The Limits of Sovereign Power

If the State is a moral person whose life is in the union of its members, and if the most important of its cares is the care for its own preservation, it must have a universal and compelling force, in order to move and dispose each part as may be most advantageous to the whole. As nature gives each man absolute power over all his members, the social compact gives the body politic absolute power over all its members also; and it is this power which, under the direction of the general will, bears, as I have said, the name of Sovereignty.

If the State is a moral person whose life depends on its members’ unity, and if its greatest concern is self-preservation, then it must have power that reaches and compels every member. This power must allow the State to direct and arrange each part as may best serve the whole. Just as nature gives each person absolute power over every part of their body, the social compact gives the body politic absolute power over all its members. Under the direction of the general will, this power is called Sovereignty, as I have said.

But, besides the public person, we have to consider the private persons composing it, whose life and liberty are naturally independent of it. We are bound then to distinguish clearly between the respective rights of the citizens and the Sovereign,¹ and between the duties the former have to fulfil as subjects, and the natural rights they should enjoy as men.

But besides the public body, we must consider the individuals who make it up. Their lives and freedom are naturally independent of that body. We must therefore clearly distinguish between the rights of citizens and those of the Sovereign,¹ We must also distinguish between citizens’ duties as subjects and the natural rights they should enjoy as human beings.

Each man alienates, I admit, by the social compact, only such part of his powers, goods and liberty as it is important for the community to control; but it must also be granted that the Sovereign is sole judge of what is important.

I admit that under the social compact, each man gives up only the powers, possessions, and freedom the community needs to control. But we must also accept that the Sovereign alone decides what the community needs to control.

Every service a citizen can render the State he ought to render as soon as the Sovereign demands it; but the Sovereign, for its part, cannot impose upon its subjects any fetters that are useless to the community, nor can it even wish to do so; for no more by the law of reason than by the law of nature can anything occur without a cause.

A citizen ought to provide every service they can offer the State as soon as the Sovereign demands it. But the Sovereign, in turn, cannot impose restrictions on its subjects that serve no purpose for the community. Nor can the Sovereign even wish to do so, because nothing can happen without a cause. This is true under the law of reason just as under the law of nature.

The undertakings which bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual; and their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for others without working for ourselves. Why is it that the general will is always in the right, and that all continually will the happiness of each one, unless it is because there is not a man who does not think of "each" as meaning him, and consider himself in voting for all? This proves that equality of rights and the idea of justice which such equality creates originate in the preference each man gives to himself, and accordingly in the very nature of man. It proves that the general will, to be really such, must be general in its object as well as its essence; that it must both come from all and apply to all; and that it loses its natural rectitude when it is directed to some particular and determinate object, because in such a case we are judging of something foreign to us, and have no true principle of equity to guide us.

Our commitments to society bind us only because they are mutual. By their very nature, we cannot fulfill these commitments for others without also working for ourselves. Why is the general will always right? And why does everyone always want each person to be happy? Is it not because everyone takes "each" to mean himself and thinks of himself when voting for all? This proves that equal rights, and the sense of justice they create, come from each person's preference for himself. They therefore come from human nature itself. This also proves that the general will must be general in both its source and its purpose to be truly general. The general will must come from all and apply to all. It loses its natural fairness when directed at a specific, particular matter. In that case, we are judging something outside our own concerns and have no true principle of fairness to guide us.

Indeed, as soon as a question of particular fact or right arises on a point not previously regulated by a general convention, the matter becomes contentious. It is a case in which the individuals concerned are one party, and the public the other, but in which I can see neither the law that ought to be followed nor the judge who ought to give the decision. In such a case, it would be absurd to propose to refer the question to an express decision of the general will, which can be only the conclusion reached by one of the parties and in consequence will be, for the other party, merely an external and particular will, inclined on this occasion to injustice and subject to error. Thus, just as a particular will cannot stand for the general will, the general will, in turn, changes its nature, when its object is particular, and, as general, cannot pronounce on a man or a fact. When, for instance, the people of Athens nominated or displaced its rulers, decreed honours to one, and imposed penalties on another, and, by a multitude of particular decrees, exercised all the functions of government indiscriminately, it had in such cases no longer a general will in the strict sense; it was acting no longer as Sovereign, but as magistrate. This will seem contrary to current views; but I must be given time to expound my own.

Indeed, a dispute arises whenever a question concerns a specific fact or right not covered by a prior general agreement. The individuals concerned form one side, and the public forms the other. But I see neither a law to follow nor a judge to decide the case. In such a case, asking for an explicit decision from the general will would be absurd. Such a decision could only express the conclusion reached by one side. To the other side, the decision would therefore express only an outside, particular will, prone here to injustice and error. Thus, just as a particular will cannot represent the general will, the general will changes its nature when addressing particulars. As a general will, it cannot pass judgment on an individual or a specific fact. For example, the people of Athens appointed or removed their rulers, granted honors to one person, and punished another. Through many specific decrees, the people exercised all the functions of government without distinction. In such cases, their will was no longer general in the strict sense. They were acting not as Sovereign, but as magistrate. This view will seem contrary to current opinions. But I must be given time to explain my own.

It should be seen from the foregoing that what makes the will general is less the number of voters than the common interest uniting them; for under this system, each necessarily submits to the conditions he imposes on others; and this admirable agreement between interest and justice gives to the common deliberations an equitable character which at once vanishes when any particular question is discussed, in the absence of a common interest to unite and identify the ruling of the judge with that of the party.

The discussion above shows that what makes the will general is less the number of voters than their shared interest. For under this system, everyone must accept the conditions they impose on others. This admirable agreement between interest and justice makes collective decisions fair. But that fairness vanishes as soon as a particular question is discussed without a shared interest. No common interest then unites the judge and the party involved or brings their judgments into agreement.

From whatever side we approach our principle, we reach the same conclusion, that the social compact sets up among the citizens an equality of such a kind, that they all bind themselves to observe the same conditions and should therefore all enjoy the same rights. Thus, from the very nature of the compact, every "act of Sovereignty", i.e. every authentic act of the general will, binds or favours all the citizens equally; so that the Sovereign recognises only the body of the nation, and draws no distinctions between those of whom it is made up. What, then, strictly speaking is an act of Sovereignty? It is not a convention between a superior and an inferior, but a convention between the body and each of its members. It is legitimate, because based on the social contract, and, equitable, because common to all; useful, because it can have no other object than the general good, and stable, because guaranteed by the public force and the supreme power. So long as the subjects have to submit only to conventions of this sort, they obey no-one but their own will; and to ask how far the respective rights of the Sovereign and the citizens extend, is to ask up to what point the latter can enter into undertakings with themselves, each with all, and all with each.

However we approach our principle, we reach the same conclusion: the social contract establishes equality among citizens. All citizens commit themselves to the same conditions and should therefore enjoy the same rights. Thus, by the contract’s very nature, every "act of Sovereignty", that is, every genuine act of the general will, binds or benefits all citizens equally. So the Sovereign recognizes only the nation as a whole and makes no distinctions between its members. What, then, strictly speaking, is an act of Sovereignty? It is not an agreement between a superior and an inferior, but between the whole community and each member. Such an agreement is legitimate because it rests on the social contract, and fair because it applies to everyone. It is useful because its only possible purpose is the common good. It is stable because public force and supreme power guarantee it. As long as subjects must submit only to agreements of this kind, they obey only their own will. So asking how far the respective rights of the Sovereign and the citizens extend means asking another question. How far can citizens make commitments to themselves, each to all and all to each?

We can see from this that the sovereign power, absolute, sacred and inviolable as it is, does not and cannot exceed the limits of general conventions, and that every man may dispose at will of such goods and liberty as these conventions leave him; so that the Sovereign never has a right to lay more charges on one subject than on another, because, in that case, the question becomes particular, and ceases to be within its competency.

We can see from this that sovereign power is absolute, sacred, and inviolable. Even so, sovereign power does not and cannot go beyond the limits set by general agreements. Every man may freely use whatever property and liberty these agreements leave him. So the Sovereign never has the right to place greater burdens on one subject than on another. In that case, the matter concerns a particular individual and therefore falls outside the Sovereign’s authority.

When these distinctions have once been admitted, it is seen to be so untrue that there is, in the social contract, any real renunciation on the part of the individuals, that the position in which they find themselves as a result of the contract is really preferable to that in which they were before. Instead of a renunciation, they have made an advantageous exchange: instead of an uncertain and precarious way of living they have got one that is better and more secure; instead of natural independence they have got liberty, instead of the power to harm others security for themselves, and instead of their strength, which others might overcome, a right which social union makes invincible. Their very life, which they have devoted to the State, is by it constantly protected; and when they risk it in the State's defence, what more are they doing than giving back what they have received from it? What are they doing that they would not do more often and with greater danger in the state of nature, in which they would inevitably have to fight battles at the peril of their lives in defence of that which is the means of their preservation? All have indeed to fight when their country needs them; but then no one has ever to fight for himself. Do we not gain something by running, on behalf of what gives us our security, only some of the risks we should have to run for ourselves, as soon as we lost it?

Once we accept these distinctions, we see that individuals give up nothing of real value in the social contract. In fact, the contract leaves them better off than before. Rather than giving something up, they have made a beneficial exchange. They have traded an uncertain and unstable way of life for a better, more secure one. They have traded natural independence for liberty, and the power to harm others for their own security. They have exchanged their strength, which others could overpower, for a right that social union makes invincible. The State constantly protects the very lives they have committed to it. When they risk their lives to defend the State, are they doing more than returning what they have received? Would they not face the same risks more often, and in greater danger, in the state of nature? There, they would inevitably have to risk their lives in battles to defend what they need to survive. All must indeed fight when their country needs them, but then no one ever has to fight for himself. Do we not gain by taking only some risks to defend the source of our security? Without that security, we would have to face all those risks for ourselves.