Different Systems of Legislation

If we ask in what precisely consists the greatest good of all, which should be the end of every system of legislation, we shall find it reduce itself to two main objects, liberty and equality—liberty, because all particular dependence means so much force taken from the body of the State, and equality, because liberty cannot exist without it.

If we ask what exactly is the greatest good for all, the answer comes down to liberty and equality. Every system of legislation should aim for these two goals. Liberty matters because all dependence on particular people takes strength away from the State. Equality matters because liberty cannot exist without equality.

I have already defined civil liberty; by equality, we should understand, not that the degrees of power and riches are to be absolutely identical for everybody; but that power shall never be great enough for violence, and shall always be exercised by virtue of rank and law; and that, in respect of riches, no citizen shall ever be wealthy enough to buy another, and none poor enough to be forced to sell himself:¹ which implies, on the part of the great, moderation in goods and position, and, on the side of the common sort, moderation in avarice and covetousness.

I have already defined civil liberty. Equality does not mean that everyone must have exactly the same power and wealth. Instead, power must never be great enough to allow violence, and must always be exercised according to rank and law. As for wealth, no citizen should ever be rich enough to buy another, or poor enough to be forced to sell himself:¹ This means the powerful must be moderate in their wealth and status, while ordinary people must curb greed and envy.

Such equality, we are told, is an unpractical ideal that cannot actually exist. But if its abuse is inevitable, does it follow that we should not at least make regulations concerning it? It is precisely because the force of circumstances tends continually to destroy equality that the force of legislation should always tend to its maintenance.

We are told that such equality is an impractical ideal that can never actually exist. But if abuses of equality are inevitable, does that mean we should not at least make rules about equality? Circumstances constantly tend to destroy equality. Precisely because of this, laws should always work to preserve equality.

But these general objects of every good legislative system need modifying in every country in accordance with the local situation and the temper of the inhabitants; and these circumstances should determine, in each case, the particular system of institutions which is best, not perhaps in itself, but for the State for which it is destined. If, for instance, the soil is barren and unproductive, or the land too crowded for its inhabitants, the people should turn to industry and the crafts, and exchange what they produce for the commodities they lack. If, on the other hand, a people dwells in rich plains and fertile slopes, or, in a good land, lacks inhabitants, it should give all its attention to agriculture, which causes men to multiply, and should drive out the crafts, which would only result in depopulation, by grouping in a few localities the few inhabitants there are.² If a nation dwells on an extensive and convenient coast-line, let it cover the sea with ships and foster commerce and navigation. It will have a life that will be short and glorious. If, on its coasts, the sea washes nothing but almost inaccessible rocks, let it remain barbarous and ichthyophagous: it will have a quieter, perhaps a better, and certainly a happier life. In a word, besides the principles that are common to all, every nation has in itself something that gives them a particular application, and makes its legislation peculiarly its own. Thus, among the Jews long ago and more recently among the Arabs, the chief object was religion, among the Athenians letters, at Carthage and Tyre commerce, at Rhodes shipping, at Sparta war, at Rome virtue. The author of The Spirit of the Laws has shown with many examples by what art the legislator directs the constitution towards each of these objects.

But these general goals of every good legal system must be adapted to each country’s conditions and its people’s character. These circumstances should determine the best system of institutions for each country. That system may not be the best in itself, but it should be best for the State it serves. If, for example, the soil is barren and unproductive, or the land is overcrowded, people should turn to manufacturing and crafts. They should trade their products for the goods they lack. If, instead, people live on rich plains and fertile slopes, or fertile land has too few inhabitants, they should focus entirely on agriculture. Agriculture encourages population growth. They should drive out crafts, since crafts would only reduce the population by concentrating the few existing inhabitants in a few places.² If a nation has a long, accessible coastline, let it cover the sea with ships and encourage trade and navigation. Its life will be short and glorious. If the sea along its coast washes only against almost inaccessible rocks, let its people remain uncivilized and live on fish. The nation will have a quieter life, perhaps a better one, and certainly a happier one. In short, besides the principles common to all nations, each nation has something distinctive about it. This distinctive character gives those principles a particular application and makes the nation’s laws uniquely its own. Thus, religion was the chief goal among the Jews long ago and, more recently, among the Arabs. Literature was the chief goal among the Athenians, trade at Carthage and Tyre, shipping at Rhodes, and war at Sparta. At Rome, the chief goal was virtue. The author of The Spirit of the Laws has shown, through many examples, how skillfully lawmakers direct constitutions toward each goal.

What makes the constitution of a State really solid and lasting is the due observance of what is proper, so that the natural relations are always in agreement with the laws on every point, and law only serves, so to speak, to assure, accompany and rectify them. But if the legislator mistakes his object and adopts a principle other than circumstances naturally direct; if his principle makes for servitude while they make for liberty, or if it makes for riches, while they make for populousness, or if it makes for peace, while they make for conquest—the laws will insensibly lose their influence, the constitution will alter, and the State will have no rest from trouble till it is either destroyed or changed, and nature has resumed her invincible sway.

A State’s constitution becomes truly strong and lasting when it properly respects what suits its circumstances. This keeps natural relationships and laws in agreement on every point. The law serves only, so to speak, to secure, support, and correct those relationships. But suppose the lawmaker misunderstands his goal and adopts a principle different from the one circumstances naturally call for. His principle might promote servitude when circumstances favor liberty, or wealth when circumstances favor population growth, or peace when circumstances favor conquest. If so, the laws will gradually lose their influence, and the constitution will change. The State will then face constant trouble until it is either destroyed or transformed, and nature regains its irresistible rule.