But coming to the other point—where a leading citizen becomes the prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, but by the favour of his fellow citizens—this may be called a civil principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or anarchy.
Now consider the other case, when a leading citizen becomes his country’s prince through the support of his fellow citizens. He gains power not through evil deeds or any intolerable violence. This can be called a civil principality. Gaining it does not necessarily require genius or good fortune, but rather a fortunate shrewdness. Such a principality is gained through the support of either the people or the nobles. These two distinct groups exist in all cities. The people do not want the nobles to rule or oppress them. The nobles want to rule and oppress the people. These opposing desires produce one of three outcomes in cities: a principality, self-government, or anarchy.
A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles, accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.
A principality is established either by the people or by the nobles, depending on which group has the opportunity. When the nobles see they cannot stand against the people, they build up the reputation of one of their own. They make him prince so they can pursue their ambitions under his protection. When the people find they cannot resist the nobles, they too build up the reputation of one of their own. They make him prince so his authority will protect them. A ruler who gains power with the nobles’ help has more difficulty keeping it than one supported by the people. He is surrounded by many who consider themselves his equals. Because of this, he cannot rule them or manage them as he wishes. But a ruler who gains power through popular support stands alone. Around him, there are few or none who are unwilling to obey him.
Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, because of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do well without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them daily, and to give or take away authority when it pleases him.
Besides, you cannot satisfy the nobles through fair dealing and without harming others, but you can satisfy the people. The people’s aim is more just than the nobles’ aim. The nobles want to oppress, while the people only want to avoid oppression. Also, a prince can never protect himself against a hostile people, because there are too many of them. He can protect himself against the nobles, because they are few. The worst a prince can expect from a hostile people is that they will abandon him. But hostile nobles may not only abandon him, they may also rise against him. They are more farsighted and shrewd in these matters. They always act in time to save themselves and win favors from whoever they expect to prevail. Furthermore, the prince must always live with the same people, but he can manage well without the same nobles. He can make and unmake nobles daily, granting or taking away their authority whenever he pleases.
Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them, especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them. But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you, and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.
To make this point clearer, I say that nobles should be viewed in two main ways. Either they tie their fate entirely to yours, or they do not. Those who do, and are not greedy, should be honored and loved. Those who do not can be dealt with in two ways. Some hold back out of timidity and a natural lack of courage. You should make use of them, especially those who offer good advice. You honor them when things go well, and need not fear them when things go badly. Others avoid committing themselves because of their own ambitions. This shows that they think more of themselves than of you. A prince should guard against them and fear them as if they were open enemies. In hard times, they always help bring about his ruin.
Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity.
Therefore, a prince who gains power through the people’s support should keep their goodwill. This is easy, since they ask only that he not oppress them. But a prince who gains power through the nobles’ support, against the people’s wishes, must above all win them over. He can easily do this by taking them under his protection. When people receive kindness from someone they expected to harm them, they become more closely attached to their benefactor. The people thus quickly become more devoted to him than if their support had brought him to power. A prince can win their affection in many ways, but these vary with the circumstances. No fixed rules can be given, so I will leave them out. But I repeat, a prince must have the people’s goodwill. Without it, he has no security in times of trouble.
Nabis, Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this would not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that “He who builds on the people, builds on the mud,” for this is true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali in Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above, who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps the whole people encouraged—such a one will never find himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his foundations well.
Nabis, ruler of the Spartans, withstood attacks from all Greece and a victorious Roman army. He defended his country and his government against them. To overcome this danger, he only needed to protect himself against a few individuals. But this would not have been enough if the people had been hostile. Let no one challenge this claim with the familiar proverb, “He who builds on the people, builds on the mud.” This is true when a private citizen bases his security on the people. He convinces himself they will free him when his enemies or the authorities oppress him. He will very often find himself mistaken, as the Gracchi did in Rome and Messer Giorgio Scali in Florence. But consider a ruler who has established himself as described above. He knows how to command, is courageous, remains undaunted in adversity, and lacks none of the other necessary qualities. Through his determination and energy, he keeps all the people’s spirits up. Such a ruler will never find his trust in them misplaced. He will have shown that he built on solid foundations.
Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, was defeated by the Romans under Flamininus in 195 B.C. He was killed in 192 B.C.
Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is described in Machiavelli’s “Florentine History,” Book III.
These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when citizens have need of the state, because then every one agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state and of him, and then he will always find them faithful.
These principalities face danger when they move from civic government to absolute rule. Their princes rule either personally or through magistrates. When they rule through magistrates, their government is weaker and less secure. It depends entirely on the goodwill of the citizens appointed to those offices. Especially in troubled times, these officials can easily destroy the government through plotting or open defiance. Amid such turmoil, the prince has no chance to exercise absolute authority. Citizens and subjects are used to taking orders from magistrates and are unwilling to obey him during the confusion. In uncertain times, he will always find too few men he can trust. Such a prince cannot rely on what he sees in peaceful times, when citizens need the state. Then everyone agrees with him. They all make promises, and when death seems far away, they all wish to die for him. But in troubled times, when the state needs its citizens, he finds few willing to do so. This test is all the more dangerous because it can only be tried once. A wise prince must therefore ensure that his citizens always need the state and him, whatever the circumstances. Then he will always find them loyal.