Book 1, Chapter 2

The First Societies

3 min

The most ancient of all societies, and the only one that is natural is the family: and even so the children remain attached to the father only so long as they need him for their preservation. As soon as this need ceases, the natural bond is dissolved. The children, released from the obedience they owed to the father, and the father, released from the care he owed his children, return equally to independence. If they remain united, they continue so no longer naturally, but voluntarily; and the family itself is then maintained only by convention.

The family is the oldest of all societies and the only natural one. Even so, children remain dependent on their father only as long as they need him to survive. As soon as that need ends, the natural bond dissolves. The children no longer owe their father obedience, and the father no longer owes his children care. Both return to independence. If the family stays together, its members do so by choice, not by nature. The family is then held together only by agreement.

This common liberty results from the nature of man. His first law is to provide for his own preservation, his first cares are those which he owes to himself; and, as soon as he reaches years of discretion, he is the sole judge of the proper means of preserving himself, and consequently becomes his own master.

This shared freedom comes from human nature. A person's first rule is to preserve his own life, and his first responsibilities are to himself. As soon as he can judge for himself, he alone decides how best to preserve his life. He therefore becomes his own master.

The family then may be called the first model of political societies: the ruler corresponds to the father, and the people to the children; and all, being born free and equal, alienate their liberty only for their own advantage. The whole difference is that, in the family, the love of the father for his children repays him for the care he takes of them, while, in the State, the pleasure of commanding takes the place of the love which the chief cannot have for the peoples under him.

The family, then, may be called the first model for political societies. The ruler corresponds to the father, and the people to the children. All are born free and equal, and give up their freedom only for their own benefit. The only difference is that a father’s love for his children rewards him for caring for them. In the State, however, the pleasure of commanding replaces the love a ruler cannot have for the people he rules.

Grotius denies that all human power is established in favour of the governed, and quotes slavery as an example. His usual method of reasoning is constantly to establish right by fact. It would be possible to employ a more logical method, but none could be more favourable to tyrants.

Grotius denies that all human power is established for the benefit of those governed. He cites slavery as an example. His usual approach is to treat what exists as proof of what is right. A more logical approach would be possible, but none could be more favorable to tyrants.

"Learned inquiries into public right are often only the history of past abuses; and troubling to study them too deeply is a profitless infatuation" (Essay on the Interests of France in Relation to its Neighbours, by the Marquis d'Argenson). This is exactly what Grotius has done.

It is then, according to Grotius, doubtful whether the human race belongs to a hundred men, or that hundred men to the human race: and, throughout his book, he seems to incline to the former alternative, which is also the view of Hobbes. On this showing, the human species is divided into so many herds of cattle, each with its ruler, who keeps guard over them for the purpose of devouring them.

According to Grotius, then, it is unclear whether humanity belongs to a hundred men or those hundred men to humanity. Throughout his book, he seems to favor the first view, which Hobbes also holds. In this view, humanity is divided into herds of cattle. Each herd has a ruler who guards the cattle in order to devour them.

As a shepherd is of a nature superior to that of his flock, the shepherds of men, i.e. their rulers, are of a nature superior to that of the peoples under them. Thus, Philo tells us, the Emperor Caligula reasoned, concluding equally well either that kings were gods, or that men were beasts.

Just as a shepherd is naturally superior to his flock, the shepherds of men, that is, their rulers, are naturally superior to the peoples they rule. This was how Emperor Caligula reasoned, Philo tells us. Caligula concluded, with equally good reason, either that kings were gods or that men were beasts.

The reasoning of Caligula agrees with that of Hobbes and Grotius. Aristotle, before any of them, had said that men are by no means equal naturally, but that some are born for slavery, and others for dominion.

Caligula’s reasoning agrees with that of Hobbes and Grotius. Before any of them, Aristotle had said that men are by no means equal by nature. Instead, some are born to be slaves, and others to rule.

Aristotle was right; but he took the effect for the cause. Nothing can be more certain than that every man born in slavery is born for slavery. Slaves lose everything in their chains, even the desire of escaping from them: they love their servitude, as the comrades of Ulysses loved their brutish condition. If then there are slaves by nature, it is because there have been slaves against nature. Force made the first slaves, and their cowardice perpetuated the condition.

Aristotle was right, but he mistook the effect for the cause. Nothing is more certain than this: every man born into slavery is born to be a slave. Slaves lose everything in their chains, even the desire to escape. They love their slavery, just as the comrades of Ulysses loved their lives as beasts. So if there are slaves by nature, it is because others were enslaved against nature. Force created the first slaves, and their cowardice kept them enslaved.

See Plutarch's short essay entitled "That Animals Reason."

I have said nothing of King Adam, or Emperor Noah, father of the three great monarchs who shared out the universe, like the children of Saturn, whom some scholars have recognised in them. I trust to getting due thanks for my moderation; for, being a direct descendant of one of these princes, perhaps of the eldest branch, how do I know that a verification of titles might not leave me the legitimate king of the human race? In any case, there can be no doubt that Adam was sovereign of the world, as Robinson Crusoe was of his island, as long as he was its only inhabitant; and this empire had the advantage that the monarch, safe on his throne, had no rebellions, wars, or conspirators to fear.

I have said nothing about King Adam or Emperor Noah, father of the three great monarchs who divided the universe. Some scholars have identified these monarchs with the children of Saturn, who divided the universe in the same way. I trust I will receive proper thanks for my restraint. For I am a direct descendant of one of these princes, perhaps even through the eldest branch of the family. How do I know that checking the records might not prove me the rightful king of the human race? In any case, there is no doubt that Adam ruled the world as long as he was its only inhabitant. Robinson Crusoe ruled his island in the same way. And Adam’s empire had one advantage: the monarch sat securely on his throne, with no rebellions, wars, or conspirators to fear.