well as civil laws. They alone have the right to decide what is just or unjust, pious or impious. Finally, I show how rulers can best preserve this right and keep their state safe. They do so by allowing everyone to think what they like and say what they think.

Such, Philosophical Reader, are the questions I submit to your notice, counting on your approval, for the subject matter of the whole book and of the several chapters is important and profitable. I would say more, but I do not want my preface to extend to a volume, especially as I know that its leading propositions are to Philosophers but common places. To the rest of mankind I care not to commend my treatise, for I cannot expect that it contains anything to please them: I know how deeply rooted are the prejudices embraced under the name of religion; I am aware that in the mind of the masses superstition is no less deeply rooted than fear; I recognize that their constancy is mere obstinacy, and that they are led to praise or blame by impulse rather than reason. Therefore the multitude, and those of like passions with the multitude, I ask not to read my book; nay, I would rather that they should utterly neglect it, than that they should misinterpret it after their wont. They would gain no good themselves, and might prove a stumbling-block to others, whose philosophy is hampered by the belief that Reason is a mere handmaid to Theology, and whom I seek in this work especially to benefit. But as there will be many who have neither the leisure, nor, perhaps, the inclination to read through all I have written, I feel bound here, as at the end of my treatise, to declare that I have written nothing, which I do not most willingly submit to the examination and judgment of my country's rulers, and that I am ready to retract anything, which they shall decide to be repugnant to the laws or prejudicial to the public good. I know that I am a man and, as a man, liable to error, but against error I have taken scrupulous care, and striven to keep in entire accordance with the laws of my country, with loyalty, and with morality.

These, philosophical reader, are the questions I ask you to consider, counting on your approval. For the subjects of this book as a whole and of each chapter are important and useful. I would say more, but I do not want my preface to become a book itself. Besides, I know that philosophers already regard its main claims as commonplace. I make no effort to recommend my treatise to the rest of humanity. I cannot expect the book to contain anything that would please them. I know how deeply rooted are the prejudices held in the name of religion. I know that superstition is as deeply rooted in the minds of the masses as fear. I recognize that their firmness is merely stubbornness. Their praise and blame are guided by impulse rather than reason. So I ask the masses, and those who share their passions, not to read my book. Indeed, I would rather they ignore the book entirely than misinterpret it, as they usually do. They would gain nothing themselves and might hinder others. Those others find their philosophy restricted by the belief that Reason is merely a servant of Theology. They are the people I especially seek to help in this work. But many will lack the leisure, or perhaps the desire, to read everything I have written. So I feel obliged to make a declaration here, as I do at the end of my treatise. I most willingly submit everything I have written to examination and judgment by my country's rulers. I am ready to retract anything they judge contrary to the laws or harmful to the public good. I know that I am human and therefore liable to error. But I have taken the greatest care to avoid error. I have striven to remain fully in keeping with my country's laws, with loyalty, and with morality.