How Town Trade Improved the Countryside

The increase and riches of commercial and manufacturing towns contributed to the improvement and cultivation of the countries to which they belonged, in three different ways.

The growth and wealth of trading and manufacturing towns helped improve and cultivate the surrounding countryside in three ways.

First, by affording a great and ready market for the rude produce of the country, they gave encouragement to its cultivation and further improvement. This benefit was not even confined to the countries in which they were situated, but extended more or less to all those with which they had any dealings. To all of them they afforded a market for some part either of their rude or manufactured produce, and, consequently, gave some encouragement to the industry and improvement of all. Their own country, however, on account of its neighbourhood, necessarily derived the greatest benefit from this market. Its rude produce being charged with less carriage, the traders could pay the growers a better price for it, and yet afford it as cheap to the consumers as that of more distant countries.

First, they provided a large and readily available market for the country's raw produce. This encouraged cultivation and further improvement. The benefit was not limited to the countries where they were located. It also extended, to varying degrees, to all the countries they traded with. They provided a market for some of the raw or manufactured goods of all those countries. As a result, they encouraged industry and improvement in all of them. Their own country, however, necessarily benefited most from this market because it was nearby. Its raw produce cost less to transport. Traders could therefore pay growers a better price and still sell the produce to consumers as cheaply as goods from more distant countries.

Secondly, the wealth acquired by the inhabitants of cities was frequently employed in purchasing such lands as were to be sold, of which a great part would frequently be uncultivated. Merchants are commonly ambitious of becoming country gentlemen, and, when they do, they are generally the best of all improvers. A merchant is accustomed to employ his money chiefly in profitable projects; whereas a mere country gentleman is accustomed to employ it chiefly in expense. The one often sees his money go from him, and return to him again with a profit; the other, when once he parts with it, very seldom expects to see any more of it. Those different habits naturally affect their temper and disposition in every sort of business. The merchant is commonly a bold, a country gentleman a timid undertaker. The one is not afraid to lay out at once a large capital upon the improvement of his land, when he has a probable prospect of raising the value of it in proportion to the expense; the other, if he has any capital, which is not always the case, seldom ventures to employ it in this manner. If he improves at all, it is commonly not with a capital, but with what he can save out or his annual revenue. Whoever has had the fortune to live in a mercantile town, situated in an unimproved country, must have frequently observed how much more spirited the operations of merchants were in this way, than those of mere country gentlemen. The habits, besides, of order, economy, and attention, to which mercantile business naturally forms a merchant, render him much fitter to execute, with profit and success, any project of improvement.

Secondly, city residents often used their wealth to buy land that was for sale. Much of this land was often uncultivated. Merchants commonly aspire to become country gentlemen. When they do, they are generally the best at improving land. A merchant is used to putting his money mainly into profitable projects. A country gentleman, by contrast, is used to spending it mainly on expenses. The merchant often sees his money leave him and return with a profit. Once the country gentleman spends his money, he rarely expects to see any more of it. These different habits naturally affect their attitudes and dispositions in every kind of business. The merchant is generally bold in undertaking projects, while the country gentleman is cautious. The merchant is not afraid to invest a large sum at once in improving his land. He will do so when he has a reasonable prospect of raising its value in proportion to the expense. The country gentleman rarely ventures to invest his capital in this way, if he has any at all. If he makes improvements, he usually pays for them with savings from his annual income rather than with capital. Anyone who has lived in a trading town surrounded by unimproved land must have often noticed the difference. Merchants improved land much more energetically than country gentlemen did. Business also naturally teaches merchants habits of order, thrift, and attention. These habits make them much better suited to carry out any improvement project successfully and profitably.

Thirdly, and lastly, commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and with them the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived almost in a continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile dependency upon their superiors. This, though it has been the least observed, is by far the most important of all their effects. Mr Hume is the only writer who, so far as I know, has hitherto taken notice of it.

Third and last, trade and manufacturing gradually brought order and good government to the people of the countryside. They also brought people freedom and security. Before this, country people had lived in an almost constant state of war with their neighbors and in servile dependence on their superiors. Though this effect has received the least attention, it is by far the most important of all. As far as I know, Mr Hume is the only writer who has noticed it so far.

In a country which has neither foreign commerce nor any of the finer manufactures, a great proprietor, having nothing for which he can exchange the greater part of the produce of his lands which is over and above the maintenance of the cultivators, consumes the whole in rustic hospitality at home. If this surplus produce is sufficient to maintain a hundred or a thousand men, he can make use of it in no other way than by maintaining a hundred or a thousand men. He is at all times, therefore, surrounded with a multitude of retainers and dependants, who, having no equivalent to give in return for their maintenance, but being fed entirely by his bounty, must obey him, for the same reason that soldiers must obey the prince who pays them. Before the extension of commerce and manufactures in Europe, the hospitality of the rich and the great, from the sovereign down to the smallest baron, exceeded every thing which, in the present times, we can easily form a notion of Westminster-hall was the dining-room of William Rufus, and might frequently, perhaps, not be too large for his company. It was reckoned a piece of magnificence in Thomas Becket, that he strewed the floor of his hall with clean hay or rushes in the season, in order that the knights and squires, who could not get seats, might not spoil their fine clothes when they sat down on the floor to eat their dinner. The great Earl of Warwick is said to have entertained every day, at his different manors, 30,000 people; and though the number here may have been exaggerated, it must, however, have been very great to admit of such exaggeration. A hospitality nearly of the same kind was exercised not many years ago in many different parts of the Highlands of Scotland. It seems to be common in all nations to whom commerce and manufactures are little known. I have seen, says Doctor Pocock, an Arabian chief dine in the streets of a town where he had come to sell his cattle, and invite all passengers, even common beggars, to sit down with him and partake of his banquet.

In a country with neither foreign trade nor fine manufactured goods, a great landowner has little to buy with his surplus produce. This is the produce left after maintaining the people who farm his land. So he consumes it all at home, offering generous hospitality in a rustic setting. If the surplus can feed a hundred or a thousand men, he can use it only by maintaining that many. He is therefore always surrounded by many retainers and dependants. They have nothing to give in return for their upkeep and are fed entirely by his generosity. So they must obey him, just as soldiers must obey the prince who pays them. Before trade and manufacturing expanded in Europe, the hospitality of the rich and powerful was almost beyond our imagination today. This was true of everyone from the sovereign down to the smallest baron. Westminster-hall was William Rufus's dining room, and it may often have been no larger than his company required. Thomas Becket showed his magnificence by spreading clean hay or rushes on his hall floor when they were in season. Knights and squires who could not find seats could then sit on the floor to eat without spoiling their fine clothes. The great Earl of Warwick is said to have entertained 30,000 people every day at his various manors. Although that number may be exaggerated, the number must have been very large to allow for such an exaggeration. Not many years ago, much the same kind of hospitality was practiced in many parts of the Highlands of Scotland. It seems common to all nations where trade and manufacturing are little known. Doctor Pocock says he saw an Arabian chief dining in the street of a town where he had come to sell cattle. The chief invited everyone passing by, even common beggars, to sit down and share his feast.

The occupiers of land were in every respect as dependent upon the great proprietor as his retainers. Even such of them as were not in a state of villanage, were tenants at will, who paid a rent in no respect equivalent to the subsistence which the land afforded them. A crown, half a crown, a sheep, a lamb, was some years ago, in the Highlands of Scotland, a common rent for lands which maintained a family. In some places it is so at this day; nor will money at present purchase a greater quantity of commodities there than in other places. In a country where the surplus produce of a large estate must be consumed upon the estate itself, it will frequently be more convenient for the proprietor, that part of it be consumed at a distance from his own house, provided they who consume it are as dependent upon him as either his retainers or his menial servants. He is thereby saved from the embarrassment of either too large a company, or too large a family. A tenant at will, who possesses land sufficient to maintain his family for little more than a quit-rent, is as dependent upon the proprietor as any servant or retainer whatever, and must obey him with as little reserve. Such a proprietor, as he feeds his servants and retainers at his own house, so he feeds his tenants at their houses. The subsistence of both is derived from his bounty, and its continuance depends upon his good pleasure.

Those who occupied the land were just as dependent on the great landowner as his retainers were. Even those who were not serfs were tenants at will. They paid rent that was nowhere near equal to the living the land provided them. Some years ago, in the Highlands of Scotland, a common rent for land that supported a family was a crown, half a crown, a sheep, or a lamb. In some places this is still the case today. Yet money now buys no more goods there than elsewhere. In a country where a large estate’s surplus produce must be consumed on the estate itself, the landowner will often find it more convenient for some of it to be consumed away from his own house. This is so, provided those who consume it are as dependent on him as his retainers or household servants. He is thereby spared the inconvenience of having either too many guests or too large a household. A tenant at will may have enough land to support his family for little more than a token rent. Such a tenant is as dependent on the landowner as any servant or retainer and must obey him just as completely. Just as the landowner feeds his servants and retainers in his own house, he feeds his tenants in theirs. Both depend on his generosity for their living, and both continue to receive it only as long as he pleases.

Upon the authority which the great proprietors necessarily had, in such a state of things, over their tenants and retainers, was founded the power of the ancient barons. They necessarily became the judges in peace, and the leaders in war, of all who dwelt upon their estates. They could maintain order, and execute the law, within their respective demesnes, because each of them could there turn the whole force of all the inhabitants against the injustice of anyone. No other person had sufficient authority to do this. The king, in particular, had not. In those ancient times, he was little more than the greatest proprietor in his dominions, to whom, for the sake of common defence against their common enemies, the other great proprietors paid certain respects. To have enforced payment of a small debt within the lands of a great proprietor, where all the inhabitants were armed, and accustomed to stand by one another, would have cost the king, had he attempted it by his own authority, almost the same effort as to extinguish a civil war. He was, therefore, obliged to abandon the administration of justice, through the greater part of the country, to those who were capable of administering it; and, for the same reason, to leave the command of the country militia to those whom that militia would obey.

The power of the ancient barons rested on the authority that great landowners necessarily held over their tenants and retainers. They necessarily became judges in peacetime and leaders in wartime for everyone who lived on their estates. They could keep order and enforce the law on their lands. Each could turn the combined force of all the inhabitants against any person who acted unjustly. No one else had enough authority to do this. The king, in particular, did not. In those days, the king was little more than the greatest landowner in his kingdom. The other great landowners showed him a certain respect for the sake of their common defense against shared enemies. Suppose he had tried to enforce payment of a small debt on a great landowner's estate. All the inhabitants were armed and accustomed to standing by one another. To enforce payment by his own authority would have taken the king almost as much effort as ending a civil war. He therefore had to leave the administration of justice in most of the country to those capable of carrying it out. For the same reason, he had to leave command of the country militia to those it would obey.

It is a mistake to imagine that those territorial jurisdictions took their origin from the feudal law. Not only the highest jurisdictions, both civil and criminal, but the power of levying troops, of coining money, and even that of making bye-laws for the government of their own people, were all rights possessed allodially by the great proprietors of land, several centuries before even the name of the feudal law was known in Europe. The authority and jurisdiction of the Saxon lords in England appear to have been as great before the Conquest as that of any of the Norman lords after it. But the feudal law is not supposed to have become the common law of England till after the Conquest. That the most extensive authority and jurisdictions were possessed by the great lords in France allodially, long before the feudal law was introduced into that country, is a matter of fact that admits of no doubt. That authority, and those jurisdictions, all necessarily flowed from the state of property and manners just now described. Without remounting to the remote antiquities of either the French or English monarchies, we may find, in much later times, many proofs that such effects must always flow from such causes. It is not thirty years ago since Mr Cameron of Lochiel, a gentleman of Lochaber in Scotland, without any legal warrant whatever, not being what was then called a lord of regality, nor even a tenant in chief, but a vassal of the Duke of Argyll, and with out being so much as a justice of peace, used, notwithstanding, to exercise the highest criminal jurisdictions over his own people. He is said to have done so with great equity, though without any of the formalities of justice; and it is not improbable that the state of that part of the country at that time made it necessary for him to assume this authority, in order to maintain the public peace. That gentleman, whose rent never exceeded £500 a-year, carried, in 1745, 800 of his own people into the rebellion with him.

It is a mistake to think that these territorial jurisdictions originated in feudal law. Great landowners held these rights allodially, as owners of land not subject to a feudal lord. They held them several centuries before even the name of feudal law was known in Europe. These rights included not only the highest civil and criminal jurisdictions, but also the power to raise troops, coin money, and make bylaws governing their own people. In England, the Saxon lords’ authority and jurisdiction seem to have been as great before the Conquest as those of any Norman lord afterward. Yet feudal law is not thought to have become England’s common law until after the Conquest. In France, there can be no doubt that the great lords held the most extensive authority and jurisdictions allodially, long before feudal law was introduced there. All that authority and jurisdiction necessarily arose from the state of property and customs just described. We need not go back to the distant past of the French or English monarchies to find proof of this. Much later times provide many examples showing that such causes must always produce such effects. Less than thirty years ago, Mr Cameron of Lochiel, a gentleman of Lochaber in Scotland, exercised the highest criminal jurisdiction over his own people. He did so without any legal authority. He was not what was then called a lord of regality, or even a tenant in chief. He was a vassal of the Duke of Argyll, and was not even a justice of the peace. He is said to have exercised this jurisdiction with great fairness, though without any of the formalities of justice. It is quite possible that conditions in that part of the country made it necessary for him to assume this authority to maintain the public peace. In 1745, this gentleman, whose rent never exceeded £500 a year, led 800 of his own people into the rebellion.

The introduction of the feudal law, so far from extending, may be regarded as an attempt to moderate, the authority of the great allodial lords. It established a regular subordination, accompanied with a long train of services and duties, from the king down to the smallest proprietor. During the minority of the proprietor, the rent, together with the management of his lands, fell into the hands of his immediate superior; and, consequently, those of all great proprietors into the hands of the king, who was charged with the maintenance and education of the pupil, and who, from his authority as guardian, was supposed to have a right of disposing of him in marriage, provided it was in a manner not unsuitable to his rank. But though this institution necessarily tended to strengthen the authority of the king, and to weaken that of the great proprietors, it could not do either sufficiently for establishing order and good government among the inhabitants of the country; because it could not alter sufficiently that state of property and manners from which the disorders arose. The authority of government still continued to be, as before, too weak in the head, and too strong in the inferior members; and the excessive strength of the inferior members was the cause of the weakness of the head. After the institution of feudal subordination, the king was as incapable of restraining the violence of the great lords as before. They still continued to make war according to their own discretion, almost continually upon one another, and very frequently upon the king; and the open country still continued to be a scene of violence, rapine, and disorder.

The introduction of feudal law, far from extending the authority of the great allodial lords, may be seen as an attempt to limit it. The law established a clear hierarchy from the king down to the smallest landowner, with many services and duties at each level. While a landowner was a minor, the landowner’s immediate superior received the rent and managed the land. As a result, the king received the rents and managed the lands of all great landowners who were minors. The king was responsible for their care and education. As their guardian, he was also supposed to have the right to arrange their marriages, provided the matches were suitable to their rank. But although this system necessarily tended to strengthen the king’s authority and weaken that of the great landowners, it could not do either enough to establish order and good government among the people of the country. This was because it could not sufficiently change the pattern of landownership and the customs that caused the disorder. As before, government authority remained too weak at the top and too strong at the lower levels. The excessive strength of those at the lower levels caused the weakness at the top. After the feudal hierarchy was established, the king was still no more able to restrain the violence of the great lords. They continued to make war as they pleased, almost constantly against one another and very often against the king. The countryside remained a scene of violence, plunder, and disorder.

But what all the violence of the feudal institutions could never have effected, the silent and insensible operation of foreign commerce and manufactures gradually brought about. These gradually furnished the great proprietors with something for which they could exchange the whole surplus produce of their lands, and which they could consume themselves, without sharing it either with tenants or retainers. All for ourselves, and nothing for other people, seems, in every age of the world, to have been the vile maxim of the masters of mankind. As soon, therefore, as they could find a method of consuming the whole value of their rents themselves, they had no disposition to share them with any other persons. For a pair of diamond buckles, perhaps, or for something as frivolous and useless, they exchanged the maintenance, or, what is the same thing, the price of the maintenance of 1000 men for a year, and with it the whole weight and authority which it could give them. The buckles, however, were to be all their own, and no other human creature was to have any share of them; whereas, in the more ancient method of expense, they must have shared with at least 1000 people. With the judges that were to determine the preference, this difference was perfectly decisive; and thus, for the gratification of the most childish, the meanest, and the most sordid of all vanities they gradually bartered their whole power and authority.

But foreign trade and manufacturing gradually achieved what all the violence of feudal institutions never could. They did so quietly and almost imperceptibly. They gradually gave the great landowners something to buy with all the surplus produce of their lands. The landowners could consume these goods themselves, without sharing them with tenants or retainers. All for ourselves, and nothing for other people, seems to have been the vile rule of mankind’s masters in every age. So, once landowners could consume the full value of their rents themselves, they had no desire to share it. Perhaps they exchanged the cost of supporting 1,000 men for a year for a pair of diamond buckles. Or perhaps they exchanged it for something equally frivolous and useless. Along with that support, they gave up all the influence and authority it could give them. But the buckles would be entirely their own. No other human being would have any share of them. Under the older way of spending, they would have had to share with at least 1,000 people. For the landowners making the choice, this difference settled the matter completely. So, to satisfy the most childish, meanest, and most sordid of all vanities, they gradually traded away all their power and authority.

In a country where there is no foreign commerce, nor any of the finer manufactures, a man of £10,000 a-year cannot well employ his revenue in any other way than in maintaining, perhaps, 1000 families, who are all of them necessarily at his command. In the present state of Europe, a man of £10,000 a-year can spend his whole revenue, and he generally does so, without directly maintaining twenty people, or being able to command more than ten footmen, not worth the commanding. Indirectly, perhaps, he maintains as great, or even a greater number of people, than he could have done by the ancient method of expense. For though the quantity of precious productions for which he exchanges his whole revenue be very small, the number of workmen employed in collecting and preparing it must necessarily have been very great. Its great price generally arises from the wages of their labour, and the profits of all their immediate employers. By paying that price, he indirectly pays all those wages and profits, and thus indirectly contributes to the maintenance of all the workmen and their employers. He generally contributes, however, but a very small proportion to that of each; to a very few, perhaps, not a tenth, to many not a hundredth, and to some not a thousandth, or even a ten thousandth part of their whole annual maintenance. Though he contributes, therefore, to the maintenance of them all, they are all more or less independent of him, because generally they can all be maintained without him.

In a country with no foreign trade or fine manufactured goods, a man with an income of £10,000 a year has little choice in how to spend it. He can maintain perhaps 1,000 families, all of whom are necessarily at his command. In Europe today, a man with £10,000 a year can spend his entire income, and generally does. Yet he can do so without directly maintaining 20 people or commanding more than 10 footmen, who are not worth commanding. Indirectly, perhaps, he maintains as many people as he could have done under the old way of spending, or even more. He exchanges his entire income for a very small quantity of valuable goods. But a great many workers must have been employed to gather and prepare them. Their high price generally comes from the workers’ wages and the profits of those who directly employ them. By paying that price, he indirectly pays all those wages and profits. In this way, he indirectly helps maintain all the workers and their employers. Usually, however, he contributes only a very small part of each person’s support. For a very few, perhaps, he contributes less than a tenth of what they need for the year. For many, he contributes less than a hundredth, and for some, less than a thousandth or even a ten thousandth. So, although he helps maintain them all, they are all more or less independent of him. Generally, they can all support themselves without him.

When the great proprietors of land spend their rents in maintaining their tenants and retainers, each of them maintains entirely all his own tenants and all his own retainers. But when they spend them in maintaining tradesmen and artificers, they may, all of them taken together, perhaps maintain as great, or, on account of the waste which attends rustic hospitality, a greater number of people than before. Each of them, however, taken singly, contributes often but a very small share to the maintenance of any individual of this greater number. Each tradesman or artificer derives his subsistence from the employment, not of one, but of a hundred or a thousand different customers. Though in some measure obliged to them all, therefore, he is not absolutely dependent upon any one of them.

When great landowners spend their rents supporting their tenants and retainers, each landowner fully supports all his own tenants and retainers. But when they spend their rents supporting tradespeople and craftspeople, they may collectively support as many people as before. They may even support more, because of the waste involved in country hospitality. Yet each landowner often contributes only a very small share of any one person’s support. Each tradesperson or craftsperson earns a living by serving not one customer, but hundreds or thousands of different customers. So, although each owes something to all those customers, none is absolutely dependent on any one of them.

The personal expense of the great proprietors having in this manner gradually increased, it was impossible that the number of their retainers should not as gradually diminish, till they were at last dismissed altogether. The same cause gradually led them to dismiss the unnecessary part of their tenants. Farms were enlarged, and the occupiers of land, notwithstanding the complaints of depopulation, reduced to the number necessary for cultivating it, according to the imperfect state of cultivation and improvement in those times. By the removal of the unnecessary mouths, and by exacting from the farmer the full value of the farm, a greater surplus, or, what is the same thing, the price of a greater surplus, was obtained for the proprietor, which the merchants and manufacturers soon furnished him with a method of spending upon his own person, in the same manner as he had done the rest. The cause continuing to operate, he was desirous to raise his rents above what his lands, in the actual state of their improvement, could afford. His tenants could agree to this upon one condition only, that they should be secured in their possession for such a term of years as might give them time to recover, with profit, whatever they should lay out in the further improvement of the land. The expensive vanity of the landlord made him willing to accept of this condition; and hence the origin of long leases.

As the great landowners gradually spent more on themselves, the number of their retainers inevitably fell. Eventually, they dismissed them all. For the same reason, they gradually dismissed the tenants they did not need. Farms grew larger, and fewer people occupied the land, despite complaints of depopulation. Only the number needed to cultivate it remained, given the imperfect state of farming and improvement at the time. By removing these unnecessary mouths and charging farmers the full value of their farms, landowners obtained a greater surplus, or the price of a greater surplus. Merchants and manufacturers soon gave them a way to spend it on themselves, just as they had spent the rest. As this process continued, landowners wanted to raise rents above what their land could support in its current state of improvement. Their tenants could agree to this on one condition only. They needed a secure right to occupy the land for enough years to recover, with a profit, whatever they spent on further improvements. The landowners’ costly vanity made them willing to accept this condition. This was the origin of long leases.

Even a tenant at will, who pays the full value of the land, is not altogether dependent upon the landlord. The pecuniary advantages which they receive from one another are mutual and equal, and such a tenant will expose neither his life nor his fortune in the service of the proprietor. But if he has a lease for a long term of years he is altogether independent; and his landlord must not expect from him even the most trifling service, beyond what is either expressly stipulated in the lease, or imposed upon him by the common and known law of the country.

Even a tenant at will who pays the full value of the land is not entirely dependent on the landlord. The financial benefits they receive from each other are mutual and equal. Such a tenant will risk neither his life nor his fortune in the landlord’s service. But a tenant with a long-term lease is completely independent. The landlord must not expect even the smallest service beyond what the lease expressly requires or the country’s established law imposes.

The tenants having in this manner become independent, and the retainers being dismissed, the great proprietors were no longer capable of interrupting the regular execution of justice, or of disturbing the peace of the country. Having sold their birth-right, not like Esau, for a mess of pottage in time of hunger and necessity, but, in the wantonness of plenty, for trinkets and baubles, fitter to be the playthings of children than the serious pursuits of men, they became as insignificant as any substantial burgher or tradesmen in a city. A regular government was established in the country as well as in the city, nobody having sufficient power to disturb its operations in the one, any more than in the other.

Once the tenants had become independent and the retainers had been dismissed, the great landowners lost their power to obstruct justice or disturb the country’s peace. They had sold their birthright, but not like Esau, for a bowl of food in a time of hunger and need. Instead, surrounded by plenty, they had recklessly sold it for trinkets and baubles. These were better suited to children’s play than to the serious pursuits of men. As a result, the landowners became no more important than any prosperous city merchant or tradesman. Orderly government was established in the countryside as well as in the city. No one in either place had enough power to disrupt it.

It does not, perhaps, relate to the present subject, but I cannot help remarking it, that very old families, such as have possessed some considerable estate from father to son for many successive generations, are very rare in commercial countries. In countries which have little commerce, on the contrary, such as Wales, or the Highlands of Scotland, they are very common. The Arabian histories seem to be all full of genealogies; and there is a history written by a Tartar Khan, which has been translated into several European languages, and which contains scarce any thing else; a proof that ancient families are very common among those nations. In countries where a rich man can spend his revenue in no other way than by maintaining as many people as it can maintain, he is apt to run out, and his benevolence, it seems, is seldom so violent as to attempt to maintain more than he can afford. But where he can spend the greatest revenue upon his own person, he frequently has no bounds to his expense, because he frequently has no bounds to his vanity, or to his affection for his own person. In commercial countries, therefore, riches, in spite of the most violent regulations of law to prevent their dissipation, very seldom remain long in the same family. Among simple nations, on the contrary, they frequently do, without any regulations of law; for among nations of shepherds, such as the Tartars and Arabs, the consumable nature of their property necessarily renders all such regulations impossible.

This may not relate to the present subject, but I cannot help noting it. In commercial countries, very old families are very rare. By these I mean families that have passed a considerable estate from father to son for many successive generations. In countries with little commerce, such as Wales or the Highlands of Scotland, such families are very common. Arabian histories seem to be full of genealogies. A history written by a Tartar Khan, which has been translated into several European languages, contains hardly anything else. This proves that ancient families are very common among those nations. In some countries, a rich man can spend his income only by supporting as many people as it will support. There, he is likely to reach the limit of his income. His generosity, it seems, is seldom so great that he tries to support more people than he can afford. But where he can spend even the largest income on himself, he often sets no limits on his spending. This is because he often sets no limits on his vanity or his love of himself. In commercial countries, therefore, riches very seldom remain in the same family for long. This is true despite the strongest laws intended to prevent them from being squandered. Among simple nations, by contrast, riches often remain in the same family without any such laws. Among nations of shepherds, such as the Tartars and Arabs, the perishable nature of their property necessarily makes all such laws impossible.

A revolution of the greatest importance to the public happiness, was in this manner brought about by two different orders of people, who had not the least intention to serve the public. To gratify the most childish vanity was the sole motive of the great proprietors. The merchants and artificers, much less ridiculous, acted merely from a view to their own interest, and in pursuit of their own pedlar principle of turning a penny wherever a penny was to be got. Neither of them had either knowledge or foresight of that great revolution which the folly of the one, and the industry of the other, was gradually bringing about.

In this way, two groups of people brought about a revolution of the greatest importance to public happiness. Neither group had the slightest intention of serving the public. The great landowners were motivated solely by the desire to satisfy the most childish vanity. The merchants and craftspeople were much less ridiculous. They acted only in their own interest, following their petty principle of making money wherever they could. Neither group knew or foresaw the great revolution that the landowners' folly and the merchants' and craftspeople's industry were gradually bringing about.

It was thus, that, through the greater part of Europe, the commerce and manufactures of cities, instead of being the effect, have been the cause and occasion of the improvement and cultivation of the country.

Thus, in most of Europe, trade and manufacturing in cities did not result from improvements in the countryside. Instead, they helped bring about those improvements, including the cultivation of the land.

This order, however, being contrary to the natural course of things, is necessarily both slow and uncertain. Compare the slow progress of those European countries of which the wealth depends very much upon their commerce and manufactures, with the rapid advances of our North American colonies, of which the wealth is founded altogether in agriculture. Through the greater part of Europe, the number of inhabitants is not supposed to double in less than five hundred years. In several of our North American colonies, it is found to double in twenty or five-and-twenty years. In Europe, the law of primogeniture, and perpetuities of different kinds, prevent the division of great estates, and thereby hinder the multiplication of small proprietors. A small proprietor, however, who knows every part of his little territory, views it with all the affection which property, especially small property, naturally inspires, and who upon that account takes pleasure, not only in cultivating, but in adorning it, is generally of all improvers the most industrious, the most intelligent, and the most successful. The same regulations, besides, keep so much land out of the market, that there are always more capitals to buy than there is land to sell, so that what is sold always sells at a monopoly price. The rent never pays the interest of the purchase-money, and is, besides, burdened with repairs and other occasional charges, to which the interest of money is not liable. To purchase land, is, everywhere in Europe, a most unprofitable employment of a small capital. For the sake of the superior security, indeed, a man of moderate circumstances, when he retires from business, will sometimes choose to lay out his little capital in land. A man of profession, too whose revenue is derived from another source often loves to secure his savings in the same way. But a young man, who, instead of applying to trade or to some profession, should employ a capital of two or three thousand pounds in the purchase and cultivation of a small piece of land, might indeed expect to live very happily and very independently, but must bid adieu for ever to all hope of either great fortune or great illustration, which, by a different employment of his stock, he might have had the same chance of acquiring with other people. Such a person, too, though he cannot aspire at being a proprietor, will often disdain to be a farmer. The small quantity of land, therefore, which is brought to market, and the high price of what is brought thither, prevents a great number of capitals from being employed in its cultivation and improvement, which would otherwise have taken that direction. In North America, on the contrary, fifty or sixty pounds is often found a sufficient stock to begin a plantation with. The purchase and improvement of uncultivated land is there the most profitable employment of the smallest as well as of the greatest capitals, and the most direct road to all the fortune and illustration which can be required in that country. Such land, indeed, is in North America to be had almost for nothing, or at a price much below the value of the natural produce; a thing impossible in Europe, or indeed in any country where all lands have long been private property. If landed estates, however, were divided equally among all the children, upon the death of any proprietor who left a numerous family, the estate would generally be sold. So much land would come to market, that it could no longer sell at a monopoly price. The free rent of the land would go no nearer to pay the interest of the purchase-money, and a small capital might be employed in purchasing land as profitable as in any other way.

This order, however, runs against the natural course of things, so it must be slow and uncertain. Compare the slow progress of European countries whose wealth depends heavily on commerce and manufacturing. Our North American colonies, whose wealth is based entirely on agriculture, have advanced rapidly. In most of Europe, the population is not thought to double in less than five hundred years. In several of our North American colonies, it has been found to double in twenty or twenty-five years. In Europe, the law of primogeniture and various forms of perpetual inheritance restrictions prevent the division of great estates. They therefore hinder the growth of small landownership. Yet a small landowner knows every part of his little property. He regards it with all the affection that ownership, especially of a small property, naturally inspires. He therefore takes pleasure not only in cultivating it but also in beautifying it. Such an owner is generally the most industrious, intelligent, and successful of all who improve land. These same laws also keep so much land off the market that buyers always have more capital than there is land to buy. As a result, the land that does come up for sale always sells at a monopoly price. Its rent never pays the interest on the purchase price. The rent must also cover repairs and other occasional expenses, which do not reduce interest earned on money. Throughout Europe, buying land is a very unprofitable use of a small amount of capital. A person of moderate means who retires from business will sometimes invest his small capital in land for its greater security. A professional who earns his income elsewhere also often likes to secure his savings in the same way. But suppose a young man invests two or three thousand pounds in buying and cultivating a small piece of land. He does this instead of going into trade or taking up a profession. He might expect to live very happily and independently. But he must give up all hope of great wealth or distinction. If he used his capital differently, he might have the same chance as others of gaining them. Such a person will also often scorn becoming a tenant farmer, even though he cannot aspire to owning land. So the small amount of land offered for sale, and its high price, keep many people from investing in cultivating and improving it. Otherwise, they would have invested their capital that way. In North America, by contrast, fifty or sixty pounds is often enough capital to start a plantation. There, buying and improving uncultivated land is the most profitable use of both the smallest and the largest amounts of capital. It is also the most direct path to all the wealth and distinction anyone could want in that country. Indeed, such land can be had in North America for almost nothing, or for much less than the value of what it naturally produces. This is impossible in Europe, or in any country where all land has long been private property. If landed estates were divided equally among all the children, however, an estate would generally be sold when an owner with a large family died. So much land would come onto the market that it could no longer sell at a monopoly price. The net rent from the land would come no closer to paying the interest on the purchase price. A small amount of capital could then be invested in buying land as profitably as in any other way.

England, on account of the natural fertility of the soil, of the great extent of the sea-coast in proportion to that of the whole country, and of the many navigable rivers which run through it, and afford the conveniency of water carriage to some of the most inland parts of it, is perhaps as well fitted by nature as any large country in Europe to be the seat of foreign commerce, of manufactures for distant sale, and of all the improvements which these can occasion. From the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, too, the English legislature has been peculiarly attentive to the interest of commerce and manufactures, and in reality there is no country in Europe, Holland itself not excepted, of which the law is, upon the whole, more favourable to this sort of industry. Commerce and manufactures have accordingly been continually advancing during all this period. The cultivation and improvement of the country has, no doubt, been gradually advancing too; but it seems to have followed slowly, and at a distance, the more rapid progress of commerce and manufactures. The greater part of the country must probably have been cultivated before the reign of Elizabeth; and a very great part of it still remains uncultivated, and the cultivation of the far greater part much inferior to what it might be, The law of England, however, favours agriculture, not only indirectly, by the protection of commerce, but by several direct encouragements. Except in times of scarcity, the exportation of corn is not only free, but encouraged by a bounty. In times of moderate plenty, the importation of foreign corn is loaded with duties that amount to a prohibition. The importation of live cattle, except from Ireland, is prohibited at all times; and it is but of late that it was permitted from thence. Those who cultivate the land, therefore, have a monopoly against their countrymen for the two greatest and most important articles of land produce, bread and butcher’s meat. These encouragements, although at bottom, perhaps, as I shall endeavour to show hereafter, altogether illusory, sufficiently demonstrate at least the good intention of the legislature to favour agriculture. But what is of much more importance than all of them, the yeomanry of England are rendered as secure, as independent, and as respectable, as law can make them. No country, therefore, which the right of primogeniture takes place, which pays tithes, and where perpetuities, though contrary to the spirit of the law, are admitted in some cases, can give more encouragement to agriculture than England. Such, however, notwithstanding, is the state of its cultivation. What would it have been, had the law given no direct encouragement to agriculture besides what arises indirectly from the progress of commerce, and had left the yeomanry in the same condition as in most other countries of Europe? It is now more than two hundred years since the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, a period as long as the course of human prosperity usually endures.

England has naturally fertile soil, a long coastline in proportion to its size, and many navigable rivers. These rivers allow goods to be transported by water to some of the most inland parts of the country. England is therefore perhaps as well suited by nature as any large European country to foreign trade and manufacturing for distant markets. It is also well suited to all the improvements these activities can bring about. From the beginning of Elizabeth’s reign, English lawmakers have paid particular attention to the interests of trade and manufacturing. In fact, no country in Europe, not even Holland, has laws that are more favorable overall to these industries. Trade and manufacturing have accordingly continued to advance throughout this period. The cultivation and improvement of the land have no doubt advanced gradually too. But they seem to have followed slowly and at a distance behind the faster progress of trade and manufacturing. Most of the country was probably cultivated before Elizabeth’s reign. Yet a very large part remains uncultivated, and the cultivation of the far greater part falls well short of its potential. English law, however, favors agriculture not only indirectly by protecting trade, but also through several direct incentives. Except in times of scarcity, the export of grain is not only permitted but encouraged by a bounty. In times of moderate abundance, duties on imported foreign grain are high enough to amount to a ban. The import of live cattle is prohibited at all times, except from Ireland. Even imports from Ireland have only recently been permitted. Those who cultivate the land therefore have a monopoly over their fellow countrymen in the two greatest and most important products of the land: bread and butcher’s meat. These incentives sufficiently demonstrate at least the good intentions of lawmakers to favor agriculture. Yet, as I shall try to show later, they are perhaps ultimately altogether illusory. Much more important than all these incentives is the position of England’s yeomanry. The law makes these landholders as secure, independent, and respectable as it can. No country, therefore, can give more encouragement to agriculture than England if it has the right of primogeniture, pays tithes, and allows perpetuities in some cases, though perpetuities are contrary to the spirit of the law. Even so, this is the state of England’s cultivation. What would it have been if the law had given agriculture no direct encouragement beyond the indirect benefits of progress in trade? What if it had left the yeomanry in the same condition as in most other European countries? More than two hundred years have now passed since the beginning of Elizabeth’s reign, a period as long as human prosperity usually lasts.

France seems to have had a considerable share of foreign commerce, near a century before England was distinguished as a commercial country. The marine of France was considerable, according to the notions of the times, before the expedition of Charles VIII. to Naples. The cultivation and improvement of France, however, is, upon the whole, inferior to that of England. The law of the country has never given the same direct encouragement to agriculture.

France seems to have had a considerable share of foreign trade nearly a century before England became known as a trading country. Before Charles VIII's expedition to Naples, France had a considerable fleet by the standards of the time. However, France's land is, on the whole, less cultivated and improved than England's. French law has never given agriculture the same direct encouragement.

The foreign commerce of Spain and Portugal to the other parts of Europe, though chiefly carried on in foreign ships, is very considerable. That to their colonies is carried on in their own, and is much greater, on account of the great riches and extent of those colonies. But it has never introduced any considerable manufactures for distant sale into either of those countries, and the greater part of both still remains uncultivated. The foreign commerce of Portugal is of older standing than that of any great country in Europe, except Italy.

Spain and Portugal trade considerably with other parts of Europe, though mostly in foreign ships. They trade with their colonies in their own ships. This trade is much greater because of the colonies’ great wealth and size. But it has never led to significant manufacturing for distant markets in either country. Most of the land in both countries remains uncultivated. Portugal’s foreign trade is older than that of any other major European country except Italy.

Italy is the only great country of Europe which seems to have been cultivated and improved in every part, by means of foreign commerce and manufactures for distant sale. Before the invasion of Charles VIII., Italy, according to Guicciardini, was cultivated not less in the most mountainous and barren parts of the country, than in the plainest and most fertile. The advantageous situation of the country, and the great number of independent states which at that time subsisted in it, probably contributed not a little to this general cultivation. It is not impossible, too, notwithstanding this general expression of one of the most judicious and reserved of modern historians, that Italy was not at that time better cultivated than England is at present.

Italy is the only great European country that seems to have been cultivated and improved throughout through foreign trade and goods manufactured for sale in distant markets. According to Guicciardini, before the invasion of Charles VIII, even Italy’s most mountainous and barren regions were as well cultivated as its flattest and most fertile ones. The country’s favorable location probably contributed greatly to this widespread cultivation. So did the large number of independent states in Italy at the time. Even so, it is possible that Italy was no better cultivated then than England is now. This may be true despite the broad claim made by Guicciardini, one of the most judicious and cautious modern historians.

The capital, however, that is acquired to any country by commerce and manufactures, is always a very precarious and uncertain possession, till some part of it has been secured and realized in the cultivation and improvement of its lands. A merchant, it has been said very properly, is not necessarily the citizen of any particular country. It is in a great measure indifferent to him from what place he carries on his trade; and a very trifling disgust will make him remove his capital, and, together with it, all the industry which it supports, from one country to another. No part of it can be said to belong to any particular country, till it has been spread, as it were, over the face of that country, either in buildings, or in the lasting improvement of lands. No vestige now remains of the great wealth said to have been possessed by the greater part of the Hanse Towns, except in the obscure histories of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It is even uncertain where some of them were situated, or to what towns in Europe the Latin names given to some of them belong. But though the misfortunes of Italy, in the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries, greatly diminished the commerce and manufactures of the cities of Lombardy and Tuscany, those countries still continue to be among the most populous and best cultivated in Europe. The civil wars of Flanders, and the Spanish government which succeeded them, chased away the great commerce of Antwerp, Ghent, and Bruges. But Flanders still continues to be one of the richest, best cultivated, and most populous provinces of Europe. The ordinary revolutions of war and government easily dry up the sources of that wealth which arises from commerce only. That which arises from the more solid improvements of agriculture is much more durable, and cannot be destroyed but by those more violent convulsions occasioned by the depredations of hostile and barbarous nations continued for a century or two together; such as those that happened for some time before and after the fall of the Roman empire in the western provinces of Europe.

The capital a country gains from commerce and manufacturing is always a precarious and uncertain possession. It remains so until some of it has been secured and made permanent through cultivating and improving the land. As has rightly been said, a merchant is not necessarily a citizen of any particular country. For the most part, he does not care where he conducts his trade. Even a slight annoyance can make him move his capital from one country to another. With it, he takes all the industry that capital supports. None of it can be said to belong to a particular country until it has been spread across that country. This happens through buildings or lasting improvements to the land. No trace now remains of the great wealth that most of the Hanse Towns were said to possess. It survives only in the obscure histories of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It is even uncertain where some of those towns were located. It is also uncertain which European towns correspond to the Latin names given to some of them. But the misfortunes of Italy greatly reduced commerce and manufacturing in the cities of Lombardy and Tuscany. This happened in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Even so, those regions remain among the most populous and best cultivated in Europe. The civil wars of Flanders, followed by Spanish rule, drove away the great commerce of Antwerp, Ghent, and Bruges. But Flanders remains one of the richest, best cultivated, and most populous provinces of Europe. The ordinary upheavals of war and government easily dry up the sources of wealth that comes only from commerce. Wealth that comes from the more solid improvements of agriculture is much more lasting. It can be destroyed only by more violent upheavals, caused by hostile and barbarous nations plundering for a century or two. Such upheavals took place in the western provinces of Europe for some time before and after the Roman empire fell.