The Tribunate

When an exact proportion cannot be established between the constituent parts of the State, or when causes that cannot be removed continually alter the relation of one part to another, recourse is had to the institution of a peculiar magistracy that enters into no corporate unity with the rest. This restores to each term its right relation to the others, and provides a link or middle term between either prince and people, or prince and Sovereign, or, if necessary, both at once.

Sometimes an exact balance cannot be established between the parts of the State. Or causes that cannot be eliminated keep changing how those parts relate to one another. In either case, a special magistracy is established, separate from all the other bodies. This magistracy restores each part’s proper relationship with the others. It also acts as a link between the prince and the people, or between the prince and the Sovereign. If necessary, it serves both roles at once.

This body, which I shall call the tribunate, is the preserver of the laws and of the legislative power. It serves sometimes to protect the Sovereign against the government, as the tribunes of the people did at Rome; sometimes to uphold the government against the people, as the Council of Ten now does at Venice; and sometimes to maintain the balance between the two, as the Ephors did at Sparta.

I shall call this body the tribunate. It protects the laws and the power to make laws. Sometimes the tribunate protects the Sovereign against the government, as the tribunes of the people did at Rome. Sometimes it supports the government against the people, as the Council of Ten now does at Venice. And sometimes it maintains the balance between the two, as the Ephors did at Sparta.

The tribunate is not a constituent part of the city, and should have no share in either legislative or executive power; but this very fact makes its own power the greater: for, while it can do nothing, it can prevent anything from being done. It is more sacred and more revered, as the defender of the laws, than the prince who executes them, or than the Sovereign which ordains them. This was seen very clearly at Rome, when the proud patricians, for all their scorn of the people, were forced to bow before one of its officers, who had neither auspices nor jurisdiction.

The tribunate is not part of the state’s governing structure and should have no legislative or executive power. But this very fact makes its own power greater. Although the tribunate can do nothing, it can prevent anything from being done. As the defender of the laws, the tribunate is more sacred and more respected than the prince who enforces them. It is also more sacred and respected than the Sovereign who makes them. This was especially clear in Rome. Despite all their contempt for the people, the proud patricians were forced to bow before one of the tribunate’s officers. This officer had neither the authority to take auspices nor the power to administer justice.

The tribunate, wisely tempered, is the strongest support a good constitution can have; but if its strength is ever so little excessive, it upsets the whole State. Weakness, on the other hand, is not natural to it: provided it is something, it is never less than it should be.

With its power wisely balanced, the tribunate is the strongest support a good constitution can have. But if the tribunate’s power is even slightly excessive, it throws the whole State into disorder. Weakness, on the other hand, is not natural to the tribunate. As long as the tribunate has any power at all, it never has less than it should.

It degenerates into tyranny when it usurps the executive power, which it should confine itself to restraining, and when it tries to dispense with the laws, which it should confine itself to protecting. The immense power of the Ephors, harmless as long as Sparta preserved its morality, hastened corruption when once it had begun. The blood of Agis, slaughtered by these tyrants, was avenged by his successor; the crime and the punishment of the Ephors alike hastened the destruction of the republic, and after Cleomenes Sparta ceased to be of any account. Rome perished in the same way: the excessive power of the tribunes, which they had usurped by degrees, finally served, with the help of laws made to secure liberty, as a safeguard for the emperors who destroyed it. As for the Venetian Council of Ten, it is a tribunal of blood, an object of horror to patricians and people alike; and, so far from giving a lofty protection to the laws, it does nothing, now they have become degraded, but strike in the darkness blows of which no one dare take note.

It becomes tyrannical when it takes over executive power instead of limiting itself to keeping that power in check. It also becomes tyrannical when it tries to bypass the laws instead of limiting itself to protecting them. The immense power of the Ephors was harmless as long as Sparta remained morally sound. But once corruption began, their power made it spread faster. Agis was slaughtered by these tyrants, and his successor avenged his blood. Both the Ephors’ crime and their punishment hastened the republic’s destruction. After Cleomenes, Sparta no longer mattered. Rome fell in the same way. The tribunes gradually seized excessive power. In the end, laws designed to protect liberty helped turn that power into a shield for the emperors who destroyed liberty. As for the Venetian Council of Ten, it is a bloodthirsty tribunal, feared and hated by patricians and ordinary people alike. Far from standing above others to protect the laws, the Council now does nothing but strike in the dark. The laws have become degraded, and no one dares acknowledge the Council’s blows.

The tribunate, like the government, grows weak as the number of its members increases. When the tribunes of the Roman people, who first numbered only two, and then five, wished to double that number, the senate let them do so, in the confidence that it could use one to check another, as indeed it afterwards freely did.

The tribunate, like the government, grows weaker as its membership increases. The tribunes of the Roman people numbered only two at first, then five. When the tribunes wanted to double their number, the senate allowed the increase. The senate was confident it could use one tribune to hold another in check, as it later did freely.

The best method of preventing usurpations by so formidable a body, though no government has yet made use of it, would be not to make it permanent, but to regulate the periods during which it should remain in abeyance. These intervals, which should not be long enough to give abuses time to grow strong, may be so fixed by law that they can easily be shortened at need by extraordinary commissions.

The best way to prevent such a powerful body from seizing power would be to avoid making it permanent. No government has yet used this method. Instead, there should be set periods when the body is inactive. These breaks should not last long enough for abuses to take hold. The law may set these breaks so that special commissions can easily shorten them when necessary.

This method seems to me to have no disadvantages, because, as I have said, the tribunate, which forms no part of the constitution, can be removed without the constitution being affected. It seems to be also efficacious, because a newly restored magistrate starts not with the power his predecessor exercised, but with that which the law allows him.

This method seems to me to have no drawbacks. As I have said, the tribunate is not part of the constitution. Because of this, the tribunate can be removed without affecting the constitution. The method also seems effective, because a newly restored magistrate begins with only the power the law allows him. He does not begin with the power his predecessor exercised.