Mixed Governments

Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a simple government. An isolated ruler must have subordinate magistrates; a popular government must have a head. There is therefore, in the distribution of the executive power, always a gradation from the greater to the lesser number, with the difference that sometimes the greater number is dependent on the smaller, and sometimes the smaller on the greater.

Strictly speaking, no government is simple. A sole ruler must have officials under him. A government run by the people must have a leader. So executive power is always divided among groups of different sizes, from larger to smaller. The difference is that sometimes the larger group answers to the smaller, and sometimes the smaller answers to the larger.

Sometimes the distribution is equal, when either the constituent parts are in mutual dependence, as in the government of England, or the authority of each section is independent, but imperfect, as in Poland. This last form is bad; for it secures no unity in the government, and the State is left without a bond of union.

Sometimes power is divided equally when the parts of government depend on one another, as in the government of England. Or each part’s authority may be independent but incomplete, as in Poland. This last form is bad because it provides no unity in government and leaves the State with nothing holding it together.

Is a simple or a mixed government the better? Political writers are always debating the question, which must be answered as we have already answered a question about all forms of government.

Is a simple or a mixed government better? Political writers are always debating this question. We must answer it as we have already answered a question about all forms of government.

Simple government is better in itself, just because it is simple. But when the executive power is not sufficiently dependent upon the legislative power, i.e. when the prince is more closely related to the Sovereign than the people to the prince, this lack of proportion must be cured by the division of the government; for all the parts have then no less authority over the subjects, while their division makes them all together less strong against the Sovereign.

Simple government is better in itself, simply because it is simple. But sometimes executive power is not dependent enough on legislative power. That is, the prince is more closely connected to the Sovereign than the people are to the prince. When this imbalance occurs, the government must be divided to correct it. Each part then has just as much authority over the subjects. But dividing the parts makes them, taken together, less powerful against the Sovereign.

The same disadvantage is also prevented by the appointment of intermediate magistrates, who leave the government entire, and have the effect only of balancing the two powers and maintaining their respective rights. Government is then not mixed, but moderated.

The same disadvantage is also prevented by appointing intermediate magistrates, who leave the government intact. Their only effect is to balance the two powers and protect the rights of each. The government is then not mixed, but moderated.

The opposite disadvantages may be similarly cured, and, when the government is too lax, tribunals may be set up to concentrate it. This is done in all democracies. In the first case, the government is divided to make it weak; in the second, to make it strong: for the maxima of both strength and weakness are found in simple governments, while the mixed forms result in a mean strength.

The opposite problems may be solved in a similar way. When government is too lax, tribunals may be established to concentrate its power. All democracies do this. In the first case, government is divided to weaken it. In the second, government is divided to strengthen it. This is because simple governments reach the extremes of both strength and weakness, while mixed forms have moderate strength.