The Basic Principle Behind Different Forms of Government

To set forth the general cause of the above differences, we must here distinguish between government and its principle, as we did before between the State and the Sovereign.

To explain the general cause of these differences, we must distinguish between government and its principle. We made a similar distinction earlier between the State and the Sovereign.

The body of the magistrate may be composed of a greater or a less number of members. We said that the relation of the Sovereign to the subjects was greater in proportion as the people was more numerous, and, by a clear analogy, we may say the same of the relation of the government to the magistrates.

The body of magistrates may have more or fewer members. We said that the ratio of the Sovereign to its subjects increases as the population grows. By a clear analogy, we may say the same about the ratio of the government to its magistrates.

But the total force of the government, being always that of the State, is invariable; so that, the more of this force it expends on its own members, the less it has left to employ on the whole people.

But the government’s total force is always the force of the State, so it remains constant. The more force the government uses on its own members, the less remains to use on the people as a whole.

The more numerous the magistrates, therefore, the weaker the government. This principle being fundamental, we must do our best to make it clear.

So the more magistrates there are, the weaker the government. Because this principle is fundamental, we must do our best to explain it clearly.

In the person of the magistrate we can distinguish three essentially different wills: first, the private will of the individual, tending only to his personal advantage; secondly, the common will of the magistrates, which is relative solely to the advantage of the prince, and may be called corporate will, being general in relation to the government, and particular in relation to the State, of which the government forms part; and, in the third place, the will of the people or the sovereign will, which is general both in relation to the State regarded as the whole, and to the government regarded as a part of the whole.

We can distinguish three fundamentally different wills in a magistrate. First is the individual's private will, directed only toward his personal advantage. Second is the shared will of the magistrates, directed solely toward the advantage of the prince. We may call this the corporate will. It is general in relation to the government, but particular in relation to the State, of which the government forms part. Third is the will of the people, or the sovereign will. This will is general in relation both to the State as a whole and to the government as part of that whole.

In a perfect act of legislation, the individual or particular will should be at zero; the corporate will belonging to the government should occupy a very subordinate position; and, consequently, the general or sovereign will should always predominate and should be the sole guide of all the rest.

In a perfect act of lawmaking, the individual or particular will should have no influence. The government’s collective will should have only a very minor role. So the general or sovereign will should always prevail and should be the sole guide for all the others.

According to the natural order, on the other hand, these different wills become more active in proportion as they are concentrated. Thus, the general will is always the weakest, the corporate will second, and the individual will strongest of all: so that, in the government, each member is first of all himself, then a magistrate, and then a citizen —in an order exactly the reverse of what the social system requires.

By contrast, in the natural order, these different wills become more active the more concentrated they are. So the general will is always weakest, the will of the governing body comes second, and individual will is strongest. As a result, each member of the government is first himself, then a magistrate, and finally a citizen. This order is exactly the reverse of what the social system requires.

This granted, if the whole government is in the hands of one man, the particular and the corporate will are wholly united, and consequently the latter is at its highest possible degree of intensity. But, as the use to which the force is put depends on the degree reached by the will, and as the absolute force of the government is invariable, it follows that the most active government is that of one man.

Given this, if one man holds all government power, his individual will and the government's collective will are completely united. The government's collective will is therefore as strong as it can possibly be. But how government power is used depends on the strength of that will. Since the government's total power remains constant, government by one man is therefore the most active.

Suppose, on the other hand, we unite the government with the legislative authority, and make the Sovereign prince also, and all the citizens so many magistrates: then the corporate will, being confounded with the general will, can possess no greater activity than that will, and must leave the particular will as strong as it can possibly be. Thus, the government, having always the same absolute force, will be at the lowest point of its relative force or activity.

Suppose, on the other hand, we combine the government with the authority to make laws. Suppose we also make the Sovereign the ruler, and every citizen a magistrate. Then the government’s collective will merges with the general will and can be no more active than the general will. As a result, individual wills must remain as strong as possible. Thus, although the government’s absolute power remains unchanged, its relative power or activity will be at its lowest.

These relations are incontestable, and there are other considerations which still further confirm them. We can see, for instance, that each magistrate is more active in the body to which he belongs than each citizen in that to which he belongs, and that consequently the particular will has much more influence on the acts of the government than on those of the Sovereign; for each magistrate is almost always charged with some governmental function, while each citizen, taken singly, exercises no function of Sovereignty. Furthermore, the bigger the State grows, the more its real force increases, though not in direct proportion to its growth; but, the State remaining the same, the number of magistrates may increase to any extent, without the government gaining any greater real force; for its force is that of the State, the dimension of which remains equal. Thus the relative force or activity of the government decreases, while its absolute or real force cannot increase.

These relationships are beyond dispute, and other considerations support them further. For example, each magistrate is more active in his governing body than each citizen is in the body of citizens. As a result, the particular will influences the government's actions much more than the actions of the Sovereign. This is because each magistrate is almost always responsible for some government function. By contrast, each citizen, acting alone, performs no function of Sovereignty. Furthermore, as the State grows larger, its actual power increases, though not in direct proportion to its growth. But if the State stays the same size, the number of magistrates may increase without limit. Even so, the government gains no greater actual power. This is because the government's power comes from the State, whose size remains unchanged. Thus, the government's relative power or activity decreases, while its absolute or actual power cannot increase.

Moreover, it is a certainty that promptitude in execution diminishes as more people are put in charge of it: where prudence is made too much of, not enough is made of fortune; opportunity is let slip, and deliberation results in the loss of its object.

Moreover, action certainly becomes slower as more people are put in charge of carrying it out. When caution gets too much weight, chance gets too little. Opportunities slip away, and discussion causes the loss of the very thing being pursued.

I have just proved that the government grows remiss in proportion as the number of the magistrates increases; and I previously proved that, the more numerous the people, the greater should be the repressive force. From this it follows that the relation of the magistrates to the government should vary inversely to the relation of the subjects to the Sovereign; that is to say, the larger the State, the more should the government be tightened, so that the number of the rulers diminish in proportion to the increase of that of the people.

I have just proved that government becomes less effective as the number of magistrates increases. I previously proved that the larger the population, the greater the force needed to keep it in check. It follows that the ratio of magistrates to government must vary inversely with the ratio of subjects to the Sovereign. In other words, the larger the State, the more tightly organized its government must be. So the number of rulers must decrease in proportion to the increase in the number of people.

It should be added that I am here speaking of the relative strength of the government, and not of its rectitude: for, on the other hand, the more numerous the magistracy, the nearer the corporate will comes to the general will; while, under a single magistrate, the corporate will is, as I said, merely a particular will. Thus, what may be gained on one side is lost on the other, and the art of the legislator is to know how to fix the point at which the force and the will of the government, which are always in inverse proportion, meet in the relation that is most to the advantage of the State.

I should add that I am discussing the government’s relative strength here, not how rightly it acts. On the other hand, the more magistrates there are, the closer the government’s collective will comes to the general will. Under a single magistrate, however, the government’s collective will is merely an individual will, as I said. Thus, what may be gained on one side is lost on the other. The lawmaker’s skill lies in finding the balance between the government’s strength and its will that best serves the State. The government’s strength and its will always vary in inverse proportion.