THE speech of Themistocles the Athenian, which was haughty and arrogant, in taking so much to himself, had been a grave and wise observation and censure, applied at large to others. Desired at a feast to touch a lute, he said, He could not fiddle, but yet he could make a small town, a great city. These words (holpen a little with a metaphor) may express two differing abilities, in those that deal in business of estate. For if a true survey be taken of counsellors and statesmen, there may be found (though rarely) those which can make a small state great, and yet cannot fiddle; as on the other side, there will be found a great many, that can fiddle very cunningly, but yet are so far from being able to make a small state great, as their gift lieth the other way; to bring a great and flourishing estate, to ruin and decay. And certainly whose degenerate arts and shifts, whereby many counsellors and governors gain both favor with their masters, and estimation with the vulgar, deserve no better name than fiddling; being things rather pleasing for the time, and graceful to themselves only, than tending to the weal and advancement of the state which they serve. There are also (no doubt) counsellors and governors which may be held sufficient (negotiis pares), able to manage affairs, and to keep them from precipices and manifest inconveniences; which nevertheless are far from the ability to raise and amplify an estate in power, means, and fortune. But be the workmen what they may be, let us speak of the work; that is, the true greatness of kingdoms and estates, and the means thereof. An argument fit for great and mighty princes to have in their hand; to the end that neither by over-measuring their forces, they leese themselves in vain enterprises; nor on the other side, by undervaluing them, they descend to fearful and pusillanimous counsels.
The Athenian Themistocles made a proud and arrogant remark, claiming too much credit for himself. Applied more generally to others, however, it would have been a serious and wise judgment. Asked at a feast to play a lute, he said he could not fiddle. But he could turn a small town into a great city. With a little help from metaphor, these words describe two different abilities among those who conduct affairs of state. A careful survey of advisers and statesmen would reveal some, though few, who can make a small state great. Yet they cannot fiddle. On the other hand, many can fiddle very skillfully, but are far from able to make a small state great. Their talent works the other way, bringing a great and flourishing state to ruin and decay. Certainly, the corrupt tricks and schemes of many advisers and governors deserve no better name than fiddling. These win them favor with their rulers and respect among ordinary people. But they offer passing pleasure and reflect well only on those who practice them. They do not promote the welfare or advancement of the state they serve. There are also, no doubt, advisers and governors who can be considered competent and equal to their duties. They can manage affairs and keep the state from disaster and obvious difficulties. Yet they fall far short of increasing its power, resources, and prosperity. But whatever the abilities of those doing the work, let us turn to the work itself. That is, the true greatness of kingdoms and states, and the means of achieving it. This is a subject that great and powerful rulers should keep close at hand. It can prevent them from overestimating their strength and ruining themselves in fruitless ventures. It can also prevent them from underestimating their strength and adopting fearful, cowardly policies.
The greatness of an estate, in bulk and territory, doth fall under measure; and the greatness of finances and revenue, doth fall under computation. The population may appear by musters; and the number and greatness of cities and towns by cards and maps. But yet there is not any thing amongst civil affairs more subject to error, than the right valuation and true judgment concerning the power and forces of an estate. The kingdom of heaven is compared, not to any great kernel or nut, but to a grain of mustard-seed: which is one of the least grains, but hath in it a property and spirit hastily to get up and spread. So are there states, great in territory, and yet not apt to enlarge or command; and some that have but a small dimension of stem, and yet apt to be the foundations of great monarchies.
A state's size and territory can be measured, and its finances and revenue can be calculated. Its population can be estimated from military rolls. The number and size of its cities and towns can be seen on charts and maps. Yet nothing in public affairs is more prone to error than judging a state's true power and strength. The kingdom of heaven is compared not to a large kernel or nut, but to a mustard seed. It is one of the smallest seeds, yet it has an inner power to grow and spread quickly. Likewise, some states have vast territories but little capacity to expand or rule others. Others have only a small base, yet can become the foundations of great monarchies.
Walled towns, stored arsenals and armories, goodly races of horse, chariots of war, elephants, ordnance, artillery, and the like; all this is but a sheep in a lion's skin, except the breed and disposition of the people, be stout and warlike. Nay, number (itself) in armies importeth not much, where the people is of weak courage; for (as Virgil saith) It never troubles a wolf, how many the sheep be. The army of the Persians, in the plains of Arbela, was such a vast sea of people, as it did somewhat astonish the commanders in Alexander's army; who came to him therefore, and wished him to set upon them by night; and he answered, He would not pilfer the victory. And the defeat was easy. When Tigranes the Armenian, being encamped upon a hill with four hundred thousand men, discovered the army of the Romans, being not above fourteen thousand, marching towards him, he made himself merry with it, and said, Yonder men are too many for an embassage, and too few for a fight. But before the sun set, he found them enow to give him the chase with infinite slaughter. Many are the examples of the great odds, between number and courage; so that a man may truly make a judgment, that the principal point of greatness in any state, is to have a race of military men. Neither is money the sinews of war (as it is trivially said), where the sinews of men's arms, in base and effeminate people, are failing. For Solon said well to Croesus (when in ostentation he showed him his gold), Sir, if any other come, that hath better iron, than you, he will be master of all this gold. Therefore let any prince or state think solely of his forces, except his militia of natives be of good and valiant soldiers. And let princes, on the other side, that have subjects of martial disposition, know their own strength; unless they be otherwise wanting unto themselves. As for mercenary forces (which is the help in this case), all examples show, that whatsoever estate or prince doth rest upon them, he may spread his feathers for a time, but he will mew them soon after.
Walled towns, well-stocked arsenals and armories, fine breeds of horses, war chariots, elephants, guns, and artillery are not enough. All this is only a sheep in a lion’s skin unless the people themselves are brave and warlike. Even numbers count for little in armies whose soldiers lack courage. As Virgil says, “A wolf never worries about how many sheep there are.” On the plains of Arbela, the Persian army was such a vast sea of men that Alexander’s commanders were somewhat alarmed. They came to him and urged him to attack by night. He answered that he would not steal his victory. And the Persians were easily defeated. Tigranes of Armenia was camped on a hill with four hundred thousand men. He saw the Roman army approaching, numbering no more than fourteen thousand, and laughed at the sight. He said, “Those men are too many for an embassy and too few for a battle.” But before sunset, he found them enough to put him to flight with immense slaughter. Many examples show how greatly courage can outweigh numbers. We may therefore rightly judge that a state’s greatness depends above all on having a people bred for war. Nor is money the strength of war, as people commonly say, when a base and unmanly people lack physical strength. Solon spoke wisely to Croesus when the king proudly displayed his gold. “Sir, if someone comes with better iron weapons than yours, he will become master of all this gold.” No prince or state should therefore rely on its forces unless its native troops are good and brave soldiers. On the other hand, rulers whose subjects are warlike should recognize their strength, unless they otherwise fail themselves. As for mercenaries, the remedy when native soldiers are lacking, all examples show what happens to rulers who depend on them. They may spread their feathers for a time, but they will soon shed them.
The blessing of Judah and Issachar will never meet; that the same people, or nation, should be both the lion's whelp and the ass between burthens; neither will it be, that a people overlaid with taxes, should ever become valiant and martial. It is true that taxes levied by consent of the estate, do abate men's courage less: as it hath been seen notably, in the excises of the Low Countries; and, in some degree, in the subsidies of England. For you must note, that we speak now of the heart, and not of the purse. So that although the same tribute and tax, laid by consent or by imposing, be all one to the purse, yet it works diversely upon the courage. So that you may conclude, that no people overcharged with tribute, is fit for empire.
The blessings of Judah and Issachar will never come together in one people or nation. They cannot be both the lion’s cub and the donkey weighed down by burdens. Nor will a people weighed down by taxes ever become brave and warlike. Taxes approved by the people’s representatives do less to weaken their courage. This has been clearly seen in the excise taxes of the Low Countries. It has also been seen, to some degree, in the taxes granted by Parliament in England. Remember, we are speaking here of the heart, not the purse. The same tax costs people just as much whether they consent to it or it is imposed on them. Yet its effect on their courage differs. We may therefore conclude that no people burdened with excessive taxes is fit to build and rule an empire.
Let states that aim at greatness, take heed how their nobility and gentlemen do multiply too fast. For that maketh the common subject, grow to be a peasant and base swain, driven out of heart, and in effect but the gentleman's laborer. Even as you may see in coppice woods; if you leave your staddles too thick, you shall never have clean underwood, but shrubs and bushes. So in countries, if the gentlemen be too many, the commons will be base; and you will bring it to that, that not the hundred poll, will be fit for an helmet; especially as to the infantry, which is the nerve of an army; and so there will be great population, and little strength. This which I speak of, hath been nowhere better seen, than by comparing of England and France; whereof England, though far less in territory and population, hath been (nevertheless) an overmatch; in regard the middle people of England make good soldiers, which the peasants of France do not. And herein the device of king Henry the Seventh (whereof I have spoken largely in the History of his Life) was profound and admirable; in making farms and houses of husbandry of a standard; that is, maintained with such a proportion of land unto them, as may breed a subject to live in convenient plenty and no servile condition; and to keep the plough in the hands of the owners, and not mere hirelings. And thus indeed you shall attain to Virgil's character which he gives to ancient Italy:
States that seek greatness must take care that their nobles and gentlemen do not multiply too quickly. This reduces ordinary subjects to lowly peasants, discouraged and little more than laborers for the gentlemen. You can see the same thing in woods managed for regular cutting. If too many mature trees remain, healthy undergrowth cannot grow, only scrub and bushes. Likewise, if a country has too many gentlemen, its common people will be reduced to a low condition. Not even one person in a hundred will be fit to wear a soldier’s helmet. This is especially true of the infantry, which forms the backbone of an army. The population will be large, but its strength will be small. Nowhere has this been clearer than in a comparison between England and France. Though England has far less territory and fewer people, it has nevertheless proved more than a match for France. England’s middle ranks make good soldiers, while France’s peasants do not. In this respect, King Henry VII’s policy was wise and admirable. I have discussed it at length in the history of his life. He required farms and farmhouses to have a set amount of land attached to them. This was enough to let a farmer live in reasonable comfort, without being reduced to a servant’s position. It also kept the plow in the hands of landowners, rather than mere hired laborers. In this way, you will indeed achieve the character Virgil attributes to ancient Italy:
Terra potens armis atque ubere glebae.
A land strong in arms and rich in fertile soil.
Neither is that state (which, for any thing I know, is almost peculiar to England, and hardly to be found anywhere else, except it be perhaps in Poland) to be passed over; I mean the state of free servants, and attendants upon noblemen and gentlemen; which are no ways inferior unto the yeomanry for arms. And therefore out of all questions, the splendor and magnificence, and great retinues and hospitality, of noblemen and gentlemen, received into custom, doth much conduce unto martial greatness. Whereas, contrariwise, the close and reserved living of noblemen and gentlemen, causeth a penury of military forces.
Nor should we overlook another group, which, as far as I know, is almost unique to England. It is hardly found elsewhere, except perhaps in Poland. I mean the free servants and attendants of noblemen and gentlemen. They are in no way inferior to the yeomanry as fighting men. Without question, then, certain established customs among noblemen and gentlemen contribute greatly to military strength. These include splendid and magnificent living, large households of attendants, and generous hospitality. By contrast, when noblemen and gentlemen live privately and keep small households, they cause a shortage of fighting men.
By all means it is to be procured, that the trunk of Nebuchadnezzar's tree of monarchy, be great enough to bear the branches and the boughs; that is, that the natural subjects of the crown or state, bear a sufficient proportion to the stranger subjects, that they govern. Therefore all states that are liberal of naturalization towards strangers, are fit for empire. For to think that an handful of people can, with the greatest courage and policy in the world, embrace too large extent of dominion, it may hold for a time, but it will fail suddenly. The Spartans were a nice people in point of naturalization; whereby, while they kept their compass, they stood firm; but when they did spread, and their boughs were becomen too great for their stem, they became a windfall, upon the sudden. Never any state was in this point so open to receive strangers into their body, as were the Romans. Therefore it sorted with them accordingly; for they grew to the greatest monarchy. Their manner was to grant naturalization (which they called jus civitatis), and to grant it in the highest degree; that is, not only jus commercii, jus connubii, jus haereditatis; but also jus suffragii, and jus honorum. And this not to singular persons alone, but likewise to whole families; yea to cities, and sometimes to nations. Add to this their custom of plantation of colonies; whereby the Roman plant was removed into the soil of other nations. And putting both constitutions together, you will say that it was not the Romans that spread upon the world, but it was the world that spread upon the Romans; and that was the sure way of greatness. I have marvelled, sometimes, at Spain, how they clasp and contain so large dominions, with so few natural Spaniards; but sure the whole compass of Spain, is a very great body of a tree; far above Rome and Sparta at the first. And besides, though they have not had that usage, to naturalize liberally, yet they have that which is next to it; that is, to employ, almost indifferently, all nations in their militia of ordinary soldiers; yea, and sometimes in their highest commands. Nay, it seemeth at this instant they are sensible, of this want of natives; as by the Pragmatical Sanction, now published, appeareth.
Every effort must be made to ensure that the trunk of Nebuchadnezzar’s tree of monarchy can support its branches. In other words, the crown or state’s native subjects must be sufficiently numerous in proportion to the foreign subjects they govern. Therefore, all states that freely grant citizenship to foreigners are well suited to empire. A handful of people may try to rule vast territories with the greatest courage and political skill in the world. They may succeed for a time, but they will suddenly fail. The Spartans were very restrictive about granting citizenship. As long as they stayed within their limits, they stood firm. But when they expanded, their branches grew too large for their trunk, and they suddenly fell like a windblown tree. No state ever welcomed foreigners into its body as openly as the Romans did. The results matched their policy, for they grew into the greatest empire. Their practice was to grant citizenship, which they called jus civitatis, with the fullest rights. These included not only rights of trade, marriage, and inheritance, but also rights to vote and hold public office. They granted these rights not only to individuals, but also to whole families, cities, and sometimes nations. Add to this their practice of founding colonies, which transplanted Roman stock into the soil of other nations. Consider these two policies together. You could say that Rome did not spread across the world, but that the world spread into Rome. This was the sure path to greatness. I have sometimes wondered how Spain holds and controls such vast territories with so few native Spaniards. Yet Spain’s entire territory forms a very large tree trunk, far larger than Rome or Sparta at their beginnings. Besides, although Spain has not freely granted citizenship, it has adopted the next best practice. It employs people of all nations almost without distinction as ordinary soldiers, and sometimes even in the highest commands. Indeed, Spain now seems aware of its shortage of native subjects, as the recently published Pragmatic Sanction shows.
It is certain that sedentary, and within-door arts, and delicate manufactures (that require rather the finger than the arm), have, in their nature, a contrariety to a military disposition. And generally, all warlike people are a little idle, and love danger better than travail. Neither must they be too much broken of it, if they shall be preserved in vigor. Therefore it was great advantage, in the ancient states of Sparta, Athens, Rome, and others, that they had the use of slaves, which commonly did rid those manufactures. But that is abolished, in greatest part, by the Christian law. That which cometh nearest to it, is to leave those arts chiefly to strangers (which, for that purpose, are the more easily to be received), and to contain the principal bulk of the vulgar natives, within those three kinds,—tillers of the ground; free servants; and handicraftsmen of strong and manly arts, as smiths, masons, carpenters, etc.; not reckoning professed soldiers.
It is certain that seated, indoor work and delicate manufacturing are naturally at odds with a military spirit. Such work requires the fingers rather than the arms. In general, all warlike peoples are somewhat idle and prefer danger to hard work. They must not be trained too far out of this habit if they are to keep their vigor. The ancient states of Sparta, Athens, Rome, and others therefore gained a great advantage from using slaves. These slaves generally carried out such manufacturing work. But Christian law has largely abolished slavery. The closest alternative is to leave these trades chiefly to foreigners. For this purpose, foreigners should be admitted more readily. Most ordinary native-born people should be kept within three occupations. These are farming, service as free people, and strong, manly trades such as blacksmithing, masonry, and carpentry. Professional soldiers are not included in this count.
But above all, for empire and greatness, it importeth most, that a nation do profess arms, as their principal honor, study, and occupation. For the things which we formerly have spoken of, are but habilitations towards arms; and what is habilitation without intention and act? Romulus, after his death (as they report or feign), sent a present to the Romans, that above all, they should intend arms; and then they should prove the greatest empire of the world. The fabric of the state of Sparta was wholly (though not wisely) framed and composed, to that scope and end. The Persians and Macedonians had it for a flash. The Gauls, Germans, Goths, Saxons, Normans, and others, had it for a time. The Turks have it at this day, though in great declination. Of Christian Europe, they that have it are, in effect, only the Spaniards. But it is so plain, that every man profiteth in that, he most intendeth, that it needeth not to be stood upon. It is enough to point at it; that no nation which doth not directly profess arms, may look to have greatness fall into their mouths. And on the other side, it is a most certain oracle of time, that those states that continue long in that profession (as the Romans and Turks principally have done) do wonders. And those that have professed arms but for an age, have, notwithstanding, commonly attained that greatness, in that age, which maintained them long after, when their profession and exercise of arms hath grown to decay.
Above all, a nation seeking empire and greatness must make warfare its chief source of honor, study, and occupation. The things we discussed earlier merely prepare a nation for war. And what use is preparation without purpose and action? After his death, Romulus reportedly sent the Romans a message, though the story may be invented. Above all, they should devote themselves to warfare. Then they would become the greatest empire in the world. Sparta’s entire system of government was designed for that purpose, though not wisely. The Persians and Macedonians briefly had this devotion. The Gauls, Germans, Goths, Saxons, Normans, and others had it for a time. The Turks still have it today, though it has greatly declined. In Christian Europe, effectively only the Spaniards have it. Everyone improves most at what they devote themselves to. This is so obvious that it needs no further discussion. It is enough to point this out. No nation that does not openly make warfare its calling can expect greatness to fall into its lap. On the other hand, history teaches one lesson with absolute certainty. States that maintain this calling for a long time achieve wonders, as the Romans and Turks especially have done. Even nations that have devoted themselves to warfare for only one age have generally achieved greatness during that age. That greatness sustained them long afterward, even as their devotion to warfare and their military practice declined.
Incident to this point is, for a state to have those laws or customs, which may reach forth unto them just occasions (as may be pretended) of war. For there is that justice, imprinted in the nature of men, that they enter not upon wars (whereof so many calamities do ensue) but upon some, at the least specious, grounds and quarrels. The Turk hath at hand, for cause of war, the propagation of his law or sect; a quarrel that he may always command. The Romans, though they esteemed the extending the limits of their empire, to be great honor to their generals, when it was done, yet they never rested upon that alone, to begin a war. First, therefore, let nations that pretend to greatness have this; that they be sensible of wrongs, either upon borderers, merchants, or politic ministers; and that they sit not too long upon a provocation. Secondly, let them be prest, and ready to give aids and succors, to their confederates; as it ever was with the Romans; insomuch, as if the confederate had leagues defensive, with divers other states, and, upon invasion offered, did implore their aids severally, yet the Romans would ever be the foremost, and leave it to none other to have the honor. As for the wars which were anciently made, on the behalf of a kind of party, or tacit conformity of estate, I do not see how they may be well justified: as when the Romans made a war, for the liberty of Grecia; or when the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, made wars to set up or pull down democracies and oligarchies; or when wars were made by foreigners, under the pretence of justice or protection, to deliver the subjects of others, from tyranny and oppression; and the like. Let it suffice, that no estate expect to be great, that is not awake upon any just occasion of arming.
Related to this, a state should have laws or customs that provide seemingly just grounds for war. A sense of justice is rooted in human nature. People do not begin wars, with all their resulting disasters, without at least apparently reasonable grounds and grievances. The Ottoman ruler always has the spread of his religion as a cause for war. This is a justification he can invoke whenever he wishes. The Romans considered expanding their empire a great honor for their generals once it was achieved. Yet they never relied on that alone as a reason to begin a war. First, nations that aspire to greatness must be alert to wrongs against their border populations, merchants, or diplomatic representatives. They must not wait too long to respond to a provocation. Second, they must be prepared and ready to help their allies, as the Romans always were. An ally might have defensive treaties with several other states. When threatened with invasion, it might appeal to each of them for help. Even then, the Romans would always be first to respond, leaving no other state that honor. As for ancient wars fought to support a political faction or a similar form of government, I find them hard to justify. The Romans, for example, fought for the freedom of Greece. The Spartans and Athenians fought to establish or overthrow democracies and oligarchies. Foreign powers also fought under the pretext of justice or protection, to free another ruler’s subjects from tyranny and oppression. The same applies to similar wars. Let this be enough: no state can expect greatness unless it is alert to every just occasion for taking up arms.
No body can be healthful without exercise, neither natural body nor politic; and certainly to a kingdom or estate, a just and honorable war, is the true exercise. A civil war, indeed, is like the heat of a fever; but a foreign war is like the heat of exercise, and serveth to keep the body in health; for in a slothful peace, both courages will effeminate, and manners corrupt. But howsoever it be for happiness, without all question, for greatness, it maketh to be still for the most part in arms; and the strength of a veteran army (though it be a chargeable business) always on foot, is that which commonly giveth the law, or at least the reputation, amongst all neighbor states; as may well be seen in Spain, which hath had, in one part or other, a veteran army almost continually, now by the space of six score years.
No body can be healthy without exercise, whether a human body or a state. Certainly, for a kingdom or state, a just and honorable war is the proper exercise. Civil war is like the heat of a fever. Foreign war, however, is like the heat of exercise and serves to keep the body healthy. In an idle peace, courage weakens and morals grow corrupt. Whatever war may do for happiness, it unquestionably serves greatness to remain mostly under arms. Maintaining a veteran army at all times is costly. Yet its strength usually allows a state to dictate terms to its neighbors, or at least gain prestige among them. Spain clearly shows this. For the past 120 years, it has kept a veteran army almost continuously in one place or another.
To be master of the sea, is an abridgment of a monarchy. Cicero, writing to Atticus of Pompey his preparation against Caesar, saith, Consilium Pompeii plane Themistocleum est; putat enim, qui mari potitur, eum rerum potiri. And, without doubt, Pompey had tired out Caesar, if upon vain confidence, he had not left that way. We see the great effects of battles by sea. The battle of Actium, decided the empire of the world. The battle of Lepanto, arrested the greatness of the Turk. There be many examples, where sea-fights have been final to the war; but this is when princes or states have set up their rest, upon the battles. But thus much is certain, that he that commands the sea, is at great liberty, and may take as much, and as little, of the war as he will. Whereas those that be strongest by land, are many times nevertheless in great straits. Surely, at this day, with us of Europe, the vantage of strength at sea (which is one of the principal dowries of this kingdom of Great Britain) is great; both because most of the kingdoms of Europe, are not merely inland, but girt with the sea most part of their compass; and because the wealth of both Indies seems in great part, but an accessory to the command of the seas.
Control of the sea is a shortcut to ruling an empire. Writing to Atticus about Pompey’s preparations against Caesar, Cicero says, “Pompey’s plan is exactly like that of Themistocles. He thinks whoever controls the sea controls everything.” Without doubt, Pompey would have worn Caesar out if overconfidence had not led him to abandon that strategy. We see the great consequences of naval battles. The Battle of Actium decided who would rule the world. The Battle of Lepanto halted the growth of Turkish power. Many naval battles have ended wars, but only when rulers or states have staked everything on those battles. This much is certain. Whoever commands the sea has great freedom and can engage in as much or as little warfare as he chooses. Yet even those strongest on land often find themselves severely restricted. Certainly, in Europe today, naval strength offers a great advantage. It is one of the chief natural gifts of this kingdom of Great Britain. Most European kingdoms are not entirely inland, but have coastlines along most of their borders. Moreover, the wealth of both the East and West Indies seems largely to follow from command of the seas.
The wars of latter ages seem to be made in the dark, in respect of the glory, and honor, which reflected upon men from the wars, in ancient time. There be now, for martial encouragement, some degrees and orders of chivalry; which nevertheless are conferred promiscuously, upon soldiers and no soldiers; and some remembrance perhaps, upon the scutcheon; and some hospitals for maimed soldiers; and such like things. But in ancient times, the trophies erected upon the place of the victory; the funeral laudatives and monuments for those that died in the wars; the crowns and garlands personal; the style of emperor, which the great kings of the world after borrowed; the triumphs of the generals, upon their return; the great donatives and largesses, upon the disbanding of the armies; were things able to inflame all men's courages. But above all, that of the triumph, amongst the Romans, was not pageants or gaudery, but one of the wisest and noblest institutions, that ever was. For it contained three things: honor to the general; riches to the treasury out of the spoils; and donatives to the army. But that honor, perhaps were not fit for monarchies; except it be in the person of the monarch himself, or his sons; as it came to pass in the times of the Roman emperors, who did impropriate the actual triumphs to themselves, and their sons, for such wars as they did achieve in person; and left only, for wars achieved by subjects, some triumphal garments and ensigns to the general.
The wars of recent ages seem to be fought in darkness compared with the glory and honor ancient wars brought men. Today, military service is encouraged by ranks and orders of chivalry. Yet these are awarded indiscriminately to soldiers and civilians alike. There may also be some recognition on a coat of arms, hospitals for wounded and disabled soldiers, and similar provisions. But ancient times offered much more. Trophies were raised at the site of victory. Those who died in war received funeral speeches and monuments. Individuals received crowns and garlands. Victorious commanders received the title of imperator, later borrowed by the world’s great kings as “emperor.” Generals received triumphal processions when they returned. Soldiers received generous gifts and payments when their armies were disbanded. These things could fire every man’s courage. Above all, the Roman triumph was not mere spectacle or empty display. It was one of the wisest and noblest institutions ever created. It provided three things. The general received honor, the treasury received wealth from the spoils, and the army received gifts. But perhaps this honor would not suit monarchies, except when given to the monarch himself or his sons. This was the practice under the Roman emperors. They reserved actual triumphs for themselves and their sons, for wars they had personally fought and won. When subjects won wars, their generals received only triumphal robes and insignia.
To conclude: no man can by care taking (as the Scripture saith) add a cubit to his stature, in this little model of a man's body; but in the great frame of kingdoms and commonwealths, it is in the power of princes or estates, to add amplitude and greatness to their kingdoms; for by introducing such ordinances, constitutions, and customs, as we have now touched, they may sow greatness to their posterity and succession. But these things are commonly not observed, but left to take their chance.
To conclude, as Scripture says, no one can add a cubit to their height by worrying about it. This is true of the small frame of the human body. But rulers and governing bodies can increase the size and greatness of kingdoms and commonwealths. By introducing the laws, systems of government, and customs we have discussed, they can sow greatness for future generations and successors. Yet these things are usually neglected and left to chance.