Its Rising Tide

I must not devote any more chapters here to a description of the further progress of Khadi. It would be outside the scope of these chapters to give a history of my various activities after they came before the public eye, and I must not attempt it, if only because to do so would require a treatise on the subject. My object in writing these chapters is simply to describe how certain things, as it were spontaneously, presented themselves to me in the course of my experiments with truth.

I must not devote any more chapters here to the further progress of Khadi. A history of my various activities after they became public would be beyond the scope of these chapters. I must not attempt one, if only because it would require a treatise. My purpose in writing these chapters is simply to describe how certain things seemed to present themselves spontaneously during my experiments with truth.

To resume, then, the story of the non-co-operation movement. Whilst the powerful Khilafat agitation set up by the Ali Brothers was in full progress, I had long discussions on the subject with the late Maulana Abdul Bari and the other Ulema, especially with regard to the extent to which a Musalman could observe the rule of non-violence. In the end they all agreed that Islam did not forbid its followers from following non-violence as a policy, and further, that, while they were pledged to that policy, they were bound faithfully to carry it out. At last the non-co-operation resolution was moved in the Khilafat Conference, and carried after prolonged deliberations. I have a vivid recollection how once at Allahabad a Committee sat all night deliberating upon the subject. In the beginning the late Hakim Saheb was sceptical as to the practicability of non-violent non-co-operation. But after his scepticism was overcome, he threw himself into it heart and soul, and his help proved invaluable to the movement.

To return to the story of the non-cooperation movement. The powerful Khilafat agitation started by the Ali Brothers was in full swing. During that time, I had long discussions with the late Maulana Abdul Bari and the other Ulema. We discussed, in particular, how far a Muslim could follow the rule of nonviolence. In the end, they all agreed that Islam did not forbid its followers from adopting nonviolence as a policy. They also agreed that, while pledged to that policy, they were bound to follow it faithfully. Finally, a resolution on non-cooperation was proposed at the Khilafat Conference. After long deliberations, it was passed. I vividly remember a committee in Allahabad deliberating on the subject all night. At first, the late Hakim Saheb doubted whether nonviolent non-cooperation was practical. But once his doubts were overcome, he threw himself into it heart and soul. His help proved invaluable to the movement.

Next, the non-co-operation resolution was moved by me at the Gujarat Political Conference that was held shortly afterwards. The preliminary contention raised by the opposition was, that it was not competent to a provincial conference to adopt a resolution in advance of the Congress. As against this, I suggested that the restriction could apply only to a backward movement; but as for going forward, the subordinate organisations were not only fully competent, but were in duty bound to do so, if they had in them the necessary grit and confidence. No permission, I argued, was needed to try to enhance the prestige of the parent institution, provided one did it at one’s own risk. The proposition was then discussed on its merits, the debate being marked by its keenness no less than the atmosphere of ‘sweet reasonableness’ in which it was conducted. On the ballot being taken the resolution was declared carried by an overwhelming majority. The successful passage of the resolution was due not a little to the personality of Sjt. Vallabhbhai and Abbas Tyebji. The latter was the president, and his leanings were all in favour of the non-co-operation resolution.

Next, I proposed the non-co-operation resolution at the Gujarat Political Conference, held shortly afterward. The opposition first argued that a provincial conference had no authority to adopt a resolution before the Congress did. I suggested that this restriction could apply only to a backward movement. Subordinate organizations had full authority to move forward. Indeed, they had a duty to do so if they had the necessary courage and confidence. I argued that no permission was needed to try to enhance the prestige of the parent institution, provided one acted at one’s own risk. The resolution was then discussed on its merits. The debate was keen, but it was conducted in an atmosphere of ‘sweet reasonableness’. When the votes were counted, the resolution was declared passed by an overwhelming majority. Its passage owed much to the personalities of Sjt. Vallabhbhai and Abbas Tyebji. Abbas Tyebji was the president, and he was wholly in favor of the non-co-operation resolution.

The All-India Congress Committee resolved to hold a special session of the Congress in September 1920 at Calcutta to deliberate on this question. Preparations were made for it on a large scale. Lala Lajpat Rai was elected President. Congress and Khilafat specials were run to Calcutta from Bombay. At Calcutta there was a mammoth gathering of delegates and visitors.

The All-India Congress Committee decided to hold a special Congress session in Calcutta in September 1920 to discuss this question. Large-scale preparations were made for the session. Lala Lajpat Rai was elected President. Special Congress and Khilafat trains ran from Bombay to Calcutta. A huge crowd of delegates and visitors gathered in Calcutta.

At the request of Maulana Shaukat Ali I prepared a draft of the non-co-operation resolution in the train. Up to this time I had more or less avoided the use of the word non-violent in my drafts. I invariably made use of this word in my speeches. My vocabulary on the subject was still in process of formation. I found that I could not bring home my meaning to purely Moslem audiences with the help of the Sanskrit equivalent for non-violent. I therefore asked Maulana Abul Kalam Azad to give me some other equivalent for it. He suggested the word ba-aman, similarly for non-co-operation he suggested the phrase tark-i-mavalat.

At Maulana Shaukat Ali’s request, I drafted the non-co-operation resolution on the train. Until then, I had more or less avoided using the word non-violent in my drafts. I always used it in my speeches. My vocabulary on the subject was still developing. I found that I could not convey my meaning to entirely Muslim audiences using the Sanskrit equivalent of non-violent. So I asked Maulana Abul Kalam Azad for another equivalent. He suggested ba-aman and, for non-co-operation, the phrase tark-i-mavalat.

Thus, while I was still busy devising suitable Hindi, Gujarati and Urdu phraseology for non-co-operation, I was called upon to frame the non-co-operation resolution for that eventful Congress. In the original draft the word non-violent had been left out by me. I had handed over the draft to Maulana Shaukat Ali who was travelling in the same compartment without noticing the omission. During the night I discovered the error. In the morning I sent Mahadev with the message, that the omission should be made good before the draft was sent to the press. But I have an impression, that the draft was printed before the insertion could be made. The Subjects Committee was to have met the same evening. I had therefore to make the necessary correction in the printed copies of the draft. I afterwards saw, that there would have been great difficulty, had I not been ready with my draft.

While I was still trying to find suitable Hindi, Gujarati and Urdu terms for non-co-operation, I was asked to draft the non-co-operation resolution for that eventful Congress. I left the word non-violent out of the original draft. Without noticing the omission, I handed the draft to Maulana Shaukat Ali, who was travelling in the same compartment. During the night, I discovered the error. In the morning, I sent Mahadev with a message asking that the word be added before the draft went to press. But I have the impression that the draft was printed before the word could be added. The Subjects Committee was to meet that same evening. So I had to make the necessary correction in the printed copies of the draft. I later realized that there would have been great difficulty if I had not had my draft ready.

None the less my plight was pitiable indeed. I was absolutely at sea as to who would support the resolution and who would oppose it. Nor had I any idea as to the attitude that Lalaji would adopt. I only saw an imposing phalanx of veteran warriors assembled for the fray at Calcutta, Dr. Besant, Pandit Malaviyaji, Sjt. Vijayaraghavachari, Pandit Motilalji and the Deshabandhu being some of them.

Nevertheless, my situation was truly distressing. I had no idea who would support the resolution or who would oppose it. I also had no idea what position Lalaji would take. All I could see was a formidable lineup of veteran warriors gathered for the battle in Calcutta. They included Dr. Besant, Pandit Malaviyaji, Sjt. Vijayaraghavachari, Pandit Motilalji and the Deshabandhu.

In my resolution non-co-operation was postulated only with a view to obtaining redress of the Punjab and the Khilafat wrongs. That however did not appeal to Sjt. Vijayaraghavachari. ‘If non-co-operation was to be declared, why should it be with reference to particular wrongs? The absence of Swaraj was the biggest wrong that the country was labouring under; it should be against that that non-co-operation should be directed,’ he argued. Pandit Motilalji also wanted the demand for Swaraj to be included in the resolution. I readily accepted the suggestion, and incorporated the demand for Swaraj in my resolution, which was passed after an exhaustive, serious and somewhat stormy discussion.

In my resolution, I proposed non-co-operation only to obtain redress for the wrongs in Punjab and over the Khilafat. But Sjt. Vijayaraghavachari did not agree. ‘If non-co-operation was to be declared, why should it be directed against particular wrongs? The lack of Swaraj was the greatest wrong the country faced. Non-co-operation should be directed against that,’ he argued. Pandit Motilalji also wanted the demand for Swaraj included in the resolution. I readily accepted the suggestion and added the demand for Swaraj to my resolution. The resolution passed after a thorough, serious and somewhat stormy discussion.

Motilalji was the first to join the movement. I still remember the sweet discussion that I had with him on the resolution. He suggested some changes in its phraseology which I adopted. He undertook to win the Deshabandhu for the movement. The Deshabandhu’s heart was inclined towards it, but he felt sceptical as to the capacity of the people to carry out the programme. It was only at the Nagpur Congress, that he and Lalaji accepted it whole-heartedly.

Motilalji was the first to join the movement. I still remember the pleasant discussion we had about the resolution. He suggested some changes to its wording, which I adopted. He promised to win the Deshabandhu over to the movement. The Deshabandhu was sympathetic to the movement, but he doubted whether the people could carry out the programme. Only at the Nagpur Congress did he and Lalaji accept the programme wholeheartedly.

I felt the loss of the late Lokamanya very deeply at the special session. It has been my firm faith to this day, that had the Lokamanya been then alive, he would have given his benedictions to me on that occasion. But even if it had been otherwise, and he had opposed the movement, I should still have esteemed his opposition as a privilege and an education for myself. We had our differences of opinion always, but they never led to bitterness. He always allowed me to believe, that the ties between us were of the closest. Even as I write these lines, the circumstances of his death stand forth vividly before my mind’s eye. It was about the hour of midnight, when Patwardhan, who was then working with me, conveyed over the telephone the news of his death. I was at that time surrounded by my companions. Spontaneously the exclamation escaped my lips, ‘My strongest bulwark is gone.’ The non-co-operation movement was then in full swing, and I was eagerly looking forward to encouragement and inspiration from him. What his attitude would have been with regard to the final phase of non-co-operation will always be a matter of speculation, and an idle one at that. But this much is certain, that the deep void left by his death weighed heavily upon everybody present at Calcutta. Every one felt the absence of his counsels in that hour of crisis in the nation’s history.

I felt the loss of the late Lokamanya deeply at the special session. To this day, I firmly believe that, had he been alive, he would have given me his blessing on that occasion. But even if he had opposed the movement, I would still have regarded his opposition as a privilege and an education. We always had differences of opinion, but they never led to bitterness. He always gave me reason to believe that our ties were very close. Even as I write, the circumstances of his death are vivid in my mind. It was around midnight when Patwardhan, who was then working with me, called to tell me of his death. My companions were gathered around me at the time. I cried out spontaneously, ‘My strongest bulwark is gone.’ The non-co-operation movement was then in full swing, and I was eagerly looking to him for encouragement and inspiration. We can only speculate about what his attitude toward the final phase of non-co-operation would have been. And such speculation is pointless. But one thing is certain: the deep void his death left weighed heavily on everyone present at Calcutta. Everyone missed his counsel at that moment of crisis in the nation’s history.