Thoughts on Multiple Lives

223. "The dogma of reincarnation," it is sometimes objected, "is not new; it is a resuscitation of the doctrine of Pythagoras." We have never said that spiritist doctrine was of modern invention; on the contrary, as the inter-communication of spirits with men occurs in virtue of natural law, it must have existed from the beginning of time, and we have always endeavoured to prove that traces of this inter-communication are to be found in the earliest annals of antiquity. Pythagoras, as is well known, was not the author of the system of metempsychosis; he borrowed it from the philosophers of Hindoostan and of Egypt, by whom it had been held from time immemorial. The idea of the transmigration of souls was, therefore, in the earliest ages of the world, a general belief, equally admitted by the common people and by the most eminent thinkers of that period.

223. Some object, "The doctrine of reincarnation is not new. It is a revival of Pythagoras's teaching." We have never claimed that spiritist doctrine was a modern invention. On the contrary, spirits communicate with people through a law of nature, so this communication must have existed from the beginning of time. We have always tried to show that traces of it can be found in the earliest records of antiquity. As is well known, Pythagoras did not create the doctrine of metempsychosis. He borrowed it from the philosophers of Hindoostan and Egypt, who had held it since time immemorial. The idea that souls pass from one body to another was therefore widely believed in the earliest ages of the world. Ordinary people and the most eminent thinkers of that time accepted it alike.

By what road did this idea come to them? Did it reach them through revelation or through intuition?

How did they come to this idea? Did it come to them through revelation or intuition?

In regard to this point we know nothing; but it may be safely assumed that no idea could thus have traversed the successive ages of the world, and have commanded the assent of the highest intellects of the human race, if it had not been based on some solid ground of truth and reason. The antiquity of this doctrine should therefore be considered as an argument in its favour, rather than as an objection. But, at the same time, it must not be forgotten that there is, between the antique doctrine of metempsychosis and the modern doctrine of reincarnation, this capital difference, viz., that the spirits who inculcate the latter reject absolutely the idea that the human soul can pass into an animal, and vice versa.

We know nothing about this point. But we can safely assume that the idea must have had some solid basis in truth and reason. Otherwise, it could not have endured through the ages and won the agreement of humanity's greatest thinkers. The age of this doctrine should therefore count in its favor, rather than against it. At the same time, we must remember a crucial difference between the ancient doctrine of metempsychosis and the modern doctrine of reincarnation. The spirits who teach reincarnation absolutely reject the idea that a human soul can pass into an animal, and vice versa.

The spirits, therefore, who now proclaim the dogma of the plurality of our corporeal existences reassert a doctrine which had its birth in the earliest ages of the world, and which has maintained its footing to the present day in the convictions of many minds; but they present this dogma under an aspect which is more rational, more conformable with the natural law of progress, and more in harmony with the wisdom of the Creator, through the stripping away of accessories added to it by superstition. A circumstance worthy of notice is the fact that it is not in this book alone that the doctrine in question has been inculcated by them of late years; for, even before its publication, numerous communications of a similar nature had already been obtained in various countries, and their number has since been greatly increased.

The spirits who now proclaim that we have multiple bodily lives are therefore restating an ancient doctrine. It originated in the earliest ages of the world and is still believed by many people today. But the spirits present it in a more rational form, more consistent with the natural law of progress and the Creator's wisdom. They do this by stripping away additions made by superstition. It is worth noting that this book is not the only place where spirits have recently taught this doctrine. Even before its publication, many similar communications had been received in various countries. Their number has since increased greatly.

It may here be asked, why it is that the statements of all spirits are not in unison in regard to this subject? To this question we shall recur elsewhere.

One may ask why all spirits do not agree on this subject. We will return to this question elsewhere.

Let us, for the present, examine the matter from another point of view, entirely irrespective of any assumed declarations of spirits in regard to it. Let us put the latter entirely aside for the moment; let us suppose them to have made no statement whatever in regard to it; let us even suppose the very existence of spirits not to have been surmised. Placing ourselves for a moment on neutral ground, and admitting, as equally possible, the hypotheses of the plurality and of the unity of corporeal existences, let us see which of these hypotheses is most in harmony with the dictates of reason and with the requirements of our own interest.

For now, let us examine the matter from another point of view, without relying on any supposed statements by spirits. Let us put those statements aside and suppose that spirits have said nothing about the matter. Let us even suppose that no one has imagined that spirits exist. From this neutral position, let us accept two possibilities as equally possible: the plurality and the unity of bodily existences. Let us see which is more consistent with reason and with our own interests.

There are persons who reject the idea of reincarnation simply because they do not like it, declaring that their present existence has been quite enough for them, and that they have no wish to recommence a similar one. Of such persons we would merely inquire whether they suppose that God has consulted their wishes and opinions in regulating the universe? Either the law of reincarnation exists, or it does not exist. If it exists, no matter how displeasing it may be to them, they will be compelled to submit to it; for God will not ask their permission to enforce it. It is as though a sick man should say, "I have suffered enough to-day; I do not choose to suffer to-morrow." No matter what may be his unwillingness to suffer, he will nevertheless be obliged to go on suffering, not only on the morrow, but day after day, until he is cured. In like manner, if it be their destiny to live again corporeally, they will thus live again, they will be reincarnated. In vain will they rebel against necessity, like a child refusing to go to school, or a condemned criminal refusing to go to prison. They will be compelled to submit to their fate, no matter how unwilling they may be to do so. Such objections are too puerile to deserve a more serious examination. Let us say, however, for the consolation of those who urge them, that the spiritist doctrine of reincarnation is by no means so terrible as they imagine it to be; that the conditions of their next existence depend on themselves, and will be happy or unhappy according to the deeds done by them in this present life; and that they may even, by their action in this life, raise themselves above the danger of falling again into the mire of expiation.

Some people reject the idea of reincarnation simply because they do not like it. They say their present life has been quite enough, and they do not wish to begin a similar one again. We would simply ask whether they think God has consulted their wishes and opinions in governing the universe. Either the law of reincarnation exists, or it does not. If it exists, they will have to submit to it, however much they dislike it. God will not ask their permission to enforce it. It is as if a sick person were to say, "I have suffered enough today. I do not choose to suffer tomorrow." However unwilling that person may be to suffer, they will still have to suffer tomorrow and day after day until they are cured. In the same way, if they are destined to live again in a body, they will do so. They will be reincarnated. They may rebel against necessity, like a child refusing to go to school or a convicted criminal refusing to go to prison. But their rebellion will be in vain. They will have to submit to their fate, however unwilling they may be. Such objections are too childish to deserve more serious examination. But, to comfort those who raise them, the spiritist doctrine of reincarnation is not nearly as terrible as they imagine. The conditions of their next life depend on them. Their next life will be happy or unhappy according to their deeds in this life. Through their actions in this life, they may even rise above the danger of falling again into the mire of expiation.

We take it for granted that those whom we are addressing believe in some sort of future after death, and that they do not look forward either to annihilation or to a drowning of their soul in a universal whole, without individuality, like so many drops of rain in the ocean; which comes to much the same thing. But, if you believe in a future state of existence, you probably do not suppose that it will be the same for all; for, in that case, where would be the utility of doing right? Why should men place any restraint upon themselves? Why should they not satisfy all their passions, all their desires, even at the expense of the rest of the world, if the result is to be the same in all cases? On the contrary, you no doubt believe that our future will be more Or less happy according to what we have done in our present life; and you have doubtless the desire to be as happy as possible in the future to which you look forward, since it will be for all eternity! Do you, perchance, consider yourself to be one of the most excellent of those who have ever existed upon the earth, and therefore entitled to supreme felicity? No. You admit, then, that there are some who are better than you, and who have consequently a right to a higher place, although you do not deserve to be classed among the reprobate. Place yourself, then, in thought, for a moment, in the medium condition which, according to your own admission, will properly be yours, and suppose that some one comes to you and says, "You suffer; you are not so happy as you might be; and meanwhile you see others in the enjoyment of unmixed happiness. Would you like to exchange your position for theirs?" "Undoubtedly, I should," you reply; "what must I do to bring about such a result?" "Something very simple; you have only to begin again what you have done badly, and try to do it better." Would you hesitate to accept the offer, even at the cost of several existences of trial?

We assume that those we are addressing believe in some kind of life after death. We also assume that you do not expect to be annihilated or to lose your individual soul in a universal whole, like a drop of rain in the ocean. That would amount to much the same thing. But if you believe in life after death, you probably do not think it will be the same for everyone. If it were, what would be the use of doing right? Why should people restrain themselves? Why should they not satisfy all their passions and desires, even at everyone else’s expense, if the result is the same in every case? On the contrary, you no doubt believe that our future happiness will depend on what we have done in this life. And you surely want to be as happy as possible in the future you expect, since it will last for all eternity! Do you perhaps think you are one of the best people ever to have lived on earth, and therefore entitled to the greatest happiness? No. Then you admit that some people are better than you and therefore deserve a higher place. Yet you do not deserve to be counted among the wicked. For a moment, imagine yourself in the middle position that you admit would rightly be yours. Suppose someone comes to you and says, "You suffer. You are not as happy as you could be. Meanwhile, you see others enjoying perfect happiness. Would you like to trade places with them?" "Of course I would," you reply. "What must I do to make that happen?" "Something very simple. You only have to start over and do better what you did badly." Would you hesitate to accept the offer, even if it meant several lives of trial?

Let us take another illustration, still more prosaic. Suppose that some one comes to a man who, though not in a state of absolute destitution, has to endure many privations through the smallness of his means, and says to him, "Here is an immense fortune, of which you may have the enjoyment, on condition that you work hard during one minute." The laziest of men, in response to such an offer, would say, without hesitation, "I am ready to work for one minute, for two minutes, for an hour, for a whole day if necessary! What is a day's labour in comparison with the certainty of ease and plenty for all the rest of my life?"

Let us take another, even more ordinary example. Imagine a man who is not completely destitute but suffers many hardships because he has little money. Someone comes to him and says, "Here is an immense fortune for you to enjoy, provided you work hard for one minute." Even the laziest man would answer without hesitation, "I am ready to work for one minute, two minutes, an hour, or a whole day if necessary! What is a day's work compared with the certainty of comfort and plenty for the rest of my life?"

But what is the duration of a corporeal life in comparison with eternity? Less than a minute; less than a moment.

But how long is a physical life compared with eternity? Less than a minute. Less than a moment.

We sometimes hear people bring forward the following argument:—"God, who is sovereignly good, cannot impose upon man the hard necessity of recommencing a series of sorrows and tribulations." But would there be more kindness in condemning a man to perpetual suffering for a few moments of error than in giving him the means of repairing his faults?

We sometimes hear people make this argument: "God, who is supremely good, cannot force people to begin a series of sorrows and hardships again." But would it be kinder to condemn someone to endless suffering for a few moments of error? Or would it be kinder to give them a way to make up for their faults?

"Two manufacturers had each a workman who might hope to become some day the partner of his employer. But it happened that both these workmen made so very bad a use of their day that they merited dismissal. One of the manufacturers drove away his unfaithful workman, despite his supplications; and this workman, being unable to obtain any other employment, died of want. The other said to his workman—'You have wasted a day; you owe me compensation for the loss you have thus caused me. You have done your work badly; you owe me reparation for it. I give you leave to begin it over again. Try to do well, and I will keep you in my employ, and you may still aspire to the superior position which I had promised you."

"Two manufacturers each had a worker who hoped to become his employer's partner someday. But both workers made such poor use of their day that they deserved to be dismissed. One manufacturer sent his unfaithful worker away, despite his pleas. Unable to find another job, the worker died of poverty. The other manufacturer said to his worker, 'You have wasted a day. You owe me compensation for the loss you have caused me. You have done your work badly, and you owe me a way to make it right. I will let you start over. Try to do well, and I will keep you in my employ. You may still hope to gain the higher position I promised you.'"

Need we ask which of the manufacturers has shown himself to be the most humane? And would God, who is clemency itself, be more inexorable than a just and compassionate man? The idea that our fate is decided for ever by a few years of trial, and notwithstanding the fact that it was not in our power to attain to perfection while we remained upon the earth, fills the mind with anguish; while the contrary idea is eminently consoling, for it leaves us hope. Thus, without pronouncing for or against the plurality of existences, without admitting either hypothesis in preference to the other, we assert that, if the matter were left to our own choice, there is no one who would prefer incurring a sentence against which there should be no appeal. A philosopher has said that "if God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent Him for the happiness of the human race;" the same might be said in regard to the plurality of existences. But, as we have already remarked, God does not ask our permission in the establishment of providential ordering; He does not consult our preferences in the matter. Either the law of reincarnation exists, or it does not exist; let us see on which side is the balance of probabilities, considering the matter from another point of view, but still leaving out of sight all idea of any statements that have been made by spirits in regard to it, and examining the question merely as a matter of philosophic inquiry.

Need we ask which manufacturer has shown himself to be the most humane? Would God, who is mercy itself, be less forgiving than a just and compassionate man? The thought that a few years of testing decide our fate forever fills us with anguish. This is especially true because we could not achieve perfection while we were on earth. The opposite idea is deeply comforting, because it leaves us with hope. We do not take a position for or against multiple lives, or favor either possibility. But we say that, if the choice were ours, no one would choose a sentence with no possibility of appeal. A philosopher has said that "if God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him for the happiness of the human race." The same might be said about multiple lives. But, as we have already noted, God does not ask our permission when establishing the order of providence. He does not consult our preferences in the matter. Either the law of reincarnation exists, or it does not. Let us consider the question from another point of view and see which possibility is more likely. We will still set aside everything spirits have said about it and examine it solely as a philosophical question.

If the law of reincarnation do not exist, we can have but one corporeal existence; and if our present corporeal life be our only one, the soul of each individual must have been created at the same time as his body; unless, indeed, we assume the anteriority of the soul, in which case we should have to inquire what was the state of the soul before its union with the body, and whether this state did not constitute an existence of some kind or other. There is no middle ground. Either the soul existed before its union with the body, or it did not. If it existed, what was its condition? Was it possessed of self-consciousness? If not, its state must have been nearly equivalent to non-existence. If possessed of individuality, it must have been either progressive or stationary; in either case, what was its degree of advancement on uniting itself to the body? If, on the contrary, it be assumed, according to the general belief, that the soul is born into existence at the same time as the body—or that, previous to the birth of the body, it possesses only negative faculties—we have to propose the following questions:—

If the law of reincarnation does not exist, we can have only one physical life. If our present physical life is our only one, each person's soul must have been created at the same time as the body. We could instead assume that the soul existed before the body. In that case, we would have to ask what state the soul was in before it joined the body. We would also have to ask whether that state amounted to some kind of existence. There is no middle ground. Either the soul existed before it joined the body, or it did not. If it existed, what was its condition? Was it self-aware? If not, its state must have been almost the same as nonexistence. If it had its own individuality, it must have been either developing or remaining unchanged. In either case, how far had it advanced when it joined the body? On the other hand, we may assume, as is generally believed, that the soul comes into existence alongside the body. Or we may assume that, before the body's birth, the soul has only negative faculties. In either case, we must ask the following questions:

1. Why do souls manifest so great a diversity of aptitudes independently of the ideas acquired by education?

1. Why do souls show such a wide range of abilities, regardless of what they learn through education?

2. Whence comes the extra-normal aptitude for certain arts and sciences displayed by many children while still very young, although others remain in a state of inferiority, or of mediocrity, all their life?

2. Where does the extraordinary talent some very young children show for certain arts and sciences come from, while others remain inferior or mediocre all their lives?

3. Whence do some individuals derive the innate or intuitive ideas that are lacking in others?

3. Where do some people get the innate or intuitive ideas that others lack?

4. Whence do some children derive the precocious instincts of vice or of virtue, the innate sentiments of dignity or of baseness, which often contrast so strikingly with the situation into which they are born?

4. Where do some children get their early instincts for vice or virtue, and their inborn sense of dignity or baseness? These qualities often contrast sharply with the circumstances into which they are born.

5. Why is it that some men, independently of education, are more advanced than others?

5. Why are some men more advanced than others, regardless of their education?

6. Why is it that among the races which people the globe some are savage and others civilised? If you took a Hottentot baby from its mother's breast, and brought it up in our most renowned schools, could you succeed in making of it a Laplace or a Newton?

6. Why are some races in the world savage and others civilized? Suppose you took a Khoikhoi baby from its mother's breast and raised it in our most renowned schools. Could you make it into a Laplace or a Newton?

What is the philosophy or the theosophy that can solve these problems? Either the souls of men are equal at their birth, or they are unequal. If they are equal, why these inequalities of aptitude? Will it be said that these inequalities depend on the corporeal organisation of each child? But such a doctrine would be the most monstrous and the most immoral of hypotheses; for, in that case, man would be a mere machine, the sport of matter; he would not be responsible for his actions, but would have the right to throw all the blame of his wrong-doing on the imperfections of his physical frame. If, on the other hand, souls are created unequal, God must have created them so; but, in that case, why is this innate superiority accorded to some and denied to others? And would such partiality be consistent with the justice of God, and the equal love He bears to all His creatures?

What philosophy or theosophy can solve these problems? Human souls are either equal at birth or unequal. If they are equal, why do people have different aptitudes? Will someone say that these differences depend on each child's physical makeup? But that would be the most monstrous and immoral of theories. For in that case, a person would be a mere machine, a plaything of matter. He would not be responsible for his actions. He would have the right to blame all his wrongdoing on flaws in his body. If, on the other hand, souls are created unequal, God must have created them that way. But then why are some born superior to others? Would such favoritism be consistent with God's justice and his equal love for all his creatures?

Admit, on the contrary, a succession of existences, and everything is explained. Men bring with them, at their birth in flesh, the amount of intuition they have previously acquired. They are more or less advanced, according to the number of existences they have previously accomplished, according as they are nearer to or farther from the common starting-point; exactly as, in a company made up of individuals of different ages, each will possess a degree of development proportionate to the number of years he has already lived; the succession of years being, to the life of the body, what the succession of existences is to the life of the soul. Bring together in the same place, at the same time, a thousand individuals of all ages, from the new-born babe to the patriarch of eighty. Suppose that a veil is thrown over their past, and that you, in your ignorance of that past, imagine them all to have been born on the same day. You would naturally wonder how it is that some are big and others little; that some are wrinkled and others fresh; that some are learned and others ignorant; but if the cloud which hid their past were dispersed, and you discovered that some had lived longer than others, all these differences would be explained. God, in His justice, could not create souls more or less perfect. But granting the plurality of our corporeal existences, there is nothing in the differences of quality that we see around us in any way inconsistent with the most rigorous equity; for what we see around us is then perceived to have its roots, not in the present, but in the past.

Instead, accept that we live a succession of lives, and everything is explained. At birth, people bring with them the intuition they acquired in previous lives. They are more or less advanced according to how many lives they have lived. Their advancement depends on how near or far they are from the common starting point. It is just like a group of people of different ages. Each person’s development is proportional to the number of years they have lived. The succession of years in the body’s life is like the succession of lives in the soul’s life. Bring together a thousand people of all ages, from newborn babies to elders of eighty. Suppose their past is hidden from you, and you imagine they were all born on the same day. You would naturally wonder why some are big and others small, some wrinkled and others fresh. You would wonder why some are learned and others ignorant. But if their past were revealed, you would discover that some had lived longer than others. Then all these differences would be explained. In his justice, God could not create some souls more perfect than others. But if we accept that we live multiple physical lives, the differences we see are entirely consistent with perfect fairness. We can then see that these differences have their roots not in the present, but in the past.

Is this argument based on any pre-conceived system or gratuitous supposition? No. We start from a fact that is patent and incontestable—viz., the inequality of natural aptitudes and of intellectual and moral development; and we find this fact to be inexplicable by any of the theories in vogue, while the explanation of this fact afforded by another theory is at once simple, natural, and rational. Is it reasonable to prefer a theory which does not explain this fact to one which does?

Is this argument based on a preconceived system or an unsupported assumption? No. We start with an obvious and undeniable fact: people differ in their natural abilities and their intellectual and moral development. We find that none of the popular theories can explain these differences. But another theory offers an explanation that is simple, natural, and reasonable. Is it reasonable to prefer a theory that cannot explain these differences to one that can?

In regard to the sixth question, it will doubtless be replied that the Hottentot is of an inferior race; in which case we beg to inquire whether a Hottentot is or is not a man? If he be not a man, why try to make him a Christian? If he be a man, why has God refused to him and to his race the privileges accorded to the Caucasian race? Spiritist philosophy is too broad to admit the existence of different species of men; it recognises only men whose spiritual part is more or less backward, but who are all capable of the same progress. Is not this view of the human race more conformable with the justice of God?

In response to the sixth question, people will no doubt say that the Khoikhoi are an inferior race. If so, we must ask: is a Khoikhoi person a human being or not? If not, why try to make him a Christian? If he is, why has God denied him and his race the privileges given to the Caucasian race? Spiritist philosophy is too broad to accept the existence of different human species. It recognizes only human beings whose spiritual development is more or less backward, but who are all capable of the same progress. Is this view of humanity not more consistent with the justice of God?

We have been considering the soul in regard to its past and its present; if we consider it in regard to the future, we are met by difficulties which the theories in vogue are equally unable to explain:—1. If our future destiny is to be decided solely by our present existence, what will be in the future the respective positions of the savage and of the civilised man? Will they be on the same level, or will there be a difference in the sum of their eternal felicity?

We have considered the soul’s past and present. When we consider its future, we face difficulties that current theories are equally unable to explain: 1. If our future destiny is decided solely by our present life, what will be the future positions of a person from an uncivilized society and one from a civilized society? Will they be on the same level, or will their eternal happiness differ in degree?

2. Will the man who has laboured diligently all his life to advance his moral and intellectual improvement be placed in the same rank with the man who, not through his own fault, but because he has had neither the time nor the opportunity for advancing, has remained at a lower point of moral and intellectual improvement?

2. A man has worked hard all his life to improve morally and intellectually. Will he be placed at the same rank as a man who has made less progress? The second man has had neither the time nor the opportunity to improve, through no fault of his own.

3. Can the man who has done wrong because the means of enlightenment have been denied to him be justly punished for wrong-doing which has not been the result of his own choice?

3. Can a man be justly punished for doing wrong because he was denied the means of enlightenment? His wrongdoing was not the result of his own choice.

4. We endeavour to enlighten, moralise, and civilise mankind; but, for one whom we are able to enlighten, there are millions who die every year without the light having reached them. What is to be the fate of these millions? Are they to be treated as reprobates? and, if they are not to be so treated, how have they deserved to be placed in the same category with those who have become enlightened and moralised?

4. We try to enlighten humanity, improve its morals, and make it civilized. But for every person we enlighten, millions die each year without receiving that light. What will become of these millions? Will they be treated as wicked? If not, how have they earned a place alongside those who have become enlightened and moral?

5. What is to be the fate of children who die before they have been able to do either good or evil? If they are to be received among the supremely happy, why should this favour be granted to them without their having done anything to deserve it? And in virtue of what privilege are they exempted from undergoing the tribulations of the earthly life?

5. What happens to children who die before they can do good or evil? If they are to be among the supremely happy, why should they receive this favor without having earned it? What gives them the privilege of being spared the hardships of earthly life?

Which of the doctrines hitherto propounded can solve these problems? But, if we admit the fact of our consecutive existences, all these problems are solved in conformity with the divine justice. What we are not able to do in one existence we do in another. None are exempted from the action of the law of progress; every one is rewarded progressively, according to his deserts, but no one is excluded from the eventual attainment of the highest felicity, no matter what may be the obstacles he has to encounter on the road.

Which of the doctrines proposed so far can solve these problems? But if we accept that we live successive lives, all these problems are solved in keeping with divine justice. What we cannot do in one life, we do in another. No one is exempt from the law of progress. Everyone is rewarded gradually, according to what they deserve. But no one is denied the chance to reach the highest happiness eventually, whatever obstacles they face along the way.

The questions growing out of the subject we are considering might be multiplied indefinitely, for the psychologic and moral problems which can only find their solution in the plurality of existences are innumerable. In the present considerations we have restricted our inquiry to those which are most general in their nature. "But," it may still be urged by some objectors, "whatever may be the arguments in its favour, the doctrine of reincarnation is not admitted by the Church; its acceptance would therefore be the overthrow of religion."

We could ask endless questions about the subject we are considering. There are countless psychological and moral problems that can only be solved through the idea of multiple lives. Here, we have limited our inquiry to the most general of these problems. "But," some objectors may still argue, "whatever the arguments in its favor, the Church does not accept the doctrine of reincarnation. Accepting it would therefore overthrow religion."

It is not our intention to treat of the question, in this place, under the special aspect suggested by the foregoing objection; it is sufficient for our present purpose to have shown the eminently moral and rational character of the doctrine we are considering. But it may be confidently asserted, that a doctrine which is both moral and rational cannot be antagonistic to a religion which proclaims the Divine Being to be the most perfect goodness and the highest reason. What, we may ask in our turn, would have become of the Church if, in opposition to the convictions of mankind and the testimony of science, it had persisted in rejecting overwhelming evidence, and had cast out from its bosom all who did not believe in the movement of the sun or in the six days of creation? What would be the credit or authority possessed among enlightened nations by a religious system that should inculcate manifest errors as articles of belief? Whenever any matter of evidence has been established, the Church has wisely sided with the evidence. If it be proved that the facts of human life are irreconcilable, on any other supposition, with a belief in the justice of God—if various points of the Christian dogma can only be explained with the aid of this doctrine, the Church will be compelled to admit its truth, and to acknowledge that the apparent antagonism between them is only apparent. We shall show, elsewhere, that religion has no more to fear from the acceptance of this doctrine than from the discovery of the motion of the earth and of the periods of geologic formation, which, at first sight, appear to contradict the statements of the Bible. Moreover, the principle of reincarnation is implied in many passages of Holy Writ, and is explicitly formulated in the Gospels:—

We do not intend to address the question here from the specific angle raised by the preceding objection. For now, it is enough to have shown that the doctrine we are considering is deeply moral and rational. But we can confidently assert that a moral and rational doctrine cannot conflict with a religion that proclaims God to be perfectly good and supremely rational. We might ask in turn what would have become of the Church if it had continued to reject overwhelming evidence. What if it had opposed human conviction and scientific evidence? What if it had cast out everyone who did not believe that the sun moves or that creation took six days? What credibility or authority would a religious system have among enlightened nations if it taught obvious errors as articles of faith? Whenever evidence has established a fact, the Church has wisely accepted it. Suppose it is proved that only this doctrine can reconcile the facts of human life with belief in God's justice. Suppose, too, that it is proved that certain points of Christian dogma can be explained only with this doctrine's help. Then the Church will be compelled to admit its truth. It will also have to acknowledge that the conflict between the doctrine and Christianity is only apparent. Elsewhere, we shall show that religion has no more to fear from accepting this doctrine than from other discoveries. These include the discovery that the earth moves and that geological formations developed over long periods. At first sight, these discoveries appear to contradict the Bible. Moreover, the principle of reincarnation is implied in many passages of Holy Writ. It is also stated explicitly in the Gospels:

"When they came down from the mountain (after the transfiguration), Jesus gave this commandment, and said to them—'Speak to no one of what you have just seen, until the Son of Man shall have been resuscitated from among the dead.' His disciples thereupon began to question Him, and inquired, 'Why, then, do the Scribes say that Elias must first come?' But Jesus replied to them, 'It is true that Elias must come, and that he will re-establish all things. But I declare to you that Elias has already come, and they did not know him, but have made him suffer as they listed. It is thus that they will put to death the Son of Man.' Then His disciples understood that He spoke to them of John the Baptist." (St Matthew, chap. xvii.)

"When they came down from the mountain (after the transfiguration), Jesus commanded them: 'Tell no one what you have just seen until the Son of Man has risen from the dead.' His disciples then asked him, 'Why, then, do the Scribes say that Elias must come first?' Jesus replied, 'It is true that Elias must come and restore all things. But I tell you that Elias has already come. They did not recognize him, but made him suffer as they pleased. In the same way, they will put the Son of Man to death.' Then his disciples understood that he was speaking to them about John the Baptist." (St Matthew, chapter 17.)

Since John the Baptist is declared by Christ to have been Elias, it follows that the spirit or soul of Elias must have been reincarnated in the body of John the Baptist.

Christ said that John the Baptist was Elias. So the spirit or soul of Elias must have been reincarnated in the body of John the Baptist.

But whatever may be our opinion in regard to reincarnation, whether we accept it or whether we reject it, it is certain that we shall have to undergo it, if it really exists, notwithstanding any belief of ours to the contrary. The point which we here desire to establish is this, viz., that the teaching of the spirits who proclaim it is eminently Christian, that it is founded on the doctrines of the immortality of the soul, of future rewards and punishments, of the justice of God, of human free-will, and the moral code of Christ; and that, therefore, it cannot be anti-religious.

But whatever we believe about reincarnation, whether we accept or reject it, we will have to undergo it if it exists. No belief of ours to the contrary can change that. Our point is that the teaching of the spirits who proclaim reincarnation is deeply Christian. It is based on the immortality of the soul, future rewards and punishments, the justice of God, human free will, and the moral code of Christ. It therefore cannot be anti-religious.

We have argued the matter, as we remarked above, without reference to statements made by spirits; such statements being, for many minds, without authority. If we, and so many others, have adopted the hypothesis of the plurality of existences, we have done so not merely because it has been proclaimed by spirits, but because it has appeared to us to be eminently rational, and because it solves problems that are insoluble by the opposite hypothesis. Had it been suggested to us by a mere mortal, we should, therefore, have adopted it with equal confidence, renouncing, with equal promptitude, our preconceived opinions on the subject; for when an opinion has been shown to be erroneous, even self-love has more to lose than to gain by persisting in holding it. In like manner, we should have rejected the doctrine of reincarnation, even though proclaimed by spirits, if it had appeared to us to be contrary to reason, as, indeed, we have rejected many other ideas which spirits have sought to inculcate, for we know, by experience, that we can no more give a blind acceptance to ideas put forth by spirits than we can to those put forth by men.

As we noted above, we have argued this matter without relying on statements made by spirits. For many people, such statements carry no authority. We and many others have adopted the idea that we live more than one life. We have done so not merely because spirits have proclaimed it. We have adopted it because it seems highly rational and solves problems that the opposing view cannot solve. If an ordinary person had suggested it, we would have accepted it just as confidently. We would have abandoned our previous opinions on the subject just as readily. For once an opinion has been shown to be wrong, even our pride has more to lose than to gain by clinging to it. Likewise, we would have rejected reincarnation, even though spirits proclaimed it, if it had seemed contrary to reason. Indeed, we have rejected many other ideas that spirits have tried to teach us. Experience has shown us that we can no more blindly accept ideas from spirits than those from people.

The principal merit of the doctrine of reincarnation is, then, to our minds, that it is supremely rational. But it has also in its favour the confirmation of facts—facts positive and, so to say, material, which are apparent to all who study the question with patience and perseverance, and in presence of which all doubt as to the reality of the law in question is impossible. When the appreciation of these facts shall have become popularised, like those which have revealed to us the formation and rotation of the earth, they who now oppose this doctrine will be compelled to renounce their opposition.

In our view, the main merit of the doctrine of reincarnation is that it is supremely rational. But facts also confirm it. These facts are definite and, so to speak, material. They are apparent to all who study the question patiently and persistently. In the face of these facts, no doubt about the reality of the law of reincarnation is possible. Understanding of these facts will become widespread, just as it has for facts about the earth's formation and rotation. When that happens, those who now oppose the doctrine will be forced to abandon their opposition.

To sum up:—We assert that the doctrine of the plurality of existences is the only one which explains what, without this doctrine, is inexplicable; that it is at once eminently consolatory and strictly conformable with the most rigorous justice; and that it is the anchor of safety which God in His mercy has provided for mankind.

To sum up, we assert that the doctrine of multiple lives is the only explanation for what would otherwise be inexplicable. It is deeply comforting and fully consistent with the strictest justice. It is the anchor of safety that God, in his mercy, has provided for humanity.

The words of Jesus Himself are explicit as to the truth of this last assertion; for we read in the 3d chapter of the Gospel according to St John that Jesus, replying to Nicodemus, thus expressed Himself:—

Jesus's own words clearly confirm this last claim. In chapter 3 of the Gospel according to St John, Jesus replies to Nicodemus in these words:

"Verily, verily, I tell thee that, if a man be not born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." And when Nicodemus inquires, "How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter again into his mother's womb and be born a second time?" Jesus replies, "Except a man be born of water and of the spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God. What is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of the spirit is spirit. Be not amazed at what I have told thee; you must be born again" (Vide Resurrection of the Body, No. 1010.)

"Truly, I tell you, if a person is not born again, they cannot see the kingdom of God." Nicodemus asks, "How can a person be born when they are old? Can they enter their mother's womb again and be born a second time?" Jesus replies, "Unless a person is born of water and the spirit, they cannot enter the kingdom of God. What is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of the spirit is spirit. Do not be amazed at what I have told you. You must be born again" (See Resurrection of the Body, No. 1010.)