Law

By the social compact we have given the body politic existence and life: we have now by legislation to give it movement and will. For the original act by which the body is formed and united still in no respect determines what it ought to do for its preservation.

Through the social contract, we have given the body politic existence and life. Now we must give it movement and will through laws. For the original act that forms and unites the body politic does not determine how it should preserve itself.

What is well and in conformity with order is so by the nature of things and independently of human conventions. All justice comes from God, who is its sole source; but if we knew how to receive so high an inspiration, we should need neither government nor laws. Doubtless, there is a universal justice emanating from reason alone; but this justice, to be admitted among us, must be mutual. Humanly speaking, in default of natural sanctions, the laws of justice are ineffective among men: they merely make for the good of the wicked and the undoing of the just, when the just man observes them towards everybody and nobody observes them towards him. Conventions and laws are therefore needed to join rights to duties and refer justice to its object. In the state of nature, where everything is common, I owe nothing to him whom I nave promised nothing; I recognise as belonging to others only what is of no use to me. In the state of society all rights are fixed by law, and the case becomes different.

What is good and in keeping with order is so by the nature of things, regardless of human agreements. All justice comes from God, its only source. But if we knew how to receive such divine inspiration, we would need neither government nor laws. There is undoubtedly a universal justice that comes from reason alone. But for this justice to be accepted among us, people must practice it toward one another. In human affairs, without natural penalties, the laws of justice have no effect. They only benefit the wicked and ruin the just when a just person follows them toward everyone, but nobody reciprocates. Agreements and laws are therefore needed to link rights with duties and direct justice toward its proper object. In the state of nature, where everything is shared, I owe nothing to anyone to whom I have promised nothing. I recognize as belonging to others only what is of no use to me. In society, all rights are defined by law, so the situation is different.

But what, after all, is a law? As long as we remain satisfied with attaching purely metaphysical ideas to the word, we shall go on arguing without arriving at an understanding; and when we have defined a law of nature, we shall be no nearer the definition of a law of the State.

But what, after all, is a law? As long as we give the word purely abstract meanings, we will keep arguing without reaching an understanding. And once we have defined a law of nature, we will be no closer to defining a law of the State.

I have already said that there can be no general will directed to a particular object. Such an object must be either within or outside the State. If outside, a will which is alien to it cannot be, in relation to it, general; if within, it is part of the State, and in that case there arises a relation between whole and part which makes them two separate beings, of which the part is one, and the whole minus the part the other. But the whole minus a part cannot be the whole; and while this relation persists, there can be no whole, but only two unequal parts; and it follows that the will of one is no longer in any respect general in relation to the other.

I have already said that the general will cannot be directed at a particular object. Such an object must be either inside or outside the State. If outside, a will that does not belong to that object cannot be general in relation to that object. If inside, the object is part of the State. In that case, the relationship between the whole and the part turns them into two separate entities. One is the part, and the other is the whole with that part removed. But the whole with a part removed cannot be the whole. As long as this relationship continues, there can be no whole, only two unequal parts. It follows that the will of one part is no longer general in any respect in relation to the other.

But when the whole people decrees for the whole people, it is considering only itself; and if a relation is then formed, it is between two aspects of the entire object, without there being any division of the whole. In that case the matter about which the decree is made is, like the decreeing will general. This act is what I call a law.

But when the whole people makes a decree for the whole people, the people are considering only themselves. If a relationship then forms, it is between two aspects of the same whole, without dividing that whole. In that case, the decree’s subject is general, just like the will that makes the decree. This act is what I call a law.

When I say that the object of laws is always general, I mean that law considers subjects en masse and actions in the abstract, and never a particular person or action. Thus the law may indeed decree that there shall be privileges, but cannot confer them on anybody by name. It may set up several classes of citizens, and even lay down the qualifications for membership of these classes, but it cannot nominate such and such persons as belonging to them; it may establish a monarchical government and hereditary succession, but it cannot choose a king, or nominate a royal family. In a word, no function which has a particular object belongs to the legislative power.

When I say laws always have a general purpose, I mean that law considers subjects as a whole. Law considers actions in general, never a particular person or action. Thus, the law may establish privileges, but cannot grant them to anyone by name. The law may create several classes of citizens and even set the qualifications for belonging to those classes. But the law cannot name specific people as members of those classes. The law may establish a monarchy and hereditary succession. But the law cannot choose a king or name a royal family. In short, no power directed at a particular person or action belongs to the legislature.

On this view, we at once see that it can no longer be asked whose business it is to make laws, since they are acts of the general will: nor whether the prince is above the law, since he is a member of the State; nor whether the law can be unjust, since no one is unjust to himself; nor how we can be both free and subject to the laws since they are but registers of our wills.

From this perspective, we immediately see that there is no longer any question of who should make laws. Laws are acts of the general will. Nor can we ask whether the prince is above the law, because he is a member of the State. Nor can we ask whether the law can be unjust, because no one is unjust to himself. Nor can we ask how we can be both free and subject to the laws. The laws are simply records of our wills.

We see further that, as the law unites universality of will with universality of object, what a man, whoever he be, commands of his own motion cannot be a law; and even what the Sovereign commands with regard to a particular matter is no nearer being a law, but is a decree, an act, not of sovereignty, but of magistracy.

We also see that law must be general both in the will it expresses and in what it addresses. So no command a man issues on his own authority can be a law, whoever he may be. Even a command from the Sovereign on a particular matter is no more a law. Such a command is a decree, an act of government administration, not sovereignty.

I therefore give the name 'Republic' to every State that is governed by laws, no matter what the form of its administration may be: for only in such a case does the public interest govern, and the res publica rank as a reality. Every legitimate government is republican;¹ what government is I will explain later on.

I therefore call every State governed by laws a 'Republic', whatever form its administration may take. Only then does the public interest rule, and the res publica become a reality. Every legitimate government is republican.¹ I will explain later what government is.

Laws are, properly speaking, only the conditions of civil association. The people, being subject to the laws, ought to be their author: the conditions of the society ought to be regulated solely by those who come together to form it. But how are they to regulate them? Is it to be by common agreement, by a sudden inspiration? Has the body politic an organ to declare its will? Who can give it the foresight to formulate and announce its acts in advance? Or how is it to announce them in the hour of need? How can a blind multitude, which often does not know what it wills, because it rarely knows what is good for it, carry out for itself so great and difficult an enterprise as a system of legislation? Of itself the people wills always the good, but of itself it by no means always sees it. The general will is always in the right, but the judgment which guides it is not always enlightened. It must be got to see objects as they are, and sometimes as they ought to appear to it; it must be shown the good road it is in search of, secured from the seductive influences of individual wills, taught to see times and spaces as a series, and made to weigh the attractions of present and sensible advantages against the danger of distant and hidden evils. The individuals see the good they reject; the public wills the good it does not see. All stand equally in need of guidance. The former must be compelled to bring their wills into conformity with their reason; the latter must be taught to know what it wills. If that is done, public enlightenment leads to the union of understanding and will in the social body: the parts are made to work exactly together, and the whole is raised to its highest power. This makes a legislator necessary.

Laws, properly understood, are simply the terms of civil association. Since the people must obey the laws, the people should also write them. Only those who come together to form a society should set its terms. But how should they set those terms? By common agreement, or by some sudden inspiration? Does the political community have a body that can express its will? Who can give the community the foresight to draw up and announce its decisions in advance? Or how can the community announce those decisions when the need arises? How can a blind multitude create a system of laws for itself, so great and difficult a task? The people often do not know what they want, because they rarely know what is good for them. Left to themselves, the people always want what is good, but they certainly do not always recognize it. The general will is always right, but the judgment guiding it is not always well informed. The people must be led to see things as they are, and sometimes as those things should appear to them. The people must be shown the right path they are searching for. They must be protected from the seductive influence of individual wills. They must learn to see connections across time and distance. They must weigh the appeal of immediate, tangible benefits against the danger of distant, hidden harms. Individuals see the good they reject. The public wants the good it cannot see. All equally need guidance. Individuals must be compelled to bring their wills into line with their reason. The public must be taught to understand what it wants. If this happens, a better-informed public brings understanding and will together within the political community. The parts then work in perfect harmony, and the whole reaches its greatest strength. This is why a legislator is necessary.