Interpreting Scripture

When people declare, as all are ready to do, that the Bible is the Word of God teaching man true blessedness and the way of salvation, they evidently do not mean what they say; for the masses take no pains at all to live according to Scripture, and we see most people endeavouring to hawk about their own commentaries as the word of God, and giving their best efforts, under the guise of religion, to compelling others to think as they do: we generally see, I say, theologians anxious to learn how to wring their inventions and sayings out of the sacred text, and to fortify them with Divine authority. Such persons never display, less scruple or more zeal than when they, are interpreting Scripture or the mind of the Holy Ghost; if we ever see them perturbed, it is not that they fear to attribute some error to the Holy Spirit, and to stray from the right path, but that they are afraid to be convicted of error by others, and thus to overthrow and bring into contempt their own authority. But if men really believed what they verbally testify of Scripture, they would adopt quite a different plan of life: their minds would not be agitated by so many contentions, nor so many hatreds, and they would cease to be excited by such a blind and rash passion for interpreting the sacred writings, and excogitating novelties in religion. On the contrary, they would not dare to adopt, as the teaching of Scripture, anything which they could not plainly deduce therefrom: lastly, those sacrilegious persons who have dared, in several passages, to interpolate the Bible, would have shrunk from so great a crime, and would have stayed their sacrilegious hands.

People declare, as all are ready to do, that the Bible is the Word of God. They say it teaches people true blessedness and the way to salvation. Yet they plainly do not mean what they say. For the masses make no effort at all to live according to Scripture. And we see most people trying to peddle their own commentaries as the word of God. Under the guise of religion, they do their utmost to force others to think as they do. We generally see theologians eager to twist the sacred text to support their own inventions and claims. They then reinforce those inventions and claims with divine authority. Such people never show fewer scruples or greater zeal than when interpreting Scripture or the mind of the Holy Ghost. If we ever see them troubled, they are not afraid of attributing some error to the Holy Spirit. Nor are they afraid of straying from the right path. Instead, they fear that others will prove them wrong, bringing down their authority and exposing it to contempt. But if people really believed what they say about Scripture, they would live quite differently. Their minds would not be troubled by so many disputes or so much hatred. They would no longer feel such a blind and reckless passion for interpreting sacred writings and inventing religious novelties. On the contrary, they would not dare call anything Scripture’s teaching unless they could clearly derive it from Scripture. Finally, those sacrilegious people who dared to insert material into several biblical passages would have recoiled from so great a crime. They would have held back their sacrilegious hands.

Ambition and unscrupulousness have waxed so powerful, that religion is thought to consist, not so much in respecting the writings of the Holy Ghost, as in defending human commentaries, so that religion is no longer identified with charity, but with spreading discord and propagating insensate hatred disguised under the name of zeal for the Lord, and eager ardour.

Ambition and dishonesty have become so powerful that religion is seen less as respecting the Holy Ghost’s writings than defending human interpretations. As a result, religion is no longer identified with love for others, but with spreading conflict and senseless hatred. Such hatred is disguised as zeal for the Lord and passionate devotion.

To these evils we must add superstition, which teaches men to despise reason and nature, and only to admire and venerate that which is repugnant to both: whence it is not wonderful that for the sake of increasing the admiration and veneration felt for Scripture, men strive to explain it so as to make it appear to contradict, as far as possible, both one and the other: thus they dream that most profound mysteries lie hid in the Bible, and weary themselves out in the investigation of these absurdities, to the neglect of what is useful. Every result of their diseased imagination they attribute to the Holy Ghost, and strive to defend with the utmost zeal and passion; for it is an observed fact that men employ their reason to defend conclusions arrived at by reason, but conclusions arrived at by the passions are defended by the passions.

To these evils we must add superstition, which teaches people to despise reason and nature. Superstition teaches them to admire and revere only what conflicts with both. So it is no wonder that people try to make Scripture seem to contradict reason and nature as much as possible. They do so to increase admiration and reverence for Scripture. Thus they imagine that the deepest mysteries lie hidden in the Bible. They exhaust themselves investigating these absurdities while neglecting what is useful. They attribute every product of their diseased imagination to the Holy Ghost. They then defend these inventions with the greatest zeal and passion. For experience shows that people use reason to defend conclusions reached through reason. But they use their passions to defend conclusions reached through passion.

If we would separate ourselves from the crowd and escape from theological prejudices, instead of rashly accepting human commentaries for Divine documents, we must consider the true method of interpreting Scripture and dwell upon it at some length: for if we remain in ignorance of this we cannot know, certainly, what the Bible and the Holy Spirit wish to teach.

If we want to stand apart from the crowd and escape theological prejudices, we must avoid a rash mistake. We must not accept human commentaries as divine documents. Instead, we must consider the true method of interpreting Scripture and examine that method at some length. For without knowing this method, we cannot know for certain what the Bible and the Holy Spirit intend to teach.

I may sum up the matter by saying that the method of interpreting Scripture does not widely differ from the method of interpreting nature - in fact, it is almost the same. For as the interpretation of nature consists in the examination of the history of nature, and therefrom deducing definitions of natural phenomena on certain fixed axioms, so Scriptural interpretation proceeds by the examination of Scripture, and inferring the intention of its authors as a legitimate conclusion from its fundamental principles. By working in this manner everyone will always advance without danger of error - that is, if they admit no principles for interpreting Scripture, and discussing its contents save such as they find in Scripture itself - and will be able with equal security to discuss what surpasses our understanding, and what is known by the natural light of reason.

I can sum up the matter by saying that interpreting Scripture differs little from interpreting nature. In fact, the methods are almost the same. To interpret nature, we examine its history and use certain fixed axioms to derive definitions of natural phenomena. Similarly, to interpret Scripture, we examine Scripture and draw valid conclusions about its authors’ intentions from its fundamental principles. By following this method, everyone will always proceed without risk of error. This holds if they accept only principles found in Scripture itself when interpreting and discussing its contents. They will then be equally safe in discussing what lies beyond our understanding and what reason naturally reveals to us.

In order to make clear that such a method is not only correct, but is also the only one advisable, and that it agrees with that employed in interpreting nature, I must remark that Scripture very often treats of matters which cannot be deduced from principles known to reason: for it is chiefly made up of narratives and revelation: the narratives generally contain miracles - that is, as we have shown in the last chapter, relations of extraordinary natural occurrences adapted to the opinions and judgment of the historians who recorded them: the revelations also were adapted to the opinions of the prophets, as we showed in Chap. II., and in themselves surpassed human comprehension. Therefore the knowledge of all these - that is, of nearly the whole contents of Scripture, must be sought from Scripture alone, even as the knowledge of nature is sought from nature. As for the moral doctrines which are also contained in the Bible, they may be demonstrated from received axioms, but we cannot prove in the same manner that Scripture intended to teach them, this can only be learned from Scripture itself.

I want to show that this method is not only correct but also the only advisable one. I also want to show that it agrees with the method used to interpret nature. To do so, I must point out that Scripture very often discusses matters beyond what known principles of reason establish. For Scripture consists chiefly of narratives and revelations. The narratives generally contain miracles, meaning accounts of extraordinary natural events, as we showed in the last chapter. These accounts were adapted to the opinions and judgment of the historians who recorded them. The revelations were also adapted to the prophets’ opinions, as we showed in Chapter II. In themselves, these revelations were beyond human understanding. Therefore, knowledge of all these matters, nearly everything in Scripture, must come from Scripture alone. This is just as knowledge of nature must come from nature. The Bible also contains moral teachings that can be demonstrated from accepted axioms. But those axioms cannot prove that Scripture intended to teach those moral doctrines. We can learn Scripture’s intention only from Scripture itself.

If we would bear unprejudiced witness to the Divine origin of Scripture, we must prove solely on its own authority that it teaches true moral doctrines, for by such means alone can its Divine origin be demonstrated: we have shown that the certitude of the prophets depended chiefly on their having minds turned towards what is just and good, therefore we ought to have proof of their possessing this quality before we repose faith in them. From miracles God's divinity cannot be proved, as I have already shown, and need not now repeat, for miracles could be wrought by false prophets. Wherefore the Divine origin of Scripture must consist solely in its teaching true virtue. But we must come to our conclusion simply on Scriptural grounds, for if we were unable to do so we could not, unless strongly prejudiced accept the Bible and bear witness to its Divine origin.

If we are to affirm Scripture's divine origin without prejudice, we must rely solely on Scripture's own authority. We must prove that Scripture teaches true moral principles, for only this can demonstrate its divine origin. We have shown that the prophets' certainty depended chiefly on their minds being directed toward justice and goodness. So we must have proof that the prophets had this quality before we put our faith in them. Miracles cannot prove God's divinity, as I have already shown and need not repeat here. For false prophets could also perform miracles. Therefore, Scripture's divine origin must rest solely on its teaching true virtue. But we must reach this conclusion on Scriptural grounds alone. Otherwise, we could not accept the Bible and affirm its divine origin unless we were strongly prejudiced.

Our knowledge of Scripture must then be looked for in Scripture only.

We must therefore seek our understanding of Scripture in Scripture alone.

Lastly, Scripture does not give us definition of things any more than nature does: therefore, such definitions must be sought in the latter case from the diverse workings of nature; in the former case, from the various narratives about the given subject which occur in the Bible.

Finally, Scripture does not define things for us any more than nature does. So, in nature, we must find definitions by studying the different ways nature works. In Scripture, we must find definitions in the Bible’s various accounts of the subject in question.

The universal rule, then, in interpreting Scripture is to accept nothing as an authoritative Scriptural statement which we do not perceive very clearly when we examine it in the light of its history. What I mean by its history, and what should be the chief points elucidated, I will now explain.

The general rule for interpreting Scripture, then, is to accept no statement as authoritative unless its meaning is very clear. That clarity must come from examining Scripture in light of its history. I will now explain what I mean by its history and the main points that need to be clarified.

The history of a Scriptural statement comprises -

The history of a statement in Scripture includes:

I. The nature and properties of the language in which the books of the Bible were written, and in which their authors were, accustomed to speak. We shall thus be able to investigate every expression by comparison with common conversational usages.

I. The nature and features of the language in which the books of the Bible were written. This was also the language their authors normally spoke. We can thus examine every expression by comparing it with everyday speech.

Now all the writers both of the Old Testament and the New were Hebrews: therefore, a knowledge of the Hebrew language is before all things necessary, not only for the comprehension of the Old Testament, which was written in that tongue, but also of the New: for although the latter was published in other languages, yet its characteristics are Hebrew.

All the writers of both the Old Testament and the New Testament were Hebrews. So knowledge of Hebrew is essential above all else. This knowledge is needed to understand not only the Old Testament, written in Hebrew, but also the New Testament. For although the New Testament was published in other languages, its characteristics are Hebrew.

II. An analysis of each book and arrangement of its contents under heads; so that we may have at hand the various texts which treat of a given subject. Lastly, a note of all the passages which are ambiguous or obscure, or which seem mutually contradictory.

II. An analysis of each book, with its contents organized by topic. This will let us easily find the various passages on a given subject. Finally, a list of all passages that are unclear, have more than one possible meaning, or seem to contradict one another.

I call passages clear or obscure according as their meaning is inferred easily or with difficulty in relation to the context, not according as their truth is perceived easily or the reverse by reason. We are at work not on the truth of passages, but solely on their meaning. We must take especial care, when we are in search of the meaning of a text, not to be led away by our reason in so far as it is founded on principles of natural knowledge (to say nothing of prejudices): in order not to confound the meaning of a passage with its truth, we must examine it solely by means of the signification of the words, or by a reason acknowledging no foundation but Scripture.

I call passages clear or obscure depending on how easily their meaning can be understood from the context. I do not mean how easily reason can determine whether those passages are true. We are concerned not with the truth of passages, but only with their meaning. When seeking a text’s meaning, we must take special care not to be misled by reasoning based on natural knowledge. This is even more important when our reasoning rests on prejudices. To avoid confusing a passage’s meaning with its truth, we must examine the passage only through its words’ meaning. Or we must use reasoning that takes Scripture alone as its foundation.

I will illustrate my meaning by an example. The words of Moses, "God is a fire" and "God is jealous," are perfectly clear so long as we regard merely the signification of the words, and I therefore reckon them among the clear passages, though in relation to reason and truth they are most obscure: still, although the literal meaning is repugnant to the natural light of reason, nevertheless, if it cannot be clearly overruled on grounds and principles derived from its Scriptural "history," it, that is, the literal meaning, must be the one retained: and contrariwise if these passages literally interpreted are found to clash with principles derived from Scripture, though such literal interpretation were in absolute harmony with reason, they must be interpreted in a different manner, i.e. metaphorically.

I will explain my meaning with an example. Moses’ words, "God is a fire" and "God is jealous," are perfectly clear if we consider only what the words mean. I therefore count these among the clear passages, though they are deeply obscure in relation to reason and truth. Still, their literal meaning must be retained unless the grounds and principles drawn from Scripture’s "history" clearly rule it out. This holds even though the literal meaning conflicts with the natural light of reason. Conversely, suppose these passages, read literally, conflict with principles drawn from Scripture. Then they must be read differently, that is, metaphorically, even if the literal reading agrees completely with reason.

If we would know whether Moses believed God to be a fire or not, we must on no account decide the question on grounds of the reasonableness or the reverse of such an opinion, but must judge solely by the other opinions of Moses which are on record.

If we want to know whether Moses believed God was a fire, we must not judge that belief by its reasonableness. Instead, we must judge solely by the other recorded opinions of Moses.

In the present instance, as Moses says in several other passages that God has no likeness to any visible thing, whether in heaven or in earth, or in the water, either all such passages must be taken metaphorically, or else the one before us must be so explained. However, as we should depart as little as possible from the literal sense, we must first ask whether this text, God is a fire, admits of any but the literal meaning - that is, whether the word fire ever means anything besides ordinary natural fire. If no such second meaning can be found, the text must be taken literally, however repugnant to reason it may be: and all the other passages, though in complete accordance with reason, must be brought into harmony with it. If the verbal expressions would not admit of being thus harmonized, we should have to set them down as irreconcilable, and suspend our judgment concerning them. However, as we find the name fire applied to anger and jealousy (see Job xxxi:12) we can thus easily reconcile the words of Moses, and legitimately conclude that the two propositions God is a fire, and God is jealous, are in meaning identical.

In this case, Moses says in several other passages that God resembles nothing visible in heaven, on earth, or in water. So either all those passages must be read metaphorically, or the passage before us must be read that way. However, we should depart as little as possible from the literal meaning. We must therefore first ask whether the statement God is a fire can have any meaning besides the literal one. In other words, does the word fire ever mean anything besides ordinary, natural fire? If no second meaning can be found, we must read the statement literally, however contrary to reason it may be. All the other passages must then be interpreted to agree with that statement, though they agree completely with reason. If their wording would not allow such agreement, we would have to consider the passages irreconcilable. We would then have to suspend judgment about them. However, we find that the word fire is used to mean anger and jealousy (see Job 31:12). We can therefore easily reconcile Moses' words. We can legitimately conclude that the two statements God is a fire and God is jealous mean the same thing.

Further, as Moses clearly teaches that God is jealous, and nowhere states that God is without passions or emotions, we must evidently infer that Moses held this doctrine himself, or at any rate, that he wished to teach it, nor must we refrain because such a belief seems contrary to reason: for as we have shown, we cannot wrest the meaning of texts to suit the dictates of our reason, or our preconceived opinions. The whole knowledge of the Bible must be sought solely from itself.

Further, Moses clearly teaches that God is jealous. He never says that God has no passions or emotions. So we must conclude that Moses himself held this belief, or at least wanted to teach it. We must not avoid this conclusion because the belief seems contrary to reason. As we have shown, we cannot twist the meaning of texts to fit our reason or preconceived opinions. All knowledge of the Bible must come solely from the Bible itself.

III. Lastly, such a history should relate the environment of all the prophetic books extant; that is, the life, the conduct, and the studies of the author of each book, who he was, what was the occasion, and the epoch of his writing, whom did he write for, and in what language. Further, it should inquire into the fate of each book: how it was first received, into whose hands it fell, how many different versions there were of it, by whose advice was it received into the Bible, and, lastly, how all the books now universally accepted as sacred, were united into a single whole.

III. Finally, such a history should describe the background of all surviving prophetic books. It should cover each author's life, conduct, and studies, and explain who he was. It should explain what prompted him to write, when he wrote, for whom, and in what language. Further, the history should trace what happened to each book: how each book was first received and whose hands it passed through. It should examine how many different versions of each book existed and who recommended including each book in the Bible. Finally, it should explain how all the books now universally accepted as sacred were brought together into a single whole.

All such information should, as I have said, be contained in the "history" of Scripture. For, in order to know what statements are set forth as laws, and what as moral precepts, it is important to be acquainted with the life, the conduct, and the pursuits of their author: moreover, it becomes easier to explain a man's writings in proportion as we have more intimate knowledge of his genius and temperament.

As I have said, all such information should be included in the "history" of Scripture. We need to know which statements are presented as laws and which as moral teachings. To do so, it is important to know about the author's life, behavior, and activities. Moreover, the better we know a writer's mind and temperament, the easier it becomes to explain his writings.

Further, that we may not confound precepts which are eternal with those which served only a temporary purpose, or were only meant for a few, we should know what was the occasion, the time, the age, in which each book was written, and to what nation it was addressed.Lastly, we should have knowledge on the other points I have mentioned, in order to be sure, in addition to the authenticity of the work, that it has not been tampered with by sacrilegious hands, or whether errors can have crept in, and, if so, whether they have been corrected by men sufficiently skilled and worthy of credence. All these things should be known, that we may not be led away by blind impulse to accept whatever is thrust on our notice, instead of only that which is sure and indisputable.

Further, we must not confuse eternal rules with rules that served only a temporary purpose or applied only to a few. To avoid this confusion, we should know the circumstances, time, and historical period in which each book was written. We should also know which nation each book addressed. Finally, we should know the other points I have mentioned, so we can be sure the work is authentic. We should also establish whether anyone has tampered with the work in a sacrilegious way, or whether errors may have crept in. If errors have crept in, we should know whether people with enough skill and credibility have corrected them. We should know all these things so that blind impulse does not lead us to accept whatever comes before us. Instead, we should accept only what is certain and beyond dispute.

Now when we are in possession of this history of Scripture, and have finally decided that we assert nothing as prophetic doctrine which does not directly follow from such history, or which is not clearly deducible from it, then, I say, it will be time to gird ourselves for the task of investigating the mind of the prophets and of the Holy Spirit. But in this further arguing, also, we shall require a method very like that employed in interpreting nature from her history. As in the examination of natural phenomena we try first to investigate what is most universal and common to all nature - such, for instance, as motion and rest, and their laws and rules, which nature always observes, and through which she continually works - and then we proceed to what is less universal; so, too, in the history of Scripture, we seek first for that which is most universal, and serves for the basis and foundation of all Scripture, a doctrine, in fact, that is commended by all the prophets as eternal and most profitable to all men. For example, that God is one, and that He is omnipotent, that He alone should be worshipped, that He has a care for all men, and that He especially loves those who adore Him and love their neighbour as themselves, &c. These and similar doctrines, I repeat, Scripture everywhere so clearly and expressly teaches, that no one was ever in doubt of its meaning concerning them.

Once we have this history of Scripture, we must settle what we will accept as prophetic teaching. We must accept nothing unless it follows directly from this history or can be clearly deduced from it. Only then, I say, will we be ready to investigate the minds of the prophets and the Holy Spirit. But this further inquiry will also require a method much like the one used to interpret nature through its history. When examining natural phenomena, we first try to investigate what is most universal and common to all nature. Examples include motion and rest, along with their laws and rules. Nature always follows these laws and rules and continually works through them. Then we move on to what is less universal. In the same way, we first seek in the history of Scripture what is most universal. This universal teaching forms the basis and foundation of all Scripture. All the prophets recommend it as eternal and most beneficial to all people. For example, God is one and almighty, and he alone should be worshipped. He cares for all people. He especially loves those who worship him and love their neighbors as themselves, and so on. Scripture everywhere teaches these and similar doctrines so clearly and explicitly, I repeat, that no one has ever doubted their meaning.

The nature of God, His manner of regarding and providing for things, and similar doctrines, Scripture nowhere teaches professedly, and as eternal doctrine; on the contrary, we have shown that the prophets themselves did not agree on the subject; therefore, we must not lay down any doctrine as Scriptural on such subjects, though it may appear perfectly clear on rational grounds.

Scripture nowhere explicitly teaches the nature of God, how he regards and provides for things, or similar matters as eternal truths. On the contrary, we have shown that the prophets themselves disagreed on these subjects. Therefore, we must not claim that any doctrine on these subjects is taught by Scripture, though reason may make it seem perfectly clear.

From a proper knowledge of this universal doctrine of Scripture, we must then proceed to other doctrines less universal, but which, nevertheless, have regard to the general conduct of life, and flow from the universal doctrine like rivulets from a source; such are all particular external manifestations of true virtue, which need a given occasion for their exercise; whatever is obscure or ambiguous on such points in Scripture must be explained and defined by its universal doctrine; with regard to contradictory instances, we must observe the occasion and the time in which they were written. For instance, when Christ says, "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted" we do not know, from the actual passage, what sort of mourners are meant; as, however, Christ afterwards teaches that we should have care for nothing, save only for the kingdom of God and His righteousness, which is commended as the highest good (see Matt. vi:33), it follows that by mourners He only meant those who mourn for the kingdom of God and righteousness neglected by man: for this would be the only cause of mourning to those who love nothing but the Divine kingdom and justice, and who evidently despise the gifts of fortune. So, too, when Christ says: "But if a man strike you on the right cheek, turn to him the left also," and the words which follow.

Once we properly understand this universal teaching of Scripture, we must turn to other, less universal teachings. These still concern the general conduct of life and flow from the universal teaching like streams from a spring. They include all specific outward expressions of true virtue that require a particular occasion to be practiced. Anything obscure or ambiguous in Scripture about these matters must be explained and clarified through its universal teaching. Where passages contradict one another, we must consider the circumstances and time in which they were written. For example, Christ says, "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted". The passage itself does not tell us what kind of mourners he means. But Christ later teaches that we should care about nothing except the kingdom of God and his righteousness. He presents these as the highest good (see Matt. vi:33). It follows that by mourners he meant only those who mourn because people neglect God's kingdom and righteousness. For such neglect would be the only cause of mourning for those who love only God's kingdom and justice. These people clearly regard the gifts of fortune as worthless. The same applies when Christ says, "But if a man strike you on the right cheek, turn to him the left also," and to the words that follow.

If He had given such a command, as a lawgiver, to judges, He would thereby have abrogated the law of Moses, but this He expressly says He did not do (Matt. v:17). Wherefore we must consider who was the speaker, what was the occasion, and to whom were the words addressed. Now Christ said that He did not ordain laws as a legislator, but inculcated precepts as a teacher: inasmuch as He did not aim at correcting outward actions so much as the frame of mind. Further, these words were spoken to men who were oppressed, who lived in a corrupt commonwealth on the brink of ruin, where justice was utterly neglected. The very doctrine inculcated here by Christ just before the destruction of the city was also taught by Jeremiah before the first destruction of Jerusalem, that is, in similar circumstances, as we see from Lamentations iii:25-30.

If he had given judges such a command as a lawgiver, he would have abolished the law of Moses. But he explicitly says he did not do so (Matt. v:17). So we must consider who was speaking, on what occasion, and to whom. Now Christ said he did not lay down laws as a lawgiver, but taught moral principles as a teacher. For his aim was less to correct outward actions than to change people’s state of mind. Moreover, he spoke these words to oppressed people living in a corrupt state on the brink of ruin. In that state, justice was utterly neglected. Christ taught this very doctrine just before the destruction of the city. Jeremiah had also taught it before the first destruction of Jerusalem, under similar circumstances, as we see in Lamentations iii:25-30.

Now as such teaching was only set forth by the prophets in times of oppression, and was even then never laid down as a law; and as, on the other hand, Moses (who did not write in times of oppression, but - mark this - strove to found a well-ordered commonwealth), while condemning envy and hatred of one's neighbour, yet ordained that an eye should be given for an eye, it follows most clearly from these purely Scriptural grounds that this precept of Christ and Jeremiah concerning submission to injuries was only valid in places where justice is neglected, and in a time of oppression, but does not hold good in a well-ordered state.

The prophets taught this only in times of oppression, and even then they never made it a law. Moses, on the other hand, did not write in times of oppression. Instead, take note, he sought to establish a well-ordered state. Although Moses condemned envy and hatred of one's neighbor, he still decreed an eye for an eye. So these grounds, drawn from Scripture alone, make the conclusion entirely clear. Christ and Jeremiah's teaching about submitting to injuries applied only where justice was neglected and in times of oppression. It does not apply in a well-ordered state.

In a well-ordered state where justice is administered every one is bound, if he would be accounted just, to demand penalties before the judge (see Lev:1), not for the sake of vengeance (Lev. xix:17, 18), but in order to defend justice and his country's laws, and to prevent the wicked rejoicing in their wickedness. All this is plainly in accordance with reason. I might cite many other examples in the same manner, but I think the foregoing are sufficient to explain my meaning and the utility of this method, and this is all my present purpose. Hitherto we have only shown how to investigate those passages of Scripture which treat of practical conduct, and which, therefore, are more easily examined, for on such subjects there was never really any controversy among the writers of the Bible.

In a well-ordered state where justice is administered, anyone who wants to be considered just must seek penalties through a judge (see Lev:1). The purpose must not be revenge (Lev. xix:17, 18), but to defend justice and the laws of their country. It must also be to prevent the wicked from rejoicing in their wickedness. All of this clearly agrees with reason. I could give many other examples along the same lines. But I think the examples already given are enough to explain my meaning and the usefulness of this method. That is all I aim to do here. So far, we have only shown how to study passages of Scripture dealing with practical conduct. These passages are therefore easier to examine, because the writers of the Bible never really disagreed on such matters.

The purely speculative passages cannot be so easily traced to their real meaning: the way becomes narrower, for as the prophets differed in matters speculative among themselves, and the narratives are in great measure adapted to the prejudices of each age, we must not, on any account infer the intention of one prophet from clearer passages in the writings of another; nor must we so explain his meaning, unless it is perfectly plain that the two prophets were at one in the matter.

The true meaning of purely theoretical passages is harder to uncover. Here, the path becomes narrower because the prophets disagreed on theoretical matters. Their narratives are also largely shaped by the prejudices of each age. So we must never infer one prophet’s intention from clearer passages in another prophet’s writings. Nor must we use those passages to explain the first prophet’s meaning, unless both prophets clearly agreed on the matter.

How we are to arrive at the intention of the prophets in such cases I will briefly explain. Here, too, we must begin from the most universal proposition, inquiring first from the most clear Scriptural statements what is the nature of prophecy or revelation, and wherein does it consist; then we must proceed to miracles, and so on to whatever is most general till we come to the opinions of a particular prophet, and, at last, to the meaning of a particular revelation, prophecy, history, or miracle. We have already pointed out that great caution is necessary not to confound the mind of a prophet or historian with the mind of the Holy Spirit and the truth of the matter; therefore I need not dwell further on the subject. I would, however, here remark concerning the meaning of revelation, that the present method only teaches us what the prophets really saw or heard, not what they desired to signify or represent by symbols. The latter may be guessed at but cannot be inferred with certainty from Scriptural premises.

I will briefly explain how we can discover what the prophets intended in such cases. Here, too, we must begin with the most general principle. First, we must examine the clearest statements in Scripture to learn the nature of prophecy or revelation and what it involves. Then we must turn to miracles and other general matters before examining the opinions of a particular prophet. Finally, we must consider the meaning of a particular revelation, prophecy, historical account, or miracle. We have already noted the need for great care here. We must not confuse a prophet’s or historian’s mind with the mind of the Holy Spirit or the truth of the matter. So I need not discuss this warning further. However, I would add one point about the meaning of revelation. This method tells us only what the prophets actually saw or heard, not what they intended their symbols to mean or represent. We may guess at the intended meaning of those symbols, but cannot establish it with certainty from Scripture.

We have thus shown the plan for interpreting Scripture, and have, at the same time, demonstrated that it is the one and surest way of investigating its true meaning. I am willing indeed to admit that those persons (if any such there be) would be more absolutely certainly right, who have received either a trustworthy tradition or an assurance from the prophets themselves, such as is claimed by the Pharisees; or who have a pontiff gifted with infallibility in the interpretation of Scripture, such as the Roman Catholics boast. But as we can never be perfectly sure, either of such a tradition or of the authority of the pontiff, we cannot found any certain conclusion on either: the one is denied by the oldest sect of Christians, the other by the oldest sect of Jews. Indeed, if we consider the series of years (to mention no other point) accepted by the Pharisees from their Rabbis, during which time they say they have handed down the tradition from Moses, we shall find that it is not correct, as I show elsewhere. Therefore such a tradition should be received with extreme suspicion; and although, according to our method, we are bound to consider as uncorrupted the tradition of the Jews, namely, the meaning of the Hebrew words which we received from them, we may accept the latter while retaining our doubts about the former.

We have now explained our method for interpreting Scripture. We have also shown that it is the only and surest way to discover Scripture’s true meaning. I am willing to admit that some people, if any such people exist, would have even greater certainty. They would need to have received a trustworthy tradition or an assurance from the prophets themselves, as the Pharisees claim. Or they would need a pontiff who interprets Scripture infallibly, as the Roman Catholics boast of having. But we can never be completely certain of either such a tradition or the pontiff’s authority. So we cannot base any certain conclusion on either. The oldest sect of Christians denies one, and the oldest sect of Jews denies the other. Indeed, consider just the chronology the Pharisees accept from their Rabbis, without mentioning any other point. This chronology covers the period during which they claim to have handed down the tradition from Moses. We will find that the chronology is incorrect, as I show elsewhere. We should therefore regard such a tradition with extreme suspicion. Yet our method requires us to regard one tradition received from the Jews as uncorrupted: the meaning of Hebrew words. We may accept these meanings while still doubting the tradition supposedly handed down from Moses.

No one has ever been able to change the meaning of a word in ordinary use, though many have changed the meaning of a particular sentence. Such a proceeding would be most difficult; for whoever attempted to change the meaning of a word, would be compelled, at the same time, to explain all the authors who employed it, each according to his temperament and intention, or else, with consummate cunning, to falsify them.

No one has ever been able to change the meaning of a word in everyday use. Yet many have changed the meaning of a particular sentence. Changing a word’s meaning would be extremely difficult. Anyone attempting it would also have to explain every author who used the word, accounting for each author’s temperament and intentions. Otherwise, they would have to use extraordinary cunning to misrepresent those authors.

Further, the masses and the learned alike preserve language, but it is only the learned who preserve the meaning of particular sentences and books: thus, we may easily imagine that the learned having a very rare book in their power, might change or corrupt the meaning of a sentence in it, but they could not alter the signification of the words; moreover, if anyone wanted to change the meaning of a common word he would not be able to keep up the change among posterity, or in common parlance or writing.

Further, ordinary people and scholars alike preserve language. But only scholars preserve the meaning of particular sentences and books. So we can easily imagine scholars with a very rare book under their control changing or corrupting a sentence’s meaning. But they could not change the meanings of the words. Moreover, if anyone wanted to change the meaning of a common word, they could not make the change last. The change would not survive among later generations or in everyday speech or writing.

For these and such-like reasons we may readily conclude that it would never enter into the mind of anyone to corrupt a language, though the intention of a writer may often have been falsified by changing his phrases or interpreting them amiss. As then our method (based on the principle that the knowledge of Scripture must be sought from itself alone) is the sole true one, we must evidently renounce any knowledge which it cannot furnish for the complete understanding of Scripture. I will now point out its difficulties and shortcomings, which prevent our gaining a complete and assured knowledge of the Sacred Text.

For these and similar reasons, we can readily conclude that no one would ever think of corrupting a language. Yet a writer’s intended meaning may often have been distorted by changing his wording or misinterpreting it. Our method rests on the principle that knowledge of Scripture must come from Scripture alone. Since our method is the only true one, we must clearly give up any knowledge our method cannot provide for a complete understanding of Scripture. I will now explain the method’s difficulties and shortcomings, which prevent us from gaining complete and certain knowledge of the Sacred Text.

Its first great difficulty consists in its requiring a thorough knowledge of the Hebrew language. Where is such knowledge to be obtained? The men of old who employed the Hebrew tongue have left none of the principles and bases of their language to posterity; we have from them absolutely nothing in the way of dictionary, grammar, or rhetoric.

Its first major difficulty is that it requires a thorough knowledge of Hebrew. Where can such knowledge be found? The ancient speakers of Hebrew left later generations no account of their language’s principles or foundations. They left us absolutely nothing in the way of a dictionary, grammar, or guide to rhetoric.

Now the Hebrew nation has lost all its grace and beauty (as one would expect after the defeats and persecutions it has gone through), and has only retained certain fragments of its language and of a few books. Nearly all the names of fruits, birds, and fishes, and many other words have perished in the wear and tear of time. Further, the meaning of many nouns and verbs which occur in the Bible are either utterly lost, or are subjects of dispute. And not only are these gone, but we are lacking in a knowledge of Hebrew phraseology. The devouring tooth of time has destroyed turns of expression peculiar to the Hebrews, so that we know them no more.

The Hebrew nation has now lost all its grace and beauty. This is only to be expected after the defeats and persecutions the nation has endured. Only fragments of its language and a few books remain. Nearly all the names of fruits, birds, and fish, along with many other words, have been lost over time. Further, the meanings of many nouns and verbs in the Bible are either completely lost or disputed. Beyond these losses, we also lack knowledge of Hebrew patterns of expression. Time has devoured the turns of phrase unique to the Hebrews, so we no longer know those expressions.

Therefore we cannot investigate as we would all the meanings of a sentence by the uses of the language; and there are many phrases of which the meaning is most obscure or altogether inexplicable, though the component words are perfectly plain.

Therefore, studying how the language is used cannot reveal all the meanings of a sentence as we would like. And many phrases have meanings that are very obscure or entirely inexplicable, though their individual words are perfectly clear.

To this impossibility of tracing the history of the Hebrew language must be added its particular nature and composition: these give rise to so many ambiguities that it is impossible to find a method which would enable us to gain a certain knowledge of all the statements in Scripture,⁷. In addition to the sources of ambiguities common to all languages, there are many peculiar to Hebrew. These, I think, it worth while to mention.

Besides the impossibility of tracing the history of the Hebrew language, we must consider its distinctive nature and structure. These create so many ambiguities that no method can give us certain knowledge of all the statements in Scripture,⁷. Besides the sources of ambiguity common to all languages, Hebrew has many of its own. I think these are worth mentioning.

Firstly, an ambiguity often arises in the Bible from our mistaking one letter for another similar one. The Hebrews divide the letters of the alphabet into five classes, according to the five organs of the month employed in pronouncing them, namely, the lips, the tongue, the teeth, the palate, and the throat. For instance, Alpha, Ghet, Hgain, He, are called gutturals, and are barely distinguishable, by any sign that we know, one from the other. El, which signifies to, is often taken for hgal, which signifies above, and vice versa. Hence sentences are often rendered rather ambiguous or meaningless.

First, ambiguity often arises in the Bible when we mistake one letter for another that looks similar. The Hebrews divide the alphabet into five groups, based on the five parts of the mouth used to pronounce letters. These are the lips, tongue, teeth, palate, and throat. For example, Alpha, Ghet, Hgain, and He are called gutturals. These letters are barely distinguishable from one another by any sign known to us. El, meaning to, is often mistaken for hgal, meaning above, and vice versa. As a result, sentences often become rather ambiguous or meaningless.

A second difficulty arises from the multiplied meaning of conjunctions and adverbs. For instance, vau serves promiscuously for a particle of union or of separation, meaning, and, but, because, however, then: ki, has seven or eight meanings, namely, wherefore, although, if, when, inasmuch as, because, a burning, &c., and so on with almost all particles.

A second difficulty comes from the many meanings of conjunctions and adverbs. For example, vau can either connect or separate ideas, meaning and, but, because, however, or then. The word ki has seven or eight meanings: therefore, although, if, when, since, because, a burning, and so on. Almost all particles have similarly varied meanings.

The third very fertile source of doubt is the fact that Hebrew verbs in the indicative mood lack the present, the past imperfect, the pluperfect, the future perfect, and other tenses most frequently employed in other languages; in the imperative and infinitive moods they are wanting in all except the present, and a subjunctive mood does not exist. Now, although all these defects in moods and tenses may be supplied by certain fundamental rules of the language with ease and even elegance, the ancient writers evidently neglected such rules altogether, and employed indifferently future for present and past, and vice versa past for future, and also indicative for imperative and subjunctive, with the result of considerable confusion.

The third major source of doubt is that Hebrew verbs lack many tenses. In the indicative mood, they lack the present, past imperfect, pluperfect, future perfect, and other tenses commonly used in other languages. In the imperative and infinitive moods, Hebrew verbs have only the present tense. There is no subjunctive mood. Although certain basic rules of Hebrew can fill all these gaps easily and even elegantly, ancient writers evidently ignored those rules altogether. They freely used the future tense for the present and past, and the past tense for the future. They also used the indicative mood for the imperative and subjunctive. These practices caused considerable confusion.

Besides these sources of ambiguity there are two others, one very important. Firstly, there are in Hebrew no vowels; secondly, the sentences are not separated by any marks elucidating the meaning or separating the clauses. Though the want of these two has generally been supplied by points and accents, such substitutes cannot be accepted by us, inasmuch as they were invented and designed by men of an after age whose authority should carry no weight. The ancients wrote without points (that is, without vowels and accents), as is abundantly testified; their descendants added what was lacking, according to their own ideas of Scriptural interpretation; wherefore the existing accents and points are simply current interpretations, and are no more authoritative than any other commentaries.

Besides these sources of ambiguity, there are two others, one of them very important. First, Hebrew has no vowels. Second, sentences have no marks to clarify their meaning or separate their clauses. Although points and accents have generally supplied these missing features, we cannot accept these substitutes. They were invented and designed by people of a later age, whose authority should carry no weight. There is abundant evidence that the ancients wrote without points (that is, without vowels and accents). Their descendants added what was missing, following their own ideas about how to interpret Scripture. So the existing accents and points are simply current interpretations, with no more authority than any other commentaries.

Those who are ignorant of this fact cannot justify the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews for interpreting (chap. xi:21) Genesis (xlvii:31) very differently from the version given in our Hebrew text as at present pointed, as though the Apostle had been obliged to learn the meaning of Scripture from those who added the points. In my opinion the latter are clearly wrong. In order that everyone may judge for himself, and also see how the discrepancy arose simply from the want of vowels, I will give both interpretations. Those who pointed our version read, "And Israel bent himself over, or (changing Hqain into Aleph, a similar letter) towards, the head of the bed." The author of the Epistle reads, "And Israel bent himself over the head of his staff," substituting mate for mita, from which it only differs in respect of vowels. Now as in this narrative it is Jacob's age only that is in question, and not his illness, which is not touched on till the next chapter, it seems more likely that the historian intended to say that Jacob bent over the head of his staff (a thing commonly used by men of advanced age for their support) than that he bowed himself at the head of his bed, especially as for the former reading no substitution of letters is required. In this example I have desired not only to reconcile the passage in the Epistle with the passage in Genesis, but also and chiefly to illustrate how little trust should be placed in the points and accents which are found in our present Bible, and so to prove that he who would be without bias in interpreting Scripture should hesitate about accepting them, and inquire afresh for himself. Such being the nature and structure of the Hebrew language, one may easily understand that many difficulties are likely to arise, and that no possible method could solve all of them. It is useless to hope for a way out of our difficulties in the comparison of various parallel passages (we have shown that the only method of discovering the true sense of a passage out of many alternative ones is to see what are the usages of the language), for this comparison of parallel passages can only accidentally throw light on a difficult point, seeing that the prophets never wrote with the express object of explaining their own phrases or those of other people, and also because we cannot infer the meaning of one prophet or apostle by the meaning of another, unless on a purely practical question, not when the matter is speculative, or if a miracle, or history is being narrated. I might illustrate my point with instances, for there are many inexplicable phrases in Scripture, but I would rather pass on to consider the difficulties and imperfections of the method under discussion.

People unaware of this fact cannot defend the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews for his interpretation of Genesis. In Hebrews (11:21), he reads Genesis (47:31) very differently from our Hebrew text with its present vowel marks. They act as though the Apostle had to learn Scripture’s meaning from those who added the vowel marks. In my opinion, those who added the marks are clearly wrong. I will give both interpretations so everyone can judge for themselves. This will also show how the discrepancy arose simply from the absence of vowels. Those who added the vowel marks to our version read, "And Israel bent himself over the head of the bed." Alternatively, they read "towards" instead of "over", changing Hqain into Aleph, a similar letter. The author of the Epistle reads, "And Israel bent himself over the head of his staff." He substitutes mate for mita, words that differ only in their vowels. Now this account concerns only Jacob's age, not his illness. His illness is not mentioned until the next chapter. So the historian more likely meant that Jacob bent over the head of his staff. Elderly men commonly use a staff for support. This reading seems more likely than saying that he bowed at the head of his bed. It is especially likely because the staff reading requires no change of letters. With this example, I have sought to reconcile the passage in the Epistle with the passage in Genesis. But my chief purpose is to show how little we should trust our present Bible’s vowel marks and accents. I therefore mean to show that anyone seeking to interpret Scripture without bias should hesitate to accept these marks. Such readers should investigate the meaning afresh for themselves. Given the nature and structure of Hebrew, we can easily understand why many difficulties are likely to arise. No possible method could solve them all. It is useless to hope that comparing parallel passages will resolve our difficulties. We have shown how to discover a passage’s true meaning when several interpretations are possible. The only method is to examine how the language is used. Comparing parallel passages can shed light on a difficult point only by chance. For the prophets never wrote expressly to explain their own expressions or those of other people. Nor can we infer one prophet’s or apostle’s meaning from another’s, except on a purely practical question. We cannot do so on speculative matters, or when a miracle or historical event is being recounted. I could illustrate my point with examples, since Scripture contains many expressions that cannot be explained. But I would rather move on to consider the difficulties and shortcomings of the method under discussion.

A further difficulty attends the method, from the fact that it requires the history of all that has happened to every book in the Bible; such a history we are often quite unable to furnish. Of the authors, or (if the expression be preferred), the writers of many of the books, we are either in complete ignorance, or at any rate in doubt, as I will point out at length. Further, we do not know either the occasions or the epochs when these books of unknown authorship were written; we cannot say into what hands they fell, nor how the numerous varying versions originated; nor, lastly, whether there were not other versions, now lost. I have briefly shown that such knowledge is necessary, but I passed over certain considerations which I will now draw attention to.

The method presents another difficulty because it requires a history of everything that has happened to every book in the Bible. We are often quite unable to provide such a history. For many books, we either know nothing about their authors or are at least uncertain who the authors were. Or we may call them writers, if that term is preferred. I will discuss this uncertainty at length. Further, we know neither the circumstances nor the dates when these books of unknown authorship were written. We cannot say whose hands the books passed through or how the many different versions arose. Nor, finally, do we know whether other versions once existed but are now lost. I have briefly shown why such knowledge is necessary. But I left out certain considerations that I will now discuss.

If we read a book which contains incredible or impossible narratives, or is written in a very obscure style, and if we know nothing of its author, nor of the time or occasion of its being written, we shall vainly endeavour to gain any certain knowledge of its true meaning. For being in ignorance on these points we cannot possibly know the aim or intended aim of the author; if we are fully informed, we so order our thoughts as not to be in any way prejudiced either in ascribing to the author or him for whom the author wrote either more or less than his meaning, and we only take into consideration what the author may have had in his mind, or what the time and occasion demanded. I think this must be tolerably evident to all.

Suppose we read a book containing unbelievable or impossible stories, or written in a very unclear style. If we know nothing about its author, or when or why the book was written, our efforts will be fruitless. We will gain no certain knowledge of its true meaning. Without this information, we cannot possibly know the author's aim or intended aim. If we have all this information, we can organize our thoughts without bias. We avoid attributing more or less than the author's meaning to either the author or the intended reader. We consider only what the author may have had in mind, or what the time and circumstances required. I think all of this must be reasonably clear to everyone.

It often happens that in different books we read histories in themselves similar, but which we judge very differently, according to the opinions we have formed of the authors. I remember once to have read in some book that a man named Orlando Furioso used to drive a kind of winged monster through the air, fly over any countries he liked, kill unaided vast numbers of men and giants, and such like fancies, which from the point of view of reason are obviously absurd. A very similar story I read in Ovid of Perseus, and also in the books of Judges and Kings of Samson, who alone and unarmed killed thousands of men, and of Elijah, who flew through the air, said at last went up to heaven in a chariot of fire, with horses of fire. All these stories are obviously alike, but we judge them very differently. The first only sought to amuse, the second had a political object, the third a religious object.We gather this simply from the opinions we had previously formed of the authors. Thus it is evidently necessary to know something of the authors of writings which are obscure or unintelligible, if we would interpret their meaning; and for the same reason, in order to choose the proper reading from among a great variety, we ought to have information as to the versions in which the differences are found, and as to the possibility of other readings having been discovered by persons of greater authority.

We often read similar stories in different books but judge them very differently, depending on our opinions of the authors. I remember once reading in some book about a man named Orlando Furioso. He used to ride a kind of winged monster through the air and fly over any countries he liked. He also killed vast numbers of men and giants without help, and performed other such imaginary feats. Judged by reason, these feats are obviously absurd. I read a very similar story about Perseus in Ovid, and others in the books of Judges and Kings. Samson, alone and unarmed, killed thousands of men. Elijah flew through the air and finally went up to heaven in a chariot of fire, with horses of fire. All these stories are obviously alike, but we judge them very differently. The first aimed only to entertain, the second had a political purpose, and the third had a religious purpose. We draw these conclusions simply from the opinions we had already formed of the authors. So we clearly need to know something about the authors of obscure or unintelligible writings if we want to understand their meaning. For the same reason, we need information about differing versions of a text to choose the correct reading among many alternatives. We need to know which versions contain the differences. We also need to know whether people with greater authority may have discovered other readings.

A further difficulty attends this method in the case of some of the books of Scripture, namely, that they are no longer extant in their original language. The Gospel according to Matthew, and certainly the Epistle to the Hebrews, were written, it is thought, in Hebrew, though they no longer exist in that form. Aben Ezra affirms in his commentaries that the book of Job was translated into Hebrew out of another language, and that its obscurity arises from this fact. I say nothing of the apocryphal books, for their authority stands on very inferior ground.

This method presents another difficulty with some books of Scripture: they no longer survive in their original language. The Gospel according to Matthew is thought to have been written in Hebrew, and certainly the Epistle to the Hebrews. Yet neither survives in Hebrew. Aben Ezra states in his commentaries that the book of Job was translated into Hebrew from another language. He says this translation is why the book is hard to understand. I say nothing about the apocryphal books, since their authority rests on a much weaker basis.

The foregoing difficulties in this method of interpreting Scripture from its own history, I conceive to be so great that I do not hesitate to say that the true meaning of Scripture is in many places inexplicable, or at best mere subject for guesswork; but I must again point out, on the other hand, that such difficulties only arise when we endeavour to follow the meaning of a prophet in matters which cannot be perceived, but only imagined, not in things, whereof the understanding can give a clear idea, and which are conceivable through themselves:⁸ matters which by their nature are easily perceived cannot be expressed so obscurely as to be unintelligible; as the proverb says, "a word is enough to the wise." Euclid, who only wrote of matters very simple and easily understood, can easily be comprehended by anyone in any language; we can follow his intention perfectly, and be certain of his true meaning, without having a thorough knowledge of the language in which he wrote; in fact, a quite rudimentary acquaintance is sufficient. We need make no researches concerning the life, the pursuits, or the habits of the author; nor need we inquire in what language, nor when he wrote, nor the vicissitudes of his book, nor its various readings, nor how, nor by whose advice it has been received.

I consider the difficulties described above in interpreting Scripture through its own history to be so great that I can say without hesitation: in many places, Scripture’s true meaning cannot be explained, or at best can only be guessed at. But I must again point out that these difficulties arise only when we try to understand a prophet’s meaning about certain matters. These are matters that cannot be understood, but only imagined. The difficulties do not concern things the mind can clearly grasp and understand through themselves:⁸ things that are naturally easy to understand cannot be expressed so obscurely that they become unintelligible. As the proverb says, "a word is enough to the wise." Euclid wrote only about very simple, easily understood matters, so anyone can easily understand him in any language. We can follow his intention perfectly and be certain of his true meaning without thoroughly knowing the language he used. In fact, a very basic knowledge of the language is enough. We need not research the author’s life, interests, or habits. Nor need we ask what language he wrote in, when he wrote, or what happened to his book over time. We need not examine the book’s variant readings, or ask how or on whose advice it came to be accepted.

What we here say of Euclid might equally be said of any book which treats of things by their nature perceptible: thus we conclude that we can easily follow the intention of Scripture in moral questions, from the history we possess of it, and we can be sure of its true meaning.

What we say here about Euclid applies equally to any book about things that are understandable by their nature. So we conclude that the history of Scripture available to us makes its purpose in moral matters easy to follow. We can also be sure of Scripture’s true meaning.

The precepts of true piety are expressed in very ordinary language, and are equally simple and easily understood. Further, as true salvation and blessedness consist in a true assent of the soul - and we truly assent only to what we clearly understand - it is most plain that we can follow with certainty the intention of Scripture in matters relating to salvation and necessary to blessedness; therefore, we need not be much troubled about what remains: such matters, inasmuch as we generally cannot grasp them with our reason and understanding, are more curious than profitable.

The teachings of true piety use everyday language and are just as simple and easy to understand. Moreover, true salvation and blessedness consist in the soul’s genuine acceptance of truth. And we genuinely accept only what we clearly understand. So we can clearly follow Scripture’s intended meaning with certainty on matters concerning salvation and necessary for blessedness. Therefore, we need not worry much about the rest. Since we generally cannot grasp these other matters through reason and understanding, they satisfy curiosity more than they benefit us.

I think I have now set forth the true method of Scriptural interpretation, and have sufficiently explained my own opinion thereon. Besides, I do not doubt that everyone will see that such a method only requires the aid of natural reason. The nature and efficacy of the natural reason consists in deducing and proving the unknown from the known, or in carrying premises to their legitimate conclusions; and these are the very processes which our method desiderates. Though we must admit that it does not suffice to explain everything in the Bible, such imperfection does not spring from its own nature, but from the fact that the path which it teaches us, as the true one, has never been tended or trodden by men, and has thus, by the lapse of time, become very difficult, and almost impassable, as, indeed, I have shown in the difficulties I draw attention to.

I think I have now presented the true method of interpreting Scripture and explained my own view well enough. Besides, I have no doubt everyone will see that this method needs only natural reason. Natural reason works by deducing and proving the unknown from the known, or by drawing valid conclusions from premises. These are exactly the processes our method requires. Although we must admit that this method cannot explain everything in the Bible, the limitation is not inherent in it. Rather, no one has ever maintained or followed the path this method shows us to be the true one. So, over time, the path has become very difficult and almost impossible to follow. Indeed, I have already shown this through the difficulties I have pointed out.

There only remains to examine the opinions of those who differ from me. The first which comes under our notice is, that the light of nature has no power to interpret Scripture, but that a supernatural faculty is required for the task. What is meant by this supernatural faculty I will leave to its propounders to explain. Personally, I can only suppose that they have adopted a very obscure way of stating their complete uncertainty about the true meaning of Scripture. If we look at their interpretations, they contain nothing supernatural, at least nothing but the merest conjectures.

All that remains is to examine the views of those who disagree with me. The first view is that natural reason has no power to interpret Scripture. Instead, a supernatural ability is needed for the task. I will leave those who propose this supernatural ability to explain what they mean by it. Personally, I can only suppose they have found a very obscure way to express their complete uncertainty about Scripture’s true meaning. If we look at their interpretations, we find nothing supernatural, or at least nothing beyond mere guesswork.

Let them be placed side by side with the interpretations of those who frankly confess that they have no faculty beyond their natural ones; we shall see that the two are just alike - both human, both long pondered over, both laboriously invented. To say that the natural reason is insufficient for such results is plainly untrue, firstly, for the reasons above stated, namely, that the difficulty of interpreting Scripture arises from no defect in human reason, but simply from the carelessness (not to say malice) of men who neglected the history of the Bible while there were still materials for inquiry; secondly, from the fact (admitted, I think, by all) that the supernatural faculty is a Divine gift granted only to the faithful. But the prophets and apostles did not preach to the faithful only, but chiefly to the unfaithful and wicked. Such persons, therefore, were able to understand the intention of the prophets and apostles, otherwise the prophets and apostles would have seemed to be preaching to little boys and infants, not to men endowed with reason. Moses, too, would have given his laws in vain, if they could only be comprehended by the faithful, who need no law. Indeed, those who demand supernatural faculties for comprehending the meaning of the prophets and apostles seem truly lacking in natural faculties, so that we should hardly suppose such persons the possessors of a Divine supernatural gift.

Compare these interpretations with those of people who openly admit to having only their natural abilities. We will see that both kinds are just alike: human, carefully thought over, and laboriously invented. To say that natural reason cannot produce such results is plainly false. First, as explained above, the difficulty of interpreting Scripture comes from no weakness in human reason. It comes simply from the carelessness, not to say malice, of people who neglected the Bible’s history. They neglected it while materials for studying that history were still available. Second, everyone, I think, admits that supernatural ability is a gift from God, granted only to the faithful. But the prophets and apostles preached not only to the faithful, but chiefly to unbelievers and the wicked. These people, therefore, could understand what the prophets and apostles meant. Otherwise, the prophets and apostles would have seemed to be preaching to little boys and infants, not to rational adults. Moses, too, would have given his laws in vain if only the faithful could understand them. The faithful need no law. Indeed, those who insist that understanding the prophets and apostles requires supernatural abilities seem truly lacking in natural abilities. So we could hardly suppose that such people possess a supernatural gift from God.

The opinion of Maimonides was widely different. He asserted that each passage in Scripture admits of various, nay, contrary, meanings; but that we could never be certain of any particular one till we knew that the passage, as we interpreted it, contained nothing contrary or repugnant to reason. If the literal meaning clashes with reason, though the passage seems in itself perfectly clear, it must be interpreted in some metaphorical sense. This doctrine he lays down very plainly in chap. xxv. part ii. of his book, "More Nebuchim," for he says: "Know that we shrink not from affirming that the world hath existed from eternity, because of what Scripture saith concerning the world's creation. For the texts which teach that the world was created are not more in number than those which teach that God hath a body; neither are the approaches in this matter of the world's creation closed, or even made hard to us: so that we should not be able to explain what is written, as we did when we showed that God hath no body, nay, peradventure, we could explain and make fast the doctrine of the world's eternity more easily than we did away with the doctrines that God hath a beatified body. Yet two things hinder me from doing as I have said, and believing that the world is eternal. As it hath been clearly shown that God hath not a body, we must perforce explain all those passages whereof the literal sense agreeth not with the demonstration, for sure it is that they can be so explained. But the eternity of the world hath not been so demonstrated, therefore it is not necessary to do violence to Scripture in support of some common opinion, whereof we might, at the bidding of reason, embrace the contrary."

Maimonides held a very different view. He argued that every passage in Scripture allows various, even contradictory, meanings. But we could never be certain of any particular meaning until we knew our interpretation contained nothing contrary to reason. If the literal meaning conflicts with reason, the passage must be interpreted metaphorically, even if it seems perfectly clear. He states this doctrine very plainly in chapter 25, part 2 of his book, "More Nebuchim." He says: "Understand that what Scripture says about creation is not what keeps us from affirming that the world has always existed. For passages teaching that the world was created are no more numerous than passages teaching that God has a body. Nor is the way to interpreting the creation passages closed to us, or even difficult. We could explain those passages just as we did when we showed that God has no body. Indeed, perhaps we could explain and establish the world's eternal existence more easily than we refuted the teaching that God has a blessed body. Yet two things keep me from taking this approach and believing that the world is eternal. Since it has been clearly demonstrated that God has no body, we must reinterpret every passage whose literal meaning contradicts that demonstration. For those passages can certainly be explained in another way. But the world's eternal existence has not been demonstrated in the same way. So there is no need to force Scripture to support a commonly held opinion whose opposite reason might lead us to accept."

Such are the words of Maimonides, and they are evidently sufficient to establish our point: for if he had been convinced by reason that the world is eternal, he would not have hesitated to twist and explain away the words of Scripture till he made them appear to teach this doctrine. He would have felt quite sure that Scripture, though everywhere plainly denying the eternity of the world, really intends to teach it. So that, however clear the meaning of Scripture may be, he would not feel certain of having grasped it, so long as he remained doubtful of the truth of what, was written. For we are in doubt whether a thing is in conformity with reason, or contrary thereto, so long as we are uncertain of its truth, and, consequently, we cannot be sure whether the literal meaning of a passage be true or false.

These are Maimonides’ words, and they clearly establish our point. For if reason had convinced him that the world is eternal, he would not have hesitated to twist Scripture’s words. He would have explained them away until they seemed to teach that doctrine. He would have been quite certain that Scripture really means to teach that the world is eternal. Yet Scripture plainly denies the world’s eternity everywhere. So, however clear Scripture’s meaning might be, he would not be certain he had understood it correctly. His uncertainty would last as long as he doubted the truth of what Scripture said. For as long as we are uncertain whether something is true, we cannot know whether it agrees with reason. Nor can we know whether it contradicts reason. Consequently, we cannot be sure whether a passage’s literal meaning is true or false.

If such a theory as this were sound, I would certainly grant that some faculty beyond the natural reason is required for interpreting Scripture. For nearly all things that we find in Scripture cannot be inferred from known principles of the natural reason, and, therefore, we should be unable to come to any conclusion about their truth, or about the real meaning and intention of Scripture, but should stand in need of some further assistance.

If this theory were sound, I would certainly agree that interpreting Scripture requires some ability beyond natural reason. For nearly everything we find in Scripture cannot be deduced from the known principles of natural reason. So we would be unable to reach any conclusion about the truth of what Scripture says. Nor could we determine Scripture’s real meaning and intent. Instead, we would need some further help.

Further, the truth of this theory would involve that the masses, having generally no comprehension of, nor leisure for, detailed proofs, would be reduced to receiving all their knowledge of Scripture on the authority and testimony of philosophers, and, consequently, would be compelled to suppose that the interpretations given by philosophers were infallible.

Further, if this theory were true, the masses would generally lack the understanding or time needed for detailed proofs. So they would have to base all their knowledge of Scripture on the authority and testimony of philosophers. As a result, they would be forced to assume that philosophers’ interpretations were infallible.

Truly this would be a new form of ecclesiastical authority, and a new sort of priests or pontiffs, more likely to excite men's ridicule than their veneration. Certainly our method demands a knowledge of Hebrew for which the masses have no leisure; but no such objection as the foregoing can be brought against us. For the ordinary Jews or Gentiles, to whom the prophets and apostles preached and wrote, understood the language, and, consequently, the intention of the prophet or apostle addressing them; but they did not grasp the intrinsic reason of what was preached, which, according to Maimonides, would be necessary for an understanding of it.

Indeed, this would be a new form of church authority and a new kind of priests or pontiffs. They would be more likely to inspire ridicule than reverence. Our method certainly requires knowledge of Hebrew, which ordinary people have no time to learn. But the objection just raised cannot be brought against us. For the ordinary Jews or Gentiles whom the prophets and apostles addressed in speech and writing understood the language. So these listeners and readers understood what the prophet or apostle meant. But they did not grasp the underlying reason for what was preached. According to Maimonides, grasping that reason would be necessary to understand the teaching.

There is nothing, then, in our method which renders it necessary that the masses should follow the testimony of commentators, for I point to a set of unlearned people who understood the language of the prophets and apostles; whereas Maimonides could not point to any such who could arrive at the prophetic or apostolic meaning through their knowledge of the causes of things.

So nothing in our method requires ordinary people to rely on the testimony of commentators. For I can point to people without formal learning who understood the language of the prophets and apostles. But Maimonides could not point to any such people who could understand the prophets or apostles through knowledge of the causes of things.

As to the multitude of our own time, we have shown that whatsoever is necessary to salvation, though its reasons may be unknown, can easily be understood in any language, because it is thoroughly ordinary and usual; it is in such understanding as this that the masses acquiesce, not in the testimony of commentators; with regard to other questions, the ignorant and the learned fare alike.

As for ordinary people today, we have shown that everything necessary for salvation is easily understood in any language. This remains true even if the reasons are unknown, because these teachings are entirely familiar and commonplace. Ordinary people are satisfied with this understanding, not with what commentators say. On other questions, the uneducated and the educated are in the same position.

But let us return to the opinion of Maimonides, and examine it more closely. In the first place, he supposes that the prophets were in entire agreement one with another, and that they were consummate philosophers and theologians; for he would have them to have based their conclusions on the absolute truth. Further, he supposes that the sense of Scripture cannot be made plain from Scripture itself, for the truth of things is not made plain therein (in that it does not prove any thing, nor teach the matters of which it speaks through their definitions and first causes), therefore, according to Maimonides, the true sense of Scripture cannot be made plain from itself, and must not be there sought.

But let us return to Maimonides’ view and examine it more closely. First, he assumes that the prophets agreed completely with one another and were accomplished philosophers and theologians. For he holds that the prophets based their conclusions on absolute truth. He also assumes that Scripture’s meaning cannot be made clear from Scripture itself, because Scripture does not reveal the truth about things. Scripture proves nothing and does not explain its subjects through their definitions and first causes. Therefore, according to Maimonides, Scripture’s true meaning cannot be made clear from Scripture itself and must not be sought there.

The falsity of such a doctrine is shown in this very chapter, for we have shown both by reason and examples that the meaning of Scripture is only made plain through Scripture itself, and even in questions deducible from ordinary knowledge should be looked for from no other source.

This very chapter shows that such a doctrine is false. For we have shown, through both reasoning and examples, that Scripture’s meaning becomes clear only through Scripture itself. Even on questions answerable through ordinary knowledge, we should look for Scripture’s meaning in no other source.

Lastly, such a theory supposes that we may explain the words of Scripture according to our preconceived opinions, twisting them about, and reversing or completely changing the literal sense, however plain it may be. Such licence is utterly opposed to the teaching of this and the preceding chapters, and, moreover, will be evident to everyone as rash and excessive.

Finally, such a theory assumes we may interpret Scripture according to our preconceived opinions. It allows us to twist Scripture’s words, reversing or completely changing their literal meaning, however clear that meaning may be. Such freedom completely contradicts the teachings of this chapter and the preceding chapters. Moreover, everyone will recognize such freedom as reckless and excessive.

But if we grant all this licence, what can it effect after all? Absolutely nothing. Those things which cannot be demonstrated, and which make up the greater part of Scripture, cannot be examined by reason, and cannot therefore be explained or interpreted by this rule; whereas, on the contrary, by following our own method, we can explain many questions of this nature, and discuss them on a sure basis, as we have already shown, by reason and example. Those matters which are by their nature comprehensible we can easily explain, as has been pointed out, simply by means of the context.

But even if we allow all this freedom, what can it achieve in the end? Absolutely nothing. Matters that cannot be proved make up most of Scripture. Reason cannot examine these matters, so this rule cannot explain or interpret them. By contrast, our own method lets us explain many such questions and discuss them on a firm foundation. We have already shown this through reasoning and examples. As we have pointed out, matters that are understandable by their nature can easily be explained from the context alone.

Therefore, the method of Maimonides is clearly useless: to which we may add, that it does away with all the certainty which the masses acquire by candid reading, or which is gained by any other persons in any other way. In conclusion, then, we dismiss Maimonides' theory as harmful, useless, and absurd.

Therefore, Maimonides' method is clearly useless. We may add that the method destroys all the certainty ordinary people gain from an honest reading. It also destroys all the certainty anyone else gains in any other way. In conclusion, then, we reject Maimonides' theory as harmful, useless, and absurd.

As to the tradition of the Pharisees, we have already shown that it is not consistent, while the authority of the popes of Rome stands in need of more credible evidence; the latter, indeed, I reject simply on this ground, for if the popes could point out to us the meaning of Scripture as surely as did the high priests of the Jews, I should not be deterred by the fact that there have been heretic and impious Roman pontiffs; for among the Hebrew high-priests of old there were also heretics and impious men who gained the high- priesthood by improper means, but who, nevertheless, had Scriptural sanction for their supreme power of interpreting the law. (See Deut. xvii:11, 12, and xxxiii:10, also Malachi ii:8.)

We have already shown that the tradition of the Pharisees is inconsistent. The authority of the popes of Rome, meanwhile, needs more credible evidence. I reject their authority for this reason alone. Suppose the popes could explain Scripture’s meaning as reliably as the high priests of the Jews did. Then the fact that some Roman pontiffs have been heretics and impious men would not deter me. For among the ancient Hebrew high priests, there were also heretics and impious men who gained their office improperly. Yet Scripture authorized even these men to exercise supreme authority in interpreting the law. (See Deut. 17:11, 12, and 33:10, also Malachi 2:8.)

However, as the popes can show no such sanction, their authority remains open to very grave doubt, nor should anyone be deceived by the example of the Jewish high-priests and think that the Catholic religion also stands in need of a pontiff; he should bear in mind that the laws of Moses being also the ordinary laws of the country, necessarily required some public authority to insure their observance; for, if everyone were free to interpret the laws of his country as he pleased, no state could stand, but would for that very reason be dissolved at once, and public rights would become private rights.

However, since the popes can show no such authorization, their authority remains open to very serious doubt. Nor should anyone be misled by the example of the Jewish high priests into thinking Catholicism also needs a pontiff. Remember that the laws of Moses were also the ordinary laws of the country. For that reason, some public authority was necessary to ensure those laws were obeyed. For if everyone were free to interpret their country’s laws as they pleased, no state could survive. That very freedom would cause the state to collapse at once, and public rights would become private rights.

With religion the case is widely different. Inasmuch as it consists not so much in outward actions as in simplicity and truth of character, it stands outside the sphere of law and public authority. Simplicity and truth of character are not produced by the constraint of laws, nor by the authority of the state, no one the whole world over can be forced or legislated into a state of blessedness; the means required for such a consummation are faithful and brotherly admonition, sound education, and, above all, free use of the individual judgment.

Religion is very different. Religion consists less in outward actions than in sincerity and honesty of character. For that reason, religion lies outside the scope of law and public authority. Neither legal pressure nor state authority can produce sincerity and honesty of character. No one anywhere can be forced into blessedness, nor can laws bring anyone into that state. Reaching blessedness requires sincere, brotherly guidance, sound education, and, above all, the freedom to use one's own judgment.

Therefore, as the supreme right of free thinking, even on religion, is in every man's power, and as it is inconceivable that such power could be alienated, it is also in every man's power to wield the supreme right and authority of free judgment in this behalf, and to explain and interpret religion for himself. The only reason for vesting the supreme authority in the interpretation of law, and judgment on public affairs in the hands of the magistrates, is that it concerns questions of public right. Similarly the supreme authority in explaining religion, and in passing judgment thereon, is lodged with the individual because it concerns questions of individual right. So far, then, from the authority of the Hebrew high-priests telling in confirmation of the authority of the Roman pontiffs to interpret religion, it would rather tend to establish individual freedom of judgment. Thus in this way also, we have shown that our method of interpreting Scripture is the best. For as the highest power of Scriptural interpretation belongs to every man, the rule for such interpretation should be nothing but the natural light of reason which is common to all - not any supernatural light nor any external authority; moreover, such a rule ought not to be so difficult that it can only be applied by very skilful philosophers, but should be adapted to the natural and ordinary faculties and capacity of mankind. And such I have shown our method to be, for such difficulties as it has arise from men's carelessness, and are no part of its nature.

Everyone has the highest right to think freely, even about religion. It is inconceivable that anyone could give up this power. Therefore, everyone also has the highest right and authority to judge religious matters freely and interpret religion for themselves. The sole reason magistrates hold the highest authority to interpret laws and judge public affairs is that these concern public rights. Similarly, individuals hold the highest authority to explain religion and judge religious matters because these concern individual rights. So the authority of the Hebrew high-priests does not support the Roman pontiffs’ authority to interpret religion. Rather, it would tend to establish individual freedom of judgment. In this way, too, we have shown that our method of interpreting Scripture is the best. For everyone holds the highest authority to interpret Scripture. So the only standard for interpretation should be the natural light of reason, which everyone shares. It should not be any supernatural light or external authority. Moreover, this standard should not be so difficult that only highly skilled philosophers can apply it. Instead, it should suit the natural, ordinary abilities and understanding of human beings. And I have shown that our method meets this requirement. Whatever difficulties the method presents arise from people’s carelessness, not from the nature of the method itself.