1. The natural conceptions are common to all men, and one cannot contradict another. For which of us but affirms that the Good is profitable, and that we should choose it, and in all circumstances follow and pursue it? Which of us but affirms that uprightness is honorable and becoming? Where, then, doth the contradiction arise? Concerning the application of the natural conceptions to things severally. When one saith, He did well, he is a worthy man, and another, Nay, but he did foolishly, then there is a contradiction among men, one with another. And there is the same contradiction among the Jews and the Syrians and the Egyptians and the Romans; not whether that which is righteous should be preferred to all things and in all cases pursued, but whether this be righteous or unrighteous, to eat the flesh of swine. And ye can discover the same contradiction in the matter of Achilles and Agamemnon. For call them before us: What sayest thou, Agamemnon, Should not that which is right and fair come to pass?
1. All people share the same natural ideas, and these ideas cannot contradict one another. For who among us does not agree that the Good is beneficial? Who does not agree that we should choose it, follow it, and pursue it in all circumstances? Who among us does not agree that uprightness is honorable and fitting? Where, then, does disagreement arise? In applying these natural ideas to particular things. One person says, He did well, he is a worthy man. Another says, No, he acted foolishly. Here people disagree with one another. The same disagreement exists among the Jews, Syrians, Egyptians, and Romans. They do not disagree about whether what is right should be preferred above everything and pursued in every case. They disagree about whether eating pork is right or wrong. You can find the same disagreement between Achilles and Agamemnon. Let us call them before us. What do you say, Agamemnon? Shouldn't what is right and fair be done?
——“That should it.”
“That’s what it should do.”
And what sayest thou, Achilles, Doth it not please thee that what is fair and right should be done?
And what do you say, Achilles? Doesn't it please you to see what is fair and right being done?
——“Of all things this doth most please me.”
“Of all things, this pleases me most.”
Then make application of your natural conceptions. Whence arose this dispute? The one saith: I am not bound to deliver up Chryseis to her father. And the other saith: Thou art bound. Assuredly one of them must ill apply the conception of duty. And again the one saith: Therefore if I should deliver up Chryseis, it is meet that I take his prize from one of you. And the other: Wouldst thou, then, take from me my beloved? He saith: Yea, even thine. And shall I alone, and I alone, have nothing? And thus ariseth the contradiction.
Then apply your natural concepts. How did this dispute arise? One says: I am not obliged to return Chryseis to her father. The other says: You are obliged. Certainly one of them must be applying the concept of duty incorrectly. Again, one says: Then if I return Chryseis, it is right for me to take one of your prizes. The other says: Would you take my beloved from me, then? He says: Yes, yours. And am I alone, I alone, to have nothing? This is how the conflict arises.
2. What is it, then, to be educated? It is to learn to apply the natural conceptions to each thing severally according to nature; and further, to discern that of things that exist some are in our own power and the rest are not in our own power. And things that are in our own power are the will, and all the works of the will. And things that are not in our own power are the body, and the parts of the body, and possessions and parents and brethren and children and country and, in a word, our associates. Where now shall we place the Good? To what objects shall we apply it? To those which are in our own power? Then is health not good, and whole limbs and life? and are not children and parents and country? And who will bear with you if you say this? Let us, then, transfer it to these things. Now, can one be happy who is injured, and has missed gaining what is good? He cannot. And can such a one bear himself towards his fellows as he ought? How is it possible that he should? For I have it of nature that I must seek my own profit. If it profits me to own a piece of land, it profits me to take it from my neighbor. If it profits me to have a garment, it profits me to steal it from the bath. And hence wars, seditions, tyrannies, conspiracies. And how shall I be able to maintain a right mind towards God? for if I suffer injury and misfortune, it cannot be but He neglects me. And what have I to do with Him if He cannot help me? And, again, what have I to do with Him if He is willing to let me continue in the evils in which I am? Henceforth I begin to hate Him. Why, then, do we build temples and set up statues to Zeus as we do to powers of evil, such as Fever? And how is He now the Saviour and the Raingiver and the Fruitgiver? And verily, all this follows, if we place anywhere in external things the nature and being of the Good.
2. What does it mean, then, to be educated? It means learning to apply our natural ideas to each particular thing in accordance with nature. It also means recognizing that some things are within our control and others are not. Our will and all its actions are within our control. Our body and its parts are not within our control. Neither are possessions, parents, siblings, children, country, or, in short, the people around us. Where, then, should we place the Good? To which things should we apply it? To those within our control? Then are health, sound limbs, and life not good? Nor children, parents, and country? Who will put up with you if you say this? Let us, then, place the Good in these things instead. Now, can someone be happy who has suffered harm and failed to gain what is good? He cannot. And can such a person treat others as he should? How could he? For it is in my nature to seek my own benefit. If owning a piece of land benefits me, then taking it from my neighbor benefits me. If having a garment benefits me, then stealing it from the baths benefits me. This leads to wars, rebellions, tyrannies, and conspiracies. And how can I maintain the right attitude toward God? If I suffer harm and misfortune, he must be neglecting me. And what have I to do with him if he cannot help me? Again, what have I to do with him if he is willing to leave me suffering these evils? From that point on, I begin to hate him. Why, then, do we build temples and put up statues to Zeus, as we do to evil powers like Fever? And how can he still be the Savior, the Giver of Rain, and the Giver of Fruit? Indeed, all this follows if we place the nature and essence of the Good in anything outside our control.
τὰ μέν εἰσιν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. Some things are within our control, and others are not. This distinction is fundamental to Epictetus’s teaching. He sometimes expresses it as τὰ ἡμέτερα and τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, things that are ours and things belonging to others. Or he uses τὰ ἴδια and τὰ ἀλλότρια, things that are our concern and things that are not.
A temple to Fever stood on the Mons Palatinus in Rome. Upton quotes an interesting inscription to this deity from Gruter, p. xcvii.: Febri. Divæ. Febri. Sanctæ. Febri. Magnæ. Camilla. Amata. Pro. Filio. Male. Affecto. P.