1. God is beneficial. But the Good is also beneficial. It is likely, then, that where the essence of God is, there also should be the essence of the Good. And what is the essence of God? Flesh? God forbid. A property in land? God forbid. Fame? God forbid. Mind, Intelligence, Right Reason? Even so. Here, then, once for all, seek the essence of the Good. For surely you will in no wise seek it in a plant? Nay. Or in any unreasoning creature? Nay. If, then, it is sought in a reasoning creature, wherefore continue to seek it anywhere else than in the difference between reasoning and unreasoning creatures?
1. God is beneficial. But the Good is also beneficial. It is likely, then, that the essence of the Good is wherever the essence of God is. And what is the essence of God? Flesh? God forbid. Land ownership? God forbid. Fame? God forbid. Mind, intelligence, right reason? Yes, indeed. Here, then, once and for all, look for the essence of the Good. Surely you would not look for it in a plant? No. Or in any creature without reason? No. If, then, you seek it in a reasoning creature, why keep looking anywhere else? Why not look in what distinguishes reasoning creatures from creatures without reason?
2. The plants have not so much as the use of appearances, therefore we speak not of the Good in their regard. The Good, then, needs the power of using appearances. And this alone? Nay; for if so, say then that Good and Happiness and Unhappiness are with the lower animals too. But this you will not say, and you are right; for though they possessed the use of appearances in the highest degree, yet the observing and considering of this use they do not possess, and naturally so, for they exist to serve others, nor have any supreme object in themselves. For the ass was not made for any supreme object in himself? Nay, but he was made able to bear, because we had need of a back; and, by Zeus, we had need moreover that he should walk; wherefore he received also the power to use appearances, else had he not been able to walk. And thereupon the matter stopped. For had he also received the observing and considering of the use of appearances, it is clear that in reason he could no longer have been subject to us, nor have served those needs of ours, but he had been our equal and our like.
2. Plants cannot even make use of impressions, so we do not speak of the Good in relation to them. The Good, then, requires the ability to use impressions. Is that all? No. Otherwise, you would have to say that lower animals also experience Good, Happiness, and Unhappiness. But you will not say this, and you are right. Even if they could use impressions to the highest degree, they could not examine and reflect on that use. This is natural, since they exist to serve others and have no ultimate purpose of their own. Was the donkey, then, not made for some ultimate purpose of his own? No. He was made able to carry loads because we needed a back to carry them. And, by Zeus, we also needed him to walk. So he was also given the ability to use impressions. Otherwise, he could not have walked. And that was where it stopped. Suppose he had also been given the ability to examine and reflect on his use of impressions. Clearly, it would no longer have been reasonable for him to be subject to us or serve our needs. Instead, he would have been our equal and our like.
Nor have any object in themselves. Readers of Lotze may recall his term Fürsichseinheit, meaning the self-centered quality of true Being. The Greek here is οὐκ ἀυτὰ προηγούμενα. The word προηγούμενα appears in Bk. I. viii. 13, and Bk. III. v. 5. It refers to a person’s primary aims or obligations.
3. For use is one thing, and observation and study is another. God had need of the other animals to use appearances, but of us to observe and study appearances. Wherefore it is enough for them to eat and drink, and rest and breed, and do whatever else each of them performs, but to us, to whom the faculty of observing and studying hath also been given, these things are not enough; but unless we act after a certain manner and ordinance, and conformably to the nature and constitution of man, we shall never attain the end of our being. For where the constitution is different, different there also is the task and the end. When, therefore, the constitution is one for use alone, then the use, of whatever kind it be, is enough; but where there is also observing and studying of the use, then, unless the due employment of this faculty be added, the end shall never be gained. What then? God hath constituted every other animal, one to be eaten, another to serve for tilling the land, another to yield cheese, another to some kindred use; for which things what need is there of the observing and studying of appearances, and the ability to make distinctions in them? But man he hath brought in to be a spectator of God and of His works, and not a spectator alone, but an interpreter of them. Wherefore it is shameful for a man to begin and to end where creatures do that are without Reason; but rather should he begin when they begin, and end where Nature ends in ourselves. But she ends in contemplation, in observing and studying, in a manner of life that is in harmony with Nature. See to it, then, that ye die not without having been spectators of these things.
3. Using appearances is one thing. Observing and studying them is another. God needed the other animals to use appearances, but he needed us to observe and study them. For animals, it is enough to eat, drink, rest, reproduce, and do whatever else each kind does. But these things are not enough for us, since we also have the ability to observe and study. We must act in a certain way, following an order that suits human nature and how we are made. Otherwise, we will never fulfill the purpose of our existence. Different natures bring different tasks and purposes. When a creature is made only to use things, using them in whatever way is enough. But when it can also observe and study that use, it must exercise this ability properly. Otherwise, it will never fulfill its purpose. What follows? God made every other animal for a use. One is to be eaten, another to help till the land, another to provide cheese, another for some similar purpose. For these tasks, why would they need to observe and study appearances, or to distinguish between them? But he brought human beings into the world to witness God and his works. And not only to witness them, but also to interpret them. So it is shameful for a human being to begin and end where creatures without reason do. Instead, we should begin where they begin and end where Nature reaches its goal in us. That goal is contemplation, observation and study, and a way of life in harmony with Nature. Take care, then, not to die without having witnessed these things.
4. Seek, then, the essence of the Good there, where if it be not, thou wilt not say that the Good is in any other thing.
4. Look, then, for the essence of the Good where it must be. If it is not there, you would not say the Good is in anything else.
5. But what? are not those creatures also works of God? Surely; yet not supreme objects, yet not parts of the Gods. But thou art a supreme object, thou art a piece of God, thou hast in thee something that is a portion of Him. Why, then, art thou ignorant of thy high ancestry? Why knowest thou not whence thou camest? Wilt thou not remember, in thine eating, who it is that eats, and whom thou dost nourish? in cohabiting, who it is that cohabits? in converse, in exercise, in argument, knowest thou not that thou art nourishing a God, exercising a God? Unhappy man! thou bearest about with thee a God, and knowest it not! Thinkest thou I speak of some God of gold and silver, and external to thee? Nay, but in thyself thou dost bear Him, and seest not that thou defilest Him with thine impure thoughts and filthy deeds. In the presence even of an image of God thou hadst not dared to do one of those things which thou dost. But in the presence of God Himself within thee, who seeth and heareth all things, thou art not ashamed of the things thou dost both desire and do, O thou unwitting of thine own nature, and subject to the wrath of God?
5. But what? Aren’t those creatures also God’s works? Certainly, but they are not supreme beings or parts of the gods. You, however, are a supreme being. You are a piece of God. You have something within you that is part of him. Why, then, are you ignorant of your noble ancestry? Why don’t you know where you came from? When you eat, won’t you remember who is eating and whom you are nourishing? When you have sex, won’t you remember who is having sex? When you talk, exercise, or argue, don’t you know that you are nourishing a god, exercising a god? You miserable person! You carry a god around with you and don’t know it! Do you think I mean some god made of gold or silver, outside you? No, you carry him within yourself. Yet you don’t see that you defile him with your impure thoughts and filthy deeds. Even before an image of God, you would not have dared to do any of those things you do. Yet God himself is within you, seeing and hearing all things. Aren’t you ashamed of what you desire and do in his presence? You are ignorant of your own nature and subject to God’s wrath!
6. Why, then, do we fear in sending forth a young man from the school into some of the business of life, lest he should do wrong in anything, and be luxurious or profligate, and lest a wrapping of rags degrade him, or fine raiment uplift him? Such a one knoweth not his own God, nor with whom he is setting out. But can we have patience with him, saying, Would that I had you with me! And hast thou not God with thee there? or having Him, dost thou seek for any other? or will He speak other things to thee than even these?
6. Why, then, are we afraid to send a young man from school into the business of life? Do we fear he will do something wrong or live in luxury or recklessness? Do we fear that rags will lower his self-esteem, or fine clothes make him proud? Such a person does not know his own God, nor who is going with him. But can we be patient with him when he says, If only I had you with me! Don’t you have God with you there? And if you have him, do you look for anyone else? Or will he tell you anything different from what you have learned here?
Would that I had you with me! In Long’s translation, you is explained as referring to God. I see no reason for this interpretation. I think these words are meant to be spoken by a disciple to his teacher. Epictetus may have heard similar words from many of his own disciples as they left to enter active life.
7. But wert thou a statue of Pheidias, an Athena or Zeus, then wert thou mindful both of thyself and of the artist; and if thou hadst any consciousness, thou wouldst strive to do nothing unworthy of thy maker nor of thyself, nor ever to appear in any unseemly guise. But now that Zeus hath made thee, thou carest therefore nothing what kind of creature thou showest thyself for? And yet, is the one Artist like the other artist, or the one work like the other work? And what kind of work is that which hath in itself the faculties that were manifest in the making of it? Do not artists work in stone or brass or gold or ivory? and the Athena of Pheidias, when she hath once stretched out her hand and received upon it the figure of Victory, standeth thus for all time? But the works of God have motion and breathing, and the use of appearances and the judgment of them. Wilt thou dishonor such a Maker, whose work thou art? Nay, for not only did He make thee, but to thee alone did He trust and commit thyself. Wilt thou not remember this too, or wilt thou dishonor thy charge? But if God had committed some orphan child to thee, wouldst thou have neglected it? Now He hath given thee to thyself, and saith, I had none more worthy of trust than thee; keep this man such as he was made by nature—reverent, faithful, high, unterrified, unshaken of passions, untroubled. And thou wilt not.
7. If you were a statue by Pheidias, an Athena or Zeus, you would be mindful of yourself and your maker. If you had any awareness, you would try to do nothing unworthy of your maker or yourself. You would never let yourself appear in any improper way. But now that Zeus has made you, do you care nothing about what kind of creature you appear to be? Yet is one artist like the other, or one work like the other? And what kind of work contains the very abilities that were displayed in its creation? Do artists not work in stone, bronze, gold, or ivory? Once Pheidias’s Athena has stretched out her hand and received the figure of Victory, she stands that way forever. But God’s works move and breathe. They can make use of impressions and judge them. Will you dishonor such a maker, whose work you are? There is more, for he not only made you but entrusted you to yourself alone. Will you not remember this too, or will you dishonor what he entrusted to you? If God had entrusted an orphan child to you, would you have neglected it? Now he has given you to yourself and says, I had no one more trustworthy than you. Keep this man as nature made him, reverent, faithful, noble, fearless, unshaken by passions, untroubled. And you refuse.
8. But they may say: Whence doth this fellow bring us that eye of scorn and solemn looks? I have it not yet as I should, For I am yet unbold in those things which I have learned and assented to; I yet fear my weakness. But let me be bold in them, and then ye shall see such a look, such a guise, as behooveth me to wear. Then shall I show you the statue when it is perfected and polished. What look ye for?—an eye of scorn? God forbid! For doth the Zeus in Olympia look scornfully?—nay, but his glance is steadfast, as becometh him who will say,
8. But they may say: Where does this fellow get that scornful gaze and solemn expression? I do not yet have the expression I should. For I am not yet confident in the things I have learned and accepted. I still fear my weakness. But let me gain confidence in them. Then you will see the look and bearing that suit me. Then I will show you the statue, finished and polished. What do you expect? A scornful gaze? God forbid! Does the Zeus at Olympia look scornful? No, his gaze is steady, as befits one who will say,
“None trusts in vain my irrevocable word.”—Il. i. 526.
“No one who trusts my unbreakable promise will be disappointed.” Il. i. 526.
Such will I show myself to you—faithful, reverent, generous, untroubled. Not also, then, deathless, ageless, deceaseless? Nay, but dying as God, sickening as a God. These I have, these I can; but other things I neither have nor can. I will show you the thews of a philosopher. And what are these? A pursuit that never fails, an avoidance that never miscarries, seemly desire, studious resolve, cautious assent. These shall ye see.
This is how I will show myself to you: faithful, reverent, generous, untroubled. Not also immortal, ageless, beyond death? No, but dying as a god would, falling ill as a god would. These qualities I have, these things I can do. But other things I neither have nor can do. I will show you a philosopher’s strength. And what is that? Pursuit that never fails, avoidance that never goes wrong, proper desire, thoughtful resolve, careful assent. These you will see.
Cautious assent means being careful about accepting the impressions that appearances create.