Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other reproaches.
I have discussed the more important qualities mentioned above. I will briefly discuss the others under this general rule. As I have partly explained already, a prince must avoid things that make him hated or despised. Whenever he succeeds in this, he will have done his part. He need not fear any danger from other criticisms.
It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor their honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways.
Above all, as I have said, a ruler becomes hated by being greedy and seizing his subjects’ property and women. He must avoid both. When their property and honor are left untouched, most men live contentedly. He then has to deal only with the ambition of a few. He can easily restrain them in many ways.
It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can hope either to deceive him or to get round him.
A prince becomes contemptible if people see him as fickle, frivolous, unmanly, mean-spirited, or indecisive. He should guard against all these traits as carefully as he would steer clear of a dangerous rock. His actions should show greatness, courage, seriousness, and strength of character. In his personal dealings with his subjects, he should make clear that his decisions are final. He should maintain a reputation that leaves no one hoping to deceive him or get around his authority.
That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other from without, on account of external powers. From the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies, and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.
A prince who creates this impression is highly respected, and people do not easily conspire against a highly respected prince. If everyone knows he is an excellent ruler and his people revere him, he is difficult to attack. A prince therefore has two dangers to fear, one from his subjects and another from foreign powers. Strong arms and good allies protect him from foreign powers. If he is well armed, he will have good allies. Affairs at home will always remain peaceful when affairs abroad are peaceful, unless a conspiracy has already disturbed them. Even if trouble arises abroad, he will withstand every attack if he has prepared and lived as I have advised. He must not lose hope, just as Nabis the Spartan did not, as I mentioned earlier.
But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against a prince always expects to please them by his removal; but when the conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few have been successful; because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith with you.
As for his subjects, when foreign affairs are troubled, a prince need only fear that they will secretly conspire. He can easily protect himself by avoiding their hatred and contempt, and by keeping the people satisfied with him. This is essential, as I explained at length above. One of a prince’s most effective defenses against conspiracies is to avoid the people’s hatred and contempt. Anyone plotting against a prince always expects his removal to please the people. But if a conspirator expects only to offend them, he will lack the courage to act. The difficulties facing a conspirator are endless. Experience shows that there have been many conspiracies, but few have succeeded. A conspirator cannot act alone. He can recruit a partner only from those he believes are discontented. As soon as you reveal your plans to a discontented person, you give him the means to satisfy himself. By reporting you, he can expect every advantage. He sees that betraying you offers certain rewards, while joining you offers uncertain rewards and many dangers. To remain loyal to you, he must be an exceptionally loyal friend or a deeply determined enemy of the prince.
And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and thus cannot hope for any escape.
In short, the conspirator faces only fear, suspicion, and the terrifying prospect of punishment. The prince, however, has the authority of his position, the laws, and protection from friends and the state. Add the people’s goodwill to all these advantages, and no one could possibly be reckless enough to conspire against him. Usually, a conspirator has reason to fear before carrying out his plot. In this case, he must also fear what follows the crime. His crime makes the people his enemies, leaving him no hope of escape.
Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer Annibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer Giovanni, who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there after the death of Annibale who was able to rule the state, the Bolognese, having information that there was one of the Bentivogli family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to the government.
Countless examples could be given on this subject, but I will give just one from our fathers’ time. Messer Annibale Bentivogli, ruler of Bologna and grandfather of the present Annibale, was murdered by the Canneschi. They had conspired against him. The only surviving member of his family was Messer Giovanni, who was still a child. Immediately after the assassination, the people rose up and killed all the Canneschi. This happened because the Bentivogli family enjoyed great popular support in Bologna at that time. That support was so strong that the people acted even though no one there could rule after Annibale’s death. They learned that a member of the Bentivogli family was living in Florence. Until then, he had been thought to be a blacksmith’s son. The people of Bologna sent for him and put him in charge of their city. He ruled it until Messer Giovanni eventually took over the government.
Giovanni Bentivogli was born in Bologna in 1438 and died in Milan in 1508. He ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli’s strong condemnation of conspiracies may reflect his own very recent experience in February 1513. He had been arrested and tortured for his alleged involvement in the Boscoli conspiracy.
For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep the people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most important objects a prince can have.
For this reason, I believe a prince need not worry much about conspiracies when his people respect him. But when his people are hostile and hate him, he should fear everything and everyone. Well-run states and wise princes have taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation. They have also taken every care to keep the people satisfied and content. This is one of the most important goals a prince can have.
Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be liable to from the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who could beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the king. Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or a greater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can draw another important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs of reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in their own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people.
France is among the best organized and governed kingdoms of our time. It has many good institutions on which the king’s freedom and security depend. The foremost is parliament and its authority. The kingdom’s founder understood the nobles’ ambition and boldness. He saw that they needed restraints to keep them in check. He also knew that the people hated the nobles because they feared them, and he wanted to protect the people. Yet he did not want the king to bear direct responsibility for this protection. Otherwise, the nobles would blame the king for favoring the people, and the people would blame him for favoring the nobles. So he established an independent authority to restrain the powerful and favor the less powerful without bringing blame on the king. No arrangement could be better or wiser, or provide greater security for the king and kingdom. This leads to another important conclusion. Princes should leave decisions that attract blame to others and keep those that win favor in their own hands. I also believe that a prince should value the nobles, but not in ways that make the people hate him.
It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of some of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those times.
Perhaps some who have studied the lives and deaths of the Roman emperors may think many contradict my argument. Some lived nobly and showed great strength of character. Yet they lost their empires or were killed by subjects who conspired against them. To answer these objections, I will review the characters of some of these emperors. I will show that the causes of their downfall were no different from those I have already identified. At the same time, I will discuss only what deserves the attention of anyone studying the affairs of that period.
It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.
I think it is enough to consider all the emperors from Marcus the philosopher to Maximinus. They were Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.
There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold, cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he should exercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and give vent to their own greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors were always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had no great authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the principality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours, were inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, as princes cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass this, they ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerful. Therefore, those emperors who through inexperience had need of special favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to the people; a course which turned out advantageous to them or not, accordingly as the prince knew how to maintain authority over them.
First, note that rulers in other principalities had to contend only with ambitious nobles and an unruly population. Roman emperors faced a third difficulty, the cruelty and greed of their soldiers. This problem was so difficult that it ruined many emperors. It was hard to satisfy both the soldiers and the people. The people loved peace, so they favored a prince who had no great ambitions. The soldiers, however, favored a warlike prince who was bold, cruel, and greedy. They were quite willing for him to treat the people this way. That would let them receive double pay and indulge their own greed and cruelty. As a result, emperors who lacked strong authority, whether through birth or upbringing, were always overthrown. Most emperors, especially those newly in power, recognized the difficulty of satisfying these opposing desires. They therefore tended to satisfy the soldiers, caring little about harming the people. This course was necessary because princes cannot avoid being hated by someone. Their first priority should be to avoid being hated by everyone. When they cannot manage this, they must make every effort to avoid the hatred of the most powerful. Thus, emperors whose inexperience left them needing special support sided more readily with the soldiers than with the people. Whether this helped them depended on how well the prince knew how to maintain his authority over the soldiers.
From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title, and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards, being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always kept both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated nor despised.
For these reasons, Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander all met sad ends, except Marcus. All three lived modestly, loved justice, opposed cruelty, and were humane and kind. Marcus alone lived and died with honor because he had inherited the throne. He owed nothing to either the soldiers or the people. Afterward, his many virtues earned him respect. Throughout his life, he kept both groups in their proper places and was neither hated nor despised.
But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus, having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do evil; for when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain yourself—it may be either the people or the soldiers or the nobles—you have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works will do you harm.
But Pertinax became emperor against the soldiers’ wishes. Under Commodus, they had grown used to living without restraint. They could not tolerate the honest way of life Pertinax wanted to impose on them. He thus gave them cause to hate him, and his old age also earned their contempt. He was overthrown at the very start of his rule. Here we should note that good deeds can earn hatred just as much as bad ones. Therefore, as I said before, a prince who wants to keep his state is very often forced to do evil. The group you believe you need to stay in power may be corrupt. It may be the people, the soldiers, or the nobles. In that case, you must give in to their desires and satisfy them. Then good deeds will do you harm.
But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the army conspired against him, and murdered him.
But let us turn to Alexander, a man of such great goodness that he earned many praises. Among them was this: during his fourteen years as emperor, he never had anyone executed without a trial. Nevertheless, he was seen as effeminate and as a man who let his mother rule him. He became despised, and the army conspired against him and murdered him.
Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious-men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except Severus, came to a bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour that, keeping the soldiers friendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he reigned successfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the sight of the soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way astonished and awed and the former respectful and satisfied. And because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a prince to imitate.
Now consider the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus Caracalla, and Maximinus. You will find them all cruel and greedy. To satisfy their soldiers, they did not hesitate to commit every kind of injustice against the people. All except Severus came to a bad end. But Severus had such courage and ability that he ruled successfully, keeping the soldiers loyal while oppressing the people. These qualities won him such admiration among soldiers and people alike that the people remained stunned and awed. The soldiers remained respectful and satisfied. Because his achievements as a new prince were great, I want to show briefly how skillfully he imitated the fox and the lion. As I said above, a prince must imitate the natures of both.
Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master of the whole empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in the west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that, being elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to share that dignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which things were accepted by Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and killed Niger, and settled oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus, little recognizing the benefits that he had received from him, had by treachery sought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he was compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him out in France, and took from him his government and life. He who will, therefore, carefully examine the actions of this man will find him a most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and respected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it need not be wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold the empire so well, because his supreme renown always protected him from that hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his violence.
Knowing Emperor Julian’s laziness, Severus persuaded the army he commanded in Sclavonia that they should march on Rome. He argued that they should avenge Pertinax, who had been killed by the praetorian soldiers. Using this excuse, he marched the army toward Rome without appearing to seek the throne. He reached Italy before anyone knew he had set out. When he arrived in Rome, the Senate elected him emperor out of fear and killed Julian. Severus wanted to rule the whole empire, but two obstacles remained. One was in Asia, where Niger, commander of the Asian army, had arranged to have himself proclaimed emperor. The other was in the west, where Albinus also sought the throne. Severus thought it dangerous to openly oppose both, so he decided to attack Niger and deceive Albinus. He wrote to Albinus that the Senate had elected him emperor and that he would share this rank with him. He also gave Albinus the title of Caesar and said the Senate had made Albinus his fellow ruler. Albinus accepted all of this as true. But after Severus defeated and killed Niger and settled affairs in the east, he returned to Rome. There he complained to the Senate that Albinus had shown little appreciation for the benefits he had received from him. He claimed that Albinus had treacherously plotted to murder him, and that this ingratitude forced him to punish Albinus. Severus then sought him out in France and stripped him of both his rule and his life. Anyone who carefully examines this man’s actions will find him a very brave lion and a very cunning fox. They will find him feared and respected by everyone, and not hated by the army. It is no surprise that, as a newcomer to power, he held the empire so securely. His outstanding reputation always protected him from the hatred the people might otherwise have felt because of his violence.
But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that such-like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who does not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the less because they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care, but had contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor’s ruin.
But his son Antoninus was an outstanding man with excellent qualities. These won him the people’s admiration and the soldiers’ approval. He was a warrior who could endure great hardship and despised rich food and other luxuries. This made him beloved by the armies. Yet his savagery and cruelty were so extreme and unheard of that he committed countless individual murders. Then he killed a large number of Rome’s people and all the people of Alexandria. The whole world came to hate him, and those around him feared him. In the end, a centurion murdered him in the middle of his army. Here we must note that princes cannot prevent assassinations carried out with such determined and desperate courage. Anyone unafraid to die can commit them. But a prince has less reason to fear them because they are very rare. He need only avoid seriously wronging those he employs or keeps around him in the service of the state. Antoninus had failed to take this precaution. He had killed the centurion’s brother in a humiliating manner and threatened the centurion himself every day. Yet he kept the man in his bodyguard. As events showed, this was reckless and brought about the emperor’s ruin.
But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against and was killed.
But let us turn to Commodus, who should have found it very easy to keep control of the empire. As the son of Marcus, he had inherited it. He needed only to follow his father’s example to please his people and soldiers. But he was cruel and brutal by nature. He devoted himself to entertaining and corrupting the soldiers so he could freely plunder the people. At the same time, he failed to uphold his dignity. He often entered the arena to fight gladiators and did other disgraceful things unworthy of an emperor. This made the soldiers despise him. Hated by the people and despised by the soldiers, he became the target of a conspiracy and was killed.
It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought him into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the imperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised many cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him, to which may be added his own army; this latter, besieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him.
It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike man. The armies were disgusted by the effeminacy of Alexander, whom I have already discussed. They killed him and chose Maximinus as emperor. He did not hold the throne for long, because two things made him hated and despised. First, he had been a shepherd in Thrace. Everyone knew this and considered it deeply shameful, so they looked down on him. Second, after becoming emperor, he delayed going to Rome to take possession of the imperial seat. He had also gained a reputation for extreme brutality. Through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, he had committed many acts of cruelty. Thus, the whole world was angered by his low birth and frightened by his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate and all the people of Rome. All Italy conspired against him, and his own army joined them. His soldiers were besieging Aquileia and struggling to capture it. They were disgusted by his cruelties. Seeing so many people against him, they feared him less and murdered him.
I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the people rather the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful.
I will not discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who were utterly contemptible and were quickly killed. I will conclude by saying that rulers today face far less pressure to satisfy their soldiers’ excessive demands. They must still indulge their soldiers somewhat, but this is soon dealt with. None of these rulers have armies experienced in governing and administering provinces, as the Roman Empire’s armies were. Back then, satisfying the soldiers mattered more than satisfying the people. Today, all rulers except the Turkish sultan and the Sultan of Egypt must put the people’s satisfaction before their soldiers’. This is because the people are more powerful.
From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that, putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in the hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the state of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason that it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons of the old prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that position by those who have authority, and the sons remain only noblemen. And this being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new principality, because there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in new ones; for although the prince is new, the constitution of the state is old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its hereditary lord.
I have made an exception above for the Ottoman sultan. He always keeps twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry around him. The kingdom’s security and strength depend on them. He must therefore put aside all concern for the people and keep these soldiers loyal to him. The Sultan of Egypt’s kingdom is similar. It is entirely in the soldiers’ hands. So he too must keep them loyal, without regard for the people. But you must note that the Sultan of Egypt’s state differs from all other principalities. It resembles the Christian papacy, which cannot be called either a hereditary principality or a newly established one. The former ruler’s sons do not inherit his position. Instead, it passes to whoever is elected by those with the authority to choose. The sons remain only noblemen. Since this is an ancient custom, the state cannot be called a new principality. It has none of the difficulties found in new principalities. Although the ruler is new, the state’s system of government is old. It is designed to receive him as though he were its hereditary ruler.
But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and firm.
But returning to our subject, anyone who considers it will see that hatred or contempt destroyed the emperors named above. They will also see why, though these emperors followed different approaches, only one in each group met a happy end. The rest met unhappy ends. Pertinax and Alexander were new rulers, so imitating Marcus, who had inherited his rule, would have been useless and dangerous. Likewise, imitating Severus would have utterly destroyed Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus. They lacked the courage and ability needed to follow his example. Therefore, a prince who is new to power cannot imitate Marcus’s actions. Nor does he need to follow everything Severus did. Instead, he should take from Severus whatever is necessary to establish his state. From Marcus, he should take the qualities suited to preserving an already stable, firmly established state with honor.