Preface

In the following pages I have confined myself in the main to those problems of philosophy in regard to which I thought it possible to say something positive and constructive, since merely negative criticism seemed out of place. For this reason, theory of knowledge occupies a larger space than metaphysics in the present volume, and some topics much discussed by philosophers are treated very briefly, if at all.

In the following pages, I have focused mainly on philosophical problems where I thought I could say something positive and constructive. I chose this focus because purely negative criticism seemed out of place. For this reason, this book gives more space to the theory of knowledge than to metaphysics. Some topics widely discussed by philosophers receive very little attention, if any.

I have derived valuable assistance from unpublished writings of G. E. Moore and J. M. Keynes: from the former, as regards the relations of sense-data to physical objects, and from the latter as regards probability and induction. I have also profited greatly by the criticisms and suggestions of Professor Gilbert Murray.

I have received valuable help from unpublished writings by G. E. Moore and J. M. Keynes. Moore’s writings helped me with the relationship between sense-data and physical objects. Keynes’s writings helped me with probability and induction. I have also benefited greatly from Professor Gilbert Murray’s criticisms and suggestions.

1912

1912