Αἰδήμων.—Pious, reverent, modest. The substantive is αἰδώς, the German Ehrfurcht (Wilhelm Meister, Wanderjahre, Bk. II. ch. ii.), a virtue in high regard with Epictetus, who generally mentions it in connection with that of “faithfulness,” πίστις. In Wordsworth’s poem, “My heart leaps up when I behold a rainbow in the sky,” the “natural piety” which he prays may abide with him in his old age seems to be just that moral sensitiveness or αἰδώς which passes into reverence and worship in the presence of certain things, and into shame and dread in that of others.
Αἰδήμων. Pious, reverent, modest. The noun is αἰδώς, the German Ehrfurcht (Wilhelm Meister, Wanderjahre, Book II, chapter ii). Epictetus values this virtue highly and generally mentions it alongside “faithfulness,” πίστις. Wordsworth’s poem, “My heart leaps up when I behold a rainbow in the sky,” expresses a similar idea. He prays that “natural piety” may remain with him in old age. This seems to be precisely that moral sensitivity, or αἰδώς. In the presence of certain things, it becomes reverence and worship. In the presence of others, it becomes shame and dread.
Ἀπάθεια.—Peace—that is, peace from passion, πάθη. Πάθος was any affection of the mind causing joy or grief. As it appears from Bk. II. iii. I., ἀπάθεια is not, in Epictetus, the state of absolute freedom from these passions, but that of being able to master them so that they shall not overwhelm the inner man.
Ἀπάθεια. Peace, meaning freedom from passion, πάθη. Πάθος meant any feeling in the mind that caused joy or grief. As Book II, iii, 1 shows, Epictetus does not use ἀπάθεια to mean complete freedom from these passions. Instead, it means being able to control them so they do not overwhelm the inner self.
Διαρθρωτικός.—That which organizes, constitutes organically, forms into a system. From ἄρθρον, a joint. The word “analyze,” by which Long translates διαρθροῦν, seems to me wanting in the formative sense expressed by the original.
Διαρθρωτικός. That which organizes, brings parts into a unified whole, or forms a system. From ἄρθρον, a joint. Long translates διαρθροῦν as “analyze.” This seems to me to miss the original word’s sense of forming something.
Δόγμα.—An opinion, that which seems (δοκεῖν) true; generally in the special sense of a philosophic dogma.
Δόγμα. An opinion, something that seems (δοκεῖν) true. Usually used specifically to mean a philosophical doctrine.
Ἐυροεῖν.—To prosper; literally, to flow freely, εὔροια, prosperity. A common Stoic phrase for a happy life.
Ἐυροεῖν. To prosper, literally “to flow freely.” εὔροια means prosperity. A common Stoic phrase for a happy life.
Εὐσέβεια.—Religion, piety. σέβομαι—“to feel awe or fear before God and man, especially when about to do something disgraceful” (Liddell and Scott); to worship, respect, reverence.
Εὐσέβεια. Religion, piety. σέβομαι. “To feel awe or fear before God and other people, especially when about to do something disgraceful” (Liddell and Scott). To worship, respect, or revere.
Ἡγεμονικόν (τό).—The Ruling Faculty—that in a man which chooses, determines, takes cognizance of good and evil, and sways the inferior faculties (δυνάμεις, powers) to its will. Lotze notes this hegemonic quality in the human soul as that which distinguishes it from the bundle of sensations into which the Association Philosophy would resolve it.
Ἡγεμονικόν (τό). The Ruling Faculty. The part of a person that chooses, decides, and recognizes good and evil. It directs the lower faculties (δυνάμεις, powers) according to its will. Lotze identifies this hegemonic quality in the human soul as what distinguishes it from a bundle of sensations. The philosophy of association would reduce the soul to such a bundle.
θαυμάζειν.—To admire, be dazzled with admiration by, to worship, to be taken up with a thing so as to lose the power of cool judgment. A frequent word in Epictetus, the sense of which is precisely rendered in Hor. Sat. I, 4, 28, “Hunc capit argenti splendor, stupet Albius ære.”
θαυμάζειν. To admire, to be dazzled by admiration, to worship, to become so absorbed in something that clear judgment becomes impossible. Epictetus uses this word often. Its meaning is captured precisely in Horace, Satires I, 4, 28, “Hunc capit argenti splendor, stupet Albius ære.”
Ἰδιώτης.—One of the vulgar, an unlettered person; in Epictetus, one uninstructed in philosophy. Originally the word meant one who remained in private life, not filling any public office, or taking part in State affairs. A man might be an ἰδιώτης, or “layman,” with respect to any branch of science or art.
Ἰδιώτης. A common person, someone without formal education. In Epictetus, it means someone without training in philosophy. Originally, the word meant someone who lived a private life, holding no public office or taking part in state affairs. A person could be an ἰδιώτης, or “layman,” in any branch of science or art.
Καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός.—The good and wise man—literally, beautiful and good. A standing phrase to denote the perfection of human character. καλὸς is a word sometimes difficult to render. Curtius connects it etymologically with Sanscrit, kalyas; Gothic, hails=healthy.
Καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός. The good and wise man, literally, beautiful and good. A common phrase describing the perfection of human character. καλὸς is a word that is sometimes difficult to translate. Curtius links it through its word origins to Sanskrit, kalyas, and Gothic, hails, meaning healthy.
Οἴησις.—“Conceit”—defined by Cicero as “Opinatio”—intellectual self-sufficiency, the supposing one’s self to know something when one does not. “The first business of a philosopher,” says Epictetus, “is to cast away oἴησις, for it is impossible that one can begin to learn the things that he thinks he knows” (Diss. II. xvii. 1.) He is not, in short, to be “wise in his own conceit.”
Οἴησις. “Conceit,” defined by Cicero as “Opinatio,” means intellectual self-sufficiency, believing you know something when you do not. “A philosopher’s first task,” says Epictetus, “is to give up οἴησις. It is impossible to begin learning things you think you already know” (Diss. II. xvii. 1.) In short, a philosopher must not be “wise in his own eyes.”
ὄρεξις, ἔκκλισις, ὁρμή, ἀφορμή.—Pursuit, avoidance, desire, aversion. According to Simplicius (Comment. Ench. i.), ὄρεξις and ἔκκλισις were used by the Stoics to express the counterparts in outward action of the mental affections, ὁρμὴ and ἀφορμή, and were regarded as consequent upon the latter.
ὄρεξις, ἔκκλισις, ὁρμή, ἀφορμή. Pursuit, avoidance, desire, aversion. According to Simplicius (Comment. Ench. i.), the Stoics used ὄρεξις and ἔκκλισις for outward actions corresponding to inner feelings, ὁρμὴ and ἀφορμή. They regarded these outward actions as resulting from those inner feelings.
προαίρεσις.—The Will; but as used in Epictetus, this word implies much more than the mere faculty of volition. Literally, it means a choosing of one thing before another; in Epictetus, the power of deliberately resolving or purposing, the exercise of the reflective faculty being implied. It is hardly to be distinguished from τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, q. v.
προαίρεσις. The Will. In Epictetus, this word means much more than simply the ability to choose. Literally, it means choosing one thing over another. In Epictetus, it means the power to make deliberate decisions or form intentions, with reflection implied. It is barely distinguishable from τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, see that entry.
προλήψεις.—“Natural Conceptions.” See Preface, xxviii., xxix. The “primary truths” of Lord Herbert of Cherbury.
προλήψεις. “Natural Conceptions.” See the Preface, pages xxviii and xxix. Lord Herbert of Cherbury’s “primary truths.”
Συγκατατίθεσθαι.—To assent to or acquiesce in anything, to ratify by the judgment the emotions produced by external things or events, such as the sense of dread, or pleasure, or reprobation, which they arouse in us. To be on one’s guard against the hasty yielding of this assent is one of Epictetus’s main injunctions to the aspirant in philosophy.
Συγκατατίθεσθαι. To agree to or accept something. To endorse, through judgment, the emotions that external things or events stir in us, such as dread, pleasure, or disapproval. One of Epictetus’s main instructions to students of philosophy is to guard against giving this assent too quickly.
Ταράσσεσθαι.—To be troubled; ἀ-ταραξία, tranquillity. Ταράσσειν is primarily to stir up, confuse, throw into disorder.
Ταράσσεσθαι means to be troubled. ἀ-ταραξία means tranquillity. Ταράσσειν primarily means to stir up, confuse, or throw into disorder.
φαντασία.—An appearance; with the Stoics, any mental impression as received by the perceptive faculty before the Reason has pronounced upon it, a bare perception.
φαντασία. An appearance. For the Stoics, any mental impression received by the mind’s perceptive faculty before reason has judged it. A bare perception.