Freedom of Thought and Speech in a Free State

If men's minds were as easily controlled as their tongues, every king would sit safely on his throne, and government by compulsion would cease; for every subject would shape his life according to the intentions of his rulers, and would esteem a thing true or false, good or evil, just or unjust, in obedience to their dictates. However, we have shown already (Chapter XVII.) that no man's mind can possibly lie wholly at the disposition of another, for no one can willingly transfer his natural right of free reason and judgment, or be compelled so to do. For this reason government which attempts to control minds is accounted tyrannical, and it is considered an abuse of sovereignty and a usurpation of the rights of subjects, to seek to prescribe what shall be accepted as true, or rejected as false, or what opinions should actuate men in their worship of God. All these questions fall within a man's natural right, which he cannot abdicate even with his own consent.

If people’s minds were as easily controlled as their tongues, every king would be secure on his throne. Government would no longer need force. For every subject would live as their rulers intended. At their rulers’ command, subjects would judge things true or false, good or evil, just or unjust. But we have already shown (Chapter XVII.) that no one’s mind can ever be entirely under another person’s control. No one can willingly give up their natural right to reason and judge freely, or be forced to do so. For this reason, a government that tries to control minds is considered tyrannical. Rulers abuse their power and seize their subjects’ rights when they try to dictate what people must accept as true. The same applies when rulers dictate what people must reject as false, or what beliefs should guide their worship of God. All these matters fall within each person’s natural right, which no one can give up, even willingly.

(20:5) I admit that the judgment can be biassed in many ways, and to an almost incredible degree, so that while exempt from direct external control it may be so dependent on another man's words, that it may fitly be said to be ruled by him; but although this influence is carried to great lengths, it has never gone so far as to invalidate the statement, that every man's understanding is his own, and that brains are as diverse as palates.

(20:5) I admit that judgment can be biased in many ways, and to an almost incredible degree. Even without direct outside control, a person's judgment may depend so heavily on another man's words that he effectively rules it. But however far this influence extends, it has never disproved the fact that each person's understanding is his own. And minds differ as much as tastes do.

(20:6) Moses, not by fraud, but by Divine virtue, gained such a hold over the popular judgment that he was accounted superhuman, and believed to speak and act through the inspiration of the Deity; nevertheless, even he could not escape murmurs and evil interpretations. How much less then can other monarchs avoid them! Yet such unlimited power, if it exists at all, must belong to a monarch, and least of all to a democracy, where the whole or a great part of the people wield authority collectively. This is a fact which I think everyone can explain for himself.

(20:6) Moses gained such influence over public opinion through divine power, not deception, that people considered him superhuman. They believed he spoke and acted through God's inspiration. Yet even he could not escape complaints and hostile interpretations. How much less, then, can other monarchs avoid them! Yet such unlimited power, if it exists at all, must belong to a monarch. It can least of all belong to a democracy, where all or a large part of the people govern collectively. I think everyone can explain this fact for themselves.

(20:10) However unlimited, therefore, the power of a sovereign may be, however implicitly it is trusted as the exponent of law and religion, it can never prevent men from forming judgments according to their intellect, or being influenced by any given emotion. It is true that it has the right to treat as enemies all men whose opinions do not, on all subjects, entirely coincide with its own; but we are not discussing its strict rights, but its proper course of action. I grant that it has the right to rule in the most violent manner, and to put citizens to death for very trivial causes, but no one supposes it can do this with the approval of sound judgment. Nay, inasmuch as such things cannot be done without extreme peril to itself, we may even deny that it has the absolute power to do them, or, consequently, the absolute right; for the rights of the sovereign are limited by his power.

(20:10) However unlimited a sovereign’s power may be, it can never stop people from judging according to their own understanding. Nor can it stop them from being influenced by any given emotion. This remains true however completely people trust the sovereign as the authority on law and religion. The sovereign does have the right to treat people as enemies unless their opinions agree entirely with its own on every subject. But we are discussing not its strict rights, but how it should act. I grant that the sovereign has the right to rule with extreme violence and execute citizens for very trivial reasons. But no one thinks that sound judgment could approve of such conduct. Indeed, because such actions necessarily put the sovereign in extreme danger, we may even deny its absolute power to act so. Consequently, we may also deny its absolute right to do so, since the sovereign’s rights are limited by its power.

Since, therefore, no one can abdicate his freedom of judgment and feeling; since every man is by indefeasible natural right the master of his own thoughts, it follows that men thinking in diverse and contradictory fashions, cannot, without disastrous results, be compelled to speak only according to the dictates of the supreme power. Not even the most experienced, to say nothing of the multitude, know how to keep silence. Men's common failing is to confide their plans to others, though there be need for secrecy, so that a government would be most harsh which deprived the individual of his freedom of saying and teaching what he thought; and would be moderate if such freedom were granted. Still we cannot deny that authority may be as much injured by words as by actions; hence, although the freedom we are discussing cannot be entirely denied to subjects, its unlimited concession would be most baneful; we must, therefore, now inquire, how far such freedom can and ought to be conceded without danger to the peace of the state, or the power of the rulers; and this, as I said at the beginning of Chapter XVI., is my principal object. It follows, plainly, from the explanation given above, of the foundations of a state, that the ultimate aim of government is not to rule, or restrain, by fear, nor to exact obedience, but contrariwise, to free every man from fear, that he may live in all possible security; in other words, to strengthen his natural right to exist and work without injury to himself or others.

No one can give up the freedom to judge and feel. Everyone has a natural right, which cannot be taken away, to control their own thoughts. People therefore think in different and contradictory ways. Forcing them to speak only as the supreme authority commands cannot be done without disastrous results. Not even the most experienced people know how to keep silent, much less the general public. People commonly reveal their plans to others, even when secrecy is necessary. So a government would be extremely harsh if it denied individuals the freedom to say and teach what they thought. A government would be moderate if it granted that freedom. Still, we cannot deny that words may harm authority as much as actions do. So although subjects cannot be denied this freedom entirely, granting it without limits would be extremely harmful. We must therefore ask how far this freedom can and should extend without endangering public peace or the rulers' power. As I said at the beginning of Chapter XVI, this question is my main concern. The earlier explanation of the foundations of a state clearly shows the ultimate purpose of government. Its purpose is not to rule or control people through fear, or to demand obedience. On the contrary, its purpose is to free everyone from fear so they can live as safely as possible. In other words, government should strengthen everyone's natural right to live and work without harming themselves or others.

(20:19) No, the object of government is not to change men from rational beings into beasts or puppets, but to enable them to develope their minds and bodies in security, and to employ their reason unshackled; neither showing hatred, anger, or deceit, nor watched with the eyes of jealousy and injustice. In fact, the true aim of government is liberty.

(20:19) No, government's purpose is not to turn people from rational beings into beasts or puppets. Instead, it is to let people develop their minds and bodies safely and use their reason freely. People should neither show hatred, anger, or deceit nor be watched with jealousy and injustice. In fact, the true aim of government is freedom.

(20:21) Now we have seen that in forming a state the power of making laws must either be vested in the body of the citizens, or in a portion of them, or in one man. For, although men's free judgments are very diverse, each one thinking that he alone knows everything, and although complete unanimity of feeling and speech is out of the question, it is impossible to preserve peace, unless individuals abdicate their right of acting entirely on their own judgment. Therefore, the individual justly cedes the right of free action, though not of free reason and judgment; no one can act against the authorities without danger to the state, though his feelings and judgment may be at variance therewith; he may even speak against them, provided that he does so from rational conviction, not from fraud, anger, or hatred, and provided that he does not attempt to introduce any change on his private authority.

(20:21) We have now seen that, when forming a state, lawmaking power must belong to all citizens, some citizens, or one man. People’s independent judgments differ widely, and each person thinks he alone knows everything. Although complete agreement in feeling and speech is impossible, peace requires individuals to surrender their right to act entirely on their own judgment. So individuals rightly give up their freedom to act, but not their freedom to reason and judge. No one can act against the authorities without endangering the state, though his feelings and judgment may oppose the authorities. He may even speak against the authorities, provided he speaks from reasoned conviction, not deceit, anger, or hatred. He must also refrain from trying to introduce any change on his own authority.

(20:24) For instance, supposing a man shows that a law is repugnant to sound reason, and should therefore be repealed; if he submits his opinion to the judgment of the authorities (who, alone, have the right of making and repealing laws), and meanwhile acts in nowise contrary to that law, he has deserved well of the state, and has behaved as a good citizen should; but if he accuses the authorities of injustice, and stirs up the people against them, or if he seditiously strives to abrogate the law without their consent, he is a mere agitator and rebel.

(20:24) For example, suppose a man shows that a law goes against sound reason and should therefore be repealed. Suppose he submits his opinion to the authorities, who alone have the right to make and repeal laws. If he also continues to obey the law, he has served the state well and acted as a good citizen should. But suppose he accuses the authorities of injustice and stirs up the people against them. Or suppose he tries to overturn the law without their consent by inciting rebellion. In either case, he is nothing more than an agitator and a rebel.

(20:25) Thus we see how an individual may declare and teach what he believes, without injury to the authority of his rulers, or to the public peace; namely, by leaving in their hands the entire power of legislation as it affects action, and by doing nothing against their laws, though he be compelled often to act in contradiction to what he believes, and openly feels, to be best.

(20:25) Thus we see how a person may state and teach his beliefs without undermining his rulers’ authority or public peace. He can do so by leaving rulers full power to make laws governing actions and doing nothing against those laws. This holds even though he may often be forced to act against what he believes, and openly considers, best.

(20:26) Such a course can be taken without detriment to justice and dutifulness, nay, it is the one which a just and dutiful man would adopt. We have shown that justice is dependent on the laws of the authorities, so that no one who contravenes their accepted decrees can be just, while the highest regard for duty, as we have pointed out in the preceding chapter, is exercised in maintaining public peace and tranquillity; these could not be preserved if every man were to live as he pleased; therefore it is no less than undutiful for a man to act contrary to his country's laws, for if the practice became universal the ruin of states would necessarily follow.

(20:26) Such a course can be taken without compromising justice or duty. Indeed, a just and dutiful person would choose this course. We have shown that justice depends on the laws set by the authorities. So no one who violates their established decrees can be just. As we pointed out in the preceding chapter, the highest commitment to duty means preserving public peace and order. Peace and order could not survive if everyone lived as they pleased. Therefore, anyone who acts against their country's laws fails in their duty. For if everyone did so, states would inevitably collapse.

(20:28) Hence, so long as a man acts in obedience to the laws of his rulers, he in nowise contravenes his reason, for in obedience to reason he transferred the right of controlling his actions from his own hands to theirs. This doctrine we can confirm from actual custom, for in a conference of great and small powers, schemes are seldom carried unanimously, yet all unite in carrying out what is decided on, whether they voted for or against. But I return to my proposition.

(20:28) Therefore, as long as a man obeys his rulers’ laws, he does not act against his reason. For by following reason, he transferred the right to control his actions from himself to his rulers. We can confirm this principle by looking at actual practice. At a conference of great and small powers, proposals are seldom approved unanimously. Yet all the powers join in carrying out the decision, whether they voted for or against it. But I return to my argument.

(20:31) From the fundamental notions of a state, we have discovered how a man may exercise free judgment without detriment to the supreme power: from the same premises we can no less easily determine what opinions would be seditious. Evidently those which by their very nature nullify the compact by which the right of free action was ceded. For instance, a man who holds that the supreme power has no rights over him, or that promises ought not to be kept, or that everyone should live as he pleases, or other doctrines of this nature in direct opposition to the above-mentioned contract, is seditious, not so much from his actual opinions and judgment, as from the deeds which they involve; for he who maintains such theories abrogates the contract which tacitly, or openly, he made with his rulers. Other opinions which do not involve acts violating the contract, such as revenge, anger, and the like, are not seditious, unless it be in some corrupt state, where superstitious and ambitious persons, unable to endure men of learning, are so popular with the multitude that their word is more valued than the law.

(20:31) From the basic principles of a state, we have discovered how someone may judge freely without undermining the supreme authority. From the same principles, we can just as easily determine which opinions are seditious. Clearly, these are opinions that inherently cancel the agreement by which people gave up their right to act freely. For example, someone might hold that the supreme authority has no rights over him, or that promises need not be kept. Or he might hold that everyone should live as he pleases. Anyone holding these or similar views directly opposed to that agreement is seditious. This is not so much because of his opinions and judgment as because of the actions those opinions involve. For anyone who maintains such views cancels the agreement he made with his rulers, whether silently or openly. Other opinions are not seditious if they involve no actions that violate the agreement, such as revenge, anger, and the like. The only exception is in some corrupt state where superstitious and ambitious people cannot tolerate people of learning. There, those superstitious and ambitious people are so popular with the public that their word carries more weight than the law.

(20:35) However, I do not deny that there are some doctrines which, while they are apparently only concerned with abstract truths and falsehoods, are yet propounded and published with unworthy motives. This question we have discussed in Chapter XV., and shown that reason should nevertheless remain unshackled. If we hold to the principle that a man's loyalty to the state should be judged, like his loyalty to God, from his actions only - namely, from his charity towards his neighbours; we cannot doubt that the best government will allow freedom of philosophical speculation no less than of religious belief. I confess that from such freedom inconveniences may sometimes arise, but what question was ever settled so wisely that no abuses could possibly spring therefrom? He who seeks to regulate everything by law, is more likely to arouse vices than to reform them. It is best to grant what cannot be abolished, even though it be in itself harmful. How many evils spring from luxury, envy, avarice, drunkenness, and the like, yet these are tolerated - vices as they are - because they cannot be prevented by legal enactments. How much more then should free thought be granted, seeing that it is in itself a virtue and that it cannot be crushed! Besides, the evil results can easily be checked, as I will show, by the secular authorities, not to mention that such freedom is absolutely necessary for progress in science and the liberal arts: for no man follows such pursuits to advantage unless his judgment be entirely free and unhampered.

(20:35) However, I do not deny that some doctrines are put forward and published with unworthy motives. These doctrines may seem to concern only abstract questions of truth and falsehood. We discussed this issue in Chapter XV and showed that reason should nevertheless remain free. Suppose we hold that loyalty to the state, like loyalty to God, should be judged only by a person's actions. That means judging people by their kindness toward their neighbors. If we hold to this principle, we cannot doubt that the best government will allow freedom of philosophical inquiry. It will allow this freedom no less than freedom of religious belief. I admit that such freedom may sometimes cause problems. But what question has ever been settled so wisely that no abuses could possibly follow? Anyone who tries to regulate everything by law is more likely to encourage vices than to correct them. It is best to allow what cannot be eliminated, even if it is harmful in itself. How many evils arise from luxury, envy, greed, drunkenness, and similar vices? Yet these habits, vices though they are, are tolerated because laws cannot prevent them. How much more, then, should freedom of thought be allowed, since it is itself a virtue and cannot be crushed! Besides, the civil authorities can easily curb the harmful results of free thought, as I will show. Such freedom is also absolutely necessary for progress in science and the liberal arts. For no one can pursue these fields successfully unless their judgment is entirely free and unrestricted.

(20:44) But let it be granted that freedom may be crushed, and men be so bound down, that they do not dare to utter a whisper, save at the bidding of their rulers; nevertheless this can never be carried to the pitch of making them think according to authority, so that the necessary consequences would be that men would daily be thinking one thing and saying another, to the corruption of good faith, that mainstay of government, and to the fostering of hateful flattery and perfidy, whence spring stratagems, and the corruption of every good art.

(20:44) But let us grant that freedom may be crushed and people kept so firmly under control that they dare not whisper. They may speak only at their rulers’ command. Even so, rulers can never force people to think as ordered. People would therefore inevitably think one thing and say another every day. This would undermine good faith, the main support of government, and encourage hateful flattery and treachery. Such flattery and treachery give rise to schemes and corrupt every worthwhile pursuit.

(20:45) It is far from possible to impose uniformity of speech, for the more rulers strive to curtail freedom of speech, the more obstinately are they resisted; not indeed by the avaricious, the flatterers, and other numskulls, who think supreme salvation consists in filling their stomachs and gloating over their money-bags, but by those whom good education, sound morality, and virtue have rendered more free. Men, as generally constituted, are most prone to resent the branding as criminal of opinions which they believe to be true, and the proscription as wicked of that which inspires them with piety towards God and man; hence they are ready to forswear the laws and conspire against the authorities, thinking it not shameful but honourable to stir up seditions and perpetuate any sort of crime with this end in view. Such being the constitution of human nature, we see that laws directed against opinions affect the generous minded rather than the wicked, and are adapted less for coercing criminals than for irritating the upright; so that they cannot be maintained without great peril to the state.

(20:45) It is simply impossible to make everyone speak alike. The harder rulers try to restrict free speech, the more stubbornly people resist them. This resistance does not come from the greedy, flatterers, or other fools. Such people think their greatest salvation lies in filling their bellies and gloating over their bags of money. Instead, resistance comes from those whom good education, sound morals, and virtue have made freer. People generally resent it most when opinions they believe true are branded criminal. They also resent seeing beliefs that inspire devotion to God and goodwill toward others condemned as wicked. So they are ready to reject the laws and plot against the authorities. They consider it honorable, not shameful, to stir up rebellion and commit any crime toward this end. Given this human nature, we see that laws against opinions affect generous-minded people rather than the wicked. Such laws do less to restrain criminals than to provoke the upright. So these laws cannot be maintained without putting the state in great danger.

(20:48) Moreover, such laws are almost always useless, for those who hold that the opinions proscribed are sound, cannot possibly obey the law; whereas those who already reject them as false, accept the law as a kind of privilege, and make such boast of it, that authority is powerless to repeal it, even if such a course be subsequently desired.

(20:48) Moreover, such laws are almost always useless. Those who believe the banned opinions are sound cannot possibly obey the law. But those who already reject those opinions as false welcome the law as a kind of privilege. They boast so much about this privilege that the authorities are powerless to repeal the law, even if they later wish to.

(20:49) To these considerations may be added what we said in Chapter XVIII. in treating of the history of the Hebrews. And, lastly, how many schisms have arisen in the Church from the attempt of the authorities to decide by law the intricacies of theological controversy! If men were not allured by the hope of getting the law and the authorities on their side, of triumphing over their adversaries in the sight of an applauding multitude, and of acquiring honourable distinctions, they would not strive so maliciously, nor would such fury sway their minds. This is taught not only by reason but by daily examples, for laws of this kind prescribing what every man shall believe and forbidding anyone to speak or write to the contrary, have often been passed, as sops or concessions to the anger of those who cannot tolerate men of enlightenment, and who, by such harsh and crooked enactments, can easily turn the devotion of the masses into fury and direct it against whom they will. How much better would it be to restrain popular anger and fury, instead of passing useless laws, which can only be broken by those who love virtue and the liberal arts, thus paring down the state till it is too small to harbour men of talent. What greater misfortune for a state can be conceived then that honourable men should be sent like criminals into exile, because they hold diverse opinions which they cannot disguise? What, I say, can be more hurtful than that men who have committed no crime or wickedness should, simply because they are enlightened, be treated as enemies and put to death, and that the scaffold, the terror of evil-doers, should become the arena where the highest examples of tolerance and virtue are displayed to the people with all the marks of ignominy that authority can devise?

(20:49) To these arguments we may add what we said in Chapter XVIII about the history of the Hebrews. And finally, how many divisions have arisen in the Church because authorities tried to settle complex theological disputes by law! People hope to win the support of the law and the authorities. They hope to triumph over their opponents before an applauding crowd and gain honors. Without these hopes, they would not fight so maliciously, nor would such fury rule their minds. Both reason and daily experience teach us this. Laws have often been passed prescribing what everyone must believe and forbidding anyone to speak or write against those beliefs. Such laws have often served to appease the anger of people who cannot tolerate enlightened thinkers. Through these harsh and underhanded laws, those intolerant people can easily turn the masses’ religious devotion into fury. They can then direct that fury against anyone they choose. How much better it would be to restrain the anger and fury of the people instead of passing useless laws! Such laws can be broken only by those who love virtue and the liberal arts. They thus shrink the state until it has no room for talented people. What greater misfortune can we imagine for a state than the exile of honorable people as though they were criminals? They are exiled because they hold different opinions that they cannot hide. What, I ask, could be more harmful than treating people as enemies and executing them simply because they are enlightened? These people have committed no crime or wicked act. Yet the scaffold, meant to terrify wrongdoers, becomes a stage for displaying the highest examples of tolerance and virtue. These examples are shown to the people amid every mark of disgrace the authorities can devise.

(20:56) He that knows himself to be upright does not fear the death of a criminal, and shrinks from no punishment; his mind is not wrung with remorse for any disgraceful deed: he holds that death in a good cause is no punishment, but an honour, and that death for freedom is glory.

(20:56) A man who knows he is upright does not fear dying as a criminal and does not shrink from any punishment. He feels no remorse for any shameful deed. He believes dying for a good cause is not a punishment but an honor, and dying for freedom is glorious.

(20:57) What purpose then is served by the death of such men, what example in proclaimed? the cause for which they die is unknown to the idle and the foolish, hateful to the turbulent, loved by the upright. The only lesson we can draw from such scenes is to flatter the persecutor, or else to imitate the victim.

(20:57) What purpose, then, does the death of such men serve? What example does it set? The idle and foolish do not understand the cause these men die for. Troublemakers hate that cause, while the upright love it. The only lesson we can learn from such scenes is to flatter the persecutor or imitate the victim.

(20:58) If formal assent is not to be esteemed above conviction, and if governments are to retain a firm hold of authority and not be compelled to yield to agitators, it is imperative that freedom of judgment should be granted, so that men may live together in harmony, however diverse, or even openly contradictory their opinions may be. We cannot doubt that such is the best system of government and open to the fewest objections, since it is the one most in harmony with human nature. In a democracy (the most natural form of government, as we have shown in Chapter XVI.) everyone submits to the control of authority over his actions, but not over his judgment and reason; that is, seeing that all cannot think alike, the voice of the majority has the force of law, subject to repeal if circumstances bring about a change of opinion. In proportion as the power of free judgment is withheld we depart from the natural condition of mankind, and consequently the government becomes more tyrannical.

(20:58) If outward agreement is not to count for more than genuine conviction, freedom of judgment must be granted. Such freedom is also essential if governments are to maintain firm authority and not be forced to yield to agitators. People can then live together in harmony, however different or even openly contradictory their opinions may be. We cannot doubt that this system of government is best and faces the fewest objections. It is the system most in keeping with human nature. In a democracy, everyone accepts the government's authority over their actions, but not over their judgment and reason. Democracy is the most natural form of government, as we have shown in Chapter XVI. Since not everyone can think alike, the majority's decision has the force of law. But the law can be repealed if circumstances lead to a change of opinion. The more freedom of judgment is restricted, the further we move from humanity's natural condition. As a result, government becomes more tyrannical.

In order to prove that from such freedom no inconvenience arises, which cannot easily be checked by the exercise of the sovereign power, and that men's actions can easily be kept in bounds, though their opinions be at open variance, it will be well to cite an example. Such an one is not very, far to seek. The city of Amsterdam reaps the fruit of this freedom in its own great prosperity and in the admiration of all other people. For in this most flourishing state, and most splendid city, men of every nation and religion live together in the greatest harmony, and ask no questions before trusting their goods to a fellow-citizen, save whether he be rich or poor, and whether he generally acts honestly, or the reverse. His religion and sect is considered of no importance: for it has no effect before the judges in gaining or losing a cause, and there is no sect so despised that its followers, provided that they harm no one, pay every man his due, and live uprightly, are deprived of the protection of the magisterial authority.

An example will help show that such freedom causes no trouble that the sovereign power cannot easily control. It will also show that people's actions can easily be kept within bounds, even when their opinions openly clash. We need not look far for an example. The city of Amsterdam enjoys the fruits of this freedom in its great prosperity and the admiration of all other peoples. In this thriving state and splendid city, people of every nation and religion live together in the greatest harmony. Before entrusting their goods to a fellow citizen, they ask only whether that person is rich or poor, honest or dishonest. The person's religion or sect is considered unimportant, since neither affects whether someone wins or loses a court case. No sect is so despised that its followers are denied the protection of the authorities, provided they harm no one, give everyone their due, and live honestly.

(20:67) On the other hand, when the religious controversy between Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants began to be taken up by politicians and the States, it grew into a schism, and abundantly showed that laws dealing with religion and seeking to settle its controversies are much more calculated to irritate than to reform, and that they give rise to extreme licence: further, it was seen that schisms do not originate in a love of truth, which is a source of courtesy and gentleness, but rather in an inordinate desire for supremacy, From all these considerations it is clearer than the sun at noonday, that the true schismatics are those who condemn other men's writings, and seditiously stir up the quarrelsome masses against their authors, rather than those authors themselves, who generally write only for the learned, and appeal solely to reason. In fact, the real disturbers of the peace are those who, in a free state, seek to curtail the liberty of judgment which they are unable to tyrannize over.

(20:67) On the other hand, politicians and the States began taking up the religious controversy between Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants. When that happened, the controversy grew into a schism. This clearly showed that laws aimed at settling religious disputes are far more likely to provoke than to reform. Such laws also encourage extreme lawlessness. Further, it became clear that schisms do not arise from a love of truth, which encourages courtesy and gentleness. Instead, schisms arise from an excessive desire for supremacy. All these considerations make the following clearer than the sun at noon. The true schismatics are those who condemn other people's writings and stir up the quarrelsome masses against the authors. Those who provoke such unrest, rather than the authors themselves, are responsible for division. The authors generally write only for learned readers and appeal solely to reason. In fact, the real disturbers of the peace are those who seek to restrict freedom of judgment in a free state. They seek to restrict that freedom because they cannot impose tyrannical control over people's judgment.

(20:70) I have thus shown:-

(20:70) So I have shown:

I. That it is impossible to deprive men of the liberty of saying what they think.

I. It is impossible to take away people's freedom to say what they think.

II. That such liberty can be conceded to every man without injury to the rights and authority of the sovereign power, and that every man may retain it without injury to such rights, provided that he does not presume upon it to the extent of introducing any new rights into the state, or acting in any way contrary, to the existing laws.

II. Such freedom can be granted to everyone without harming the rights and authority of the sovereign power. Everyone may keep this freedom without harming those rights, provided they do not use it to introduce new rights into the state or act against existing laws.

(20:73) III. That every man may enjoy this liberty without detriment to the public peace, and that no inconveniences arise therefrom which cannot easily be checked.

(20:73) III. That everyone may enjoy this freedom without harming public peace. And that any problems arising from this freedom can easily be controlled.

IV. That every man may enjoy it without injury to his allegiance.

IV. That everyone may enjoy it without compromising their allegiance.

V. That laws dealing with speculative problems are entirely useless.

V. Laws dealing with theoretical questions are entirely useless.

VI. Lastly, that not only may such liberty be granted without prejudice to the public peace, to loyalty, and to the rights of rulers, but that it is even necessary, for their preservation. For when people try to take it away, and bring to trial, not only the acts which alone are capable of offending, but also the opinions of mankind, they only succeed in surrounding their victims with an appearance of martyrdom, and raise feelings of pity and revenge rather than of terror. Uprightness and good faith are thus corrupted, flatterers and traitors are encouraged, and sectarians triumph, inasmuch as concessions have been made to their animosity, and they have gained the state sanction for the doctrines of which they are the interpreters. Hence they arrogate to themselves the state authority and rights, and do not scruple to assert that they have been directly chosen by God, and that their laws are Divine, whereas the laws of the state are human, and should therefore yield obedience to the laws of God - in other words, to their own laws. Everyone must see that this is not a state of affairs conducive to public welfare. Wherefore, as we have shown in Chapter XVIII., the safest way for a state is to lay down the rule that religion is comprised solely in the exercise of charity and justice, and that the rights of rulers in sacred, no less than in secular matters, should merely have to do with actions, but that every man should think what he likes and say what he thinks.

VI. Finally, such freedom can be granted without harming public peace, loyalty, or the rights of rulers. Indeed, this freedom is necessary to preserve all three. For when people try to remove this freedom, they put opinions on trial, not just actions, which alone can cause harm. They only succeed in making their victims appear to be martyrs, stirring pity and a desire for revenge rather than fear. In this way, honesty and good faith are corrupted, while flatterers and traitors are encouraged. Sectarians triumph because their hostility has been appeased, and the state has endorsed the doctrines they interpret. As a result, these sectarians claim the state's authority and rights for themselves. They do not hesitate to claim that God has chosen them directly and that their laws are divine. By contrast, they say, the state's laws are human and must therefore yield to God's laws, meaning their own laws. Everyone must see that this situation does not serve the public good. Therefore, as we showed in Chapter XVIII., the safest course for a state is to establish the following rule. Religion consists solely in practicing charity and justice. The authority of rulers, in religious as well as secular matters, should extend only to actions. But everyone should be free to think what they like and say what they think.

(20:82) I have thus fulfilled the task I set myself in this treatise. It remains only to call attention to the fact that I have written nothing which I do not most willingly submit to the examination and approval of my country's rulers; and that I am willing to retract anything which they shall decide to be repugnant to the laws, or prejudicial to the public good. I know that I am a man, and as a man liable to error, but against error I have taken scrupulous care, and have striven to keep in entire accordance with the laws of my country, with loyalty, and with morality.

(20:82) I have now completed the task I set myself in this treatise. I need only point out that I willingly submit everything I have written to my country's rulers for examination and approval. I am willing to retract anything those rulers judge to be contrary to the laws or harmful to the public good. I know I am human and therefore capable of error. But I have taken great care to avoid error. I have also worked to remain fully faithful to my country's laws, to loyalty, and to morality.