Establishing Government Is Not a Contract

The legislative power once well established, the next thing is to establish similarly the executive power; for this latter, which operates only by particular acts, not being of the essence of the former, is naturally separate from it. Were it possible for the Sovereign, as such, to possess the executive power, right and fact would be so confounded that no one could tell what was law and what was not; and the body politic, thus disfigured, would soon fall a prey to the violence it was instituted to prevent.

Once legislative power is firmly established, the next step is to establish executive power in the same way. Executive power deals only with specific actions and is not an essential part of legislative power. For these reasons, the two powers are naturally separate. If the Sovereign, acting as such, could hold executive power, legal right and actual practice would become hopelessly confused. No one could then tell what was law and what was not. The political community, distorted in this way, would soon fall victim to the violence it was created to prevent.

As the citizens, by the social contract, are all equal, all can prescribe what all should do, but no one has a right to demand that another shall do what he does not do himself. It is strictly this right, which is indispensable for giving the body politic life and movement, that the Sovereign, in instituting the government, confers upon the prince.

Since all citizens are equal under the social contract, all can decide what all should do. But no one has the right to demand that another person do what they themselves do not do. This very right is essential to give the political community life and movement. When establishing the government, the Sovereign grants precisely this right to the prince.

It has been held that this act of establishment was a contract between the people and the rulers it sets over itself.—a contract in which conditions were laid down between the two parties binding the one to command and the other to obey. It will be admitted, I am sure, that this is an odd kind of contract to enter into. But let us see if this view can be upheld.

Some have argued that this act of establishment was a contract between the people and their chosen rulers. The contract set terms for both sides, requiring the rulers to command and the people to obey. I am sure everyone will agree that this is an odd kind of contract to enter into. But let us see whether this view can be defended.

First, the supreme authority can no more be modified than it can be alienated; to limit it is to destroy it. It is absurd and contradictory for the Sovereign to set a superior over itself; to bind itself to obey a master would be to return to absolute liberty.

First, supreme authority can no more be changed than it can be given away. To limit that authority is to destroy it. It is absurd and contradictory for the Sovereign to place a higher authority above itself. For the Sovereign to bind itself to obey a master would mean returning to absolute freedom.

Moreover, it is clear that this contract between the people and such and such persons would be a particular act; and from this it follows that it can be neither a law nor an act of Sovereignty, and that consequently it would be illegitimate.

Moreover, a contract between the people and specific individuals would clearly be an act concerning those individuals alone. It follows that such a contract could be neither a law nor an act of Sovereignty. The contract would therefore be illegitimate.

It is plain too that the contracting parties in relation to each other would be under the law of nature alone and wholly without guarantees of their mutual undertakings, a position wholly at variance with the civil state. He who has force at his command being always in a position to control execution, it would come to the same thing if the name "contract" were given to the act of one man who said to another; "I give you all my goods, on condition that you give me back as much of them as you please."

Clearly, too, the parties to the contract would be bound to each other only by the law of nature. They would have no guarantees at all that either would keep their promises. Such a situation is completely at odds with civil society. Whoever commands force can always control how the agreement is carried out. So we might just as well call the following act a "contract": one man says to another, "I give you all my possessions, on condition that you give me back as much as you please."

There is only one contract in the State, and that is the act of association, which in itself excludes the existence of a second. It is impossible to conceive of any public contract that would not be a violation of the first.

There is only one contract in the State: the agreement to form a society. That agreement itself rules out any second contract. No public contract can be imagined that would not violate the first.