1. Since Reason is that by which all other things are organized and perfected, it is meet that itself should not remain unorganized. But by what shall it be organized? For it is clear that this must be either by itself or by some other thing. But this must be Reason; or something else which is greater than Reason, which is impossible.
1. Since Reason organizes and perfects all other things, it should not remain unorganized itself. But what can organize it? Clearly, either Reason itself or something else must do this. But that other thing must be Reason, or something greater than Reason, which is impossible.
The Greek is Ἐπειδὴ λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ διαρθρῶν καὶ ἐξεργαζόμενος τὰ λοιπά. διαρθρόω literally means to form with joints, hence to form an organic whole with interdependent parts. Long translates it as “analyze.”
2. “Yea,” one may say, “but it is more pressing to cure our vices, and the like.”
2. “Yes,” someone might say, “but it is more urgent to correct our faults and things like that.”
You desire, then, to hear something of these things? Hear then; but if you shall say to me, I know not if you are reasoning truly or falsely? or if I utter something ambiguous, and you shall bid me distinguish, shall I lose patience with you and tell you, It is more pressing to cure our vices than chop logic?
So you want to hear about these things? Then listen. But suppose you say to me, I don’t know whether your reasoning is right or wrong. Or suppose I say something ambiguous, and you ask me to clarify. Should I lose patience with you and say, It is more urgent to cure our vices than debate fine points of logic?
3. For this reason I think the logical are set at the beginning of our study, even as before the measuring of corn we set the examination of the measure. For unless we shall first establish what is a modius and what is a balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything?
3. For this reason, I think logic comes first in our studies. In the same way, we check the measure before measuring grain. Unless we first establish what a modius is and what a balance is, how can we measure or weigh anything?
Modius. A unit of measurement equal to about two gallons.
4. In this case, then, if you have not understood and accurately investigated the criterion of all other things, and that through which they are understood, shall we be able to investigate and understand anything else? and how could we? Yea, but a modius is a wooden thing, and barren. But it measures corn. And logic is also barren. As regards this, indeed, we shall see. But even if one should grant this, it sufficeth that logic is that which distinguishes and investigates other things, and, as one may say, measures and weighs them. Who saith these things? is it Chrysippus alone and Zeno and Cleanthes? but doth not Antisthenes say it? And who wrote that the investigation of terms is the beginning of education?—was it not Socrates? and of whom doth Xenophon write that he began with the investigation of terms, what each of them signified?
4. Have you understood and carefully examined the standard for judging all other things, through which they are understood? If not, can we examine and understand anything else? How could we? Yes, but a modius is a wooden measure, and it produces nothing. But it measures grain. And logic also produces nothing. We will see about that. But even if we grant this, it is enough that logic distinguishes and examines other things. We might say it measures and weighs them. Who says these things? Only Chrysippus, Zeno, and Cleanthes? Doesn’t Antisthenes say the same? And who wrote that examining terms is the beginning of education? Wasn’t it Socrates? And whom does Xenophon describe as beginning by examining terms and what each one meant?
Antisthenes, around 400 b. c., founded the Cynic school in the gymnasium called the Cynosarges, which gave the school its name. As a Cynic, his authority would naturally be respected by those listening to Epictetus. Examining terms, or names, is indeed the beginning of philosophy and the guide to truth in any field. But perhaps not everyone is qualified to do it. Each term’s meaning must be genuinely understood, not just formally defined. A primrose means one thing to Peter Bell and another to Wordsworth. Similarly, the term Duty means one thing to Herbert Spencer and another to Kant.