Slavery

Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow, and force creates no right, we must conclude that conventions form the basis of all legitimate authority among men.

No one has natural authority over another person, and force creates no rights. So we must conclude that agreements are the basis of all legitimate authority among people.

If an individual, says Grotius, can alienate his liberty and make himself the slave of a master, why could not a whole people do the same and make itself subject to a king? There are in this passage plenty of ambiguous words which would need explaining; but let us confine ourselves to the word alienate. To alienate is to give or to sell. Now, a man who becomes the slave of another does not give himself; he sells himself, at the least for his subsistence: but for what does a people sell itself? A king is so far from furnishing his subjects with their subsistence that he gets his own only from them; and, according to Rabelais, kings do not live on nothing. Do subjects then give their persons on condition that the king takes their goods also? I fail to see what they have left to preserve.

Grotius says that if an individual can give up his freedom and become someone’s slave, why couldn’t an entire people do the same and submit to a king? This passage contains plenty of unclear words that need explaining. But let us focus on the word alienate. To alienate means to give away or sell. Now, a man who becomes another person’s slave does not give himself away. He sells himself, at least in exchange for enough to live on. But what does a people sell itself for? Far from providing his subjects with enough to live on, a king gets his own living entirely from them. And, as Rabelais says, kings do not live on nothing. Do subjects then hand themselves over on the condition that the king takes their possessions too? I fail to see what they have left to protect.

It will be said that the despot assures his subjects civil tranquillity. Granted; but what do they gain, if the wars his ambition brings down upon them, his insatiable avidity, and the vexatious conduct of his ministers press harder on them than their own dissensions would have done? What do they gain, if the very tranquillity they enjoy is one of their miseries? Tranquillity is found also in dungeons; but is that enough to make them desirable places to live in? The Greeks imprisoned in the cave of the Cyclops lived there very tranquilly, while they were awaiting their turn to be devoured.

Some will say that a despot guarantees his subjects peace at home. Granted, but what do his subjects gain if his ambition brings wars upon them? What if those wars, his endless greed, and his ministers’ abuses burden them more than their own conflicts would have? What do his subjects gain if the very peace they enjoy is one of their miseries? There is peace in dungeons too, but does that make dungeons desirable places to live? The Greeks imprisoned in the Cyclops’ cave lived there very peacefully as they waited their turn to be devoured.

To say that a man gives himself gratuitously, is to say what is absurd and inconceivable; such an act is null and illegitimate, from the mere fact that he who does it is out of his mind. To say the same of a whole people is to suppose a people of madmen; and madness creates no right.

To say that a man gives himself away for nothing is absurd and unthinkable. Such an act is invalid and illegitimate simply because the man who does so is out of his mind. To say the same of an entire people is to assume that they are all mad. And madness creates no rights.

Even if each man could alienate himself, he could not alienate his children: they are born men and free; their liberty belongs to them, and no one but they has the right to dispose of it. Before they come to years of discretion, the father can, in their name, lay down conditions for their preservation and well-being, but he cannot give them, irrevocably and without conditions: such a gift is contrary to the ends of nature, and exceeds the rights of paternity. It would therefore be necessary, in order to legitimise an arbitrary government, that in every generation the people should be in a position to accept or reject it; but, were this so, the government would be no longer arbitrary.

Even if each man could give up his own freedom, he could not give up his children’s freedom. They are born human and free. Their freedom belongs to them, and only they have the right to give it up. Before children are old enough to judge for themselves, their father can set conditions on their behalf for their survival and well-being. But he cannot give his children away permanently and unconditionally. Such a gift goes against nature’s purposes and exceeds a father’s rights. So, for arbitrary government to be legitimate, the people in every generation would need to be able to accept or reject it. But if the people had that choice, the government would no longer be arbitrary.

To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to surrender the rights of humanity and even its duties. For him who renounces everything no indemnity is possible. Such a renunciation is incompatible with man's nature; to remove all liberty from his will is to remove all morality from his acts. Finally, it is an empty and contradictory convention that sets up, on the one side, absolute authority, and, on the other, unlimited obedience. Is it not clear that we can be under no obligation to a person from whom we have the right to exact everything? Does not this condition alone, in the absence of equivalence or exchange, in itself involve the nullity of the act? For what right can my slave have against me, when all that he has belongs to me, and, his right being mine, this right of mine against myself is a phrase devoid of meaning?

To give up liberty is to give up being human, surrendering the rights of humanity and even its duties. No compensation is possible for someone who gives up everything. Giving up liberty goes against human nature. To take all freedom from a person's will is to take all moral value from their actions. Finally, an agreement granting absolute authority to one side and demanding unlimited obedience from the other is empty and contradictory. Isn't it clear that we owe nothing to someone from whom we have the right to demand everything? With nothing equal given in return and no exchange, doesn't this condition alone make the agreement invalid? For what right can my slave have against me when everything he has belongs to me? Since his rights are mine, a right of mine against myself is a meaningless phrase.

Grotius and the rest find in war another origin for the so-called right of slavery. The victor having, as they hold, the right of killing the vanquished, the latter can buy back his life at the price of his liberty; and this convention is the more legitimate because it is to the advantage of both parties.

Grotius and others find another source of the so-called right to enslave people in war. In their view, the victor has the right to kill the defeated. So the defeated person can buy back his life by giving up his freedom. This agreement is all the more legitimate because it benefits both parties.

But it is clear that this supposed right to kill the conquered is by no means deducible from the state of war. Men, from the mere fact that, while they are living in their primitive independence, they have no mutual relations stable enough to constitute either the state of peace or the state of war, cannot be naturally enemies. War is constituted by a relation between things, and not between persons; and, as the state of war cannot arise out of simple personal relations, but only out of real relations, private war, or war of man with man, can exist neither in the state of nature, where there is no constant property, nor in the social state, where everything is under the authority of the laws.

But clearly, the supposed right to kill the defeated does not follow from the state of war. People living in their original independence have no relationships stable enough to establish either peace or war. For that reason alone, people cannot be natural enemies. War arises from relationships involving things, not relationships between people. A state of war cannot arise from personal relationships alone, but only from relationships involving property. So private war, or war between individuals, cannot exist either in the state of nature or in society. In the state of nature, there is no lasting ownership of property. In society, everything falls under the authority of the law.

Individual combats, duels and encounters, are acts which cannot constitute a state; while the private wars, authorised by the Establishments of Louis IX, King of France, and suspended by the Peace of God, are abuses of feudalism, in itself an absurd system if ever there was one, and contrary to the principles of natural right and to all good polity.

Individual fights, duels, and clashes are acts that cannot create a state. By contrast, private wars were authorized by the Establishments of Louis IX, King of France, and suspended by the Peace of God. These private wars are abuses of feudalism. Feudalism itself is an absurd system if ever there was one. It goes against the principles of natural right and all sound government.

War then is a relation, not between man and man, but between State and State, and individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men, nor even as citizens,¹ but as soldiers; not as members of their country, but as its defenders. Finally, each State can have for enemies only other States, and not men; for between things disparate in nature there can be no real relation.

War, then, is a relationship between States, not between individuals. Individuals are enemies only because of circumstances, not as human beings or even as citizens,¹ but as soldiers. They are enemies not as members of their country, but as its defenders. Finally, a State can have only other States as enemies, not individuals. This is because things so different in nature can have no real relationship.

Furthermore, this principle is in conformity with the established rules of all times and the constant practice of all civilised peoples. Declarations of war are intimations less to powers than to their subjects. The foreigner, whether king, individual, or people, who robs, kills or detains the subjects, without declaring war on the prince, is not an enemy, but a brigand. Even in real war, a just prince, while laying hands, in the enemy's country, on all that belongs to the public, respects the lives and goods of individuals: he respects rights on which his own are founded. The object of the war being the destruction of the hostile State, the other side has a right to kill its defenders, while they are bearing arms; but as soon as they lay them down and surrender, they cease to be enemies or instruments of the enemy, and become once more merely men, whose life no one has any right to take. Sometimes it is possible to kill the State without killing a single one of its members; and war gives no right which is not necessary to the gaining of its object. These principles are not those of Grotius: they are not based on the authority of poets, but derived from the nature of reality and based on reason.

Furthermore, this principle follows the established rules of all times and the consistent practice of all civilized peoples. Declarations of war serve less to notify rulers than to notify their subjects. A foreigner may be a king, an individual, or a people. Any foreigner who robs, kills, or detains subjects without declaring war on their ruler is not an enemy but a bandit. Even in actual war, a just ruler seizes everything belonging to the enemy State within its territory. But he respects the lives and property of individuals, honoring the rights on which his own rights rest. The aim of war is to destroy the hostile State. The opposing side therefore has the right to kill that State's defenders while they bear arms. But as soon as those defenders lay down their arms and surrender, they cease to be enemies or the enemy's instruments. They become once again simply human beings, whose lives no one has any right to take. Sometimes a State can be destroyed without killing a single one of its members. And war grants no right beyond what is necessary to achieve its aim. These principles are not those of Grotius. They do not rest on the authority of poets, but come from the nature of reality and rest on reason.

The right of conquest has no foundation other than the right of the strongest. If war does not give the conqueror the right to massacre the conquered peoples, the right to enslave them cannot be based upon a right which does not exist No one has a right to kill an enemy except when he cannot make him a slave, and the right to enslave him cannot therefore be derived from the right to kill him. It is accordingly an unfair exchange to make him buy at the price of his liberty his life, over which the victor holds no right. Is it not clear that there is a vicious circle in founding the right of life and death on the right of slavery, and the right of slavery on the right of life and death?

The right of conquest rests on nothing but the right of the strongest. If war gives conquerors no right to massacre conquered peoples, no right to enslave those peoples can follow from it. No one has the right to kill an enemy unless he cannot enslave that enemy. So the right to enslave an enemy cannot come from the right to kill him. It is therefore an unfair exchange to force the defeated enemy to buy his life at the cost of his freedom. The victor has no right to take that life. Isn’t the circular reasoning clear? The right to decide life and death is based on the right to enslave. And the right to enslave is based on the right to decide life and death.

Even if we assume this terrible right to kill everybody, I maintain that a slave made in war, or a conquered people, is under no obligation to a master, except to obey him as far as he is compelled to do so. By taking an equivalent for his life, the victor has not done him a favour; instead of killing him without profit, he has killed him usefully. So far then is he from acquiring over him any authority in addition to that of force, that the state of war continues to subsist between them: their mutual relation is the effect of it, and the usage of the right of war does not imply a treaty of peace. A convention has indeed been made; but this convention, so far from destroying the state of war, presupposes its continuance.

Even if we accept this terrible right to kill everyone, I maintain that enslavement in war creates no obligation. Neither a person enslaved in war nor a conquered people owes a master anything beyond obedience enforced by compulsion. By accepting something in exchange for the captive’s life, the victor has done the captive no favor. Instead of killing him without profit, the victor has killed him for a useful purpose. So the victor gains no authority over the captive beyond force, and the two remain at war. Their relationship results from that war, and exercising the right of war does not amount to a peace treaty. An agreement has indeed been made. But far from ending the state of war, that agreement assumes the war continues.

So, from whatever aspect we regard the question, the right of slavery is null and void, not only as being illegitimate, but also because it is absurd and meaningless. The words slave and right contradict each other, and are mutually exclusive. It will always be equally foolish for a man to say to a man or to a people: "I make with you a convention wholly at your expense and wholly to my advantage; I shall keep it as long as I like, and you will keep it as long as I like."

So, however we look at the question, the right to enslave is null and void. This right is not only illegitimate but also absurd and meaningless. The words slave and right contradict each other and cannot coexist. It will always be equally foolish for a man to say to another man or to a people: "I make an agreement with you entirely at your expense and entirely for my benefit. I will honor the agreement as long as I like, and you will honor it as long as I like."