1. The master-argument seems to start from propositions such as these: There being a mutual contradiction among these three propositions—(1) “Every past event is necessarily true,” and (2) “An impossibility cannot follow a possibility,” and (3) “Things are possible which neither are nor will be true,” Diodorus, perceiving this contradiction, made use of the force of the first two in order to prove that nothing is possible which neither is nor will be true. And, again, one will hold these two, (3) that a thing is possible which neither is nor will be true, and (2) that an impossibility cannot follow from a possibility; but by no means that every past thing is necessarily true, and thus those of the school of Cleanthes appear to think, whom Antipater strongly defended. But some hold the other two, (3) that a thing is possible that neither is nor will be true, and (1) that every past event is necessarily true; but maintain that an impossibility may follow from a possibility. But all three it is impossible to hold at once, because of their mutual contradiction.
1. The master argument seems to begin with propositions like these: These three propositions contradict one another: (1) “Every past event is necessarily true.” (2) “An impossibility cannot follow from a possibility.” (3) “Things are possible which neither are nor will be true.” Diodorus recognized this contradiction. He used the force of the first two to prove that nothing is possible unless it is or will be true. Others accept these two propositions: (3) something is possible even though it neither is nor will be true. And (2) an impossibility cannot follow from a possibility. But they firmly reject the claim that every past event is necessarily true. This appears to be the view of the followers of Cleanthes, whom Antipater strongly defended. Others accept the remaining pair: (3) something is possible even though it neither is nor will be true. And (1) every past event is necessarily true. But they maintain that an impossibility may follow from a possibility. It is impossible to accept all three at once, because they contradict one another.
James Harris explained the name “master-argument” in a long and valuable note sent to Upton. He believed it referred to the supreme importance of the issues it addressed. Different Stoic leaders took different positions on these issues. Diodorus held that both future and past events were necessary. Cleanthes held that both were contingent. Chrysippus held that past events were necessary and future events contingent. Any two of the three propositions mentioned in the text rule out the third. For modern philosophy, of course, no real distinction exists between the possible and the certain in the phenomenal world. The possible is simply what we do not know will happen or not.
2. Now, if any one inquire of me, And which of these dost thou hold? I shall answer him that I do not know, but I have received this account, that Diodorus holds certain of them, and I think the followers of Panthoides and Cleanthes certain others, and those of Chrysippus yet others. And thyself? Nay, it is no affair of mine to try my own thoughts, and to compare and estimate statements, and to form some opinion of my own upon the matter. And thus I differ no whit from the grammarians. Who was Hector’s father? Priam. And his brothers? Alexander and Deiphobus. And their mother, who was she? Hecuba. That is the account I have received. From whom? From Homer; and I think Hellanicus has written of them, and maybe others too. And I; what better have I to say about the master-argument? But if I am a vain man, and especially at a banquet, I shall amaze all the company by recounting those who have written on it;—for Chrysippus wrote on it wonderfully in his first book “On Possibilities;” and Cleanthes wrote a separate treatise on it, and so did Archedemus. And Antipater wrote too, not only in his book “On Possibilities,” but also separately in those on the master-argument. Have you not read the work? No! Then read it. And what good will it do him to read it? He will become yet more of a babbler and a nuisance than he is now, for what else hath the reading of it done for you? What opinion have you formed for yourself on the matter? Nay, but you will tell us all about Helen, and Priam, and the island of Calypso, that never existed, nor ever will.
2. Now, if anyone asks me, And which of these do you accept? I will answer that I do not know. But I have been told that Diodorus accepts some of them. I think the followers of Panthoides and Cleanthes accept others, and those of Chrysippus still others. And you yourself? No, it is not my business to examine my own thoughts, compare and assess arguments, or form my own opinion. And so I am no different from the grammarians. Who was Hector’s father? Priam. And his brothers? Alexander and Deiphobus. And who was their mother? Hecuba. That is what I have been told. By whom? By Homer. And I think Hellanicus wrote about them, and perhaps others did too. And what better can I say about the master-argument? But if I am vain, especially at a banquet, I will amaze everyone by listing those who have written about it. Chrysippus wrote wonderfully about it in his first book “On Possibilities.” Cleanthes wrote a separate treatise on it, and so did Archedemus. Antipater wrote about it too, not only in “On Possibilities,” but also in separate works on the master-argument. Have you not read the work? No! Then read it. And what good will reading it do him? He will become even more of a babbler and a nuisance than he is now. For what else has reading it done for you? What opinion have you formed for yourself on the subject? No, instead you will tell us all about Helen, Priam, and Calypso’s island, which never existed and never will.
Of course, Epictetus is being ironic here. All of this is exactly what a thinker should do.
3. And in Homer, indeed, it is no great matter if you have simply mastered the account, and formed no opinion of your own. But in ethics this is even much more often the case than in other matters. Tell me concerning good and evil things! Listen to him, then, with his—
3. With Homer, it is no great matter if you have simply learned the story without forming your own opinion. But in ethics, this happens much more often than in other subjects. Tell me about good and evil things! Listen, then, to what he has to say, with his...
“Me to Ciconia brought the wind from Troy.” —Od. ix, 39.
“The wind carried me from Troy to Ciconia.” Od. ix, 39.
Of things some are good, some evil, and some indifferent. Now the good things are the virtues, and those that have the nature of virtue, and the evil things the vices, and those that have the nature of vice; and the indifferent things are between these, as wealth, health, life, death, pleasure, affliction. And how do you know this? Because Hellanicus affirms it in his history of the Egyptians; for as well say this as that Diogenes has it in his Ethics, or Chrysippus, or Cleanthes. But have you tested any of their sayings, and formed an opinion for yourself? Show me how you are wont to bear a storm at sea. Do you remember the difference between good and evil when the sail clatters, and some vexatious man comes to you as you are shrieking, and says—
Some things are good, some are evil, and some are indifferent. Good things are the virtues and things with the nature of virtue. Evil things are the vices and things with the nature of vice. Indifferent things fall between these, such as wealth, health, life, death, pleasure, and suffering. And how do you know this? Because Hellanicus says so in his history of the Egyptians? You might as well say that as cite Diogenes in his Ethics, or Chrysippus, or Cleanthes. But have you tested any of their statements and formed your own opinion? Show me how you usually handle a storm at sea. Do you remember the difference between good and evil when the sail rattles? What happens when some annoying man comes up to you while you are screaming and says:
I suppose Epictetus is criticizing people who offer stock philosophical phrases as easy answers to major ethical questions. They do this just as they might quote Homer about an event in the life of Odysseus. In neither case do they seek the deep conviction that only vigorous use of their own reason can produce. A little later, he depicts someone quoting Hellanicus, the historian, on the distinction between good and evil. Yet Hellanicus never addressed that subject. If it is merely a question of authority, one name is as good as another. None is any use at all.
——“Tell me, by the Gods, what you were lately saying, Is it any vice to be shipwrecked? Hath it anything of the nature of vice?”
“Tell me, by the gods, what were you saying just now? Is being shipwrecked a moral failing? Does it have anything in common with moral wrongdoing?”
Would you not lay hold of a stick and shake it in his face: Let us alone, man; we are perishing, and you come to mock us! And do you remember the difference if you are accused of something and Cæsar sends for you? If one should come to you when you enter, pale and trembling, and should say, “Why do you tremble, man? what is your business concerned with? Doth Cæsar there within dispense virtue and vice to those who go in to him? Why, you will say; must you too mock me in my calamities?
Wouldn’t you grab a stick and shake it in his face? Leave us alone, man. We’re dying, and you come to mock us! And do you remember how differently you react when you’re accused of something and Caesar summons you? Suppose someone approaches you as you enter, pale and trembling, and says, “Why are you trembling, man? What is your case about? Does Caesar in there hand out virtue and vice to those who come before him?” What, you will say, must you mock me in my troubles too?
——“Nevertheless, tell me, O Philosopher, why you tremble—is it not merely death that you are in danger of, or imprisonment, or bodily suffering, or exile, or disgrace? What else? Is it any vice? or anything of the nature of vice?”
“Still, tell me, philosopher, why are you trembling? Aren’t you only facing death, imprisonment, physical suffering, exile, or disgrace? What else? Is it any moral failing, or anything like one?”
And you will reply somewhat to this effect: Let me alone, man; my own evils are enough for me.
And you will reply something like this: Leave me alone, man. I have enough troubles of my own.
And truly you say well, for your own evils are enough for you; which are meanness, cowardice, and your false pretenses when you sat in the school of philosophy. Why did you deck yourself in others’ glory? Why did you call yourself a Stoic?
You are right, for you have enough faults of your own. They are pettiness, cowardice, and the false pretenses you kept up while studying philosophy. Why did you dress yourself in other people’s glory? Why did you call yourself a Stoic?
4. Watch yourselves thus in the things that ye do, and ye shall see of what school ye are. And the most of you will be found Epicureans, but some few Peripatetics, and those but slack. For where is the proof that ye hold virtue equal to all other things, or indeed superior? Show me a Stoic, if ye have one. Where or how can ye? But persons that repeat the phrases of Stoicism, of these ye can show us any number. And do they repeat those of the Epicureans any worse? and are they not equally accurate in the Peripatetic? Who is, then, a Stoic? As we say that a statue is Pheidian which is wrought according to the art of Pheidias, show me a man that is wrought according to the opinions he utters! Show me one that is sick and yet prosperous, in peril and prosperous, dying and prosperous, in exile and prosperous, in evil repute and prosperous. Show him to me! by the Gods! fain would I see a Stoic! And have ye none that is fully wrought out; then show me at least one that is in hand to be wrought—one that even leaneth towards these things. Do me this favor—grudge not an old man a sight that I have never seen yet. Think ye that I would have you show me the Zeus of Pheidias or the Athene—a work all ivory and gold? Nay; but let one show me a man’s soul that longs to be like-minded with God, and to blame neither Gods nor men, and not to fail in any effort or avoidance, and not to be wrathful nor envious, nor jealous, but—for why should I make rounds to say it?—that desires to become a God from a man, and in this body of ours, this corpse, is mindful of his fellowship with Zeus. Show me that man. But ye cannot! Why, then, will ye mock yourselves and cheat others? Why wrap yourselves in others’ garb, and go about, like thieves that steal clothes from the bath, with names and things that in nowise belong to you?
4. Watch yourselves in what you do, and you will see which school you belong to. Most of you will turn out to be Epicureans. A few will be Peripatetics, and not very committed ones. Where is the proof that you value virtue as much as everything else, or even more? Show me a Stoic, if you have one. Where could you find one, and how? You can show us any number of people who repeat Stoic phrases. But aren't they just as good at repeating Epicurean teachings? Aren't they equally accurate with Peripatetic teachings? Who, then, is a Stoic? We call a statue Pheidian when it is made according to the art of Pheidias. So show me someone whose character is shaped by the beliefs he expresses! Show me someone who is sick yet flourishing, in danger yet flourishing, dying yet flourishing. Show me someone who is in exile yet flourishing, disgraced yet flourishing. Show him to me! By the gods, how I long to see a Stoic! If you have no one fully formed, show me at least someone still being shaped. Show me someone who is even leaning toward these things. Do me this favor. Don't deny an old man a sight he has never yet seen. Do you think I want you to show me Pheidias's Zeus or Athena, made entirely of ivory and gold? No. Show me a human soul that longs to think as God does, and to blame neither gods nor people. Show me a soul that never fails to achieve what it seeks or avoid what it rejects. Show me one that is neither angry, envious, nor jealous. Why talk around it? Show me someone who desires to become a god rather than a human. Show me someone who, in this body of ours, this corpse, remembers his fellowship with Zeus. Show me that person. But you cannot! Why, then, do you keep making fools of yourselves and deceiving others? Why dress yourselves in other people's clothes? You go around like thieves who steal clothes from the baths, claiming names and qualities that don't belong to you.
Aristotle’s followers called themselves Peripatetics.
5. And now I am your teacher and ye are being taught by me. And I have this aim—to perfect you, that ye be unhindered, uncompelled, unembarrassed, free, prosperous, happy, looking unto God alone in all things great and small. And ye are here to learn these things, and to do them. And wherefore do ye not finish the work, if ye have indeed such an aim as behooves you, and if I, besides the aim, have such ability as behooves me? What is here lacking? When I see a carpenter, and the wood lying beside him, I look for some work. And now, here is the carpenter, here is the wood—what is yet lacking? Is the thing such as cannot be taught? It can. Is it, then, not in our power? Yea, this alone of all things is. Wealth is not in our power, nor health, nor repute, nor any other thing, save only the right use of appearances. This alone is by nature unhindered; this alone is unembarrassed. Wherefore, then, will ye not make an end? Tell me the reason. For either the fault lies in me, or in you, or in the nature of the thing. But the thing itself is possible, and indeed the only thing that is in our power. It remains that I am to blame, or else ye are; or, to speak more truly, both of us. What will ye, then? Let us at length begin to entertain such a purpose among us, and let the past be past. Only let us make a beginning: trust in me, and ye shall see.
5. Now I am your teacher, and you are learning from me. My aim is to perfect you. I want you to be unhindered, unforced, untroubled, free, flourishing, and happy. I want you to look to God alone in all things, great and small. You are here to learn these things and put them into practice. So why do you not finish the work? Do you truly have the purpose you should have? And do I have both the purpose and the ability I should have? If so, what is missing? When I see a carpenter with wood beside him, I expect to see some work done. Here is the carpenter, and here is the wood. What is still missing? Is this something that cannot be taught? It can be taught. Is it, then, beyond our control? No, this alone, of all things, is within our control. Wealth is not within our control, nor health, nor reputation, nor anything else except the right use of our impressions. This alone is by nature unhindered. This alone is free from obstruction. Why, then, will you not finish the work? Tell me the reason. The fault must lie either with me, with you, or with the nature of the task. But the task itself is possible. Indeed, it is the only thing within our control. So either I am to blame, or you are. More accurately, both of us are. What do you say, then? Let us finally begin to share this purpose, and let the past be past. Let us just make a beginning. Trust me, and you will see.